The Myth of Labour-Management Partnerships and the Risk to Labour:
A CAMI Automotive Study

by

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine and explore the level of risk that CAMI workers confront under their existing labour-management partnership arrangement. Risk is explored using two distinct categories, distributive and political. Distributive risk is expressed as tangibly substantive, reflecting the real terms and conditions of employment, and the changing social relations of production on the floor. The second type of risk is political and is concerned with the effects that labour-management partnerships have on the displacement of unions as legitimate agents of/for workers within the workplace. Data was collected using three methods; content analysis, cross-sectional survey and focus group interviews. The study revealed that CAMI workers are exposed to both distributive and political risk under their current LMP arrangement.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

CAMI Automotive was supposed to be different. Located in Ingersoll Ontario, it was co-created in 1988 by General Motors (GM) and Suzuki Motor Company and was one of the first Canadian automotive assembly plants in Canada to practice lean production and Japanese production management (JPM)\(^1\). CAMI was also the first auto assembly plant in Canada to allow the unionization of its plant workers without a membership vote. Significantly, CAMI served as the site for Canada’s first voluntary joint labour-management partnership (LMP)\(^2\) agreement in the auto industry. The LMP brought a promise of worker empowerment, improved labour relations and extended rights and benefits in exchange for worker commitment to intensified labour on the assembly-line floor.

The Canadian Auto Workers union collaborated with Suzuki and GM during the formative stages of CAMI, co-developing the organizational plant structures, processes, and practices aimed at achieving continuous improvement on the shop floor through the elimination of waste. In return for their commitment to the partnership and lean production, the CAMI LMP should have guaranteed workers equal access to the decision making process, providing them with a voice in determining how work is performed everyday on the assembly-line floor. However, it didn’t take long for the company to silence worker voices and any workplace harmony that existed prior to the production was short lived once CAMI began to build cars.

\(^1\) For clarity purposes, JPM, LMP and lean production are synonymous and will be used throughout this article.
\(^2\) See Appendix G for a breakdown on LMP principles. Information table from Working in Partnership, by Sarah Pass, 2008; www.nottingham.ac.uk.
By 1992, workers\(^3\) voted to strike against the company, mocking CAMI company “values of open communications, empowerment, kaizen\(^4\), and team spirit by replacing them with their own new values of dignity, respect, fairness, and solidarity” (Rinehart et al., 1997:4). Earlier research at CAMI has encompassed measuring worker commitment to lean manufacturing techniques, and that question has already been answered. Research has found that workers at CAMI are not as committed to lean manufacturing as they initially were when the Suzuki-led management team of 1990 opened the doors to the CAMI plant. With reduced levels of shop floor democracy and rising levels of exploitation of the labour-force, workers ultimately withdrew their support to many of the lean programs, and from the 1992 strike onward, they began reasserting their rights to resist through formal and informal means. And although past CAMI research findings suggest reduced worker commitment connected to certain technical aspects of lean manufacturing, the broader question of “worker risks” from partnership arrangements has not yet been asked at CAMI.

In December of 2009, GM announced that it had bought out Suzuki Motors to become the sole owner of the company. At the time of its formation, CAMI was the third step of a three-pronged initiative\(^5\) by GM to introduce JPM in North America. Today, the other two prongs of GM’s lean manufacturing and LMP strategy (NUMMI and Saturn Corporation) no longer exist. Given the failure of GM’s other two LMP initiatives, CAMI workers and the CAW are well advised to pay very close attention to their new owner.

North American based research on the topic of LMPs suggests that labour usually suffers under these arrangements (Murray et al., 2000; Parker, 1987; Graham, 1989; Rinehart et al.,

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\(^3\) This research is limited to studying the unionized workers at CAMI, represented by CAW Local 88.

\(^4\) Kaizen is also known in North America as either quality circles or quality of working life, Kaizen’s objective is to find efficiency through continuous improvement techniques and methods.

However it seems, on the surface, that CAMI workers have managed to cope well under global pressures on the automotive industry. In fact, the CAMI plant has prospered under its LMP during very difficult economic times. With over 3000 unionized workers on site and continued growth expected, the LMP seems to have worked to the benefit of workers and the company alike. However, discussions with the union executive and workers reveal a more complex story. Workers are under constant pressure to perform at peak levels. The creation of a new “second-tier” labour force, called supplemental workforce employees (SWEs) and introduced in the 2010 bargaining round, appears both divisive and unfair. And of course, the misuse of JPM and the intensification of work are of paramount importance to workers on the line. Since the 2008 recession, GM continues to develop and initiate major cost reduction programs aimed squarely at its workforce. CAMI workers need to be prepared. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine and explore the level of risk that CAMI workers confront under their existing labour-management partnership arrangement.

Risk will be explored in relation to two distinct categories, distributive and political. According to Lucio and Stuart (2005), distributive risk can be conceptualized as tangibly substantive, reflecting the real terms and conditions of employment, and the changing balance of power on the floor. Moreover, distributive risk also encompasses the trade off of combined workplace flexibility and the intensification of workload, ostensibly in exchange for increased “job security”. Risk contrasts with the notion of reciprocal obligation, in which workers receive employment security in return for a high level of workplace intensity and commitment (Womack et al., 1990: 102), a characteristic of JPM considered vital for lean manufacturing to succeed but which has rarely been realized by workers outside of Japan. The second type of risk is political and associated with the effects that labour-management partnerships have on
the displacement of unions as legitimate agents of/for workers within the workplace. In other words, unions can find themselves undermined or even displaced within the dynamic of the workplace through formal and informal relations achieved through the use of team leaders, group leaders, team concept, kaizen programs and other collaborative-participative mechanisms normally associated with lean manufacturing partnership arrangements.

1.1 Outline

This research is structured into five chapters. Chapter Two begins with a general overview of past CAMI research followed by a brief discussion of the literature on similar North American and European LMPs. The chapter then provides a Marxian critique of LMPs and lean production per se. Chapter Three sets out the methodology and research design. It concludes by discussing limitations to the research and a brief review of some ethical considerations. Chapter Four presents the results in relation to the two types of risk examined: distributive and political. The review presents findings related to contract review, grievance summary and the cross-sectional survey measured against prescribed LMP principles. It continues by providing an in-depth review of the experiences and implications of the SWE category. Chapter Five provides concluding remarks on the topic of risk to workers at CAMI.


Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 CAMI Background.

CAMI has been the site of previous research projects related to worker commitment and JPM. Notably, Rinehart, Huxley, and Robertson researched CAMI Automotive from 1990 to 1991. Their longitudinal study, published in 1997, measured the effects of lean production on worker commitment. Additionally, they focused on workplace alienation and the intensification of workload under lean manufacturing. My first paper, *CAMI Automotive, Issues & Concerns Leading to the Strike* (1992), focused on uncovering the primary reasons why CAMI workers chose to strike after only two years of working under the JPM model. My second paper, *Lean Production in the Scarce Economy, Coping at CAMI* (2008), focused on the erosion of worker commitment under JPM, and closely mirrored the work done by Rinehart et al. In this section, I will briefly review the results of these specific research projects and their relevance to my current research.

Rinehart et al. (1997) studied the effects of lean production on the workers of CAMI over two years, and found multiple reasons for the erosion of worker commitment at CAMI. On the shop floor, production requirements intensified as managers used worker suggestions (garnered using JPM methodology) and kaizen to increase workloads while at the same time reducing takt times. In other words, as workers improved the production process, management used the new-found efficiencies against the workforce. As CAMI management broke its twin promises

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6 Takt time is an industrial engineering term which refers to the amount of time it takes to complete a predetermined task in any process. One goal of lean production is to reduce takt time.
of following the tenets of lean production and reciprocal obligation\textsuperscript{7}, workers became progressively disillusioned with and subjectively alienated from the JPM manufacturing process and the product of their own work. As Rinehart et al. reported:

The proportion of highly committed and moderately committed workers in the sample declined through each of the four interview periods. By the final round, 50.6 percent fell into the moderately committed category, while only 1.3 percent indicated high commitment. The percentage of uncommitted respondents grew steadily from 11.8 in round 1, to 24.7 in round 2, and to 48.1 in the final round. Despite a highly selective recruitment process, the ideals taught in Nagare\textsuperscript{8} training, and the company’s professed commitment to a labour-management partnership, workers’ disenchantment with CAMI grew steadily. The number of workers who indicated no commitment to CAMI’s objectives quadrupled over the two-year research period (1997:163).

The CAMI strike of 1992 was significant for many reasons. JPM is based on a collaborative model of labour relations that is ostensibly highly committed to a total teamwork approach and a worker-friendly environment. Focusing on team-work cells, multi-skilled workers, and a participative union-management decision-making process, CAMI was to be the new model of automotive manufacturing in Canada. Womack, Roos and Jones have described dynamic work teams as the “heart of the lean factory” (1990:99). According to Jurgens, Malsch and Dohse, “group work could be a means to achieve many objectives at the same time: greater job flexibility among individuals (by practicing job rotation), enhanced responsibility of shop floor workers for cost and quality (by delegating quality control, equipment maintenance, and

\textsuperscript{7} According to Womack et al; “plants trying to adopt lean production reveal that workers respond only when there exists some sense of reciprocal obligation, a sense that management actually values skilled workers, will make sacrifices to retain them, and is willing to delegate responsibility to the team. Merely changing the organization chart to show “team” and introducing quality circles to find ways to improve production processes are unlikely to make much difference”(1990:99).

\textsuperscript{8} The CAMI training manual defines Nagare as “one by one” “mixed lot” production. In simple terms, this is a JIT, small lot, short production batch system which requires quick die changes and inventory changes. This would be considered the most demanding and dynamic system for building cars and trucks. See page 27, Rinehart et al (1997).
process control responsibilities to the group), and improved social relations in production (through less control and more mutual help and support between workers and supervisors)”(1993:375). And yet on Monday, September 14th, 1992, 2,100 workers of CAW Local 88 went on strike against CAMI, signaling to the automotive industry that something had gone drastically wrong.

My 1992 study\(^9\) revealed some interesting facts about the strike and the effects that JPM was having on CAMI workers. Once CAMI commenced the production of cars, JPM ideology shifted. Founding putative principles and values receded under the constant change of shop floor supervisors and middle management personnel. As new managers arrived, workers noticed that those “values” meant less and less. Cost reduction and efficiency replaced the original values of open communication, empowerment, kaizen, and team spirit. In the end, workers overwhelmingly blamed the influx of GM management for the erosion of JPM values\(^{10}\). As the commitment to the “founding values” diminished, workers reacted in defiance to the change. As one worker stated, “If they want to treat us like the others, then they are going to have to pay us like them\(^{11}\)” (Billyard, 1992:13). Striking for higher wages and improved shop floor rights can be viewed as the overtly antagonistic response of the workers to the loss of company commitment to JPM values and methodology.

My interest in CAMI was revived in 2008 when I wrote my undergraduate thesis, *Lean Production in the Scarce Economy, Coping at CAMI*. This time, I was interested in following up on the Rinehart et al. study on the commitment of workers to lean production. Their work

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\(^9\) This study included a cross-sectional survey and ‘strike line’ focus groups.

\(^{10}\) My 1992 finding contrasted Rinehart’s main finding. He discounted the influence of GM middle management in eroding commitment to lean and the LMP.

\(^{11}\) Workers at CAMI were paid less than traditional automotive plants in Ontario at that time. This worker, and others, expressed strong feelings that CAMI workers were paid less while having to work harder (intensification of workload) under JPM.
directly connected worker disenchantment to JPM practice and CAMI management performance. As such, my 2008 research closely mirrored that of the Rinehart team’s previous work. Duplicating many of their questions\(^\text{12}\) allowed me to draw comparisons to earlier research on worker commitment. Survey results indicated how workers continued to withdraw their support from kaizen initiatives aimed primarily at productivity improvement. At the same time workers were ready to commit to lean production on the proviso that the original JPM methodology was adhered to. But before they would commit, they demanded increased job security as a quid pro quo. Ultimately, workers responded aggressively to the lack of reciprocal obligation on the part of the company, accusing the company of using JPM rhetoric as a fig leaf to conceal increasingly exploitative practices.

In 2010, Local 88 agreed to the use of Supplemental Workforce Employees (SWE). This decision would turn out to be one that the union not only regretted but has since rigorously fought GM to overturn. The background to SWE use in GM dates back to its implementation at the Oshawa plant in 2006. At that time, the union agreed with the company that SWEs could be hired on a temporary flexible basis, for a maximum of 8 months and only during model launches. For any other purpose, the company would need to have mutual agreement with the local union. Unfortunately for the Oshawa union and its members, the company failed to live up to its commitment on the use of SWE.

Since that time, the use of SWE has escalated at CAMI while the company refused to hire any full time workers. Commenting on the use of SWE prior to negotiations in 2012, CAW President Ken Lewenza expressed his concern by saying: "When we bargained the supplemental workforce, the way it was explained to the committee was that these folks would

\(^{12}\) Some of the Rinehart questions were duplicated in an effort to find comparisons. My chosen research method was cross-sectional, whereas Rinehart’s was longitudinal.
mainly be used during major launches. During major launches you always need extra people. "Since then, every single time, including volume increases at CAMI, the company has argued it's a short term blip. That's an issue we're going to have to deal with in negotiations." (http://business.financialpost.com/2012/08/04/atables/)

2.2 LMPs and Lean Manufacturing in North America

Given the promises that LMPs bring to unions and workers, it is easily understandable today why the CAW decided to cooperate with GM-Suzuki in the creation of the CAMI partnership arrangement. LMP arrangements are described by proponents as good for both companies and workers. The textbook description for partnership work "refers to the relationship between employers, employees and their representatives. It is about developing better employment relationships of all levels, helping to build trust in the workplace, sharing of information and working together to solve business problems" (Pass, 2008:3). But the good news wasn’t supposed to stop there. The Involvement and Partnership Association (IPA) and the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) have developed exclusive partnership principles as objectives for companies, worker associations and unions to follow. According to the TUC, workplaces were more likely to have better performance results, higher retention rates and higher salaries and profits when they supported and practiced by the LMP models (Pass, 2008:3). According to Pass, academic research has uncovered partnerships bring seven primary benefits to workers and union; improved information sharing, decreased uncertainty, higher levels of trust, increased opportunities to influence management, involvement in decision making, better worker relations and harmonization of terms and conditions of employment and lastly recognition of the legitimate role of unions (2008:7). Given these purported results, it seems
reasonable for unions and workers to support the formation of partnerships when approached by employers to do so. Unfortunately, in practice, LMP arrangements have not produced the results for workers as often reported or expected. This latter point is corroborated by a review of research on how other LMPs in North America have fared under these arrangements.

Workers at New Motors Manufacturing Inc (NUMMI) and Subaru Isuzu Automotive (SIA) experienced adverse working conditions as a result of their LMPs. Mike Parker (1987) found that lean production resembled a “management-by-stress system” one characterized by increasing productivity levels through peer pressure (within self-managed work teams) and management intimidation on the assembly line. Parker paid particular attention to the use of the “andon cords”, as did Rinehart and his group. Both studies found management misusing andon cord principles as a way of increasing line speeds. Parker describes how this was accomplished:

> In the management-by-stress system, “all green” signals inefficiency. Workers are not working as hard as they might. If the system is stressed-by speeding up the line for example- the weakest points become evident and the yellow lights go on. Once the problems have been corrected, the system can then be further stressed (perhaps by reducing the number of workers) and then rebalanced. The ideal is for the system to run with all stations oscillating between green and yellow. Thus the system equilibrates or drives toward being evenly balanced as managers constantly readjust and rebalance to make production even more efficient. (1987:262).

Both Parker and Rinehart uncovered how shop floor management modified andon cord use to intensify work on the assembly line. My 2008 research uncovered similar abuse of the andon cord system. At CAMI, the yellow andon cord had been eliminated, leaving only the red and

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13 The Andon cord is a device that allows workers to ask for help. Usually accompanied by a lighting system (green/yellow and red) indicating the level or degree of the production problem. A red light signifies a line shut down, yellow a potential problem and green, no problem.
green, CAMI management’s solution to keeping the line running at optimum efficiency. As
one worker stated when asked about line speeds and andon cord use, “at $16,600 dollars a
minute for downtime on the line they don’t care, they just want the line running” (Billyard,
2008: 95).

Similar to NUMMI, SIA workers also reacted to the intensification of work. Laurie Graham
(1989) wrote at a time when North American industry looked to JPM as means to regaining its
competitive advantage over global competitors. Graham’s research uncovered similar patterns
of worker abuse through the manipulation of lean production methods. Workers responded
aggressively against SIA by openly challenging management on the shop floor and threatening
unionization. Through their collective action, the SIA workforce was able to make some
moderate gains, but Graham (1989: 79) reported that their gains were short lived and ultimately
the collective actions of workers produced substantially negative outcomes.

Unlike CAMI, partnership agreements usually result from direct pressures exerted on unions
by companies that are claiming economic hardship. Canada’s first example of an LMP
arrangement was reviewed by Murray, Levesque and Vallee (2000). Under extreme pressures
and the threat of closure in 1999, the unionized workers of General Motors, Boisbriand,
Quebec, co-crafted a new labour agreement with the company, transitioning plant relations
from the established traditional automotive assembly model to lean manufacturing. Fearing
plant closure and the promise of a new model line, the majority of workers agreed with signing
onto the new agreement. The Boisbriand workers were in fact the first in Canada to negotiate
and agree to this new form of social relations within the auto sector. They were also the first
CAW local union to voluntarily open up the contract prior to the expiry date. And although
their new agreement was hailed within the automotive industry, the workers of GM Boisbriand
soon realized their new relationship was fraught with new risks. Team concept, worker participation and co-operation in lean production programs led to increased workloads, rising occupational injuries and heightened worker dissatisfaction.

Similar to CAMI, the Boisbraind workers experienced an intensification of work through reduced takt time associated with the kaizen principle and JPM team approach. As reported by Murray, Leveque, and Vallee:

Teamwork at Boisbraind, as has often been the case elsewhere, did not translate into an empowerment of the workers or an enrichment of their jobs. Such a transformation was perhaps difficult to countenance when the average work cycle for most workers remained between forty-five and fifty-five seconds. Furthermore, the introduction of lean production principles greatly reduced worker autonomy. Workers could no longer gain time on the line by temporarily working faster or accumulating a reserve of extra parts in order to create some personal recovery or down time” (2000:237).

