ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNAL REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

by

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Abstract

The thesis assesses the impact of international factors on relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during and after the Cold War. Through an analysis of the Cyprus problem it explores both why external actors intervene in communal conflicts and how they influence relations between ethnic groups in plural societies. The analytical framework employed throughout the study draws on contributions of International Relations theorists and students of ethnic conflict.

The thesis argues that, as in the global political system, relations between ethnic groups in unranked communal systems are anarchic; that is, actors within the system do not recognize a sovereign political authority. In bipolar communal systems dominated by two relatively equal groups, the struggle for security and power often leads to appeals for assistance from external actors. The framework notes that neighboring states and Great Powers may heed calls for assistance, or intervene without a prior request, if it is in their interest to do so. The convergence of regional and global interests in communal affairs exacerbates ethnic conflicts and precludes the development of effective political institutions. The impact of external intervention in ethnic conflicts has the potential to alter the basis of communal relations.

The Cyprus problem is examined both during and after the Cold War in order to gauge how global and regional actors and the structure of their respective systems have affected relations between ethnic groups in Cyprus. The thesis argues that Cyprus’s descent into civil war in 1963 was due in part to the entrenchment of external interests in
the Republic’s constitution. The study also notes that power politics involving the
United States, Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey continued to affect the development of
communal relations throughout the 1960s, 70s, and, 80s. External intervention
culminated in July and August 1974, after a Greek sponsored coup was answered by
Turkey’s invasion and partition of Cyprus. The forced expulsion of Greek Cypriots from
the island’s northern territories led to the establishment of ethnically homogeneous
zones, thus altering the context of communal relations dramatically.

The study also examines the role of the United Nations in Cyprus, noting that its
failure to settle the dispute was due in large part to a lack of cooperation from Turkey,
and the United States’ and Soviet Union’s acceptance of the status quo following the
1974 invasion and partition of the island. The thesis argues that the deterioration of
Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era has made a solution to the dispute
unlikely for the time being. Barring any dramatic changes in relations between
communal and regional antagonists, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will
continue to develop along the lines established in July/August 1974.

The thesis concludes by affirming the validity of its core hypotheses through a
brief survey of recent works touching on international politics and ethnic conflict.
Questions requiring further research are noted as are elements of the study that require
further refinement.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td><em>Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou</em> (Progressive Party of the Working People)</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDEK</td>
<td><em>Eniaion Democratike Enosis Kentrou</em> (Unified Democratic Center Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td><em>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston</em> (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdish Workers Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMT</td>
<td><em>Turk Murkavemet Teskilati</em> (Turkish Defense Organization)</td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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Cyprus

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Kyrenia

Kyrenia Mountains

TURKISH - CYPRIOT HELD

Yerolakkos

Tymbou

Ercan

Nicosia

TROODOS MOUNTAINS

Paphos

Larnaca

DHEKELIA

Akrotiri

Limassol

Miles 20

Source: United Nations

- United Nations buffer zone
- British sovereign bases
Introduction

Understanding the Cyprus Problem: Three Levels of Inquiry

The Cyprus problem, like most other ethnic conflicts, has a variety of causes. These causes extend beyond the community itself and include the influence of other countries as well as pressures created by the international system. The rivalry between Greek and Turkish Cypriots has developed in response to relations between Greece and Turkey, threats to NATO cohesion, and the strategic interests of foreign powers. International as well as domestic political considerations have been crucial to its development.

Scholars are beginning to emphasize the role of international politics in ethnic conflicts.1 Many have noted that the end of the Cold War has led to a proliferation of conflicts based on ethnicity. In the words of Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, “the system of bipolarity contained elements of order whose disappearance has not only altered the context within which military intervention is considered, but also increased the potential for violent ethnic conflict within the system as a whole.”2 Samuel P. Huntington has stated that the ideological divisions of the Cold War have been replaced

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by cultural ones. According to Huntington, "...the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations." While there can be no contesting the fact that ethnic conflicts have been affected by the end of international bipolarity, little has been said about ethnic conflicts during that era. There is an acute deficiency in our understanding of how the bipolar international system affected ethnic relations in plural states. This study aims at addressing the aforementioned problem by analyzing ethnic conflict in Cyprus both during and after the Cold War.

The thesis has two objectives: i) to identify international factors that have exacerbated communal tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots; and, ii) to explore how the end of the Cold War has affected the conflict. Meeting these objectives will require an examination of the communal, regional, and global dimensions of the problem. The thesis will argue that communal relations have been adversely influenced by British colonial policies, poor relations between Greece and Turkey, and Great Power politics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The thesis will also argue that the end of the Cold War has not improved the odds of solving the problem. Changes in the international system may actually hinder attempts to reconcile Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

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The defense of these arguments will entail the review of a large body of literature. The works under consideration fall into four broad categories: a) the vast array of books, articles, and government publications devoted specifically to the Cyprus problem; b) studies of the foreign and security policies of Greece and Turkey; c) works touching on the global implications of the Cyprus problem, in terms of NATO and UN involvement; d) recent efforts aimed at providing a clearer understanding of ethnic conflict in the context of international relations.

Invariably, one must ask whether the world needs another study on Cyprus. Does Cyprus merit such attention? Several factors point to a positive answer. As Charles W. McCaskill has stated, both the humanitarian and strategic dimensions of the problem demand scholarly attention. The proliferation of ethnic conflicts throughout the world also points to the need for more work on the subject. Contrary to the predictions of modernization theorists, ethnic identity has not succumbed to the pressures associated with greater economic interaction and the growth of mass communication. In the words of Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset:

It is now clearly established that the assimilationist assumptions are not valid. Most parts of the globe have been touched by ethnic conflict. While the postcolonial countries continue to experience the effects of ethnic polarization, ethnic passions have now engulfed regions of the world that until recently were thought to have solved the ‘nationality’ problem.

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Cypriots have endured most of the hardships associated with ethnic conflict; they have witnessed foreign invasion, partition, forced exchange of populations, and all manner of human rights abuses. Thus, the history of the Cyprus problem provides ample data for testing new theories of ethnic conflict. A better understanding of the Cyprus problem may allow scholars and policymakers to deal with current and future ethnic conflicts with greater expertise. Finally, the increasingly hostile nature of Greek-Turkish relations has made the settlement of the Cyprus problem an international priority.

Conversely, there has been relatively little research done on the state of the Cyprus problem in the post-Cold War era. This study aims at providing some insight into the way in which current international conditions have influenced developments in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey.

The thesis is divided into four chapters which follow a brief summary of the origins of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. Chapter One, *Cyprus: The Role of Ethnic, Regional, and International Bipolarity*, provides an analysis of the communal, regional, and global dimensions of the Cyprus problem. Bipolarity will be employed as a unifying concept. Bipolarity refers to the domination of a system by two, roughly equal powers. The chapter will review several theories of bipolarity and assess their worth in terms of understanding the Cyprus problem. The interaction of all three elements of the problem

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8 See Human Rights—Turkey's Violations of Human Rights in Cyprus: Findings of the European Commission of Human Rights and Continuing Violations by Turkey, (Nicosia, Cyprus: Cyprus Bar Association, 1989); and They Make a Desert and They Call It Peace: Cyprus After the Turkish Invasion, (Nicosia: Union of the Municipalities of Cyprus, 1991).

has contributed to its durability. Understanding this interaction is a key element of this chapter and the thesis. Chapter Two, *International Politics and the Evolution of the Cyprus Problem: 1964-1990*, traces the development of the Cyprus problem with reference to international politics. The chapter examines the effects of global bipolarity on the Cyprus problem to 1990, through an analysis of the policies of the Soviet Union, the United States, Greece, and Turkey. The chapter also reviews the UN’s role in Cyprus during the era of international bipolarity. Chapter Three, *The Cyprus Problem in the Emerging International System*, considers the Cyprus problem in the post-Cold War period. This chapter examines trends in Cypriot domestic politics, Greek-Turkish relations, the role of the European Union, and recent UN negotiations in an effort to reach some understanding of how the Cyprus problem has evolved in the emerging international system. The continuing relevance of regional and communal bipolarity is emphasized throughout the discussion. The concluding chapter, *Ethnic Conflicts and International Order: The Case of Cyprus*, provides a summary of the work’s main arguments and concludes with a set of hypotheses based on the preceding analysis. The chapter will emphasize the importance of international factors in ethnic conflicts, thus linking the thesis to current scholarship in the field.

**Background: The Roots of Ethnic Rivalry in Cyprus**

Cyprus is located in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean, approximately 80 kilometers off the south coast of Turkey. The island covers an area of 9251 square
kilometers, and has a population of 710,200. The Cypriot population is divided by ethnicity, language, and religion: 80% Greek-Christian; 18% Turkish-Moslem; and, 2% Armenian and Maronite Christian. Cyprus straddles three major inter-sea routes: that joining the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean, via the Dardanelles and the Aegean; that connecting the Atlantic and the western Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, via the Suez Canal; and the overland connection of the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf, via the Tigris and Euphrates valley.

Colonization by Mycenean Greeks at the beginning of the first millennium BC introduced Greek language, art, and religion to the island. Greek influence on Cyprus during the Hellenistic and Byzantine periods was profound. According to Kyriakos C. Markides, “During more than eight centuries of Byzantine rule, the culture of Byzantium penetrated every fiber of Cypriot life, perhaps more so than in any other part of the Greek world.” Byzantine rule ended in 1191, when Richard Coeur de Lion captured the island and sold it to the Latin house of Lusignan. Latin rule, administered by the Franks, the Venetians, and the Genoese, was marked by the establishment of a feudal system and the

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11Monteagle Stearns, entangled allies: u.s. policy toward greece, turkey, and cyprus. (New York: council on foreign relations press, 1992), p. 107. as Laurence stern has noted, “though the Turks comprised only 18 percent of the island’s population, it was the Greek Cypriots who constituted the true minority in their corner of the Mediterranean.” see the wrong horse: the politics of intervention and the failure of American diplomacy. (New York: Times Books, 1977): p. 80.

12Cyprus’ strategic location has contributed to a long history of foreign intervention. See Robert McDonald, the problem of cyprus, Adelphi papers 234 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1988-89), p. 7.


suppression of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71 drastically altered the island’s demography. The original Turkish Cypriot settlers were Ottoman soldiers, 30,000 of whom were given fiefs by Sultan Selim II. These settlers, or sipahis, were the immediate ancestors of the present Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish settlers differed from the native Greeks in terms of culture, ethnic origin, language, and religion. This, however, did not lead to immediate confrontation. While the two groups possessed traits which contributed to differing identities, they lived in relative harmony. According to Paschalis Kitromilides and Theodore A. Couloumbis, Ottoman rule in Cyprus was marked by the peaceful coexistence of Moslems and Christians.

The empire was administered through the millet system. Populations were grouped into millets which were constituted on the basis of religious confession, rather than ethnic origin. After obliterating all vestiges of European feudalism, the Ottomans restored the prestige of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Autocephalous Archbishop of Cyprus, as

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15 Markides, p. 3.
18 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 30.
19 According to Anthony D. Smith, an ethnic community is, “...a named human population with a myth of a common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity.” Anthony D. Smith, “Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,” in Brown, Ethnic Conflict, pp. 28-29.
20 For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Adamantia Pollis “International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus,” in Neumann, Small States, especially, pp. 51-53.
Ethnarch, was granted ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction over the island’s Christian Orthodox population.22

The political functions of the Ottoman rulers vis-à-vis their subjects were limited and, in turn, little was expected in the way of loyalty or relatedness to the state. For the most part, the subjects remained autonomous and governed their own affairs.23

The millet system was designed to ensure the orderly collection of state taxes in a vast, multiethnic empire. The Ethnarch’s role in the system ensured a substantial degree of prestige and honor for the Church, “As long as the Turks occupied Cyprus, the Church remained the central institutional sphere around which the political, intellectual, and cultural life of Greek Cypriots revolved.”24

In his seminal work, Cyprus Constitutionalism and Crisis Government, Stanley Kyriakides states that the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism can be attributed to cultural ties between Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Kyriakides emphasizes the role of the Cypriot Orthodox Church during the Ottoman occupation:

This feeling of ‘Greekness’ by the Greek Cypriots can thus be explained in terms of their devotion to their ancient Greek heritage, and to their attachment to Byzantium and Eastern Orthodox Christianity.25

In contrast to this position, Adamantia Pollis has argued that group differences exhibited during the Ottoman occupation did not preclude the development of a Cypriot national

22 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 31.
24 Markides, p. 5.
25 Kyriakides, p. 8.
Pollis cites examples of intermarriage, Moslem and Orthodox populations joining together in opposition to increased tax burdens, and the development of a unique Cypriot dialect, spoken by both groups, to defend her hypothesis. According to Pollis, the origin of intergroup rivalry lay in the imposition of British colonial rule:

Granting a divide-and-rule policy, the British did not exploit existing psychologically relevant differences but redefined those differences within a British conceptual framework. Thus the meaning of religious differences and the millet system in Cyprus was comprehended by the British in nationalist terms. Hence, the British took apolitical differences in Cyprus between Moslems and Eastern Orthodox and through indirect rule politicized them and transformed them into nationality groups. The generally shared culture and values were ignored, as were the common bonds among members of the same socioeconomic strata, irrespective of religion.

Pollis states that British reforms in the fields of education and government led to the emergence of rival Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities. As part of their literacy campaign, the British expanded the number of schools in Cyprus. They also encouraged the importation of teachers from Greece and Turkey. Greek and Turkish boards of education were established and texts for the Greek schools were to be approved by the Ministry of Education in Greece. Thus:

...the school systems became the major structure for the dissemination of nationalist doctrines, a task admittedly facilitated by the centrality of Orthodoxy in the concept of Greek nationality.... Children of the island learned languages alien to them and were socialized into believing, as their

26 Pollis, p. 587.
27 Ibid., p. 585-87
28 Pollis, Small States, p. 54.
29 Pollis, p. 589.
parents had not, that they were Greeks and Turks.... Hence, they were enemies.\textsuperscript{31}

The introduction of the Legislative Council under the Constitution of 1882

exacerbated communal competition. The Council contained twelve elected members and six members appointed by the British High Commissioner.\textsuperscript{32} Of the elected members, three were Moslem, and nine were Orthodox Christian. The High Commissioner acted as the presiding officer of the Council, and as such, possessed the deciding vote. Greek Cypriots quickly objected to the Council's character, "the six official members together with the Turkish members could offset the nine Greek members."\textsuperscript{33} The concept of majority rule was clearly abrogated. As well, no policies or programs were introduced to develop a loyalty broader than that of Greek and Turk.\textsuperscript{34} According to Pollis:

The British thus strengthened identification within each community, sharpened cleavages between them, and drew the communities into political relationships perhaps relevant for a modern nation-state, but irrelevant to the previously existing communal social order and to the premises which sustained it.\textsuperscript{35}

British reforms in education and representative government ensured the ascent of Greek and Turkish nationalism among Christian and Moslem Cypriots.\textsuperscript{36} The abandonment of the \textit{millet} system placed greater emphasis on ethnic identity as opposed

\textsuperscript{31} Pollis, p. 589-90.

\textsuperscript{32} Cyprus: Country Study, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{33} Kyriakides, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{34} Pollis, Small States, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{35} Pollis, p. 591.

\textsuperscript{36} As Donald L. Horowitz has noted, nurturing rival nationalisms facilitated colonial domination: "Building colonial administration on a substructure of ethnic government helped insure that the disparities would be interpreted through the lens of ethnicity and made it easy to see who the participants were." Donald L. Horowitz, \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict}, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985): p. 150.
to religion. The Cypriot Orthodox Church, threatened by secular British rule, became a vocal advocate of Greek nationalism. British policies formalized ethnic divisions and encouraged communal politicization:

...the horizontal bonds that had developed between the two communities under the Ottoman Empire did not prove strong enough to resist either the emerging nationalist aspirations of Greek Cypriots, or the deliberate separatist British colonial policies...whereas the Cypriots existed within the non-national Ottoman Empire for more than two and a half centuries, under the British Empire each of the communities was given national characteristics and was seen as a natural extension of Greece and the Ottoman Turks respectively.

Nicholas Sambanis has noted that ascribing all blame for hostility between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the British ignores the fact that the beginning of the enosis campaign can be traced to the Cypriot elite’s espousal of Hellenic national ideals in the early 1800s. Sambanis argues that political and social interaction between Cypriots has been influenced by external sources and “ancient affections”-lessons of history, past communal relations, stereotypes, prejudices, religious and other social factors. In a similar sense, Markides has stated that, “It was the interplay of cultural-ideological factors with the structural strains of colonialism that gave birth to Enosis as a social movement.” Markides and Sambanis agree that the development of Greek and Turkish

38 Coufoudakis, Essays, pp. 33-34.
40 Ibid., p. 130.
41 Markides, p. 11.
nationalism in Cyprus is due in part to over ninety years of struggle between Greece and Turkey.

The Kingdom of Greece, established May 1832, initially contained less than a third of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire. This situation influenced the development of the irredentist doctrine of Megali Idea (Great Idea). Proponents of the Megali Idea aimed to unite all areas of Greek settlement within a single state.\(^{42}\) Invariably, Greece’s territorial expansion came at the expense of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{43}\) In May 1919, Greek troops established a foothold on the coast of Asia Minor, in the city of Smyrna. The Greek landing was accompanied by over 350 Turkish casualties. As historian Richard Clogg has noted, the atrocities acted as a catalyst for the revival of Turkish nationalism, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk).\(^{44}\) After a failed Greek offensive in March 1921, Turkish troops forced the Greek army to retreat and evacuate Smyrna. Turkish troops occupied the city and massacred over 30,000 Greek and Armenian Christians.\(^{45}\) Approximately 900,000 were forced to flee under horrifying conditions. In the words of Henry Morgenthau, a League of Nations official:

...typhoid and smallpox swept through the ships. Lice infested everyone...Men and women went insane. Some leapt overboard to end their miseries in the sea. Those who survived were landed without shelter upon the open beach, loaded with filth, racked by fever, without blankets or even warm clothing, without food and without money.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{42}\) See Clogg, pp. 46-99.

\(^{43}\) In the words of Dr. Peter Loizos, “Effectively, Greece fought her way out of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey mistrusts Greece to this day.” See Cyprus, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1976): p. 16.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 94.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p. 97.

