HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY: AN UNDERSTANDING OF ITS STANDPOINT AND PREDICAMENT

by

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INTRODUCTION

Marvin Farber in 1940 wrote that "It (phenomenology) was thoroughly understood by few, although it was discus-

sed by many," since "most students of philosophy did not devote the necessary time to the study of phenome-
nology." 1 Farber's statement seems to hold true even today to the extent that his criticism reminds one of a question: What is it to understand a philosophy?

Farber presumably draws a sharp distinction between 'thorough understanding' and 'mere discussion.' Is the attainment of thorough understanding, however, a matter only of "the necessary time" devoted, as Farber contends? The necessary time is, as a matter of course, a necessary condition for understanding; nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that the necessary time alone is itself a sufficient fulfillment. It is probably true that the more time one devotes to the study of thought, the more familiar one would likely become, at least, with the words by way of which the thought is articulated. Such familiarity, however, should not be confused with understanding, for the former is a condition of the latter, but not necessarily vice versa. But, what is it to un-

derstand thought? Does understanding simply refer to a mere conceptual representation of a thought-complex?

The argument should not be overlooked that the understanding of thought is not merely one-dimensional, which is to say, any systematization of thought alone is in no way the sufficient fulfillment and justification of thought. For thought is not in itself self-contained and self-subsisting. Neither is it complete in itself. One can therefore argue that thought is to be understood not only in terms of its forms but also in terms of its basis and justification. To put it otherwise, thought is responsible for and justified by its penetration into the socio-historical dimension of reality, which is one of the most significant dimensions of philosophy. Hence the real thrust of thought can and must be measured by the degree of its penetration into the socio-historical problems of its own time.

The guiding thread of Husserl is first introduced by his historical predicament of the present time as crisis.² Although his predicament of crisis is insepa-

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² Habermas contends that the notion of crisis generally stems from a critical judgement of the objective context of reality, viz., social reality. He writes:

In Greek usage the critical judgement referred to the crisis, as the dispute over right which presses on to a decision; critique itself was an element within the objective context of the crisis. (Theory and Practice, trans. by John Viertel [Boston: Beacon Press, 1973], p.213, my emphasis.)
rable from the historical background of his time. Husserl does not delve into the socio-historical crisis-context of reality. Husserl, rather, methodologically suspends the objective context of reality or its objective existence (i.e., in a naturalistic sense) by condemning it as a naive metaphysical construction. To avoid the charge of metaphysics, Husserl substitutes objective reality for the objectivity of knowledge. Hence, Husserl's 'historical' predicament necessarily turns into an 'un-historical' predicament of knowledge, objective knowledge of empirical reality.

Husserl henceforward consistently directs his concern to epistemological problems pertaining to the constitution of knowledge. The underlying motif of Husserl's epistemological interest is an epistemological overcoming of the naïveté inherent in the unquestioned presuppositions of objectivism in general. Husserl contends that the absence of a universal theory of knowledge allows the overwhelming dominance of naturalism and positivism, which is the state of crisis.

The first phase of phenomenology stands for a strict methodology ideally free from presuppositions. It is a pure descriptive method emptied of metaphysical

Critique is hence neither arbitrary nor accidental, but it essentially pertains to the structure of reality and finds its basis and justification in society. The goal of critique, it follows, is nothing other than a qualitative change of the structure of socio-historical reality, which is immediately followed by a qualitative difference of our relation to reality.
elements, normative and logical principles of science. Even logic itself is placed in question by Husserl (cf. Chapter Two, Section A). Husserl's phenomenological critique of knowledge thus calls in question every presupposition. It is, however, to be noted that the underlying premise of Husserl's critique of knowledge is the a priori absolute dimension of transcendental consciousness.

One can only argue that the descriptive method of phenomenology is from the first intrinsically linked to the last phase of the development of phenomenology, viz., transcendental phenomenology. Hence, the latter is not a merely contingent development of phenomenology but theoretically an inevitable result of Husserl's motive. Husserl's motif of a presuppositionless method is derived from the very premise of the transcendental dimension of philosophical reflection. The scope and legitimacy of the method is thus justified and totalized by its own premise.

Obviously, method is not itself a normative or thematic principle --- i.e., method is not autonomous in itself. In other words, description is not simply prescription. Method can and must apply to the thematic region of philosophical reflection on socio-historical reality. When correctly applied to an analysis of reality, Husserl's philosophy turns out to be a transcendental analysis from a transcendental (i.e., for Husserl, an absolutely necessa-
ry) point of view. It signifies that a reality is reduced by Husserl to a contingent world, the absolute necessity of which lies immanent in the transcendental dimension of consciousness. The dimension of philosophy in Husserl here turns into the subjective, internal dimension of pure reflection, and the socio-historical dimension of reality into the internalized, generalized, homogeneous dimension of consciousness.

Such an internal dimension of philosophical reflection may provide at best an ideal condition for possible changes of the structure of reality and yet the ideal alone, when constructed, does not stand for its own sufficient fulfillment. How does a transcendentally deduced ideal relate to real, concrete problems pertaining to various dimensions of human activity? An ideal that does not have concrete and necessary connections with a reality likely results in an abstraction for the sake of abstraction or mere chimera, the function of which is nothing but consolidation and mystification of the very reality. When considering his extreme internalization of the socio-historical dynamics, one may have to view Husserlian phenomenology as, in the last resort, "the last stronghold of idealism." 3

In Chapter One, I shall focus my discussion on the method and structure of Galilean physics and then Husserl's

critique of it. Husserl's universal critique of natural science, from an epistemological point of view, paves the way for the pure descriptive method of phenomenology. It is Husserl's contention that only a first philosophy (Erste Philosophie) which is not motivated and conditioned by natural science can provide the justification and ultimate foundation of the latter.

In Chapter Two, I shall concern myself with elucidating such phenomenological notions as transcendental logic, intentionality, and life-world. Such an exposition of Husserl's key thoughts will hopefully lead to a critical vantage point where I am allowed to observe some shortcomings of Husserlian phenomenology.
CHAPTER ONE
HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF SCIENCE
A. HUSSERL'S LEGITIMATION OF CRISIS

Husserl makes a diagnostic statement in his essay "The Crisis of European Man": "The European nations are sick; Europe itself, they say, is in critical condition." ¹ Why and how is it so? Husserl contends that, in contrast with the ancient Greeks, European humanity has lost sight of the unity of man and nature. Husserl conceives of the world, in admiration of the ideal of the ideal of the ancient Greeks, as constituted by two equal dimensions, namely, nature and spirit (Geist). ² Nature and spirit, maintains Husserl, are therefore two self-contained realities, the interaction of which takes place in the sphere of culture, community, communal life, etc. Since one is intrinsically bound to the dimension of socio-cultural, historical life in his interaction with nature, Husserl argues that "Our enivroning world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life." ³ Hence European humanity is taken to be the unity of spirituality (Geistigkeit) and creative activities within the sphere of nature.

Why does Husserl think humanity is in crisis?

He attributes the cause of the present crisis to the

² Ibid., p.152.
³ Ibid., p.154.
dominance of objectivism in general and its varying modes of naturalism. Husserl conceives that naturalistic objectivism is a consistent abstraction from nature as nature, which does not "lead to a self-contained 'world,' a world whose interrelationships are purely spiritual, that could be the theme of a pure and universal humanistic science (Geisteswissenschaft), parallel to pure natural science." 4 In other words, naturalistic objectivism stands for an abstracted objectification of spirit as well as nature, while annulling the spiritual interrelationship between the two. The pole of objectivity for this kind of objectivism is the 'objective' existence of the world. Husserl critically observes that the objective existence of the world is a metaphysically (more specifically, ontologically) committed construction of the world inherent in "modern dualism interpreting the world." 5 The tension between man and nature is carried over to the extent that nature is given preference methodologically and factually as a guiding pole, and that in turn man is oriented toward the poles of infinity (the objective existence of the world) while living in

4 Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, op.cit., p.152.

5 Ibid., p.155.
finitude or a factually finite world. 6 Hence this type of humanity, Husserl argues, is in ambivalence of finitude and infinity, reality and irreality. The irreconcilability of this ambivalence by naturalistic objectivism is due to the absence of an insight into the ambivalent relation between nature and spirit.

The consequences of this are, according to Husserl, various modes of skepticism insisting on "the validity of the factually experienced world, that of actual experience (Erfahrung)," and finding "in it nothing of reason or its ideas." 7 This means that only an experienced world (fact-world) is the self-contained world, finite in itself. Although the ambivalence may seem reconciled and dissolved, humanity is coming to a halt by losing sight of entelechy through which it seeks to exist in civilization and history. 8 Husserl here understands by entelechy a kind of historically self-fulfilling force inherent in man to make ideals or pure

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6 Ibid., p.160.
7 Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p.13. This work will be hereafter referred to as Crisis.
8 Ibid., p.15.
rational norms actualizable in the finite dimensions of man’s life. Husserl in due course makes explicit that we are in need of an ideal pole toward which we are oriented in an infinite historical progress of civilization, in short, the telos of humanity. For Husserl the telos is an ideal, rational norm for our practical worlds. And it is also a comprehension of the ambivalent relationship between the two equal dimensions of reality, specifically, nature and spirit.