The workers at the Boisbraind plant soon realized that their new social relations pact with GM did not work in their favour. The promise of worker empowerment and equality under JPM was never realized. Contrary to the promises made during negotiations, the new LMP brought with it a reduction in worker autonomy, intensified work, reduced compensation and a weakened union. In other words, the Boisbraind workers experienced an increase in both distributive and political risks through their LMP.

In 1998, the National Union of Arvida Aluminum Workers represented Jonquiere, Quebec workers in signing a new partnership agreement with Alcan whose premise was increased investment in exchange for a no-strike provision in the union contract. In this way, the company aimed at securing operational stability and the steady flow of product to the world market while the workers gain apparent workplace security through a commitment of increased capital investment in new technologies aimed at improving bottom line performance in the
global economy. Losing the right to strike for the duration of the collective agreement is a standard condition in all contracts. However, the Alcan workers further agreed to increase the length of this new partnership agreement to an astounding 18-year term. Not surprisingly, the agreement was viewed as a “beacon for a new labour-management relations climate for some, a testament to weakened union power and an undermining of union values and objectives for others” (Murray et al., 2000:238).

In 1991, Atlas Steel, a division of Rio Algom, entered into a similar partnership arrangement with its Tracy Quebec workers. That partnership was described as the first of the new social contracts in Quebec to provide a “minimal level of employment, final offer arbitration on monetary issues for the next agreement, and the creation of a joint union-management committee on organizational change, human resources development and quality initiatives” (Murray et al., 2000:239). The Tracy agreement generally reflects the basic tenets of JPM and other LMPs, but it did have one strikingly different component. As with Boisbriand, the Tracy workers relinquished union power in exchange for new financial investments dedicated to the modernization of its plant and equipment. But in the case of Tracy, the Quebec government intervened and demanded that “the union and management at Atlas Steel must agree to forego the right to strike or lockout for a period of six years before the state would agree to make a financial commitment to the modernization of the plant” (Murray et al., 2000:239).

This sort of government intervention can only militate against workers’ interests. State-led finance for capitalist projects is a false promise to workers. Governments invest tax dollars into corporations by way of grants, subsidies, tax breaks and loans which companies then take advantage of to improve sinking profitability during recessionary times while workers are
forced to accept concessions on wages and benefits. In other words, Atlas workers relinquished their power by agreeing to the elimination of their right to strike so that the company could benefit from state finance. In return for losing their right to strike, one might think that the labour contract would have guaranteed the right of the workers to some form of profit sharing for the entire six-year duration. But this was not the case. Instead, workers relinquished their bargaining power simply in exchange for state financing that was used exclusively to build balance sheet wealth for the employer. Their sacrifice translated into greater shareholder wealth and strengthened the company’s bottom line at labour’s expense. Thus, the Tracy partnership could be described as a transitional relationship. According to Lucio and Stuart (2005), transitional partnerships are entered into by labour when workers and unions believe they need to work closely with management to achieve a specific outcome. This seems to have been the case in the Tracy partnership. Indeed, the Tracy partnership was a micro-corporatist arrangement that placed “enterprise loyalty” above union and worker interests (Murray et al., 2000: 240).

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14 Coercive, transitional and nurturing represent the types of relationship between workers and management in partnerships. See, Lucio and Stuart in, Partnership and new industrial relations in a risk society: an age of shotgun weddings and marriages of convenience (2005). Transitional relationships extol the advantage of focused collaboration at critical points when strategic alliance is required.
2.3 LMPs and Conflicting-Collaboration. Managing the Relationship

Case studies have proven how labour is put at risk in LMP arrangements. With workers taking the brunt of LMP risk, organized labour should be questioning the true purpose and validity of these types of relationship. Monica Rolfsen's (2011) paper is a response to previous research that questioned the ongoing value and benefit of LMP arrangements for labour.

Rolfsen studied two North American examples of LMPs and a case study of a Norwegian manufacturing company that supports her argument that partnerships work better for unions when the latter maintain and exercise their traditional bargaining powers. Rolfsen maintained that close cooperation between unions and companies need not be a controversial issue if the power balance between them remains relatively equal. In developing her argument Rolfsen cites the 1984 NUMMI partnership between the United Auto Workers (UAW), General Motors and Toyota Automotive. The NUMMI partnership was unique, as it invited the union leadership to join management in the development of shop floor policies and procedures. Consulting with the union on operational matters also involved the union participating in the selection of team leaders. The involvement of the union in management matters created many shop-floor problems and rank-and-file workers soon began to distrust team leaders and union officials. Split in its views and reacting to diverse concerns over the partnership, the union body broke into two caucuses: the Administration caucus and the People’s caucus. For its part, the Administration caucus was accused of being too ‘cozy’ with management while the People’s caucus was considered out of touch and lacking vision as to how to take advantage of their new “partnership”. It’s important to recognize the legitimate concerns of the People’s caucus. When union-officials become part of the decision-making process and partake in the creation of rules and regulations, workers rights are always diminished. Rolfsen suggests that when
“participation increases, so does the need for internal union democracy in order to maintain the partnership on a long term level” (2011: 595). The People’s caucus recognized that the union was weakened by collaborating with the company under conditions where the threat of conflict has been removed. Consistent with Rolfsen’s thesis, collaboration, in the absence of any willingness to resort to conflict, served to delegitimize and weaken the NUMMI union, leading to its ultimate demise.

Unfortunately for NUMMI workers, on April 1st, 2010, 4,700 UAW members lost their jobs as car production was moved north to Toyota’s Cambridge, Ontario plant. Toyota cited the loss of GM as a partner in 2009 and the deep global recession of 2008-09 as the primary reasons for the closure. Interestingly, there was no mention of the LMP with the UAW in the announcement or subsequent press releases. The NUMMI partnership ultimately failed the union and its member/workers as their agreement did little to save their jobs in the end. The partnership with the union died when Toyota halted production. Today, Tesla Motors\textsuperscript{15} has reopened the plant to build electric cars after garnering a 365 million dollar federal loan. There was no mention anywhere in the press release of a labour partnership with the UAW.

In carrying out her own study, Rolfsen visited Tool Factory, a small manufacturer of tools in Norway. Rolfsen claimed that the problematic aspect of LMP lies in the modified role that workers perform under the new arrangement. By acting as managers and taking on managerial responsibilities, team leaders and union executives who participate in the creation of company policy and practice begin to distance themselves from the rank and file. As previously discussed, this phenomenon was found to exist at NUMMI, leading to the formation of two competing caucuses.

\textsuperscript{15} See the announcement at teslamotors.com, press releases. October 27th, 2010.
Rolfsen identifies two very important elements needed for successful long-term partnerships. The first speaks to distributive risks: workers should protect their wages and benefits at all cost, and not trade away compensation for new partnership agreements. Second, extended partnership arrangements must be supported by extended union democracy. In other words, unions must strategically focus worker power by negotiating strong contract language that builds workers’ rights into new partnership arrangements. They must also not cross over the fine boundaries that exist between management and workers. Becoming too involved in organizational decision-making weakens the union’s formal position as independent agents/protectors of the worker. When unions participate in organizational directives and the decision-making process (hiring, firing, evaluating, etc.), a management agenda is allowed to creep into the union ranks, further blurring institutional lines and effectively obviating the role of the union. Baccaro and Howell described this as institutional convergence. It reflects a “mutation in the function and meaning of existing institutions, producing different practices and consequences in new contexts” (2011: 525).

Rolfsen does not view the blurring of roles within the organization as necessarily problematic. In fact, she insists that “close cooperation in long-term development issues need not be controversial. Quite the contrary, this is mentioned as the most positive outcome of the partnership” (Rolfsen, 2011: 591). Yet in the NUMMI example, Rolfsen found labour giving up too much power. It seems that Rolfsen is prescribing a precarious balancing act for workers if partnership arrangements are to work to their benefit or perhaps, more realistically, survive them. In other words, workers can preserve partnership arrangements if they can learn to properly calibrate levels of collaboration and conflict with employers. In this respect, Rolfsen seems to be suggesting that workers should “cozy up” to management, but not get too close. In
summary, Rolfsen writes that “an important conclusion is that the long term development of organizational issues is an arena where the union can participate very closely without crossing the firing line” (Rolfsen, 2011: 606).

2.4 The Truth about Lean Manufacturing: A Marxian Critique

Rolfsen insists that unions can make LMPs work for them if they undertake certain protective strategies. Others take the view that no LMP can actually benefit workers, no matter how effectively navigated by the union. Tony Smith (2000) applied the theoretical framework of Karl Marx in his book, *Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production: A Marxian Critique of the New Economy*. In Smith’s words, “the project was to assess the extent to which Marxian theory illuminates contemporary developments in capitalism, in specific, the rise of ‘flexible’ networks of production”\(^\text{16}\). In reviewing his work, I will concentrate my discussion on three critical Marxian concepts used by Smith; structural coercion, exploitation and real subsumption. Smith illustrates how these concepts refer to necessary and perennial features of capitalism in *all* its variant forms, including lean manufacturing and, by extension, LMPs.

Referring to Volume 1 of Karl Marx’s *Capital*, Smith argues that structural coercion rests upon the basic inequality that exists under capitalism, with one class possessing sufficient economic resources to purchase the means of production and means of subsistence, while another class lacks such resources (Smith, 2000: 53). Smith argues that the inherent lack of equality between owners and workers under all forms of capitalism is paramount in determining the level or degree of structural coercion that exists within any given relationship. While the level or degree of structural coercion that exists within any owner-worker relationship is contingent upon the specifics of that arrangement, Smith concludes that workers

\(^{16}\) An excerpt from Tony Smiths webpage, http://www.public.iastate.edu/~tonys/.
cannot escape the effects of structural coercion under any form of capitalism, including the novel forms related to LMPs and lean manufacturing.

According to Smith, some advocates of the new economy argue for the importance of “multiple job experiences” and see this as a positive outcome for workers. Supposedly, workers benefit when they are forced to navigate through multiple career identities and a subsequent variety of workplace opportunities in a given lifetime of paid labour. In other words, the suggestion is made that workers are better off without labour employment guarantees. This neo-liberal perspective rationalizes the removal of “guaranteed work” in LMP arrangements under which corporations were to provide lifetime guaranteed employment to workers in exchange for workplace flexibility and intensified work under lean manufacturing. The creation of a counter-narrative to rationalize the disappearance of a fundamental tenet of LMP has been offered up as ideological compensation for job security and the reciprocal obligation long associated with lean manufacturing and established LMPs. Smith concludes that the “rhetoric of freedom here masks the continued coercive powers of capital” (2000: 55).

Of course, most workers under LMP arrangements continue to be subjected to intensified work without any form of guaranteed employment making the LMP power arrangement fully biased in favour of capital. Workers involved in LMP arrangements are required to perform leaned out work at intensified rates without any added protection, or any reasonable form of reciprocal obligation from capital. In my focus group research, many of the workers interviewed talked about how they feared supervisor reprisal and termination if they failed to perform to the established productivity levels. Although CAMI workers were once optimistic about their relationship with CAMI, when it comes to trust and security, conditions have deteriorated considerably. As a full time worker observed, the “relationship with management
hasn’t changed. It was rough back then, and 23 years later, nothing has changed. We are penalized for not being able to keep up with lean production”. In this respect, CAMI workers continue to face the pressure of performance against an alternative measure of progressive discipline and termination. Thus, LMP arrangements have not resulted in any “balancing” of power between management and workers.

The guarantee of lifetime work under lean manufacturing has already been debunked by many researchers (Parker, 1987; Rinehart et al., 1997; Graham, 1989; Murray et al., 2000). Today, lifetime work is only afforded to a small percentage of workers around the world in the automotive industry. Even in Japan, where life time work was once a hallmark of the auto industry, less than one third of the workforce now enjoys that distinct privilege (Smith, 2000: 56). And even under those most favourable of arrangements, the company still has the right to terminate workers at its discretion. In North America, I was unable to find any evidence of a practicing LMP arrangement involving guaranteed work. However, LMP and lean production methodology persists in many different forms throughout North America, including CAMI Automotive, without any formal guarantees of work.

Corporations will continue to push for the competitive advantage that lean production provides. But as more and more companies searching for higher profits embrace LMP principles and practices, their individual competitive advantage will disappear as the playing field levels out. Smith suggests this is one reason why workers are not provided guaranteed work in LMPs. Indeed, the right to fire is “extremely important to those who own and control capital.” As regarding terminating workers, Smith concludes that right to fire is “extremely important to those who own and control capital. Again and again they have refused to allow employment guarantees to be written into contracts on the grounds that this would limit their
flexibility. Needless to say, workers lack a symmetrical ability to depose of management” (Smith, 2000:57). In short, LMPs have not resulted in a balancing of the power relation between workers and management. Smith finds LMP workers also experience the same lack of power in their everyday work relations as do workers in other, more traditional forms of manufacturing. In this respect, structural coercion persists, albeit under a different set of institutional relations.

Wage workers are exploited when their surplus value is appropriated by the capitalist in the form of profit. As Smith explains, “those who own and control capital are generally able to impose a wage contract whose terms allow them to appropriate an economic surplus created by wage labourers” (Smith, 2000:53). Surplus value is defined by Smith as the portion of value that workers create that is not distributed back to them. Exploitation enters the equation when surplus value is appropriated from workers by the company and retained for accumulation or capitalist consumption in the form of profit or earnings. But the notion of exploitation takes on a more sinister twist under lean manufacturing. When workers enter into LMP arrangements, they must perform to a set of operating principles and practices that demands far more of them than traditional manufacturing or automotive assembly. As Smith states, “the whole point of lean production is to produce more with less, that is, to increase economic output per unit of labour power purchased” (2000: 60). With increasingly frequent and prolonged recessions, the continued erosion of profits\(^\text{17}\) has forced companies to find new labour-saving technologies and methodologies to combat the structural limitations inherent in capitalism. Companies found that

\(^{17}\) Murray E.G. Smith (2010:54) provides an in-depth analysis of Marx’s account of the falling rate of profit.
lean production worked best to generate “relative surplus value”\textsuperscript{18} when scientific management techniques were combined with technological innovation and the diminished use of labour. Murray E.G. Smith (2010) has described why increasing “relative” as distinct from “absolute” surplus value has long been important to the profitability of capitalist enterprises:

Since work time cannot be indefinitely extended, absolute surplus value faces a clear limit in the length of the working day and in the maximal intensity of the labour process. Relative surplus value, on the other hand, faces limits set only by the level of development of labour-saving technology. Consequently, relative surplus value techniques become an increasingly important method of raising the rate of surplus value over the course of capitalist development – especially in the face of struggles by working people for a reduced workweek with no loss in pay (2010:53).

However under the conditions of the current economic crisis, which has its roots in a profitability crisis of “productive capital” that extends back to the 1970’s, the automotive industry now faces structural limitations in raising the level of relative surplus value. In other words, “labour-saving” technological innovation is no longer able to provide solutions compatible with increasing the absolute magnitude of surplus value for automakers. With advances in labour-saving technology stalled due to the downward pressure they place on enterprise profitability companies have moved towards lean methodology to provide higher levels of productivity within the prevailing limits of the work-day. Indeed, JIT, JPM, MRP, lean manufacturing, quality circles, and kaizen qualify as capitalist innovations that are clearly geared towards producing larger quantities of \textit{absolute} surplus value\textsuperscript{19}. Such a strategy clearly exists within the LMP framework at CAMI, where there is clear evidence of reduced team

\textsuperscript{18} “Precisely because relative surplus value techniques allow individual capitalist firms to produce more output with less labour, productivity improvements are sought through increases in the technical composition of capital” (Smith, M., 2010:53).

\textsuperscript{19} In Marx’s theory, such an intensification of the labour process serves to increase “absolute surplus value.” (Smith, M., 2010)
sizes, intensified work, and the shrinking of takt time or production cycles within the set limits of the “management imposed” six-day work-week.\textsuperscript{20}

Smith (2000) reports that workers in traditional assembly lines work forty-five seconds of every minute whereas in lean organizations they work fifty-seven seconds out of every minute on the line. The extra work time on the line “is equivalent to each worker performing the equivalent of more than an extra day’s labour every five-day week” (2000:60). CAMI workers have reported (see Appendix C) that they are now working at the lean rate described by Smith. One worker reported that the assembly line cycles at 57 seconds, leaving no rest time between essential tasks.

So, it’s proven that LMP workers produce more, work longer hours, and receive no additional income for their extra effort. From this perspective, they are clearly subjected to higher rates of exploitation. According to Smith, the key to exploitation lies in ownership, decision-making and control. In capitalist-owned organizations, the owners and management control how surplus value is accumulated and distributed, not the workers. For Smith, socialism is the only real alternative to the exploitation inherent in all “models” of capitalism. In this regard, he avers that “if the surplus is controlled by the workforce or its elected representatives, exploitation is not present. If it is not so controlled, then the category is applicable” (Smith, 2000:62).

Lastly, I will discuss the concept of real subsumption in relation to lean manufacturing. Real subsumption\textsuperscript{21} has been defined as a process whereby the class-antagonistic social relations of capitalism penetrate the labour process itself. Smith points to the development of

\textsuperscript{20} Although the regular work week consists of forty hours over five days, the company has the right to force workers to work up to forty-eight hours in any week, including Saturday, as per the collective agreement (under Article 33, Hours of Work). CAMI continues to exercise its management rights under Article 33 and as such, Saturday work is mandatory.

\textsuperscript{21} Definition from; http://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/s/u.htm.
lean manufacturing and LMP arrangements as meeting the criteria of real subsumption. As manufacturing firms faced the real threat of eroding profits, transforming the social relations in production\textsuperscript{22} became a necessary action as they fought for their financial survival. LMP advocates characterize the invention of lean manufacturing as a “worker friendly” collaborative form of labour-relations whereby workers are allowed to participate with management in organizing the labour process through continuous improvement programs and JPM. Smith calls this the “Good Taylorism” argument. He goes on to say, “the rhetoric of teamwork, multi-skilling, and worker empowerment might seem to suggest that in the new economy the members of the workforce decide for themselves how production should be structured from day to day. This is not at all the case” (Smith, 2000:68). Smith argues that lean manufacturing continues to demonstrate the same fundamental antagonisms and alienating characteristics that have always existed between labour and capital. Lean represents a transformative stage of capitalist manufacturing solely developed by companies to augment absolute and relative surplus value. From this perspective, Smith concludes that lean is “captured by Marx’s definition of the real subsumption of labour under capital” (Smith, 2000:73).

