TOWARD AN ENCOUNTER WITH TECHNICS
(A Pathway in Martin Heidegger's Thought)

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Introduction

"The Wasteland Grows."
--Nietzsche.

There is a darkening in the West that reaches out to cover the entire earth. It covers by destroying everything, no matter how essential, that is not appropriate to its way to be. Most of its destruction occurs by assimilating and transforming whatever it encounters. The earth is consumed along with the sky. All men are assimilated into a standardization that leads to the pre-eminence of the mediocre. The sense of the divine disintegrates. All this is a part of a leveling off which destroys all order and rank.

If these are merely additional judgments about the decline of our age they amount to very little. Such judgments abound in everyday conversation as well as in the economic, social, political, moral, and religious spheres of man's life. All such talk has evaluation in common; evaluation speaks of the value, the price range within which an age belongs. Such evaluations appear correct and so there is immediate agreement and approval of such diagnoses. Facts abound that provide the needed documentation for these evaluations. Correct evaluations emerge from all spheres of human endeavor. What is correct conforms to its object--i.e. the evaluations conform to the age. Correctness is accomplished. But if correctness is only derived and is not at all related to what is most essential then there remains an unexplored depth to our age. If the truth of our age lies concealed beneath the obviousness of what proves to be correct then inquiry becomes necessary; inquiry
that seeks to encounter what is most essential about our age will have to experience the change in the essence of truth. If this change remains unchallenged then the reality reigning throughout the modern world will remain concealed.

Our age is the age of technics.\(^1\) What now is is permeated by the dominance of technics. Technics is what the disclosure of Being has come to. But the way to be of technics remains closed to man because its development has unfolded in such a way that the thought appropriate to technics is not capable of thinking the way to be of technics or of recalling the origin and history of that way to be. Thus technics prevents man from encountering its way to be. The danger arises that thinking may be subjected to the evaluation of the calculating and planning which justifies the technical through its economic successes. This criterion would reveal the thoughtfulness of thinking as totally worthless.

The dazzling glitter of technics attracts man and blinds him to all that is essential: this is the darkening. Man tends to be fascinated by the constant array of novelties and attractions that technics offers. Man is distracted from his own way to be. Most decisive in the age of technics is that man is content with the setup of technics. All inhabitants of the earth scurry toward the glitter that technics offers. As technics moves toward its goal of subjecting the entire earth it is not just man-made products that press closer from every direction. There is a destiny—i.e. a sending, a mittance—that claims all men in a uniform manner. There is a determination of Being that arose in the West and that is now spreading over the entire earth. This westernization—and this means technicalization—of the earth is welcomed as necessary modernization. Technics
conquers through the appeal of its glittering appearances.

There are advances in every sphere of the technic-al, yet the

times grow more troubled. There are grandiose achievements on the
earth, on the moon, and in space, yet there is a darkening. A person
who gives himself over to the task of thinking must give thought to
the occurrence of technics. The question about technics arises at
a time when man's relation to technics has become unsteady, as well as
obscure; it arises at a time when the technical threatens to dominate
everything that is.

As awareness of the consequences of the technic-al manner of
dwelling upon this earth grows it becomes crucial to ask about technics.
In giving ourselves over to this need care must be taken as to the
manner of thinking that is used in approaching the problem. This
points to the greatest danger—the danger that man in his present way
of thinking—representational-calculative thinking—will not be able
to open himself in his way to be to the essential decisions that the
age of technics demands. From within this danger there is a call, a
call for a radically different manner of thinking. The thought that
heeds the call can be characterized as thinking that recalls (Andenken).
In thinking that recalls there is a return to Being, as well as a
return to the thought appropriate to the way to be of man. Only in
such a return can man turn thoughtfully to the essential occurrences
of this age.

Technics conceals all that is essential about it. Too often
the need to ask about the way to be of technics never gets underway;
too often the ground that enabled technics to emerge remains hidden.
Technics appears to concern human doing alone. In this way man immerses
himself more fully in technics.
Our world becomes increasingly technic-al. Our world becomes less fit for human beings. We lose our sense of being at home in the world. We become alienated from all that is essential to being human. If man allows the thinking appropriate to his way to be to sink into oblivion in favor of representational-calculative thinking then he will become a victim of technics. What is most dangerous about the age of technics is that man is unprepared to confront this transformation, that man is no longer able to confront any occurrence meditatively.

Heidegger has, in thinking what has been thought about Being, revealed the history of metaphysics as the history of Being. He has seen technics as the fireworks in the night, the dazzling ending which may continue for some time, but which is nevertheless the end of metaphysics. Heidegger's path must be thoughtfully cared for. Heidegger's thought if it is thought again, as the same, will keep the revealed history of metaphysics, as history of Being, and its ending from sinking back into oblivion, from becoming re-veiled.

In asking about technics and its relation to man I hope to find a pathway through Martin Heidegger's works that will help to prepare for an essential confrontation with the way to be of technics. I will point to the thought that is capable of this encounter. This thesis is for the most part the preparation and is not yet the confrontation. This thesis is an attempt to reveal and to gather the sense of the way to be of technics, and in doing so to show the manner in which man may then encounter this way to be. In moving toward an encounter with technics I have tried to reveal a pathway in Martin Heidegger's thought, a pathway that includes many disclosures which bear directly upon our times.
I. Technics.

Dealing with technics involves the technical; this would take us into the practical realm of beings and man's activity there. Asking for the way to be of technics will take us in a very different direction. In preparing the ground for experiencing man's relation to technics it is necessary to ask for the way to be of technics. This task does not involve condemnation or praise of technics; either position binds man more tightly to technics. A third position, indifference, is the stance man today holds toward technics: indifference cuts off all possibility of gaining insight into the way to be of technics by not taking the question about technics seriously. Indifference also avoids seeing or admitting a darkening in the west. For the neutral all is well and questioning is just so much idleness, or unnecessary rocking of the boat; complacency reigns. The sense of urgency of our times is covered up by numerous novelties of the moment. In busyness man rests; all sense of urgency is also lost in the hustle and bustle of our modern times. Questioning must not fall in the face of indifference. Technics must be revealed in all its questionability, in all of its opaqueness, if man is to save his ownmost way to be.

In asking for the way to be of technics we are asking about the way in which it is, the way in which it holds sway over everything today. There are two familiar answers that are most immediately
offered. Technics is defined as (1) "...a means to an end..." and as (2) "...a human doing...". Ends and means are human doing: the two definitions belong together. These are respectively the instrumental and the anthropological definitions of technics. By examining examples of ancient and modern machinery it appears that the instrumental definition holds in the past as well as today. The water wheel of the past moved by the stream's motion differs from the hydro-electric station of today that harnesses the power of a river, but both are equally means to an end, and this allows both to share the instrumental definition. Because the instrumental definition proves to be correct, is apparent, and is easily accepted it governs every attempt at experiencing the human relation to technics. Guided by the instrumental definition we are drawn into a position of believing that technics must be mastered. This becomes apparent today when technics seems to be running rampant, and there is talk everywhere about how man cannot control the monster he has created. The will to master is an approach that conforms to technics. The will to master involves bigger and better machines which are meant to solve all problems; more of the same is guaranteed. Talk of the ability of technics alone to master and control technics is common. The hope is that man will, with great effort, become the master and thus usher in a modern golden age. Technics is hailed and looked to for its saving powers. All this talk and its aims conform to technics. Conforming to technics means not taking the step outside of technics. Yet, the conformance accords with the correctness of the instrumental definition.

What does it mean to say that the instrumental definition is correct? How far does correctness reach? Correctness assures us
that what is before us is something proving to be right, corresponding, or pertaining to what is at issue. This says: what is before us (the instrumental definition) conforms to what is at issue (technics). As long as only correctness has been ascertained we have not yet inquired deep enough and we have not yet reached the truth of the matter or disclosed the way to be of technics--i.e. we are still within the sphere where technics guarantees itself by providing all the answers. Correctness does not pertain to nothing at all; inquiry is necessary.

"Causality reigns where ends are followed, means applied; there the instrumental rules."² Because the instrumental definition rests on causality we ask about causality.

Within the tradition of philosophy it is taught that there are four causes: material, formal, final, and efficient. This doctrine finds its roots in Aristotle's thought. Subsequent development emphasizes the efficient cause, and "...to effect means: to attain results, effects."³ Causality when it is thought in this way departs from the original Greek insight. "What we call cause, the Romans causa, is called aiton by the Greeks: that which is responsible /verschuldet/ for something else."⁴ The four causes as the Greeks thought them were a unity that belonged together in "being responsible for" something, and this in the sense in which that something was brought about by and owed itself to the four causes. Heidegger gives an example to clarify this: a chalice is indebted to--
i.e. owes itself to--the silver, the eidos (chalice-look), the telos (that which limits and makes an end from which limit the chalice begins to be the thing it is), and the silver smith, who is not the efficient cause, but rather is he who

...lays his plans /überlegt sich/ in order, and collects together the three aforementioned manners of being responsible for. In Greek, laying /überlegen/ is called legein, logos." 5.

The gathering together of the silver smith allows the other three ways of "being responsible for" to come together in a unity that brings forth the chalice. Each of these four is co-responsible for the emergence of the chalice; each can be distinguished, but the four belong together in a unity.

The modern understanding of "being responsible for" covers up the original sense of aition by interpreting it as a moral omission or as a way of effecting. For the Greeks "being responsible for" had the sense of bringing to a stand, of presencing, and of bringing forth. Poiesis is this bringing forth to stand. Physis--emergence, blossoming, shining forth--is poiesis in its most important sense. What is brought forth emerges from concealment into unconcealment. The Greeks called this arrival aletheia; the Romans translated this as veritas; we call this truth, but mean correctness. In the original Greek sense of aletheia this word named the uncovering or the emerging into unconcealedness that was necessary for anything to come forth and, through being brought to a stand in this emergence, to be. Accordingly, unconcealedness grounds every emergence, every bringing forth. This means unconcealedness
is necessary for the four-fold gathering together in which (e.g.) the chalice emerges. Causality, ends and means, and the instrumental emerge only in virtue of the original unconcealedness in which they find their disclosure; the original uncovering, 
aletheia, is their need.

All that is carried on under the name of technics is possible only after an initial uncovering that first lets beings come to presence. This shows that technics is more than only a means, that technics is more originally thought as a way of uncovering. In our quest for the way to be of technics, we are asking for its grounds. The original uncovering is the event our search must find its sense in. What comes after cannot be fundamental enough for our investigation. Ends and means, and the instrumental rest on the original uncovering.

In going beyond the correctness of the instrumental definition we step out of the realm of the technical and into the realm of truth (unconcealedness; discoveredness). This is necessary in order to confront technics in its way to be. Confronting technics in its way to be is more primordial than a concern with the activity of technics, in as much as the way to be of technics makes possible or opens up the possibility for all technic-al dealings with beings. Confronting technics our asking turns to the Greek sense of another term: technikon belongs to technē. Technē "...denotes neither art nor technology but a knowledge, the ability to plan and organize freely...creating, building in the sense of a deliberate producing."

"Technē belongs to the 'bringing out to the fore,' to poiesis; it is something poietic."? Technē is a knowledge in the sense of knowing one's way around or being in the know; as such it provides an opening;
the opening is an uncovering. *Techne* uncovers in a special manner. What is uncovered in *techne* is what does not yet lie present. For example, the sculptor approaches the block of stone and in shaping his work uncovers what does not yet lie present. There is no set pattern—i.e. no paradigm the work must conform to. The sculptor, stone, and work dictate the uncovering. Another of Heidegger’s examples is that of a shipbuilder. Here too it is the uncovering which gathers the design and materials into the ship that emerges and thus determines the manner of making. *Techne* is not the making and manipulating of the technical. *Techne* is not yet the instrumental; the way to be of *techne* lies in uncovering. This way occurs in the realm of *aletheia*. Turning to a consideration of *techne* provides a primordial confrontation between technics and an occurrence essentially related, but yet radically different from it.

Somehow it astounds the common sensibility to think that modern technics, that the atomic age, can have light shed upon it by considerations of the Greek world, and of the Greek sense of things. Perhaps astounding the common sensibility can provide the shaking of everyday complacency which is needed to recapture the awe that has gone out of our lives. Perhaps in the tuning of awe matters can again be made questionable. That there are major differences between the Greek and modern ages is obvious, but what is the same can have differences. What is the same stands related by its very differences.

The atomic age: as soon as it is spoken it seems as though we have laid claim to the way to be of our age. The atomic age speaks of the calculating plans of, and of the manipulation by, man;
thus the age is characterized as made by man. Technics is looked at as a plan or projection of man which at this point in its unfolding demands that man decide whether he will succumb to the self-projecting reign of the plan or rise to power and assert himself as the maker of the plan. This makes the issue one of deciding whether man will fall prey to his creation or whether he will become lord over it. When our understanding of the situation is reduced to maker-made (man-machine) we come to ask, at best, for an ethics appropriate to the atomic age.

Every care must be given to ties to ethics, in an age of technology when the individual, subject to the nature of a mass society, can be brought to a dependable steadfastness only by means of ordering and gathering his plans and actions as a whole in a way that corresponds to a technological age. 8.

As Heidegger goes on to note, this is not yet asking deeply enough; this is still to assume that man alone made technics. Ethics is necessary; at this point we ask that the bomb be banned or that atomic energy be turned to peaceful uses--i.e. we remain within the realm of the technical. We ask for far more when we begin by seeing that modern technics is a way of uncovering. To be sure it is its own way of uncovering: modern technics uncovers by a provoking which demands that nature give up energy which is then accumulated. Modern technics demands that the earth as well as all that is come forth in a manner appropriate to the way to be of technics. Nature is given over to the demands of a technic-al ordering that consumes and in this way exploits. Heidegger notes 9, that the vanes of the old windmill turn in the wind, and no accumulation of energy is made. There is an element of bestowal in the relation between windmill, air, and man. In a second example Heidegger speaks of a tract of land.
Modern technics turns to the land and provokes the earth into uncovering itself as a store of coal, a repository of minerals. The relation runs thus: reservoir of energy, accumulation, exploitation. In contrast the field as it is uncovered for the ancient farmer emerges to be cultivated, preserved, and cared for. The soil is not provoked. The farmer entrusts the seed to the earth, sky, and forces of growth. The relation is one of bestowal.

Provoking is geared towards releasing, storing and accumulating the various energies found in nature and finally delivering them over to technical uses. "Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry." Vision that sees the universe as a gigantic gasoline station is a very peculiar vision, one that has roots nurtured in a definite ground. Through technics uncovering becomes characterized as a provoking of the energy hidden in nature. The sequence in this uncovering is: energy concealed in nature, revealing of energy, transforming energy, accumulating what has been transformed, redistributing what has been accumulated, and finally changing once again what gets distributed. To exemplify this think of the gasoline industry from raw oil reserve to your car. The relation governing all of this is not one of chaos. Throughout the entire sequence there reigns the guidance of man; what is guided is then secured by man. The uncovering which provokes is characterized by this guiding and securing.

Uncovering which provokes places nature--i.e. brings nature to stand at the disposition of man. Nature thus arranged or positioned becomes a field to reach via certitude(correctness). Referring to what
has been said earlier concerning correctness we can see that what is before us (nature) conforms to what is at issue (technics).