Consequently, Husserl claims that the crisis of European humanity originates in the conspicuous dominance of objectivism and naturalism. He contends that natural science is in principle incapable of providing us with any telos, because it is a science lost in the finite but definite world of facts. ⁹ It is a science that explores the structure of a fact-world, and nothing more than that. Husserl thinks that a naturally existing world is not merely a self-contained world but also an historically manifested world of spirit. Hence an analysis of this world must, in Husserl’s view, take into account the two dimensions of a fact-world and spirit and their interrelationship. However, as Husserl obser-

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⁹ Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p.157. This work will be hereafter referred to as CM.
ves, natural science is directed to the naturalization of a fact-world. Doubtless, natural science is a legitimate method insofar as it deals with the structure of a natural world. Nevertheless, the scope of natural science is limited because it methodologically disregards another dimension of reality, viz., spirit. Husserl argues that factual science has virtually nothing to do with "questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence." 10 Therefore, factual science falls short of the "absolute truths" as the ultimate foundation to synthesize its theoretical and practical achievements and human existence; "it does not attain actualization of a system of absolute truths." 11 Factual science is a degeneration of science into "an unphilosophical study of mere facts" which renders science incapable of coping with "its significance for man's life as a whole, and for his life purposes in particular." 12

The life of man as conceived by natural science, Husserl believes, turns into a mere concatenation of definite facts, the experience of which is determinately complete and finite in itself. Life thus falls into a series of disconnected events and experiences, into a infinity

10 _Crisis, op.cit.,_ p.6.
11 _CM, op.cit.,_ p.12.
of determinate facts. Consequently, man loses sight of "the universal unity of all being." 13 Husserl then suggests possibilities of the universal knowledge of all being in unity through philosophical reflection. He calls attention to "the possibility for the true being of mankind; the latter is, necessarily, being toward a telos and can only come to realization, if at all, through philosophy --- through us, if we are philosophers in all seriousness." 14

The naturally existing world in question is an epistemological problem for Husserl: How do we know universally and essentially the objective context of a reality? In this light Husserl examines the method of scientific epistemology and in the end condemns it as methodologically naive. That is to say, Husserl argues that scientific epistemology cannot provide its own justification and ultimate foundation, because it falls prey to an infinite circularity of the determinacy of facts; i.e., its point of departure is an experienced but still indefinite fact, and its goal thematization or naturalization of the fact. It remains, on principle, captive to the supposed determinacy or autonomy of a fact from the first. Husserl on the other hand calls in question the ontological status of the fact. How is the

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13 *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, op.cit., p.159.
14 *Crisis*, op.cit., p.17, Husserl's emphasis.
fact brought into being? Husserl thus states:

On the one side stand the sciences of the dogmatic standpoint, facing the facts and unconcerned about all problems of an epistemological kind. They take their start from the primordial givenness of the facts they deal with (and in the testing of their ideas return always to these facts), and they ask what the nature of the immediately given facts may be, and what can be mediately inferred from that natural ground concerning these same facts and those of the domain as a whole. On the other side we have the rogouro roud inquiries of the epistemological, the specifically philosophical standpoint.

Husserl thus criticizes the scientist's belief in the pre-givenness of the facts as a dogmatic standpoint.

Hans Reichenbach offers a counter-argument to Husserl's, saying that philosophical epistemology is futile. He writes:

The attempt to preserve the concept of a priori knowledge in the face of such results, and to establish philosophical laws "prior to all science" constitutes the hopeless myopia. Academic philosophy reveals a complete misconception of the total situation by still clinging to the idea of the autonomy of philosophy. A philosophy which, independently of scientific research, engages in formulating laws for all fields of knowledge will eventually come into conflict with science. Today it is rather the autonomy of problems that be recognized as basic in science and epistemology. (Modern Philosophy of Science, trans. by Maria Reichenbach [New York: Humanities Press, 1959], pp. 82-3, his emphasis.)

Hence epistemology for Reichenbach is "the analysis of actual scientific knowledge rather than the analysis of reason" (p.79). However, Husserl places in question the "autonomy of problems" itself.
Hence, scientific knowledge is a one-sided knowledge from a dogmatic standpoint unless the very standpoint is fully justified. Otherwise, Husserl contends, "Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact." 16 In the same breath Husserl poses a question:

But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense, and well-being into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment? 17

Husserl thereby expresses his view that natural science must be founded on universal science, through the philosophical reflection of which natural science can be fully justified. Husserl rather dogmatically insists that "Science in the plural, all those sciences ever to be established or already under construction, are but dependent branches of the One Philosophy." 18

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16 Crisis, op.cit., p.8.
17 Ibid., pp.6-7.
18 Ibid., p.8.
Hence, the ideal of philosophy for Husserl is the one that can provide a universal critique of knowledge, based on the insight into the essence of knowledge or the insight free from any prejudice into the objective constitution of knowledge. Husserl argues that philosophy in this sense is the ultimate science of beings in an absolute sense, the universal knowledge of the unity of all being. He writes:

What is needed is a science of beings in an absolute sense. This science, which we shall call metaphysics, grows out of a 'critique' of the natural sciences which is based upon the distinctive basic forms of knowledge-objectivities (in the sense of the different fundamental correlations between knowledge and objectivity) won by the universal critique of knowledge. 19

To sum up, the legitimation of crisis by Husserl is:

(1) the disintegration of man and nature, (2) the conspicuous dominance of naturalistic objectivism, (3) the methodological naiveté of natural science, and consequently (4) the loss of the telos of humanity. A philosophical critique of scientific epistemology is therefore the primary task for Husserl, which in its turn reduces the historical predicament of crisis to a predicament of knowledge and accordingly paves the way for phenomenology as a universal theory of knowledge.

B. HUSSERL AND THE 'NEW SCIENCE' OF GALILEO

1. Husserl's View of the History of Science

Husserl criticizes scientific epistemology as the narrower sense of a critique of natural knowledge. The claimed correlation between natural knowledge and objectivity is to be placed in question. For the scientific method to determine the objectivity of natural knowledge is itself questionable. Husserl finds this general scientific method in the new science of Galileo by taking it as the paradigm of all the exact sciences in history. Husserl matter-of-factly admits that post-Galilean science is methodologically in the same line with Galileo's. They belong in the category of exact science on principle. Husserl states:

Physics, whether presented by a Newton or a Planck or an Einstein, or whomever else in the future, was always and remains exact science. It remains such even if, as one think, an absolutely final form of total theory-construction is never to be expected or striven for. 20

Elsewhere Husserl makes more express his view of the history of the natural sciences as 'cumulative' or 'linear.'

In the unending progression of correct theories, individual theories characterized as 'the natural science of a particular time,' we have a progression of hypotheses which are in every respect hypotheses and verification. In the progression there is growing perfection, and

20 Crisis, op.cit., p.4.
for all it comes more and more to itself, to
its 'ultimate' true being, that it gives us a
better and better 'representation (Vorstellung)'
of what 'true nature' is ... thus it is related
to an infinite historical progress of approx-
imation. 21

The progression of natural science is thus an histo-
rical approximation to actualization of a system of abso-
lute truths, of "the idea of absolute or scientifically
genuine truth" that is "an infinite horizon of approxi-
mations, tending toward that idea." 22 This generaliza-
tion by natural science is placed in question by Husserl
in his critique of the exact sciences. Husserl is concern-
ed with justifying this generalization through philosophi-
cal reflection, while bringing to light the method and
structure of Galilean physics. Husserl's interpretation of
the history of science is, however, a matter of dispute.
It is seriously challenged by philosophers of science such
as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. 23

23 Science is admittedly concerned with the generality of
natural laws. In regard to the perfection of those na-
tural laws the history of science can possibly be view-
ed as a 'linear progression' or 'growing perfection.'
Some contemporary scientists and philosophers of scien-
ce, however, strongly argue against this view of the
history of science. Instead, they emphasize that the
transition from classical science to nuclear physics,
from the physics of Galileo and Newton to nuclear phy-
sics, has brought about a structural as well as metho-
dological change.

Heisenberg, for example, points out the signifi-
cant differences between classical physics and nuclear
physics. (Cf. Philosophical Problems of Nuclear Sci-
ence, trans. by F.C. Hayes [London: Faber and Faber Ltd].)
Husserl's argument seems to lead to a view that science is in principle historically relative and hence that its knowledge is also relative. (A thorough analysis of this view goes beyond the scope of this work.)

Nuclear physics has methodologically renounced "the concepts of an absolute scale of time and of objective events in space and time" (p.17). Hence, the concepts of time and space are no longer those ones held by Galileo and Newton. The special theory of relativity has also brought forth a change of the concepts of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity.' In short, there is no room left in nuclear physics for the concept of the a priori, pure speculation. Nuclear physics is thus no longer dependent on the postulation of an a priori object or ideal guiding pole. Modern physics had likewise done away with the naive hypotheses of classical physics and even shows that the structure of the latter is complete in itself and that hence it has arbitrary belief in its unlimited application (pp.23-4). Heisenberg writes:

The most significant important new result of nuclear physics was the recognition of the possibility of applying quite different types of natural laws, without contradiction, to one and the same physical events.... Thus, the transition in science from previously investigated fields of experience to new ones will never consist simply of the application of already known laws to these new fields. On the contrary, a really new field of experience will always lead to the crystalization of a new system of scientific concepts and laws. (p.24)

Likewise, Thomas Kuhn shows the transition of one scientific paradigm to another as a "scientific revolution" followed by a change of world-view. (Cf. The Structure of Scientific Revolution, (Chicagp: The University of Chicago Press, 1962)). The historical transition from one existing normal science to a new one is a recognition of the limits of the first; accordingly, the world is to be viewed differently hereafter. The swinging stone for Aristotle, for example, is a pendulum for Galileo. The meaning manifested in the former is obviously distinguished from that in the latter, although both are directed to one and the same physical event.
(Note 23, continued) Hence, the progress of scientific knowledge for Kuhn is not simply linear or cumulative but historical with respect to the changes of world-view as represented in particular normal sciences. However, Kuhn seems to fail to justify fully his thesis of scientific revolution because it still remains obscure how a scientific revolution occurs.
2. Metaphysical Presupposition of Galilean Physics

The underlying premise of Galilean science is the presupposed possibility of a quest of the 'origin' or absolute determination of the object in question. A particular object seems to have no universal determinacy in itself; the particular is not necessarily, obviously enough, identified with the universal. The predication of universality is hence a matter of judgement in its genuine sense. Therefore, the understanding of an object rests in our determination of the objective relation between the actually experienced object and the category, experience and forms. In this respect, the understanding of the object in question is to know the possible as well as actual object in its totality. Hence understanding, for this purpose, requires the universal categories of actual and possible objects.

Speculative quest of the categories belongs in a metaphysics which is concerned with "the quest of the arche, the 'origin' of Being itself, i.e., of the world as the sum total of all Beings." 24 In short, the thematic goal of metaphysics is the arche, the origin of Being, and its methodological question is how we can ever come to know the origin in its objectivity. 25

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25 A metaphysical quest of the arche has been peculiarly set up by the Christin theology of the Supreme Being. Christian faith in the creative order of the universe is supplanted by man's reason and hence is made inte-
Galilean science is generally characterized as the 'abstraction' or 'idealization' of particular beings in favor of the rationally determined and hence objective all-embracing idea of Being. Galileo's inductive generalization or idealization of the universal is a humanization of knowledge based upon the Christian-theological world-view. The scientific exploration of nature by Galileo is supplanted by his personalized access to the Ultimate Origin of beings. Man's earthly comprehension of God, Supreme Being, as an indefinable concept gives way eventually to a secular certitude of man's knowledge: the secularization of knowledge by way of the earthly reason.