Dreams of a ‘Greater Greece’ perished in the fires of Smyrna along with over 2,500 years of Greek civilization in Asia Minor. Atrocities committed by both sides contributed to the creation and perpetuation of “ancient affections”. Cyprus was not exempted from the violence. In 1821, at the beginning of the Greek rebellion, Archbishop Kyprianos, several Bishops, and hundreds of priests and important laymen were arrested and summarily hanged or decapitated by order of the Ottoman Governor.⁴⁷

The Treaty of Lausanne, ratified by Greece and Turkey in 1923, provided for the compulsory exchange of populations on the basis of religion. Thus, the question of minorities had been settled, albeit in a most inhumane manner.⁴⁸ Cyprus was an important exception to this process. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey formally renounced any claim to sovereignty over the island in favor of Britain.⁴⁹ For some Greek Cypriots, enosis remained a tantalizing possibility. Turkish Cypriots, recalling excesses committed by Greeks against Moslems in Thrace, Crete, and Smyrna, recoiled at any suggestion of union with Greece.⁵⁰ British insensitivity to the political demands of moderate Cypriots strengthened the hand of enosis advocates.⁵¹ Taxation, poverty, and a suffocating political system lent credibly to those who claimed that only enosis would allow for an improvement in people’s lives. Conversely, Turkish Cypriots linked their

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⁴⁹ Kyle, p. 5.
⁵¹ Ibid., p. 538.
survival to the maintenance of British rule or the return of Cyprus to Turkey.\textsuperscript{52} This difference in perceptions would have important consequences in the future.

Thus, the underlying causes of the Greek/Turkish rivalry in Cyprus were well established prior to the outbreak of intercommunal violence in the late 1950s. The \textit{millet} administrative system ensured the division of Ottoman subjects on the basis of religion. After 1878, the imposition of a secular order on religiously based communities facilitated the emergence of rival nationalisms\textsuperscript{53}. In response to the secular threat posed by colonialism, the Greek Orthodox Church advocated the ascendancy of Greek-Christian morality. The Church's espousal of \textit{enosis} was related to its fear of modernity.\textsuperscript{54}

The establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 marked the beginning of over ninety years of conflict between Greeks and Turks. Atrocities suffered by both sides contributed to a legacy of mistrust and bitter memories. Fear and political segregation divided Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Colonialism and the clash of Greek and Turkish nationalism facilitated the development of mutually exclusive ethnic identities. The absence of bicommunal social and political institutions further contributed to the alienation of the two groups.

\textsuperscript{53} Loizos, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{54} Markides, p. 11.
Chapter One

Anarchy, Bipolarity, and the Communal, Regional, and Global Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem

To this war of every man against every man this is also consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice.

Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to link the communal, regional, and global dimensions of the Cyprus problem to a single analytic framework. This framework seeks to explain why and how international factors have exacerbated ethnic divisions in Cyprus during and after the Cold War. The framework may also serve as a model for analyzing the effects of international politics on ethnic conflicts generally.

The proposed model borrows heavily from the work of international relations scholars. It is made up of two concepts which have served as important tools for analyzing conflict between states: anarchy and bipolarity. It will be argued that anarchy and bipolarity can be used to describe regional and communal political systems as well as the global political system. Moreover, these systems are intimately linked. Anarchy and bipolarity help explain behavior within each system and behavior which arises out of the interaction of these systems.
After defining regional and communal bipolar systems, the chapter shall discuss their relation to each other and to the international system. The interaction of all three systems shall be illustrated through an analysis of the Cyprus problem from the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960 to the outbreak of communal violence in 1963-4.

**Anarchy and Bipolarity**

Many scholars have concluded that the Cyprus problem is multidimensional. That is, the communal, regional, and global aspects of the problem have contributed to its durability. According to Ronald Meinardus:

> ...the Cyprus issue is an intercommunal problem where a Greek majority is at odds with a Turkish minority (local level). Secondly the issue is a problem of Greek-Turkish relations...This is the regional level...finally, the Cyprus issue is an international problem, affecting not only the United Nations, but also...NATO, the European Community and the United States...¹

Each dimension of the Cyprus problem may be regarded as comprising a distinct political system. Political scientists have often differentiated between domestic and international political systems. According to Kenneth Waltz:

> The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super-and subordination. Some are entitled to command; others are required to obey.

Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic.²

Anarchic political systems lack a sovereign power. They resemble Hobbes’ characterization of the State of Nature; an unceasing conflict in which survival becomes the principal motive for action.³ As Barry R. Posen has pointed out, the key to security in anarchic systems is power. Actors in an anarchic system struggle to ensure their survival and enhance their security.⁴ The quest for security often leads to instability and conflict:

In anarchy there is no automatic harmony...A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasure of peace. Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies.⁵

The absence of a supreme authority charged with preventing and mediating disputes leads to the constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force.⁶ In Waltz’s words, “Among men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence.”⁷ Self-protection is therefore a key element in survival. This

³ Waltz elaborates on Hobbes’ State of Nature by properly noting that “...the state of nature is a state of war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out.” Waltz, Theory, p. 102.
⁶ Ibid., p. 188.
⁷ Waltz, Theory, p. 102.
in turn results in the what International Relations theorists refer to as the security
dilemma, “...what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the
end, can make one less secure.” Thus, cooperation in anarchic political systems is
tenuous. The absence of a universal authority results in a self-help system, with
individual actors responsible for their own defense. 9

The struggle for security and power is particularly acute in bipolar systems.
Bipolarity refers to the structure of a system: the number of actors within it and the
distribution of power among them. 10 A bipolar system contains two dominant actors
roughly equal in terms of their capabilities. Although anarchy and bipolarity are usually
associated with the international political system, they can also be used to describe
communal and regional political systems. 11 By identifying shared characteristics of these
systems we may gain a clearer understanding of how they interact.

Regional Systems

All states reside within the global political system. Hence, they are affected by
that system’s structure. However, not all states are equal in terms of their capabilities.

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8 Posen, p. 28. Also see, Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2
9 Waltz, Theory, p. 104.
10 See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and
419-29; Morton A. Kaplan, “Balance of Power, Bipolarity, and Other Models of International Systems,”
American Political Science Review 51 (September 1957): pp. 684-95.
11 Waltz notes that, “We easily lose sight of the fact that struggles to achieve and maintain power, to
establish order, and to contrive a kind of justice within states, may be bloodier than the wars among
them.” Theory of International Politics, p. 103.
Nikolaos Zahariadis has noted that global structure is not the only structural variable affecting a small country’s foreign policy:

Because they lack the resources for extensive international interaction, they tend to concentrate on regional issues of immediate security. Consequently, a regional component should be added to our framework: the regional balance of power. Although it is affected by the global system, it also has its own internal dynamics that influence a state’s foreign policy.  

According to Michael Brecher, a regional subsystem may be identified in terms of three elements: i) its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographic region; ii) there are at least two actors; iii) there is a relatively self-contained network of political interactions between the members, involving such activities as goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration, and dealing with power relations and military interactions. Michael Haas cites two criteria for membership in a regional subsystem: i) a member must interact more or less continuously in a manner relevant to

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14 See Michael Brecher, “International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southeastern Asia,” World Politics XV (January 1963): pp. 221-235., and Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” American Political Science Review 2 (March 1970): pp. 100-101. While the inclusion of military force in Brecher and Haas’s list of defining characteristics of regional subsystems is apt in most cases, it should be noted that military interactions can be infrequent in some regions; specifically those characterized by either very weak regional powers or by an absence of serious rivalries or conflicts. Military interactions can be very important in traditionally volatile regions such as the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
political-military goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration; ii) a member must possess military capability.\textsuperscript{15}

The Eastern Mediterranean may be regarded as a regional subsystem dominated by Greece and Turkey. Relations between Greece and Turkey are conditioned by the structure of the global system and circumstances within their regional subsystem. Thus, Greece and Turkey petitioned to be admitted into the NATO alliance to allay their fear of Soviet expansion.\textsuperscript{16} Evanthis Hatzivassiliou has noted that the impetus for ‘solving’ the Cyprus question through the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959-60 arose from Britain, Greece and Turkey’s desire to maintain the integrity of the NATO alliance. Conversely, Matthew Evangelista has stated that as the perception of external threat wanes, the degree of cohesion between states in regional subsystems diminishes and is replaced by renewed struggle.\textsuperscript{17} In other words, shifts in the global political system will have a corresponding effect on relations between states in regional subsystems.

Communal Systems

R.S. Milne has applied the concept of bipolarity to relations between ethnic groups within a state. According to Milne, an ethnically bipolar state contains two dominant ethnic groups of roughly equal size, which together constitute eighty percent or

\textsuperscript{15} Haas, pp. 101-102.


more of the population. Milne notes that, “In the bipolar case the vital point is that the approximate equality in numbers, plus the existence of only two main groups, produces not balance but competition and confrontation.”

Despite its not satisfying Milne’s definition in terms of equal populations, Cyprus may be regarded as an ethnically bipolar state. While Greek Cypriots constitute a commanding majority of the island’s population, they are a minority in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s influence on Cypriot politics has enabled Turkish Cypriots to maintain that they are a separate and equal community. In the words of Gowher Rizvi:

One of the key considerations informing discussions on Cyprus’s constitutions was that it was a bicommmunal nation, and that the logic of arithmetic was inapplicable...Turkey’s support gave the Turkish Cypriots added muscle. They argued that Cyprus, an off-shore island of Turkey, should be treated as a part of Turkey, in which the Greek Cypriots themselves became a small minority in the population of Turkey as a whole.

Thus, Cyprus’ domestic structure is both bipolar and unranked. According to Donald L Horowitz, an unranked ethnic system lacks clearly understood conceptions of superordinate and subordinate status. Turkey’s support has given Turkish Cypriots the ability to reject the establishment of a sovereign political entity on the island. This in

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19 Ibid., p. 8.
21 Horowitz, p. 22.
turn has led to an anarchic system marked by an intense struggle for power and security. Horowitz has noted that such systems are particularly prone to bitter conflict:

unranked ethnic systems resemble the international system. The fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end. Conflicts over needs and interests are subordinated to conflicts over group status and over the rules to govern conflict. Constitutional consensus is elusive, and the symbolic sector of politics looms large. 22

In an anarchic system the quest for power becomes all encompassing. It ensures survival at a minimum and domination at an extreme. Thus, ethnic groups resemble states in an anarchic international system. 23 Politics in ethnically bipolar states is aimed at securing security and advantage at the expense of the rival group. Conversely, a gain by one side is deemed a loss by the other. There is little room for accommodation and compromise in such a system; “Misunderstandings and misperceptions abound. As there is less generalized domination, so there is also less generalized collaboration.” 24

Synthesis

The link between global and regional systems has been noted in the preceding discussion, as has the concept of an anarchic, bipolar communal system. The final step

22 Ibid., p. 187.
23 According to Horowitz, “The analogy to the international system is suggestive, not only with respect to alliance formation and negotiation along group lines, but also with respect to conflict and warfare.” See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 31.
24 Ibid., p. 28.
in constructing the proposed framework lies translating these concepts into a set of working hypotheses.\textsuperscript{25} At this point it is important to note some particular features of the Cyprus problem: i) the ethnic communities in Cyprus identify with the two dominant powers in the regional system; ii) the two regional powers are allied to the United States, a global Superpower; iii) control of Cyprus is in the interests of communal, regional and global actors; iv) the struggle for power is particularly intense because all three systems lack a sovereign.

The failure of civil society\textsuperscript{26} in Cyprus is due to more than the absence of a common national identity. It is also due to the absence of a sovereign political authority and the multiplicity of interests and actors in Cypriot politics. The interests of regional and global actors have deepened divisions within Cyprus by contributing to the anarchic nature of the domestic political system.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, foreign influence is much more subtle

\textsuperscript{25} The proposed framework subscribes to Morton A. Kaplan’s criteria and description of illustrative models. According to Kaplan: “Social science models of the type required in the study of international politics abstract from reality. These models are of the ‘if then’ type and give rise to reliable predictions only when a large number of parameters are held constant. In the real world, the parameters may vary greatly and sometimes wildly. At best the conclusions of our models are tendency statements that may or may not apply to particular cases. They are not descriptive accounts of the efficient causes of events or of the concrete chain of events that produces a particular result. If, however, they serve to elucidate an important aspect of events, to distinguish between different periods, to explain observed differences—even if not with exactitude and infallibility—and to help predict other aspects of situations that might not have been expected or might not have been related to those investigated, they serve a useful purpose.” Morton A. Kaplan, “Intervention in Internal War,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife, (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1964): p. 94

\textsuperscript{26} E. Shils defines civil society in terms of three major components: “The first is a part of society comprising a complex of autonomous institutions—economic, religious, intellectual and political—distinguishable from the family, clan, the locality and the state. The second is a part of society possessing a particular complex of relationships between itself and the state and a distinctive set of institutions which maintain the separation of the state and civil society and maintain effective ties between them. The third is a widespread pattern of refined or civil manners.” E. Shils, “The Virtues of Civil Society,” Government and Opposition 26 (Winter 1991): p. 4.

\textsuperscript{27} David Welsh notes that Switzerland’s neutrality has ensured that its different linguistic groups have not sought to make common cause with German, French, or Italian colinguals in European conflicts. Conversely, these countries have had little influence in Swiss domestic politics. David Welsh, “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict,” in Brown., ed. Ethnic Conflict, p. 54.
than some observers have noted. In Cyprus, communal, regional, and global systems are inextricably tangled. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have developed in response to political conditions locally, regionally, and internationally.

These characteristics may be translated into a set of conditions which form a general framework for the analysis of ethnic conflicts. In unranked communal systems, each group will do all it can to compete successfully with rival groups. Overtures to outside parties with interests in the dispute will be common. If the dispute impacts on the stability of the global system, outside influence will extend beyond regional actors and include global powers. The influence of international actors extends beyond instances of overt intervention. The quest for security and power in the global and regional systems influences political life within the unranked communal system. Bipolarity exacerbates competition within each system, leading to each side to regard politics as a zero-sum game. Incidence of violence is likely to increase at times of transition, when either of the three systems is subject to profound change. Thus, ethnic conflict will coincide with transitions in regional and global politics, especially in unranked systems. A brief analysis of the Cyprus problem from the establishment of the independent Cypriot Republic to the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1963-4 should illustrate the validity of these hypotheses.

Enosis, Takism and the End of British Rule

The independent Republic of Cyprus came into existence on the 16 August, 1960. The establishment of the Republic came after five years of negotiations between Greece,
Turkey, and Britain which culminated in the signing of the Zurich and London agreements in February 1959. Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders were also signatories to the agreement, though they had little influence on its formulation. The period leading up to independence was marked by the armed rebellion of Greek Cypriots against British rule. The Greek Cypriots sought the right to self-determination, which translated into union with Greece. Britain adamantly opposed the enosis struggle, citing its strategic interests in the region. As Kyriakides has noted, the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 and Suez in 1954 increased Cyprus’ strategic value. Britain’s interests in Cyprus were clearly enunciated by Sir Anthony Eden in 1955:

> Our duty if called on,...is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our ally (Turkey). Neither the NATO obligations...nor the Baghdad Pact, nor any agreement in the Middle Eastern Area or the Persian Gulf, or anything else, none of these can be speedily and effectively carried out today unless we have the assured and unfettered use of bases and use of facilities in Cyprus.... The welfare and indeed lives of our people depends on Cyprus as a protective guard and staging post to take care of those interests, above all oil. This is not imperialism. It should be the plain duty of our Government and we intend to discharge it. 

British policy included granting legitimacy to Turkey’s claim to Cyprus. Britain countered the Greek Cypriots’ request for self-determination by arguing that, given

30 Attalides, p. 6.
31 In a speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1954, Selim Sarper, Turkey’s UN Representative stated that: “Turks of Anatolia had settled in Cyprus...They remained closely linked to the mother country, by race, custom and collective social sentiment...From the geographical, racial, historical, and economic aspects...Turkey must be primarily affected by the status of the island.” United Nations, General
British policy included granting legitimacy to Turkey’s claim to Cyprus. Britain countered the Greek Cypriots’ request for self-determination by arguing that, given Turkey’s strategic and cultural interests in Cyprus, the island should be partitioned in the event of a British withdrawal. British policy resulted in unintended conflict between Greece and Turkey. As Attalides has observed:

As a Maneuver by Britain to maintain Cyprus, the official involvement of Turkey proved a failure. It had an important unintended consequence in making the application of the principle of self-determination to Cyprus impossible, because it would have resulted in union with Greece. The Turkish Prime Minister had stated his country’s readiness to go to war as early as May 1956 in order to prevent this.

The stage had been set for the entrenchment of foreign interests in Cyprus. The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, held in London in August 1955 formally recognized the legitimacy of Turkey’s claims on Cyprus, thereby nullifying the status quo established by the Treaty of Lausanne. The talks ended in failure, with Greece and Turkey nowhere near an agreement.

Communal relations between 1955-1959 were marked by violence and further division. The Greek Cypriots’ struggle for enosis was spearheaded by EOKA (Ethniki

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32 Attalides, p. 137.

33 Coufoudakis, Essays, p. 35. The Conference coincided with anti-Greek riots in Izmir and Istanbul. The rioters destroyed Greek property and Orthodox Churches. Many scholars agree that the riots were stage managed by the Turkish government, although they did not count on the ensuing devastation. According to Kyle, “The message was clearly meant to be that Turkish forbearance was not to be too much counted on.” Kyle, p. 7.
Organosis Kyprion Agoniston--National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). EOKA was led by General George Grivas, a former officer of the Greek Army and leader of an extreme right-wing guerrilla group during the Axis occupation. EOKA enjoyed the support of Cyprus’ Archbishop Makarios and the mainland Greek government. In response to the enosis struggle, militant Turkish Cypriots advocated the partition of the island--takism. By 1957-58 Turkish Cypriots had formed their own paramilitary organization, TMT (Turk Murkavemet Teskilati--Turkish Defense Organization). British authorities exacerbated communal divisions by enlisting Turkish Cypriots into their security forces, thereby making them targets for EOKA violence. Order broke down in June 1958, following a bomb explosion outside the Turkish press office in Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots led by TMT retaliated against Greek Cypriots. EOKA reciprocated by lifting all restrictions on killing Turks, “At the end of an eight-week period of horror, 127 people had lost their lives and more than 300 had been injured.”

The United States grew increasingly alarmed as events in Cyprus deteriorated. American pressure and the costs of maintaining its position in Cyprus contributed to shift in British policy. In the winter of 1958, the British decided that bases in Cyprus were

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35 According to Bahcheli, “It was during this period that Ankara increased its aid to enable the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to replace the underground organization called VOLKAN(volcano) with the better-led TMT(Turk Murkavemet Teskilati--Turkish Defense Organization). Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations, p. 40. Christopher Hitchens notes that Turkish Cypriot paramilitary groups were treated with favor by the British, “In a celebrated case in 1958, a Turk, Sergeant Tuna, was convicted of possessing bombs and ammunition by a British court. The good sergeant, unlike his Greek counterparts, was allowed bail in his own recognizance and left immediately for Turkey.” Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, (London: Quartet Books, 1984): p. 46.

36 Markides, p. 25.

37 By this time there were over 30,000 British soldiers in Cyprus battling EOKA. As Attalides has noted, “the strategic use of Cyprus was being vitiating by the effort to keep it.” Attalides, p. 12.
sufficient in terms of maintaining their strategic interests. Britain’s decision coincided with Greek and Turkish concerns regarding the danger of further conflict. It was at this point that the imperatives of regional and global actors converged, “It became evident that Greece and Turkey had to search for a ‘solution’ to safeguard their own interests in Cyprus, to secure British strategic interests, and to stabilize their respective roles within the Western alliance.” Independence became the vehicle for securing the interests of outside parties. The Greek Cypriot leadership had little choice but to go along with the proceedings; the possibility of having Cyprus partitioned did not constitute a palatable option. The British gave their blessing to bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey over the future of the Cyprus. The Zurich Agreement grew out of these bilateral discussions.