Man carries out this provoking, but even man becomes disposed. Heidegger states that such facts as the talk about sick material in a clinic speak of this disposition. He also gives as an example the forester who is disposed by the lumbering industry: the forester

...is disposed in the dispositionality of cellulose which, for its part, is provoked by the need for paper put at the disposal of newspapers and illustrated magazines...and these exact and set down public opinion so that what is printed is absorbed in order to set down a disposed formation of opinion. 12.

Man is never merely positioned in as much as man is the there of technics and as such disposes and uncovers. This does not alter the fact that unconcealedness itself, upon which modern technics obtains a footing, is not made by man.

Man stands in unconcealedness. Man's response to the claim of unconcealedness is such that he uncovers what is presencing within unconcealedness by remaining open and being there. When man responds by setting nature over against him as an object to be manipulated, provoked, and positioned he is positioned in a definite way. Modern technics must include in its way to be a provoking that calls upon man in a manner such that man is called upon to dispose the actual as positioned in a particular way.

Man in his forgetfulness of Being no longer understands that he is called upon. Man sees himself as calling 'all the shots', and thus as an independent--i.e. unrelated--being. For modern man there is no longer a sense of the divine and Being has become an empty concept; only man made institutions and powerful men are acknowledged as those who set the order that directs all other men.
Man is the measure. Man sees man as the only threat and as the only hope in projecting man’s destiny. Man misses what has already occurred and does not heed the call that sent him on his way.

Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has already happened. 13.

We fail to see that Being speaks in the way to be of technics. Mentioning Being emphasizes that far more is under consideration than the relation between man and his machines. The claim of Being is a claim that includes man, all other beings, nature, and history. Being has a bearing upon man and all other beings.

Man in his way to be is not the master of all beings: "Man is the shepherd of Being." 14. This speaks of man in his essential way to be. When man sees himself as a master over beings he disperses himself amidst beings, thus turning away from Being; when man is in this way he does not heed the call of Being. As master of all beings man seeks mastery over them—i.e. technical virtuosity. Even if "caring" was to be reintroduced into this mastery the technical disease would not be cured. Man as master remains estranged from the way to be Being has granted him. Man is man because he is the there of Being. Man is the site for Being amidst beings. Man as the there of Being is in his ownmost way to be the guardian or shepherd of Being when he tends this way to be by tending to the truth of Being. Man as the master of beings names man in his technical way to be. Man as the shepherd of Being names man in his original way to be—i.e. in the way to be in which man is man--; man as the shepherd of Being names man in his belonging together with Being (see part IV).

Mastery is the way in which man proceeds by becoming more technical, and this includes becoming further estranged from Being. Man as a
"caring" master could still not be the shepherd of Being. Quite simply: Being cannot be mastered by man. Where or how would man get hold of Being in order to master it? What is important to see is that all talk of mastery—including a "caring" master—does not reach what is most original or primary about man. Man in any mode of mastery fails to provide a primordial enough depth to his way to be. Furthermore man as master over beings fails not only to heed this depth and originalness of man's way to be, but as master over beings man also fails to heed the call of Being. Technics in its way to be is a destiny in the history of Being—i.e. technics as a sending of Being—where Being is forgotten. Technics is grounded in the history of metaphysics understood as the forgetfulness of Being. Man cares for—shepherds—the sending of Being by re-turning to the call of Being.

Man is sent on his way. This way is his destiny. Man is sent into a way of uncovering by Being. Each way to uncover has its destiny or sending. A way of uncovering always sends man in a direction that is in accordance with the unconcealedness of what is. The relation here is one of freedom. It is Being that calls out of the core of the way to be of any uncovering. Man listens and in hearing the call is "...a listener and not a slave."\textsuperscript{15}

Freedom is not the common notion of having the power to obtain any end chosen. "Freedom dominates what is free in the sense of what is illuminated, i.e. what is uncovered."\textsuperscript{16} The relation between man and his destiny (way of uncovering) is free in so far as the way to be of freedom lies in truth (uncovering). "Freedom reveals itself as the 'letting-be' of what-is."\textsuperscript{17} For Heidegger letting-be does not call for passivity and indifference. Letting-
be is man's part in the unconcealedness of what is, and demands man's participation in revealing what is. Correctness is made possible when man frees (lets-be) what is, letting what is be unconcealed. Thus correctness is not primordial. Unconcealedness is the original occurrence necessary for correctness. Thus, based upon unconcealedness, correctness is not primary. Truth as correctness is only possible after truth as unconcealedness degenerates into (1) the correctness of propositions and (2) the agreement, which is invoked as correspondence, between subject and object. Letting-be brings forth what is and allows it to emerge (stand forth). Freedom accordingly is the setting forth or exposing of the unconcealedness of what is.

Man is this freedom. Man stands immediately related to uncovering (truth). The relation is one of letting-be. Man stands-out (ex-sists) in his Being-there in as much as he is the being who finds his ground in unconcealedness (truth) as the freeing (letting-be) of what-is. Man's relation to unconcealedness is necessary for dealings with the technical to arise at all.

"...freedom, or ex-sistent, revelatory Da-sein possesses man..."18. In this way ex-sistent Da-sein frees man for his freedom which lies open as a choice of actual possibilities, as well as actual necessities. Freedom is not caprice. Freedom possessing man orders him with its inner directive, which is the way to be of the unconcealedness that reigns. This speaks of man's destiny, but yet because man is possessed by freedom man can never merely let things be as they are. With every uncovering there is a necessary concealing or covering. Freedom is therefore always an illuminating that both reveals and conceals. "Freedom is the realm of the destiny which brings at its given time an uncoveredness
In this destiny calculation and planning now challenge us everywhere as the attunement of our age. The horizon man dwells in lets everything appear as calculable and to be manipulated. Being is challenged to let all beings appear in this way. Man is challenged to concern himself with all beings in one way only, and this is the calculative way. That man has surrendered consistently and now constantly to this challenge is the danger facing man.

Heidegger calls the gathering of the challenge that brings man and Being face to face in the above way, the set-up (das Ge-Ste]]ll). The set-up is the way in which Heidegger refers to how man and Being concern each other in the age of technics. The way to be of the set-up orders all that is in its own pre-disposed manner thereby closing off any other possible disclosure of what is, and also any disclosure of what is as it is. Calculative thought is the thought appropriate to the disposition of the set-up. The set-up establishes the Being of beings before any disclosure; this is possible because the set-up contains within itself the establishing or ordering which it carries out. The set-up gathers what it brings forth into the framework that it is. The set-up is what calls upon man from out of the way to be of modern technics. The set-up is the ordering and securing of all that constitutes modern technics and also includes the life that corresponds. With the set-up the way to be of technics has been named. We must see how the set-up is a way to be. We must see how it is that Being disposes not only man, but everything, to be in this way.

The set-up orders man as well as everything else by disposing both in their way to be. The set-up is more immediate than atomic
energy, than all the machinery that is commonly offered as the whole of technics, and, in as much as it orders man, than man. Lespice all of this what is named in the set-up is strange to our hearing. Heidegger says that we never encounter the set-up while we remain within the thinking which thinks the Being of beings as what is present:

...the set-up no longer concerns us as something that is present--therefore the set-up seems at first strange. It remains strange above all because it is not an ultimate, but rather first gives us That which prevails throughout the constellation of Being and man. 21.

What prevails is the set-up that disposes man and everything in a certain way to be. The determinateness, in the sense of a directive, spoken of here guides us into a better understanding of what technics is and is not.

The set-up positions man in a manner such that he is provoked to uncover what-is in a way that reveals what-is as already positioned in a certain way. Thus we can now say that the instrumental and anthropological definitions are not adequate. Remembering these definitions what this says is that technics is not merely human doing, or the means of human doing. Man and Being belong together in such a way that each bears upon the other. This bearing is concealed by the set-up. The way in which man is today borne by Being is the way in which man is disposed, the way in which man is.

We must experience simply this owning in which man and Being are delivered over to each other, that is, we must enter into what we call bearing. 22.

Here it is enough to note that Heidegger calls the set-up the prelude to bearing.

...in bearing the possibility arises that it may overcome the mere dominance of the set-up to turn it into a more original appropriating. 23.
"Setting-up" (stellen) speaks of more than just provoking: setting forth (Herstellen) and setting out (Darstellen) are also included within the sense of set-up (Ge-stell). What sets forth and sets out is also capable of unconcealing—i.e. it is poiesis. Here what Heidegger has in mind can be seen by considering the example he gives of the setting up and the placing of a statue in a temple. This setting up is fundamentally a bringing up into the fore; this is different yet related to the setting up which provokes and disposes. The set-up that is the way to be of modern technics has roots in what the Greeks called logos. Logos is here understood as the letting-lie-forth and this is understood in its essential relatedness to poiesis and thesis. For the Greeks what was set up was brought to a stand and in this stance disclosed a world. In this disclosure things were let be as they are. The set-up of modern technics gathers by forcing everything into the availability of raw materials for technic-al productivity. Yet the Greek and modern setting up have unconcealedness in common.

The uncovering which is the way to be of modern technics is becoming the predominant way of man's uncovering. This uncovering approaches nature with the disposition which understands nature as an accumulation of energy. Nature is outlined in advance as to be calculated and manipulated. This disposition is evident in what comes out of modern natural science, physics. Physics posits nature in a certain way prior to all inquiry—i.e. on the basis of certain hypotheses nature is outlined in advance as a calculable store of forces. A certain uncovering is at work in this view of nature which precedes all technics. This is only to say that man is disposed to inquire
in a certain way prior to any actual inquiry. That man is disposed
toward a certain way to be is necessary, but one way can be more
proper to man than another.

The uncovering that precedes the way to be of modern technics
remains hidden for some time. Heidegger's attempt to re-think
the earliest Greek thought is guided by preparing for what has long
ago emerged and is only now becoming apparent to men. In the study
of history modern science appears in the 17th century, while power
driven machinery appears in the last half of the 18th century.
Heidegger's insight is that the way to be that began to become
apparent in the last half of the 18th century was already prevailing
some time before. So too the world-view of modern physics was
nothing determined solely by the men present during the histori-
graphically determined emergence of modern physics. At this
emergence nature was disposed to make itself apparent in a certain
way, and the men present were also disposed in their inquiry.
Modern science is not merely a product of human fabrication; it is
grounded in the way to be of technics.

Nature as well as men are disposed by the set-up that is the
way to be of modern technics.

Yet the reference to this is still by no means the answer to
the question about technics if we mean by answer the response
to the essence of that which is asked about. 25.

In determining the response to the way to be of modern technics
man comes to the fore.

The way in which what is emerges into unconcealment as
positioned in a certain way does not occur apart from man but
man does not determine this way of uncovering. Man is disposed
to uncover the actual in the way which is characterized by the way to be of modern technics. Man's uniqueness is that he stands out—i.e. *ek-sists*—by standing in the realm of the way to be of the set-up. In asking for man's relationship to the way to be of modern technics the asking must arise in the realm where man and this way to be are together. Accordingly, the question cannot be raised in a technic-al manner. This is why the question of technics is a question of a way to be and thus finds its place as an inquiry that listens to the call of Being.

The destiny of unconcealedness is today the set-up that is the way to be of modern technics. While technics is the destiny of unconcealedness, and hence the destiny our age is heir to, this is not the same as the common talk about how technics is modern fate—i.e. talk of technics as that in the face of which man has no recourse.

The main thrust of "The Question About Technics" is to think the way to be of technics and in doing so to open up the way for a free relationship to this way to be. The way to be of technics has been shown to be nothing technic-al. Our age is the age of the machine because it is the age of technics and not vice versa. The way to be of technics is what is most thought-provoking in our times, but this means that our age is also a most dangerous age. Our age is most thought-provoking because it most intensely calls for and has need of thought. The way to be of technics has been named: the set-up (*Ge-Stell*). Thought about the set-up reveals the set-up as the destiny of unconcealedness. Freedom possessing man brings man to dwell in the realm from which the destiny of unconcealedness is sent. Technics is not, then, our modern fate; we are not helpless
in the face of technics, and we cannot remain indifferent to technics. The attitude that believes technics will solve all problems also fails. Each of these attitudes does not take into account the way to be of technics; each fails in not going further than the machines and man. Because we dwell in the realm from which the destiny of unconcealedness is sent the possibility exists that "When we open ourselves uniquely to the essence of technics we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a calling claim that frees."26.

To get a fuller sense of the way to be of technics I will consider metaphysics. This will broaden the perspective of the question about technics, making it possible to understand better the characterization of technics that will then emerge.

II. Metaphysics.

Heidegger thinks the way to be of metaphysics in terms of the ambiguity between beings and Being. Thought in this way the beginning of metaphysics is the same as the beginning of western thought. The beginning of metaphysics lies in Socrates' and Plato's thought only if the way to be of metaphysics is conceived in terms of a supra-sensible/sensible division, but this is actually only an interpretation of the ambiguity that is already there with the original disclosure of the ὑπο that governs thought from its ancient beginnings. This ambiguity remains the unthought governing all metaphysics; it enters into the way to be of metaphysics as thoughtlessness.
It is decisive that from the beginning this inquiry into Being has been interpreted and asked about in a onesided manner, governed by the physical: beings orient all consideration of Being. This onesidedness never comes into view. The history of Being unfolds with Being lost in forgottenness; metaphysics remains essentially physics.

Forgottenness is necessary. This forgottenness is such that it lies within the relation between man and Being. All previous thought about this relation has taken place within the domain of metaphysics, and there was no possibility for a knowledge of Being because metaphysics thinks only of beings. Being as the presence of the present slips into concealedness in the same motion in which it gives presence to what is present. Being conceals itself by directing our gaze toward what is present. Forgottenness of Being is due to this necessary withdrawal into concealedness of Being. Yet there still remains much that is preserved: "...the concealment of the still unrevealed being (verbal) \textit{Wesens} of Being, preserves untouched treasures..."¹.

Heidegger quotes Descartes' image of philosophy as a tree: its roots, metaphysics; its trunk, physics; its branches, all the other sciences.². Remaining with this image Heidegger asks about the soil from which the roots gather their nourishment. When metaphysics represents beings as beings it can do so only because beings are already in sight. Thus metaphysics begins already within the light of Being. When this occurs Being is in unconcealedness (\textit{aletheia}). The truth of Being is the ground and nourishment of metaphysics, and philosophy fails to take notice of this. Philosophy
leaves its ground from the start, and it leaves by means of metaphysics. Yet the ground as grounding and nourishing remains, even if forgotten.

Metaphysics is the basis of philosophy but not of thinking. In asking about the ground of metaphysics the questioning must be metaphysical but it must also (and more so) be non-metaphysical—i.e. it must think in terms of the ground. To succeed in getting to the ground of metaphysics could aid in restoring the human way to be as well as in overcoming metaphysics. In order for man's questioning to become non-metaphysical it is necessary to grow out of the chains metaphysics binds man's nature with. In overcoming metaphysics thought sets about re-calling Being itself. To orient ourselves and to prepare for the transition from representational-calculative thinking to a thinking that recalls it will be useful to consider metaphysics and its history.

The history of metaphysics is the history of Being—i.e. the history of Being as the progression away from the origin. Being is always a destiny (a sending) and it is permeated by its tradition. Accordingly it is useful to ask about the history of the inquiry into Being. This will bring the questioner to a genuine possibility of asking about Being by allowing him to grow beyond the confines of tradition.