Even God Himself as a concept turns into an object of reasoning; the existence of God is only to be inferred. Under the assault by the earthly, God is eventually made latent as the ultimate principle of the former. The absolute as a logical presupposition is thus anchored in

Ilogible. Heidegger refers to the workings of the underlying theology thus:

The creative order as conceived by theology is supplanted by the possibility of planning everything with the aid of earthly reasoning (Weltvernuft), which is a law unto itself and can claim that its workings are immediately intelligible (what we call 'logical'). (On The Essence of Truth, in: Existence and Being, ed. and trans. by Werner Brock [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949], p.279.)
the hidden but universal presence of God. "Philosophical thought," Landgrebe states, "enters on the path of purely rational cognition to which God is no longer accessible directly as a Thou but henceforth only indirectly by way of an inference from the phenomenal to the non-phenomenal." 26 An earthly inference from the phenomenal to the non-phenomenal is an ascent toward the Being of beings, the universal of the particular, the origin of the phenomenal. Galileo's scientific account of the physical events is, in this light, the transcendence of the phenomenal into the non-phenomenal, of an ever-changing world of experiences into the eternalistic world of rational cognition, of the material content into the ideal form.

Mundane physical objects of our sense-experience, Galileo believes, are subject to reasoning for their necessary demonstrations. Galileo thus convincingly argues:

In my opinion no one, in contradistinction to that dictum, should close the road to free philosophizing about mundane and physical things, as if everything has already been discovered and revealed with certainty. 27

Here Galileo assumes that the 'essence' of the mundane thing is subjected to our 'discovery' or the possibility

26 Landgrebe, op.cit., p.201, his emphasis.
of the absolute givenness of the non-phenomenal as manifest in the phenomenal pertains to reasoning or philosophizing. In other words, he speculatively postulates the objective existence of the world in its absolute givenness. Hence, the laws of nature formulated through philosophizing are the universal representation of the objective structure of nature. Galileo states:

But Nature, on the other hand, is inexorable and immutable; she never transgresses the laws imposed upon her, or cares a whit whether her abstruse reasons and methods of operation are understandable to me. 28

28 Ibid., p.271.

This conception of nature is also found in the thought of Galileo's contemporary Francis Bacon. For both of them nature is no longer conceived of as an object of 'imitation' but relentlessly of 'domination.' Bacon without hesitation expresses this view:

Human knowledge and human power meet in one, for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be reduced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed, and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule. (The New Organon, in: A Selection of His Works, ed. by Sidney Warhaft [Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1965], p.331.)

Power and knowledge are now synonymous in the presence of nature. Knowledge here is referred to a set of axioms derived from the senses and particulars. The thus inductively attained axioms are above all synonymous with the generality of nature, viz., the exact laws of nature. This formulation of axioms is what Bacon and Galileo call the "discovery of Nature." The world of what Bacon calls "the Idols" is thus transformed into the world of "the Ideas," mere speculation into experimentation. This transformation is the basic theme of the Enlightenment.
The prime task of Galilean science, as he suggest, is the discovery of nature and then the formulation of the laws inherent in nature. Where and how does Galileo seek the origin?
3. Galileo's Scientific Method

Galileo's study on falling bodies is in the modern times one of the most far-reaching and radical revolts against Aristotle's theory of motion. Galileo's introduction of the concept of inertia is, after all, an historical moment terminating the ancient cosmology of the universe --- a transformation of the world-view, in Koyré's terms, "from the finite Cosmos of the Greeks to the infinite universe of the Moderners." 29

Aristotle had argued that the speed of a freely falling body is in proportion to its weight, the cause of its fall. To prove the implausibility of Aristotle's theory of motion, Galileo makes use of a method, what he calls "critical thought-experiment." Galileo says:

But, even without further experiment, it is possible to prove clearly, by means of a short and conclusive argument, that a heavier body does not move more rapidly than a lighter one provided both bodies are of the same material and in short such as those mentioned by Aristotle. 30

And Galileo goes on to point out the logical inconsistency of Aristotle's hypothesis and the conclusion. Galileo argues thus:

Its weight would be increased if the larger

stone moved rapidly; but we have already con-
cluded that when the small stone moves more
slowly it retards to some extent the speed of
the larger, so that the combination of the two,
which is a heavier body than the larger of the
two stones, would move less rapidly, a conclu-
sion which is contrary to your hypothesis. We
gether therefore that large and small bodies
move with same speed provided they are of the
same specific gravity. 31

It is the spirit of critical experiment and obser-
vations that makes the scientific discoveries possible
and that further leads Galileo to an expansion of the
horizon of knowledge beyond the limitations imposed by
logically incoherent assumptions of the ancient sciences.
Knowledge is no longer constrained to a limited number
of axioms and logical inferences. Established axioms
as well as sense-data of the phenomenal are subjected
to thought-experiences and empirical observations by
means of scientific devices. The authority of ancient
cosmology and mechanics is finally overcome by the new
science of Galileo. A scientific exploration of the phe-
nomenal through reasoning, Galileo believes, is a way
to the manifestation of the origin and to the forma-
tion of a new world-view.

Let us examine more closely the method of Galilean
science as seen in the study of Galileo on falling bo-
dies. Note that Galileo's theory of inertial motion,

31 Galilei, Dialogues concerning Two New Sciences,
op.cit., p.62.
according to Koyré, is built upon three logical assumptions:

Thus, in order to appear evident, the principle of inertial motion presupposes (a) the possibility of isolating a given body from all its physical environments, (b) the conception of space which identifies it with the homogeneous, infinite space of Euclidean geometry, and (c) a conception of movement --- and of rest--- which considers them as states and places them on the same ontological level of being. 32

The first presupposition is sharply contrasted with Aristotle's notion of an absolute space when he argues that matter and space are in principle inseparable and that there can be no space without matter. Aristotle therefore contends, as Kuhn understands, that "These natural positions and the lines by which bodies move to them are determined entirely by the intrinsic geometry of an absolute space, a space in which each position is occupied" or that "The natural motion of a stone is governed by space alone, not by the stone's relation to other bodies." 33 Thus, in contradistinction to Aristotle's, the first presupposition enables Galileo to account for the motion of a freely falling body in terms of its relation to the air, i.e., the resistance of air against the body in motion.

The second presupposition leads to the concept of the divisibility of space --- the concept of distance

32 A. Koyré, _op. cit._, p.4.
traversed during an interval of time. This helps Galileo to reduce the phenomenon of the motion of a falling body to numerical measurement and quantification.

The last presupposition, likewise, leads to a conception that movement and rest are nothing but modal changes of the physical phenomenon of motion. Between the two there is no qualitative difference but only a quantitative one as evident in measurement. Above all, the distance traversed by a falling body is a linear proportionality of the speed and time. This conception of movement originates in Galileo's notion of "steady or uniform motion" by which he means "one in which the distances traversed by the moving particle during any equal intervals of time, are themselves equal." 34

What is required to account for the motion are the quantifiable mechanical factors, namely, the only relevant factors in the study of motion: speed, time, distance, traversed, and certain constant proportions. All these factors, regardless of the way we subjectively experience the motion of a falling body, are theoretically reduced to numerical, mathematically measurable determinate properties.

Spatio-temporal events and geometrical configurations are likewise translatable into mathematical or geometrical terms which are, according to Galileo, the language of

34 Galilei, Dialogues concerning Two New Sciences, op.cit., p.148.
nature. Galileo says:

Philosophy is written in this grand book --- I mean the universe --- which stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one is wandering about in a dark labyrinth. 35

The universe is thus reduced by Galileo to the 'mathematization of nature' or the mathematically abstracted ideation of mundane things and events. The presumptive 'absolute givenness' of the objective existence of the world, in Galileo, directly corresponds to the objectivity of mathematical ideation, abstract exact laws of nature. Thus, Galileo replaces speculatively determined qualities, e.g., secondary qualities like color, smell, taste, and the like, with measurable quantitative, numerical physical qualities. Immensely impressed by the applicability of the symbols of mathematics, Galileo describes the principle of his new science:

Since I assume matter to be unchangeable and always the same, it is clear that we are no less able to treat this constant and invariable property in a rigid manner than if it belonged to simple and pure mathematics. 36

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36 G.Galilei, Dialogues concerning Two New Sciences, op.cit., p.5.
The truth of nature for Galileo is no longer anything superhuman or unintelligible beyond the reach of our reasoning, but is above all humanly attainable as mathematical facts. Collingwood comments on Galileo’s notion of truth thus:

...the truth of nature consists in mathematical facts; what is real and intelligible in nature is that which is measurable and quantitative. Quantitative distinctions, like those between colours, sounds, and so forth, have no place in the structure of the natural worlds but are modifications produced in us by the operation of determinate natural bodies on our sense-organs. 37

Galileo’s conception of truth as mathematical, it follows, rests on the very presupposition that the essence of a thing is a logical whole, self-contained and complete in itself, in the last analysis, property. In short, a given thing as an a priori objective existence is a sum of constant properties and matters independent of our subjective experience of it.

However, it is to be noted that Galileo’s reduction of the physical to a mathematically self-evident property seems to draw out a further sharp distinction between the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal, existence and essence, quality and quantity. The hypothesis that the mathematical essence is the objectivity of existence necessarily postulates the priority of essence over

existence, and that of quantity over quality. 38

Husserl launches an attack upon the dubiousness of the
origination of the presupposition: How is the presup-
position sufficiently verified?

The postulation of mathematically self-evident facts
constitutes Galileo's significant principle, i.e., non-
contradictory operation of judgement-forms to infer the
causal relations among mathematical factors. The inertial
motion is thus explained away by establishing the causal
relations among velocity, distance, and other constant
factors. A logical analysis of quantifiable relations
pertaining to the property of a matter in the last re-
sort brings forth uniformity or regularity as theorized
in the exact laws of nature. Systematization of the exact
natural laws in terms of symbols, either mathematical or

38 The formal distinction between essence and existence
has its historical beginning in what the Romans call
ratio, which has been modified into what we presently
call reason presumably as the essence of man. Herein
the primordial relation of man to something that
exists, of reason to the given object, remains ob-
fuscated: "As ratio assumes dominion, all relations
are turned around." (Heidegger, What Is Called Thin-
Row, 1954), p. 210.) It is no doubt true that Galileo
inherited the notion of reason as ratio which he pla-
ced in the center of his scientific exploration of
the universe. Thinking and reasoning for Galileo is
apprehension by reason which in turn poses an object
as a being-in-itself (An-sich-sein). In this regard,
as Heidegger understands it, the concept of ratio
leads to man's practical domination over the objects,
and logic turns into the logic of domination.
geometrical, is a formalization of scientific discoveries, which readily gives us meaning, valid a priori, to all particular cases it secures.