The independent Republic of Cyprus was a compromise intended to diffuse the confrontation between Greece and Turkey, maintain British strategic interests, and bolster NATO’s southern flank. The difficulty in terms of the communal conflict lay in establishing the basis for effective government. As many scholars have pointed out, the political system which grew out of the Zurich-London Agreements failed in this regard. The argument advanced by this study is that the entrenchment of global and regional interests prevented the development of a mutually accepted sovereign political power on

38 Bahcheli, p. 43.
39 Kyriakides, p. 141.
40 “NATO’s southern flank covers approximately 470,000 square miles and includes the central and eastern Mediterranean along with the three peninsular member countries of Italy, Greece, and Turkey...NATO’s southern flank is integrally related to the Middle East and western Europe on one hand and Africa on the other.” Yorgos A. Kourvetaris, “The Southern Flank of NATO: Political Dimensions of the Greco-Turkish Conflict Since 1974,” East European Quarterly 4 (January 1988): p. 431. See, Elias Vlanton and Diane Alicia, “The 1959 Cyprus Agreement: Oracle of Disaster,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 4 (Winter 1984): pp. 5-31. This article includes the State Department report in its entirety.
the island. In other words, the domestic political system in Cyprus failed to satisfy either ethnic groups’ desire for security and effective government. The domestic political system was anarchic, as were the regional and global systems which enveloped it. The interaction of all three systems exacerbated ethnic friction, which reached crisis proportions in 1963.

The Zurich-London Agreements

The Cypriot Republic’s Constitution is actually an amalgamation of four documents: The Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment, and the Basic Structure. The constitution formalized the bicommunal nature of Cypriot society and entrenched foreign interests in Cyprus’ future.41

The Basic Structure established the character of the Republic’s political system. As was noted in an American State Department intelligence report:

The most striking feature of the Basic Structure is its emphasis on giving the two ethnic groups on the island a proportionate voice in all affairs and on working out arrangements to avoid domination of one group by the other.42

41 In the words of Adamantia Pollis, “Cypriot independence was circumscribed, sovereignty was severely curtailed by the constitutional and treaty rights given to the three foreign countries, the constituent power of its people was prescribed constitutionally and by international treaty while its legislative power was severely restricted.” in Neumann, ed., Small States, p. 63.

Article 1 established the State of Cyprus as a Republic with a presidential regime, "the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the island respectively." Executive authority resided with the President and Vice-President. The two executives appointed seven Greeks and three Turks as members of the Council of Ministers. While decisions made by the Council of Ministers were based on an absolute majority, both the President and Vice-President were given the power to veto any decision concerning foreign affairs, defense, or security.

The Executive's veto power extended to decisions rendered by the Republic's legislative branch, the House of Representatives. Strict adherence to ethnic proportionality also marked the legislative branch of government. Members would be elected for a five year term, "by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent. for the Greek community and 30 per cent. for the Turkish community." The ethnic division of Cypriot society was reflected in the functions of the legislative branch. A qualified majority was required to change electoral law and to enact any law relating to municipalities, duties or taxes. Representatives from both communities had to reach separate majorities in order to pass legislation in these areas.

Matters of religion, education, culture, and personal status (questions concerning marriage, divorce, inheritance, guardianship and parent-child relationships) were the

44 Conference, p. 5-6.
45 Ibid., p. 5.
46 Vlanton and Alicia, p. 19.
exclusive domain of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers had jurisdiction in those areas where some overlap between the two communities may have occurred. In essence, the communal chambers were an outgrowth of the millet system. They ensured the division of the two communities culturally and politically.

In short, every dimension of Cypriot politics and society was formally divided along ethnic lines. The judicial system was headed by the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish judges and a neutral president who was neither Greek, Turkish, or British. The public service was to be composed of 70% Greeks and 30% Turks. This despite the fact that the Turks made up only 18% of the general population and were not as well educated as their Greek counterparts. The proportional system also applied to the Republic’s Armed Forces, with 60% of its members recruited from the Greek community and 40% from the Turkish. Article 20 provided for the establishment of separate municipalities by the Turkish inhabitants in Cyprus’ five largest towns.

The Basic Structure perpetuated communal divisions in Cypriot society. The three additional treaties ensured the active participation of foreign powers. The Treaty of Guarantee established an international obligation on the part of the governments of Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey to abide by the provisions of the Basic Structure and to prevent enosis or partition of the island. In effect, the treaty disavowed self-determination for either community. While this would appear to be a laudable objective,

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47 Kyle, p. 8.
48 Vlanton and Alicia, p. 17.
49 Ibid., p. 23.
it opened the door to differing interpretations by the guarantors. As was noted in the State Department’s report, “The effectiveness of the treaty with regard to common as well as unilateral actions is questionable should serious rifts develop among the Guarantors.”

According to Article 1 of the Treaty of Alliance, “The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defense and undertake this Treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defense.” All three parties pledged to resist any threat to the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. The treaty allowed for the establishment of a tripartite headquarters and the stationing of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers on the island. Thus, a direct military presence by both regional powers was mandated by the constitution. Aside from the obvious implications of stationing foreign troops on Cypriot soil, the Treaty of Alliance did little to enhance the authority of the Republic’s government. The new government clearly did not enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Even more damaging in terms of the new state’s sovereignty was the Treaty of Establishment. Under the conditions of the Treaty, Britain retained full sovereignty over two enclaves in Cypriot territory. Thus, ninety-nine square miles of Cypriot territory was devoted to Britain’s strategic needs. Christopher Hitchen’s has noted that, “To this day, the Cypriot government has no jurisdiction over these bases or the uses to which they are

50 This point is summarized nicely by Kyriakides, “The effect of this provision within the constitutional framework of the Republic of Cyprus is negative because it links British, Greek, and Turkish interests to the constitutional developments of the Republic of Cyprus.” See p. 55.
51 Ibid., p. 27.
put. No other democratic country has ever imposed or accepted conditions of that kind.\textsuperscript{52} Apparently, the British felt no need to negotiate an agreement for bases with Cyprus. The British granted independence only after their military interests were guaranteed in perpetuity. This bizarre arrangement symbolized the entrenchment of foreign interests in Cyprus.

\textbf{From Independence to Civil War: 1960-63}

The Zurich-London Agreements formalized the division of Cypriot society along ethnic lines. All of the island's political and civil institutions were divided according to rigid communal criteria. Rather than fostering the emergence of a unified civil society, the agreements hardened existing divisions and granted them formal standing in the constitution:

The constitutionalized interference in the affairs of Cyprus resulted in continuous friction, thereby preventing Cypriots, Greek and Turkish alike, from developing their own political consciousness. The two communities tended to look to their respective 'mother' countries for support in solving Cypriot domestic problems.\textsuperscript{53}

It should be noted that neither community encouraged the development of a Cypriot identity. The few who attempted to do so were treated harshly by nationalist elements within their community.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} Hitchens, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{53} Kyriakides, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{54} See, Hitchens, pp. 53-54.
Independence did not assuage the mistrust each community harbored. The leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, saw themselves as guardians of their respective group’s interests, “This approach, as well as the absence of a consensus on how to cope with the major aspects of government, led to constitutional disputes within less than one year.”

The two communities had very different interpretations of the constitution. Neither position lent itself to compromise:

On the one hand, the Greek Cypriots felt that the Constitution established a ‘privileged position’ for the Turkish Cypriot community. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots viewed the Constitution as securing absolutely minimum guarantees for their effective participation in Government.

The two communities confronted each other on several key issues, including the ethnic composition of military units, the passage of tax legislation, the establishment of separate municipalities, and the implementation of the 70:30 ratio in the composition of the civil service. Each of these issues was driven by mutual mistrust and fear of the other community’s intentions. Thus, political disagreements went beyond differences over ideology or policy; every issue was considered crucial in terms of security and relative power. The divided nature of the Government’s authority made effective handling of these issues difficult. The leadership of both sides used their constitutional powers to

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55 Bahcheli, p. 53.
56 Kyriakides, p. 75.
57 Kitromilides and Couloumbis, p. 173.
further their ethnic group’s agenda. Turkish Cypriots were adamant in their demands for representation in the civil service, separate municipalities and segregated military units. Their position was bolstered by the fact that the power of the majority community was ‘checked’ by Turkey. Conversely, Greek Cypriots resented what they felt was an unfair share of power, “although they had set aside their cherished aspiration for Enosis, the final settlement gave them less than what the hard facts of their contribution to the economy would warrant.”

As the political climate deteriorated, both communities formed clandestine organizations with connections to Greece and Turkey. By the end of 1961, the Turkish language press was calling for the intervention of Turkey, Greece, and Britain and the resignation of Archbishop Makarios. The political system established by the Zurich-London Agreements proved to be ineffective; the notion of an independent Cypriot government existed only on paper.

It is erroneous to suggest, as some have, that Cyprus’ descent into civil war was due solely to bitter memories of the past. This argument ignores the fact that the political system established by the Zurich-London Agreements aimed at satisfying foreign interests at expense of effective government in Cyprus. Both sides could afford

58 Bahcheli, p. 54.
61 Kyle, p. 9.
62 Rizvi, p. 69.
63 Hitchens, p. 55.
to flout the government’s authority because it was inherently weak. The unranked domestic system which prevailed during periods of Ottoman and British rule was formally recognized in the Republic’s constitution. Its maintenance was guaranteed through binding treaties with foreign powers. It is therefore no wonder that President Makarios’ presentation of thirteen points, which aimed at establishing effective government in Cyprus, were rejected by Turkey before the Vice-President Kuchuk could respond. As Hitchens has noted:

The thirteen points would have decided the allocation of jobs and the weight of parliamentary votes in stricter proportion to the population. As compensation, Dr. Kuchuk’s Vice Presidential position would have been enhanced. But in essence, the minority veto would have been broken--and the Turks were not willing to surrender that privilege. 63

The division of sovereign authority among foreign states and ethnic groups in Cyprus resulted in political deadlock which, in turn, encouraged further polarization:

In the midst of the Republic’s difficulties, the extremist groups were able to thrive. Within each community ‘secret armies’ were organized...The Turkish Cypriots were determined to prevent any Greek Cypriot attempts to bring about extraconstitutional solutions to the deadlocks. The Greek Cypriots were preparing to forestall partitioning of the island and eventual intervention by Turkey. 64

63 Ibid.
64 Kyriakides, p. 111.
The rejection of Makarios’ proposals ignited these extremist elements. Despite the President and Vice-President’s appeals for calm, Cyprus erupted. The violence revealed the scale of lawlessness which had infected Cypriot society in the preceding years. Former EOKA thugs, led by Nicos Sampson, attacked Turkish Cypriot civilians indiscriminately. Turkish military forces expelled Greek Cypriot civilians from their homes, as they fought to establish a Turkish enclave around the island’s northern coast. Between December 21 and 25, hundreds of people were killed, wounded, taken as hostage, and evicted from their homes. The violence threatened to engulf Greece and Turkey after Turkish jets overflow Nicosia on Christmas Day 1963. By the end of December, British troops had established a neutral zone in Nicosia. Greek and Turkish Cypriots were formally divided by the infamous “Green Line”.

Ironically, the political system which was designed to ensure amity between Greece and Turkey and the maintenance of British and NATO interests had the opposite affect. The convergence of global and regional interests in Cyprus exacerbated previous divisions in Cypriot society. This led to the complete breakdown of order and the beginnings of physical separation. This interaction of anarchic political systems would continue to shape Cypriot politics in the future.

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65 Bahcheli, p. 60.
66 Hitchens, p. 56.
67 Bahcheli, p. 60.
Chapter Two


Who shall account for this portioning, by what law comes this allotment of pain, grief, and despair?

Aeschylus: Seven Against Thebes

Introduction

This chapter will examine the impact of international actors on the development of Cypriot communal relations between 1964-1990. It shall analyze the policies of global and regional powers from a systemic perspective, noting that both the Superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and Greece and Turkey based their policies on considerations of power dictated by shifts within the international system. Thus, during the period of acute Superpower confrontation between 1964-1967, the United States pursued an active policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to preclude a confrontation between NATO allies Greece and Turkey. Conversely, Superpower détente led to greater fluidity at the regional level, allowing Turkey to improve its relations with the USSR. As the chapter shall point out, the absence of a credible deterrent allowed Turkey to improve its standing regionally by intervening in Cyprus in July-August 1974.
The Turkish invasion dramatically altered relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. While the separation of the two communities into ethnically homogeneous zones and the stationing of approximately 35,000 Turkish troops on the island preserved the anarchic character of communal relations, it also ensured that the Greek Cypriots would have to make important concessions in order to secure a political settlement. However, the hardening of the communal systems’ bipolar structure and the growing antagonism between Greece and Turkey had a negative impact on negotiations. Moreover, intercommunal talks sponsored by the good offices of the United Nations Secretary General were hampered by Superpower indifference to the fate of the Cypriots. The United States and the Soviet Union lost interest in the Cyprus problem because it no longer threatened the global balance of power; the partition of the island provided a brutal but effective solution to over a decade of instability. The United Nations was left with the unenviable task of guarding against violence on the ground while simultaneously urging the two communities to reunite at the political level. Its failure to broker a settlement was as much due to the character of international politics as it was to the intransigence of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot interlocutors.

**The Era of Uncertainty: 1964-1967**

The breakdown of communal relations in 1963-64 resulted in the direct involvement of Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus conflict. Greek and Turkish troops stationed on the island joined their Cypriot compatriots in the intercommunal fighting. This marked the first time in NATO’s history that troops from two member states were
fighting one another. The threat of a Greco-Turkish war drew the immediate attention of Britain and the United States. The British and Americans proposed that a NATO peacekeeping force be dispatched to Cyprus. The proposal, acceptable to Greece, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, was rejected by President Makarios. According to Bahcheli, “The Greek-Cypriot leader feared that Turkey had a larger influence within the Western alliance than Greece and that a NATO solution would be more favorable to Turkey than to Greek-Cypriots and Greece.” Makarios preferred that the matter be taken up by the UN, in order to take advantage of the support of countries opposed to NATO involvement. The Greek Cypriot’s rejection of the NATO forces deepened American concern. As a result, President Lyndon B. Johnson dispatched Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball to Nicosia to persuade Makarios to accept a modified version of the NATO peacekeeping plan. Ball was rebuffed by Makarios, whose position was now supported by the Soviet Union. In June 1964, a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey was narrowly avoided after President Johnson sent a strongly worded letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, warning him of the consequences of a Turkish invasion. Johnson threatened to suspend America’s obligation to protect Turkey against possible Soviet retaliation:

1 Joseph, p. 171.
2 The threat was real. During the crisis the Turkish fleet left the strategic Straits and sailed to the ports of Iskenderum and Mersin, opposite Cyprus. The Greek fleet stood between the islands of Rhodes and Crete, some 250 miles west of Cyprus. Both countries mobilized their forces along the Thracian border. See Joseph, p. 172.
4 Bahcheli, p. 61.
5 Ibid.
6 Kyriakides, p. 149.
I hope you will consider that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.\footnote{For the full text of the Johnson letter \textit{See} Stearns, \textit{Entangled Allies}, pp. 156-59.}

It should be noted that while the letter was regarded as an insult by the Turkish government, it did stop the planned intervention. This was because the threat of Soviet retaliation was credible. Krushchev had warned that, “If a foreign armed intervention takes place in Cyprus the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence...”\footnote{\textit{See} Attalides, p. 141.} The Soviets’ pledge was followed by a promise to supply the Greek Cypriots with conventional arms, torpedo boats and anti-aircraft artillery. By October 1965, the Cypriot government had received over 70 million dollars worth of Soviet military aid.\footnote{Ibid.}

Both the United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cyprus problem in terms of strategic interests. Given the United States’ position as the status quo power in the Eastern Mediterranean, its involvement in Cypriot affairs was easier to discern.

According to Coufoudakis:

\begin{quote}
American policy was determined by considerations reflecting the concerns of the Western regional alliances; the changing strategic balance among the superpowers in the region; the effects of the Arab-Israeli crisis in the region
\end{quote}
and on superpower relations; and the concern of American officials over the neutralist tendencies and the political base of the Makarios regime.  

The United States initially rejected mediation by the UN in order to limit the Soviet Union’s influence in Cyprus. As H.W. Brands Jr. has noted, “since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the fundamental goal of American policy in the eastern Mediterranean had been to keep the Russians out. To the Johnson administration, allowing Soviet participation even in debate on the Cyprus issue seemed the height of Western folly”.

The American solution to the Cyprus problem was presented by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1964. The plan included three key points: i) most of Cyprus was to be united with Greece in a partial consummation of enosis; ii) an area of the northern coast was to be awarded to Turkey as a military base and a political canton—other Turkish cantons were to be autonomous within the Greek area; iii) The island of Kastellorizon, off the north coast, was to be ceded to Turkey. In Acheson’s opinion the plan would satisfy Greek, Turkish and American interests: the Greek dream of enosis would be fulfilled, Turkish security interests would be protected, Makarios would be removed, and Cyprus would be firmly in NATO’s sphere of influence. Since the Soviet Union feared the establishment of NATO bases in Cyprus, Moscow’s support for Makarios’ rejection of the plan was not surprising. According to Nancy Crawshaw:

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11 Brands, Jr., pp. 349-50.

12 Hitchens, p. 57.

The Soviet Union had a vested interest in his survival, which was a safeguard against *enosis* and the extension of NATO influence. His adamant refusal to give way to the Turks helped to perpetuate a dispute which was damaging to the Western alliance.\(^\text{14}\)

On March 4, 1964, the Security Council adopted Resolution 186 which authorized the formation of UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus).\(^\text{15}\) The force of 6369 troops became operational on March 27, 1964. Its mission was “to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.”\(^\text{16}\) The Resolution also recommended the appointment of a mediator responsible to the Secretary General.\(^\text{17}\) From its inception the peacekeeping force was hampered by divergent views regarding its function:

To the Greek Cypriots and Greece, the United Nation’s presence in Cyprus was regarded as a means of ending the Turkish Cypriot ‘rebellion’ and of helping the Government of Cyprus defend itself against Turkish invasion. To the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, the United Nations Peace Force was a means of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community from threats of domination by the Greek Cypriots and Greece.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^\text{17}\) Kyriakides, p. 151.

\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., p. 152-53.
By all accounts, UNFICYP did diffuse many tense situations. However, the presence of paramilitary groups, often aided by Greek and Turkish troops, hindered the peacekeepers’ efforts.