The tradition man is born into takes hold of him from the moment he is. Inertia seems to rule as man is inclined to fall back on the world in which he is. The tradition remains master when faced by inertia, and thus keeps man from providing his own guidance. Tradition transmits what has been (and still comes toward us as governing and as yet unexperienced), but does so only after cover-
ing over and distorting what becomes merely passed on. The original Greek beginnings of metaphysics and of thought are reduced to the self-evident because of their alleged primitiveness. More misunderstandings enter into the tradition with the transformation of the words of the original Greek into the Roman language. What is necessary is to loosen up this hardened tradition of metaphysical thought which now reaches out to dominate every attempt at thinking.

We question historically if we ask what is still happening even if it seems to be past. We ask what is still happening and whether we remain equal to this happening so that it can really develop. 3.

In revealing the basic positions taken by man toward Being and beings (including man) the history of metaphysics will lead to today, the age of technics.

For Heidegger, the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus represents the decisive opening up of western thought wherein there can still be found a thinking that is non-metaphysical in that it remembers Being. The chronological labeling of pre-Socratics or pre-Platonists is a judgment that received a peculiar orientation from Plato's position as the greatest figure in western metaphysics. This is because Platonism has had the most decisive influence in this history. But Heidegger asks if "...the greatness of any thinking can be computed from the length and breadth of its effects, and assessed by the volume of assent it has gained?" 4. Parmenides and Heraclitus are not yet metaphysicians and therein lies their greatness.

The original disclosure of the nature of thinking--named from out of the way to be of Being--appears in Parmenides' saying
(fragment 6) which Heidegger renders as: "Useful to let-lie-
before-us so (the) taking-to-heart also: beings in being.";
fragment 8 is rendered: "For the same: taking-to-heart is so also
presence of what is present." Heidegger sees these fragments as
the original utterance of the way to be of man: man is he who
enters into the apprehension of Being. "Apprehension occurs for the
sake of Being." Because Parmenides' original utterance becomes cov-
ered over at the beginning of philosophy it is necessary to re-call
Parmenides' thought as it was before it was distorted.

"Taking-to-heart" is how Heidegger renders what is usually
translated as thinking. With Parmenides' thought there was as yet
no word for thinking; to use the word "thinking" is to impose a
framework that is foreign to Parmenides' thought. "To-let-lie-
before-us" is how Heidegger renders Legein, which is usually
translated as saying. The sense of these translations becomes
clearer by considering Heraclitus. What remains to be pointed out
here is that in Parmenides' thought "taking-to-heart" (Noein), and
"to-let-lie-before-us" (Legein) are in an original unity with
Being. But Parmenides also had that which remained unthought:

Parmenides grasped this being in its presence, and also in
its oneness. As Heidegger says, the twofold character of
being as such, and much less the unfolding of this two-
fold character of being, remained unthought by Parmenides. 7.

Parmenides and Heraclitus stood at the dawn of the disclosure of
Being in its unity. Logos belonged to Being and was not yet
placed on the side of man as one of his possessions. With the
sundering of this belonging together--i.e. when logos came to be
viewed as a possession of man--the possibility for the beginning of
metaphysics in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle was opened up. *Logos* then gives birth to logic, which is a symptom of decline. By considering Heraclitus' thought the origin of this decline which continues to govern today, the end of metaphysics, can be seen.

Heidegger sees the *logos* of Heraclitus and the *legein* of Parmenides as the same. *Logos* is the order that collects; it includes the collecting and the collectedness. In fragment 50 where Heraclitus speaks of *logos* Heidegger finds an explicit connection between hearing and *logos*. *Logos* is understood as that which calls all men to the order of Being; *logos* can also be characterized as the comprehensive order of Being. Hearing is an attunement to Being where man heeds the call. Because man can be attuned to the *logos* he is also a part of it.

To gather and to collect characterizes thought in its original coming to light. *Logos* is an ingathering, an attunement. *Logos* in the sense of *legein* makes that which is appear; it reveals that which is hidden. In Heraclitus' thought *logos* and *physis* name the same. The uncovering of what is concealed is the presence of the present: the Being of beings. Underlying all of this is the relation between Being, truth, and *logos*. As *logos* and *physis* part company in later philosophies *logos* becomes forgotten. Emphasis is placed on the collector: man. *Logos* becomes a faculty of man: reason, *ratio*. The original unity at the origin of western thought remains concealed by the beginning that is metaphysics. *Logos* as the name for Being is forgotten.

Plato completes what the origin began: he interprets Being as *idea*. This interpretation is a consequence of Being as emerging appearance (*physis*). "The word *idea* means that which is seen in the
visible aspect it offers. What is offered is the look, *eidos*, of what confronts us."\(^8\) In Plato's thought what is a consequence is exalted to the way to be; thus the look predominates as a moment of Being that appeals to man because there is an implied looker-on. "The vision makes the thing. Now this vision becomes decisive instead of the thing itself."\(^9\) The *idea* as Being achieves the status of a model, and thus becomes an ideal for the appearances or copies of it. Appearance, previously the emerging power of the self-blossoming, is now merely the emerging copy of Being.

Heidegger finds the transformation of the way to be of truth the most important and the most decisive of Plato's transformations. This change dominates the history of metaphysics. *Aletheia* as the unconcealedness that was the original way to be of *physis* comes to designate "...a correctness of vision, of apprehension as representation."\(^10\) In the original Greek experience of truth *aletheia* belonged together with Being. Before Plato unconcealedness was "...openly present in the region in which man abides."\(^11\) Plato's allegory of the cave tells of transitions to different abodes where there is a new unconcealedness at each stage that participates in more and more reality as one progresses. *Aletheia* in its originality appears at various points in the allegory, but another way to be of truth has emerged as dominant: "Everything depends upon the shining of the phenomenal and the possibility of its visibleness."\(^12\). *Aletheia* is important only in as much as it makes the phenomenal visible in its look (*eidos*), and in its Being (*idea*). *Idea* is presented as the master of *aletheia*. What was once thought as a unity is now moving toward a hierarchy. The progression in the
allegory is one that points to the need to continually make one's sight more correct. Correctness consists in the agreement between the sight and the thing. "Truth becomes...correctness of the ability to perceive and to declare something."\(^{13}\). Unconcealedness resides with beings. Correctness names the relation between human knowing and beings, and it now resides with man.

The ambiguities and tendencies present as possibilities in the origins of western thought are taken up and developed by Plato. With Plato's thought metaphysics is beginning and "Throughout the whole history of philosophy, Plato's thinking remains decisive in changing forms. Metaphysics is Platonism."\(^{14}\).

Aristotle's thinking provides a transition between the early Greek thinkers and the metaphysics that followed. The transition represents a continued move away from its origins, but it still contains traces of the original thought. With Aristotle the philosophy of the Greeks draws to an end.

At the beginning of metaphysics \textit{physis} is thought as "...presence and permanence in the sense of enduring (\textit{ousia})."\(^ {15}\). In Aristotle's thought what has presence and permanence, and endures, has been brought to a stand (or to its place) in one of two ways: "...in the manner of \textit{physis} (allowing something to emerge of itself) or in the manner of \textit{poiesis} (to produce and represent something)."\(^ {16}\). What has come to stand is there as work (\textit{ergon}).

'Work' means what is completely at rest in the rest of outward appearance--standing, lying in it--what is completely at rest in presencing in unconcealment...
\textit{Ergon} now characterizes the manner of presencing. Presence, \textit{ousia}, thus means \textit{energeia}; to presence-as-work (presence understood verbally) in the work of work-ness. Workness does not mean actuality as the result of an action, but rather the presencing, standing there in unconcealment, of what is set up."\(^{17}\).
Enorgeia, thought as *physis* or *poiesis*, remains close to the origin of Greek thought in as much as it still rests on unconcealedness. Energeia, when translated into Latin as *actualitas*, no longer includes unconcealedness.

For Aristotle the enduring of what is present is the distinctive manner of presencing, and the look (*eidos*) is an appearance that is no longer derived as in Plato's thought. By letting *eidos* remain within the structure of the presencing of what is present Aristotle is not free of Plato's influence: "Between *energeia* and the primordial essence of Being (*aletheia-physis*) stands the idea."\(^{18}\)

Within the subsequent history of metaphysics the unconcealedness of Being finds its limits in *idea* and *energeia*. Enorgeia dominates but it never loses *idea* as a fundamental characteristic of Being.

The same ambiguity surrounding *aletheia* in Plato's thought can be found in Aristotle's. Aristotle thinks of unconcealedness as resting with beings, but he also thinks of truth as residing in the understanding. *Logos*, originally the order of unconcealedness becomes a statement and truth becomes an attribute of the *logos*.

Where the understanding makes an assertion in order to pass judgment is the place of truth and falsehood and their difference. The assertion is true in so far as it is compared to the circumstances and is therefore...(likeness). \(^{19}\)

*Logos* as statement has come to dominate Being. With the transformation of *physis* to *eidos* and *logos* to *kategoria* (*aletheia* to correctness accompanies this change) the original discoloration of Being is forgotten. *Logos* becomes a tool--logic--which Aristotle completes in all its essential elements.

Thought becomes characterized by *logos* in the sense of statement. Accordingly thought becomes understanding and thus reason.
Presentative thought finds its beginning with Aristotle's thought and is finally crystallized in Descartes' thought. Before Descartes lies the Middle Ages and their further transformation of Greek thought.

The medieval philosophers were under the influence of the Latin translation of *energeia* to *actualitas*, and thus interpreted presence in terms of actuality or existence alone. Being, thought as actuality, easily came to include the notion of an act and an actor. Christianity took the highest being, the divine being, of Aristotle's thought and conceived of it as God (the creator, actor). With this transformation the question as to the Being of beings loses all questionableness as it is now taken on faith that all beings have been created by God. Within God's creation there exists a hierarchy and each created being occupies its own particular position within the hierarchy.

Truth is also further transformed in medieval thought. Heidegger quotes Thomas Aquinas: "...truth is really met with in the human or in the divine understanding."20. Truth is conceived as the correspondence between the intellect and the thing. Thus *certitudo* means *essentia*; and it will take Descartes to transform *certitudo* to certainty.

Medieval thought determined the relation between the created beings and their creator. As man's reason comes to the fore the Being of beings "...becomes thinkable in terms of pure mathematical thought."21. Descartes' thought emerged at a time when mathematics --understood in the sense of the taking notice in advance and from oneself of what is to be learned about or known--was establishing itself as the ground for all thinking.
It was a time which, in accordance with this free projection of the world, embarked on a new assault upon reality...the mathematical wills to ground itself in the sense of its own inner requirements. It expressly intends to explicate itself as the standard of all thought and to establish the rules which thereby arise.  22.

Descartes asks for the true being in the sense of that being which is certain. Certitude is now conceived as certainty. The most certain being that Descartes can find is the human ego. Man is emerging as the being that dominates all other beings; his ego comes to the fore as a unique subjectum.

As Being comes to presence as actualitas (a transformation of energeia) hypokeimenon is transformed into subjectum. Hypokeimenon is what lies present by itself; subjectum is what is placed under what has been effected. Logos is also conceived as what underlies. Ousia has become substantia and means what truly is, and what is constant. What underlies is thought of as substantia. Logos and hypokeimenon become included in what is translated as ratio. Accordingly man is being slipped under everything as the ultimate ground for what is real.

When Descartes searches for a fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum he finds that the cogito meets his criteria. The cogito is certain because it lies already present in all representational thought and it is self-certain because it is grounded by the thinking being itself. The cogito grounds other beings in as much as it guarantees the truth of all beings and becomes the condition for all other beings—i.e. what is present is only in as much as it is represented.

Descartes' meditations represent a new beginning, a beginning
upon which the whole of modern metaphysics rests. At this new beginning both beings and truth are thought in terms of representation. Because of Descartes' rootedness in traditional metaphysics and in medieval ontology much of what he discovered remains unthought in its consequences; it remains the task of modern metaphysics to carry this out.

Leibniz expands Descartes' insight of the subject to include all beings. Metaphysics is carried further into subjectivity when Leibniz conceives of the subject as *ens percipiens et appetens*.

Every subjectum is determined in its esse by vis (perceptio-appetitus). Every substantia is monad. Thus the essence of the reality of the res cogitans developing in the light of truth as certainty attains its scope in which it rules everything real. 23.

From this point and on metaphysics thinks of Being in terms of will; accordingly metaphysical thought will realize the richness that will includes until finally Nietzsche thinks the will to power. Truth continues to be thought as consonance or correspondence in Leibniz's thought.

Kant's thought represents a prelude to the end of metaphysics. The transformation that left man, as bearer of ratio, the being that dominates all other beings also changed the sense of what thought is. These transformations prepared the way for a critique of pure reason. Critique here means to set and delineate the limits of pure reason.

After Descartes the object-ness of representation characterizes the presence of what is present. Kant's metaphysics--i.e. his transcendental philosophy--finds its task in determining the conditions necessary for what is present to be an object for a
subject. For Kant beings appear only as objects of experience—i.e. re-presented. Accordingly: "The conditions for the possibility of experience in general are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience."²⁴

In laying the foundation of metaphysics Kant's essential discovery is the transcendental imagination. Heidegger sees that if Kant would have accepted this discovery as the fundamental faculty in human knowing that this would have meant that what was traditionally considered a lower faculty (imagination) would be the ground for a higher faculty (reason). Thus if Kant had embraced his discovery he would have had to accept the far-reaching implication that ratio and logic were not entitled to the dominance they possessed in current metaphysical thought; logic would have lost its throne as arbiter over beings. Kant recoiled from this discovery. Heidegger sees the true result of Kant's foundation as "...the revelation of the subjectivity of the subject."²⁵ To conclude: "...this /Kant's/ metaphysics of objects, once the first critique has thrown light upon the inadequacy of pure reason to ground it, evolves into a metaphysics of will, et. of practical reason."²⁶

Hegel represents the culmination of metaphysics in as much as he gathers together the subject-ism that Descartes initiated. Absolute certainty is gained by absolving thought from its relation to objects. Truth becomes known in unconditional awareness. Knowledge is self-consciousness; as knowing becomes detached from objects it comes closer to absolute self-consciousness. Knowing as absolved acts its own conditions out of its own nature. Heidegger after some etymological considerations interprets knowing as to-have-seen. Thus presence and idea are thought. Presence thought in terms of absolute knowing can only mean the presented-ness of presence as such.

Absolute knowledge thinks itself and does this in the mode of
presentation. Because it proposes objects to itself by first rendering the object present (presentation) and then present to the subject (re-presentation) it remains thoroughly immersed in subjectism. Being is now interpreted in terms of the subject and its presentation.

The quest for certainty finds its end and fullest realization in Hegel's thought.

To interpret Being as subject-centered present-ness is to bring to a culmination the conception of truth-as-certitude, for, when all is said and done, this whole conception expands Absolute Certitude (Self-awareness) into Being itself. 27.

Nietzsche is the last metaphysician. Nietzsche's thought comes at the end of the modern age of metaphysics--i.e. at the end of an age where subject-ism has held sway over all thought. Subject-ism developed to a point where all its forms became, in different ways, metaphysics of will. Nietzsche represents the consummation of metaphysics because his philosophy, as will to power, is the last possibility of both subject-ism and Being thought as will; will is thought simply and purely as will. Will to power characterizes all beings.

