COMMODOITIES AND THEIR FETISHISM

A thesis submitted to
Brock University

by

David G. A. Keatinge

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
June 1978

(C) David G. A. Keatinge
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professor James Hansen for his invaluable assistance in making this thesis a reality and for constantly reminding me to 'go the hard way'. Without him this thesis would not exist. I would also like to thank my wife, Suzanna, for patience and understanding when it was most needed.
COMMODITIES AND THEIR FETISHISM
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................. 1

I. Analysis of the Commodity .......... 3
   1. Exchange-value/Use-value ....... 4
   2. The Two-Fold Nature of Labour .... 9
   3. The Forms of Value ........... 13
      A. Elementary Form of Value
         - The Relative and Equivalent Forms .... 14
      B. Expanded Form of Value ......... 20
      C. General Form of Value ........... 22

II. The Fetishism of the Commodity ... 23

III. Fetishism and Marx's Theory of Alienation .......... 35

IV. The 'Fetishized' Consciousness .......... 51

V. Conclusion .............................. 73
   A. The General Importance of the Notion of Fetishism .... 74
   B. Fetishism and Marx's Notion of Praxis ........... 79
Introduction

Commodities and Their Fetishism
Many problems present themselves in attempting to discuss Marx's notion of the fetish characteristics of commodities. It has been argued that it is one of the central points of Marx's entire corpus.\(^1\) It has also been argued that it is merely "a brilliant sociological generalization" and, even further, that it is an "independent and separate entity, internally hardly related to Marx's economic theory".\(^2\) How could such a theory be understood in such drastically different ways? Perhaps the clue is to be found somewhere in Marx's discussion of the fetishism of commodities itself. Because of the difficulty in understanding fetishism, I intend to examine what Marx himself has to say first before dealing with any points related to the notion of fetishism. Thus, the first parts of this thesis will consist of long quotations and repetition of what Marx has to say. If a notion may be called 'central' and yet 'hardly related' to Marx's work at the same time, surely a clear examination of this section is necessary.

After an examination of the initial sections of Capital, I intend to examine the following: the relation of fetishism to the theory of alienation; how one may regard fetishism as a problem for philosophy; and how, in fact, the theory of fetishism is of prime importance for an understanding of Marx's writings. What I want to stress throughout is that without an understanding of what is inherent in the production of the commodity causing it to be necessarily fetishistic, it is practically impossible to understand much of Marx's other writings.

A commodity appears, at first sight, a very trivial thing and easily understood. Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.
I

Analysis of the Commodity
Section 1: Use Value/Exchange Value

Our first task in discussing the fetishism of commodities is to examine the commodity itself and attempt to understand Marx's analysis in the first seventy pages of Capital. Marx first describes the commodity as "an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another". This satisfaction of human wants is broadly defined; whether "they spring from the stomach or from fancy, makes no difference". Thus, the commodity is a 'useful thing' in that it fulfills certain wants, and as a useful thing it may be viewed qualitatively and quantitatively as a) the use of its various properties, and b) various quantities of the commodity itself. This quantity-quality distinction becomes very important in the ensuing analysis. The distinction is also a revolutionary breakthrough for economic thought.

Thus, "the utility of a thing makes it a use-value". This utility has no separate existence from the commodity since the utility of any thing is limited by the very properties of that thing. Thus, there is a very close relationship between the material of the commodity and its use-value. "Use-values become a reality only by use or consumption." Marx also notes that in the capitalist form of society, use-values are "the material depositories of exchange-value".

Marx notes that exchange-value at first appears to be a quantitative relation, "a relation constantly changing with time and place". Thus, exchange-value seems to be rela-
tive and not inherent in commodities. Marx is not satisfied with the 'apparent' analysis of the exchange-value and decides to analyze it more deeply. Since any given quantity of a commodity is equal to various quantities of other commodities, Marx notes: 1. the valid exchange-values of a given commodity express something equal; and 2. exchange-value is only the mode of expression, the phenomenal form, of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it. The point, then, is that if two different commodities in different proportions are equal, there must be a third element which decides why these two different proportions of two different commodities are equal. It is also clear that none of the 'natural' properties of a commodity could be this common third element, since these properties only directly come into play as far as the commodity is a utility or use-value. Further, the exchange of commodities is obviously a total abstraction from use-value in that the use-value of the commodity for any individual would ensure the use or consumption of that commodity by the individual himself. Since the use-values of commodities are concerned with the different qualities of the commodity, and as exchange-values are concerned with different quantities, it follows that some other third element must be found by which we can equate the different proportions of various commodities.