Research will show how CAMI workers have withdrawn from many of the imposed lean programs for many of the reasons that Tony Smith indicates in his book. My research revealed how CAMI workers translated teamwork to really mean fewer workers under ever-intensified conditions. They understand multi-skilling to mean multi-tasking. And they also realize workers are not empowered at any level in the production process. In short, workers are powerless to make any changes at CAMI unless they opt to exert pressure on the company.

\textsuperscript{22}Michael Buroway defined the social relations in production as the relational aspect of the labour process that exists within a specific manufacturing setting and between workers and management (1979:15). Firms can alter the social relations in production through the introduction of new technology and shop floor transformative methodologies like JPM, JIT and LMPs.
through their collective bargaining power and ultimately the withdrawal of their labour if need be.

To summarize, by applying the notions of structural coercion, exploitation and real subsumption, Smith concluded that LMPs, JPM, and lean production contain the same inherent characteristics as earlier capitalist forms. In many ways, Smith was also challenging new capitalist utopians. New-age labour-management relations have not reduced capitalist requirements for commodifying and exploiting living labour. Indeed, Smith found no evidence that the fundamental antagonism between labour and capital has changed under these new arrangements. Confident in his work, Smith stated “the baseline condition of the working class as a whole in lean production continues to be defined by a lack of access to the means of production and means of subsistence” (Smith, 2000:118).

2.5 Conclusion

The chapter begins with a general discussion on the development of LMPs, JPM and lean manufacturing. The case studies provided in the literature review have revealed how previous research has shown how workers are at continuous risk from LMP arrangements. The inclusion of Rolfsen's research contrasted with other contributors and provided the reader with a conventional labour-relations view on LMPs. In her argument, Rolfsen provided remedies to unions that have entered into LMPs as combined solutions for surviving in LMPs relations while reducing overall worker risk. Rolfsen's research suggests that unions need to develop new coping strategies and additional protections (against both types of risk) when they participate in LMP relationships. However, by offering up band-aid solutions and remedies for workers as means of
reducing risk in these arrangements, Rolfsen’s recommendations actually imply there must be something fundamentally wrong with the LMP model.

The chapter concludes by providing a Marxian analysis of lean production and LMPs. Tony Smith's research neatly contextualized the case study examples provided in the chapter by illustrating how LMPs contain the same inherent capitalist characteristics of earlier epochs. LMPs cannot be reformed as suggested by Rolfsen to improve working conditions (from the standpoint of workers) without undermining their very reason for existence for the capitalist employer. More precisely and on theoretical grounds, there are compelling reasons to believe that the whole purpose of LMPs is to weaken workers’ power to resist exploitation leading to increased “worker risk”. Indeed, Smith found no evidence that the fundamental antagonism between labour and capital has changed under these new arrangements to benefit labour.
Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Because of the recent inclusion of SWE into the LMP arrangement, the research was split into two critical components for reviewing risk, FT and SWE. In this chapter, I will examine conceptualization, choice of research method, operationalization, survey population, and sampling.

3.2.0 Research Design

The purpose of my research is to reveal and understand the risks to unionized CAMI workers under the existing LMP agreement. This project has incorporated the three main aspects of social research: exploration, description and explanation.\(^{23}\)

The population being studied in this project is restricted to the hourly workforce of CAMI Automotive of Ingersoll, Ontario. The workers are represented by CAW Local 88. The plant is located alongside Highway 401, one of Ontario’s main transportation corridors into the United States. The workforce of approximately 3000 is primarily drawn from southwestern Ontario and it also includes preferential hires\(^{24}\) from other GM plants. There are 570 acres (2.3 km\(^2\)) of property with over 1.7 million sq. ft. of floor space.

\(^{23}\) Most research studies include all three types. See in Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (1992:90-92).

\(^{24}\) Preferential hires are displaced fulltime workers from other CAW-member plants in Ontario, namely EMD, in London. In 2012, CAW bargained with GM to allow these workers to join the CAMI workforce after they had been displaced by the closure of their plant by EMD’s parent company, Caterpillar, in February 2012. Unlike SWE workers, preferential hires retain fulltime worker rights and protection as afforded by the collective agreement. SWEs now have fewer rights than workers that have never worked at
3.2.1 Cross-sectional Survey & Focus Group Interviews

The sample for the cross-sectional survey\textsuperscript{25} was drawn utilizing the snowball sampling method. However, this was not the original plan for determining the sample population. I initially requested union support for the use of a systematic random sampling methodology. Unfortunately, the union was unable to supply resources or grant time to accommodate my request. Without union support and access to the seniority roll and confidential worker information, I was not able to carry out this type of sampling procedure. However, the union was prepared to distribute surveys selectively and proportionally throughout the plant by utilizing union area representatives. Each area in the plant received a proportion of blank surveys. The area representative was responsible for distributing surveys to those workers interested in participating.

The study population consisted of approximately 3000 unionized workers. Units of analysis were the individual workers within the ranks of the union, and only those actively working. With cooperation from the union executive and a shop floor committee, workers were approached to voluntarily participate in the cross-sectional survey. Each representative area received an appropriate number of blank surveys to be handed out to workers over a two-week period. In total, 300 surveys were introduced and distributed throughout the plant, or approximately 10.0\% of the total worker population. With 280 completed surveys returned, I was

\textsuperscript{25} Designed to study some phenomenon by taking a cross section of it at one time and analyzing the cross section carefully (Babbie, 1991: 99).
able to secure a return rate of 93%, which overall can be viewed as a representative 9.3% of the total worker population at CAMI.

It is worthwhile to briefly discuss how such a high rate of return for the survey was achieved. The researcher has established a long history with Local 88 dating back to 1992. Of particular importance, the union executive has maintained positive relations and continuity with the researcher, with the Plant Chairperson actively involved in previous research. Early discussions around the survey focused on concerns related to the 2008 survey return rate. Through that discussion, it was agreed by the union that they would more actively encourage their members to consider participating. This was achieved through their website, which spread the word of the project. As such, when worker representatives entered their areas with hard copy surveys, workers were already informed in advance about the research, making the job of handing out surveys much easier to accomplish.

Workers received hard copies of the cross-sectional survey which included a cover page providing all necessary information required by the worker to allow for a value-making decision on his/her participation. The area representative was allowed to approach workers in their respective areas of work. The selection process for survey participants was solely determined by the area representative. Factors discussed where availability of active workers/participants and of course, interest in completing the questionnaire. Once completed, surveys were returned to the plant union office by the participant where a drop box was conveniently located. The union notified the researcher once it was determined that no further surveys were expected.

Focus group interviews were held at the CAW Local 88 union hall. Its uses were limited to providing thick descriptive examples to compare or contrast against survey findings and other secondary analysis only (Billyard, 2008:44). As union resources were limited, I was unable to
randomly select participants for focus group interviews. Due to these logistical constraints, I decided to tap into the union training schedule that was underway. Working with the union executive, I coordinated my focus groups around their existing training schedules. Although this simplified the process of selection, focus group interviews were restricted to those who were receiving union training on the day of the interviews and closely align with nonprobability sampling method. Additionally, I separated workers into two categories, SWE and FT. Separating SWE from FT workers allowed SWE participants to openly discuss the contentious two-tier wage structure with the interviewer and other like-minded workers without fear of FT intimidation or reprisal.

3.2.2 Survey Questionnaire Detail

The survey (see Appendix A) was divided into three sections for purposes of analysis. The first section of questions (1-6) are categorical variables providing generalized participant background information from the research population. Questions 7 through 20 (closed-ended) were intended to operationalize the concept of risk, both distributive and political. Additionally, these questions were framed to determine how the CAMI LMP stands up against the established principles of LMPs as developed by either the Involvement and Partnership Association (IPA) or the Trades Union Congress (TUC). The final two questions, 21 and 22 (open-ended), allowed participants to provide comment on specific plant floor concerns and to offer suggestions for improving worker rights. Comments from questions 21 and 22 can be found in Appendix C.

26 These are organizations located in the U.K. The Involvement and Partnership Association (IPA) was established through employer’s associations while the Trades Union Congress (TUC) was created from the representatives of organized labour. Both groups developed similar values and principles related to labour and management partnership arrangements. See Samuel & Bacon (2010).
3.2.2a Research Population (Questions 1-6)

(i) Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid male</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

Of those that responded to the survey, 196 or 70% indicated that they were male with 84 or 30% indicating they were female. The union reports that females account for approximately 25% of the total worker population. Thus, the sample distribution closely resembles the gender mix of the overall worker population.

(ii) Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 to 39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 49</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>60.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>99.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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<td>.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The CAMI workforce continues to age. With 232 out of 280 participants over 40 years of age and 48 or 17.2% aged 39 or lower, they are an aging workforce. According to the union, the average age of CAMI workers is 48 years.
(iii) **Years at CAMI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<td>Valid less than 5</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 11</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>72.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 280 respondents, 204 or 72.9% have more than 11 years with CAMI. The remaining 76 or 27.1% have less than 10 years. High seniority and years of service reflects the low turnover rate of workers in the plant.

(iv) **Area worked at CAMI and Classification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Valid assembly</td>
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<td>43.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>43.9</td>
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<td>welding</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paint</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materials</td>
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<td>4.6</td>
<td>83.6</td>
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<td>quality</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>91.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

Assembly work is the predominant classification in the plant. The union estimates that 75% of all workers are in the assembly areas of the plant. Given their estimate, this result suggests that assembly is underrepresented in the survey. However, 73% of respondents had over 11 years service, suggesting that a higher proportion of senior workers (with the ability of working ‘offline’) completed the questionnaire. This may explain why assembly is underrepresented.
Union Experience outside of CAMI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid yes</td>
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<td>51.4</td>
<td>51.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>48.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Having past union experience in traditional workplace settings could influence how workers respond to terms and conditions within the LMP at CAMI. Working at CAMI under lean manufacturing exposes workers to intensified work, multi-tasking, and reduced cycle times. How workers view LMP could be influenced by their past experiences in either union or non-union environments. Of the respondents, 51.4% had previous union experience while 48.6% did not belong to unions prior to joining CAMI.

Job Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid team leader</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>65.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The role of the team leader is vital to managing lean manufacturing systems. Additionally, in the CAMI setting, the team leader becomes the active conduit between management and worker. From the union perspective, the role of the team leader is also important to protect the rights and security of its workers. At the same time, management can influence team leaders to support company agendas which promote improved productivity and cost cutting initiatives. In this way, team leaders are constantly under pressure from workers and management. Understanding how
team leaders are assessing and responding to worker risk is therefore important. Of the 280 respondents, 75 were team leaders with 205 making up production associates and production support group workers. With 205 respondents representing all other workers, the response mix between team leader and worker is appropriate to the demographics of the plant.

(vii) **Union Status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Valid committeeperson</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>local executive</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>union member</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>93.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 280 respondents, 16 or 5.7% were union committeepersons, 3 or 1.1% represented the executive, with the remaining 261 or 93.2% comprising FT and SWE workers.

(viii) **Employment status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid full time</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of all respondents, 88.9% were FT with 31 or 11.1% SWE workers. Having SWE workers respond is important given their reduced levels of compensation and workplace rights at CAMI. The ratio between SWE and FT workers in the survey is representative of the worker population in the plant.
3.2.2b  **LMP Values and Outcomes**

Nine questions (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, and 19) are related to LMP values and outcomes as defined by the IPA and the TUC. These questions were intended to determine how CAMI workers might view LMP principles at work within their own environment. It’s important to note that these questions did not specify any of the LMP principles *per se*, but instead they reflect aspects of IPA and TUC values and outcomes. LMP values and outcomes are important criteria in assessing overall risk to workers. A company’s willingness to practice the prescribed values and outcomes can influence the level of risk that LMPs place on workers. In other words, adherence to LMP principles is vitally important to the partnership arrangement and required to limit risk to workers. These questions will measure how workers perceive management’s commitment to the LMP values and outcomes.

3.2.2c  **Distributive & Political Risk**

Ten questions (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20) are related to the two types of risk that are associated with LMP partnership arrangements. These questions were intended to determine how workers perceived risk within their workplace. As discussed in Chapter 2, distributive risk can be expressed as tangibly substantive, reflecting the real terms and conditions of employment, and the changing social relations in production on the floor. Moreover, distributive risk is also concerned with the trade-off of combined workplace flexibility and the intensification of workload in exchange for increased worker security. The second type of risk is political and associated with the effects that labour-management partnerships have on the displacement of unions as legitimate agents of/for workers within the
workplace and more generally, the capacity of workers to organize collectively in opposition to management.

3.3 Contract and Grievance Analysis and Review

To further explore both distributive and political risks, the union provided collective agreements dating from September 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1998 through to September 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2013\textsuperscript{27}. Contract analysis included a full review of base wages, shift premiums, vacation entitlement, and rest periods\textsuperscript{28}. Additionally, the union was able to provide detailed grievance information dating from 2009 through to June 2012. Grievances were categorized by sex and type. For the purposes of this study, grievances were defined as either disciplinary or procedural. Sex was defined as either male or female. Disciplinary grievances were those initiated by workers to challenge disciplinary action against them, while procedural grievances related to compensation complaints, time studies, workloads, health and safety and other contract language or interpretation disputes.

3.4 Limitations of the Research

There are some limiting factors associated with cross-sectional studies which must be addressed. Internal validity is considered typically weak as it is difficult to establish causal relationships from the resulting data. Bryman and Teevan conclude:

A cross-sectional design entails the collection of data (usually quantitative) on more than one case (usually many more than one) and at

\textsuperscript{27} The first three contracts (89-91, 92-95, 95-98) were not available for review and are not included in this study. CAW Local 88 has negotiated eight contracts to date.

\textsuperscript{28} See Appendix F for results.
a single point in time, on two or more variables (usually more than two), which are then examined to detect patterns of association. The practice makes it difficult to show cause because the independent and dependent variables are measured simultaneously, making any demonstration of temporal order, that the cause actually precedes the effect, harder to specify (2005:37).

Bryman and Teevan suggest; “as sample size increases, sampling error decreases” (2005:224).

A final collection rate of 280 out of 300 provided ample data for analysis. With 20 closed-ended questions, approximately 5600 individual data points were collected and inputted into SPSS for analysis. Additionally, the survey had two open-ended questions which respondents could answer. The response rate for open-ended questions was approximately 40%. Survey responses can be found in Appendix C. Response to the survey questionnaire was excellent with a return rate of 93%, reflecting an overall 9.3% of the total population. However, due to union resource and time constraints, it was decided to distribute surveys to workers utilizing union area representatives in each area of the plant. In all cases, the area union representative informally asked workers if they wanted to participate. With their agreement, workers filled out the survey and submitted the completed survey into a drop box at the in-plant union office. Although this was an effective process with excellent results, it introduced an element of nonprobability to the study. Given the uniqueness of the CAMI site, I contend sampling methodology did not significantly reduce the reliability of sampling, even though, “in general, nonprobability sampling methods are regarded as less reliable than probability sampling methods” (Babbie, 1992: 233). As with the survey questionnaire, focus groups sampling did not incorporate random selection and is representative of nonprobability sampling methodology.

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29 SPSS: IBM Statistical Product & Service Solutions. System was provided by Brock ITS with all data stored on the Brock server and available for review.
A concern was raised about the efficacy of the ordinal measurement structure of the cross-sectional survey. Simply stated, the questions gave respondent three choices\(^{30}\) rather than four, which could have affected the outcome of the survey as the questions were not balanced. Upon reviewing the survey responses, six questions\(^{31}\) received heavy weighting in the middle choice. Questions 11 through 17 were related directly to risk while question 19 was concerned with the level of commitment to LMP arrangements. In hindsight, balancing the questions would have eliminated any ambiguity associated with these results. That said, I contend any ambiguity related to question weighting is relieved through the focus group and open ended question results which overall are in agreement with the cross-sectional survey results and the arguments raised in this paper. Additionally, it is important to note that of the questions which had significant middle choice result, the aggregate of 'agree' or 'somewhat agree' in all of these questions ranged from a low of 56.4% to a high of 94.3% with an overall 75.3% average. These results clearly support findings that suggest many CAMI workers overwhelmingly believe that; work is intensifying, workers are compelled to keep up, team leaders are collaborating with management while workers cooperate, workers are prepared to work without conflict, working conditions, wages, and benefits have worsened, management can't be trusted while the LMP is beneficial for both GM and the union. Lastly, my results are also similar to previous research on LMPs. In other words, there is nothing provocative about my findings which should raise any significant concern regarding the validity of the cross-sectional survey results.

The qualitative-observational nature of focus group interviews raises some general concerns. Babbie quotes Richard Krueger on the disadvantages of focus group methodology, suggesting

\(^{30}\) Survey question measures were: very much agree, somewhat agree, disagree.
\(^{31}\) Questions 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 19 received >50% of respondent answers in the “somewhat agree” category. It is reasonable to suggest that the inclusion of an additional measure, “somewhat disagree” might have changed the outcome of these questions.
that “focus groups afford the researcher less control than individual interviews; data are difficult to analyze; moderators require special skills; difference between groups can be troublesome; groups are difficult to assemble; and the discussion must be conducted in a conducive environment” (1992:255). Lastly, data collected from focus group interviews did not undergo SPSS coding or analysis.

Secondary analysis\(^{32}\) was an aspect of this study. LMPs have existed in Great Britain and the European Community for over 20 years, allowing sociologists and labour relations experts to research the value of LMPs from differing perspectives. In comparison, North American research on LMPs is limited. This is partially due to the fact that outside of CAMI, it is difficult to find any existing formal LMPs in North America. To enhance my research, I relied on articles from both Europe and North America. By contrasting and comparing my findings to existing literature, it was my intention to add credibility to my study. Articles from Smith, Lucio, Stuart, Murray, Levesque, Vallee, Rinehart and Rolfsen and others have been cited in my work. However, secondary analysis has its limitations. According to Bryman and Teevan (2005:134), it is difficult to assess the quality of academic work when it is completed by someone else. The new researcher has no control over data quality, and lacks familiarity with complex data supplied by others. In this regard, an element of risk resides when citing outside sources.