What is left out of account in Galeileo's mathematization of nature is "a closer determination of the relation of the mathematical in the sense of mathematics to the intuitive direct perceptual experience (zur anschaulichen Erfahrung) of the given things and to these things themselves." 39 For the mathematization of nature, Husserl contends, is a sort of tautology, the verification of which is an endless course of verifications. Husserl writes:

It (verification) is remarkable because the hypothesis, in spite of the verification, continues to be and is always a hypothesis; its verification (the only kind conceivable for it) is an endless course of verifications. It is the peculiar essence of natural science, it is a priori in its way of being, to be unendingly hypothetical and unendingly verified. 40


40 Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 42.
4. Husserl's Critique of Galilean Science

Husserl conceives of exact science strictly as a method of predicative induction and predication, a method of knowing concerned with the ascent from *doxa* (mere opinion in contingency) to *episteme* (exact objective knowing). Husserl, however, rebukes exact science for its peculiar methodological autonomy; i.e., the method itself turns out to be the cognition of 'true being.' The substitution of the method for true being, Husserl maintains, originates in the hypothesis of exact science, as self-evident, namely, the hypothesis that "objects of our experience are determined in themselves and that the activity of cognition is precisely to discover by approximation these determinations subsisting in themselves, to establish them 'objectively' as they are in themselves --- and here 'objectivity' means 'once and for all' and 'for everyone.'" 41 The above mentioned method leads to the very method of science, that is, idealization and mathematization as seen in the method of Galilean science.

Galileo's mechanics founds itself upon the method of 'mathematization of nature' and 'idealization of

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41 Husserl, *Experience and Judgement*, ed. by Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. by James Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 43. This work will be hereafter referred to as *EJ.*
pure geometry (geometrization). In Galileo's science, this mathematization of nature serves as a guiding pole; nevertheless, because of the presumptive postulation of the guiding pole in the beginning, Galileo's mechanics falls into an endless regression of approximation of the empirically real to the pure generality of 'the objectively' real, to what Husserl calls the "limit-forms" (Limesgestalten). Husserl says:

Here, we recognize something that truly is --- though only in the form of a constantly increasing approximation, beginning with what is empirically given, to the geometrical ideal shape [form] which functions as a guiding pole. 42

The geometrical ideal form or ideal object as a guiding pole is already predetermined, a priori, by "an ideal praxis of 'pure thinking' which remains exclusively within the realm of pure limit-forms." 43 Thus, limit-forms are forms of 'pure thinking' or a priori categories or possible objects; they are "the structure of categorial actions," but "not objects of experience." 44 In short, limit-forms are in principle not attainable. 45 As they are non-attainable, the knowing of an experienced object is in constantly increasing approximation toward the ideal of limit-

42 Crisis, op.cit., p.29
43 Ibid., p.26, Husserl's emphasis.
44 EJ, op.cit., p.44.
forms. Galileo's limit-forms of the real worlds of experience are changed into the world of ideal forms. As Husserl points out, "the exact world was from the first substituted for the world of our experience." 46

In Galileo's case, this substitution is a direct and logical result of his acceptance of mathematics as "a realm of pure objective knowledge," of ideal objects and limit-forms of pure thinking. 47 Galileo's uncritical acceptance of mathematics — uncritical to the extent that he does not offer a critique of pure reason or thinking which gives rise to mathematical knowledge — as a matter of course enables him to invert the closed world of the ancients into the infinite universe while reducing a world of our experience to a peculiarly applied mathematics. Husserl explains:

If we adhere strictly to Galileo's motivation, considering the way in which it in fact laid the foundation for the new idea of physics, we must make clear to ourselves the strangeness of his basic conception in the situation of his time; and we must ask, accordingly, how he could hit upon this conception, namely, that everything which manifests must have its mathematical index in events belonging to the sphere of shapes — which is, of course, already thought of as idealized — and that there must arise from this the possibility of an indirect mathematization, in the fullest sense, i.e., it must be possible (though indirectly and through a particular inductive method) to construct ex datis, and thus to

46 EJ, op.cit., p.44.
determine objectively, all events in the sphere of the plena. The infinite nature, taken as a concrete universe of causality --- for this was inherent in that strange conception --- became (the object of ) a peculiar applied mathematics. 48

How in fact do we know that nature is essentially a mathematical manifold? Is it simply a matter of 'fact' as Galileo assumes? If it is indeed a matter of fact, it is above all not more than a presumptive fact of pure thinking foreign to our actually real experience. How could we possibly and actually verify this 'fact' that is from the first nothing other than a hypothesis, viz., "the universal applicability of pure mathematics"? 49

Insofar as the hypothesis remains unverified, "the unrestricted generality of natural laws" in accordance with mathematization is, of course, dubitable. 50

Hence, Husserl pursues an inquiry into the constitution of the "exactness" of Galileo's generality. Husserl asks:

What constitutes exactness? Obviously, nothing other than what we exposed above: empirical measuring with increasing precision, but under the guidance of a world of ideation, or rather a world of certain particular ideal structures that can be correlated with given scales of measurement --- such a world having been objectified in advance through idealization and construction. 51

The constitutive whole of the world for Galileo is a theoretically and ideationally totalized whole of su-

49 Crisis, op.cit., p.38.
50 Ideas, op.cit., p.54.
51 Crisis, op.cit., p.34, my emphasis.
pposed exactness, which is totally remote from the worlds of experience. As Husserl's analysis clearly shows, the world as a whole, as a manifold of the idealized world, is always already projected and schematized within the realm of pure thinking, what Husserl calls "mathematical praxis." Now an empirical world is simply reduced to a variable manifold of the idealized world of absoluteness. Exactness for Galileo therefore corresponds to absolute identity, the absolute objectivity of limit-forms. Husserl writes:

But in this mathematical praxis we attain what is denied us in empirical praxis: "exactness"; for there is the possibility of determining the ideal shapes in absolute identity, of recognizing them as substrates of absolutely identical and methodologically, univocally determinable qualities. 52

The finiteness of an empirical world, i.e., the contingency and limitations of our sensory experience, finally becomes determined by Galileo as finite in terms of the given determinacy of ideal exactness. Husserl concludes that Galileo's method to mathematize an empirical world of space-time in the last analysis 'indirectly' in the absolute identity of mathematics. Scientific objectification of an empirical world through mathematization appears to Husserl, after all, to be nothing but an empty and dogmatic generality. Husserl's

52 Crisis, op.cit., p.27.
criticism of Galilean new science seems, indeed, to the point; however, obviously enough, criticism is in principle not an end in itself. It can and must transcend what it refutes. Here lies Husserl's motivation to 'radicalize' science through philosophical reflection.
5. A Step Toward the Ideal of Philosophy

Husserl's critique of Galilean science has made explicit the point that the general method of exact science appears to justify the objectivity of its knowledge by reason of the a priori separability of reason and that which exists; i.e., the totality of the latter is, to begin with, 'absolutely' given in the former --- the absolute givenness of the objective existence of an object. If they are truly separable, it follows then that an object exists 'in itself' and at the same time this being-in-itself is absolutely given in reason as 'universal' knowledge. How should we, then, understand the subjective act of reflection if such knowing is ever possible? Husserl, in the spirit of the 'beginner,' hereby must pose a very fundamental question:

Can reason and that-which-is (Seiendes) be separated, where reason, as knowing, determine what is (was Seiendes ist)? 53

The above question occupies Husserl's mind as the guiding question of his philosophizing at the stage.

Exact science based on the a priori distinction between reason and the given object is defined by Husserl as factual science or science of fact (Tatsachen-

53 *Crisis.*, p.11.
wisssenschaft), which is sharply distinguished from eidetic science, science of essence. What Husserl understands by fact is the contingency of being(s), the real in individual form as having the spatio-temporal existence. \(^{54}\) "Individual Being of every kind (Sein jeder Art)," Husserl states, "is, to speak quite generally, 'accidental' (zufällig). It is so-and-so, but essentially it could be other than it is." \(^{55}\) The contingency of fact, according to Husserl, is correlative to "a necessity (Notwendigkeit) which does not carry the mere actuality-status of a valid rule of connexion obtaining between temporally-spatial facts, but has the character of essential necessity, and therewith a reflection to essential universality." \(^{56}\)

What Husserl means by essence (Eidos) is the necessity of being, essential being qua "Being as it is in itself," to which the meaning of contingent fact belongs. Otherwise stated, the meaning of a contingent fact is bestowed by the essential necessity of essence. The essence of an object manifests, so to speak, what it is in its variable, individual, contingent fact-forms. "But every such 'what' can be 'set out as Ideas'." \(^{57}\)

Husserl's conception of essence therefore rests upon

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54 Cf. *Ideas*, op.cit., p.46f.
Ideas that are cognizable on principle. Husserl, however, warns us that 'essence' is in no way a metaphysical goal of the transcendent. It is rather an ultimate being in the evident givenness of pure intuiting (Schauen). In other words, it is an immanent being presented and encountered within the realm of phenomenon, phenomenon in a strictly phenomenological sense. Phenomenon is taken as 'appearance' in an intuitive givenness of something. However, unlike fact, phenomenon for Husserl is not bestowed with a definite meaning or determinacy. The dimension of phenomenon is hence a field of absolute (apodictic) givenness where "it [a field of the present] is given to consciousness perceptually, with the most originary originality, as it iself." 58 The method to exclude any metaphysical postulation of the transcendent and to have an insight into essence is what Husserl calls phenomenology.

Husserl thereby emphasizes that the science of facts is not to be confused with that of essence, as in the case of positivism, for the subject-matter of the former is not the same as the latter. The science of facts deals exclusively with the "region" by which Husserl means "the highest and most inclusive generic unity
belonging to a concretum, that is, the essential unitary connexion of the summa genera which belongs to the lowest differences within the concretum." 59 The eidetic (essential) scope of the "Region" which "includes the ideal totality of the concretely unified systems of differences of these genera, the individual scope the ideal totality of possible individuals answering to such concrete essences," is the theme of the science of essence. 60 The sharp distinction between the science of fact and that of essence leads, as Sinha understands it, to the observation that "eidetic science should in general precede experiential science, so far as the structure of possible essences precede, from the phenomenological point of view --- i.e., from the point of view of 'origination' --- the stratum of facts." 61

Next, Husserl shows from a logical point of view that an analytic theory of exact science like analytical propositions is not necessarily a theory of essence. The type of logic involved in the analytical theories of exact science is the logic of judgement, the so-called "apophantic logic" which is preceded by "formal ontology." 62 They belong together in "formal logic" which serves in exact science as the principle of operation.


60 *Ideas, op.cit.*, p.69.