Nietzsche thinks at a time when man is about to dominate the earth. He is the first to ask if man is capable of subjecting the earth. Man is characterized by the 'spirit of revenge'. Revenge is the will's revulsion against every 'it was'. Revulsion occurs not against the passing of time, but only against what passes and remains locked in the past. This aversion to transience has roots as far back as Plato: Plato placed the transient in the realm of becoming and opposed this to the non-transient which he placed in the realm of Being. The transient--the earthly--was non-being. In
this way metaphysics views Being as eternity—i.e. as independent of time.

How is man to assume dominion over the earth, how is he to take the earth, as earth, into his guardianship, if and as long as he degrades the earthly in that the spirit of revenge determines his reflection? If saving the earth as earth is at stake, then the spirit of revenge must first vanish. That is why deliverance from the spirit of revenge is the bridge to the highest hope for Zarathustra. 28.

Deliverance detaches man from the revulsion that has held sway over his thinking. This occurs when what passes is not allowed to become locked in the 'it was'. This calls for what Heidegger characterizes as the darkest and last thought of western metaphysics: the eternal recurrence of the same.

The eternal recurrence of the same allows the will to say yes to time by willing the recurrence of every 'it was'. The will willed the coming and going of the transience of time.

The will willed its own eternity. Will is primal being. The highest product of primal being is eternity. The primal being of beings is the will, as the eternally recurrent willing of the eternal recurrence of the same. The eternal recurrence of the same is the supreme triumph of the metaphysics of the will that eternally willed its own willing. 29.

Freed from its revulsion to time the will is the Being of beings in their totality. In this way the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same, which teaches the Being of beings, and the doctrine of the overman—in which man overcomes the spirit of revenge—, which teaches the relatedness of man and the Being of beings, belong together.

By securing man in his essential nature man is prepared to subject the earth, man is prepared to become the master capable of using the powers of technics in his dominion over the earth and over all human activity.

Nietzsche is the transition from the preparatory time of the modern age—measured historically, the time between 1600 and
1900--to the beginning of its completion. It will probably be either very short and catastrophic or else very long in the sense of an arrangement of what has been attained which becomes more and more durable. 30.

Metaphysics finds its end in technics.

The modern age can be characterized by science, mechanical technique, the process by which art becomes aesthetics, human activity understood and carried out as culture, and the transition to godlessness. Mechanical technique is the most apparent of these. The phenomena of science, aesthetics, culture, and godlessness press in upon us constantly. Heidegger chooses science to determine what conception of beings and of truth all of these phenomena rest on. In doing so he intends to arrive at the metaphysical foundation of the modern age.

Heidegger names research as the way to be of modern science. The way to be of research "...is the fact that knowledge establishes itself as a procedure in a realm of the existent, of nature or of history." Procedure opens a sphere in which it can then move. Research can then proceed by projecting a plan which indicates the way in which thought must conduct itself within the sphere. In this way a 'blueprint' is laid out or a framework is set up within which an event must fit in order to be known. "This design...therefore contains its verification in the fact that for every step of its investigation...research depends on it in advance." Adherence to the projection of the ground plan constitutes the rigor or discipline of the research. Each sphere demands its own sort of rigor and it may be that the inexactitude of one sphere may demand more rigor than the exactitude of another.

If the projected sphere is to become objective then the complex
of interrelations of what is properly understood an event must be
made accessible. This is accomplished by the interjection of a
'permanent' within the change—i.e. a sub-ject, something that
underlies and is graspable and calculable, is introduced. The
procedure attempts to make all things into objects so that rules and
laws are made possible; it is only on the basis of these that facts
can emerge. As facts emerge they preserve the rules and laws, and
they tend toward clarification of the projected sphere. Clarification
in modern natural science takes place by means of experimentation.

The experiment is that procedure which in its arrangement
and execution is borne and guided by the law basic to it, in
order to produce the facts which conform to the law or deny it. 34.
Experiments take place on the basis of research. The experiment
always begins by turning to a law. In comparison: Greek science,
begins by turning to the things themselves; in medieval science,
where truth lies in church doctrine, knowledge is the correct
understanding of the dogma and the doctrine set down by various
authorities.

Modern science becomes specialized. Research is always est-
ablished on the basis of its own limited area within which fields
of investigation are opened up. This is a manifestation of busy-
ness, which is a part of the way to be of modern science. Busy-
ness leads to the institutional character of science. Institutes
gather the results of the specialization and on the basis of this
generate new procedure, thus guaranteeing continued busy-ness.

This necessity of accepting its own results as determining
the ways and means of the advancing method is essential to
the business character of research. This, however, is what
forces upon research its institutional character. 35.
As what is (beings) fits into the sphere opened up by modern
science the illusion arises that this is a consequence of better research of the facts, better method, and better apparatus. What is happening is that modern science is only now catching up with its way to be—i.e. Being is dominated by the procedure, and beings appear only if they can be made to arise within the framework of the sphere procedure has opened up. As long as thought remains within modern science the facts established by it will continue to guarantee their validity, and to force their truth upon thought.

Within the institutional character of modern science and all it determines the research worker engaged in his projects fills the spot left by the disappearance of the scholar. This is a result of the business character of modern science. Researchers become the technicians who in their specialized capacities begin to 'call the shots' in the planning of all spheres. Life becomes more than ever before a business. "Plan and discipline, procedure and busyness, mutually postulating one another, constitute the essence of modern science, transform it into research." 36.

The way to be of modern science has been brought to light in order to reveal the metaphysical foundation of the modern age. Research determines that what is (beings) is only in as much as it can be positioned as a "consistence"/Bestand/available for calculation. Research determines that what is is an object. The object-ification of beings is carried out in a positioning that makes beings present to calculative thought in such a way that this thought guarantees the certainty of beings. Modern science arises only after truth has been transformed into certainty of representation. This conception of beings and of truth occurs in the metaphysics of Descartes: the metaphysical foundation of the modern age is laid
in Descartes' metaphysics, and

...if science as research is an essential phenomenon of modern times, then whatever constitutes the metaphysical basis of research must determine, first and far in advance, the nature of modern times as such. 37.

It is decisive that the way to be of man changes so that man becomes the primary subject that grounds all beings both in their existence and in truth. Subject is understood in terms of subjectum as a translation of hypokeimenon: "...what lies before us, that which gathers everything to itself to become its basis." 38. Man can become this center only with a particular transformation of the conception of beings in their totality. In asking about when this transformation appears and the way to be of the modern age, Heidegger points out that such a reflection asks for the modern world view as opposed to the world view that other ages had. A world view is a picture of the world. What "world" here names includes not only "world" understood as beings as a whole, but world understood as also establishing the standard which then becomes binding. View or picture names what is meant when we say 'we get the picture' about something. We get the picture when we grasp the entire context of the situation and our understanding is oriented by and can act in accordance with the situation. World view is not one individual's view of the world; it is rather world understood as a view. Where this occurs a being is only in as much as it can be put into a representation. World becomes a view only when beings receive their Being from representation—i.e. there never was a medieval or Greek world view; world view is something exclusive to the modern age.

With Plato the Being of beings is thought as eidos (appearance, look, what offers a view) and this is what "determines first and far
in advance" the way to be that is finally realized in the modern age. Modern representation means

...to bring what is present before one as something confronting oneself, to relate it to oneself, the person representing it, and to force it back into this relation to oneself as the normative area. 39.

Thus man gets the picture only by getting into the picture, and by making himself the setting in which beings must appear, or be a view. The radicalness of this change lies in the fact that man understands the change as produced by himself--i.e. man comes to the fore as the measure and master of beings in their totality. It is decisive for the modern age that the world becomes a view together with man becoming a subjectum. As modern man seeks to become more objective in his research he becomes even more subjective in his world view. The two increase together in as much as they belong together and are possible only after the world is conceived as a view and man is conceived as a subject.

The modern age conquers the world by reducing it to a picture: "The word 'view' now means the product of representational building." 40. Today man struggles to be able to impose his view as the standard for all beings. The modern age becomes an arena where different world views strive for domination over the earth. Unlimited power of calculation and planning bring all that technics, the pride of the age, can muster to aid in the cultivation of all beings and, by means of this cultivation, to conform all beings to a world view. Thus man prepares to subject the earth.
III. The Age of Technics.

This section will further gather the sense of technics through a consideration first of world as unworld and of man as he is today. Technics will next be revealed as the end of metaphysics and philosophy, and as such the destiny of beings as a whole. Finally Heidegger's sense of overcoming metaphysics will be considered.

As man views the world as pro-posed by himself and thus as one more object he proceeds to set it up according to his purposes. Nature is delivered over to and disposed of in accordance with the way to be of technics. Where nature does not fit in with man's plans he changes it--i.e. he re-frames or transposes it. Where man finds something lacking he proposes something new--i.e. he engages in the production of something. "By multifarious producing, the world is brought to stand and into position."¹ The world is posited according to man's measure. World is seen as of human making, a product of the willing of calculative thought. The whole of producible objects is posited as the world, and the willing of calculative thought which does the positing comes forth as the long concealed Being of beings. Willing asserts itself by forcing all beings under its dominion. "To such a willing, everything beforehand and thus subsequently, turns irresistibly into material for self-assertive production."² Along with the earth man too becomes raw material to be disposed of according to proposed goals. The posing initiated by willing governs everything. The establishment of the unconditioned self-assertion of the will emerges from the way to be of technics. That this way to be of technics is the destiny
of the truth of all beings becomes gradually clearer until finally it emerges in the modern age.

The light of technics' day pushes back the night and deludes those who fail to look both far and deep enough so that they fail to see technics' day as the darkness of world's night.

World is understood in this sense:

..."World" in the sense of the history of Being (cf. Being and Time) means the nonobjective presencing of the truth of Being for man in that man is essentially delivered over to Being. 3.

World becomes an unworld--i.e. the presencing of the oblivion of Being--in virtue of the occurrence in which beings become estranged from the unconcealedness of Being, and man becomes estranged from the truth of Being. Being is still there, but it is forgotten. World withdraws and this means the presencing of the truth of Being withdraws. With the oblivion of the truth of Being comes the unworld of world: world no longer worlds.

With this loss of world man is abandoned to a circle of consumption. This circle is an attempt to fill up the emptiness that comes with the oblivion of Being and abandonment to an unworld. In the age of technics beings are delivered over to the self assertive will to will which directs everything into availability for the constant consumption and the subsequent reordering of all that is. In this way the consumption of all materials is guaranteed. The emptiness that accompanies forgetfulness of Being keeps beings suspended in a dependence on human representation. This emptiness is never experienced as
such, yet man responds to this emptiness by trying to fill it with the countless possible productions and variations that producing offers. Not experiencing the emptiness guarantees the hustle and activity that fills up everydayness. In the attempt to meet the demand for more beings technics offers substitutes. The substitute is not a temporary occurrence; it is the form in which the will guarantees its dominance, its eternity, and its position as master of everything. In the age of technics the continuous rearrangement and alteration of beings is a product of the will's attempt at securing itself, as well as man's attempt to flee in the face of thought by embracing productivity. Man enters a circle of consumption, and

This circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld. 4.

Continuing within the circle includes two possible resolutions: (1) the finite possibility, in which the circle spins to an end by consuming itself and all that is; (2) the infinite possibility, in which the circle continues realizing and re-realizing every possible rearrangement of what is. In either possibility,

In place of all the world-content of things that was formerly perceived and used to grant freely of itself, the object-character of technological dominion spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. 5.

Things become objects; the gathering of the thing is replaced by the calculative fabrications that are objects.
Objects are produced with the intention that they will be used up. The built in obsolescence of cars is an example of this. The dominance of disposable objects in all areas of human consumption is another example. With all these objects quickness and convenience are the goal; the more quickly they are consumed the greater the need to replace them becomes. Constant consumption guarantees a rapid turnover in inventory, the need for increased production, and a demand for more and more disposable conveniences. Thus busy-ness or business prevails as a modern need. Things no longer stand in their own right and in their own world. World withdraws leaving the unworld of objects. Objects find their sole constancy in 'the substitute.' The unworld of the age of technics grows in its presence.

This domination establishes everything as producible and it delivers what is produced through the market. Modern man depends solely on the business risk. Modern man's venture is the business venture. "In self-assertive production, the human-ness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into...calculated market value..."6. The production of technics expands its market over the entire earth. All continents and all countries become prospective markets. Technics draws all men of the earth into the circle of consumption by everywhere offering everything, and at the right price. The glitter of the substitutes production offers appeals to man's tendency to disperse himself among objects. That everything be peddled as a cheap commodity, that nothing be sacred, that nothing be saved, that
nothing abide in itself: this is the incantation of all that
otechnics offers. Objects are the constant offering to the
consumptive circle of technics.

In the unworld of the age of technics the poetic dwelling of
man turns unpoetic. Man can dwell unpoetically only because
his dwelling is by nature poetic. Only by understanding and
heeding the poetic can we see that we are dwelling unpoetically.
In order to turn from our unpoetic dwelling we must first be
capable of heeding the poetic. But

...man is capable of poetry at any time only to the degree
to which his being is appropriate to that which itself has
a liking for man and therefore needs his presence. 

Poetry must here be thought of as what first lets man dwell;
dwelling must be thought as basic to man's Being-there--i.e. to
his ex-sistence. In this way "...man is capable of poetry..."
--
i.e. man dwells poetically--"...only to the degree...
" that his
Being-there, his ex-sistence, is appropriate to the truth of Being
which needs man as a site, a there. Dwelling poetically names that
dwelling in which man abides in his original way to be, and this
occurs when man is open to belonging together with Being. In
dwelling unpoetically man is estranged from Being, and man views
himself as the dominant being. Rationality is the faculty as
well as the criterion that is used to position man as dominant;
rationality now means thinking that calculates.

The self-assertion of human willing forces everything that
is under its dominion before any-thing can emerge in its thingness.
Calculation dominates all areas of human endeavor; this includes many
areas that have no need of calculation. All beings become material
for self-assertive production: earth and sky are raw material; man is
human material. All beings are disposed of in accordance with the pro-posed projections of calculative thought. Calculative thought consumes everything. For calculative thought only objects count as what is and they count only in order to be consumed.

...it might be that our unpoetic dwelling, its incapacity to take the measure, derives from a curious excess of frantic measuring and calculating. 8.

From out of the set-up that is the hidden way to be of technics emerges man's self-assertive will to command the ordering of all things. The building and the thinking that are based upon this willing are alienated from dwelling. World turns to unworld as man's poetic dwelling turns unpoetic.

Man sets everything up in such a way that everything is set upon and violated. Man turns to one manner of thinking and sets this up as the only way to be for thought. Confined to calculative thinking man becomes increasingly more thoughtless and in as much as thinking is intrinsic to the human way to be man becomes less human. What is most thought-provoking in the modern age is that despite the frantic increase in facts accumulated in all fields of human endeavor we still are not thinking.

In a consideration of the way in which man is today two characteristics come immediately into the foreground: thoughtlessness and rootlessness. This may at first seem strange in as much as man alone can be said to think and to dwell. What first strikes us as strange must be revealed in all its questionableness and importance.

In the essay "Memorial Address" Heidegger says that with thoughtlessness our capacity to think lies fallow.

Still only that can lie fallow which in itself is a ground for growth, such as a field. An expressway, where nothing grows, cannot be a fallow field. 9.
It is only because man in his way to be is destined to think that he can become thoughtless. But man can turn away from and thus forget what he possesses. Man today flees from the task of thinking. Man fless what is his own-most. This is the thoughtlessness of today.