By June 1964, the Greek government had installed General Grivas as leader of the Cypriot National Guard, which was manned exclusively by Greek Cypriots. The Greek government also infiltrated over 10,000 military personnel into Cyprus in defiance of the Treaty of Alliance. This was done to deter a Turkish invasion and to discourage Makarios from pursuing an overly independent, neutralist policy. Intercommunal violence had forced over 25,000 Turkish Cypriots to retreat into a number of enclaves which were administered by the “Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration.” The Greek Cypriots, who by now had sole control of the official government apparatus, instituted an economic blockade of the enclaves. They argued that Turkey was encouraging the refugees to remain in armed camps, protected by Turkish Cypriot forces, to preserve the position that partition or federation were the only possible solutions to the crisis. Turkey’s support of the Turkish Cypriots, economically and militarily, gave these arguments some justification. It also allowed the Turkish Cypriots to abstain from any formal political interaction with their Greek counterparts. As the UN Secretary General noted in his report of 11 March, 1965:

19 Grivas had indicated that he would accept a modified form of enosis in line with the Acheson Plan. His return to Cyprus was therefore supported by the Johnson administration. See Hitchens, pp. 58-59.
20 Kyriakides, p. 158.
22 Kyle notes that Turkish Cypriot paramilitary units were organized and led by Turkish officers, “Military command was exercised by a Turkish general, Kemal Coskun...All told there were about 5000 fighters. There was therefore the apparatus of a ‘state within a state’. Kyle, p. 11.
The Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the opposite direction from normality. The Community leadership discourages the Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial or other contacts with their Greek compatriots, from applying to Government offices in administrative matters, or from resettling in their home villages if they are refugees. 23

In August 1964, Grivas attacked the Turkish enclave at Kokkina in an effort to block the entry of Turkish arms and soldiers. Turkey retaliated by launching an air assault against Greek Cypriot troops. Makarios appealed to Greece and the Soviet Union and threatened to attack all Turkish Cypriot settlements. The Soviets, in contrast to their previous position, declined to take a firm stand against Turkey. According to Attalides, the Soviets decided to take advantage of Turkey’s objections to American policy, most notably the Johnson letter. 24 Thus, “the Soviet Union not only did not come to the aid of Cyprus but appealed to Makarios to use his ‘influence to prevent further bloodshed.’” 25 The changing nature of Turkish-Soviet relations 26, coupled with the inability of Greece to react quickly to Turkish incursions exposed the vulnerability of Cyprus to Turkish military action.

23 Attalides, p. 92.
24 Ibid., p. 142.
25 Kyriakides, p. 159.
26 Turkey sought improved relations with the Soviet Union in order to gain a greater degree of freedom in foreign affairs. According to Sakir Alemdar, “The Johnson letter was a turning point in US-Turkish relations. The US attempt to prevent Turkey from acting upon an issue considered vital to her national interests raised serious questions about Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy. From then on there would be moves by Turkey to open up relations with the Soviets and Third World countries in order to increase room for maneuver for the country in international affairs.” See Sakir Alemdar, “International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem,” in C.H. Dodd, ed., The Political, Social, and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus. (Huntingdon, England: The Eothen Press, 1993): p. 81.
The direct intervention of Greece and Turkey in Cypriot affairs hampered the work of the UN and exacerbated communal divisions. As a result, neither community displayed a desire for political reconciliation. President Makarios made no real effort to reintegrate the Turkish Cypriots into the political system. Conversely, the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not lobby for reintegration and seemed to prefer the separation of the two communities. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot proposal presented by former Vice-President Kuchuk to the UN in 1965 endorsed this position. According to Attalides:

The Turkish Cypriots would be concentrated in one geographical area and the Greek Cypriots in another. The area ‘given’ to the Turkish Cypriots would be 38% of the island(...) It was suggested that twenty or twenty-five thousand families would have to ‘move’ for this plan to be realized.

Given their numbers and relative strength, the Turkish Cypriots were in no position to make such a demand without the support of Turkey. That their bargaining position reflected Turkey’s strategic interests is worth noting.

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27 See Minority Rights Groups, Cyprus, (London, 1976): p. 19. According to Bahcheli, “With the Turkish-Cypriots surrounded in their impoverished enclaves, the Makarios government proceeded to isolate and pressure them to accept Greek-Cypriot rule without the special community rights provided by the Zurich-London arrangements. By offering the Turkish-Cypriots nothing better than terms of surrender, Makarios unwittingly drove them closer to Ankara.” See Bahcheli, p. 71.

28 This point is summarized nicely by Markides, “The Turkish Cypriots were able to sustain themselves economically thanks to the support they received from Turkey. The Presence of the Turkish military contingent on the island and the repeated demonstrations of support from the Turkish government reinforced the belief among Turkish Cypriots that that eventually Mother Turkey would intervene.” Markides, The Rise and Fall, p. 144.

29 Attalides, p. 85.

Turkey’s influence was further manifested by its rejection of UN mediator Galo Plaza’s report, submitted in March 1965. Plaza advocated the maintenance of a unitary Cypriot state which recognized and protected minority rights. The report rejected the implementation of a federal system, as it would “require the compulsory movement of the people concerned--many thousands on both sides--contrary to the enlightened principles of the present time...” It also noted that the powers accorded to the Turkish Cypriots under the Zurich-London Agreements were excessive, “It will need not be forgotten that the Turkish Cypriot community obtained from the Zurich and London Agreements a series of rights greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for it in the future.” Turkey rejected Galo Plaza’s report and successfully engineered his ouster. Turkey argued that, “Mr. Galo Plaza’s report contains sections which exceed his terms of reference; therefore there can be no further usefulness in the continuation of Mr. Plaza in his function.”

The 1967 Crisis

The two communities avoided serious fighting between 1965-67. Despite the relative calm, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not improve. The two communities continued to advocate irreconcilable positions regarding Cyprus’s political future. The political situation in Cyprus deteriorated markedly after 1967. On April 21,

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32 Ibid., p. 61.

a group of Greek colonels led by George Papadopoulos toppled the Greek government and established a military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{34} The junta’s leaders had served with Greek forces in Cyprus and were familiar with the Cyprus issue. They hoped to resolve the Cyprus problem in order to improve Greek-Turkish relations and NATO’s capabilities in the eastern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{35} With this objective in mind, Papadopoulos met with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in September 1967. According to Hitchens:

The meeting was intended to consummate a secret Paris meeting between Greek Admiral Toumbas and the Turkish minister Ishan Caglayangil. It would have proclaimed \textit{enosis} conceding the basis for partition, and would have made the junta appear ‘statesman-like’.\textsuperscript{36}

The meeting ended in failure after Demirel requested the withdrawal of Greek troops and an area large enough to accommodate most of the Turkish Cypriot community. It is important to note that neither Greece nor Turkey consulted with the legally recognized government of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{37} The Greek Cypriots had rejected the option of ‘double enosis’ in 1964 and continued to oppose concessions to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.

Relations between Makarios and the Greek government deteriorated rapidly. The colonels, devout adherents of anticommunism, were uncomfortable with Makarios’ non-aligned foreign policy. They were also eager to settle their differences with Turkey, in order to strengthen NATO solidarity. Makarios, in turn, was wary of the junta’s desire to

\textsuperscript{34} For a detailed analysis of the coup and junta see, C.M. Woodhouse, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels}, (London: Granada, 1985).


\textsuperscript{36} Hitchens, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{37} The United Nations General Assembly had reaffirmed the sovereignty of Cyprus and the legitimacy of the Makarios government through Resolution 2077 (XX).
'solve' the Cyprus problem without his consent. The Greek dictatorship took steps to undermine Makarios's political authority. This was manifested in their support of secret paramilitary organizations and of General Grivas.\(^{38}\) Grivas's control of the National Guard threatened Makarios's authority and hampered his relations with the Turkish Cypriots.\(^{39}\)

On November 15, 1967 Grivas, with the consent of Athens, ordered a National Guard patrol to inspect two Turkish Cypriot villages, Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros. Makarios was not informed of the operation and was therefore slow to react to the unfolding situation. The 'inspection' resulted in the deaths of twenty-eight Turkish Cypriots and damage to homes and property.\(^{40}\) The Turkish response was swift. Ankara sent jets on warning flights over Cyprus and mobilized military forces. An impending invasion was averted through strenuous diplomatic activity initiated by the United States. President Johnson sent special envoy Cyrus Vance to Athens and Ankara to reconcile the two NATO allies.\(^{41}\) An agreement was reached on November 30. The deal called for the withdrawal of over 10,000 Greek troops and the recall of General Grivas.\(^{42}\)

The 1967 crisis had important repercussions in terms of communal relations. Makarios was by now aware of the fact that Turkey's interests in Cyprus could not be denied. Once more, the withdrawal of Greek troops left Cyprus vulnerable to any future

\(^{38}\) Markides, p. 83.

\(^{39}\) Kyle, p. 13.

\(^{40}\) Bahcheli, p. 72.


\(^{42}\) Bahcheli, p. 73; Markides, p. 134.
Turkish intervention. Thus, on 12 January 1968, he declared that *enosis* was no longer a realistic objective.\(^{43}\) Most Greek Cypriots agreed that independence was the only viable option for Cyprus. This was reflected in Makarios’s landslide victory in the February 1968 presidential election, in which he carried over 95 percent of the vote while his adversary, an *enosis* proponent, won only 3.7 percent.\(^{44}\) Following the election, Makarios began taking tentative steps towards a reconciliation with Turkish Cypriots. By March 1968, all restrictions on Turkish Cypriots had been lifted. Intercommunal talks, sponsored by the UN, commenced in June. By the end of 1968, the UN Secretary-General reported that, “at last the emphasis seems to be shifting from military confrontation to negotiation.”\(^{45}\)

**The Road to Partition: 1968-1974**

Makarios appointed Glafkos Clerides as the Greek Cypriot negotiator at the intercommunal talks. The Turkish Cypriots selected Rauf Denktash to represent their position. By most accounts the talks revealed the potential for compromise between the two communities. According to Kitromilides and Couloumbis:

> ...substantive disagreement over the issue of local government was narrowed--the Greek side conceded that considerable decentralization was desirable but also insisted that the jurisdiction and functions of local government should not be such as to create essentially the infrastructure of a communal state within the unitary state of Cyprus.\(^{46}\)

\(^{43}\) Markides, p. 134.

\(^{44}\) Kyle, p. 13.


\(^{46}\) Kitromilides and Couloumbis, pp. 184-85.
For their part, the Turkish Cypriots agreed to reduce their representation in the
government from the Zurich-London standard of 30 percent to 20 percent, a figure in line
with their percentage of the population. They also agreed to limit the Vice-President’s
veto power to matters directly related to Turkish Cypriot interests.

Despite these positive signs, the two communities remained divided on two key
issues: local autonomy for Turkish Cypriots and the question of external guarantees.
Both issues reflected the anarchic character of the communal system. Turkish Cypriots
argued that their safety depended on the maintenance of self-regulated enclaves and
Turkey’s right to intervene on their behalf. The Greek Cypriots believed that the
enclaves represented the first step towards partition of the island. More importantly, they
feared that maintaining external guarantees diminished Cyprus’s sovereignty and
infringed on the rights of the majority.

Throughout the intercommunal negotiations the Greek Cypriot position was
undermined by the Greek regime’s harassment of Makarios. The junta’s tactics included
an assassination attempt in 1970. The colonels also allowed General Grivas to ‘escape’
to Cyprus and form EOKA-B, a paramilitary organization dedicated to enosis. EOKA-B
targeted Makarios supporters and members of the Greek Cypriot Communist and
Socialist parties. At the political level, Athens funded the activities of ESEA (Co-
ordination Committee for the Enosis Struggle). ESEA challenged Makarios’s nationalist

47 Bahcheli, p. 79.
48 Markides, 136.
49 Hitchens, p. 71.
credentials, forcing him to make periodic references to enosis which, in turn, heightened Turkish Cypriot mistrust. In February 1972, Athens blocked Makarios’ attempt to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. Papadopoulos called for the dismissal of Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou and other cabinet members hostile to the Greek regime.50 He also ordered Makarios to create a government of national unity which would respect the dictates of the “National Centre.”51 Makarios rejected the colonels’ ultimatum and retaliated by ordering police raids on EOKA-B hideouts. The raids uncovered documents which established clear links between the junta and EOKA-B.52

The United States’ support of the Greek military dictatorship has been examined at length in several excellent studies.53 What is important to note for the purpose of the thesis is that American support for the junta was based on strategic considerations. The United States appreciated the junta’s commitment to NATO and its staunch anti-communist ideology. In return, the Nixon administration lent credibility to a government that had been expelled from the Council of Europe and condemned by human rights

51 The government of ‘national unity’ would exclude members of the Cypriot Communist (AKEL) and Socialist (EDEK) parties. The two parties enjoyed the support of nearly 50 percent of the Greek Cypriot electorate. See Markides, p. 137.
52 Hitchens, p. 72.
groups for its use of prison camps and torture.\textsuperscript{54} The relationship culminated in the decision to establish homeport facilities for the American Sixth Fleet in Athens. The decision to homeport in Greece tied American interests to the survival of the Greek junta.

In the words of Christopher Hitchens:

\begin{quote}
By homeporting its fleet under junta auspices, the United States became almost as dependent on the dictators as the dictators were already on the United States. A vested American interest in the survival of the junta had now been created. The description of affairs which now became current—that the United States was ‘in bed’ with the Greek despots—was crude but unhappily accurate.
\end{quote}

The United States' marriage of convenience with the Greek regime would have important consequences for Cyprus. On November 21, 1973, Colonel Papadopoulos was toppled by Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, head of the Greek military police. Ioannides, a staunch advocate of \textit{enosis}, intensified terrorist activities against President Makarios. Following Grivas’ death in January 1974, Ioannides assumed responsibility for the activities of EOKA-B. By June 1974, evidence of an impending coup against Makarios was mounting. On July 3, Makarios issued an open letter to Greece’s President, Phaedon Gizikis. In the letter, Makarios accused the junta of supporting terrorist activities directed against his government and conspiring to kill him.\textsuperscript{55} Makarios ended the letter by calling for the immediate withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus. On July 15, 1974, Ioannides replied by ordering the Cypriot National Guard to overthrow Makarios.


\textsuperscript{55} Hitchens, p. 81. In the letter, Makarios stated that, “I have more than once so far felt, and in some cases I have touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to liquidate my human existence.”
Despite demolishing part of the presidential palace, the plotters failed to kill Makarios, who fled to Paphos and was rescued by British military personnel. In the meantime, Ioannides installed Nicos Sampson as the new President of Cyprus, a decision that frightened Turkish Cypriots and provided an invitation for Turkish intervention. As one Turkish diplomat put it, "The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all."56

It was at this critical moment that the convergence of regional and global interests resulted in the transformation of the Cyprus problem. Rather than condemning the coup and reaffirming Makarios’ status as head of the Cypriot government, the United States toyed with the idea of recognizing Sampson. A leak to the New York times indicated that, "the Nixon administration was leaning more towards Nikos Sampson...than toward Archbishop Makarios."57 When confronted with the story, Press Secretary Robert Anderson failed to deny its accuracy. Given the United States’ support of the Greek regime, it would have been difficult to condemn either Ioannides or Sampson. The American government had placed its interests in the hands of a group of gangsters. To admit as much would threaten the maintenance of those interests.

Turkey issued an ultimatum on July 18 calling for the resignation of Sampson, the withdrawal of Greek officers, and the upholding of Cyprus’ independence.58 Ioannides, confident that the United States would intervene, ignored the threat. In doing so, he committed a fatal error. As was noted earlier in the chapter, Turkey had begun to mend

56 Stem, p. 117.
57 Ibid., p. 113.
its fences with the Soviet Union in 1964. By 1974, the fear of Soviet retaliation no longer threatened Ankara. According to Alemdar:

Within the climate of détente, Turkish-Soviet relations began to improve and the perceived threat from the Soviets declined, which permitted more flexibility for Ankara on the Cyprus issue. It was becoming more difficult to prevent Turkish actions by using the Soviet bogeyman.\(^{59}\)

Shortly after issuing its ultimatum Turkey consulted with Britain as to the possibility of a joint intervention. After the British declined, Turkey initiated its 'peace operation', code named Attila.

**Invasion, Partition and the Transformation of Communal Relations**

Turkish troops landed on Cyprus on July 20, 1974, prompting the UN Security Council’s Resolution 353. The Resolution demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention, the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel and negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain for the restoration of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus.\(^{60}\) In an effort to minimize the threat of a Greco-Turkish war, the United States convinced Turkey to halt the invasion. In Athens the Greek Chiefs of Staff rejected Ioannides’ call for war and accepted the terms of the American cease-fire.\(^{61}\) By July 22 both the Ioannides and Sampson regimes had collapsed and been replaced by civilian governments.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{59}\) Alemdar, p. 88.

\(^{60}\) Evriades, p. 39.


Buoyed by Turkey’s strategic advantage in the wake of the July invasion, Prime Minister Ecevit noted that, “no one should assume think or speak as if nothing new has happened in Cyprus, as if nothing has changed there. A lot has changed irrevocably in Cyprus since the morning of 20th July.”63 During negotiations in Geneva, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership pressed for a solution based on the separation of the two communities and the creation of two autonomous units within a federal system. The Turkish Cypriot unit would include 34 percent of Cyprus’s total territory and required a substantial transfer of populations.64 According to Evriades, “The Greek Cypriots responded with proposals that conceded administrative autonomy, with a cantonal arrangement that excluded a geographical area or compulsory movement of population.”65 Turkey ignored these modifications and demanded an answer to its original proposal. Turkey resumed military operations after rejecting the Greek Cypriots’ request for an additional thirty-six hours to consider the plan.