\(^{32}\) Secondary analysis is a form of research in which the data collected and processed by one researcher are reanalyzed, often for a different purpose, by another. Also known as secondary data. Babbie (1992: 281)
3.5 Ethical Considerations

Any research associated with Brock University that involves living human subjects requires a review process and approval from the Research Ethics Board (REB)\textsuperscript{33} prior to commencement. Assuring participant anonymity and confidentiality is a crucial aspect of living human subject research. In respect to this project, CAMI is a thriving work environment in which many social dynamics exist. The topic of the CAMI LMP and its associated risks to workers is important to the union, and to workers. As such, the researcher must ensure that participants not only feel secure in the research environment, but that they are not purposefully or indirectly harmed as a result of the research process.

Application for ethical review of research involving human participants was submitted to the REB for review and approval. The REB reviewed the research proposal and found that certain aspects of the research required clarification. Final approval to conduct this study was given by the REB under file# 11-274 SMITH on May 17th, 2012. Additionally, a modification to the original REB application to include a survey questionnaire was submitted to the committee and approved on September 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2012.

3.6 Chapter Summary.

This chapter focused on describing the research framework of the study, including the methods employed in the development and execution of the cross-sectional survey and the focus group sessions. Additionally, the chapter outlined the major limitations to the research as determined by the researcher.

\textsuperscript{33} For a full explanation of ethics policy and procedure related to research with humans, please visit www.brocku.ca and go to Office of Research Services.
Chapter 4

Data Analysis & Findings

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore the findings obtained from three sources: the survey questionnaire, focus group interviews and documents made available to the researcher by the union. In restating the research question, I was concerned with revealing and understanding risks to unionized CAMI workers under the existing LMP agreement. Research has found that risk to CAMI workers has increased under the current LMP arrangement. Past studies have revealed a steady erosion of worker commitment to lean production. Much of this is related to structural changes made by management to original JPM methodologies, practices and the LMP arrangement. Since commencing production, CAMI workers have identified many negative aspects of their LMP that required labour-union job action and worker support to achieve change. Major examples are: andon cord modifications, kaizen manipulation, intensification of assembly line work, and the lack of reciprocal obligation for workers. In more recent years, the company introduced a two-tier worker compensation system, CAMI’s response to the pressures of the global market and the deep recession of 2008-09. In a nutshell, full time (FT) workers were afforded all the protections of the CAW contract; SWE received a substantially reduced compensation package, with limited shop-floor rights and negligible union security. The following sections will reveal how distributive and political risks have increased at CAMI. As well, findings also indicate how CAMI Automotive has selectively withdrawn from many of its LMP commitments.
Distributive Risks: Contract Review

At a fundamental level, risk can be evaluated through reviewing the performance of the collective agreement over time. Since 1998, the union has negotiated five collective agreements over a fifteen-year span. The first agreement (1989) was mutually agreed to by both parties without the use of a contract ratification vote. In return, the union was granted voluntary recognition, albeit with a wage and benefit package that was below the established industry standard at that time. After a difficult five-week strike (1992), workers achieved wage parity with other CAW represented automotive plants on Ontario. Base wages started at $23.23/hour in 1998 and rose to $33.58/hour in 2007. When compared to the average Canadian manufacturing worker during the same timeframe, CAMI generally outperformed the sector. The sector average increase was 1.9% from 2003 to 2012 with CAMI averaging 2.4%. However, in the union’s seventh contract (2007-10), wages flattened out during the final two years of the contract, with the base wage increasing at only 0.9% per year. The eighth and latest contract had CAMI workers giving back 0.08% in the first year, with no increases during the final two years. When compared to the manufacturing sector from 2008 through 2012, CAMI workers fared quite poorly, averaging 0.34% against the sector average of 1.7%.

34 Since the strike, CAMI workers have maintained relative wage parity with other CAW represented auto-assembly plants. Wages have been compared against the overall manufacturing sector as I was unable to locate any non-union assembly-plant wage information to compare against CAMI. It would have been useful to compare how non-union autoworkers workers fared against their unionized counterparts over the same timeframe.
35 For the purposes of this study, I have chosen to review the production associate class, as it represents the majority of workers at the plant. In my study, Production Associates were 65.7% of the sample population.
36 Comparison data was drawn from labour.gc.ca: Major Wage settlements by year and Sector. See http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/labour_relations/info_analysis/datas/wages/wages_year_sector.shtml
On September 20th, 2010, the union entered into an agreement with CAMI on the use of SWE in the workforce. Letter 60 specifically outlines wages, benefits and security agreements for SWE workers. In their agreement, SWE workers receive 70% of the full base rate established for FT workers. In other words, SWE workers are receiving $23.91/hour as compared to the $34.15/hour enjoyed by FT workers doing the same jobs. When compared to FT rates, the SWE rate reflects the 1999 FT rate. Adding insult to injury, shift premiums are calculated from base wage rates, with SWE workers further exploited as they receive 50 cents less an hour when compared to their FT counterparts.

For the first time ever, CAMI workers fell below the industry average as real-wage risk was evidenced in the current contract. The CAMI contract is set to expire on September 16th, 2013. In September, 2012, all other CAW-GM workers completed their master collective bargaining agreement. The term of this new contract was extended to four years, expiring on September 19th, 2016. The highlights of the agreement are that base wages remain the same for the duration of the contract, pensions are unchanged, health care benefits are basically unchanged, and the opportunity opens up for SWE workers to transition to FT. Excluding the minor victory for SWE rights, Big Three pattern bargaining did very little for auto workers in terms of improvements. In essence, they succeeded only in resisting the many concessions that GM had demanded.

37 Letter 60 can be found in the CAMI Automotive and CAW Local 88 Collective Agreement, effective September 20, 2010 to September 16, 2013. Letters in the contract are similar to memorandums of understanding.
38 CAMI is not part of the pattern bargaining agreement that GM has with the CAW union. This exclusion was part of their original LMP agreement. Information gathered from CAW-Canada Bargaining Report, September 2012://www.caw.ca/assets/images/34898_CAW-GM_Report.pdf
39 It is important to note that CAMI’s base wage is 4 cents/hour less than the base rate for Oshawa and St Catharines.
40 SWE workers now have a pathway to becoming FT workers. GM is also more limited in its use of SWE hiring practice.
41 Pattern bargaining is a CAW strategy that attempts to ensure General Motor, Ford and Chrysler workers are all treated the same.
As with their wages, CAMI workers have also experienced erosion in their benefit plan. For the purposes of this study, I have restricted my analysis to shift premiums, vacation entitlement and rest periods. Shift premiums have remained the same since the fourth contract. At $1.70 and $3.41 respectively, shift premiums are the same as all other CAW-represented autoworkers. CAMI workers had experienced continual improvement in their vacation entitlement from 1998 through to 2010. However the current contract saw vacation entitlement clawed back for low seniority workers. Workers with 1 to 3 years of seniority had their vacations reduced by a total of 3 days, reverting back to 2 weeks plus 1 day for those with 2 to 3 years seniority. In effect, this change reflects 2001-2004 vacation levels. In comparison to other CAW autoworkers, CAMI workers receive similar vacation entitlement.

Rest periods are important to all workers. In particular, coffee breaks are essential to CAMI workers as they are subjected to intensified work under lean manufacturing methodology. In other words, workers at CAMI require more downtime to physically and mentally recover during their shifts. Initially, CAMI recognized the need for worker recovery and from 1998 to 2009, rest periods in the plant consisted of two 18-minute breaks/0.5 shift. That all changed in 2010, and under the current contract, rest periods have been reduced significantly to 10 minutes/0.5 shift, a total reduction of 16 minutes/shift or 44% for each worker. This change increased worked hours on the assembly while at the same time reducing rest period benefit by $8.88/shift to each worker. Over a 250-day work-year, this translates to approximately $2,200 in lost benefits to each worker, or $6,600,000 based on the entire CAMI workforce. In contrast to the benefit erosion experienced by workers, the company gains the same amount in new-found labour productivity. GM now recovers wages directly in the form of productivity where in the

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past they were absorbed as benefit costs under the preexisting production arrangement. In one year, this means the company has gained approximately 188,521 hours of additional labour from the CAMI workforce at no extra cost.

4.3 Distributive Risks: Grievance Summary

For the purposes of this study, I was able to secure individual grievance information as retained by the union for each of the last four years. As such, I categorized grievance information by sex and grievance type for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

Grievance Summary\textsuperscript{43}

By Sex and Type

2009 – 2012*

\begin{itemize}
\item 2012 totals were annualized for comparison purposes
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{43} Grievance data was supplied for years 2009 through 2012. Previous years were not available for comparison.
The analysis of grievances is intended to provide information on how workers are responding to management tactics on the shop floor. Grievances generally reflect serious matters in labour-management relations. And because grievances reflect workers real concerns, it is reasonable to include these results in the determination of tangible risk to workers.

In December, 2009, General Motors of Canada and Suzuki Motors announced that GM had purchased Suzuki’s share of CAMI Automotive. GM took ownership in 2010, and with it came an immediate increase in the number of grievance issues year over year. In 2009, total grievances were 121. Of the 121 grievances, 70.2% were male, 23.1% female with 6.7% representing policy grievances. With a 2009 workforce of approximately 2150, the grievance to worker ratio was 5.6%. In 2010, the first full year with GM at the management helm, grievances increased to 207, with 81.6% issued by males, 13% by female workers and 5.4% deemed policy grievances. With a 2010 workforce of approximately 2450, the grievance to worker ratio was 8.5%.

In 2011, the total number of grievances declined to 187, with 81.8% issued by male workers, 15% by females, with the remaining 3.2% deemed policy grievances. Hiring rose in 2011 to a level of 2938 as demand for CAMI-made vehicles increased, resulting in a grievance-to-worker ratio of 6.4%. Annualized results for 2012 suggest a continued decline in grievances issued with a projected 157 for the year, with 75.9% issued by males, 17.7% by female workers, and 6.4% policy grievances. With approximately 3000 workers today, the grievance-to-worker ratio is projected to be 5.2%. The results show grievance volumes on the decline as the workforce increases. With 2012 grievance results settled in at approximately 5.2%, the use of grievances to resolve shop-floor issues had dropped back to 2009 levels. The decline of grievance use in 2012 is difficult to explain. Regardless, the reasons for grievance have also shifted dramatically. The
next section will show how workers are now using the grievance procedure to promote their individual power more effectively.

Measuring the type of grievances issued can also illuminate how workers perceive risk on the shop floor. For the purposes of this study, I have categorized grievances as either disciplinary or procedural. Grievances categorized as discipline reflect workers contesting reprimands, warnings, suspensions, or terminations. Grievances categorized as procedural encompass concerns over working conditions, wage and benefit disputes, health and safety, work standards, and human rights violations to name a few.

In 2009, grievances filed for disciplinary-related issues were 28.1% of the total, with procedural grievances representing the largest category at 71.9%. This result suggests that CAMI workers and its union were more focused on structural concerns over individual security or performance issues. Further, the low level of disciplinary grievances in 2009 suggests that managers and workers were able to work out their differences prior to using the grievance procedure. That said, in 2010, grievances filed for disciplinary related issues rose to 51.2% of the total, with procedural grievances now representing only 48.8%. The dramatic swing in grievance type clearly coincides with the change in ownership to GM. Not much changed in the subsequent two years, with disciplinary grievances remaining steady at 50.5%. The astounding change in grievance type suggests a major shift in both management philosophy and operating practice on the CAMI shop floor. Workers were now being challenged on a more active level by management on performance issues.

Although performance-related disciplinary action remains a real concern for workers, focus group discussions revealed absenteeism and substantiation-related\(^{44}\) disciplinary action against

\(^{44}\) Substantiation: refers to workers ability to substantiate any absenteeism they incur. If workers fail to provide reasons (documented proof in many cases), they are disciplined.
workers ranked high on management’s agenda. According to workers, high levels of absenteeism in the plant related directly to the mandatory six day work week and the continued intensification of workload. When asked about workload, a focus group participant responded, “work has intensified. The initial speed of the line was 3.2 minutes; today it’s less than a minute…57 seconds”. Workers are tired and frustrated by the lack of management empathy related to their work-life balance issues. They need time to heal and recoup from their work, and they need time to spend with their family and friends. According to workers, it has never been easy working at CAMI, but a change for the worse has occurred recently. On the question of GM influence, one FT worker during the focus group sessions said “their goal is to scare everybody into doing what they need done to get cars out” adding “this isn’t a partnership”.

4.4 On Risk & LMP Commitment: Survey Results

Ten questions (10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 20) are related to the two types of risk that are associated with LMP partnership arrangements. These questions were intended to determine how workers perceived risk within their workplace. Nine questions (7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17 and 19) provided insight into CAMI management’s commitment to the prescribed values and outcomes of LMP partnership arrangements. I propose that management’s lower commitment level to LMP values and outcomes is related directly to a subsequent higher level of distributive and political risk faced by workers on the shop floor. In this section, I will comment on the survey findings in relations to risk and management’s commitment to LMP values and outcomes.
4.4a Distributive & Political Risk

Analysis of the union contract and available grievance information has shown increased distributive risk related to wages, benefits, health and safety, and worker employment security. As the company pushes to intensify the labour process through labour-saving strategies and reduced takt time, workers continue to feel compelled to do more, regardless of the increased pressure to perform. Approximately 71% of respondents very much agreed or somewhat agreed that even though work levels have steadily intensified, they felt compelled to keep up and do more for the good of the company. Only 29.3% disagreed with the question on intensified workload and willingness to do more for the company. This result reveals two important points. Firstly, by agreeing with the statement, workers have acknowledged the continued intensification of work on the shop floor. Secondly, the majority of respondents appear to remain supportive of a fundamental LMP value, enterprise success. Workers’ willingness to work harder for the good of the company conflicts directly with the real effects of intensified work on labour. Understandably, workers are concerned. In another question, 48% of all respondents felt working conditions on the floor had worsened with 34.4% suggesting nothing has changed. With 82.4% of workers responding to similar or worsening conditions, only 17.6% believed working conditions have improved. As reported by one worker, “the company cares more for the numbers than the workers, as we get older, we are working harder, heavier jobs, 6 days a week with no downtime for our bodies to heal and recover”. This statement supports the notion that workers have rightly identified worsening conditions while still supporting the company. Although workers are supportive of the LMP value of enterprise, or company success, they want improvements. The question of worsening conditions on the shop floor also relates to an important LMP value on the quality of work life. With the near majority of respondents
suggesting worsening shop-floor conditions, the company has failed to commit to LMP principles pertaining to the quality of work life. As focus group participants stated, there is an “erosion of quality of life”, with one worker in the group raising personal concerns about being “overworked physically and mentally”.

When asked directly how they viewed benefits, wages and job security, 66.7% of workers in the survey believe conditions have worsened, 26.5% suggest no real changes, and 6.8% of workers believe conditions have improved. These results accord with my analysis of the contract and the grievance files. The contract summary clearly shows how wages and benefits have declined. Of particular concern, the SWE agreement allows the company to exercise its management rights related to worker security in a much more subjective and arbitrary manner. The large gap in wage and employment security between FT and SWE reveals significant present and future risk to all CAMI workers. The effective use of SWE by management is so substantial in terms of risk to both types of workers that it will require a separate section following this discussion. However, to conclude the discussion on distributive risks, the reductions in wage and benefits, the use of SWE workers, and the intensification of work proves how workers at CAMI have experienced and continue to be prone to a variety of distributive risks under the current LMP arrangements.

Many of the questions asked in the survey were intended to reveal how susceptible workers are to political risk under the current LMP. Political risk is associated with the effects that LMPs have on the displacement of unions as the legitimate agent for workers. In other words, unions can find themselves displaced within the dynamic of the workplace through formal and informal relations achieved through the manipulation and use of team leaders, group leaders, workers, team concept, kaizen programs, and other collaborative mechanisms normally associated with
lean manufacturing, JPM, and LMPs. Measuring how close workers are to management will assist in determining their exposure to increased political risk. Rolfsen warned against the effects of a cozy relationship between management and union. As the line of demarcation blurs under the conventions of LMPs, it is important for unions and workers to manage collaboration and conflict equally if they want to maintain their bargaining power.

CAMI workers have never shied away from doing the right things on the shop floor for productive efficiency or quality. With 96.1% of all respondents agreeing to the importance of worker cooperation with management, workers appear to be doing their part in support of key LMP values related to success and involvement. But how exactly does this high level of commitment play itself out for workers? It was difficult to any find evidence that workers were actually benefiting from their high levels of commitment. On the other hand, GM is doing very well. In an independent performance and productivity evaluation carried out by the Harbour Reporting\textsuperscript{45} Group, CAMI ranked as the fifth most efficient auto assembly plant in North America through 2007. So, it’s clear that GM has benefited from its LMP arrangement with its workers.

Whether they know it or not, workers are performing in the manner prescribed by LMP principles. Underlying their commitment to collaboration is a unanimous belief that the company must remain financially successful. In fact, 99.6% of all respondents agreed with the LMP tenet that the company must be kept profitable. With only 0.4%, or one respondent out of 280 in disagreement, the survey result on financial success is overwhelmingly in support of CAMI making money. Workers are prepared to support the LMP notion of financial success. Although

\textsuperscript{45} As reported in an article by Jim Stanford, Productivity in the North American Auto Assembly Industry, 1998-2007 at http://www.caw.ca/assets/images/Productivity_in_N_American_Auto_Assembly_CAW_Jan_09.pdf
this result does suggest workers support CAMI success, workers understand the relationship between jobs and profitability.

For many companies, profit and return on investment for shareholders remain important criteria in determining future financial consideration and support. In other words, if a facility cannot meet certain financial benchmarks, it faces the risk of closure. Autoworkers have experienced countless plant closures in North America, including the closure of NUMMI Automotive in California. During the focus group sessions, workers commented extensively on the fear of closure. Many concerns were raised over job security and the increased competition for new products and models going forward. As an example, a male assembly line worker clearly stated that his main concerns remain “job security, safety and retirement”. So, workers realize the need for companies to be profitable and, at CAMI, are prepared to do their part to achieve that outcome. However, in return, they expect to receive a “fair wage”, a safe workplace, and job security. Challenged to cooperate with management for survival, workers need to be mindful that cooperation without conflict could lead to an increased exposure to both distributive and political risk.