61 D. Sinha, *op.cit.*, p.95.

62 Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. by
Insofar as formal logic leaves out of account the subjective (noetic) conditions for knowing-reflection, it can never fulfill the function of a 'philosophical' theory of science (in the sense of episteme) but merely of pure analytics. That is to say, leaving unaccounted the subjective aspect of knowledge-constitution is a way to the pure logical construction of pure thought and empty, formal generality. Husserl states:

In its full and complete sense it [mathesis universalis] is nothing other than a formal logic carried out universally (or rather to be carried out in infinitum in its own essential totality), a science of the forms of meaning of the 'something-in-general' which can be constructed in pure thought and in empty, formal generality. 63

The empty, formal generality of a scientific theory, when so constructed, turns into mere technique. "Here the original thinking," maintains Husserl, "genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the correct results (even the 'formal truth' peculiar to the formal mathesis universalis) is excluded." 64 Thinking as conscious, constructive experience (cogito for Husserl) thus degenerates historically into "merely technical thinking" by way of symbolic con-

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Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). This work will be hereafter referred to as FTL.

63 Crisis, op.cit., p.45.
64 Ibid., p.46.
cepts. 65

Apophantic logic is the logic of technical thinking, for the truth of this type of thinking represents logical validity of our operative manipulation of concept-forms. This technical mode of thinking peculiarly transforms the inductive method of science into a 'deductive' system of meaning-categories, propositions, truths, and the like. The established meaning-categories, etc. are thrown over the world of experience or pre-predicative world as the horizon of meaning, value, etc. Husserl insists, hence, that natural science has historically fallen into "dogmatic natural science" through its "eidetic method." 66 It has totally forgotten "the question concerning the meaning and value of what we know." 67

Where does the above question indeed arise? Where should we ask for the question? Husserl thinks that we must return to consciousness where the origination of meaning-categories, concepts, and truths lies from the first. Husserl says thus:

In order to know, and to know indubitably, what a mathematical axiom states, we must not turn to the philosophical empiricists, but to consciousness, wherein, as mathematicians, we grasp axiomatic matter with complete insight into its axiomatic character. 68

65 Ibid., pp. 46-8.
67 Ibid., p. 86.
68 Ibid., p. 85.
Consciousness for Husserl is the "absolute objectivity" which as the dimension of reflection constitutes knowledge in its genuine sense, wherein the totality of an experienced thing is self-evidently presented in the form of intuiting, prior to any theorizing, reflective act. 69 Husserl understands that: 

very primordial dator Intuition is a source of authority (Rechtquelle) for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in 'intuition' in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself. 70 

The phenomenological --- 'universal' for Husserl --- analysis of consciousness thus becomes Husserl's prime theme of philosophizing.

69 Ibid., p.78.
70 Ibid., p.83.
CHAPTER TWO

PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND LIFE

Husserl conceives of the naiveté of natural science as the methodological circularity inherent in the initial presuppositions of the determinate givenness of the object. How is the transcendent determinately given, which lies beyond the field of experience? If by the transcendent is meant something beyond the field of immediate experience, i.e., in the sense of transcendence, it follows that the transcendent cannot be experienced in principle. 1 How can we know something that cannot be experienced on principle? It can be only argued that the totality of a given object is hypothetically presented in reason as a mathematical manifold, etc. This presupposition, however, as Husserl points out, remains free from verification except for logical ones. Hence, the knowledge thus obtained should be placed in question. Husserl’s interest here lies in the 'methodological' freedom from presuppositions or prejudiced standpoints.

Phenomenology in this context is strictly a method to get rid of any presupposition in the process of reflection. However, note that the freedom from presupposi-

1 M. Farber, The Aims of Phenomenology, op. cit., p. 72.
tions is itself a great presupposition. It seems to me that this paradoxical presupposition as a result of the negation of any presupposition plays a peculiar role when Husserl moves from the earlier phase of phenomenology, viz., phenomenology as a pure, descriptive method, to the later phase of transcendental idealism. I conceive of this transition of phenomenology as Husserl's return to a 'metaphysics' of subjectivism, i.e., metaphysics not in any traditional form, but a metaphysics of being in an absolutely essential sense.

Phenomenology as a pure, descriptive method is, as many may contend, anti-metaphysical or against formal ontology. Husserl in this regard offers an elaborate critique of formal logic as metaphysical in its very foundation. Husserl extensively examines the structure of formal logic as an operative principle of scientific knowing, in order to prove the methodological naïveté of natural science. Such a critique eventually leads to a more fundamental system of logic, what Husserl calls "transcendental logic." In the Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl clearly shows the shortcomings of formal logic and the transition from formal logic to transcendental logic.

Husserl warns us not to attend to the object itself but to our experiencing of the object in question. Hence, the analysis of knowledge is nothing other than an ana-
alysis of the genetic constitution of knowledge, and furthermore of experience itself. The real unity of the subject and the object in experience is, according to Husserl, the 'ideal' unity of meaning. The analysis of experience by Husserl is therefore further turned into an analysis of meaning, of meaning-constitution (bestowal of meaning). Herewith Husserl focuses his attention upon an analysis of the structure of consciousness as the absolute horizon of meaning, knowledge, norms, values, etc.

Husserl's rejection of metaphysics, especially the metaphysics of being-in-itself (An-sich-sein), consequently reduces the natural worlds to the world of 'contingency' in contrast with the world of 'absolute necessity,' viz., the world of absolute consciousness. Husserl painstakingly tries to reconcile contingency and absolute necessity in what he calls the "life-world" (Lebenswelt).\(^2\) The life-world finally comes to the fore as the primordial dimension of life materially fulfilling the infinite Ideal of life. At this point, Husserl believes that phenomenology has at length accomplished the unity of philosophy, science, and life. We shall examine in the following discussion the thrust of Husserl's phenomenological programme.

\(^2\) Cf. Crisis, op.cit.
A. Formal and Transcendental Logic

1. Formal Logic: Apophantic Logic and Formal Ontology

Exact science like mathematics and physics generally aims at seizing upon universal forms or a priori forms of empirical contents of the given things through mathematization à la Galileo or a mathesis universalis à la Leibniz. Universal forms signify the forms of possible, true judgements. In connection with those universal forms logic generally serves as the a priori theory of science, the general theory of deductive systems. Husserl, however, contends that traditional formal logic falls short of an a priori theory of all-embracing, universal knowledge. This is to say that formal logic for Husserl does not stand for the logic of universally truthful judgements.

Logic is a general theory of predicative judgements of affair-complexes, a theory of the systematic transformation of mere belief (doxa) into exact knowing (episteme). Logical inquiries first concerns the forms of judgements and their causal connections, viz., what Husserl calls "the apophantic sphere." Logic concerned with apophansis (judgement in a logical sense) takes on itself pure forms of significations, possibility of judgements qua judgements, and their analytical connections: apophantic logic. In apophantic logic, however, the truth of falsehood of a judge-
ment remains left out of account. 3

For example, 'S is p,' 'Sp is q,' '(Sp)q is r,' and so forth are all judgement-forms, each of which has within itself a 'universality' of its own, for each form is modifiable and logically extendable in such a way as 'if S is p, then S is p,' etc. In this case, 'S is p' is "the highest genus of apophantic logic, 'apophasis'," when it is extended to predicative judgement-certainties about possibilities, probabilities, and the like. 'S is p' is the highest genus in relation to 'S is p' and 'if S is p, then S is p.' 4 At the same time the form 'S is p' is the primitive form of other judgement-forms like 'Sp is q,' '(Sp)q is r,' and so forth. By properly determining the judgement-form in relation to the genus and primitive form, one can logically infer an undetermined form of judgement. Pure analytics as the theory of universal forms is thus reduced to fundamental kinds of operations and the laws of operations.

The analytical laws of operations, in fact, governs the modes of operations of judgement-forms and consequently eliminate invalid judgements as 'analytical consequence' or 'analytical contradiction.' As Husserl points out, the concepts of truth and fa-

3 FTL, op.cit., p.50.
4 Ibid., pp.51f.
lseehood, however, are entirely absent in the analytical operation.

The fundamental concepts of pure analytics in the pregnant sense include, as fundamental concepts of validity (norm-concepts), only analytic consequence and analytic contradictions; as already said, truth and falsity, along with their modalities, are not present among them. This must be rightly understood: They are not present as fundamental concepts pertaining to the thematic sphere. 5

In this respect, it can be argued that formal analytic (apophantic logic) is on principle an operational concept; it is purely methodological, but not thematic. Husserl therefore contends that formal logic of non-contradiction is a necessary condition for possible truth; which is to say, a methodologically sound operation of concepts is not necessarily truth in a thematic sense. Husserl says:

One can see forthwith that non-contradiction is an essential condition for possible truth, but also that mere analytics becomes converted into a formal truth-logic only by virtue of a connexion between these intrinsically separable concepts, a connexion that determines an eidetic law and, in a logic, must be formulated separately. 6

The methodological goal of formal logic is an 'objective-logical' condition for possible forms of true judgements. Husserl criticizes that the concept

5 Ibid., p.55, Husserl's emphasis.
6 Ibid., p.55, Husserl's emphasis.
of truth in formal logic is the concept of "correctness" which is "the sense of one concept of truth, the critical concept." 7 (The concept of truth for Husserl has a double sense, correctness and actuality. 8) Correctness seems the critical, analytical verification of a formed judgement with respect to an adequation between a given affair-complex and "a supposed objectivity as supposed: a supposed consequence, a supposed determination, a supposed plurality, a supposed cardinal number, or the like." 9 Otherwise stated, it is the adequation between empirical evidences of an affair-complex and an ideal objectivity as supposed.

What is the evidence appropriate to a critically verified correct judgement? (Note that evidence for Husserl likewise has a double sense, corresponding to the double sense of truth: the original having of a true or actual being: itself, and the property belonging to the judgement. 10) What is the evidence wherein a judgement qua judgement is formed? How is the evidence of a supposed objectivity given?

Here, another aspect of formal logic, namely, formal ontology, plays a significant role in making a supposed objectivity self-evident. 11 In order to account

7 Ibid., p.127
8 Ibid., pp.127-9.
9 Ibid., p.126
10 Ibid., p.60/128.
11 Ibid., p.76f.
better for "formal ontology", Husserl refers to the formal analysis of pure mathematics like the theory of sets, of combinations and permutations, of cardinal numbers, and so forth. Husserl states that

one recognizes that the theory of sets and the theory of cardinal numbers relate to the empty universe, any object whatever or anything whatever, with a formal universality that, on principle, leaves out of consideration every material determination of objects. 12

Final ideas explicated in evidence for mathematical theories are, as fundamental concepts, "certain derivative formations of anything-whatever." 13 In other words, the ideal object of pure mathematics is a priori postulated as 'anything whatever' or something in general. And, accordingly, such an object as ideal-objectivity is in advance self-evidently projected. It is the universal concept of a given object belonging solely to the judger. Hence it is a purely formal generality of the idea of anything whatever.