Turkey’s decision was due in part to the absence of any credible deterrent. Greece was still reeling from recent events and was therefore unable to retaliate. This, in turn, eased American fears of a possible Greco-Turkish war. Thus, the United States could afford to “tilt” in favor of the Turkish position.66 Improved Turkish-Soviet

63 Bahcheli, p. 100.
64 Camp, p. 59.
65 Evriades, p. 40.
relations precluded a strong Soviet reaction.\textsuperscript{67} In essence, Turkey capitalized on favorable conditions in the international system. In the words of Duygu Bazoglu Sezer:

\begin{quote}
...whereas Turkey could obediently yield in the 1960s, before détente, she did not yield in the 1970s when she felt less threatened by the Soviet Union. That neither the U.S. Sixth Fleet nor the Soviet \textit{Eskadra} would move against her are likely to have figured in Turkish calculations when the decision was taken to intervene in Cyprus in 1974.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

The second Turkish offensive began on August 16 and lasted two days. Cyprus was partitioned by the Attila Line, which ran from Xeros through Nicosia, to Famagusta.\textsuperscript{69} Turkish troops overran the northern region of the island, occupying thirty-eight percent of the republic’s territory and forcing approximately 160,000 Greek Cypriots to flee to the south. This ensured that a bi-zonal federation could be established.\textsuperscript{70} Turkish Cypriots assumed possession of the rich Messaoria plains and the leading holiday resorts of Kyrenia, Varosha, and Famagusta. In all, the Turkish zone encompassed territory responsible for approximately 70 percent of Cyprus’ pre-invasion economic output.\textsuperscript{71}

The international response to the invasion was swift if not effective. In November 1974, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 3212,

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{67} The Soviets did not raise the matter in the Security Council, even after the second phase of the invasion. See Norton, in Salem, ed., \textit{Cyprus: A Regional Conflict}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{69} Nancy Crawshaw, “Cyprus: The Political Background,” in Koumoulides, ed. \textit{Cyprus in Transition}, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{70} Evriades, p. 40.
\end{quote}
calling for the respect of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-
alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. It also demanded the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Cyprus, the cessation of all foreign interference, and the return of the
refugees to their homes in safety.\textsuperscript{72} The resolution was endorsed by the Security Council
in December 1974, through Resolution 361/1974. UN resolutions had little impact on
either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Turkish troops remained on the island
and the Turkish Cypriots announced the establishment of the \textit{Turkish Federated State of
Cyprus} on February 13, 1975.\textsuperscript{73} The Greek Cypriot administration, internationally
recognized as the legitimate government of Cyprus, retaliated by implementing an
economic embargo against the north. International air, maritime, postal, and
telecommunication authorities have respected the embargo, thus forcing these services to
be routed through Turkey to the Turkish Cypriots.\textsuperscript{74}

Initial talks chaired by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim were unproductive.
However, during the third round of negotiations an agreement regarding the fate of
Turkish Cypriots in the south was reached. Under the terms of the settlement,
approximately 8000 Turkish Cypriots were returned to the north on the condition that
Greek Cypriots in the Turkish zone would allowed to remain if they wished. The
agreement provided for freedom of movement and facilities for education in Greek and
for the practice of the Orthodox religion.\textsuperscript{75} Unfortunately, the Turkish Cypriot leadership

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p.13.
\textsuperscript{73} Crawshaw, \textit{Cyprus in Transition}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{74} Macdonald, \textit{The Problem of Cyprus}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 20.
did not honor its side of the bargain. According to a 1976 Staff Report by the United States Senate Subcommittee on Refugees:

Life among Cypriot Greeks in the north has not only not improved, it has deteriorated since the Cypriot-Turkish administration solemnly pledged in Vienna to take steps to normalize and protect their lives...In no respect has the Turkish administration fulfilled its obligation entered into at the third round of intercommunal talks.76

By the time the Subcommittee’s report had been released, the number of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish zone dropped from 20,000 to 3,600.77 The ethnic cleansing of the north was accompanied by the settlement of thousands of mainland Turks in the occupied territories, transforming Cyprus’ demography.78


The results of the invasion were perceived differently by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As anthropologists Russell King and Sarah Ladbury have pointed out:

The Turkish action in 1974 produced a situation which, for the Turkish government in Ankara and for the Turkish Cypriot administration, was in many respects satisfactory...the Turks were victors, both psychologically

76 Cited in Hitchens, p. 108.
78 By 1990, approximately 80,000 mainland Turks had been settled in northern Cyprus. See Adamantia Pollis, “The Missing of Cyprus--A Distinctive Case,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies Vol. 9 (1991): p. 47. There has been tension between the settlers and indigenous Turkish Cypriots. According to Sarah Ladbury, “the mainlander, for the most part is thought of as an economic parasite--as having come, not with the intent to work, but to cash in on the economic potential of post-war Cyprus. The fact that mainlanders received benefits for which many Turkish Cypriots were not eligible...made them an object of considerable resentment.” Russell King and Sarah Ladbury, “The Cultural Reconstruction of Political Reality: Greek and Turkish Cyprus Since 1974,” Anthropological Quarterly 1 (1982): p. 12.
and materially, and from the beginning their logical aim was, we suggest, to maintain the *de facto* situation and to convince others of its permanency.\(^{79}\)

Conversely, for the Greek Cypriots, “the situation since 1974 has been totally unacceptable and it is in their interests to reflect its impermanence and to stress its illegality.”\(^{80}\) The two sides’ divergent perceptions would define their approach to negotiations throughout the late 1970s and 1980s.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives met sporadically between 1974-1976. In January 1977, Rauf Denktash and Archbishop Makarios established a set of principles aimed at guiding further negotiations. They agreed that Cyprus would be an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic, with territory to be administered by each community in light of economic viability, productivity and land ownership.\(^{81}\) Questions such as freedom of movement, settlement, and property rights were to be discussed with respect to practical difficulties faced by the Turkish Cypriots. Subsequent talks based on the Makarios-Denktash guidelines revealed a divergence of views regarding the scope and power of the central government. The Greek Cypriots preferred a strong central government. Conversely, the Turkish Cypriots envisioned a confederation of two sovereign and equal states with a weak central government.\(^{82}\) Archbishop Makarios’s death in August 1977 delayed the resumption of talks for two years.

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79 Ibid., p. 4.
80 Ibid.
82 Camp, p. 63.
Negotiations resumed in 1979 and continued throughout the 1980s.\(^{83}\) A ten point agreement was reached by Denktash and Makarios’ successor, Spyros Kyprianou, in May 1979.\(^{84}\) Under the accord, the two sides agreed to negotiate along the guidelines set forth in 1977 and to give priority to the resettlement of Varosha under the auspices of the UN. The agreement also reiterated past statements regarding guarantees against union with any other country. Point six noted that both sides should, “abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks.”\(^{85}\) Special importance was to be given to, “initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.”\(^{86}\) Turkish Cypriots argued that point six required the lifting of the economic embargo. The Greek Cypriots objected to this, noting that the embargo was their sole means of pressuring the Turkish side into making concessions. The Turkish Cypriots also demanded that the Greek Cypriots accept the notion of a bizonal state despite the fact that the 1977 guidelines envisioned a bicommmunal federal system. Based on these and other disagreements, the talks faltered after only four sessions.

Following the 1974 invasion, the Greek Cypriots sought to censure Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots by obtaining favorable resolutions from the UN General Assembly, the Commonwealth, and various summits of the Non-Aligned nations.\(^{87}\)

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\(^{84}\) For the full text of the 10-point agreement, see The Cyprus Problem, op cit p. 41.

\(^{85}\) Ibid.

\(^{86}\) Ibid.

\(^{87}\) Coughlan, p. 47.
Internationalization “had the effect of buttressing Greek-Cypriot authority as the legitimate government of the island.”\textsuperscript{88} The policy was relaxed between 1979-1983 as a gesture of goodwill based on point six of the 1979 Denktash-Kyprianou agreement. However, the frustrating pace of intercommunal talks led to the resumption of the internationalization policy in Spring 1983. The Greek Cypriots’ decision was endorsed by Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou who argued that any solution to the Cyprus problem required the withdrawal of Turkish troops.\textsuperscript{89}

On May 13 1983, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 37/253, calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, repatriation of mainland colonists, and respect for human rights in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{90} The Turkish Cypriots retaliated in November through a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and the creation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish Cypriot action was denounced by the UN Security Council through Resolution 541/1983.\textsuperscript{91} Other international bodies such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament also condemned the UDI. Despite this, Turkey immediately recognized the TRNC and established formal diplomatic relations, including an exchange of ambassadors in 1984.

\textsuperscript{88} Macdonald, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{89} Nancy Crawshaw, “Cyprus: A Failure in Western Diplomacy,” The World Today 2 (February 1984): p. 73


\textsuperscript{91} For the full text of Resolution 541/1983, see International Condemnation of the Turkish Cypriot Pseudostate, (Nicosia: Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Cyprus, 1984): p. 23.
The Greek demand for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and the Turkish Cypriots’ sharp reaction against it, highlighted the relevance of security for both regional and communal actors. The stationing of over 35,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus following the 1974 invasion ensured the Turkish Cypriots’ safety and improved Turkey’s defensive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. Conversely, Greece and the Greek Cypriots regarded the Turkish troops as a threat to their security. The resulting security dilemma had a damaging effect on relations at the communal and regional levels. Greece stated that Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus was indicative of its expansionist designs. As a result, Greek security policy was redesigned to meet the threat from the East. This included the fortification of several Aegean islands close to the Turkish coast. At the communal level, the Greek Cypriots viewed the presence of Turkish troops as a confirmation of Ankara’s desire to dictate the terms of any future settlement. Rightly or wrongly they concluded that the Turkish Cypriots were being manipulated by Turkey during the intercommunal talks. All in all, although Turkey’s military commitment to the Turkish Cypriots allowed them to continue living in relative safety and isolation, it did not alter the anarchic nature of the communal system. If nothing else, it reinforced the bipolar structure of the system, thereby minimizing either side’s ability to make concessions at the bargaining table.

92 Greek policymakers also cite the presence of the Turkish Fourth Army—the Army of the Aegean—to defend their argument. The Turkish force is within easy striking distance of Greece’s Aegean islands and is equipped with a panoply of amphibious landing craft. Turkey claims that the Army of the Aegean is intended to protect against Greek aggression. For more on this subject see Robert Macdonald, “Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean–Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II,” in Robert O’Neill, ed., Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, (London: Macmillan Press, 1988): p. 74.

Intercommunal talks resumed in September 1984 under the auspices of the new UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. The Turkish Cypriots insisted on a bizonal federation with complete equality between the two sides. Preliminary discussions, otherwise known as the Proximity Talks, led to a high level meeting in January 1985. At the meeting, the Secretary General presented both sides with a detailed Draft Agreement based on the 1977 and 1979 guidelines. The plan had much in common with a 1978 proposal drafted by Matthew Nimetz, a high ranking American State Department officer. The Draft Agreement called for a bi-communal federal constitution and a bizonal territorial arrangement. The Greek Cypriots' demand for freedom of movement, property ownership, and settlement were to be addressed by working groups following the acceptance of the plan. Details regarding territorial adjustments and the question of foreign troops would also be dealt with in future negotiations. Disagreements arose after the Greek Cypriots indicated that they regarded the Draft Agreement as a basis for further negotiations and not as a comprehensive solution. The Turkish Cypriots were prepared to accept the plan as it stood. This was not surprising, given that their major demands were dealt with substantively while the Greek Cypriots' key concerns were left unresolved. A hastily revised draft aimed at addressing some of Kyprianou's key concerns was submitted to both sides in April 1985.


95 Coughlan, p. 48. It should be noted that the Turkish Cypriots had indicated that they were willing to contemplate the reduction of their zone from 38 to 29% of Cyprus' total territory. Kyprianou and the Greek Cypriots preferred that this was formally recognized in the Draft Agreement.
The Greek Cypriots accepted the new proposal but it was immediately rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.

Undaunted, de Cuellar presented a second Draft Agreement to the two parties in March 1986.\textsuperscript{96} Despite its complexity, the new plan failed to satisfy the Greek Cypriots’ concerns regarding the scope of territorial adjustments, ratification of the three freedoms, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops. While the Greek Cypriots agreed to a Turkish province encompassing 29 percent of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots countered with a demand for 30-31 percent. Denktash also insisted on maintaining Turkey’s right to intervene militarily on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.\textsuperscript{97} Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots stated that they were only prepared to accept the plan on the condition that the Greek Cypriots lift the economic embargo. Not surprisingly then, the 1986 Draft Agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot negotiators.

Intercommunal talks resumed in August 1988 following the election of George Vassiliou as president of the Republic of Cyprus. Vassiliou, an independent candidate, campaigned on a pledge to solve the Cyprus problem rapidly. A preliminary round of talks lasted until November 1988. A second series of discussions occurred between December 1988 and April 1989. In May 1989, the Secretary General assigned aides to assist the Cypriot negotiators in drafting their respective proposals. The Secretary


\textsuperscript{97} United Nations, \textit{Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus 10 December 1985--11 June 1986}, p. 21
General submitted an “ideas paper” to ensure that both sides adhered to common criteria. The negotiations revealed increased flexibility on the part of the Greek Cypriots:

...concessions included a willingness to phase in the three freedoms, beginning with the freedom of movement and holding freedom of settlement and property in abeyance. New thinking and flexibility on the territorial issue were displayed, with a range of options presented to the Turkish Cypriot side... They were more flexible than in the past on the issue of the presidency, offering alternatives such as rotating the position between the two communities or having joint elections, with Turkish votes weighted.  

During more than one hundred hours of meetings the two sides explored a vast range of issues. Buoyed by the recent turn of events, the Secretary General arranged a summit to take place between 26 February and 2 March 1990 in New York. During the New York meetings, Denktash objected to the “ideas paper” and shocked Vassiliou by insisting on the right of self-determination for both communities. This demand was explicitly denounced by the Secretary General who conceded that the two sides were still far apart. Despite Perez de Cuellar’s stern admonition, the Security Council failed to censure the Turkish Cypriots, preferring instead to renew the Secretary General’s role in the intercommunal talks through Resolution 649/1990.

**The Triumph of Violence?**

As was noted in Chapter One, the anarchic nature of the global system impacts on regional and communal systems and conditions the actions of actors at all three levels.

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98 *Cyprus: A Country Study*, p. 182.

According to George Modelski, the international system influences states to either ally themselves with communal antagonists, isolate the combatants and suppress the conflict, or, encourage reconciliation. In a similar sense, Stephen Ryan has argued that global powers react to ethnic conflicts in order to secure geopolitical advantage, maintain access to vital resources, and preserve alliances. According to Ryan, global powers protect these interests through active engagement in conflict resolution, military intervention, or acceptance of the status quo. In the post-1974 period, both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the consequences of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, thus weakening the UN’s efforts to negotiate a settlement acceptable to both communities. Neither Superpower regarded the division of the island into ethnically homogeneous zones as important in terms of its strategic interests; in essence, partition settled the problem. Both Superpowers relied on UNFICYP to keep the two communities apart and the UN Secretary General to keep them talking.

Once more, the failure of the intercommunal talks reflected the UN’s impotence in the face of a determined regional power. The triumph of the Turkish position was reflected in the Greek Cypriots’ grudging acceptance of the principles of bizonality and

101 Ryan, p. 95.
102 Cold War thinking dictated US policy during the 1974-1990 period. Writing in 1984, former State Department Special Cyprus Coordinator Richard Haas noted that, “Attempts to pressure local parties and their mainland patrons towards compromise would merely damage existing relationships; moreover, neutralist sentiments are sufficiently strong in both Greece and Turkey that, under the right circumstances, political figures in each country could meet with considerable success by proposing a new foreign policy inimical to Western interests. The best course in these circumstances is to eschew for the present any major diplomatic rush. Rather, the US and its European allies would do better to focus their energies on maintaining in Cyprus the 2,000-strong UN peacekeeping force...” (emphasis added) Dr. Richard Haas, “Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean—Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part I,” in Robert O’Neill, ed., Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, pp. 67-68.
equality of the two communities. It also revealed the utility of force in anarchic political systems. UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and respect for fundamental human rights were meaningless without the weight of the Superpowers behind them. The Soviets’ indifference to the Cyprus problem and the United States’ vocal support of Turkey from 1974 and through the 1980s reflected the futility of the UN’s position in Cyprus.\(^{103}\) To make matters worse, the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations in the post-1974 period precluded regional cooperation in solving the dispute.\(^{104}\)

Thus, as the 1980s drew to a close and the world witnessed the end of the Cold War, a solution to the Cyprus problem appeared as remote as it had been in 1964. Unfortunately, the situation would not improve in immediate the post-Cold War era.

\(^{103}\) Some may object to this assertion by citing the American Arms Embargo against Turkey between 1974-1978 and the Soviet Union’s request for an international conference to solve the Cyprus problem in 1986. In reply, one may counter by noting that the American embargo was imposed by Congress over the stern objections of the Ford and Carter administrations. The effect of the embargo was also questionable. As Bruce R. Kuniholm has noted, “the United States provided Turkey with considerable military assistance throughout the embargo years: $95 million in 1975...$125 million in 1976, $125 million in 1977, and $175 million in 1978.” Bruce R. Kuniholm, “Turkey and NATO,” in Kaplan et al, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean, pp. 231-232. The Soviets call for an international summit dedicated to solving the Cyprus problem was not followed up after its initial rejection by the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey. By most accounts, the Soviets accepted the islands partition and were not prepared to challenge the Western allies on this issue. See Norton, in Salem, ed., Cyprus: A Regional Conflict, p. 110.

\(^{104}\) The regional conflict between Greece and Turkey reached crisis proportions in the late 1970s and 1980s. Greek military spending averaged 7% of GDP, while Turkey averaged 5%. According to Kourvetaris, “By 1982, with the exception of the United States, Greece and Turkey had the highest defense expenditures as measured by percentages of gross national product among the sixteen members of NATO (6.7% and 5.2% respectively).” War over drilling rights in the Aegean was narrowly averted in 1975 and 1987. Following the 1987 crisis Greek Prime Minister Papandreou met with his Turkish counterpart Turgut Ozal in Davos Switzerland. The meetings led to a short détente in Greco-Turkish relations. By 1990, however, the “Spirit of Davos” had given way to mutually antagonistic positions on Cyprus, and the Aegean. See Kourvetaris, East European Quarterly 4 (January 1988): p. 443. Also see Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979/80); Mehmet Ali Birand, “A Turkish View of Greek-Turkish Relations,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 16 (Fall 1988): pp. 173-183; and Duygu Sezer, “The Strategic Matrix of the SEM: A Turkish Perspective,” in Constas, ed., pp. 109-128.
Chapter Three

The Cyprus Problem in the Emerging International System

All this for peace. Yet, when the wars are waged, there are new calamities brewing.

St. Augustine: The City of God

Introduction

The end of the Cold War produced profound changes in the global political system. The disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the breakup of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era in international relations; an era bereft of the familiar features which characterized the bipolar global system.¹ This chapter shall examine the Cyprus problem in the years between 1990-1995 in order to understand how change in the global system has affected the evolution of Cypriot communal relations. After outlining some major features of the emerging international system, the chapter will explore how the end of global bipolarity has exacerbated tensions between Greece and Turkey, leading both states to maintain irreconcilable positions on several bilateral issues including Cyprus. A brief examination of UN initiatives in Cyprus between 1990-1995 will reveal that the impediments to a negotiated settlement have also outlasted the Cold War order. Moreover, the marginalization of the Cyprus problem in terms of global

politics continues. The proliferation of conflicts throughout the world has absorbed the attention and resources of the UN and the Great Powers. Ironically, the relative stability bred by the current state of affairs threatens to make the division of Cyprus permanent. Barring any dramatic changes, communal relations will continue to develop along the lines set out following the partition of the island in August 1974.

The Emerging International System

Although a substantive appraisal of post-Cold War international relations is beyond the scope of this study, a brief examination of the emerging international system is necessary in order to place developments in Cyprus into greater perspective.