The importance of union voice cannot be underestimated when working under the constant pressures associated with lean manufacturing. Workers need to have the highest level of confidence that their union is an equal partner with the company when it comes to working through complex issues related to the rigors of the assembly plant floor. Of the survey respondents, 79.3% of the participants believed that the company respects the role of the union as the voice of the worker, with 20.7% disagreeing with the statement. Although this response appears to validate the LMP commitment to union recognition and respect, I found related
questions conflicted with this result. Political risk appears to be mounting against the union through the transformation of CAMI operational practices and policy aimed at productivity improvement and cost reduction. In other words, management is gradually eroding union power. Workers have noticed this within the workplace dynamic, and although the majority of respondents find the company respects the union as the voice of the worker, I suspect this result more closely reflects their view towards contract rights related to union representation and not the LMP and worker experiences on the assembly line floor.

Having an open and transparent relationship is considered important under the TUC’s partnership model. I asked workers to respond to the company’s performance in regard to this important supplementary building block. It is important for CAMI workers to know that the company does not have a hidden agenda. Of course, workers were quick to recognize how the company has failed to live up to many of its commitments. Some examples of workers’ concerns related to this topic were raised during the focus group session. When asked to comment on GM influence, one worker commented, “Suzuki people had integrity and they were good people, now we are GM”, with another adding “managements style and practice is not what they talk about”. In the survey questionnaire, 71.6% of worker respondents found the company failed to live up to this LMP building block. For effective relations to exist under LMP arrangements, workers need to believe that they can trust the company. However, the majority of worker respondents at CAMI believe the company has its own agenda, leaving workers wondering what the future holds. Lack of transparency and hidden agendas have eroded any trust that had existed at the plant in the past.

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46 On questions related to LMP principles of transparency, trust, and the specific use of team leaders. See Appendix B, survey results.
Under the IPA LMP version, trust is considered an essential element to an effective partnership arrangement. According to the IPA doctrine, trust can only be gained through an established active relationship between the union and the company. But trust seems to be off the table for both the union and CAMI workers. On the topic of trust, 94.3% of all worker respondents agreed that management could not be trusted. When coupled with previous results, the lack of trust that workers have towards the company is not surprising. The company has eroded wages, benefits, and security provisions while leveraging its existing LMP at the expense of workers. However, this result conflicts with some of the earlier findings. With 96.1% of all respondents agreeing on the importance of workers cooperation with management, workers appear to be doing their part in support of key LMP values related to success and involvement. Why would CAMI workers cooperate with the company when they realize the truth about their LMP relationship? The fact remains that CAMI workers still enjoy a superior compensation package when compared to other manufacturing jobs that exist in Ontario. A FT worker lamented that his main concern was the “erosion of good paying manufacturing jobs”. It reflects his concern that if he lost his job, he knows that he will not be able to replace his current compensation package. In short CAMI workers are worried about losing their jobs and, along with their union, are prepared to do whatever is necessary to make CAMI work for them and the company.

Combining the recognition of workers needs for security and the company’s need to maximize operational flexibility is a key tenet of the IPA doctrine. This idea is not new to the automotive industry. It dates back to the notion of reciprocal obligation developed by the Toyota Automotive Company following the end of WWII. Under the Toyota program, workers toiled and in return they received higher wages and employment security. When CAMI was originally
formed, the union and the company agreed in principle to adopt many of the key components of lean manufacturing and elements of LMP agreements. In the early days at Toyota\textsuperscript{47}, workers received a full set of rights including a guarantee of lifetime employment. Womack considered lifetime employment a key ingredient to lean and LMP. They believed “to make the system work, of course management must offer its full support to the factory work force and, when the auto market slumps, make sacrifices to ensure job security that has been historically offered only to valued professionals. It truly is a system of reciprocal obligation” (1990:102). Buried in the notion of reciprocal obligation, we find security and flexibility bound up together, representing the first key IPA supplementary building block.

For all their effort, CAMI workers have not enjoyed any reciprocity. In my 2008 CAMI study, I noted:

\begin{quote}
workers have not been afforded either life-time employment guarantees or a full set of rights. CAMI workers have commented on how employment guarantees were philosophically discussed and supported under Suzuki management during the formative years. However it soon became apparent to the union executive that the company was not prepared to formally agree to a no-layoff clause in the contract. By 1995, the company had abandoned its “no-layoff” rhetoric resulting in CAMI subsequently adopting an active layoff policy with the first layoffs occurring in 1996” (2008:69).
\end{quote}

For LMPs to be effective for workers and companies, formalized security (for workers) and flexibility (for employers) must be equally respected and upheld.

I asked a series of questions in the survey to determine how the company had performed in meeting its commitments to reciprocal obligations under LPM guidelines. The following discussion represents how workers measured CAMI commitment. The question on intensified work has already been discussed, with 82.4\% of worker respondents suggesting that working

\textsuperscript{47} From \textit{The Machine that Changed the World}, Womack et al (1990).
conditions have either stayed the same or worsened over time. Only 17.6% of workers in the survey believe the shop floor has actually improved. Along with worsening conditions, layoffs have been initiated by management in combination with the creation and implementation of the two-tier worker classification. CAMI’s use of these cost-reduction initiatives illustrates their lack of commitment to important worker essentials in LMP arrangements. Interestingly, even though workers understand all of this, they continue to commit to the LMP program. When asked if they felt compelled to keep up with workloads and to do more for the good of the company, 70.7% of all respondents agreed at some level. With only 29.3% disagreeing, the majority of workers in the survey are still prepared to do more for the company.

Consistent with this result is worker willingness to cooperate with management to resolve issues collaboratively and without conflict. In respect to cooperation, 76.1% of worker respondents agreed that workers are more likely to work with management today than in the past. Similarly, 56.3% went on to state that they are prepared to resolve issues without conflict. In other words, CAMI workers are less likely than before to utilize grievance and arbitration to resolve workplace issues and concerns. This result appears to be supported by the reduction in workplace grievances over the last three years. Since spiking in 2010, the total number of grievances issued by workers at the plant has declined by approximately 25% over the last three years. On the surface, this result might seem a promising sign to labour relations optimists. However, further evidence will suggest that cooperation does not equate to workers necessarily buying into the present form of LMP, nor does it mean they are prepared to relinquish their power through embracing contradictory management ideology and practice.

When it comes to trusting CAMI, 94.3% of worker respondents said they do not trust the company. When asked to rate workplace conditions, 82.4% think the plant is not improving at all.

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48 This is a projection based on annualizing results from June 27th/2012.
all. With the progressive intensification of work through reduced team size, increased tasking and reduced takt time, workers are under significant management pressure to perform on a daily basis. On the topic of wages, benefits and security, 93.2% believed their contract provisions have either eroded or remained the same. The facts support this result, since 2010, wages and benefits have either declined slightly or remained unchanged\(^{49}\). So, even though workers have responded positively to supporting CAMI and the LMP through cooperative and collaboratively measures, they are not ready to embrace the company wholeheartedly by abandoning their collective power. When asked to comment on the importance of union representation, 98.9% of all workers in the survey agreed that the CAW is vitally important to protect their worker rights. The overwhelming response for union representation to protect worker rights contrasts with the unions and workers willingness to collaborate with management under the current LMP arrangements. This apparent contradiction works because the union has developed a complex relationship strategy whereby the union navigates and manages competing interests simultaneously.

The ability to reconcile conflict and collaboration is an important attribute of LMPs. In an earlier study, Peetz (1996) concluded that conflict and collaboration are not mutually exclusive traits:

It appears, then, that we have a paradox: unionization is enhanced both by cooperation and conflict. To understand this paradox, it is necessary to examine whether perceived union-management cooperation and participation in industrial conflict genuinely are mutually exclusive. In fact, the evidence from the surveys suggests that they are not mutually exclusive. Employees who had participated in industrial action at their current workplace were more likely than those who had not participated in such action to agree that unions cooperated with management. This does not imply that participation in industrial action promoted

\(^{49}\) For wage and benefits review, see Appendix F.
perceptions of cooperativeness. Rather, it is more likely that employees who had favourable attitudes towards unions, arising in part from perceptions of union cooperativeness, were more inclined to support industrial action. The implication is that participation in industrial action is not incompatible with generally cooperative perceptions of union behaviour (1996:565).

Rolfsen also found how labour can work closely with management in an LMP while simultaneously protecting its bargaining power. Both Peetz and Rolfsen stress the importance of union vigilance under LMP arrangements. In other words, “to protect a partnership on a long term basis, it also seems important that it is not exchanged for reduced benefits for union members, and to develop a strong union democracy” (2011:606). As such, it is reasonable to conclude that CAMI workers and their union have got it right from this perspective. It is not irrational for workers and unions to participate with companies to improve competitive advantage through LMP arrangements as long as workers are mindful to protect their rights. This explains how workers can be both supportive of the company while at the same time not trusting them to make good decisions on behalf of workers. In other words, CAMI workers have developed a unique set of social relations within the LMP workplace allowing them to cooperate without compromise. With 98.9% of workers supporting the union, it would be difficult for CAMI management to split and erode the union as had happened at NUMMI Freemont. Solidarity is alive and well at the CAMI plant. But trouble still lurks. Later I will discuss the use of SWE workers and the divisive nature of that arrangement.

When it comes to assessing how workers view their existing LMP arrangement, the answer is clear. As already discussed, 70.8% of workers are prepared to accept intensified work to ensure the company succeeds. The majority of workers find management and workers resolving issues in a collaborative manner and without conflict. Over 79% of workers feel the company respects
the role of the union as the voice of the workers, reinforcing the notion that independent union representation is vital to any LMP relation. Most importantly, 99.6% believe it is important for CAMI to be financially successful. The combination of these findings illustrates the high level of understanding and awareness that CAMI workers and their union have in regards to their LMP arrangement with CAMI. On precisely that question, 79.3% of the workers participating in the survey responded favourably when asked if the LMP at CAMI works well for workers and the union. Before proceeding to the chapter summary, I will discuss the sensitive topic of SWEs and the two-tier worker classification. I asked one question on the survey to gauge worker opinion on SWEs and the results will be discussed next. However, it was in the focus group sessions and the open ended questions that the real narrative on the use of SWEs comes to life. Suffice to say, workers recognize the danger of SWE. Not surprisingly, the findings illustrate how all workers are very concerned with the trend towards a tiered workforce.

4.4b Two-Tier Wages & SWEs

The use of SWEs raises a fundamental question of equality and worker rights. Equality and fair treatment of all workers remains a cornerstone objective for any progressive union. So, is risk to SWEs comparable to that of their FT counterparts? To answer that question, risk to SWEs was approached from two distinct perspectives. The first risk relates to the terms and conditions of employment that potential worker-candidates are forced to accept in order to work at the plant. The second set of risks relates to the effect that the use of SWEs has on the various relationships within the plant. This section is primarily concerned with risk relationships that exist between, SWEs and supervisors, SWEs and FTs, and SWEs and the union.
In the survey, workers were asked if they agreed with having FT and SWE workers in CAMI. Of the 280 respondents, 3 or 1.1% did not answer the question. Of the remaining 277 respondents, 17 or 6.1% very much agreed with having both SWE and FT workers, 69 or 24.9% somewhat agreed, and 191 or 69% disagreed with having both SWE and FT workers in the plant. When the results were collapsed, 31% of the worker respondents agreed with the use of SWE with 69% in disagreement. The survey results clearly show the majority of CAMI workers would favour the removal of the SWE class, and the two-tier wage structure.

Responses and comments gathered from the open-ended questions and focus group sessions amplify the results of the survey on the topic of SWEs. The focus group sessions were split into two categories, SWE and FT. The SWE interview group raised numerous concerns, including strained shop floor relations with other SWEs, FT workers, supervisors, and the union. The SWE group also identified very specific shortcomings related to their compensation packages and shop-floor rights and security provisions when compared to FT workers. To fully understand their concerns, I’ll turn to the collective bargaining agreement that exists between Local 88 and the company for answers.

The SWE benefit package is also unattractive when compared to FT workers. With no pension, they are also limited to 4% of their annual rate for vacation entitlement. Time off the line is important to all workers. They need their time off to recoup from the rigors of intensified work. In this respect, SWE workers are again short changed when compared to FT workers. FT workers are progressively entitled to more vacation\(^{50}\) based on their rising seniority. SWE workers are capped at two weeks. Without adequate time off, they expressed a growing frustration and anxiety towards a compensation structure that is clearly exploitive. As one SWE expressed, “the benefit/security provisions are more important than getting the FT rate”.

\(^{50}\) To view the vacation entitlement program for full time workers, see Appendix F.
SWE workers are not adequately protected by the contract. For the purpose of job selection, SWE seniority only works for them within the SWE classification, and only if the company deems them to have performed to company expectations. The qualifying criterion is therefore subjective and based on supervisory discretion. On the topic of overtime, SWEs are again subjected to second class status. The contract\textsuperscript{51} explains how SWEs, “will be entitled to overtime opportunities on a last to be asked basis by shift” (2010:187).

Furthermore, SWE workers, regardless of their tenure in the company are always considered probationary employees. The definition of probationary worker can be found on page 13 of the CAMI-CAW Collective Agreement (2010-2013). In terms of probationary rights and protection for workers, the contract clearly states, “CAMI will be the sole judge of their ability and suitability for employment, and termination will be at CAMI’s discretion”. The use of the probationary designation allows the company to arbitrarily decide the fate of any SWE workers. Although SWE workers are represented by the union, the union grievance procedure does not protect them adequately, as the union’s power of arbitration is not afforded to SWE workers due to their permanent probationary status. Moreover, as previously mentioned, former EMD workers were allowed to displace SWE workers through an agreement that the CAW National made with GM upon the closure of the London facility. With 25 SWEs already displaced, another 115 are on the chopping block waiting for the day that their jobs will be eliminated in favour of the terminated EMD workers.

The closing statement in Letter 60 encapsulates just how precarious the working relationship is between SWE and the company. It says that SWEs “will be treated as probationary employees in all aspects as described in the collective agreements unless specifically mentioned in this

\textsuperscript{51} Excerpts from the contract, Collective Agreement between CAMI Automotive Inc. and CAW TCA Local 88, Effective September 20, 2010 to September 16, 2013.
memorandum” (2010:187). In the final analysis, wages, benefits and security provisions for SWEs fall far short when compared to FT workers. SWE workers are at risk and their predicament is well known and felt by FT workers. With the majority of survey respondents in agreement with abolishing the two-tier wage structure, it isn’t any wonder that I received a multitude of written responses (Appendix C) demanding that the SWE designation be eliminated in favour of FT status. Survey results in combination with worker comments illustrate the concern that all CAMI workers have related to the injustice that exists under the existing two-tier wage structure. The gap in wages, benefits, job mobility and security defines a relationship which is clearly exploitive of SWE workers. In other words, my research has established risk specific to SWE workers under the LMP arrangement.

FT workers have also begun to realize the risk of SWE in relationship to their position in the plant as well. When asked about the two-tier structure, the majority of FT workers disapproved of the practice. With 246 FT respondents, 166 or 67.5% of all full timers disagreed with having SWE. Of the remaining 32.5%, 63 or 25.6% somewhat agreed with SWE while 17 or 6.9% agreed with the two-tier model. With 67.5% disapproving and a further 32.5% somewhat in favour, 93.1% of FT workers recognize or partially recognize the risk associated with having SWE in the plant. While FT workers have recognized risks associated with the two-tier structure on SWE workers, they have also associated increased risk to themselves. The following comments (Appendix C) from FT workers illustrate many of their concerns:

SWEs in time could erode long term benefits and pensions. Once all the FT workers retire, this place will have a mock union of SWEs. I think their trying to get rid of us full timers for SWEs. Two tier workforce undermines unity. Pension erosion and cola must be maintained. Lack of solidarity as a union. The erosion of wages, holidays and pensions by GM. Two-tier wages are a poison that should be banned by government. Equal pay for equal work. The workers do not stick together and it will
worsen with tier wages. Divide between FT and SWE. Lack of
solidarity, due to increase in unwelcomed intimidation from company to
SWE workforce. Workers pitted against each other. Maintain a strong
union voice, push for rights of all workers, FT and SWEs.

Comments from FT workers reflect a growing understanding of risk related to the continued
acceptance of SWE workers at CAMI. Full timers recognize that their own wages, rights, and
security are now under pressure. As one FT worker suggested, we are on a “race to the bottom”. However, beyond personal financial risk, FT workers now regard the two-tier structure as
damaging their collective strength and union solidarity. Many of the comments received point to
a serious concern over the future of the union. With continued growth in SWE numbers, full
timers believe that they may ultimately be the minority. In other words, if the SWE-to-FT ratio
continues to increase, the ‘race to the bottom’ seems imminent.

Fundamental worker security under the SWE arrangement is virtually nonexistent. As
mentioned earlier, SWEs are considered perpetual probationary workers. And although they can
utilize the grievance procedure, they do not have any access to arbitration, limiting the union’s
ability to legitimately fight for them in any meaningful way. In comparison, FT workers would
never accept giving up security rights that affords them a fighting chance to achieve workplace
justice. So, full timers have now connected the risks associated with the use of SWEs to the
potential erosion of their own rights and security. As such, they see the need to reverse the SWE
program, not only for the SWEs, but as a way of reducing their own risk under the current LMP.
Not surprisingly, SWEs find risk residing in all aspects of their CAMI relationship. They need
to navigate relationships carefully within the plant walls, given the precarious nature of their
status. The next section will discuss how risk is viewed within the various SWE relationships
that exist at CAMI.
When it comes to supervisor-worker relations, SWEs are at risk. When directly asked in the survey if management could be trusted, 96.8% of all SWE respondents said no, slightly higher than the overall average. The lack of trust in management is rooted in the oppressive and unequal relationship that exists between the two groups. Although CAMI rules and regulations are intended to apply equally to all workers, the truth is something totally different. SWE workers are under constant pressure from management to perform in ways from which many of the FT workers are exempt. The focus group sessions revealed many interesting facts about life on the line for SWEs. SWEs are under the constant gaze of management. Considered easy prey for supervisors, SWEs know they must not only perform, but their performance must be equal to if not better than that of their FT counterparts. Many examples were provided during the focus group, illuminating the high risk associated with SWE life at CAMI. One SWE strategically declined washroom breaks during her first six months at CAMI upon receiving a supervisor’s recommendation that taking washroom breaks was a ‘bad idea’.