Marx discovers this 'third element' - the commodity is a product of labour. But he notes that even this has undergone some change: in order to examine it thus, as a product of la-
bour, we must abstract its use-value from its material existence and the specific quality of that labour. "There is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labour, human labour in the abstract." 10

The following paragraph in Capital 11 is somewhat puzzling; we have seen that the commodity is a product of labour. In fact, we have discovered that in order to relativize various commodities we must consider them as the products of one kind of labour: human labour in the abstract. To take this a step further, Marx begins to point out the "unsubstantial reality" in each of these products which accounts for one considering these products as the result of homogenous human labour. "All that these things now tell us is, that human labour-power is embodied in them." 12 The fact is that now the specific character of the human labour is lost in these "crystals of this social substance". 13 These products are now - Values. 14 Marx is making a distinction here - he is not merely referring now to exchange-value when he uses this word. He is referring to some "unsubstantial reality" which necessarily came to 'be' as a result of the social relation inherent in commodity exchange. This point will be elaborated in a later section. We only need to note that the term 'Value' is in some way equated with the "unsubstantial reality" to which Marx refers.

When commodities are exchanged, then, exchange-value and use-value become necessarily but abstractly separated. Exchange-value becomes independent of use-value in exchange. At the same time, in abstracting from the product's use-value
the residue is Value as described somewhat puzzlingly above. "The common substance that manifests itself in the exchange-value of commodities, whenever they are exchanged, is their value." ¹⁴

Since the useful article has value because of the abstract human labour embodied in it, it follows for Marx that the quantity of labour embodied in the commodity will be the measurement whereby various commodities may be compared. Similarly, it follows that since we are talking in abstract terms, but an abstractness necessary for this analysis, the time considered as measurement of labour embodied in the commodity will be the labour-time socially necessary to produce the article. "The labour-time socially necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time." ¹⁵ Thus, the amount of socially necessary labour for the production of an article determines the magnitude of value of that article. Commodities with equal quantities of labour embodied in them are of the same value. "As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour-time." ¹⁶

Value remains constant if the labour-time also does, but labour-time is bound to change with variations in the productiveness of labour. This productiveness is influenced by many factors such as technological development.

In general, the greater the productiveness of labour, the less is the labour-time required for the production of an article, the less is the amount of labour crystallized in that article and the less is its
value: and vice versa. .."17

Marx ends this section on "The Two Factors of a Commodity" with several important points, defining and delimiting the notion of use-value and value: 1. A thing can be a use-value without having value. This is quite clear from our previous discussion concerning the difference between the two: any 'natural' product could fall into this category; 2. a thing can be useful and the product of human labour, without being a commodity. This also follows from our discussion of the exchange-value and use-value of a product; a man may labour and produce something useful for himself - it is thus not for exchange and hence not a commodity. Within the notion of a commodity, there is a necessity for use-values for others - "social use-values"; 3. nothing can have value without being an object of utility. 18 Even if the commodity fails to satisfy the direct need of its producer, i.e., as a use-value, it has use-value for someone else and it is for this reason that it has exchange-value. One might say, therefore, that the commodity has indirect use-value for its producer, i.e., in the form of that commodity for which he exchanges his own commodity.

"If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it, the labour does not count as labour and therefore creates no value." Without first having utility, it appears that even labour may not produce value. In fact, Marx notes that this labour "does not count as labour".
Section 2: The Two-Fold Nature of Labour

As the commodity has a two-fold nature, so too, then, does labour possess the same two-fold nature: "for, so far as it finds expression in value, it does not possess the same characteristics that belong to it as a creator of use-values". Marx calls this the "point which is the pivot on which a clear comprehension of Political Economy turns". As such, it is obvious that he finds it necessary to explore this two-fold nature of labour more closely.

In Marx's example concerning this analysis, he takes two commodities, a coat and 10 yds. of linen, and allows 10 yds. of linen = W, the coat = 2W. Thus, if we follow our previous analysis, it is the case that the coat is use-value fulfilling a particular want, i.e. the protection of its owner from the elements, etc. A certain kind of labour want into its production, "the nature of which is determined by its aim, mode of operation, subject, means and result".

