Effect of executive compensation on firm performance
| dc.contributor.author | Abedin, Mohammad Yameenul | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-05-04T15:46:43Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-05-04T15:46:43Z | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10464/6368 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Brock University | en_US |
| dc.subject | CEO compensation | en_US |
| dc.subject | pay-for-performance | en_US |
| dc.subject | Fama-French 3-factor model | en_US |
| dc.subject | risk taking | en_US |
| dc.subject | pay-volatility sensitivity | en_US |
| dc.title | Effect of executive compensation on firm performance | en_US |
| dc.type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation | en |
| dc.degree.name | M.Sc. Management | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Masters | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Faculty of Business Programs | en_US |
| dc.degree.discipline | Faculty of Business | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-07-31T01:28:42Z |