The added pressure of work extends to unrealistic expectations on attendance. Although pressure to attend work six days a week is universal in the plant for FT and SWE, SWEs feel additional pressure as they cannot miss any time without facing the real threat of discipline or termination. The additional SWE pressure resided in their lack of grievance and arbitration rights. As one SWE indicated, because they are always under the watchful eye of management, “SWEs need to be above and beyond” when it comes to performance related activities. The SWE worker-supervisor relationship at CAMI is similar in many ways to the subordinate-confrontational relationship that exists for most workers, but theirs is experienced at an excessive level. This excessively oppressive relationship stems directly from their lack of rights. It quite simply could not exist if SWEs were afforded the same rights as FT workers. From that
perspective, the supervisor-worker relation at CAMI generates a much higher level of risk for the SWE worker. Commenting on shop floor dynamics, a focus group participant concluded by saying, “SWEs are easy to prey on if management wants to”.

Research suggests that the worker-worker relationship helps to mitigate workplace risk for SWEs at CAMI. To determine how this relationship works, I relied on focus group discussions and answers from the open-ended question portion of the cross-sectional survey. FT workers appear to overwhelming support SWE workers, with many comments showing concern over the treatment of SWEs. FT workers understand how vulnerable SWEs are in the workplace. As one FT worker stated, “the company takes advantage of the SWEs by ruling with an iron fist and a great fear of losing their jobs if they don’t conform with management wishes”. But perhaps the best evidence comes from the SWE focus group comments. In the conversation of shop-floor dynamics, they confidently suggested that most full timers do their best to protect SWEs. Full timers understand that SWEs have very limited job, exit, or labour market power. Using their own forms of power and union protections under the collective agreement, they often put themselves between the SWE worker and supervision. Interrupting the SWE-supervisor relationship in this way acts to provide the indirect transfer of some of their hard fought workplace power. This covert strategy of protection allows full timers’ to absorb management’s ill intention towards SWEs in a way that SWEs are protected through them. Their unselfish willingness to accept management blame and scrutiny to protect SWE is well known to SWE workers. However, there are FT workers that also take advantage of the SWE. As commented on in the focus group “we need to be cautious of some FT workers. SWEs are used as scapegoats and pawns by some FT workers”. Although SWEs did cite how some FT workers made their work life more difficult, the general consensus amongst SWE participants was they
had a positive relationship with their FT counterparts. More importantly, even though some FT workers are prepared to protect them, SWEs realize that they “are easy to prey on if management wants to”.

The final discussion in this section will be on worker-union relations. How do SWEs assess their unions’ performance and has the union done an adequate job in reducing risk to SWE workers? By and large, SWEs are pleased with their union representation. However, approval of the union does not translate into satisfaction with wages, benefits, or security provisions afforded to them in the collective agreement. When asked, they appeared to understand the history behind the inclusion of SWE in the 2010 contract, and the rationale for the two-tier system. One SWE commented the “union agreed to SWEs during the recession because at the time there were so many layoffs the executive underestimated SWE impact…seems like the union was out-negotiated”. A bold statement, perhaps with some truth attached. The inclusion of SWE at the time likely reflected a union position which, in hindsight, paid too much attention to GM’s financial struggles while not providing adequate provisions for the protection and future elimination of the SWE program. Unions must always be wary of buying into corporate agendas, regardless of the threats or promises made. For its part today, the CAW is attempting to undo the SWE experience in Canada. In September 2012, the union published its CAW-Canada/General Motors Bargaining Report. In a message from Secretary-Treasurer Peter Kennedy, the union pushed for changes in the GM pattern collective agreement that would allow SWE workers to become full seniority members. According to Kennedy, the union was “determined to reject a permanent two-tier system. What’s at stake is the future of Canada’s middle class. If high productivity jobs in the auto industry can’t pay decent wages and benefits,

52 CAW-Canada/General Motors Bargaining Report (September 2012) can be found at www.caw.ca/assets/images/34898_CAW-GM_Report.pdf. CAMI bargains separately with GM and is not included in pattern bargaining.
to support a family, then no-one is safe” (2012:2). The union was able to bargain for substantial change related to the use of SWEs in its Oshawa local. With CAMI bargaining commencing sometime in 2013, it seems reasonable to suggest that Local 88 will attempt to secure similar gains for SWE. It is important to note however that SWE use has not been eliminated at GM. There are certain conditions which allow the company to still utilize SWE workers in Oshawa. How this plays out for the hundreds of SWE workers in CAMI still remains to be seen.

SWE workers will have their say when they join with FT workers to vote on the request by GM to go into early contract discussions. For their part, SWEs will be looking for full union representation and protection. When asked to comment on the importance of union voice, 83.8% of SWEs responded that they believe the company acknowledges the role of the union. They know in order to be treated as equals; SWE status and language must be eliminated. They will be pushing the union to take a strong position towards that end. As a voting group, they are now a recognized power within the local. As one SWE suggested, “SWEs have full voting rights on the contract. If SWEs go against the contract, they won’t be able to ratify”.

4.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter primarily focused on the empirical evidence provided from the cross-sectional survey. Specifically, data was utilized to assess the level of risk to workers and the types of risk that workers faced at CAMI. The high response rate to the cross-sectional survey allowed me to confidently arrive at the conclusions related to worker risk. The inclusion of focus group sessions further enhanced the empirical data provided by the cross-sectional survey.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Distributive Risk on the Rise

Firstly, the study found clear evidence that CAMI workers have been subjected to an increasing level of distributive risk. Responding to eroding profits, the company was successful in negotiating reductions in wages and benefits under the current contract. With Big Three pattern bargaining in 2012 providing no further increases over a four year term; it seems clear that CAMI workers should expect similar treatment from their employer when their contract expires in 2013. That was verified on Monday, January 21st, 2012; when *The Globe & Mail* reported that GM Canada was seeking to reopen the CAMI contract for early discussion (Keenan, 2013). In requesting the opening of negotiations seven months early, Kevin Williams, President of GM Canada, stated the company’s request comes amid their concern about how expensive it is to make vehicles in Canada compared to other countries. According to the article, Williams contends that “Canada continues to be the highest-cost producer for General Motors”. The article went on to suggest that CAMI workers should expect GM to offer them the same deal that other CAW workers ratified in 2012. If CAMI workers agree to the 2012 deal already in place in other GM plants, their base wage rate will remain unchanged through to 2016. However, there is more at stake at CAMI than the risk to eroding wages and benefits.

Buried within the GM announcement requesting early contract talks lies a vivid example of the truly coercive relationship between GM and its CAMI workers. The article mentions how GM is contemplating moving existing CAMI production models to plants in the US or Mexico...
as early as 2015. By threatening product loss and possible plant closure or massive layoff, GM Canada is now hedging that its workers will succumb to the pressure of potential job loss by begrudgingly accepting a ‘no increase’ wage plan for the duration of the new contract. CAMI workers now have to decide if the company threat of closure is a real threat or a negotiating ploy to further reduce costs at their expense. It is still too early to determine whether GM is serious about moving production out of CAMI. However, the plant does appear to be critically important to GM’s ongoing success. *The Globe & Mail* reported that CAMI produced 305,414 vehicles in 2012, more than 150% of its traditional measured ‘two shift’ capacity. The article went on to describe CAMI production as second only to the Fort Wayne pickup truck plant. Given the high rate of production under CAMI’s LMP arrangement, it is doubtful that GM would be moving production away from the Ingersoll facility at anytime soon. But for workers and the CAW executive committee, the threat remains real, and as they have in the past, they will be pressured by the company to accept a contract which is counter to the collective interests of all CAMI workers.

*The Globe & Mail* article further frames the risks that exist for workers under the CAMI LMP. Research has shown how CAMI workers have suffered distributive risk under their current arrangement. Even as production soars and work further intensifies, CAMI workers are receiving less and less for their labour. This fact is made worse when considering the use of SWE workers at CAMI, forced to perform at peak levels for reduced wages and job security. More importantly, this all comes at a time when GM is raking in high levels of profit. On February 19th, 2013, the Associated Press released an article on how General Motors continues to turn profits despite losses in the European market. As a consolidated company,

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GM has profited $13.4 billion dollars since the start of 2010. Not surprisingly, 2010 is the same year that CAMI began to take back wages and benefits from its Ingersoll workers. The article quotes how GM executives are optimistic that cost-cutting and 23 new vehicles by 2016 will help the overall profitability of the company.

This entire cost-cutting program by GM at a time of high profit-taking solidifies my argument that CAMI workers continue to be exposed to distributive risk. Their LMP has not provided them with any of the tangible advantages that supposedly come with lean manufacturing. They should be receiving higher wages and benefits for their efforts under lean’s intensified work program. They should also be entitled to a higher form of job security, but instead they have succumbed to a two-tier wage classification that provides nothing special to FT workers and virtually strips all security provisions away from the new SWE group of workers. And lastly, they should be sharing profits with GM, but instead they are asked to accept concessions under threat of closure. In short, distributive risk to CAMI workers has sharply increased since 2010 while GM and its management team have achieved productive gains and considerably enhanced profitability. When it comes to LMP arrangements, built-in flexibility benefits companies in shedding labour and keeping wages under control (Kelly, 2004). CAMI has not been an exception to this rule.
5.2 Political Risk under Alert

Despite these pressures the union continues to perform. Since the 1992 strike, the union has worked hard to protect the rights of CAMI workers. When asked about their union, 98.9% of the workers surveyed support the effort of their union. This positive result must be tempered with the knowledge that 93.2% are very concerned with eroding wages, benefits and security provisions. However, in spite of some controversial decisions made by the union in reaction during difficult economic conditions, this local has proven to be a strong union voice with worker-member support. But, the union needs to be very wary of GM given its recent track record and its insistence upon cost reduction at the expense of its workers. The introduction of SWEs represents the single greatest political risk to CAMI workers and their union. Any two-tier wage structure poses a real threat to union solidarity. Complicating matters even more so, today the workforce may be further splintered as SWEs are further alienated or displaced in favour of an external union pact with GM to bring in terminated EMD workers as FT CAMI workers.

The divisiveness created by the two-tier system and the inclusion of EMD as FT workers threatens to undo the solidarity that has always existed in the plant. Responding to the unfair nature of this arrangement, a FT worker raised his concern with the fact that the CAW was “allowing EMD workers to bump SWE workers and the fact the CAW National was behind this”. In all likelihood, the two-tier class structure poses the greatest threat or political risk to the union. From this perspective, the NUMMI Motors example may indicate what is in store for CAMI workers if they continue to be divided. Splitting of the workforce under any management system hurts solidarity and brings with it the potential of increasing political risk to the union.
A final thought on the topic of political risk. Although the acceptance of SWE workers by
the union has increased the potential for political risk to grow in the plant, I find the SWE
agreement did not result from the state of a politically weakened union. I contend the union
accepted the risk of SWE at a time when conditions in the plant appeared to support that
decision. In other words, the union’s inability to foresee future growth coupled with their
immediate concern at the time to bring in new jobs to CAMI, at any cost. These two conditions
appeared to factor heavily in their decision to accept the two-tier structure. Given the
opportunity to revisit that earlier decision, the union would likely pursue a different course of
action today. However, to reduce political risk in the future, the union must resist
compromising union values at all cost. If anything, the NUMMI experience should have taught
LMP union executives that, to maintain solidarity they must not enter into provocative
arrangements when collaborating with management. On a positive note, during pattern
bargaining in 2012, the CAW National achieved positive changes in contract language to undo
much of the SWE language in other automotive facilities. CAMI workers will benefit from
those earlier CAW gains.

5.3 Future Research

My research was limited to CAMI Automotive. As such, it did not provide for a comparative
risk analysis between traditional automotive assembly and LMPs. Future research on worker
risk could involve comparing the CAMI LMP against other traditional unionized and non-
unionized assembly plants like GM (Oshawa), Ford (Oakville), and Toyota (Cambridge).

The present research has revealed how SWE workers are exposed to exaggerated levels of
distributive risk at CAMI. But the full story behind the acceptance and use of SWE at CAMI
still remains a relatively untold story. Why would the union accept SWE when it contradicts everything it stands for? This project failed to answer that question in any meaningful way. Further exploration into why unions make decisions that go against their members’ interest and founding principles would be worthwhile research.

Workers suffer under LMP arrangements. Given the facts, why would unions decide to get into these types of arrangements in the first place? Again, my research did not attempt to reveal specific reasons behind the CAWs acceptance of the LMP partnership in 1988. Finding out the reasons why unions are prepared to collaborate with management in LMP arrangements could unearth interesting facts about the state of unionism in the automotive sector and in the Canadian economy in general.

5.4 **Concluding Remarks**

In conclusion, my research has found CAMI workers are exposed to both distributive and political risk under their current LMP arrangements. It has revealed the CAMI partnership to be a risk to workers. Under the intensified nature of work associated with lean production, CAMI workers are exposed to exaggerated forms of structural coercion, exploitation, and real subsumption. The existing partnership does not attempt to provide any reasonable level of reciprocal obligation related to guaranteed work for life: it does not provide workers with their fair share of profit in return for their intensified productive labour, and it does not allow them to participate as equals in determining how the LMP will operate on the shop floor. And when reflecting on the prescribed values that CAMI purports to uphold, workers respond with sarcasm: “open communication…keep your mouth shut, kaizen….work with what you have, team spirit….absolutely not, and the fourth one? I can’t remember”. In short, there is nothing
exceptional about the LMP relationship that benefits workers. CAMI workers have not received
the quality of working life that was promised by the founders. Any commitment to employment
security for workers has now been transformed into a two-tier wage structure that makes
working at CAMI more risky than ever before. When it comes to openness and transparency,
workers have no trust for management. And when workers were asked to consider how the
LMP had benefited them, the majority has responded in the negative. The research
overwhelmingly finds that, when it comes to following the LMP guidelines, CAMI has failed to
apply the prescribed principles that are supposed to benefit its workers.

However, the union executive must also accept a level of culpability for its role in increasing
risk to workers. In particular, two events supported by the union deserve to be questioned.
Accepting the two-tier wage classification and the EMD contract arrangement arguably
increased the threat of distributive and political risk to all CAMI workers. Given their exposure
to risk under the LMP arrangement, it would be prudent for the union to now develop clear
strategies to protect all its members. Workers need to protect their wages at all cost, and not
trade away benefits for new or modified partnership agreements. In other words, the CAMI
union must strategically focus its collective bargaining power by negotiating strong contract
language that protects and builds worker rights under LMP arrangements.

This strategy is well known to the CAW. “The CAW’s formula for progress is the
combination of clearly identified bargaining priorities, a determination to make gains, and a
commitment to generalize improvements from one workplace to other workplaces and other
sectors. Equally important, in tough times we have resisted long-term agreements, gimmicky
compensation schemes, and multi-tier wage systems. Where there have been setbacks, we have
fought to limit them and prevent their spread to other workplaces” (Robertson/Murninghan,
CAMI workers and the union can achieve these outcomes if they are prepared to, “maintain a strong union voice, and push for the rights of all workers, FT and SWEs” (male/FT/quality).

Workers and unions have had little or no effect on influencing companies to abide by the principles associated with LMPs. Perhaps part of the solution lies with the state and legislative intervention. If unions could influence politicians to advance meaningful labour law that allows workers to enjoy the full benefit of LMP arrangements, risk could be reduced. From this perspective, the CAW National could step up its fight to alert lawmakers and others of the real threat to workers under LMP partnership agreements. With mounting risk, workers need labour law specifically related to LMPs that requires companies like CAMI to live up to their contractual commitments.

Giving up on the notion that capital will ever live up to its LMP commitment to workers, Terry (2003) sees government intervention as the last viable solution. “Without them the partnership route may come to be seen not as a significant institutional innovation but as just another fashionable label, briefly adopted and then discarded, masking the parameters of the real task at hand”(2003:504). The problem is that getting government on the side of labour today appears to be nearly impossible. Examples of state “anti-union” sentiment in Canada are numerous. Just recently, the Ontario Provincial government forced restrictive contracts on teachers\(^54\) while the Government of Canada has intervened on numerous occasions to force workers back to work with unfair “back to work” legislation\(^55\).


Evidence has shown the LMP system to be biased towards capital. It is a system that has been shown to be coercive, exploitative and alienating to workers. If CAMI cannot be trusted and state intervention is a utopian dream, there remains perhaps a single solution for CAW Local 88 to consider. Workers should question supporting a system that constantly intensifies their work while gradually increasing levels of distributive and political risk. The union and workers can effect positive change in their work environment if they chose to act. Acknowledging the risk of LMPs is the first step towards reshaping the relations in production at CAMI. Developing and implementing strategies that seek to reduce risk may require the union to openly reject many of its current commitments to the LMP. However, rejecting the tenets of lean and the current LMP will require careful deliberation and reflection on the part of the union and its workers. The company has profited under the current LMP, and GM will be eager to maintain and build on the existing arrangement.
References

Department of Graduate Studies, The University of Western Ontario.


Appendix A

Self-Administered Questionnaire

Department of Sociology/MACS
Brock University

Dear Participant,

I, Doug Billyard, graduate student from the Department of Critical Sociology, Brock University, invite you to participate in a research project entitled 'The Myth of Labour-Management Partnerships, Risk to Labour. A CAMI Automotive Study'. The purpose of this study is to reveal and understand the associated risks that the CAMI labour-management partnership has had on unionized workers. Information collected from the survey questionnaire will be combined with previously collected focus group data.

Your participation in this research questionnaire is completely voluntary and you are under no obligation to complete this survey. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw completely from this study at any time and may do so at your discretion. The completion and submission of the survey indicates your consent to take part in this research project.

Do not write your name or any contact information on the questionnaire as the research will be analyzed at the group level only. Participants cannot withdraw once they have submitted their responses as data are anonymous. Only the researcher will have access to the collected data. All documentation will be retained until the completion of the project, at which time the material will be disposed of through mechanical shredding or e-file deletion, carried out by the researcher.

The study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University (file#11-274-SMITH). If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550, Ext. 3055, or email reb@brocku.ca. This research is intended to benefit academics, union officials and others in the field of labour studies. Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be made available to the union executive at CAMI upon completion of the project. All surveys should be completed and returned as soon as possible to meet the research deadline for inclusion. Surveys can be returned online directly to dpbillyard@hotmail.com, or by hardcopy, to the in-plant union office for collection purposes.