The having of the pure forms of ideal objects is an essential presupposition of mathematical analytics. Husserl hence concludes:

Accordingly it is natural to view this whole mathematics as an ontology (an apriori

12 Ibid., p.77.
13 Ibid., p.77.
theory of objects), though a formal one, relating to the pure modes of anything—whatever. 14

Therefore, formal logic is essentially 'metaphysical'; the object of formal logic is a metaphysically postulated ideal object.

Let us now examine the relation between apophantic logic and formal ontology. Judging is always judging about a given object. In the case of the judgement-form 'S is p', p is the predication of the properties pertaining to the substrate S. In formal logic, however, the object is always already present as a form, a derivative formation of anything whatever, which appears in the sphere of apophantic logic. 15 By virtue of the intrinsic relation between anything whatever (generality) and possible forms of the object, formal ontology and apophantic logic belong together in formal logic, according to Husserl. This double function of formal logic bears within itself a peculiar system-form of the deductive theory. Husserl says:

The system-form of the deductive theory, on the one hand, is itself a formation belonging in the analytic sphere. Thus deductive or nomological sciences are characterized by the fact that their system-principle is purely analytic. The deductive theory has systematic unity-form that belongs within the

14 Ibid., p.78.
15 Ibid., p.79.
province of formal logic itself, one that can be constructed a priori in logic itself --- and, more particularly, in its highest discipline, the theory of multiplicities --- as part of the total system of those forms of deductive systems that are possible a priori. 16

Thus, formal logic is a self-contained system founding itself in the province of logic.

The objectivity of formal logic is an objectivity "comprehended under the form-concepts that arise by virtue of formalization and pertain to them as categorial." 17 It is rather a 'categorial' objectivity of ontological forms. Husserl writes:

The judge is directed to something objective and, in being directed to it, he never has it otherwise than in some categorial (or, as also say, syntactical) forms or other, which are therefore ontological forms. 18

In other words, this "something objective" is in advance ontologically projected. And the possible forms of judgements explicated in the sphere of apophantic logic find their formal identity in the genus of something objective.

Husserl here calls our attention to the naïveté of formal logic which should not be overlooked. Various possible forms of judgements which arise in the

16 Ibid., p.102.
17 Ibid., p.119.
18 Ibid., p.115.
formal analytical judging, maintains Husserl, leave their beings-in-themselves fixed as identical. The identity of the beings-in-themselves is assumed from the outset as an ideal. This categorial ideal is, however, an ontological concept, and not an apophantic one at all. \(^{19}\) Knowledge of the ideal does not, in Husserl's view, represent the 'actuality' of an object or affair-complex as it is experienced.

Here such knowledge is not a matter of an actual attaining, but of an ideal one, "which has never been fulfilled in practice and which presumably can never be fulfilled." \(^{20}\) This ideal is a 'universal fiction' which is accordingly not related to the practical world. Logic which based itself on a universal fiction and which cannot provide actual norms for practice is in no way, for Husserl, the fundamental concept of logic, viz., an apriori theory of the deductive system. Husserl expresses his view of logic thus:

...logic is indeed normative, and this ideal is indeed an actual fundamental norm pertaining inseparably to the possibility of genuine science. \(^{21}\)

Now Husserl faces a need to account for a normative logic of genuine science, viz., phenomenology.

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19 Ibid., p.145
20 Ibid., p.187
21 Ibid., p.187.
2. Transcendental Logic

Husserl's guiding motif for transcendental logic is not to be understood as a construction of a new type of logic. Rather, he is concerned with providing a 'genetic' and 'constitutitional' clarification of the ultimate foundation of logic. It is therefore a 'transcendental' analysis of logic in general, aiming at the universal justification of the general theory of logic. In this regard, it can be argued that Husserl's critique of formal logic is a step toward a further radicalization of logic itself. Husserl's criticism that formal logic bases itself upon the idealization and abstraction of its object is consequently taken over by his adequation of logic that examines its own presuppositions. Logic that thoroughly examines its a priori structure and theory is Husserl's ideal of logic as the a priori theory of exact knowing and judging.

The judgement-form 'S isp' is a judgement about the substrate S which we presumably have as present before us. However, one can raise a question: Is the having of the substrate S really self-evident when judging? For traditional logic, 'the having' (evidence) of an object is a matter of "acceptance" in a natural sense (as in Seinsgeltung haben), either actively or habitually. 22 For in formal logic the object is

22 Ibid., p.117f.
always already present as an object of judging in categorial forms. Can the corporeal object, Husserl poses a question, really be substituted by a categorial, ideal form of the object in question?

Judging is a thematizing act, in Husserl's view, that takes place only when there is presented an evidence "wherein the judgement itself, qua judgement, becomes itself given." 23 Husserl without ad opposes the view that an object of judging is self-evidently given in categorial forms. It is not simply there in a naturalistic way. When does the evidence then come? What is the original evidence wherein a judgement becomes itself given?

Husserl understands by evidence, "'categorial intuition,' in which they (existing objectivities) would be given originaliter as they 'themselves', verified, cognized as truly and actually existing." 24 In other words, the evident having of the true and actual being itself of an experienced object is originally presented in his experiencing of the given object. The evidence tacitly presented in our experiencing, as the giving of something itself, is an absolute apodicticity, an ab-

23 Ibid., p.60.
24 Ibid., p.122.
solute security against illusion. Such evidence is clearly distinguished from predicative evidence pertaining to the judgement-theory; it is a pre-predicative evidence which Husserl calls "experience." Husserl says:

Accordingly, from these genetical points of view, the intrinsically first judgement-theory is the theory of evident judgements, and the intrinsically first thing in the theory of evident judgements (and therefore in judgement-theory as a whole) is the genetical tracing of predicative evidences back to the non-predicative evidence called experience. 26

Recall that evidences for Husserl have a double sense: non-predicative (or pre-predicative) in respect to the having of something, and predicative in respect to judging. Non-predicative evidences set up a horizon for 'distinct' (as opposed to 'confused') judgements, in the formation of which predicative evidences referring to the properties of a given object come to the fore. Both evidences distinctly belong in the sphere of experience in a phenomenological sense. First, non-predicative evidences presented in our immediate experience refer back to the objectivity of something existent. Second, predicative evidences refer, in judging, to the forms of judgements.

Husserl furthermore defines experience as a

26 Ibid., p.209.
direct relation to something individual, that is to say, a direct (intuitive) relation of the subject to something individual or the given object. However, Husserl does not suggest that this "something individual" is an object existing in a naturalistic way; neither is it a metaphysical entity. It is rather an existential concept of the object, the object subjectively experienced in our immediate experience. Here Husserl embarks on clarifying the relation between the subject and the object, the knower and the known, in reference to experience.

The point of departure for Husserl is not determinate pregivenness, e.g., homogeneous space and absolute time as seen in exact science, but experience and self-evident givenness of an object. The relation between the subject and the object is reduced by Husserl to the passive pregivenness of the latter and the subjective fulfillment and contribution through evidences by the former. To the point where the object is passively pregiven, Husserl admits the objective *A priori* (of 'something individual'). However, it is not his goal. For the objective *A priori* is correlated to the subjective *A priori*, i.e., fulfillment of the evidences given by the former on the side of the subject. In this manner the essence of
experience is 'meaning' or 'sense' bestowed in the domain of consciousness. The polarity of the subject and the object seems to be reconciled by defining the objectivity of the polarity as 'essential evidence.' Hence the objectivity lies not only in the pre-given object but also in the subject. Since a reflection of the subject on the pre-given object is part of experience in a broader sense, Husserl's analysis of experience turns into an analysis of the fulfillment and contribution of consciousness, of the relation between consciousness and its conscious object.

Husserl defines the correlation between consciousness and its conscious object as intentionality. Husserl's struggle to find justification and the ultimate foundation of logic is at last anchored in the 'intentional' analysis of theories and systems of logic. This program of Husserl thus leads to transcendental analysis of consciousness as the foundation of logic.
B. Intentionality

Intentionality is the kernel of Husserl's philosophy, which characterizes a non-psychological and hence transcendental analysis of consciousness, the field of pure consciousness. In Husserl the notion of intentionality does not have a psychological bearing but is thoroughly an epistemological one. Intentionality refers to the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, consciousness and conscious objects, thought and being. By virtue of the intentional relationship they are synthetically unified and in this unity both consciousness and the world are to be grasped. Intentionality is a distinct phenomenological concept which takes on the world as it appears to consciousness, as a 'phenomenon,' an appearance of the givenness of something within the sphere of consciousness. Here it is important to notice that the world is no longer a matter of course --- it is no longer determinately pre-given in the form of facts. Husserl conceives of the world as world of phenomena that do not bear a definite determinacy of meaning. (The constitution of meaning is, however, found in our subjective reflection on consciousness.)

A natural world is necessarily and constantly present, however, only as a world of phenomena which announces something that does not manifestly show itself in itself, e.g., a world of norms and values. It can therefore be argued that the first is not necessarily identified with the second. Nevertheless, in our natural attitude or stand-point, the relation between the two remains obscure because of our unquestioned belief in the objective existence of the world, given concepts, values, norms, and the like. Husserl maintains, however, that the values and predicables of a natural world belong to "the constitution of the 'actually present' objects as such, irrespective of my turning or nor turning to consider them or indeed any other objects."\(^{28}\)

Thus, the constitution of the worldly object as such is not determinately present in the object itself, but belongs to a pure reflection on pre-given evidences. It follows that an analysis of constitution requires a method that excludes our belief in the objectivity pertaining to a world of actually present objects.