It is obvious that man appears to be soaring to new heights with the ever growing number of facts. This accumulation constitutes the wealth of modern knowledge. Neither good nor bad, correct nor incorrect, application of the wealth of facts is what is most important in considering man's flight from thinking. What is essential is that the thought that plans, organizes, and conducts research is thinking of a very special kind. Calculation and manipulation are at work in the way to be of this kind of thinking. Use of a computer or other sophisticated machinery is not what is of concern here. Even without these instruments the thinking at issue remains calculative in its way to be.

Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is. There are, then, two kinds of thinking, each justified in its own way: Calculative thinking and meditative thinking. This meditative thinking is what we have in mind when we say that contemporary man is in flight from thinking. 10.

In the seventeenth century there emerged in Europe a thinking in which man as subject stands everything else over against him as objects and finds an assurance in God's existence, which is then used to guarantee certitude in knowledge. What occurred at this time was unique. The Christian conception of God as a creator allowed thinkers to view the universe in a creator-creation dichotomy. Given this dichotomy it becomes obvious that if God created every-
thing he must have the plan or the idea. This conception gives birth to two fundamental offspring: (1) the created beings must conform to the idea (in the mind of God), and thus what is 'true' will be what conforms to this idea; (2) in accordance with the divine plan there must exist a creative order or 'blueprint' of what is. Once these theological roots become forgotten the way to be of calculative thinking has been opened up; what is 'true' will conform to the subjective (man's) idea of it and the creative order becomes the logical order which lays out the steps or the planning of reasoning. Thus man assures himself of dominance over all that is. In his dominance man then determines the way to be of certainty. Truth becomes certainty. The quest for certainty characterizes the modern period. The transformation of aitheia into certitude began with the Greeks and continued until the modern period, when the way to be of man along with the way to be of world was finally transformed to man as subjectum and world as view.

With man established in his position of dominance nature becomes vulnerable to the assault of calculative thinking which approaches nature as an energy source that finds its sole value in its accessibility to transformation into what will then be used to run technics. The technical control of everything that is appears to be unlimited. Nature appears as unlimited. Man becomes the controller, the manipulator. Modern thinking calculates how nature can best be consumed.

Calculation uses everything that 'is' as units of computation, in advance, and, in the computation, uses up its stock of units. This consumption of what-is reveals the consuming nature of calculation. Only because number can be multiplied indefinitely... is it possible for the consuming nature of calculation to hide
behind its 'products' and give calculative thought the appearance of 'productivity'—whereas it is of the prime essence of calculation, and not merely in its results, to assert what is only in the form of something that can be arranged and used up. 11.

'Exact' thinking binds itself to what counts for calculation. The will to power, the will to dominate everything manipulates man into being merely an instrument of production. Man the controller, the manipulator, becomes the controlled, the manipulated. Thus the rational animal becomes the labouring animal.

Before Being can occur in its primal truth, Being as the will must be broken, the world must be forced to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation, and man to mere labor. 12.

The laboring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty nothingness. 13.

These are not portraits of man subservient to machines or atomic destruction. These are portraits of man’s loss of his way to be.

The productivity of modern thought is a myth used as a front to the barrenness of calculative thinking. Calculative thinking posits what will count as productivity and then carries out this positing. Its productivity is actually the sterility of empty manipulation. In calculative thinking the will demands to continue in its self-guaranteed circularity of results. The rational animal achieves its highest rational consciousness in the will to will which characterizes technics. Calculation also finds its highest expression in the will to will. Everywhere modern man engages himself in a struggle for some form of domination and hence power. The will to will provides the essence for the will to power. What determines every struggle for power is power itself—i.e. the outcome of these power struggles is not what is most important, power remains unchallenged with any
victor. The will to will becomes consumptive. Man too is consumed. Thus the claim of productivity conceals the consumption that occurs.

The most important raw material in technics is man, and this stems from the fact that man alone of all other beings is the subject of consumption. All other beings stand over against man, positioned as mere objects suitable for transformation and manipulation.

Since man is the most important raw material, one can reckon with the fact that some day factories will be built for the artificial breeding of human material, based on present day chemical research. Calculation and planning have already arrived in the health plans and hospitalization. Even birth as well as death is carried out factory-fashion, and in the span between man is an object as well as the subject of calculation.

The consumption of all materials, including the raw material 'man', for the unconditioned possibility of the production of everything is determined in a concealed way by the complete emptiness in which beings, the materials of what is real, are suspended.

Man attempts in vain to fill up this emptiness. But the lack caused by the forgetfulness of Being cannot be filled up by any amount of beings. Hence the circle of consumption where "...the laboring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products..." The giddy whirl then guarantees the will to will in which it can perpetuate itself and the consumptive circle of its planning order.

All beings (including man) are positioned under the sway of the way to be of modern technics. Correctness and certainty guarantee that beings enter into a uniformity of calculable reckoning. Man does not escape the leveling off of everything to the monotonous and mediocre; man enters into a uniformity of calculable reckoning. All men become uniform. Sociology, psychology, psychotherapy, and
many other modern techniques and pressures see to it that all men are guaranteed the same conditions which will result in the same happiness. Man is confined to the leveled sameness of the everyday man. Mediocrity is the measure, conformity the rule. All of this lends itself to the securing of order which allows production and consumption to proceed smoothly and on mass scales. Throughout all of this giddiness it becomes apparent that man has become thoughtless. In his thoughtlessness man has also lost his rootedness.

In "Memorial Address" Heidegger speaks to his homeland. He gives a memorial address in an attempt to think back, to think. As the attempt is made to become more thoughtful it becomes apparent that a meditative spirit is no longer present throughout the homeland. In speaking of his homeland Heidegger notes that many have been driven away and that many more have merely wandered away into the industrial wastelands. These people have become strangers to their homeland. In asking of those who have remained Heidegger notes that they are often as distant or more distant than those who have left, in that they have allowed themselves to be assaulted by radio and television, by movies, by picture magazines, by all the most modern means of communication. Men everywhere are becoming consumers caught in the consumptive ordering of what-is. Modern communication and all that it brings with it by disposing man toward consuming.

...is already much closer to man today than his fields around his farmstead, closer than the sky over the earth, closer than the change from night to day, closer than the conventions and customs of his village, than the tradition of his native world. Both those who have left their homeland and those who have remained share a common destiny--that of losing their rootedness or
autochthony (Bodenständigkeit). What occurs is due to the way to
be of this age. Our age is characterized as the atomic age, but
Heidegger notes what is most uncanny will occur if the atomic
bombs do not go off. If human life is preserved on this earth
then man will increasingly become the chief raw material. Heidegger
quotes a Nobel Prize winning chemist (Stanley 1955) who claims that
the time is near when chemists will be able to synthesize life.
Heidegger then notes that the fact that technics reigns nearly
everywhere is not what is most uncanny. What is most uncanny is
that we are unprepared for the transformation that is taking place--
i.e. we no longer think meditatively. We no longer know what it
is to think meditatively. Our thinking proceeds in the only way
we know how, and thinking becomes increasingly one-sided--calculative--
as we lose the rootedness of our Being-there. Our Being-there
becomes a cheap commodity to be disposed of in the most trivial
manner, and to be passed by 'killing time' with all manner of the
distractions that constitute the glitter of everydayness.

Man can only lose what he once possessed. Man remains constant-
ly referred to Being, even if he chooses to turn away from this
distinction. Man as man is in his way to be a responding to Being.
In whatever manner in which man relates to beings man always does so
on the basis of being that being who first confronts Being. Man
stands facing the approach of presence, and receives this presence
as a gift. Man receives this gift by being the there for what
appears in the presencing. "Man and Being are appropriated to each
other."19. By moving away from representational thinking this
belonging together can be thought in its original togetherness and
thus not in terms of solely Being or man.
If we are to think of man not as an organism but a human being, we must first give attention to the fact that man is that being who has his being by pointing to what is, and that particular beings manifest themselves as such and by such pointing. 20.

This is man's uniqueness. This has opened up the possibilities that have been realized in man as he is today. This also contains the possibilities that could save man from fleeing his being-human.

Heidegger sees the modern age as an end, an end that is only now entering into the beginning of its long drawn-out stay upon the earth. The man appropriate in that age is the last man. In *What Is Called Thinking?* Heidegger discusses Nietzsche's thought of the last man.

The last man will have

...a strangely long staying-power...on the grounds of his type of nature, which also determines the way and the "how" in which everything is, and in which everything is taken to be. 21.

The last man sets up everything that is as having its Being in the subject-object relationship in which he is the subject. Positioned in this way the last man "determines the way and how in which everything is." Nietzsche says that the last men blink. Blinking names the manner in which the last man is there.

To blink--that means to play up and set up a glittering deception which is then agreed upon as true and valid--with the mutual tacit understanding not to question the setup. 22.

To blink is typical of the thoughtlessness as well as the everydayness of the modern age. The mutual agreement of this set up soon comes to be unquestioningly accepted and agreement is no longer even necessary. The set up becomes the framework within which man is and conducts his everyday affairs. The glitter of calculated objects attracts man and finally these alone become what is both valid and valuable to man. Man is no longer concerned with things and their
world content. Objects and their consumption become man's sole preoccupation and pursuit. The last man sets upon all beings and demands that they conform to his manner of calculative thought. The last man is characterized by the spirit of revenge. Heidegger thinks of revenge in its relation to thought as that thought which positions all beings and then pursues and sets upon them; thought determined by revenge is opposed to thought that lets things be. Thought that sets upon all beings is calculative thought and this, as has already been said, finds its highest expression in the will to will. Within the tradition of metaphysics the will began gaining prominence as the Being of beings with Leibniz; will was then thought by each of the following in their own way: Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, and Schopenhauer. Will received its most developed interpretation in Nietzsche's thought of the "will to power," where "will to power" names the Being of beings. "Will to power" is will in its supremely triumphant form in as much as in "will to power" what is willed is the will and only the will: will to power names will as will to will. Heidegger calls Nietzsche the last metaphysician; when revenge is thought metaphysically it names the will's aversion to "it was." (See pp. 33-34 for a more detailed discussion of this and for the rest of this paragraph.) The last man as the man appropriate to the end of metaphysics is not capable of dominating the earth. The last men, characterized and dominated by the spirit of revenge, are not capable of subjecting the earth in as much as revenge—the will's aversion to the transient—degrades the transient, the earthly.

For Nietzsche the last man was something to be overcome. The
overman is the man who can pass over the last man by delivering himself from the spirit of revenge. The overman is accordingly he who is capable of subjecting the earth. The overman can withstand wielding the power of technics. Yet for Heidegger the overman continues to represent a lack: the overman fails to give thought to Being.

Every effort of man remains merely a makeshift expedient as long as man proceeds through calculating thought which by its nature closes man off from the possibility of remaining open to Being. "The superman surpasses man as he is by entering into the relatedness to Being..." but this is relatedness to Being "...as the will of the eternal recurrence of the same..."; thus the overman stands related to Being within technics. Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence of the same remains obscure, concealed from the blinking of the last man's manner of thinking. Nietzsche's weightiest thought remains difficult for any manner of thinking. This last thought of western metaphysics cannot be avoided. Heidegger suggests that

...the coming age, in which the essence of modern technology—the steadily rotating recurrence of the same—will come to light, might have taught man that a thinker's essential thoughts do not become in any way less true simply because we fail to think them. 24.

Philosophy unfolding as metaphysics reaches its end in the age of technics. Metaphysical thinking is representational thinking, and this thinking is rational. Metaphysically, man is the rational animal. Rational thinking becomes the calculation that in its self-assertive willing grounds all beings. Accordingly, the rational animal occupies a privileged position within this
arrangement, and metaphysical thinking thus turns from the presence of beings to the representation of beings, and more exactly to man as the setting for the reality of beings. With man as the unique subject underlying all beings and with Being thought as the will to will metaphysics has arrived at the completion of the destiny of its unfolding.

The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility. End as completion means this gathering. 25. Metaphysics has already been characterized as Platonism; this is because throughout the history of philosophy Plato's thinking has remained decisive. Nietzsche's philosophy as reversed Platonism is the gathering in which the extreme possibilities of this history are consummated.

This gathering at the end of philosophy is also the place where the sciences proclaim independence from philosophy. From its beginning philosophy provided the opening in which each particular science could then flourish. In proclaiming their independence the sciences too often forget their roots and the ground in which they were nurtured. "This development looks like the mere dissolution of philosophy, and is in truth its completion." 26.

Beings are everywhere confined to sectors governed by individual sciences, and these sectors are then subdivided. Knowledge becomes increasingly fragmented.

Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all of what can become the experiential object of his technology for man, the technology by which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of making and shaping. 27.

As new sciences of man are founded and as each science firmly
entrenches itself in its declared independence a new science basic to those emerges. This new science is cybernetics and it is appropriate to the foundation of the modern age, to the way to be of the age of technics, and to the completion of the destiny of metaphysics. Philosophy draws to a close in this age where all areas of human interest are drawn together as a cyborculture. Philosophy

...has found its place in the scientific attitude of socially active humanity... the fundamental characteristic of this scientific attitude is its cybernetic, that is. technological character. 28.

Cybernetics emerges as the science that joins together man and machine in the ordering of what is. Cybernetics does not let things emerge in their thingness; cybernetics is interested only in what an entity does, and what can be done with the entity. Cybernetics deals with how an entity functions. Thus things no longer are--i.e. they are denied their ontological status--; things are reduced to a cybernetic function. Once it is known how something functions the way is open for co-ordination, regulation, and control; the measure--standardization; uniformity. Cybernetics reduces language, which is in its origin the house of Being, to an exchange of news--to information--, to what reveals nothing and can be anonymously passed along to anyone, or anything; formal languages are sought for machines. The arts too are reduced from their original status of preserving the truth of Being in a work to a function of an "instrument of information."

Cybernetics is that science which takes over at the "helm" and
orders everything, including man, that is. This activity is appropriate to the set-up of technics.

As technics becomes the set-up or framework within which man must be, and within which what is must appear the question about technics is no longer asked. Technics becomes the accepted and unquestioned set-up, the given or the ground for all beings, for all human activity, and for all asking. Truth now becomes a matter of how much can be explained within the scope of a given hypothesis. Truth is governed by the effects scientific application can produce.

Within the sciences representational-calculative thinking reigns. At the end of philosophy the sciences carry out the triumph of metaphysical thinking in their delineation of all regions of beings. The operational and model character of this thinking emerges in this delineation. At this end the world lies stripped of its worldhood and as such gives way to the unworld that stands available to all manner of calculable and manipulable procedures. Along with this unworld there is also engineered the appropriate social order. The sciences have the exploration and confirmation of the unworld as well as the engineering of the appropriate social order as their project. What is thus effected expands to cover the entire earth.

The end of philosophy means: the beginning of the world civilization based upon Western European thinking. 29.

Evidence of this domination of the earth can be seen today. People of the East look to the technic-ally advanced countries of the west to solve their problems of hunger, housing, and disease. These people beg for all that technics can offer them. The under-developed countries of the entire earth East and West want the
opportunity to consume as much as the technic-ally advanced countries. Technics levels off the differences between the opposing technic-al powers. Russia and America are metaphysically the same: they share the same hustle or busy-ness as well as the standardization of every being (including man); all variations remain within the basic set-up of technics.