Two schools of thought have come to dominate the debate over the form and character of the emerging international system. Realists continue to emphasize the anarchic nature of international relations, while their critics argue that the spread of economic liberalism and political democracy has tempered Realist assumptions concerning the inevitability of conflict between states. In his critique of Realist hypotheses, Richard Ned Lebow argues that relations among developed democratic states of Asia, North America, Oceania, and Western Europe can no longer be characterized as anarchic. According to Lebow:

The allegedly inescapable consequences of anarchy have been largely overcome by a complex web of institutions that govern interstate relations and provide mechanisms for solving disputes. These institutions reflect and help sustain a consensus in favor of consultation and compromise that mute the consequences of power imbalances among states...a community of nations has evolved that is bound together by the realization that national
security and economic well-being require close cooperation and coordination with other democratic and democratizing states.²

Lebow’s position is qualified by James M. Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, who differentiate between relations between advanced industrial “core” states and their weaker counterparts residing at the “periphery” of the international system.³ Goldgeir and McFaul note that anarchy and competition still determine relations between developing, peripheral states. However, they attribute this to a paucity of shared norms and political instability--features that may be alleviated over time. Thus, one may conclude that even peripheral states have the capacity to evolve into members of the core, thereby escaping their uncertain future. In the meantime, however, peripheral states must contend with anarchy within their particular regional subsystem.⁴ Core states, on the other hand, no longer need to concern themselves with the vagaries of maintaining military superiority. Goldgeir and McFaul argue that for the Great Powers, ensuring survival has become a relatively easy task, “survival within the core system of states will be relegated to a perfunctory national objective, and hence the security dilemma will not dominate relations between the great powers.”⁵

⁴ The end of the Cold War has also altered the scope of Great Power interest in regional conflicts. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “regional conflicts are now decoupled from the earlier linkage with Superpower rivalry. Regional conflicts may now be globally less critical but, conversely, they may be freer to escalate to higher levels of violence.” See Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Consequences of the End of the Cold War for International Security,” Adelphi Paper 265, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992): p. 4.
⁵ Goldgeir and McFaul, p. 478.
Realist theorists contend that the demise of the global system’s bipolar structure has not altered the anarchic context of international politics. Anarchy, they argue, is a permanent feature of the global system regardless of its structure. In marked contrast to their critics, Realists contend that the end of the Cold War order has led to even greater uncertainty and instability. In a controversial article published in 1990, John Mearsheimer noted that the optimism generated by the end of the Cold War was premature. Mearsheimer argued that bipolarity, with its attendant military balance between Superpowers, fostered peace in Europe for forty-five years. Conversely, the demise of the Cold War order increased the chances of war and major crises occurring in Europe. Mearsheimer warned that the emerging international system had the potential to breed malevolent forms of hyper-nationalism. This is an important, if often neglected argument, in that it links change at the global level to the emergence of atavistic tendencies within individual states. According to Mearsheimer:

...nation states exist in an anarchic world, under constant threat from other states. In such a situation people who love their own nation and state can develop an attitude of contempt and loathing toward the nations who inhabit opposing states. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that political elites often feel compelled to portray adversary nations in the most negative way so as to mobilize public support for national security policies.

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7 Ibid., p. 52.

8 Ibid., p. 21.
In other words, disorder at the global level alters the context of communal politics. Political systems which were sustained in part by the divisions of the Cold War have been directly affected by the reordering of the global system. If one takes Mearsheimer’s argument a step further, the connection between global change and local disorder becomes apparent. Nationalism and ethnic conflict may be attributed in part to the collapse of order within regional and communal political systems, which are affected by shifts in the global system. Where order gives way to anarchy, conflict is inevitable. In the words of Michael Ignatieff, “there is one type of fear more devastating in its impact than any other: the systemic fear that arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of terror that arises when legitimate authority disintegrates.”

Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the character of international politics in the post-Cold War period, one may refer to recent events for evidence that the world has not passed into an era of peace and harmony. Thus far, security and defense structures founded during the Cold War have not formed the basis of a “security community”, as many predicted they would. Rather, the international

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9 As Pierre Hassner has aptly observed, “States have never been able to control the international environment. What is new is, first, that they control it less and less, while being more constrained by it; second, that they are less and less capable of controlling their domestic environment, the social groups, or the national minorities that are supposed to be subject to their authority...” Pierre Hassner, “Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order,” in Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, p. 132.


11 Kenneth N. Waltz wryly noted that, “The thawing of the Cold War led to an expectation that the springtime buds of peace will blossom. Instead it has permitted latent conflicts to bloom in the Balkans and elsewhere in eastern Europe, in what was part of greater Russia and later the Soviet Union, and in the Middle East.” Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 2 (Fall 1993): p. 78.

community’s disjointed response to conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Chechnya reveals that national interests continue to drive states’ foreign policies. While the threat of thermonuclear holocaust has receded, conflicts persist, often in places where they previously had not. If nothing else, one may conclude that uncertainty and violence have maintained their position in global politics, despite the end of the Cold War. The flourishing of anarchy in the emerging international system has ensured that relations between states continue to be based on considerations of power and relative advantage.

Greek-Turkish Relations After the Cold War

According to the framework established in Chapter One, shifts in the global system influence relations between actors in regional subsystems. Based on this premise, one may conclude that the transformation of the global system will have had a profound impact on relations between regional actors. This has certainly been the case in relations between Greece and Turkey. The deterioration of bilateral relations which followed Turkey’s invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974 continued unabated in the post-Cold War era. As Tozun Bahcheli has noted, changes in the security environment of these traditional adversaries has brought new possibilities for disagreement and mutual suspicion that may have an indirect effect on Cyprus. The following is a brief summary of key factors underlying the present Greco-Turkish rivalry.

As Nikolaos A. Stavrou has noted, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allowed Turkey to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.\textsuperscript{14} Turkey emerged as a formidable actor in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East."\textsuperscript{15} The late President of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, worked diligently to take advantage of Turkey’s position in the emerging international system. Ozal secured Turkey’s participation as part of the UN coalition during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, foregoing Turkey’s traditional neutrality in Middle Eastern affairs.\textsuperscript{16} In doing so, he gave notice that Turkey was intent on asserting itself as a regional power:

Whereas Ankara traditionally would have maintained strict neutrality toward conflict in the Middle East, on this occasion, Turkey, under the strong prodding of Ozal, came down four-square on the side of the allies and the UN Security Council, committed its own troops to the conflict, and permitted Turkish airbases to be used by the allied forces in offensive airstrikes against Iraq...Ankara did not shrink from hostile relations with Iraq given its interests in increasing Turkish leverage with the United States, NATO, and throughout the region.\textsuperscript{17}

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Ozal pressed for Turkish involvement in the Balkans, arguing that over nine million Moslems in the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, looked to Turkey for leadership. Soon after the collapse of Albania’s


Communist regime, Turkey extended financial aid to Tirana and offered military cooperation, including the training of Albanian officers in Turkey.\textsuperscript{18} Turkey also recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over stern Greek objections and emerged as the most active provider of military aid to the Bosnian Moslem government.\textsuperscript{19}

Greece, unlike Turkey, gained very little from the demise of the bipolar global system. The ideological divisions of the Cold War had worked towards Greece’s advantage. According to John O. Iatrides, the Cold War:

\begin{quote}
...preserved on the international arena a degree of order and predictability in the behavior of states and especially of the superpowers. In their effort to maintain their respective blocs, Moscow and Washington felt obligated to extend to their lesser partners substantial amounts of military, technical, and economic assistance and, whenever feasible, diplomatic support...as traditional Cold War perceptions become irrelevant, the value of Greece to the Atlantic alliance becomes less and less obvious.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

The dissolution of the Balkan security system and Turkey’s growing presence in the area exacerbated Greek insecurity. The decision by six European Union (EU) countries and the United States to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shattered Greece’s hopes for improved security through a common EU foreign policy.\textsuperscript{21} The possibility of a Moslem Axis composed of Turkey,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} “Turkey offered to place at least 1000 troops at the disposal of a combined expeditionary force and urged the bombing of Serbian targets.” J.F. Brown, “Turkey: Back to the Balkans?” in Fuller and Lesser, eds., \textit{Turkey’s New Geopolitics}, p. 154.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Zahariadis, “Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy,” p. 665.
\end{itemize}
Bosnia, and Albania reinforced fears in Athens of the emergence of an ‘Islamic Arc’ forming along Greece’s northern border. Greece responded to Turkey’s Balkan forays by improving its relations with Bulgaria and maintaining close ties with Serbia, which it regards as a bulwark against the expansion of Turkish influence in the region. Greece also campaigned fiercely to exclude Turkish troops from UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. These policies have often led to disagreements with Greece’s NATO and European Union allies. Viewed from Athens, these squabbles are indicative of the West’s failure to appreciate Greek security concerns.

Greece has repeatedly stated that it is not interested in redrawing borders or expanding its territory. Rather, Greece has responded to recent events in a reactive fashion which belies its discomfort with the pace of change in the Balkans. Greece’s continuing membership in NATO and the West European Union, among other multilateral organizations, clearly illustrate Athens’ preference for strong regional security organizations. However, the failure of these organizations to adequately address

22 Thanos Veremis, “Greece: The Dilemmas of Change,” in Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powder Keg, p. 132. Veremis sums up the Greek position by noting that, “since 1989 Turkey has been making inroads into the Balkan peninsula via Islamic outposts. More than 5.5 million Muslims of Bulgarian, Turkish, Serbian, Croat, and Albanian origin reside in a geographic wedge that extends from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, separating Greece from its Slavic Christian neighbors. Turkey is trying to become the champion of the Balkan Muslims and extend its influence in the region in order to enhance its strategic importance in the post-Cold War era.” Also see Tozun Bahcheli, “The Cyprus Issue in the post-Cold War Environment,” Paper presented at Cyprus and Its People: New Interdisciplinary Perspectives, a conference at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 2, 1994.


24 Greece lost this battle after the United Nations allowed 1,500 Turkish peacekeepers to serve in Moslem-held areas of Bosnia. The Turkish troops were to monitor the Bosnian cease-fire, which has been consistently violated by government troops as well as Bosnian Serb and Croat paramilitary units. See Ian Mather, “Turkey Breaks Balkan Taboo,” The European, June 17-23, 1994.

25 See Stavrou, p. 35.
Greek concerns has led Athens to act unilaterally when and where it believes its interests are threatened. The clearest example of this was Greece’s decision to close its borders with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on February 16, 1994, over the objections of its European Union allies and the United States. Greece’s robust reaction to the mistreatment of ethnic Greeks in Albania is another clear example of this phenomena.²⁶

The expansion of the Greco-Turkish rivalry into the Balkans exacerbated tensions between the two countries, accentuating their bipolar relationship.²⁷ The creation of regional alliances based on historical and religious ties reinforced the prevailing security dilemma. As a result, the bilateral disputes which dominated Greco-Turkish relations in the 1970s and 80s continued to fester in the post-Cold War era. While Cyprus is the most serious of these problems, four others are worth noting: i) the delimitation of territorial waters; ii) the delimitation of air space; iii) the fortification of several Greek islands in the eastern Mediterranean; and iv) the treatment of respective minorities in Western Thrace and Istanbul.²⁸


²⁸ Mango, p. 124-125 and Bahcheli, p. 9. According to Bahcheli, members of the Turkish community in Western Thrace have regularly complained of discriminatory treatment pertaining to their educational needs, their right to elect religious leaders or muftis and a lack of employment opportunities. Conversely, Greeks in Istanbul have also complained about the treatment they have received from Turkish officials. Large scale emigration of Greeks from Istanbul followed officially inspired anti-Greek riots in 1956. From a community of about 100,000 in 1923, the number of Greeks in Istanbul has decreased to approximately 3000 today. Greece has periodically complained of harassment and excessive curbs on the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul.
territorial waters the most volatile of the four issues. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey consistently warned that it would not tolerate the extension of Greek territorial waters from six to twelve miles, despite Greece’s right to do so under international law. For their part, Greek officials have stated that they reserve the right to extend Greece’s territorial waters despite Turkish objections.

Ankara has indicated that it prefers a package deal which would settle the question of territorial waters along with a host of other bilateral issues, excluding the Cyprus problem. Greece has consistently argued that there will be no progress on these issues until the Cyprus problem is solved. In 1990, former Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis stated that “The Turks must be made to understand that it will be impossible to make progress in Greek-Turkish relations, as well as Turkey’s attachment to the European Community if they do not solve the Cyprus issue first, and then address Greek-Turkish differences.” This seems unlikely, as Turkey plans to build a pipeline to carry oil from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to the southern Turkish bay of Iskenderun. This has increased the strategic value of Northern Cyprus. Thus, “It is unlikely that Turkey would allow the relegation of the Turkish Cypriots from a position of partner to one of minority.... This could leave the Greek Cypriots in a position to pose a threat for [sic] Turkey’s new and important oil route.” In the absence of a comprehensive settlement, both states continue to press their claims in the Aegean. This

29 Mango., p. 124.
31 Ibid., p. 48.
32 Alemdar, p. 99.
has led to provocative military exercises and violations of Greek airspace by Turkish jets. 33

Greece has tried to temper Ankara’s stance on Cyprus by making Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU--formerly the European Community) contingent on the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 34 Greece consistently vetoed the release of over $800 million in EC financial assistance earmarked for Turkey in 1986, pending movement toward the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus. 35 Greek members of the European Parliament have also spearheaded the enactment of several resolutions condemning Turkey’s continued presence on the island. Based on this and other evidence, Constantine Stephanou and Charalambos Tsardanides have noted that Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus has served as serious obstacle to Turkish membership. 36 While this may be true, closer examination reveals that the EC-EU has failed to pressure Turkey into making concessions on Cyprus.

Since the European Commission rejected Turkey’s application in December 1989, the EC-EU has maintained good relations with Ankara while not raising Turkish hopes for full membership. 37 Turkey’s perception that it may never be accepted into the


34 Turkey submitted its formal application to the European Community in April 1987. It has been an Associate member since 1963. See Michael Cendrowicz, “The European Community and Turkey: Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards,” in Dodd, ed., Turkish Foreign Policy, pp. 9-26.

35 Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War,” in Fuller and Lesser, eds., Turkey’s New Geopolitics, p. 113.


37 Officially, the Commission based its decision on Turkey’s low level of economic development, high rate of population growth, massive debt, and low tax revenues. However, scholars have noted that the political consequences of extending Europe’s borders to the Middle East also played an important role in the
elite European club has restricted the EC-EU’s leverage. Consequently, EC-EU efforts to pressure Ankara over Cyprus have been futile. This was particularly evident in March 1995, following the conclusion of a customs union agreement between Turkey and the EU. The agreement aimed at increasing trade with Turkey and propping-up its sagging economy with a large infusion of economic aid. The decision was defended by many as a way of stemming the meteoric rise of the Islamic Refah(Welfare) Party. Greece agreed not to veto the agreement on the condition that the EU open negotiations on membership with the government of Cyprus in 1996. However, only a day after the agreement was reached, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin stated that Ankara would not allow the EU to start membership talks with Cyprus prior to settling the Cyprus problem. Karayalcin warned that Turkey would annex the TRNC if the island joined the EU. Greece responded to Karayalcin’s comments by pleading with its EU partners to censure Turkey.

Ankara’s policy towards its large Kurdish minority has also revealed Europe’s impotence in the face of perceived Turkish national interests. Turkey has pursued an aggressive policy in combating the separatist Kurdish Worker’s Party(PKK). Turkey’s southeastern provinces have been under a state of emergency since 1987 and over

Commission’s decision. See Ian O. Lesser, “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War,” in Fuller and Lesser, eds., Turkey’s New Geopolitics, p. 104.
38 Ibid., p. 107.
39 “EU Link to Turkey is Final,” International Herald Tribune, March 7, 1995.
40 In the words of British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, “It is hugely in our interests that Turkey draws closer to Europe...Turkey should not be tempted or induced to go off in some other direction.” See “Trade Doors Open to Turks: Europe Sets Up Islamic Buffer,” The Globe and Mail, March 7, 1995.
400,000 Turkish soldiers, police, intelligence officers, and village guards have been mobilized to combat PKK guerrillas. The war against the PKK has led to the burning of over 1000 Kurdish villages and the arrest of scores of journalists, politicians and writers who have protested against the government’s actions. Turkey’s recent foray into northern Iraq represented a dramatic escalation in the war and drew the ire of several European governments. Their protests did not temper the Turkish government’s position. This was evident in Turkey’s decision to boycott the Council of Europe following the Council’s request that Turkey withdraw from northern Iraq, implement democratic reforms, and end human rights abuses. The United States’ continuing support for Turkey has helped Ankara resist calls to end the war against the Kurds. So long as Turkey enjoys American support, the EU will be in no position to influence Turkish policy, either in Cyprus or elsewhere.

Recent UN Initiatives

In July 1991, only a few months after the Gulf War, former American President George Bush declared that the United States would work closely with Greece, Turkey and the United Nations to solve the Cyprus problem before the end of the year. Bush stated that, “In the new world I have discussed, none of us should accept the status quo in Cyprus.” President Bush’s apparent commitment to solving the Cyprus problem was

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46 Turkey is the third largest recipient of American aid after Israel and Egypt.
shared by the new United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali. The Secretary General stated that a solution to the problem was required in order to free UN peacekeeping resources. His recommendations were presented in a one-hundred paragraph document dubbed the “Set of Ideas”, sanctioned by Security Council Resolution 750/1992.

The Set of Ideas was modeled after the comprehensive Draft Agreements of 1986, and included suggestions for territorial adjustments and the return of Varosha, Morphou and thirty-four other villages to the Greek Cypriots. The Set of Ideas called for a federal republic with a single international personality and sovereignty and a single citizenship. The two states would enjoy equal status, with the federal government controlling foreign affairs, defense, police matters, international trade, and taxation. The federated states would have responsibilities in all other matters, including education, religion, and cultural affairs. The federal civil service would be divided along a 70:30 ratio and any amendment to the constitution would require the consent of both communities. The Set of Ideas called for a bicameral legislature, with the lower house split on a ratio of 70 Greek Cypriot representatives to 30 Turkish Cypriots; the upper house would be based on a 50:50 ratio. The federal executive would consist of a president and vice-president symbolizing the unity of the country and equality of the two communities. The Set of Ideas also addressed the issues of freedom of movement,

48 For a the full text of the Set of Ideas see United Nations, Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council, 21 August 1992, (S/24472).
50 Groom, in Dodd, ed., The Political, Social, and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, pp. 31-32.
settlement, and ownership of property. Territorial adjustments under the plan would have allowed approximately 80,000 Greek Cypriots to return to their homes. Where relocation was impossible, compensation would be offered.

While the Set of Ideas was accepted by the Greek Cypriots; the Turkish Cypriots disagreed with the Secretary General’s proposals regarding the form of federation, the question of displaced persons, and the issue of territorial adjustments. They also refused to negotiate the return of the fertile Morphou district, which generates approximately 40 percent of the TRNC’s foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, Turkish Cypriot negotiators placed severe restrictions on the Greek Cypriots’ ability to travel freely in the north, thereby denying the Secretary General’s call for the realization of the three freedoms. Boutros Ghali was clearly dismayed by the Turkish Cypriot position, noting that:

...while one cannot ignore the practical difficulties involved in resolving the issue of displaced persons, the manner in which these are addressed must not deny the principles of the right to property. The Set of Ideas offers reasonable arrangements that address the practical difficulties in a manner that takes into account the legitimate rights and interests of both sides.