How can we single out a phenomenon of the world that is still non-predicative? It is the *epoché* that methodologically excludes the being and non-being, or

\(^{28}\) *Ideas, op.cit.*, p.93, Husserl's emphasis.
ontological status, of a factually experienced world. It is a method to describe pure the worlds as they appear to consciousness. The phenomenological reduction of a fact-world and our natural stand-point then leads to a pure phenomenon of the world and its relation to consciousness. A world is methodologically reduced to the world as present 'for me' and hence an intentional object of consciousness. In this manner a reality is in the end conceived of as a material correlate of our conscious act (cogito). Husserl writes:

The world is for me absolutely nothing else but the world existing for and accepted by me in such a conscious cogito. It gets its whole sense, universal and specific, and its acceptance as existing, exclusively from such cogitationes. 29

Thus an actually present object is no longer, for Husserl, an object existing autonomously in itself but is taken to be an intentional object (cogitatum). The constitution of an experienced object has its origination in the intentional correlation between cogito and cogitatum. Husserl emphasizes that the object refers to the subject, not in the way that the first is solely formally constituted by the latter, but in the way that the first is intentionally related to the latter in reference to evidences. Therefore the problem pertaining

29 CM, op.cit., p.21.
to a theory of knowledge is nothing other than an inten-
tional analysis of constitution. An intentional analysis of the constitution of the known is prepared by a transcendental reduction of a phenomenon to inten-
tionality, "consciousness of something." 30 Cogitatum is a meant object as meant (cogito) by the ego.

Husserl states:

Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, 'means' something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum... Consciounesses are also called intentional but then the word intentionality signifies nothing other than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be con-
scious of something; as a cogito, to bear within itself its cogitatum. 31

As Husserl makes clear, intentionality is the univer-
sal property of consciousness; which leads to an a priori correlation Ego-cogito-cogitatum. Hence, meaning belongs in a meant object, not in a simly, naturally existing object. 'Meant' by the ego as manifest in cogito. However, Husserl is here careful not to fall into a psychologistic analysis of the relation between cogito and cogitatum. To clarify this point, Husserl brings to light the noesis-noema correlation.

Every experience for Husserl is a process of 'be-
coming' in which we cognitively strive for 'objectively

31 CM., op.cit., p.33
valid' knowledge of the given object. Husserl seems to interpret experience as man's thematizing act, the goal of which is a distinct, correct judgement with respect to the distinct meaning of the experience.

The meaning, as Husserl repeatedly reminds us, does not pertain to the transcendence of a given object; it is rather constituted in our "directedness toward an object." The directedness signifies an intentional orientation toward an object presented in sense data, what Husserl in the Ideas calls "hyletic data." In sensible experience a given object 'exhibits' its primary content or matter (hyle) experientially. This primary content is distinguished from the intentional (morphe-form), the specific quality of intentionality. Although they are distinguishable --- for the hyle is passively given in experience and does not belong to intentionality as such, the hyle and morphe are mediately unified through the bestowal of meaning by an intentional experience. Accordingly, Husserl defines the hyle as "formless materials" and the morphe as "immaterial forms." Or, the hyle is taken to be "empirical generality and necessity," "an apriori bound to the empirical, bound to

34 Ideas, op.cit., section 85.
36 Ibid., p.227.
to the empirical and yet such that the empirical is 'inessential' to it" (material a priori). Likewise, the morphé refers to formal but unconditioned a priori necessity (formal a priori). An empirico-inductive generality for Husserl thus bases itself upon two types of necessity, empirical and formal, or presumptive and non-presumptive. Here, intentionality is a middle term that relates the former to the latter in a reflective phase of experience.

Husserl now breaks down an intentional experience into its components, namely, noesis and noema. By noesis Husserl means phases of consciousness, i.e., consciousness directed eo ipso toward something (actuality) of which it is the consciousness. Noema on the other hand signifies "'meaning' precisely as it lies 'immanent' in the experience of perception, of judgement, of liking, and so forth, i.e., if we question in pure form this experience itself, as we find it there presented to us." Within the unity of one intentional experience a series of noeses are built up, the one above the other, while on the other hand they yield noematic correlates likewise. The identity of modified noeses and noemas is found in the immanence of being in consciousness that

37 EJ, op.cit., p.374.
38 Ideas, op.cit., p.238.
is a horizon for the intentional constitution of a given object.

The immanence of consciousness as opposed to the transcendence of an object itself is phenomenologically described as intentionality which serves as the identity-pole of the referents of an intentional act; for example, the perception of this table from this angle is, as it was seen from that angle, precisely a perception of the same table. Husserl therefore states:

It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in its pregnant sense of the term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once a stream of consciousness and unity of one consciousness. 39

The immanence hence corresponds to the unity of one consciousness from which generality arises. This generality, however, encompasses not only the realm of pure possibilities but also empirical generality and necessity. In other words, every actuality of the empirical involves a pure possibility which is immanent in the unifying possibility-fulfilling consciousness. Husserl writes:

On the contrary, every actuality involves its potentialities, which are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities intentionally predelinated in respect of content, namely, in the actual subjective process it-

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39 Ideas, op.cit., Husserl's emphasis.
As Husserl emphasizes, the possibilities of an actuality are not merely formal, un-actualizable possibilities, for they are bound to empirical necessity in the beginning. The material content of a given object is thus synthetically generalized in its connections with pure a priori forms by an intentional analysis of experience. What Husserl requires for this purpose is a method that shifts the actuality into the non-actuality; or a method that is bound to the empirical and yet makes the empirical 'inessential.' Husserl states that "an act of a priori universal judgement with matching a priori necessities" is "attained, rather in an act of judgement which is connected with the obtaining of pure generalities in free variation." 41 For example, each sound has a quality, an intensity, and a timbre. This is the concrete concept 'sound' (sound-concretum). However, we notice that a particular sound has a particular moment of the concept of 'this quality,' 'this intensity,' and 'this timbre.' It can be then argued that the concrete concept included its partial concepts. Husserl goes on to argue:

...to every concrete individual belong quali-

40 _CM, op.cit.,_ p.44, Husserl's emphasis.
41 _En, op.cit.,_ p.374, my emphasis.
tative moments or parts; to every concrete individual, partial concepts; and every individual particularization of one and the same concrete concept has predicates corresponding to each partial concept of this concretum. 42

The general concept 'sound' subsists in the realm of a priori possibilities. By freely varying the example, e.g., a particular sound, we construct the a priori concept of sound which yields such partial concepts as 'quality,' 'intensity,' and 'timbre.' 43 Thus, by suspending our acceptance of the being of an actuality, we can freely imagine of other possible modes of this actuality which are intentionally delimited and actualizable. In this regard, free variation methodologically warrants 'freedom' from an actually present world and accordingly brings into being the realm of a priori possibilities.

"A broader generalization, a pure formal generalization" attained by free variation is an eidos (essence) that is " a beheld or beholdable universe, one that is pure, 'unconditioned' ... a universal not conditioned by any fact." 44 Husserl thereby refers eidos to the universal A priori in the sphere of an a priori pure thinking pertaining to the transcendental ego (Ego) or

42 Ibid., p.375.
43 Ibid., p.374.
44 CM, op.cit., p.71.
pure consciousness. The *Cartesian Meditations* reads:

> The universal Apriori pertaining to a transcendental ego as such is an eidetic form, which contains an infinity of forms, an infinity of apriori types of actualities and potentialities of life, along with the objects constitutable in a life as objects actually existing. 45

Pure consciousness is taken to be the horizon of a priori necessities and generalities with connections of the empirical. However, it is 'transcendental' to the extent where the empirical is itself 'inessential.' Here we find that Husserl seems to be shifting to an extreme form of transcendental idealism; i.e., consciousness, it seems, is given an absolute ontological status. It is however to be noted, as Boehm suggests, that the notion of absoluteness employed here is both 'substantial' and 'transcendental.' 46 Consciousness substantially exists in itself, and at the same time it is transcendental insofar as actualities or real beings cannot exist without the horizon of this substantial conscious being. This does not mean, however, that things exist only by virtue of absolute consciousness. It can be argued that absolute consciousness is the absolutely necessary horizon for all real, actual beings. Boehm interprets thus:

> ...we could say: there is nothing without


46 *R.Boehm, op.cit.*, p.196.
absolute consciousness, although there is also nothing without absolute consciousness alone. Namely, consciousness is a transcendental absolute insofar as it is the 'absolutely' necessary foundation for all other (real) being . . . . Transcendental consciousness is 'not an absolute being such that it is able to create all other (real) being from the being that is its own. 47

Husserl, however, emphasizes that absolute consciousness is not a metaphysical entity in the ordinary sense but that it is a "phenomenological residuum." Husserl says:

Consciousness has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnection. It therefore remains over as a 'phenomenological residuum,' as a region of Being which is in principle unique, and can become in fact the field of a new science --- the science of phenomenology. 48

However, this conception of consciousness yields a difficult problem, namely, a conflict between "the 'absolute' relatedness of reality to absolute consciousness and the 'absolute' indifference of the absolute with regard to the meaning of the being of reality." 49 The relationship between the contingency of a world and the absolute necessity of the eidetic world is now in question.

47 R. Boehm, op. cit., p.196
48 Ideas, op. cit., p.102.
49 R. Boehm, op. cit., p.194.
C. Life-World

A spatio-temporal world of actually present objects is phenomenologically reduced to a world of intentional objects by Husserl. Reality is no longer a naturally accepted reality but correlated to "an infinite idea, related to infinities of harmoniously combinable experience --- an idea that is the correlate of the idea of a perfect experiential evidence, a complete synthesis of possible experiences." 50 This infinite 'idea' of the world is, for Husserl, the absolutely essential necessity or eidos of the world and hence knowledge of both actual and possible objects must be based on it. An actually existing object in a spatio-temporal world is accordingly nothing but "a particular system within this multiplicity, the system of evidences relating to the object and belonging together in such a manner that they combine to make up one (though perhaps an infinite) total evidence" that is an a priori idea. 51 The material evidences of a given object are intentionally synthesized into absolute, perfect, generalized evidences wherein the 'abiding being' of the object is laid bare.

50 CM, op.cit., p.62.
51 Ibid., p.63, Husserl's emphasis.
The phenomenologist indeed becomes, of necessity, absolutely indifferent to the meaning of the being of a reality through a suspension of the ontological status of a natural world. Although every immanent perception of a given thing a priori empirically guarantees the existence of the thing in question, existence in the form of an actually present object is not absolutely necessary but is always 'contingent.' 52 For what has been set up in an experience can be possibly abandoned by further course of experience (e.g., other possible position-takings, etc.). What has been factually experienced can possibly exist otherwise or even cannot exist at all.

Husserl then argues that I myself, for whom a reality is there, am an absolute reality (Wirklichkeit), for my positing (various possible modes of directing) is unconditioned and indissoluble. 53 By virtue of my freely varying or imagining the possible modes of the existence of an actually present object, I myself bear in my consciousness the "warrant of my absolute existence (Dasein) as a fundamental possibility." 54 Husserl, it seems, conceives of man as the embodiment of infinite possibilities. However, it is obvious that insofar as possibilities remains simply subjectively potential, they fall

52 Ibid., p.131.
53 Ibid., p.131.
54 Ibid., p.130.
into 'empty' possibilities. How does Husserl think those possibilities are 'really' actualized in life?

