CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms
| dc.contributor.author | Yu, Zhimin (Jimmy) | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-05-17T13:44:34Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-05-17T13:44:34Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-05-17 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10464/4007 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation. | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Brock University | en_US |
| dc.subject | ceo compensation | en_US |
| dc.subject | compensation risk | en_US |
| dc.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
| dc.subject | board structure | en_US |
| dc.subject | ownership structure | en_US |
| dc.title | CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms | en_US |
| dc.type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation | en |
| dc.degree.name | M.Sc. Management | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Masters | en_US |
| dc.contributor.department | Faculty of Business Programs | en_US |
| dc.degree.discipline | Faculty of Business | en_US |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-08-08T02:23:29Z |