"The labour, whose utility is thus represented by the value in use of its product, or which manifests itself by making its product a use-value, we call useful labour." It is clear that only one side is being considered here - the coat as 'useful' and the labour manifesting itself in the coat by making the coat a 'use-value'. We have two different products of labour, two different use-values: two use-values that are 'qualitatively' different. As such, the labour embodied in the two products are also qualitatively different and it is
necessary for this labour to be qualitatively different in order for the two objects to stand to each other in the relation of commodities. Otherwise we would be left with a relation of similar quality, with quantity being the only possible thing differentiating them. An equivalence relation could not be set up based solely on quantity if the quality of the labour were equal. How could $2X=x$? Marx notes that coats are not exchanged for coats. And although we may protest that the quality of one coat may indeed be different from the quality of another, we are aware that it is the fact that it is the quality of the labour which allows the two articles to enter into the commodity relation that Marx is underlining here.

As many different values as there are, so are there corresponding kinds of useful labour "classified according to the order, genus, species and variety to which they belong in the social division of labour". Marx notes that the social division of labour is necessary for the production of commodities, but that the opposite is not necessarily true. A social division of labour may exist in a primitive society without there being a general production of commodities, since the people may be fulfilling their own needs through this division of labour in a direct fashion without the necessary exchange-relation of the products of labour for the product to become a commodity mediating the process. Marx also gives the example of the division of labour in the factory - this "division is not brought about by the operatives mutually exchanging their individual products".
Only such products can become commodities with regard to each other, as result from different kinds of labour, each kind being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals.26

As Marx notes, then, from this qualitative difference in the labour embodied in use-values, in a community of commodity producers this difference develops into a much more complex system. This complexity occurs because not only is the difference in quality of labour in each use-value present, but also the fact that 'a community of commodity producers' means labour carried on 'independently by individual producers'. Thus, the 'social division of labour' occurs out of these circumstances.27

So far therefore as labour is a creator of use-value, is useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges between man and nature and therefore no life.28

Just as we view various commodities merely as 'values', so too do we view various kinds of labour as being 'expenditures of human labour-power'. In the example given, it is clear that more labour-time was necessary to manufacture the coat than the linen because the coat is of higher value than the linen: to be precise, one-half the labour time was necessary in order to produce a commodity with twice as much value. Thus, if we refer back to our discussion of use-value where it was decided that the labour contained therein counted only qualitatively, we can see that, in reference to its value, the labour in a commodity counts quantitatively and only then af-
ter it has been considered in its common form as 'human labour pure and simple'.

What does this two-fold form of labour imply? As Marx says: "An increase in the quantity of use-values is an increase of material wealth." At the same time, it is possible for an increase in quantity of material wealth to occur simultaneously with a decrease in the magnitude of its value. How? Quite simply because the amount of labour-time it takes to manufacture any given quantity of various commodities may drastically decrease, even while the quantity owned may increase.
Section 3: The Forms of Value

Marx notes, then, the peculiar two-fold aspect of the commodity:

Commodities come into the world in the shape of use-values, or goods, such as iron, linen, corn, etc. This is their plain, homely, bodily form. They are, however, commodities only because they are something two-fold, both objects of utility, and at the same time, depositories of value. They manifest themselves therefore as commodities, or have the form of commodities only in so far as they have two forms, a physical or natural form and a value form. 30

And as Marx also makes sure to point out, although the relationship between the physical and value forms is intimate, they are not equal. As a commodity may, indeed, have use-value to me, so to the producer of that commodity may it only have value as exchange, i.e., it ceases to have use-value for the producer and begins to have only exchange-value. But this exchange-value may in turn manifest itself in a product retaining use-value for that producer. This is easier to discern in a simple exchange or barter society. In an advanced commodity-exchange society, the apparent chaos will easily disguise the real relations underlying the entire structure.

Furthermore, as Marx points out, "commodities have a value form common to them all, and presenting a marked contrast with the varied bodily forms of their use-values. I mean their money form". 31 What Marx says is needed is the tracing of the genesis of the money form. Why? Because the money form is the most highly developed form of that simple use-value - exchange-
value relationship and, at the same time, the most abstract form of that relationship. In order to solve the riddle of money it must be examined historically. "The simplest value relation is evidently that of one commodity to some other commodity of a different kind." This form, being the simplest value relation, hence has within it both the mystery of money and the possibility of solving this mystery.

A. Elementary Form of Value - The Relative and Equivalent Forms

In the equation \( X \) commodity \( A = Y \) commodity \( B \), several points are made. The two commodities play a different role in the equation. "The first commodity expresses its value in the second and the second is the material in which that value is expressed." The value of the first commodity is expressed as a relative value and the second appears in equivalent form. These two forms are "intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes, i.e., poles of the same expression".