This research project has not received funding from any organization.

Thank you for participating. (You are invited to detach this cover letter for your records).

Doug Billyard, Graduate Student
Department of Critical Sociology, Brock University
dpbillyard@hotmail.com

Dr. Murray E.G. Smith
Professor, Department of Sociology
Brock University
688.5550 #4370 msmith@brocku.ca
Principal Investigator
Questionnaire. Please check the appropriate responses for the following questions

1. Are you male or female?
   Male __
   Female __

1.1. Please indicate your employment status with CAMI?
   a) Full Time __
   b) SWE __

1.2. Please indicate your union status?
   a) Committeeperson __
   b) local executive __
   c) union member __

2. Your age falls into which of the following categories?
   a) Less than 30 __
   b) 31 to 39 __
   c) 40 to 49 __
   d) 50 and over __

3. How many years have you worked at CAMI in total?
   a) less than 5 __
   b) 6 to 10 __
   c) More than 11 __

4. Please indicate which area in the plant you are working in now?
   a) Assembly __
   b) Elsewhere __ please specify___________________________

5. Your job classification can be described as:
   a) Team Leader__
   b) PSG__
   c) PA__
   d) Skilled trades__

6. Did you ever belong to a union before joining CAMI?
   a) Yes __
   b) No __

Please check the appropriate response for the following questions.

7. It’s important for workers to participate and cooperate with management while at work.
   a) Very much agree__
   b) Somewhat agree __
   c) Disagree __

8. It’s important for CAMI to be financially successful.
   a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

9. The company respects the role of the union as a voice for workers.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

10. The company is open and transparent with workers…there aren’t any hidden agendas.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

11. Even though work levels have steadily intensified, I feel compelled to keep up and do more for the good of the company.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

12. More and more, team leaders are managing teams alongside management.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

13. Today, workers tend to cooperate with the management more than we did in past.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

14. Today, workers and management are more prepared to resolve issues collaboratively and without conflict.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __

15. In my opinion, working conditions on the floor have;
a) improved __
b) worsened __
c) stayed about the same __

16. Overall, our benefits, wages, and job security have;
a) improved __
b) worsened __
c) stayed about the same __

17. Management can’t be trusted.
a) Very much agree__
b) Somewhat agree __
c) Disagree __
18. Today, more than ever, workers need a strong union to protect their rights.
   a) Very much agree __
   b) Somewhat agree __
   c) Disagree __

19. The labour-management partnership that exists (lean production, teams, and kaizen) at CAMI works well for workers and our union.
   a) Very much agree __
   b) Somewhat agree __
   c) Disagree __

20. I agree with having Full Time and SWE workers in CAMI.
   a) Very much agree __
   b) Somewhat agree __
   c) Disagree __

21. What are your major concerns in the plant?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

22. Do you have any suggestions for improving worker rights?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
Appendix B

Survey Results

Q7: It’s important for workers to participate and cooperate with management while at work.

<table>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>very much agree</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>33.2</td>
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<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>62.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question is directly or indirectly related to IPA\(^56\) and LMP commitments #1, #2 and building blocks #1 and #4. In particular, the question relates to the success of the organization, building trust through involvement, commitment to the LMP processes, and achieving expected outcomes. Of the 280 respondents at total of 279 answered the question with one missing. Of the 279 valid responses\(^57\), 93 or 33.3\% of the responses very much agreed with the statement, 175, or 92.7\% somewhat agreed, while 11 or 3.9\% of the respondent population disagreed with the statement. In summary, 278 responses, or 96\% agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement, with 3.9\% disagreeing.

\(^{56}\) IPA refers to the Involvement and Participation Association principles promoted by employer organizations and supported

\(^{57}\) Valid responses only consider those that actually chose to answer the question and does not consider missing responses.
Q8: It’s important for CAMI to be financially successful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>88.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question is directly related to commitment #1 of the IPA, and indirectly related to commitment #3, and building blocks #1 and #4. Of the 280 respondents, all answered the question with no missing values. Of the 280 valid responses, 248, or 88.6% very much agreed with the statement, 31 responses or 11.1% somewhat agreed, with only 1 response, or 0.4% disagreeing with the statement. In summary, 99.6% very much or somewhat agreed, with 0.4% not in agreement.

Q9: The company respects the role of the union as a voice for workers.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>Valid very much agree</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>188</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>79.3</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question is directly related to commitments #2 and #3, and building blocks #2, #3, and #4. Of the 280 respondents, all answered the question with no missing values. Of the 280 respondents, 34, or 12.1% very much agreed with the statement, 188 or 67.1%
somewhat agreed, while 58, or 20.7% disagreed with the statement. In summary, 79.3% agreed or somewhat agreed, with 20.7% disagreeing.

Q10: The company is open and transparent with workers…there aren’t any hidden agendas.

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<td>5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>System</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
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</table>

This question is directly related to commitment #2, building trust through involvement. Of the 280 respondents, a total of 278 answered the question, with 2 missing values. Of the 278 valid responses, 5, or 1.8% very much agreed with the statement, 74 or 26.6%, somewhat agreed, and 199 or 71.6% disagreed. In summary, 29.4% agreed or somewhat agreed, with 71.6% disagreeing.

Q11: Even though work levels have steadily intensified, I feel compelled to keep up and do more for the good of the company.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>very much agree</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>70.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>29.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
This question relates to commitment #1 and building block #4. Of the 280 respondents, all answered this question. Of the 280 valid responses, 43 or 15.4% very much agreed with the statement, with 155 or 55.4% also somewhat agreeing. The remaining 82 respondents, or 29.3% of the total, disagreed with the statement. In summary, 70.8% agreed very much or somewhat with 29.2% in disagreement.

Q12: More and more, team leaders are managing teams alongside management.

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<td>Valid</td>
<td>very much agree</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<td>272</td>
<td>97.1</td>
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<td>System</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>280</td>
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</table>

This question measures the influence of LMP/IPA in combination with neoliberal trajectories on workplace dynamics. Of the 280 respondents, a total of 272 answered the question with 8 missing values. Of the 272 total responses, 75 or 27.6% very much agreed with the statement, while 158 or 58.1% agreed. The remaining 39 responses, or 14.3%, disagreed with the statement. In summary, 85.7% agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement with 14.3% in disagreement.
Q13: Today, workers tend to cooperate with team management more than we did in the past.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td>very much agree</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>76.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>System</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question measures the influence of LMP/IPA in combination with neoliberal trajectories on workplace dynamics. Of the 280 respondents, 276 answered the question with 4 missing values. Of the 276 responses, 60 or 21.7% very much agreed with 150 or 54.3% somewhat agreeing. The remaining 66 or 23.9% disagreed with the statement. In summary, 76.1% agreed or somewhat agreed, with 23.9% disagreeing.

Q14: Today, workers and management are more prepared to resolve issues collaboratively and without conflict.

<table>
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<td>very much agree</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>somewhat agree</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>279</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>System</td>
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<td>.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This question relates directly to building block #1. Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered the question with 1 missing value. Of the 279 responses, 23 or 8.2% very much agreed
with 134 or 48% somewhat agreeing. The remaining 122 or 43.7% disagreed with the statement. In summary, 56.3% agreed or somewhat agreed with 43.7% disagreeing.

Q15: On working conditions on the floor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<td>Valid</td>
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<tr>
<td>improved</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worsened</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stayed about the same</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>279</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

This question relates directly to TUC\textsuperscript{58} principle #5, quality of work life. Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered the question with 1 missing value. Of the 279 responses, 49 or 17.6% believe working conditions have improved, while 134 or 48% responded that working conditions have worsened. The remaining 96 or 34.4% believe working conditions have remained the same. In summary, 82.4% believe conditions have remained the same or worsened with only 17.6% believing plant working conditions are improving.

\textsuperscript{58} TUC is the Trades Union Congress in Britain. Its principles are closely aligned with the IPA principles. The only difference between the two organizations principles is the TUC included a concern for quality of worklife.
Q16: On benefits, wages and job security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Valid improved</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worsened</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stayed about the same</td>
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<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.5</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
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</table>

This question relates directly to the sharing of enterprise success, commitment #1 and building block #4, commitment or recognition of employment security. Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered this question with 1 missing value. Of the responses, 19 or 6.8% believed there was improvement, with 186 or 66.7% in disagreement, suggesting benefits, wages and job security have worsened. The remaining 74 or 26.5% believe benefits, wages and job security have remained unchanged. In summary, 93.2% report worsening or no change to benefits, wages and security with just 6.8% believing these critical aspects have improved.

Q17: On the topic of trusting management. (Asked in the negative)

<table>
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<td>41.1</td>
<td>41.1</td>
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<td>53.2</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
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Similar to Q10, this question relates directly to commitment # 2, building trust through involvement. Of the 280 respondents, all answered this question. Of the responses, 115 or 41.1% very much agreed with the statement, while 149 or 53.2% somewhat agreed.
The remaining 16 or 5.7% disagreed with the statement that management could not be trusted. In summary, 94.3% agreed or somewhat agreed that management could not be trusted with only 5.7% in agreement.

Q18: On the importance of union representation for protection.

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This question is meant measure worker concerns related to the LMP. Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered the question with 1 missing value. Of the 279 responses, 225 or 80.6% very much agreed and 51, or 18.3% somewhat agreed. The remaining 3, or 1.1% disagreed with the statement. In summary, 98.9% of workers agree or somewhat agree that the union is needed to protect their rights.

Q19: On the value of the LMP for workers and the union.

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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This question will be used to compare against all previous responses related to the LMP, principles, building blocks and commitments. Of the 280 respondents, 279 answered the question with 1 missing value. Of the responses, 28 or 10% agreed with 187, or 67% somewhat agreeing that the LMP works well for workers and the union. The remaining 64, or 22.9 disagreed with the statement. In summary, 77.1% of all responses agreed or somewhat agreed that the LMP works well for workers. Only 22.9% disagreed.

**Q20: On the existing Two Tier Base Wage/Benefits/Security Agreement (SWE/Fulltime).**

![Table]

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This is a fundamental question on equality and worker rights. The statement was “I agree with having FT and SWE workers at CAMI”. Of the 280 respondents, 277 rated the statement. Of the responses, 17 or 6.1% agreed with the statement with 69 or 24.9 somewhat agreeing. The remaining 191, or 69%, disagreed with the statement. In summary, 31% appear to support the use of a two tier system while 69% disagree.
Appendix C

CAMI Focus Group Session & Open Ended Survey Answers

SWE Focus Group comments.

- Union dues for SWEs are less than for fulltime workers
- Huge wage base difference
- Shift premiums based on wage base, so $3.41 versus $2.91 creates a gap.
- The alternative to being a SWE, walking the street.
- $24 dollars is good pay.
- We have a concern over benefits and security provision.
- Want the collective agreement to apply to them.
- Limited benefit plan.
- No bereavement with pay, time off without pay.
- No gate collection for SWEs reflects support for fulltime workers.
- GM has eliminated all gate collections other that charity.
- May 2010, last FT hiring
- 6 year grow in for base wage, starting at 70%.
- SWEs got a 30 cent/year raise, not considered wage, only a supplement so it’s not rolled in.
- Wages are frozen.
- Probation period for SWEs is 90 days…perform and don’t screw up…two things critical for SWEs..always.
On Shop floor dynamics

- The first group of SWEs were treated like complete shit.
- I did not take a washroom break for the first six months.
- It was recommended to not take washroom breaks
- Management watch’s every stinking little thing we are doing.
- SWEs need to be above and beyond.
- Union has done a good job getting things in place for SWEs, like union training.
- SWEs are used as scapegoats and pawns by some fulltime workers.
- SWEs need to be cautious of some fulltime workers.
- Conversely, many fulltime workers take additional responsibility and protect SWEs from area leaders.
- They ‘take the hit’ for SWEs.
- Some fulltime workers with their ‘asses on the line’ will blame SWEs.
- Some SWEs not allowed to have washroom breaks by team leaders.
- There was a rumour that one SWE was required to pay the team leader to have a washroom break.
- The treatment of SWEs on the line is similar to the fulltime workers, but the difference is SWEs are easy to prey on if management wants to.

On SWE wants & needs

- Full union representation.
- Want to feel like I’m protected
- I want a pension
- SWEs actually have lots of worker rights now. We have a major influence on the contract right now.
- SWEs have full voting rights on the contract
- If SWEs go against a contract, they won’t be able to ratify.
- SWEs are the swing vote.
- We exercise power through voting.
- Many of the original full timers will be retiring within 10 years or so.
- We need fulltime status, even with a different wage base than the existing structure.
- The benefit/security provisions are more important than getting the fulltime rate.
- SWEs are the new norm, going forward as fulltime workers disappear.
- Workers in the plant, both fulltime and SWEs are prepared to do what is necessary to equalize wages in the plant.
- The union has managed to negotiate a lot of different things for the SWEs.
- This is an active union.
- Since GM has come in, things have changed dramatically.
- There are pockets of mistreatment on the floor starting to be identified by both the union and the company.
- One big difference between SWEs and fulltime is related to attendance. We don’t have the same union protection that they have.
- Using the grievance procedure is difficult for SWEs, many don’t know how to use it.
- SWEs are afraid to speak up and ask for representation.
- SWEs approach problems differently than fulltime workers because of their status. SWEs use fulltime workers to exercise concerns and complaints.
- Union is very approachable for SWEs
- Dan is fantastic.
- There is an ‘eyes open, mouth shut’ approach for SWEs while working.
- I wouldn’t give up my job here for anything. It’s one of the best jobs I’ve ever had. It’s also by far the easiest job I’ve ever had.
- SWEs are a corporate strategy to break the union.
- Union agreed to SWEs during the recession because at the time there were so many layoffs the executive underestimated SWE impact….seems like the union was out-negotiated.
- All SWEs should have full benefits, coverage and security
- All retired FT and vacated positions should be filled with SWEs, status changed.
- The existing SWE/ fulltime balance should be maintained and there should be a cap on the number of SWEs in the plant at any given time.

**Full Time Focus Group Comments.**

- Relationship with management hasn’t changed. It was rough back then. And 23 years later, nothing has changed.
- We are penalized for not being able to keep up with lean production.
- There has been nothing progressive on the shop floor over 23 years in terms of continuous improvement.
- Relationship on the floor is based on where your located.
- Paint is mostly relaxed..if your tied to the assembly line, there is more antagonism around production.
- Shop floor management fearful of not hitting the numbers.
- New area leaders are more relaxed but in the end, what needs to get done, gets done.
- Area leaders do what they need to do to keep their jobs.

- Areas take on the personality of the manager running it.

**On GM influence.**

- Big time influence on the floor. Their goal is to scare everybody into doing what they need done to get cars out.

- Suzuki people had integrity and they were good people.

- Now we are GM, fully fledged corrupt on the floor.

- Less and less about making good products…it’s become about the numbers and downtime.

- Management’s style and practice is not what they talk about.

- There was a promise of something different, but it’s not.

- Incentives are gone!

- No special awards at all.

- Staff benefits have been eroded as well.

- Upper management doesn’t care about SWEs

- The floor thinks they should be FT.

- SWEs in time could erode long term benefits and pensions.

- Non unionized jobs are now 10 to 12 dollars an hour for the same type of work as here.

- CAMI hired well. We all have certain temperaments and work ethics they knew how to hire the best.

- Race, culture and ethnic difference is abused by management in the plant.

- 50% of workers have some sort of workplace injury like repetitive strain.

- Many workers are high on prescription meds as they can’t get through the day.

- Mandatory overtime now for three years
- Work has intensified. The initial speed of the line was 3.2 minutes, today it’s less than a minute…57 seconds.
- Management redistributes workload rather than hire additional people.
- Workers continue to find ways to get the work done.
- There is more cooperation with management that has been here a while, but nothing happens without upstairs approval.
- The union and management wouldn’t do the right thing so I had to call the ministry of labour myself to get the change.
- You personally need to know the law to take care of yourself.
- SWEs have become the necessary evil because of the economy.
- We are competing with the states and we have to respond.
- Once all the FT workers retire, this place will have a mock union of SWEs.
- We’re all burning out and today we can’t work to our full potential.
- There’s no time off.
- I think they’re trying to get rid of us full timers for SWEs.
- I’d rather have more coverage’s than base wage increases.
- It’s hard to understand why GM doesn’t look after its workers better than they do..they should.
- This isn’t a partnership!
- They’re not following Deming’s principles.
- On CAMI values; open communication…keep your mouth shut, kaizen…work with what you have, team spirit…absolutely not, and what’s the fourth one? I can’t remember.
- When the ISO people come in for audits, they ask us to lie for them.
What is the connection or disconnect between what the union says and what is actually happening on the floor…’no good deed goes unpunished’.

Survey Question Open ended statements.

Question 21. What are your major concerns in the plant?

