Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorYe, Fan
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-21T14:49:34Z
dc.date.available2021-05-21T14:49:34Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10464/15087
dc.description.abstractThis paper aims to analyze the impacts of compensation incentives and CEO power on firm’s risk-taking by using stock return volatility (Srisk) and earnings volatility (Erisk) as the proxies of firm’s risk-taking level, and by using pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) and CEO-pay slice (CPS) as the proxies of compensation incentives and CEO power, respectively. By applying ordinary least square (OLS) regression and two-stage least square (2SLS) regression on obtained data, this paper provides strong empirical evidence that PVS and CPS have negative impact on earnings volatility and stock return volatility. In addition, the negative impact of PVS on managerial risk-taking is greater for CEOs with lower CPS than that for CEOs with higher CPS. That is, EBC discourages CEOs from taking more risks, and more powerful CEOs are less risk-averse than less powerful CEOs when granted EBC.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBrock Universityen_US
dc.subjectCEO compensationen_US
dc.subjectpay-volatility sensitivityen_US
dc.subjectCEO poweren_US
dc.subjectCEO pay sliceen_US
dc.titleRisk-Taking and CEO Compensation: CEO Pay Slice Versus Pay-Volatility Sensitivityen_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US
dc.degree.nameM.Sc. Managementen_US
dc.degree.levelMastersen_US
dc.contributor.departmentFaculty of Business Programsen_US
dc.degree.disciplineFaculty of Businessen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Brock_Ye_Fan_2021.pdf
Size:
657.1Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record