As the age of technics begins to fulfill the last possibility in the development of metaphysics and the manner of thinking peculiar to it the question arises as to whether the last possibility represents "...the complete realization of all the possibilities in which the thinking of philosophy was posited..."30. or whether there is another possibility apart from the last one. The other possibility, which Heidegger sees as an actual one, was one in which philosophy began but also one which philosophy by its nature could not carry with it in its development. Heidegger raises the question as to the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. Thinking stands at the possibility of ushering in a new beginning.

Completed metaphysics, which is the ground for the planetary manner of thinking, gives the scaffolding for an order of the earth which will supposedly last for a long time. The order no longer needs philosophy because philosophy is already its foundation. But with the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its end, but in transition to another beginning. 31.

Heidegger characterizes this task for thinking as a humble one. The task of thinking that reached its last possibility in the completion of metaphysics was based upon the thinking that founded philosophy. The task of thinking that was concealed and left behind in the beginning of philosophy can be retrieved at the end of philosophy, but

...the direct or indirect effect of this thinking on the public in the industrial age, formed by technology and
science, is decisively less possible to this thinking than it was in the case of philosophy. 32.

The task of thinking at the end of philosophy is one that involves first rethinking the history of philosophy in order to prepare man for the arrival of a possibility which, however obscure and uncertain it may be continues to hold itself forth as a promise included in the dawn of western thinking. The possibility Heidegger has in mind is that the technic-al way to be of man may one day be overcome as the way in which man is. Thus the task is a transition to another beginning.

There may be a thinking which is more sober than the representa-tional-calculative thought of rationality and than the all-inclusiveness of cybernetics. This thinking would be different than that of technic-al thought but perhaps it would be in its own way even more necessary. To ask about the task of thinking is to ask about the matter which concerns thinking--i.e. what still remains an issue for thinking. Accordingly Heidegger re-emphasizes throughout What Is Called Thinking? that what is most thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking. The opening in which everything is present or absent remains unthought. The opening and how it is given remain as an issue for thinking.

What speaks in the "It gives"?
The task of thinking would then be the surrender of previous thinking to the determination of the matter of thinking. 33.

To say "Being is..." would show that thought about Being was oriented by the "it is"--where whatever is is conceived as in some way an entity--which has guided metaphysical thought about Being. Es gibt Sein: It gives (there is) Being. Being speaks in the
"It gives"; Es gibt Sein avoids thinking "Being is..."--i.e. is this, that or any-thing that is. Being gives itself; "gives" names the way to be of Being. When thinking gives itself over to "the matter of thinking" it gives itself over to that which remains unsettled, to that which remains its utmost concern, to that which is most worthy of question: to Being. Here is a call to the need of a thinking that is more original than representational-calculative thinking, and that holds promise to overcome the possibility that man will give himself over to a manner of thinking that threatens to rob him of his own-most way to be.

Metaphysics completes itself in the technic-al framework wherein beings are completely uprooted from Being, and Being abandons beings. This arrangement is the fulfillment of the destiny of modern metaphysics in as much as beings are no longer thought in their unconcealedness. In the beginning of modern metaphysics the Being of beings rested in the understanding--i.e. beings are only in as much as they are represented. The human way to be as the ultimate subject is also realized in the technic-al set-up. Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole and technics reveals itself as the destiny of beings as a whole.

With Being's abandonment of beings machination constitutes the beingness of beings. Being is reduced to beingness--i.e. a mere abstraction from what is real (beings). The beginning of metaphysics is determined by beings and by the ontological difference; metaphysics never escapes the confines of its beginning. The confinement of the beginning is what frees the possibilities that metaphysics unfolded
as in its development. When the distinction that structures the beginning and pervades the development of metaphysics is experienced in its origin metaphysics will then be seen as the history of Being and not as something produced by man. In as much as Being needs the there that man is and appropriates man as such man shares in the intimacy of the history of Being. The machination of technics is the destiny of beings as a whole, and this is the destiny of the oblivion of Being. If this destiny is to be overcome then thought must turn to recalling Being.

When Heidegger speaks of overcoming metaphysics he is speaking of the overcoming of the oblivion of Being, and this overcoming turns toward the way to be of metaphysics as well as to its ground. Overcoming turns to what remains inaccessible to metaphysics as such: overcoming turns to the foundations of metaphysics. It is necessary to strip away the layers of translation and transformation that adhere to every philosopher's thought within the history of metaphysics; this is what is meant by a destruction of metaphysics. Heidegger's aim is to retrieve the original thought and unthought within a given philosopher's thinking and to reveal the way it continues to presence in and support the age of technics. In the overcoming the original force of the thought that has been and continues to be is caught up with rather than thrust aside. What is overcome is not gotten rid of, rather just the opposite occurs: what is overcome is allowed to presence without all the trappings subsequent ages have endowed it with.

Heidegger suggests that overcoming metaphysics be thought with the rubric 'the past of metaphysics'.
The past means here: to perish and enter what has been... The past... includes, the fact that metaphysics is now for the first time beginning its unconditional rule in beings themselves, and rules as beings in the form, devoid of truth, of what is real and of objects. 34.

The past is included in the presence it continues to be. Although metaphysics can be looked upon as past in the sense that it has entered its ending this ending will continue to linger longer than the metaphysics that led up to it.

In overcoming metaphysics the attempt is made to recall Being. Only this recollection provides insight into the foundations or origins of metaphysics. Overcoming metaphysics exposes metaphysics to its limits, and brings metaphysics back within its limits. Being in its truth remains forgotten for as long as metaphysics reigns unquestioned. If in the overcoming of metaphysics thought is given to Being then...

...metaphysics overcome in this way does not disappear. It returns transformed and remains in dominance as the continuing difference of Being and beings. 35.

Heidegger also suggests that perhaps the destiny of Being was necessary in order to prepare man for thinking the twofoldness of Being and beings. This destiny also prepares for the emergence of Being as primary in this twofoldness.

Together with the beginning of the completion of metaphysics, the preparation begins, unrecognized and essentially inaccessible to metaphysics, for a first appearance of the twofoldness of Being and beings... Overcoming metaphysics is thought in the manner of the history of Being. It is the preliminary sign of the primal incorporation of the oblivion of Being. 36. Ereignis shows itself in the preliminary sign. Thus overcoming not only reveals the history of metaphysics as the oblivion of Being--it accomplishes this by delivering metaphysics to its truth--but overcoming also confronts thinking with its most demanding challenge, that of giving thought to Ereignis. This brings my inquiry close to the edge of the age of technics; we must now ask about this edge and beyond.
IV. Close to the Edge.

The danger, in every context in which Heidegger speaks of it, endangers man's existence. Ex-sisting refers to man's standing in the Open of Being. That man thinks is his openness to Being. Thus man's way to be is in danger. Being is also endangered. The unconcealedness of Being is endangered because it remains concealed and misplaced. Being is threatened with the loss of its there in as much as man turns away from his way to be.

The danger consists in the threat that assaults man's danger in his relation to Being itself, and not in accidental peril. This danger is the danger. 1.

We must find our way to the danger.

In "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" Heidegger considers how it is that language is the most dangerous of possessions. Here language is called the danger of dangers because language first holds man open to the possibility of any danger whatsoever. Danger is then characterized as a threat to ex-sistence from beings. Beings are first made manifest to man through language. Language exposes man to everything that is, and allows man to stand in the Open. Man is open to the possibility of dispersing his Being-there to a mere absorption in beings. Man turns to beings rather than Being. There then exists the danger that man's thinking may unfold in one way—that of representational-calculative thinking—and in doing so lose the thinking appropriate to man's way to be—i.e. he may lose meditative thinking which is appropriate because it alone remains open to Being and as such to being the there of Being In this way,

It is language which first creates the manifest conditions for menace and confusion to existence, and thus the possibility
of the loss of existence, that is to say--danger. 2.

Heidegger goes on to point out that while language is the danger of
dangers it also holds within itself a more immediate danger to it-
self. Language, the original saying, must be entrusted to appearance
in order to benefit all men, and so it exposes itself to the danger
of degenerating into ordinariness. Ordinariness is the danger that
lies concealed within language. This danger can be expressed in terms
of technics. Technics demands that all ordering be channeled into
representational-calculative thought: language is forced to speak
the language of the set-up. Within technics language turns into
information. The set-up demands a formalized language "...which:"in-
forms" man uniformly, that is, gives him the form in which he is
fitted into the technological-calculative universe..."3. Man in the
age of technics experiences the need to be continually informed.
Knowledge becomes equated with information; all knowing becomes
information to be passed along as public property. What is passed
along can be passed by anyone and thus language is appropriate to
no one.

In "A Dialogue on Language" the question arises as to whether
Eastern thought can turn to Western terminology in its attempt to
understand itself. Heidegger has called language the house of Being,
and "...we Europeans presumably dwell in an entirely different house
than East Asian man."4. As the danger grows it becomes difficult to
discern how the westernization of man and the earth attacks everything
in its way to be. This points to the need for a dialogue between the
East and the West. Language conceals within itself the additional
danger that in understanding events of a different house it may thrust
its own interpretation (transformation) as a framework over what does
not in its way to be fit into this framework. The western destiny initiates will to will overpowers every other destiny. Thus it becomes as important for the East-Asian man as for the Western man to learn first to see and then to confront the danger that is growing.

The danger spreading over the entire earth which faces men everywhere is that

...calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.

What great danger then might move upon us? Then there might go hand in hand with the greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing indifference toward meditative thinking, total thoughtlessness...Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature—that he is a meditative being. 5.

The glitter of technics exerts an attraction upon man and man becomes caught up in the thinking of this way to be which captivates him. Representational-calculative thinking accomplishes the constant distraction and opportunity for dispersal into ever-new attractions that disintegrating Being-there desires most. Thus what is at issue is preserving the thought proper to the way to be of man—i.e. preserving meditative thinking.

In the age of technics technics remains unexperienced in its way to be, and in this way the danger grows even greater. Technics is looked upon as a product of human willing: the growing danger is concealed. Man does not see that his way to be is threatened. The concerned man in the age of technics sees that plants, animals, the air, the water, and the earth in its entirety is endangered; he even sees that man is endangered. All of this is correct. What is concealed from this concern is that while it is true that all beings are endangered they are not in danger of losing their way to be—e.g., an animal can perish from the face of the earth—and that man allows this
showing his thoughtlessness—but the animal in his nature was not in danger. Only man can be endangered in his way to be. The danger arises that man will lose his selfhood to the calculation and planning that is not only appropriate but is demanded by the design of self-assertion. In transforming world into a mere object man not only destroys world and lets an unworlde be, but man also closes off his path to the Open. Self-assertion threatens man through its demand that unconditional will reign in all thought. Man is also threatened by the willed view that through the achievements of technics the human condition can be made easier and happier—i.e., technics will provide the panacea for all the problems that plague mankind. Always it is only a question of greater production, more precise calculation, and better manipulation. Thus a guaranteed income, a higher standard of living, and the good life in general await man in the future. But this tranquility is merely the surface of the undisturbed relentless-ness of the will's self-assertion and self-reliance. Man is threatened in his way to be by the belief that the total implication of all that is technic-al will leave being-human untouched. Man believes that the technic-al application of calculation to all regions of what is first makes intelligible and orders everything, while actually everything is merely leveled off to mediocre uniformity. The will to will demands this complete organization of everything.

The essential occurrences within technics are concealed because the manner of thinking that is set up within technics cannot in its way to be ever raise the question about technics. The danger also remains concealed. The poet receives his task of discerning the danger in the darkening of the west that is the age of technics in
virtue of his intimate relation to language. Yet the thinker is also intimately related to language and the poet needs the thinker to care for his original saying. Holderlin wrote

But where there is danger, there grows also what saves.

And Heidegger follows these lines with

It may be that any other salvation than that which comes from where the danger is, is still within the unholy. Any salvation by makeshift, however well-intentioned, remains for the duration of his destiny an insubstantial illusion for man, who is endangered in his nature. 6.

"The Turning" contains Heidegger's most sustained account of the danger. Being is here spoken of as endangered in its unconcealedness. The set-up presences as the danger, and misplaces the danger. Within the set-up it appears that man produces technics, while actually the way to be of man is positioned by the set-up. The set-up is the destiny of Being that realizes itself in technics. With the misplacement of the danger thought goes no further than the activity of man, and

If the way to be of technology—Gestell as the danger within Being—is Being itself, then technology can never be mastered... by means of a human activity that is simply dependent upon itself. 7.

The danger must be seen as the danger, this is the first task in the attempt to overcome technics by facing its still concealed way to be. We prepare for this task by asking about thinking, and specifically about how we must think if we are not to think in the representational-calculative manner. Once the thinking that responds to the way to be of Being has been discovered then "Thinkingly we first learn the dwelling within the realm in which the overcoming of the mittance of Being, the overcoming of Gestell, comes to pass."8.
If the set-up is the danger within Being and the set-up is the destiny (mittance) of Being then Being in its destiny is the danger. The concealedness of the unconcealedness of Being whereby Being sinks into complete oblivion is included in the way to be of the destiny of Being that is the modern age of technics. In order to hear the claim of Being within this present destiny of Being the danger must be seen as the danger. This involves the turning as well as the venture to the danger which holds within itself that which frees. What frees preserves Being and is the need of Being. This turn is the task for man as the there of Being. "The danger is itself the freeing when it is as danger."9.

The danger endangers man in that the claim of Being from within the way to be of technics is not heard. Thus being-human is challenged to occupy itself with the planning and calculation of everything that is through the design of representational-calculative thinking. Before further considering the turning as well as other possibilities of what saves I will consider possibilities of human action.

Action can be conceived of as the productivity and busy-ness of technics; then less action is needed, and man has already acted far too much and too thoughtlessly. What most calls for thought has been withdrawing for a long time. The way to be of technics conceals itself within this withdrawal. The age of technics includes the characteristics of thoughtlessness and 'productive' busy-ness or activity. Activity here means unchecked hustle and bustle. All action must produce results through its effects, and action is then gauged by its subsequent utility. Man's dealings with objects and other men remain within this region of action.
Action can also reside with thought. Here it is important not to place too many or inappropriate demands on the action of thinking. Thinking does not achieve the same results or 'productivity' as the sciences. Thinking, in its highest sense, does not offer answers to practical matters. Thinking also does not "...endow us directly with the power to act."¹⁰. Thinking in the age of technics has become dispersed and as such goes no further than technical activity.

Thinking remains the possibility of every man, but it is the concern of only a few. The essential thinking that is carried out in any age spreads only slowly and indirectly; when what has been thought reaches the everydayness which most men never go beyond it has become distorted and radically transformed. Thinking finds its task in opening new perspectives and in setting the measures of an age. Thinking finds its own-most fulfillment when it responds by listening to the call of Being. Being calls for thought: "...thinking is the genuine doing \(\text{handeln}\), if doing means: to assist the way to be of Being."¹¹.

In "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger asks about action. He begins this essay by saying that thought about action has not been demanding enough. Action has only been characterized in its most superficial aspects, and this does not even approach the way to be of action. Action reveals its way to be as fulfillment. "To fulfill is to unfold something in the fullness of its essence, to usher it forward into that fullness! \(\text{producere}\)."¹². Only in this way does thinking assist the way to be of Being. The action of thought does not find its way to be by producing or application. The action of thought is quite simply to think, and this action sustains man's
relation to everything that is. Thinking acts by recalling Being, and in this way is before the distinction of practical and theoretical is even made. Thinking finds its place in tending the opening of Being; this is the proper activity of thinking. But this is

...an action that is superior to all practice...Thinking surpasses doing and producing, not through the magnitude of its performance, nor through the consequences of its activity, but through the humbleness of the achievement that it accomplishes without result. 13.