It is not possible, non-tautologically, to express the value of any commodity in terms of itself - one only notes that what something is, is exactly what it is. In order for value to be expressed, some kind of comparison is necessary or, to put it another way, the value can only be expressed relatively. Since this is the case, it also means that some other commodity is present - that commodity is expressed as equivalent to our original commodity. It is also fairly clear that neither one of
the two commodities may change their place within this equation without also changing their form. Thus, whatever places any one commodity may take in the equation is merely accidental, dependent upon whether it is "the commodity whose value is being expressed or the commodity in which value is being expressed". 35

An important consideration in our initial equation, if we give specific quantities to our commodities which are expressed as equivalents, concerns what the underlying unit of equality actually is. It is obvious that considering the root of the equivalent relation per value as merely the quantity of the commodity will not lead very far. How does one determine that two apples are equal to one orange? Is it the proportion of the two fruits that gives us the ability to make them equivalent in value or is there some other determinant which occurs first and later allows us to consider two commodities quantitatively related? As Marx points out in his example of the twenty yards of linen equalling one coat, "Linen = coat is the basis of the equation". 36 So it is the identity of quality that is assumed even though the two commodities play quite different parts in this equation. As I have noted before, it is only the value of the linen that is being expressed since that is the form of the equation.

In this relation the coat is the mode of existence of value, is value embodied, for only as such is it the same as the linen. On the other hand, the linen's own value comes to the front, receives independent expression, for it is only as being value that it is comparable with the coat as a thing of equal value, or exchangeable with the coat. 37
Since we make the assumption of the linen and the coat being qualitatively identical, we also equate the labour of the one to that of the other. But it is not the specific human labour of one that we might directly equate to the other, but rather the abstract human labour of both are made equivalent in the relation. It is not that X hours of skilled craftsmanship is equal to Y hours of manual labour, but rather that both are taken to the lowest common form of abstract human labour and expressed equivalently as such.

Where the 'turnaround' occurs is expressed in Marx's statement that in the expression of equivalence between commodities, the specific character of the value-creating labour occurs. And this occurs precisely because it reduces the different kinds of labour to their common element - human labour in the abstract. In other words, to reduce tailoring or weaving to their lowest common form it becomes necessary to examine the exact nature of both kinds of labour in order to decide how to express each in their lowest common form.

While it is necessary to examine the specific character of the labour while reducing it to its lowest common form, it is also necessary to note that something else is required in order to understand the value of the commodity or how it comes to be a value. While human labour embodied in the commodity creates value, it is only value when it becomes embodied in the commodity.

In order to express the value of the linen as a congelation of human labour, that value must be expressed as having
objective existence, as being something materially different from the linen itself and yet a something common to the linen and all other commodities.

As equivalent in value, the coat is qualitatively the equal of the linen - it has value in this specific relation; but the coat itself fulfills a useful function - it is a 'mere use-value'. As a coat it does not appear as value but rather as this tweed coat with two pockets, etc. Thus, when in the relation of equivalence with any other commodity, specifically linen in Marx's example, the coat says much more about itself than when out of the relation. "As equivalent of the linen in the value equation", the coat has human labour within it - it is a depository of value. Outside this special relation it shows no such tendency. In this relation, the coat is the form of value. "The value of the commodity linen is expressed by the bodily form of the commodity coat, the value of one by the use-value of the other." 40 As use-values, the two are quite different, but the two are equivalent in value in this relation. The linen takes on a value-form different from its physical form.

As Marx notes: "all that our analysis of the value of commodities has already told us, is told us by the linen itself, so soon as it comes into communication with another commodity, the coat". 41 Through the value-relation, "the bodily form of commodity B becomes the value-form of commodity A". "The value of A, thus expressed in the use-value of B, has taken the form of relative value." 42
Marx next considers the "quantitative determination of Relative value". It is not necessary to examine this section in detail since it reflects certain general notions I have already noted and which, for the purpose of this paper, may remain quite general. The important points to be noted are: in any value relation of two commodities, both are expressed in given quantities. Any given quantity of a commodity contains a specific amount of human labour. The value-equation expresses both general value and definite quantity. Further, a change in productiveness caused by such things as technological progress will thus change the given quantities of labour expressed in the value relation and, thus, may also change the general value normally expressed in the relation.