The Secretary General added that:

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52 The Turkish Cypriots rejected the Secretary General’s suggestion that their territory be reduced to 28% of the island’s total, claiming that they were entitled to 29% or more of the territory.

53 Ibid. According to Peter Loizos, approximately half the Greek Cypriot population could return to their former homes if Famagusta and a section of the Morphou district were returned to Greek control.

54 Even this concession was challenged by Prime Minister Dervis Eroglu, who opposed any return of property to Greek Cypriots. See C.H. Dodd, “The Political Ascendancy of the Right: 1985-1993,” in Dodd, ed., The Political, Social, and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, p. 160.

The continuation of the status quo is not a viable option, I believe that, should an agreement not emerge from the talks that will reconvene in October, it would be necessary for the Security Council to give serious consideration to alternative courses of action for resolving the Cyprus problem.56

Boutros Ghali’s reprimand was not heeded by the Turkish Cypriots. During subsequent negotiations in October and November 1992, Rauf Denktash demanded prior recognition of the TRNC, the institution of a rotating presidency, and communal elections for the President and Vice-President in order to recognize the full equality of the two communities. The Secretary General and the Security Council rejected the Turkish Cypriot demands, arguing that they were fundamentally at variance with the Set of Ideas.57

Shortly after the November talks, the Secretary General noted that there existed a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. He therefore introduced a set of confidence-building measures to facilitate further negotiations. The confidence-building measures included calls for a reduction in the number of foreign troops in Cyprus; the extension of the area under UNFICYP’s control to include Varosha; the promotion of increased contact between the two communities; fewer restrictions to the free movement of persons across the Green Line; bicommmunal projects funded by international institutions; and the reopening of the Nicosia airport, with separate terminals to service

56 Ibid.
Experts from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reported that the confidence-building measures would produce significant benefits for both communities. The Secretary General appointed former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark to promote the measures. While both sides grudgingly accepted the confidence-building measures in principle, negotiations failed to break any new ground and were abandoned in late March, 1994.

Communal Perceptions

Given the UN’s financial difficulties and burgeoning agenda, it is doubtful that Cyprus will continue to receive the attention it has in the past. The proliferation of violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere has strained the UN’s resources, leading to a substantial reduction in UNFICYP’s numbers. Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and Austria have all pulled their forces out of Cyprus and there is speculation that other countries will follow suit. This does not augur well for the Greek Cypriots. Unlike their Turkish Cypriot counterparts, they do not relish the continuation of the status quo. Although they have succeeded in transforming their state into an affluent center of tourism and commerce, the political pressure exerted by thousands of refugees from the north has not waned. In the words of Roger Zetter, “Political solidarity among the representative fora of the refugees has remained remarkably firm on the issue

61 UNFICYP’s standing force was reduced from 2,141 peacekeepers in May 1992 to 1,513 in March 1993. See Groom, p. 41.
of return for nearly two decades; there is implacable opposition to any solution which compromises territorial restoration or political rights.\textsuperscript{63}

The defeat of George Vassiliou by Glaðkos Clerides in the February 1993 Presidential elections has been cited as evidence that the mood among Greek Cypriots is changing. Clerides drew much of his support from ‘rejectionists’ who oppose concessions to the Turkish Cypriots.\textsuperscript{64} The fact that Clerides has agreed to bring Cyprus within the Greek defense system is another clear sign that the Greek Cypriots are seeking new ways to voice their disapproval of the current situation. While the Greek Cypriots’ decision to expand relations with Athens is potentially unsettling, it is indicative of their growing sense of frustration.

For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have proceeded with the state building process they began in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion. The TRNC continues to rely on economic assistance from Turkey and has developed into an appendage of the Turkish mainland. Although their economy has suffered in response to the Greek Cypriot embargo and the absence of international recognition, the Turkish Cypriots continue to prize the security afforded by the presence of Turkish troops. As Sambanis has aptly observed, this security is not defined simply in terms of physical well-being; it also entails a degree of political power.\textsuperscript{65} It is apparent that the Turkish Cypriots are not prepared to give that power up in order to placate the UN. According to Bolukbasi, “the


\textsuperscript{64} Crawshaw, p. 71.

Turkish Cypriots believe that a full implementation of the three freedoms would make bizonality meaningless because the Turkish zone would soon become Hellenized and the Turks would again become second-class citizens, as they were in 1974.66

Although there is evidence that growing numbers of Turkish Cypriots are dissatisfied with the present state of affairs, they have yet to mount a serious challenge to President Denktash and Prime Minister Eroglu. Based on the political trends of the past twenty years there is ample reason to believe that the status quo will continue to be preferred by a majority of Turkish Cypriots. Barring a solution which recognizes their desire for full equality and limited contact with Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots may prefer absorption into Turkey as a way around the current economic embargo.67

However, ending negotiations with the Greek Cypriots may lead to renewed conflict. Thus far, the Greek Cypriots have placed their faith in a negotiated settlement which would allow them some access to their former homes and businesses. To slam the door on their aspirations would produce lasting resentment, which could lead to the adoption of violence as a means of pressuring the Turkish Cypriots into making territorial concessions. This, in turn, may provide the spark to ignite a wider Greco-Turkish war.

66 Bolukbasi, p. 51.

67 According to a recent report, “Denktash has shown some sympathy for the suggestion by the veteran Turkish left-wing nationalist politician Bulent Ecevit (who, as prime minister, had ordered Turkish troops to land in Cyprus in 1974) that negotiations on Cyprus should be broken off and that northern Cyprus should accept ‘Channel Islands status’ vis-a-vis Turkey.” See “Early Agreement on Cyprus Unlikely,” The Globe and Mail, February 7, 1995.
Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has not improved the odds of solving the Cyprus problem. If nothing else, the demise of the global bipolar system has added new barriers to the realization of a negotiated settlement. As this chapter has noted, the disorder which accompanied the emerging international system has exacerbated relations between Greece and Turkey. Unrest in the Balkans has provided opportunities and threats that had been absent since the end of the Second World War. Turkey’s desire to gain a foothold in the region heightened fears in Athens; as a result, bilateral disputes including the tense stand-off in the Aegean have persisted. Given the poor quality of Greek-Turkish relations, it is not likely that either side will be willing to back down from its stance in Cyprus.

The emerging international system has been marked by the breakup of states and the proliferation of violent conflicts. As a result, the Cyprus problem no longer commands the attention it once did; the dwindling number of UN peacekeepers on the island is a testament to this fact. The UN’s failure to broker a settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots has led to frustration and threats to walk away from the dispute. However genuine these sentiments are, they reveal a tragic misunderstanding of the Cyprus question. One cannot expect intercommunal negotiations alone to solve what is a much wider problem. The Turkish Cypriots have repeatedly demonstrated that they consider the status quo an acceptable state of affairs. Turkey’s support for their cause, both in terms of a security guarantee and economic aid, has allowed them this luxury. Thus far, neither the UN, the United States, nor the European Union has adequately
challenged the Turkish position. The United States, in particular, has demonstrated that it is prepared to support Turkey despite its occupation of Cyprus. This is not surprising; American policy is based on strategic interests, which in turn are shaped by the formation of the emerging international system. Clearly, the framework advanced in Chapter One of the thesis holds true in the post-Cold War era: the quest for security and power in the global and regional systems influences political life within communal systems. One may add that the conduct of global and regional powers also affects the UN’s role in mediating disputes between rival groups in strategically sensitive parts of the world.

The end of the Cold War has illustrated that the analytical division between communal conflict and international politics is still a false one. Great Powers continue to base their policies on the maintenance of interests, as do regional powers. In Cyprus, this has translated into a reinforcement of the status quo and by extension the sanctioning of Turkey’s 1974 invasion and partition of the island.

Conclusion

Communal Conflicts and International Order: The Case of Cyprus

Introduction

This chapter shall reiterate the thesis’ principal arguments and summarize the work’s findings. Having met this objective, the study’s analytical framework will be related to some recent analyses of communal conflict which share similar hypotheses and conclusions. In closing, the chapter will identify elements of the study that require refinement and related questions worthy of further research. It shall also emphasize the importance of exploring ethnic conflicts through an integrative framework which recognizes the international and domestic dimensions of communal strife.

Summary and Findings

The thesis has argued that relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been adversely influenced by international factors. These have included British colonialism, the rivalry between Greece and Turkey, and Great Power politics in the southeastern Mediterranean. The study also argued that the end of the Cold War has not improved the odds of solving the Cyprus problem. These arguments are founded on a belief that the causes of ethnic conflict often extend beyond the community itself and include the influence of other countries as well as pressures created by the international system. While the thesis focused exclusively on the Cyprus problem, the author believes
that the study’s findings may be useful to scholars and policymakers interested in questions posed by ethnic conflicts in other parts of the world.

The roots of ethnic rivalry in Cyprus were briefly explored in the thesis’s introduction. The study noted three main factors that contributed to the formation of a plural society in Cyprus: i) British colonial practices; ii) the traditional rivalry between Greece and Turkey; and, iii) the Cypriot Orthodox Church’s advocacy of enosis as a means to maintain its ascendant position in Greek Cypriot society. Throughout its administration, Britain adhered to a policy of divide and rule, which tended to emphasize differences between colonial subjects. The British government’s insistence on recognizing each community in terms of ethnicity rather than religious faith led to the reform of the Cypriot educational and political systems. The communal school systems became important sources of Greek and Turkish nationalist doctrines. This contributed to each community’s growing identification with its respective mother country. The introduction of the Legislative Council exacerbated communal competition by pitting Greek and Turkish Cypriots against each other. Reforms in education and representative government ensured the ascent of Greek and Turkish nationalism among Christian and Moslem Cypriots.

The emergence of Greek nationalism which culminated in the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece in 1832 began a long period of strife between Greeks and Turks which led to a legacy of mistrust and bitter memories. The notion of union with Greece captured the imagination of some Greek Cypriots and was eventually seized upon by the Cypriot Orthodox Church as a means of combating the secularizing influence of British
colonial rule. Turkish Cypriots feared the possibility of union with Greece and therefore advocated the maintenance of British rule or the absorption of Cyprus into Turkey.

The thesis's analytical framework was advanced in Chapter One. The framework linked communal relations in Cyprus to international factors by arguing that the Cyprus problem is made up of three anarchic political systems. The chapter argued that the concepts of anarchy and bipolarity could be used to describe regional and communal political systems as well as the global political system. As international relations theorists have noted, cooperation in anarchic political systems is tenuous because the absence of a sovereign authority makes individual actors responsible for their own security. Anarchic communal systems are often violent because groups within the system believe that they alone are responsible for their well-being; politics is reduced to the struggle for security and relative advantage. In such systems, links based on ethnicity are more pronounced because allegiances to the state are weak. The fear of domination by other groups within the system acts as a motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end. This often leads to instability and conflict, which perpetuates ethnic stereotypes.1

The thesis's analytical framework rests on the following hypotheses: a) In unranked/anarchic communal systems, each group will do all it can to compete successfully with rival groups. Overtures to regional actors with interests in the dispute will therefore be common; b) The quest for security and power in regional systems leads

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1 In the words of Ted Robert Gurr, "The greater the competition and inequalities among groups in heterogeneous societies, the greater the salience of ethnic identities and the greater the likelihood of open conflict. When open conflict does occur it is likely to intensify, or reify, both perceptions of difference among contending groups and perceptions of common interest within each group." Gurr, "People Against States," p. 348.
regional actors to intervene in ethnic conflicts in order to extend or maintain their interests; c) If the dispute impacts on relations between states at the global level, outside influence will extend beyond regional actors and include that of global powers; d) Incidence of violence in unranked communal systems is likely to increase at times of transition, when any of the three systems is subject to profound change. Violent ethnic conflicts will often coincide with transitions in regional and global politics.

The interaction of communal, regional, and global systems led to a multiplicity of competing interests in Cyprus. Global powers, namely Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union sought the maintenance and extension of their geostrategic interests, while regional powers–Greece and Turkey–pursued their own interests on the island. The first chapter’s analysis of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus found that the interests of global and regional powers played an important part in the decision to grant Cyprus independent statehood. Granting Cyprus independence was intended to diffuse tensions between Greece and Turkey, maintain British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and bolster NATO’s southern flank. The fusion of Greek and Turkish interests with Cypriot political concerns halted the development of an indigenous, Cypriot consciousness. The political system set forth in the Zurich-London agreements entrenched ethnic divisions by encouraging both communities to look to their mother countries as advocates of their respective positions. The agreements hardened existing divisions and granted them formal standing in the Republic’s constitution.

Based on these observations, the chapter concluded that Cyprus’ descent into civil war in 1963 was not simply the result of bitter memories, as some have argued. The
political system embodied by the Zurich-London Agreements aimed at satisfying foreign interests at the expense of effective government in Cyprus. The ascendancy of paramilitary organizations and the outburst of violence in December 1963 reaffirmed the fact that communal relations in Cyprus were guided by insecurity and struggle. The constitution designed to calm relations between Greece and Turkey and ensure the maintenance of British and NATO interests failed miserably. The convergence of global and regional interests exacerbated existing divisions in Cypriot society which contributed to the breakdown of order and the beginnings of physical separation.

Chapter Two dealt with international politics and the evolution of the Cyprus problem between 1964-1990. The chapter noted that the roles of the United States and Soviet Union were critical in terms of influencing the policies of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus. During the period of acute Superpower confrontation between 1964-1967, the United States pursued an aggressive policy aimed at avoiding a war between its NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Conversely, the Soviet Union sought to weaken the Western alliance by driving a wedge between Greece, Turkey and the U.S.A. Ironically, while Superpower intervention did not improve relations at the communal level, it did deter Turkey from invading Cyprus in 1964 and again in 1967.

The Superpowers’ consent to the creation of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus also reflected their strategic interests. The United States agreed to the force only after its own suggestion for mediation through NATO was rejected by President Makarios. Conversely, the Soviets sanctioned a UN presence in order to prevent the stationing of NATO troops on the island. The study noted that UNFICYP’s
success was limited by the operations of Cypriot paramilitary groups, aided by Greece and Turkey.

Throughout the 1964-1967 period, the two communities continued to engage in violent clashes. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into several enclaves which were supported militarily and economically by Turkey. The Greek Cypriots were supported by Athens, which stationed over 10,000 Greek troops on the island in defiance of the Zurich-London Agreements. Greek penetration in Cypriot affairs increased following the establishment of the Colonels regime in April 1967. The Greek junta, with Washington’s implicit support, undermined Archbishop Makarios in order to force a settlement of the Cyprus problem which would protect NATO interests and improve its standing with Washington. The colonels’ covert policies eroded Makarios’ authority and encouraged the proliferation of extremist paramilitary organizations such as EOKA-B. Events reached crisis proportions in 1967, after Athens ordered a violent assault against Turkish Cypriot positions without President Makarios’ authorization. War between Greece and Turkey was only narrowly averted.

The chapter found that Superpower policies between 1967-1974 had a further impact on the development of the Cyprus problem. The Nixon administration’s support of the Greek military regime encouraged its reckless behavior in Cyprus. Makarios was regarded by Athens and Washington as an irritant and was treated accordingly. Meanwhile, Turkey’s growing sense of alienation from the Western alliance led Ankara to accept Soviet offers for improved relations. Friendlier relations with the Soviets allowed Turkey greater leeway in Cyprus. Consequently, Ankara could afford to take a
more assertive stance in its support of the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, as was noted, the junta’s ill-conceived coup which toppled Archbishop Makarios in July 1974 was met by a swift and violent response from Turkey.

Turkey’s invasion and partition of Cyprus was not condemned by either Superpower. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized and accepted the Turkish position following the collapse of the Greek military regime in August 1974. Turkey capitalized on favorable conditions in the international system and transformed Cyprus in the process. Over 160,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to flee territory overrun by Turkish troops. Thousands died and many others went missing, never to be seen again. The international outcry which came in the wake of the Turkish invasion was marked by the conspicuous absence of the Superpower’s voices. The satisfaction of geostrategic interests proved to be much more important than the moral implications surrounding Turkey’s conduct in Cyprus.

Chapter Two also analyzed the role of the UN in post-invasion Cyprus. Based on a brief examination of several failed rounds of UN sponsored intercommunal talks, the study found that negotiations foundered on three key points. First, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had very different perceptions of the new realities which defined post-invasion Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots felt that the separation of the two communities, stationing of over 35,000 Turkish troops, and division of Cyprus’ territory was in many respects a satisfactory solution. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots condemned the Turkish invasion noting that it allowed a minority of 18 percent of the population to control over 36 percent of the island’s territory and over 70 percent of its economic potential. Moreover,
they resent that this was accomplished through means which directly challenged accepted norms of international conduct. The Greek Cypriots rejected the legitimacy of successive Turkish Cypriot administrations and enacted an economic embargo aimed at isolating the Turkish Cypriots. They continue to reject the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot state and have won international support for their position.

Secondly, negotiations were harmed by the deteriorating state of Greco-Turkish relations. Greece regarded the 1974 invasion as proof of Turkey's threat to other Greek islands in the Aegean. Thus, Athens fortified several islands close to the Turkish coast. The introduction of other bilateral disputes following the invasion precluded Greek-Turkish cooperation in solving the Cyprus problem. Ankara's insistence on maintaining a formidable military presence on Cyprus allowed the Turkish Cypriots to negotiate from a position of strength far exceeding their numbers. Turkey's military presence reinforced the bipolar structure of the island's communal system, making it very difficult for either side to make concessions at the bargaining table.

Finally, the chapter noted that the Superpowers did little to further the UN's peacemaking efforts in Cyprus. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union regarded the division of the island into ethnically homogeneous zones as important in terms of their wider interests. The Superpowers came to rely on UNFICYP to keep the two sides apart and the Secretary General to keep them talking. Peacemaking was clearly undermined by the Superpowers' decision not to uphold the implementation of several UN Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and return
of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes. The United States continued to support Turkey as an important NATO ally, while the Soviet Union simply ignored the problem.

Chapter Two’s analysis of the Cyprus problem between 1964-1990 confirmed the validity of the thesis’s analytical framework. Throughout the period, the policies of regional and global powers had a tremendous impact on the evolution of Cypriot communal relations. Regional, global, and communal actors struggled for security and power in their respective systems. The Greek Colonels’ attempt to impose their will on the island was met with further violence and the transformation of the communal system through Turkey’s violent separation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

Chapter Three examined how the demise of the global system’s bipolar structure has affected the development of the Cyprus problem in the post-Cold War era. The chapter began with a brief review of some recent material pertaining to the structure and character of the emerging international system. The chapter noted that there are two rather divergent views concerning international politics in the post-Cold War era. One school of thought proclaims the emergence of a community of developed core states existing within a rapidly developing security community. In opposition to this view, Realist scholars argue that the end of bipolarity has not altered the anarchic character of international politics. Because of recent events in Bosnia and elsewhere, the notion of an emerging security community led by a powerful United Nations has lost much of its aura. The dissolution of the Cold War order has seemingly made the global system even more unpredictable and violent. Great Powers such as the United States, Germany and Russia continue to base their foreign policies on the maintenance of national interests, just as
Great Powers always have. One may therefore conclude that the end of global bipolarity has not altered the basis of the thesis’s analytical framework or the core contentions of Realist theory. The quest for security and power in anarchic systems at all three levels of analysis persists in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of potentially explosive communal conflicts in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe is a testament to this fact.