Humbleness speaks of the action of man as the shepherd of Being; thought tends or shepherds not by setting upon and pursuing Being, but by waiting, listening, and then heeding the call of Being. Humbleness speaks of this shepherding.

Thinking is bound by laws unique to it, and it demands its own rigor; care must be taken in what is spoken and in the way what has been spoken is cared for. Thought is the manner of acting that is closest to the way to be of man; although it is a humble task it is a demanding one. Thinking is related to every possibility of what saves.

We live in destitute times. Everybody sees something of the age of technics that looms as an ever-present danger, although very few see the danger. Talk of the darkness of these times can be heard everywhere, but there is just as much talk of the possibilities that save and of the peace that could come with man's harnessing of the forces of nature. This talk remains confined to superficial issues. Most men are content merely to talk about dangers that do not endanger what is most essential. In the same way all talk of the possibilities that save remains content to go no deeper than the most immediate gratifications. Heidegger is always speaking of what saves in the most essential way--i.e. what saves man in his way to be, and what in this way also recalls Being.

The way to be of technics reveals itself as concealing the greatest danger to all that is essential, but this way to be remains
nonetheless a destiny of Being. The set-up is a way of the truth of
Being. As such this destiny remains a granting of Being, and should
contain within it what saves. Man as the there of Being remains
related to unconcealedness. Man in his togetherness with Being also
remains related to Ereignis which grants the destiny of the truth of
Being and the man appropriate to the destiny. "That which is grant-
ing, which sends thus or thus into an uncovering, is what saves as
such."14. Man in his intimacy with what sends remains open to re-
calling his way to be in its appropriateness to Being. Man's way
to be "...lies in this that he should shepherd unconcealedness, and
already along with it concealedness--of all essence \(\text{Wesen}\) on this
earth."15. Man's danger consists in giving up this way to be, but
it is precisely with the greatest danger that this way to be comes
to the fore.

Scientific representational-calculative thought when practiced
in its own sphere yields correct results. This thinking becomes
dangerous when the attempt is made to set it up as the only manner
of thinking, while in fact this thinking is a derived form of a more
original thinking. Only by a thinking that recalls is it possible
to retrieve what has withdrawn into oblivion. By recollective think-
ing the original insight into Being and the progression to the conceal-
edness of unconcealedness are retrieved.

Remembrance or re-calling memory is basic to being-human. What
is truly re-called draws near in all of its possibilities, so that
the presence of what has been is recovered and retained. Thus think-
ing that recalls gathers as well as cares for what is. Thinking that
recalls also seeks and then preserves the emerging of what saves from
out of the danger.
Thinking that recalls (Andenken) can also be looked at from two other aspects: as essential thinking (wesentlicher Denken) and as meditative thinking (besinnliches Denken). Essential thinking preserves the truth of Being. Calculative thinking gathers up everything that is as units for computation and then consumption. Essential thinking "Instead of counting on what-is with what-is... expends itself in Being for the truth of Being." In essential thinking man opens himself up to the need of Being and as such gives himself over to the task of preserving the unconcealedness of Being. Man gives himself freely to this need although the giving is appropriate to man as the there of Being. The need of Being is man's affliction in as much as the need includes the demand to preserve the unconcealedness of Being at any cost. Man bears his affliction and Being's need. Yet,

In sacrifice there is expressed that hidden thanking which alone does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed the nature of man, in order that he may take over in his relationship to being the Guardianship of Being. Thus man is the shepherd of Being; essential thinking shepherds Being.

In What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger reflects on the inter-relatedness between the old English words thencan, to think, and thancian, to thank. Thanc or thonc is the word for a grateful thought. Today we use the word thanks, and Heidegger says that the thought implies thanks. The root of thanc says: "...the gathered, all-gathering thinking that recalls." Essential thought gives thanks to its source: Being. Representational-calculative thought represents a total impoverishment of thought considered in this manner.

Memory and thanks arise from and remain included in the thanc. Heidegger points out that the original sense of memory was the
"...concentration upon the things that essentially speak to us in every thoughtful meditation." 19. Memory originally had to do with that which constantly abided. Thus memory has as much to do with recall as with abiding. The wealth of memory gives birth to the distinction between oblivion and retention. Retention remains most intimate with what is past and continues to endure. But because retention is not the entire way to be of memory "...the need to give a name to the specific retention and recovery of what is past gives rise to the coinage: re-calling memory--remembrance..." 20.

Memory gathers that which makes up man's disposition or attunement to what is. Man gives thanks when he attends to the manner in which he turns to what is. Man gives thanks for the fact that he is, and that he is in his way to be. Thinking is essential in man's way to be. Man gives thanks for thinking simply by thinking what is given to be thought, and this is that which is most thought-provoking --i.e. that we are still not thinking. "The gathering of thinking back into what must be thought is what we call the memory." 21. Thus man gives thanks by recalling. Man recalls the gathering of the disposition that attunes him, the gathering that he is. In this way man recalls himself as the there of Being; man recalls Being. When thinking brings what is most thought-provoking forth and leaves this with itself it gives the highest thanks that it can give; thinking as such would then dwell in memory.

Essential thinking needs thinking that recalls--i.e. it needs thinking that originally thinks Being. Essential thinking listens for the silent call of Being; and so it turns to the incalculable.

Essential thinking gives thought to the truth of Being. "Such
thinking is mindful of the truth of Being and thus helps the Being of truth to make a place for itself in man’s history.\textsuperscript{22} This produces nothing, but perhaps production is not always necessary. Essential thinking prepares for the utterance of the thinker and for the naming of the poet, but what is more it prepares for the return of unconcealedness as the destiny of Being.

Throughout his works Heidegger spends a great deal of effort in trying to help us to free ourselves from the technic-al interpretation and domination of thought. In \textit{Discourse on Thinking} the difference between calculative thought and meditative thought is considered. (Section III. above discussed this to some extent). Man is so dominated by representational-calculative thinking that he is unable to confront the age of technics meditatively. This means that man has lost his roots, that man has lost what was essential in his way to be. Man is helpless before the disposition of the set-up if he gives up meditative thinking. Man has reached a point where technics is a necessity. Blindly attacking technics as totally 'evil' would not only be naive, but would also prove to be ineffective. Admitting our dependence upon technics we must give thought to meditative thinking which could provide a basis for living with but not being dominated by, technical devices. Man has lost much of what is own-most in his way to be but he remains man--i.e. he remains called by the need of Being. A new autochthony could find its ground in meditative thinking.

Meditative thinking remains open to the given. Man’s way to be in as much as it is an openness includes meditative thinking. This thinking is not simply open to Being, it is open with a resolve for Being’s disclosure. Only in this way does man respond to the
need of Being. In meditative thinking man remains open by waiting for what is to be thought. While meditative thinking is open to the content it begins with and cultivates the awareness within which the content is to arise. Meditative thinking does not call for a one track logical sequence of representations. Here passivity is not what is called for, as to be open is man's most difficult task. Only through meditative thinking can the meaning of the representational-calculative thinking that now prevails be understood. Only through meditative thinking can man's way to be be preserved.

Meditative thinking in confronting technics leaves all the technical devices and gadgetry in their places, and at the same time lets them be in such a way that they do not endanger our way to be. This is not merely indifference or indecision. "I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses 'yes' and at the same time 'no,' by an old word, releasement toward things /die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen/."23. There remains in all that is technic-al a sense or meaning that man has not put there, and this sense conceals itself. Man in the age of technics is constantly touched by this hidden sense. "I call the comportment which enables us to keep open to the meaning hidden in technology, openness to the mystery."24.

Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery belong together in meditative thinking. These two comportments offer man the possibility for a new manner of dwelling in which man can dwell in a technic-al world and yet not lose his way to be to it. In this way the possibility also arises for a new ground of meaning, a new rootedness.

Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery do not come easy to man. Only through persistent thinking does either
comportment occur. Meditative thinking requires these two comportments. Thinking has traditionally been carried out in the opposite manner--i.e. thinking was a re-presenting and was intimately connected with willing. Releasement has nothing to do with re-presenting and the appearance of objects. By giving up willing thinking must remain open and alert for releasement. Releasement does not belong within the active and passive distinction. The way to be of a very different thinking lies in releasement. No objects, no re-presentations, no willing:

Scientist: But then, what in the world am I to do? Scholar: I am asking myself that too. Teacher: We are to do nothing but wait. 25.

What we wait for is left undetermined. Waiting would become merely anticipation or curiosity if we were to await something; as such it would disintegrate from the realm of meditative thinking to the realm of everydayness. In waiting we only wait, yet we can have a path, and in such thinking we must be on the path in order to be underway. Heidegger's "Conversation on a Country Path" is such a path.

Representational thinking lets objects appear within a horizon, but the openness of the horizon goes beyond the object's appearance. The openness is also not due to our looking. "What is evident of the horizon...is but the side facing us of an openness which surrounds us..."26. This openness may be thought of as a region. The region gathers and shelters what abides in it; in its withdrawal it lets everything abide in its own resting. The region lets things be things, and as such they are no longer objects. Representational thought about the region is not possible, but yet it can be named and as such remains open to a thinking that is different from representat-
ional thinking. While following the path of Heidegger's dialogue the participants move closer "...to being released into the nature of thinking."27. Waiting is the release into the open of that-which-regions. Thinking in this way becomes the nearing of the distance.

Waiting releases man from the one side of that-which-regions in which man represents beings. As long as man remains unreleased his thinking is one-track-thinking. One-track-thinking endangers man because from within its perspective it looks as though it is the sole way to think. One-track-thinking sees man as ordering everything that is, while thinking that has been released from this limited horizon understands that the order within the region is not of human doing.

Man cannot force his way into a relation with the region. This should be clear simply from what has been said about waiting. Man is released to that-which-regions only because he belongs to it; he is claimed by that-which-regions. Man is in his way to be through the regioning of that-which-regions. That-which-regions lets the way to be of truth as unconcealedness emerge. The way to be of thinking as the releasement to that-which-regions holds within itself a resolve for this disclosure of the way to be of truth. That-which-regions has need of man in order that it may unfold itself as the emergence of every way to be: "It appropriates man's nature for its own regioning."28. That-which-regions is characterized as the hidden way to be of truth. Man cannot force or produce the unconcealedness that is truth, yet this unconcealedness remains concealed without man. The need truth has for man "...rests on the regioning of human nature into that-which-regions."29. When he answers to this need man is drawn to what constitutes his nobility--i.e. to in-dwelling in re-
leasement to that-which-regions. This nobleness is the way to be of thinking as well as of thanking.

The way to be of thinking as the in-dwelling releasement to that-which-regions is man's relation to that-which-regions. Heidegger calls this the nearness of distance. That-which-regions gathers everything by letting everything return to itself, and so it is the nearness of distance and the distance of nearness: the term 'moving-into-nearness' names this.

In 'openness to the mystery' the mystery names the concealing of the concealment of beings and the importance of this. In man's everydayness the mystery is easily forgotten. It is man's way to be to let things be. In letting a thing be the totality of beings necessarily withdraws to form the concealed background to what has emerged in unconcealedness. Concealedness pervades man's entire Being-there, and as such the first thing concealed is concealedness itself; this is the mystery. Man becomes preoccupied with controlling beings and forgets the mystery of the difference between Being and beings. Nevertheless the mystery continues to abide by abandoning man to the set-up of an unworld. In preserving the thing world draws near. When man has destroyed all nearness the thing is annihilated and only objects remain: world withdraws leaving an unworld. "Withholding is the deepest mystery of Being within the domination of Gestell."30. Meditative thinking calls for openness to the mystery.

By holding himself open to the mystery man remains open to the region of the truth of Being, and not merely to the truth of beings. Man is usually drawn to what is most immediate in its practicality and then calculates and plans an order appropriate to the immediate
wants and needs of everydayness. Man sets up his measures on the basis of these plans. In recalling the mystery that pervades everything the question as to the grounds for such measure taking arises. The mystery remains necessary to man's way to be and its relation to Being. By remaining open to the mystery man remains open to the meaning concealed in technics.

Man lives in the most dangerous age. The danger that representational-calculative thinking may become the only way in which man thinks grows. Indifference and neglect of meditative thinking threaten to help realize the danger that man may throw away the way to be that is unique to him. For Heidegger the issue is not to allow man's essential nature to be discarded, and this calls for saving meditative thinking from oblivion. Meditative thinking, essential thinking, and thinking that recalls—apects of the same—when cultivated turn into the way to be of technics, save man in his way to be, and take up man's unique task of being the shepherd of Being. This is to assume that a turn is still possible for our age. Man turns when he finds the way to his way to be—i.e. when he finds his way to thinking.

Technics is overcome by getting into its hidden truth, and man is needed for this. Man rises to this need only when "...his way to be...corresponds to this overcoming." This means that man must open his way to be to the way to be of technics. When meditative thinking lies open to the danger it is revealed that Being has turned from its way to be. Being turns "...into the forgottenness of its way to be...and...against the truth of its way to be." This turning dominates within the danger, and it also conceals the
possibility of a turning. Yet by letting the danger be as the 
danger there comes to pass the turning wherein forgottenness of 
Being turns to become what preserves or upholds the way to be of 
Being. Thus from out of the danger there arrives the freeing—i.e. 
there arrives what restores, shelters, and upholds the way to be of 
Being. In upholding the way to be of Being world is also restored. 
"That world comes to be as world, that thing is as thing, this is 
the arrival from afar of the way to be of Being."33. Although this 
destiny of Being could come to pass, its time remains unknown, for 
man in his way to be always waits. Only in waiting for the way to 
be of Being does man shepherd Being.

In the turning there occurs the abrupt opening of the way to 
be of Being; this is called the flashing. In the flashing there is 
a breaking through or an appearance in which the way to be of Being 
is lit up. When forgottenness turns and world upholds the way to 
be of Being "...the flashing in of world comes to pass into the 
disregard for the thing."34—i.e. world flashes into the set-up 
and in this way truth is restored to Being without truth. "Flashing 
in is Ereignis in Being itself. Ereignis is the befitting bringing 
before the eyes."35.

Ereignis directs both poetry and thinking into their way to 
be. Ereignis yields the opening; it is the original yielding 
or granting of the "there is" in which Being gives itself. 
Ereignis is the relation of the belonging together of Being and 
man. Ereignis is a word that plays an important role in 
Heidegger's thought. I will follow Adamczewski who, in "Martin 
Heidegger and Man's Way To Be", renders Ereignis as bearing.
Bearing delivers man and Being over to each other in a unique occurrence. Heidegger suggests that the prelude to bearing is the set-up that prevails in the age of technics. Thus as the danger grows we grow nearer to bearing--i.e. to what saves.

Bearing is that realm, vibrating within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them. 36.

In this way metaphysics is overcome and man and Being are restored to their essential togetherness.

In "The Turning" insight into that which is is bearing and is thought as the turn from forgottenness of Being to upholding of the way to be of Being. The turning is possible because even though the set-up turns from things to objects, and in this way from world, it is still a flash of Being and not blind fate. Flashing in is the bearing of the turning within the set-up which strikes man through the insight. The bearing of the insight thrusts man away from human centeredness and into the direction of the insight where man is then claimed by the insight. "Only when insight comes to pass does the way to be of technology as Gestell open up..."37.