- Management has its favourite workers, not always fair. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- We should all be paid the same after working for a period of time. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- New products, tension between SWE and eventually 2 tier workers, over use of discipline on floor. (male/full time/assembly)

- Lack of respect and trust between production workers. (male/full time/assembly)

- People doing same jobs for less money, more focus on employee issues. (male/SWE/Assembly)

- The company takes advantage of the SWEs by ruling with an iron fist and a great fear of losing their jobs if they don’t conform with management wishes. Management has adopted the bullying tactics with all workers and expect us to work over 100% job load but still pay us for only 90% now. More for less! (male/full time/assembly)

- By allowing a two-tier system, such as our SWE program, it creates inequality in the workforce. This results in conflict, division and resentment within the workforce. Everyone should be able to eventually make full wages and benefits, using a graduated system. (female/fulltime/assembly)
- The SWE problem, we don’t know where we stand...future etc...very little communication from union and management. (male/SWE/assembly)

- Team sizes are too large (5-6 is plenty). Always short staffed..sharing PSG, T/L on line. Time study numbers change suddenly. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- Making it to retirement and another product. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Lack of support from some of the reps. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- People with different wages working side by side doing the same job, het one making less money. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- Job security, more out of pocket expenses for benefits, medical and dental. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Potential product loss to the states. SWEs getting kicked out. (male/SWE/assembly)

- Two tier system goes against what unions stand for “equality in the workplace”. SWE workers were only brought in to bridge the gap and start up of new product than they should be hired as “full time”. Some SWEs have been here 2 years. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Job security for all workers. Scare tactics imposed by management. Different treatment of full time members and SWEs. Longevity of employment. Not being informed about events occurring around the plant in a timely manner. (male/SWE/welding)

- Two tier workforce undermines unity. Pension erosion and cola must be maintained. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- Lack of solidarity as a union. (female/fulltime/stamping)
- To much movement of area leaders to lines where they are not aware of all the issues. Management picking on SWEs and low seniority members and not high seniority members doing the same thing. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Team leaders working on line everyday because of short staffing, people are being injured or becoming ill because of 6 day a week schedule and nobody available for relief to be able to take a day off. The amount of waste that is generated by this plant on a daily basis has increased significantly since becoming GM. (female/fulltime/materials)

- Making sure we build great vehicles so we can secure another product so we can make it to retirement. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- Credibility between the floor and management. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Being lied to by management. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Job security, amount of injuries occurring due to increased line speed. The length of time grievances take to resolve. Equal representation management held accountable for their mistakes and also equal consequences for management and workers alike. The sacking of unions, company pitting workers against workers, the SWE;s not hired full time, cutting of wages. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Divisiveness created by a two tier labour system. Health and safety compromised by a tendency for management to discipline a person who gets injured on the job. (male/fulltime/welding)

- SWEs...different pay scales and benefits, line speeds and job loads, same concerns as 80 years ago. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Still having a job, need all SWEs to become fulltime. (male/fulltime/assembly)
- The erosion of wages, holidays and pensions by GM. (male/fulltime/paint)

- I find the work gets done in spite of management. The worker realizes their jobs futures are on the line at all times. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- Putting in my time for retirement. I hate to keep giving back everything that the CAW has worked for. What would Bob White say about us being pushovers? I want my holidays and benefits back. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- Major concerns are manipulated time studies. Managers play one ‘upmanship’ and discipline PA where it is not necessary. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- That we have jobs for the future. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- The company and union always seem to have their own agenda, not always to the benefit of the workers. (female/fulltime/welding)

- Numbers over quality, contract area leaders, aging equipment and on six days a week and no time to fix. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Job process overloading. Under skilled area leaders. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Job security, wages, pension, benefits. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Race to the bottom against UAW. The weakening of the union. (male/fulltime/materials)

- Get SWEs to be full time. Still after 23 years, not sure about my job. Keep work in-house. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- SWEs should have hired fulltime with perhaps reduced benefits and language to protect their right to post for jobs and for vacation time. Seems to be a distinct division between full time CAMI, pref hires and SWEs. We are all CAMI employees. (female/fulltime/welding)
- New product for job security, pensions, plant moral. Treatment of SWE workers by some full time and management. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Division among seniority. Making 11 dollars an hour less and being asked to go down to 15 an hour less than regular employees. (female/SWE/welding)

- Job security and future work. Wage decreases in the future. SWE increased population needs to be capped. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Workload, lack of jobs suitable for injured workers. WSIB spends more money fighting claims than it does to help injured workers. I believe the money should be paid to injured workers, not lawyers and greedy WSIB employees. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Increased workload. Lack of respect for collective agreement from management. Lack of job security. Workplace injuries. Incompetent supervisors. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Ignoring seniority when convenient, union and company both. Special deals lack of clarity in working allows for big discrepancies when dealing with moving workers around and changing work procedures. (female/fulltime/paint)

- The company cares more for numbers than the workers. (male/full/paint)

- As we all get older, we are working harder, heavier jobs, 6 days a week with no downtime for our bodies to heal and recover from the workweek. We’re going to see a steady increase in older injured workers here as they steadily decrease time to complete jobs and increase the workload and weight. (male/fulltime/welding)

- The CAW allowing EMD workers to bump SWE workers and the fact that the CAW National was behind this. (male/fulltime/welding)
- Safety, job security, job overload. (male/fulltime/welding)

- No equal pay for equal work. Waste, downtime. People still not being treated equally, management having their favourites. (male/SWE/welding)

- The SWEs should be full time with the same grow-in period as the first people hired. GM makes billions in profit and screws the workers with their global economy B.S. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Quality through attitude. Bad approaches from SWEs and preferential hires will cause issues that the full-timers put behind them years ago. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Job overload, can’t trust management, no open communication, managers seem to be above all. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Job security, pension, benefits, wages that match rising costs. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Closure, SWEs rights, pension, mandatory vacations. (male/fulltime/paint)

- SWEs should be unionized workers, even if its at a lower rate of pay. Most don’t trust the union over past deals with GM. Uncertainty, nobody feels that their jobs are truly safe going into contracts next year and keeping our jobs in Canada. (female/fulltime/welding)

- Workloads and management attitude. Not enough workers. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Vacation, pension, staffing, job loads. (male/fulltime/materials)

- Being given time allowed to build quality vehicles. (female/fulltime/assembly)
- 2 tier wages are a poison that should be banned by government. Equal pay for equal work. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- Full time verses SWEs. Lack of communication between company and worker and union. Micro managing and job security. (female/fulltime/stamping)

- Erosion of quality of life. Income and security along with 6 day weeks. Income going down. Perpetual threat of closure. (male/fulltime/stamping)

- Staffing, pensions, security, plant closure language. (male/fulltime/materials)

- More vacation, job security, less discipline. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Job security. Don’t know when GM will go into crisis again. (male/fulltime/materials)

- Getting my 30 years and getting out. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- The race to the bottom for wages and benefits. (male/fulltime/quality)

- Threat of discipline and job security. (male/fulltime/welding)

- They are not telling the truth. Management lie and cheat and do what ever to get the job done. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Overworked physically and mentally. (male/fulltime)

- The continual reduction of jobs. Especially a concern given the average age of the workers. (male/fulltime/paint)

- Job security, safety, and retirement. We need more recovery time. We work 6 days a week and lost 2 weeks of holidays. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Job security, time studies and declining benefits. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- EMD workers bumping SWEs and the contract. (female/SWE/assembly)

- I understand the concept behind SWEs in the workforce but it can create a two-tiered system that isn’t really fair to the SWEs. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Job security and the future of me as a SWE. Our union must fight for SWEs rights to maintain and preserve the right to equality. In some occasions we are treated as third class workers. And that is a union failure. (male/SWE/assembly)

- Equal pay for equal work. Management focus on improving working conditions and not disciplines and favouritism. Aging workforce and 3 years of 6 days a week with 98% attendance with little to no recognition or appreciation from management. There’s a need for more honesty. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- SWEs should be fulltime with benefits. (female/fulltime/paint)

- The workers do not stick together and it will worsen with tier wages. Our union leadership is lacking in portraying togetherness and standing up for our rights. (female/fulltime/paint)

- No respect. 6 day mandatory work week. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Future product as we are in a global economy. (male/fulltime/paint)

- Job security, not only for myself but the junior workers in the plant (SWEs). (male/fulltime/paint)

- Work too much overtime. (male/fulltime/paint)

- Outsourcing vehicles to other plants. (female/fulltime/paint)

- Not enough time off. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Standards, quality and safety. (male/fulltime/quality)
- Treatment of SWEs, same work for less pay. No limit on the ratio of SWEs to full time workers. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- As time goes on, we work harder and get less reward for doing so. Lost vacation, no cost of living raises in 4 years management bonuses never missed a beat. TAKE<TAKE<TAKE. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- Distrust between labour, union and management. (male/SWE/assembly)

- Divide between full time and SWE. Management games and bootlickers getting special treatment from management. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- Lack of solidarity due to increase in unwelcome intimidation from company to SWE workforce. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Workers pitted against each other. No equal pay for equal work. Line speeds constantly increased. Not a lot of concern for balancing the workload. Jobs being sourced out that CAMI workers used to do. (female/fulltime/quality)

- The SWEs should have a chance for fulltime employment after a certain period of time. I don’t like how lean we run, team leaders on line kills quality and morale. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Pensions, base pay and holidays. (male/fulltime/paint)

- Not enough TPT’s in paint. (male/fulltime/paint)

- Future work. SWE workers should only have to put in a certain amount of time before gaining better benefits and security in their jobs. (female/fulltime/paint)

- After watching caterpillar shutdown GE in London you have to question how secure any job is. The pace of work and how workers can continue at this pace without serious repercussions to their health and home life. (female/fulltime/paint)
- Everyone be treated equal, no favourites. Losing our pensions and the well being of the worker. (female/fulltime/paint)

- Job security. Protection for all employees full and SWEs. (female/fulltime/quality)

- Hard nose management types. Very few are decent. The decent management people get more cooperation. (female/fulltime/quality)

- The erosion of good paying manufacturing jobs. (male/fulltime)

- No time off for people. Everybody is burned out. No trust in management. GM treats everyone like a number, not a person. (female/SWE/assembly)

- Wage and benefit gap between fulltime and SWEs. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Future product. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Job security and working too many hours. SWEs should be hired fulltime. (male/fulltime/quality)

- SWEs should be full time and have the right to post. (male/fulltime/assembly)

**Question 22. Do you have any suggestions for improving worker rights?**

- Hire SWEs full time! (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Management needs to be more receptive to workers issues and needs (male/fulltime/welding)

- Try to get all workers to be equal..no two tier system (male/fulltime/welding)

- Need to change public perception. Unions have been demonized by the media. We are perceived as lazy, greedy and uneducated by the public. It’s impossible to make any gains at this time. (male/fulltime/stamping)
- Need a stronger union!! (male/fulltime/materials)

- Healthy economy. (male/fulltime/welding)

- Make sure SWEs are full time, give SWEs the same rights as full timers (female/SWE/welding)

- Get rid of the useless people in this plant that take full advantage of light duty/disability and still refuse when under normal working conditions to complete a task at hand. Start protecting the people, yes even SWEs cus(sic) we are people that actually deserve a job here! (male/SWE/assembly)

- Better contractual language, more participation from unionized workers, more education to take us from always criticizing each other to supporting each other…ie..teachers to autoworkers to city workers to fire fighters to police. (male/fulltime/paint)

- Unions should go on a media blitz to educate the public about lies told to them by big 3 automakers and how it not only effects us but also them. The gained public support would give us more power to negotiate in improving our rights. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Line side issues (defects should be followed up with intent to improve or fix problems, not discipline. SWEs should be replacing retirees or quits. SWE become P.A’s, it will improve morale and the future of the company. (male/fulltime/assembly)

- Maintain a strong union voice, and push for the rights of all workers, fulltime and SWEs. More newsletters and information from union, what are issues and concerns in all areas of the plant and membership. (male/fulltime/quality)
- Make SWEs equal. (female/SWE/assembly)
- Reintroduce anti-scab legislation. (male/fulltime/assembly)
- Have management stop being adversarial. We want the same thing, to build quality cars that sell, why not work with us instead of against us? (male/fulltime/assembly)
- All workers should be equal. (female/SWE/assembly)
- Maybe deal with language issues in the next contract (male/fulltime/materials)
- Stronger union heads like when the union started. (female/fulltime/assembly)
- Legislation for temp workers, no two-tier hiring would be ideal, as the company profits skyrocket, we should see some benefit. It’s the workers that produce the profit. (female/fulltime/assembly)
- There should be a limit on the amount of money a CEO can make which the government should set. (male/fulltime/assembly)
- Solidarity within our local and with other unions and organizations. (male/fulltime/assembly)
- We have to first deal with what is going on in China. We all lose jobs to China if their rights are not improved. (male/fulltime/assembly)
- We need to voice our concerns to all levels of government with more involvement from our youth and younger generation. We need to look into our national auto manufacturing policy by having our government get into the game! (male/fulltime/materials)
- Full time workers have more rights than SWE, that is not right. TPT have it better than the SWEs. (male/fulltime/paint)
- Don’t create divisions…SWEs. Stop making concession…equal pay for equal work!!!(male/fulltime/assembly)

- More people, more minds, more power. (male/fulltime/welding)

- More openness between upper management and other layers including workers.(male/fulltime/assembly)

- Stronger leadership in the union.(male/fulltime/assembly)

- Omit management rights from the collective agreement because every situation always refers back to rights and not ours. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- SWEs have posting rights. (female/fulltime/assembly)

- Equality. (female/SWE/assembly)

- Stop trying to get along with the company. Go back to old style union. Company is not our friend. (male/fulltime/welding)
Appendix D

Brock University
Department of Sociology/MACS

Informed Consent Form

Date: XXXX/2012
Principal Student Investigator: Doug Billyard, Student, dphillyard@hotmail.com
Department of Critical Sociology
Brock University
Faculty Supervisor(s): Murray Smith, Professor, Jonah Butovsky, Associate Professor, June Corman, Professor
Department: Sociology
Brock University, Phone number: 905.688.5550

Name of Participant: (Please Print) ____________________

I have been invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to understand the risks associated with the labour-management partnership at CAMI.
To ensure the safety of participants in research, Brock University requires that all participants are informed of the nature of the research. I have included all the relevant information in bullet point form below.

As a participant of this study, I understand;
- Once published, the research will clearly identify the research site as CAMI Automotive.
- That the union has provided permission for the researcher to contact workers. The union is not sponsoring the research, and my decision to participate or not will have no bearing on my employment/union relationships.
- That this study in which I have agreed to participate will involve participating in a focus group interview.
- That I will be asked a number of questions of which I may decline to answer without penalty.
- That there is no potential for physical or psychological harm involved in answering these questions.
- That my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason.
- That the focus group will be audio-recorded and transcribed. If I decide to withdraw my participation during the focus group interview, any audio-recorded comments that I have made will be difficult to remove due to the limitations of the researcher to identify and remove data based on voice recognition alone.
- That there will be no payment for my participation.
- That I'm not obliged to answer any questions that I consider invasive, offensive or inappropriate.
- That as a participant, I will respect the confidentiality of all other participants including opinions and submissions expressed during the focus group session.
- That only the above listed researcher(s) will have access to the information.
- That any identifying information such as my name will be eliminated from research reports so that my identity cannot be associated with my answers.
- That focus group participant information will not be provided to the union or the company.

Data collected during this study will be stored by the researcher in a locked and secure filing cabinet until December/2012. Access to the data will be restricted to the principal student investigator and the faculty supervisor(s). Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be available to the union after xxx 2012, upon request.
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the Principal Student Investigator or the Faculty Supervisor(s) using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University (file #11-274-SMITH). If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688.5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca.

Thank you for your assistance in this project. Please keep a copy of this form for your records.

I agree to participate in this study described above. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the future. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time.

Signature: ____________________ Date: xxx/2012
Appendix E

Focus Group Interview Guideline
Doug Billiard

1) Introduction to participants.
(Participants will receive the consent form which will be read and signed prior to the beginning of the meeting.)
- background /purpose of the interview.
- focus group protocols and meeting expectation and time commitment will be communicated to the group. Remind group of their rights to withdraw and confidentiality.

2) Open ended Interview Guideline questions. The interview format will be more conversational, allowing participants to answer in their own terms.

a) Think back to when you first joined CAMI and describe what your thoughts and impressions of CAMI were back than compared to today? How has the partnership evolved?
- prompts; pay, benefits, working conditions, job enjoyment/fulfillment, job advancement, opportunities, workloads, personal wealth, future potential…etc

b) How would you describe your experience with the CAMI labour-management partnership?
Prompts;
- Job security/insecurity
- Work intensification
- Role of work cell teams, team leaders.
- Reduced/increased job autonomy
- Role of the union (executive, shop floor stewards)
- Role of management
- JPM and the partnership verses the traditional automotive model (describe)
- The contract (wages and benefits)
- Workplace democracy
- Reciprocal obligation (describe)
- What is missing? What would you change in the partnership to make your job and working conditions better?

b) Open the floor to any comments which the participants might like to add to the interview.
Appendix F

Compensation & Benefits Comparison 59

Production Associate Wages from 1998 – 2012

Benefits Comparison

A) Shift Premiums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>Initial Contract</th>
<th>Increase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>&gt; 11am &lt; 7pm</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 7pm &lt; 4:45am</td>
<td>&gt; 3 yrs &lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>&gt; 11am &lt; 7pm</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 7pm &lt; 4:45am</td>
<td>&gt; 5 yrs &lt; 10 yrs</td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
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<td>&gt; 10 yrs &lt; 15 yrs</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>&gt; 11am &lt; 7pm</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 7pm &lt; 4:45am</td>
<td>&gt; 3 yrs &lt; 5 yrs</td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 10 yrs &lt; 15 yrs</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
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Team leaders @ $1/hour

B) Vacation Entitlement

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Increase</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>&gt; 11am &lt; 7pm</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&gt; 7pm &lt; 4:45am</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 10 yrs &lt; 15 yrs</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>&gt; 11am &lt; 7pm</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
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<td>3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>&gt; 10 yrs &lt; 15 yrs</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
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</table>

Team leaders @ $1/hour

2004-2007 (increase)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Increase</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>&gt; 11am &lt; 7pm</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&gt; 7pm &lt; 4:45am</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 10 yrs &lt; 15 yrs</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
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Team leaders @ $1/hour

2007-2010 (increase)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>Initial</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 10 yrs &lt; 15 yrs</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 15 yrs &lt; 20 yrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59 All compensation and benefits data was retrieved from hard copy collective agreements supplied by CAW Local 88.
60 >: To qualify for vacation entitlement, > is defined in the contract as greater than or equal to.
61 d: individual days
Team leaders @ $1/hour

**2010-2013 (decrease)**

- >1yr < 2yrs: 2wks
- >2yrs < 3yrs: 2wks/1d
- no further changes

Rest Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Rest Period Duration</th>
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<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>18 minutes/0.5 shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>18 minutes/0.5 shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>18 minutes/0.5 shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>18 minutes/0.5 shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>10 minutes/0.5 shift (decrease in rest time of 16 minutes/shift)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix G

IPA & TUC Principles

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential commitments to:</td>
<td>Success of the enterprise</td>
<td>A commitment to the success of the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building trust through greater involvement</td>
<td>A focus on the quality of working life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect for the legitimacy of other partners</td>
<td>A recognition of and respect for the legitimate roles of the employer and the trade union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus supplementary ‘building blocks’</td>
<td>Recognition for employees’ desire for security and the employers’ need for maximize flexibility</td>
<td>A commitment to employment security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing success within the company</td>
<td>Openness and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informing and consulting staff about issues at workplace and company level</td>
<td>Adding value to all concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The effective representation of people’s views within the organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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