Husserl conceives of the substratum of life as the life-world (Lebenswelt), the non-predicative or pre-predicative world, wherein an object is intuitively presented. It warrants the self-evidence of an ego as well as the existence of a given object. The life-world is therefore "the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable --- our everyday life-world." 55 Moreover, Husserl argues, it is the "forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science (vergessenes Sinnesfundament der Naturwissenschaft)," in which scientific thematization originates. 56 With reference to the life-world, maintains Husserl, the scientific (e.g., mathematical or geometrical) idealities becomes intelligible. In other words, the empty generality of scientific knowledge finds its material basis in the life-world. The immanent horizon of the life-world thus stands for the meaning-foundation of scientific thematization.

The life-world is a material horizon for the fulfillment of fundamental possibilities of man, an infinite, historical process of the actualization of eidos.

56 Ibid., section 9.
In this respect, the life-world is an historical and teleological dimension of life. The purpose and meaning of exact science in relation to human existence, Husserl believes, lie in our pre-scientific life and its surrounding world, viz., life-world. 57 All theoretical and practical questions are referred only to the life-world. In this manner historical events and human activities are all sedimented in man's life-world.

The life-world is thus an a priori material dimension of life within which absolute consciousness is self-evidently fulfilled. Otherwise stated, the life-world is the empirical but formless 'origin' of knowledge, the constitution of which is carried out by intentionality. However, we find here the opposition between absolutely necessary, transcendental consciousness and materially necessary life-world. Husserl therefore suggests that we execute an epoché of this life-world in order to dissolve the conflict. Consequently, the life-world is phenomenologically reduced to the transcendental ego or pure consciousness that is "the transcendental constitution of existing objectivity." 58 Marcuse comments on transcendental subjectivity thus:

57 Crisis, op.cit., p.50.
58 Ibid., p.63
This transcendental subjectivity is no longer any particular or individual or group subjectivity. It is 'absolute' because whatever object or object-relation may appear, now appears as necessarily constituted in specific acts of synthesis which inseparably link objectivity and subjectivity. In other words, we have now what we might call the absolute original experience: the experience which is at the origin and is constitutive of any possible objectivity that can ever become the object of scientific and of any other thought. 59

Thus, Husserl finally attributes the ultimate dimension of the original experience to transcendental subjectivity. It is pure, transcendental subjectivity that is the secure dimension of transcendental phenomenology. The free essence of man belongs in this transcendental subjectivity. Husserl argues:

This life does not signify the being of any 'contents' of any kind in a stream of contents, but a variety of described ways in which the pure ego in certain intentional experience, which have the general mode of the cogito, lives therein as the 'free essence' which it is. The expression 'as free essence' refers, however, to nothing more than such modes of life as the going freely out of oneself, or going back upon oneself, spontaneously doing, experiencing something from objects, suffering, and so forth. 60

Hence, for Husserl the 'free essence' of man stands for seizing on infinite possibilities of the fulfilling life of pure consciousness.

It remains, however, unaccounted for how the


60 Ideas, op. cit., p. 247.
freedom of pure consciousness is fully exercised by a concrete man within a socio-historical dimension of reality, wherein he painstakingly struggles against afflictions inflicted upon his life. Husserl's notion of the life-world is taken to be a substratum of the socio-historical reality, at least, theoretically; however, the life-world itself is not bound to particularity, either social or historical, because it is a materially generalized (material a priori) homogeneous dimension of life as such. The life-world is nothing other than a materially reduced general, operative concept as an empirical correlate of pure consciousness. By virtue of the a priori material content of the life-world, Husserl seems to avoid a charge that pure consciousness is an empty, general, dogmatic concept. One can, nevertheless, contend that the life-world is a methodologically necessitated compromise to theoretically disguise the fiction of pure consciousness. No matter how absolutely ordered pure consciousness may be on principle, as Husserl readily admits, pure consciousness is not a creator of all things. Pure consciousness above all seems powerless toward actually present objects.

The conflict between the phenomenologically reduced pure consciousness and its material correlate, or between the formal A priori and the material A priori, appears ever indissoluble. This indissoluble conflict seems,
in the last analysis, to occlude intrinsic material relation to the surrounding world. The phenomenological 'indifference' to the meaning of a concrete reality, which is methodologically an essential phase of phenomenological analyses, is always pregnant with a danger to leave reality as it is. In other words, the phenomenological internalization of a natural world turns out to be a pure internalization incapable of externalizing that which is internalized. It seems to me that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as Erste Philosophie falls into an endless regression of 'inner' reality. To 'essentially' know something does not necessarily mean that we are accordingly capable of changing the structure of that something in relation to us knowers, unless that knowledge is transformed into our material force.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY
FROM A CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW

Husserl's idea of phenomenology as Erste Philosophe is his intention to complete his philosophy in a transcendental dimension. We cannot, however, overlook the fact that Husserl's significant shift from phenomenology as a strict methodology to phenomenology as a transcendental idealism is pregnant with a tendency to become an idealistic (perhaps, dogmatic) philosophy. Husserl himself once condemns exact science (and naturalism) as the discipline that "teaches, preaches, moralizes, reforms."¹ One wonders if Husserl can escape the same charge against his transcendental phenomenology. One must raise a legitimate question: How, and how far is phenomenology possible?

For this purpose we shall examine the negative elements in Husserl's thought. The phenomenological reduction of a reality to the subjective dimension theoretically eliminates the elements of naive belief in the structure or order of the world. Yet, the consequence is our total disconnectedness (in a material sense) from that which is actually existing. The eidetic reduction through the époché is nothing more than a method of contemplation. It rather merely proves that consciousness is powerless

¹ Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, op.cit., p.81.
toward an actually present object. Contemplation is an internal change of the relation between our consciousness and its object. Roman Ingarden correctly points out the powerlessness of phenomenology in the face of reality. Ingarden writes:

Things are given to us as existing autonomously. We can change them or destroy them by bodily activities, but they prove recalcitrant when we want to attack them with our thoughts, perceptions or feelings. Our consciousness proves powerless toward them. No matter what the experience, no matter what purely conscious change we live through, they are in themselves what they are, and we cannot influence them in this manner. 2

Husserl seems to admit this criticism, that the epoché itself does not change anything in a self-determinate, autonomous reality. 3 It is merely the attitude of consciousness that the epoché can change. It is, otherwise stated, primarily a modal theoretical change of conscious life with respect to the content (Gehalt) of a meant object. Moreover, Ingarden points out a contradiction involved in the phenomenological reduction of a given object to an intentional object. Ingarden say:

Thus he [Husserl] also did not see that purely intentional objects have a strange ambivalence of form; on the one hand, they have an intentionally formed content; as such, they are supposed to be e.g., a tree, a man, etc. On the other hand, they have a structure which belongs to them qua intentional objects. 4

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3. Ibid., p. 43.
4. Ibid., p. 44.
This strange ambivalence is also carried over in Husserl's apriorization of material contents and immaterial, pure forms.

If Husserl admits that an intentional object is a pure reflection of transcendental consciousness and that it has nothing to do with a real object, it can then be argued that Husserl's phenomenological theory of knowledge is a theory of the "objective knowledge of 'subjectivity'":" 5 Husserl's subjectivistic thought, in its aspiration for its own self-justification and objectivity, seems necessarily turn into a thought-system that justifies its own absolute foundation of subjectivity and hence proves the alleged autonomy and sovereignty of man over and against a reality. Heidegger, observing the inevitable shortcomings of subjectivism, says that "truth is brought down to the subjective level of the human subject. Even if this subject can attain to some kind of objectivity, it still remains human in its subjectivity and subject to human control." 6 Husserl's claimed objectivity of transcendental consciousness is therefore a human theoretical objectification of man's subjectivity. In this regard, Husserl's notion of objectivity seems likely to fall into a dogma, the self-justification of which lies only in our uncon-

5 Ibid., p.44.
ditioned belief in it. The negation of dogmas is the point of departure for Husserl, to which Husserl may paradoxically return in the end.

One can admit that Husserl's eidetic reduction ideally and theoretically opens up a new horizon of possibilities, which Husserl calls "a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego." 7 Note, however, that on the one side such a pure possibility-variant may end up with a mere change of one's conscious attitude (e.g., Stoicism and Romanticism) unless it is practically related to a world; on the other side, pure contemplation on a pure possibility-variant leads one to the powerless submission to a world. Hence one may argue that one's intentional retention of the intuitively given, as "I can," is likely to turn out to be a mere infinite internalization of the 'I can' --- freedom as infinitely internalized as the essence of consciousness, or freedom as an arbitrary choice of the de facto ego. The transition from 'I can' to 'I do' seems to be left out of account in Husserl's thought. The method of free variation is a method of pure internalization totally unrelated to the dimension of 'I do' or human activity in general. Husserl's phenomenology,

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7 CM, op.cit., p.71.
in my opinion, comes to a halt by facing the total absence of any concrete and objective mediation between thought and action, theory and practice, idea and reality.

Husserl fails to overcome the autonomy of empirical and transcendental consciousness by synthesizing them in terms of the lived evidences of life. The attribution to a transcendental dimension of subjectivity is, I think, an irresponsible and unjustified loophole of Husserl's thought. 8 How can Husserl justify his responsibility when his thought is directed exclusively at the 'inner man' as the universal dimension of man? 9 When it falls into the wrong hands, phenomenology might be used as an ideology of the status quo.

It is my contention that, despite his tireless, painstaking efforts to struggle against the dominance of the naive metaphysics of objectivism in general, Husserl still remains captive to the destiny of the Western nature, viz., the deep penetration of Christianity.

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8 When knowledge is attributed solely to subjectivity, knowledge might be appropriated to the particular interests of a man in conjunction with power over others. As in the case of the Enlightenment, knowledge and power are synonymous in a social context. See T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming (New York: The Seabury Press, 1969), esp. chapter I.

9 Cf. CM, op.cit., section 64. Therein Husserl concludes his discussion by quoting Augustine's words: "Noli foras ire in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas."
Philosophy, above all, is not and should not be confused with religion. It is my contention that we can and must set out with aporia and return to it over and over again. Let me close this discussion with the following quotation from Max Horkheimer:

Philosophy is neither a tool nor a blueprint. It can only foreshadow the path of progress as it is marked out by logical and factual necessities; in doing so it can anticipate the reaction of horror and resistance that will be evoked by the triumphas march of modern man. 10

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II. Other References