Thinking which is man's way to be remains open and in this way finds its way to the opening of the way to be of technics. With this occurrence man sees that world has withdrawn along with the truth of Being. But the set-up has already--with this occurrence--addressed man in his togetherness with Being. There arises the possibility for man to turn to what is--this includes beings, technics, and Being--in a more originary way.

Ereignis lets man and Being be in their belonging together--i.e. it brings man and Being into their own way to be and holds them
in this togetherness. In "On Time and Being" after Heidegger has said what Ereignis is not he asks "What remains to be said? Only this: Bearing bears." 38. Bearing bears man and Being. The last paragraph of "The Turning" reads:

That world, worlding, be the nearest of everything that comes close, in that it brings the truth of Being near to man's way to be and thus disposes man toward Ereignis. 39.

Unconcealedness of a world never just happens as something man can carelessly stumble into, and although man is necessary for unconcealedness to be human production can never set up or engineer unconcealedness. Technics is a way that conceals unconcealedness in the relentlessness of its posing and positioning of everything that is. Still thinking can give thought to the danger and the growth of what saves that it conceals, and it can "...think that all that saves must be of a higher, though at the same time kindred, essence as what threatens." 40.

This brings us to a re-turn to what bore the name of techne before technics--i.e. a re-turn to the origin of the western destiny where techne was the uncovering that let the truth of Being emerge and stabilized what was brought to a stand in the work of art. Techne at the peak of the arts in Greece was a unique uncovering. This uncovering brought out and brought forth the Being of beings--i.e. it is poiesis. Poiesis is the uncovering that lies in the way to be of the poetical. Heidegger quotes Holderlin:

"...poetizing man dwells on this earth." 41.

Art goes to the heart of human dwelling on this earth. Art has been thought throughout the history of metaphysics as aesthetics; today art must be re-called to its original way to be if it is to become more than the pleasantness of the good taste of perceptions of the
senses. Art when it has been re-called holds promise for attending to what saves.

Because the essence of technics is nothing technical the essential reflection on technics and the decisive taking issue with it must, therefore, occur in a realm which, on the one hand, is akin to the essence of technics and, on the other hand, is fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art. 42.

By looking into the way to be of art we will see how art is such a realm.

When art has been re-called it reveals itself as a disclosure of the Being of beings which is put into work. Art is concerned with truth. Art is mis-taken when it is taken as concerned with beauty alone--i.e. without truth. Through art the unconcealness of the Being of beings is put to work; the work also confirms either Being or non-Being. Heidegger uses 'work' "...in the Greek sense of ergon, the creation that discloses the truth of something that is present." 43. If the work attains to the disclosure of a particular being then there occurs 'truth at work.' Thus the work lets what is first emerge or be in truth (unconcealness).

When thinking turns to the Being of beings "...what is workly in the work...and thingly in the thing comes closer to us...Art is truth setting itself to work." 44. The truth of what is sets itself to work in the work of art. To gain access to the work we must turn to the work, as work, within the opening that it has brought forth; only here is what is workly present. In considering a temple Heidegger reveals the relational context that the temple as a work first opens up for a historical people. The temple as it stands there lets the things as well as the men of the age come forth as how and who they are.
A work sets up a world. World is not the sum total of beings. World is also not merely a framework man slips over the sum total of beings. For as long as man is the world, worlds. Other beings are worldless; man has a world because he dwells in the overtress of beings. A work opens up a world and in its abiding holds that world open. Environing nature is discovered in setting up the work. The temple as the work that has been erected allows the storm to manifest its violence, day to show its light, night to show its darkness, and so on. The world that is opened is the measure for the beings that abide in it; the world establishes distances and limits. A work first makes space for the world's spaciousness.

Heidegger distinguishes between earth and world. Man dwells on the earth and bases his dwelling in the earth: "Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises without violation."

The work resting and supported in the earth is what first lets the earth come forth as earth. The work sets up a world and sets forth the earth, and these two belong together in the Being of work. The world opens up and the earth conceals. Strife governs the relationship between the two, but it is this strife that first allows either to be. The work as setting up and setting forth instigates this strife.

A world arises within the clearing of Being and man is there in the clearing, and in the world. Here is where man's decisions arise, and here is the realm for the decisive taking issue with technics. "The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people." It is in this clearing that what is is as it
is. When the clearing remains obscured by the concealedness of unconcealedness in the age of technics beings stand against man as objects for representational-calculative thought—i.e. this is the way an object is. When the clearing is let be as the lighting of what is—which comes to pass only when world worlding bears things and things thinging bear world—then what is is by way of the unconcealedness of Being. In either case it is the clearing that lets man pass beyond himself to those beings which he is not and pass to the being which he is.

Only if there is a clearing can concealedness occur. Concealedness is actually the beginning of the clearing. Concealedness belongs to the way to be of truth (unconcealedness). One of the essential ways

...in which truth happens is the work-being of the work. Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is the fighting of the battle in which the unconcealedness of beings as a whole, or truth, is won. 47.

Art is "...the creative preserving of truth in the work. Art then is the becoming and happening of truth." 48. Art sets truth into work. The work of art is created—i.e. lets the thing emerge as what has been brought forth—and it needs to be preserved—i.e. brought into movement and happening. Truth occurs as the unconcealedness and concealedness of what is, and it

...happens in being composed, as a poet composes a poem. All art in the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry. 49.

The way to be of art is poetry. The way to be of poetry is the founding of truth. Art lets truth be.

Genuine poetic projection is the opening up or disclosure of that into which human being as historical is already cast. This is the earth and, for an historical people, its earth, the self-closing ground on which it rests together with everything that it already is, though still hidden from itself. It
is, however, its world, which prevails in virtue of the relation of human being to the unconcealedness of Being. 50.

Art realizes this highest possibility of itself when what is demands a grounding in openness; this need arose for the first time in the West in early Greece where Being was set into work. In each subsequent epoch a new need arose bringing with it its own world and its own truth. Art lets world and truth be and as such grounds history. Art grounds the truth of what is in each epoch through the work. In its way to be art is an origin in which truth comes to Being. Yet in the epilogue to "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger asks if art is today an essential way in which truth comes to Being and thus if art is decisive for man's Being—there in the age of technics. If questioning should reveal this as the case then Heidegger says we must ask why.

If art is claimed by the way to be of our age—i.e. if the way to be of technics bears upon art—art would be appropriate to an unworld. As such art could only be within technics.

In any case art is in its origins a realm akin yet different from the way to be of technics. As such the set up of the work of art offers an alternative to the set-up of the way to be of technics. The set-up of technics robs man of his way to be, conceals the way to be of Being, destroys the nearness of world, attempts to subject the earth, and disregards things. The set up of art calls for man in his way to be—i.e. calls for him to dwell poetically—, sets to work the truth of Being, sets up and preserves a world, sets forth the earth, and lets the thing emerge as itself. Technics turns away from what is, from Being. Art is an essential possibility for a return to what is, to Being.
Conclusion

If Being has withdrawn and has turned away from its truth and if this is the essential occurrence that thrusts the age of technics forth as the destiny of Being, then this age can only be overcome when man as the there of Being learns to find himself in the nearness of what is always nearest, Being. "If man... is once again to find himself in the nearness of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless."¹ This means that man as the speaker must learn to first hear Being, and only then to speak, if there remains anything that needs to be said. Man re-turns to his belonging together with the truth of Being when he opens himself to the call of Being.

Man is the thinker. Only when representational-calculative thought is overcome--i.e. put in its place--can man re-turn thought to its original belonging together with Being. Here is a call to the thinking that recalls, to essential thinking, and to meditative thinking. This unity of thought can collect the dispersed there of man. Such thinking re-turns man to the truth of Being. Thus, a "...way in which truth becomes is the thinker's questioning,"² and "...every genuine answer, is only the final result of the last step in a long series of questions. Each answer remains in force as an answer only as long as it is rooted in questioning."³ The piety of thinking lies in learning how to wait.

Another way in which man may re-turn to the truth of Being is through art. Art promises man much if only he will re-think art and then re-call art to its original way to be. Art remains akin to yet different from technics and as such is a realm in which technics may be confronted in an original way.
Thought and art are two ways in which man may re-turn to the truth of Being and in doing so encounter the long-concealed reigning way to be of technics.

As the danger grows, the need for and call to what saves grows. But the wasteland also grows, and so there is a sense of urgency unique to our times. As the light goes out of the west and the glitter of technics pushes back the night concealing it from all but the most thoughtful there arises the need to see through the glitter of all technic-al appearances and into the night wherein lies the constellation of Being and man.
Footnotes

Introduction

1. "Technics" is to be distinguished from "technology" in accordance with the distinction in German between "Technik" and "Technologie." "Technik" is the 'active way' that today dominates everything that is, and it is characterized by the method of procedure whereby everything is drawn into the set-up in order to be. Thus "technics" can be considered as the 'thing itself', while "technology" is the learning about it. Technics embraces the entire present age, as well as the man there and his social order.

"Technik" has been rendered into English as "technology" by most of Heidegger's English translators; this is in keeping with the usual usage of "technology". In this thesis I will use the term "technics" to follow the German usage, but I will not amend the quotations that contain "technology". The use of "technics" follows Adamczewski's suggestion and F. Kersten's translation of the essay "The Question About Technics".

One of Heidegger's clearest statements about technics occurs in the following quote:

Just as we call the idea of living things biology, just so the presentation and full articulation of all beings, dominated as they now are everywhere by the nature of the technical, may be called technology. ("The Principle of Identity", p. 52.)

I. Technics.

2. Ibid., p. 32.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
4. Ibid., p. 34.
5. Ibid., p. 35.
6. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 16.
11. See "The Question About Technics", p. 42; note especially the account of the hydro-electric plant on the Rhine as contrasted with the bridge over the Rhine.
16. Ibid., p. 53.
18. Ibid., p. 308-09.
19. "The Question About Technics", p. 53. "...the collective unity..." as a translation of Geshick is amended to read "destiny".
20. Das Ge-\textit{Stell} is not used in the everyday German sense of the word. The word takes on important significance in Heidegger's writings. In her introduction to Identity and Difference Joan Stambaugh suggests that Ge-\textit{stell} embraces the unity of all the activities of the verb \textit{stellen} and its forms. She translates Ge-\textit{stell} as a framework of frame. F. Kersten, in his translation of "Die Frage nach der Technik" renders Ge-\textit{stell} as "...the collective unity of exacting, positing, setting, and disposing." This is somewhat confusing and cumbersome. Adamczewski suggests set-up as a possible translation. I will use set-up, while keeping in mind that a framework is present, but not a passive frame. This frame or set-up is far from passive in as much as it disposes man and all else.
22. Ibid., p. 36. "Event of appropriation" amended to "bearing", to follow Adamczewski's translation of \textit{Ereignis}.
23. Ibid., p. 37. "Event of Appropriation" amended to "bearing".
25. Ibid., p. 51.
26. Ibid., p. 53.

II. Metaphysics.

1. \textit{The Question of Being}, p. 91.
3. \textit{What is a Thing?}, p. 43.
5. Ibid., p. 225; p. 241.
6. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 139.
7. George Joseph Seidel, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics, p. 82. At the end of what I have quoted Seidel in a footnote refers the reader to \textit{Vorträge und Aufsätze}, p. 245.
8. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 180 (following Dr. Adamczewski's corretion of the translation: "appearance" is changed to "look").
9. Ibid., p. 183.
10. Ibid., p. 185.
12. Ibid., p. 261.
13. Ibid., p. 265.
15. "Metaphysics as History of Being", p.4. For my account of what Heidegger says about the transformation of key concepts in Aristotle's thought see p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 5.
17. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 267.
22. What is a Thing?, p. 100.
25. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 221.
27. Ibid., p. 359. Richardson cites Holzwege, p. 141, and "Hegel und die Griechen", pp. 52-7.
29. What is Called Thinking?, p. 104.
31. See "The Age of the World View", p. 219, for this and most of the following account. Also see What is a Thing?, pp. 66-108.
33. Ibid., p. 272.
34. Ibid., p. 273.
35. Ibid., p. 275.
36. Ibid., p. 277.
37. Ibid., p. 278.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 280.
40. Ibid., p. 282.

III. The Age of Technics.

1. "What Are Poets For?", p. 110.
2. Ibid., p. 111.
4. Ibid., p. 107.
7. "...Poetically Man Dwells...", p. 228.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 46.
11. "What is Metaphysics?", P. 357.
13. Ibid., p. 87.
15. Ibid., p. 106-07.
16. Ibid., p. 87.
17. "Memorial Address", p. 44.
18. Ibid., p. 48.
21. Ibid., p. 74.
22. Ibid.
1. "What Are Poets For?", p. 117.
5. "Memorial Address", p. 56.
8. Ibid., p. 7.
9. Ibid., p. 5.
10. What is Called Thinking?, p. 159.
15. Ibid., p. 62. /wasen/ is supplied by Adamczewski in the text.
17. Ibid., p. 258.
18. What is Called Thinking?, p. 139, and for these comments on the Old English words see pp. 130 ff.
19. Ibid., p. 140.
20. Ibid., pp. 140-41.
21. Ibid., p. 145.
24. Ibid., p. 55.
26. Ibid., p. 64.
27. Ibid., p. 67.
28. Ibid., p. 83.
29. Ibid., p. 84.
31. Ibid., p. 6.

IV. Close To The Edge.
32. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
33. Ibid., p. 10.
34. Ibid., p. 12.
35. Ibid.
39. "The Turning", p. 16. Amended to follow Adamczewski's suggestions: "nears" to "comes close"; "appropriates" to "disposes"; "unto" to "toward".
40. "The Question About Technics", p. 64.
41. Ibid., p. 65.
42. Ibid., pp. 65-6.
43. An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 191.
45. Ibid., p. 42.
46. Ibid., p. 48.
47. Ibid., p. 55.
48. Ibid., p. 71.
49. Ibid., p. 72.
50. Ibid., p. 75.

Conclusion

3. Ibid., p. 70-1.
Bibliography

English translations of Martin Heidegger's works in alphabetical order. Titles of essays appear indented under the title they were published in English. An asterisk marks the works I relied heavily upon.

"Memorial Address"
"Conversation"
"Metaphysics as History of Being"
"Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics"
"Recollective in Metaphysics"
"Overcoming Metaphysics"
"Remembrance of the Poet"
"Heidegger and the Essence of Poetry"
*"On the Essence of Truth"
*"What is Metaphysics?"


"On Time and Being"
"The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking"
"My Way to Phenomenology"


* "A Dialogue on Language"
* "The Nature of Language"
* "The Way to Language"
* "Words" (tr. Joan Stambaugh)

"Language in the Poem—a discussion on Georg Trakl's Poetic Work"


"The Thinker as Poet"

* "The Origin of the Work of Art"
* "What Are Poets For?"
* "Building Dwelling Thinking"
* "The Thing"
* "Language"

* "...Poetically Man Dwells"...


(Parts of the above bibliography are based on Heidegger Bibliography Of English Translations, compiled by Keith Hoeller.)

Secondary sources.

Adamczewski, Zygmunt, "Martin Heidegger And Man's way To Be," Man and World 1, 3 (1968), pp. 363-379.