Chapter Three also examined Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War period and found that the dismantling of the Balkan security system had enlarged the scope of Greece and Turkey’s rivalry. Turkey began to assert itself as an important regional power following the fall of communist regimes in Albania and the former Yugoslavia. Turkey’s growing presence in the Balkans was not welcomed by Greece. The study noted that the expansion of the Greco-Turkish rivalry beyond the southeastern Mediterranean was detrimental in terms of pre-existing bilateral disputes. Neither Greece nor Turkey has softened its position over disputes regarding the delimitation of territorial waters or the fate of Cyprus. On the contrary, the heated rhetoric emerging from Athens and Ankara has illustrated the gulf which separates the two countries. One may note with certainty that the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations will continue to play an important role in the future of the Cyprus problem. As Tozun Bahcheli has correctly observed, “Greek-Turkish disputes in other spheres make a Cyprus rapprochement on the part of the two metropolitan states all the more problematic. Whereas in theory a Cypriot agreement can be reached by Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, in
practice it is difficult to envisage such an outcome without the supportive involvement of Athens and Ankara.\textsuperscript{2}

Chapter Three reviewed recent UN initiatives in Cyprus and found that the impediments to a negotiated settlement had survived the end of the Cold War. At the communal level, the Turkish Cypriots rejected the Secretary General's Set of Ideas and confidence building measures because they called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and implementation of the three freedoms. Conversely, the Greek Cypriots continued to demand a settlement which would guarantee their right to travel, own property, and reside in the north. The two sides also differed in their position regarding the scope of territorial adjustments, the powers of the central government, and the fate of the 35,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus.

The future of the UN in Cyprus is not entirely clear. Several nations have withdrawn their troops from UNFICYP, leaving only 1,513 peacekeepers in Cyprus as of March 1993. The Secretary General himself has openly stated that the UN cannot afford to remain on the island indefinitely.\textsuperscript{3} However, the UN has repeatedly demonstrated that it is not prepared to implement Security Council resolutions aimed at removing Turkish troops from the island. In truth, the Secretary General has no choice but to continue with the arduous process of intercommunal negotiations. To quit Cyprus after having invested so much time, money, and prestige would be a difficult pill for the UN to swallow. The repercussions in terms of the organization's reputation would be extremely damaging.

\textsuperscript{2} Bahcheli, "The Cyprus Issue in the Post-Cold War Environment," p. 9.

\textsuperscript{3} Macdonald, "Cyprus a Peacekeeping Paradigm," p. 182.
Practically speaking, the UN cannot afford to abandon Cyprus, as much as it may want to.

For its part, Turkey has demonstrated that it is not prepared to recall its troops, especially in light of deteriorating relations with Greece. Moreover, Turkey’s role in securing American strategic interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans has tempered Washington’s desire to pressure the Ankara over Cyprus. Consequently, Turkey is under no pressure to leave. Greece’s recent decision to extend its security umbrella to include the Republic of Cyprus represents an important shift in the Greek side’s strategy. It appears to be based on the realization that the UN alone cannot force Ankara’s hand. The Greek Cypriots and Greece may be pressuring the United States into recognizing the latent volatility of the present situation. The deployment of Greek troops to Cyprus would certainly raise the stakes considerably. According to Misha Glenny, there is evidence that the Greek strategy may be working:

"Fresh mediation by representative Richard Beattie on the divisive Cyprus issue is just getting under way. President Clinton...has given special attention to the war-threatening controversy between Greece and Turkey over Greek territorial claims in the Aegean Sea. He has sent letters to the

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4 Writing on Turkey’s place in American global strategy, Glenny notes that, “The central focus of U.S. policy is Turkey, which Washington recognizes as the major regional power with considerable potential for expansion. America’s policy is explained by its strategic and economic interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East—*from now on, the Turks are the key nation in the region.*” (emphasis added) Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War,* (New York: Penguin, 1993): p. 241.

5 The Greek strategy was neatly summarized in a report published in the Greek-Canadian journal Patrides; "In light of Turkey’s threats of annexation and further aggression, Cyprus continues its cooperation on defense matters with Greece, a development strengthened by the recent visit of Greek Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis to Nicosia. By limiting Ankara’s ability to intimidate its neighbors, the defense doctrine may also force the Turkish side to realize that negotiations offer the only way to reach a lasting settlement.” “Agreement on Key Issues Needed: Turkey Must be Pressed to Show Flexibility,” *Patrides,* April 1995, p. 29.
prime ministers of both countries and dispatched a U.S. battle cruiser to the scene. 6

One may conclude that international power politics continues to influence the development of the Cyprus problem. It is important to note that change in the structure of the global system did not alter the fundamental interests of Greece, Turkey, or the United States. Unless the situation deteriorates rapidly, as it would if Greece increased its military presence on the island, communal relations in Cyprus will likely continue to develop along the lines established in July/August 1974. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will remain strained and each side will continue to regard communal relations in terms of a zero-sum game.

The Lessons of Cyprus: The Role of International Politics in Ethnic Conflicts

The analytical framework advanced in Chapter One noted that the quest for security and power among global and regional actors influences life within unranked communal systems. This proposition was confirmed through an analysis of the Cyprus problem between 1960-1995. In the post-Cold War era, the dissolution of multiethnic states has resulted in a proliferation of ethnic conflicts. In the words of Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff:

The world of the 1990s mirrors in some respects the period following World War I, in which the collapse of the old order was followed by the birth of many new states, upsurges of ethnic violence and oppression, and the ascendancy of dictators and ideologies of exclusive nationalism. The

pattern of conflicts in Bosnia, Serbia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia fits
this scenario and signifies the beginning of challenging times.\textsuperscript{7}

Contemporary ethnic conflicts share features similar to those of the Cyprus problem; that is, the groups in question usually reside in unranked communal systems located in strategically sensitive locations. Several scholars have analyzed these conflicts in order to understand their causes and implications. The following will be a brief review of some of these studies with reference to the arguments advanced in the thesis. We will note that the effects of anarchy in unranked communal systems and the influence of external actors in communal disputes are being recognized by scholars as important elements in the emergence of contemporary ethnic conflicts.

The thesis has consistently argued that unranked/anarchic communal systems are more likely to experience conflict between ethnic groups. This argument downplays the significance of purely ethnic differences. As was noted in the study’s introduction, Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived together peaceably for over four centuries, despite differences in their religion, language, and ethnicity. The two groups began to see each other as rivals only when the island’s political fate was in question. The breakdown of rules governing communal relations contributed to the emergence of rival nationalism’s. The role of external actors deepened these divisions by introducing regional and global rivalries into the communal system.

The importance of anarchy in relations between ethnic groups has been recognized in several recent studies of nationalism and ethnic conflict. In his book Blood and Belonging, Michael Ignatieff claims that nationalism is best understood as a reaction to uncertainty and fear:

When nationalists claim that national belonging is the overwhelmingly important form of all belonging, they mean that there is no other form of belonging...that is secure if you do not have a nation to protect you. That is what warrants sacrifice on the nation’s behalf. Without a nation’s protection, every thing that an individual values can be rendered worthless. Belonging, on this account, is the first and foremost protection from violence. Where you belong is where you are safe; where you are safe is where you belong. If nationalism is persuasive because it warrants violence, it is also persuasive because it offers protection from violence. The warlord is his people’s protector: if he kills, he does so in defense of the noblest cause: the protection of the innocent.  

Ignatieff’s position is shared by Renee de Nevers, who notes that the key to avoiding confrontation in plural societies is creating an environment in which political moderation prevails. This requires a framework of laws and effective political institutions which allow citizens to feel secure.

Nurturing moderation in unranked communal systems is often made more difficult when the dispute involves external actors. In chapters one and two we noted that the role of regional and global actors tends to exacerbate communal tensions by impeding the development of stable political institutions. This is especially true where the government of a plural society does not command the respect of its citizens and is

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8 Ignatieff, p. 10.
challenged by paramilitary organizations supported by foreign countries. This was
certainly the case in Cyprus between 1963-1974 and more recently in Croatia, Bosnia
Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). In all three of
these newly independent states, the government’s authority has been tested by ethnic
challengers. In all three cases, ethnic challengers have enjoyed the support of external
allies: in Croatia the Krajina Serbs were aided by Serbia, as were the Bosnian Serbs in
Bosnia; in the FYROM ethnic Albanians have looked to Tirana for support while some
members the Slav Macedonian majority identify with Bulgaria.\(^\text{10}\) In cases where the
interests of ethnic challengers coincide with those of regional powers, stability within the
communal system is tenuous. Communal relations often become mired in neighboring
states’ rivalries, which, in turn, exacerbates relations at the communal level.

Once order breaks down completely, the opportunity for further external
involvement increases. As we noted, direct intervention by regional actors has the
potential to alter the context of communal relations. A similar argument has been
advanced by Stephen Ryan. According to Ryan, foreign intervention, “increases the scale
of the conflict...introduces into the conflict new issues and expands the number of
parties. It directs attention away from the core issue of how to create good
intercommunal relations.”\(^\text{11}\) This was certainly the case in Cyprus following the
Sampson coup in July 1974. The Greek government’s installation of the Sampson

Conflicts: Europe and Asia, (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1994): pp. 43-44. Also see Nicholas X.
Rizopoulos, “A Third Balkan War?” World Policy Journal 2 (Summer 1993): p. 3; and Misha Glenny,
“Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans,” p. 106.

\(^{11}\) Ryan, p. 38.
regime allowed Turkey to argue with some justification that it was invading Cyprus to protect its embattled kin. Once on Cypriot soil, however, the Turkish Army went far beyond its stated mandate. Turkey’s invasion and partition of Cyprus divided the island into ethnically homogeneous zones, allowing for either the implementation of a confederal political system or the absorption of northern Cyprus into Turkey; options that had hitherto been unavailable because of the intermingling of the island’s ethnic groups.

As a means of comparison, it is worthwhile to note that Serbia’s support of ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed these groups to challenge the legitimacy of the newly anointed governments in Sarajevo and Zagreb. Serbs in Bosnia and the Krajina were motivated by an intense fear of domination by the majority communities in their respective republics. The Yugoslav National Army’s assistance allowed Serb insurgents to wrest control of significant portions of Bosnian and Croatian territory, fundamentally altering communal relations in the process. While Serbian intervention was defended on the grounds of protecting besieged kin, scholars have argued persuasively that the Milosevic regime was also intent on expanding Serbian territory and power.

12 The Serb minorities’ fears were usually well founded. According to Misha Glenny, conflicts between ethnic Serbs and Croats were provoked by Croatian authorities, “President Tudjman and the government of his Croatian Democratic Union were determined to create a new state identified exclusively with the Croat nation, and the new regime in Croatia took steps to discriminate against the Serbs, who make up between 12 to 20 percent of Croatia’s population...Serbs were stripped of their status as an constituent (drzavotvoran) nation within Croatia...Tudjman also refused to offer the Serb population of at least 600,000 cultural autonomy...He ordered Serb police to be replaced by Croats, and Serbs in key positions in the local administration were dismissed.” Misha Glenny, “The Massacre of Yugoslavia,” The New York Review of Books 3 (January 30, 1992): p. 31. Also see Carl G. Jacobsen, “Yugoslavia’s Wars of Secession and Succession: Media Manipulation, Historical Amnesia, and Subjective Morality,” Mediterranean Quarterly 3 (Summer 1994): pp. 24-41.

power's territorial ambitions led to open conflict and a reordering of relations among ethnic groups.

The partition of Cyprus allowed the Turkish Cypriots to assume a position of strength in negotiations with their Greek Cypriot counterparts. The stationing of Turkish troops in Cyprus deepened the bipolar nature of communal relations and allowed the Turkish Cypriots to maintain an intransigent position during UN sponsored talks. The study noted that the United States' reliance on Turkey as an important ally allowed Ankara to ignore UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. Based on the Cypriot experience, the thesis asserts that the success of third party peacemaking efforts hinges on the cooperation of regional and global powers. Cooperation, in turn, is usually determined by whether or not it furthers regional and global powers' interests.

Clearly, Ankara does not consider the demilitarization of Cyprus to be in its best interests; Washington too has placed good relations with Turkey ahead of cooperation with the United Nations. This, in turn, has undermined the UN's credibility and effectiveness in Cyprus.

The inconsistent positions adopted by global and regional powers in Cyprus and countless other locales confirms that, by and large, states continue to base their foreign

14 In the words of Jenonne Walker, "Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash has been able to reject the UN's ideas for a settlement because substantial Turkish military force protects Turkey's gains on the island, and the West is loath to press Ankara on the point, in part lest Turkey stop providing bases from which the Iraqi Kurds are supplied." Jenonne Walker, International Mediation of Ethnic Conflicts," Survival 1 (Spring 1993): p. 116.

15 This point is echoed by Saadia Touval, who notes that, "States make the primary decisions about mediation. They decide whether to exert efforts to help settle a conflict and, if so, whether to act alone or through the United Nations. A state external to a dispute typically initiates mediation for self-interested reasons." Saadia Touval, "Why the U.N. Fails," Foreign Affairs 5 (September/October 1994): p. 46.
policies on the maintenance and extension of national interests. As Adam Roberts correctly asserts, differences in interests among states are complemented by differences in perceptions about the fundamental nature of world politics. Thus, “One should not necessarily expect relations among major powers to be good, and there may be perfectly valid reasons why countries perceive major security problems differently.” Competing interests at the global and regional levels will continue to influence relations between rival groups in unranked communal systems. It is important that scholars and policymakers accept this fact in order both to understand and deal with ethnic conflicts in an effective, realistic fashion. All too often one is confronted with legitimate analyses that conclude with faulty prescriptions. For example, according to Sambanis:

Greece and Turkey, the two ‘guarantor’ powers of Cypriot independence, have both helped create and perpetuate the conflict. Since the partition their mediation efforts have been mostly self-serving and unproductive, which suggests that both countries should be removed from the settlement process.... Other larger powers have had primarily geostrategic, balance-of-power reasons for their involvement in Cyprus and have opted for expedient, unstable solutions. Defining an appropriate role for third-party intervention should be a primary objective for future negotiations.17

Sambanis is open to challenge on two points. First, who is responsible for removing Greece and Turkey from the settlement process? Second, who shall define an appropriate role for third-party intervention? Clearly, no one is capable of doing what Sambanis has in mind because states themselves decide on the role they play in perpetuating or settling communal conflicts. They base their policies on the maintenance and extension of their

national interests. Therefore, the challenge posed by Cyprus and similar conflicts lies in framing solutions that are appealing to communal, regional, and global actors. A far more difficult challenge to be sure.

Presently, there is no universally recognized authority charged with determining how states ought to behave. When there is consensus regarding the use of force or enforcement of international law, as during the 1990-91 Gulf War, interests are the determining factor, not allegiance to elaborate codes of conduct. In the absence of a true international community, management of ethnic conflicts by external actors will be difficult. As John Chipman has noted, “Durable solutions require the type of comprehensive approach that can rarely be undertaken by outsiders, who have short attention spans and limited powers of (and political will for) enforcement.”18 In the final analysis, the future of Cyprus and similar communal conflicts is bleak. While there is every reason to desire the emergence of accepted rules of international conduct, there are fewer reasons to believe that they will arrive soon.

**Conclusion**

While scholars are beginning to recognize links between communal conflict and international politics, much of the recent literature deals exclusively with the impact of ethnic conflict on international security. Such studies usually advance schemes aimed at managing ethnic disputes to prevent them from escalating into regional or ultimately global problems. Although this is a laudable objective, it tends to reinforce the

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intellectual division between high and low politics. This thesis has approached the problem from the opposite direction; that is, it examined the affect of international politics on relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots to gain some understanding of how external forces affect communal relations in plural societies. According to the position taken by the study, there is a direct link between international politics and relations between ethnic groups in unranked communal systems. Indeed, in Cyprus an ethnic balance which by most external standards was ranked, became unranked as a result of external forces. Therefore, the distinction between international and domestic politics is blurred and proper analysis requires a study of both dimensions of the dispute.

Clearly, the insights advanced by this study require further refinement and additional research. In particular, the role of external actors in ethnic conflicts must be reconsidered given the dramatic changes which accompanied the end of the Cold War. We need to understand why regional actors continue to intervene in communal disputes and how their objectives resemble or differ from those of the past. Moreover, the relationship between communal conflict and regime transformation needs to be assessed with greater vigor. According to the thesis’s findings, democratization in unranked communal systems may be hindered by regional rivals. It would be worthwhile to test this hypothesis through further case studies of plural states in strategically sensitive parts of the world. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a particularly worthy case study because it resembles Cyprus in several ways. The FYROM is a new, ethnically bipolar state in a particularly volatile region. Ethnic Albanians who make up 20-35 percent of the republic’s total population have indicated that they would prefer
closer ties to Albania. The disintegration of basic cultural, educational, and medical facilities in Albanian-dominated areas of western FYROM has strengthened the hand of radical elements who openly challenge the legitimacy of the government in Skopje. 19 This in tum has raised the ire of ultranationalist Slav Macedonians who have responded by denying the Albanians the right to an Albanian-language university in Tetovo, the centre of Albanian politics in the FYROM. 20 The fact that a significant percentage of Slav-Macedonians support eventual absorption into Bulgaria adds yet another dimension to this potential conflict. 21 The United States and European Union fear that violence between ethnic Albanians and the Slav majority could lead to intervention by Albania, thus setting off a wider Balkan war, possibly involving Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia. As a result, the United States has contributed over 500 Marines as part of a UN force charged with preserving peace in the republic. How these factors have affected the FYROM's democratization efforts is not clear. Hence, further research structured along the lines set forth in this study would be of definite interest to scholars and policymakers alike.

In closing, it is worth emphasizing that the study of ethnic conflict requires an interdisciplinary approach. Students of comparative politics, international relations, and political philosophy need to combine their insights to appreciate the diverse causes underlying communal strife. In short, the era of theoretical solitudes should be put to rest along with the distinction between high and low politics. The importance of

21 Rizopoulos, "A Third Balkan War?" p. 3.
understanding the multidimensional character of communal conflict is doubly important in today's world. Building effective political systems in the post-Cold War era has proven to be exceptionally challenging, as the convergence of communal, regional, and global politics is a common feature of the emerging international system. The challenges faced by newly emerging states share many of the features of the Cyprus problem and therefore need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner. If nothing else, this study hopes to have provided a modest example of the benefits inherent in analyzing communal conflicts through an integrative methodology.
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