Marx next examines the equivalent form of value. I will note some of the important points here rather than go into detail so that I may add to my general analysis of the commodity rather than examine its specific tendencies in particular cases.

First, we may note that a commodity in the equivalent form expresses the fact that it is directly exchangeable with other commodities. This seems to follow quite clearly form the value-equation. While we have not talked of specific quantities, the fact that the commodity is exchangeable is expressed in the equivalent form. It is not "a quantitative determination of its value that is expressed".\(^4\) To make this more clear: in the value relation the linen, the relative form, expresses the value of linen as being different from its material and properties - it is expressed in terms of 'coat'. Marx notes that this expression "indicates that some social relation lies at the
bottom of it". 44 "With the equivalent form it is just the contrary." 45 Because the relative form expresses itself as value in terms of the equivalent, the equivalent as a commodity expresses value - "is endowed with the form of value by Nature itself". 46 This is the case only in terms of the value-relation when the coat is the equivalent to the linen. Marx's footnote in relation to this is very useful. 47 Where the problem arises is that the specific properties of anything are not gained merely in its relation to other things, although they may become more apparent and so the coat or any equivalent may appear to possess this equivalent form through the very properties it possesses, i.e., it is directly exchangeable precisely because 'Nature' or 'God' has deemed this would be the case. 48 Clearly, this is not so and Marx notes how the bourgeois political economist fails to understand the nature of money, the equivalent form most commonly used.

Thus, in the equivalent form the two-fold character of labour brings itself into play, i.e., an interaction specifically peculiar to the equivalent form. While the coat was created through specific human labour, as equivalent it embodies human labour in the abstract. "This concrete labour, becomes, therefore, the medium for expressing abstract human labour." 49 If we turn back on this relation we also realize that, since the concrete labour is directly identified with abstract human labour, then it can also be identified with any other kind of labour. While it is the labour of individuals, since it is commodity-producing, because of this peculiarity manifested in
the equivalent form, we can also see that this labour is "directly social in its character". 50 Otherwise, the product which results from this labour could not be exchanged with any other product!

Thus, any value-relation is merely a development of this simple value-relation which appears to be the basis of our present society, i.e., the money form as 'supreme equivalent'.

At this point Marx finds it necessary to correct himself concerning his earlier statement that a commodity is both a use-value and an exchange-value. Marx calls this 'common parlance':

A commodity is a use-value . . . and a value. It manifests itself as this two-fold thing . . . as soon as its value assumes an independent form - viz. the form of exchange-value. It never assumes this form when isolated, but only when placed in a value or exchange relation with another commodity of a different kind. 51

In relation to this, we must note that it is in a definite historical period of society's development that the product of labour becomes a commodity - "at the epoch when the labour spent on the production of a useful article becomes expressed as one of the objective qualities of that article, i.e., as its value". 52 Therefore, with the development of the value-form the product of labour becomes a commodity.

**B. Expanded Form of Value**

Thus, we can see from the elementary value-relation that the form of value may be expanded. The relative form of value
may be extended to any number of commodities and, thus, the labour in all these commodities, despite being specific, becomes undifferentiated human labour in the very relation of value. A social relation is therefore quite clearly perceived, for the one commodity stands in relation to the whole world of commodities. At the same time, it becomes plain that while the value of the linen in its first value-form relation may be accidental, it can no longer be considered an 'accident' once it stands as a 'social relation' viz. the world of commodities. The value of the linen remains the same in magnitude whatever commodity it is expressed in. "It becomes plain, that it is not the exchange of commodities which regulates the magnitude of their value; but, on the contrary, that it is the magnitude of their value which controls their exchange proportions." 53

Similarly, the equivalent is now one out of many commodities all expressing value while the various kinds of labour embodied in each become just "different forms of the manifestation of undifferentiated human labour". 54 This expanded form of value has all the defects of something not determined, i.e., the expressions of value are interminable and as much as each value-relation expresses some value, it may be turned around and express another value. In fact, it is the need for a specific kind of value-relation that inverts the original simple form. Since the expanded form is fragmentary, it becomes necessary to find some determination. The general form of value is such a determination in which various commodities are all expressed in value in a single commodity and, as a result, with unity because it is the same commodity.
C. General Form of Value

Thus, the original equivalent becomes some specific commodity: it becomes a universal equivalent. "The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every one of them."\(^{55}\) As a result, "the substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour".\(^ {56}\)

We can see that the movement from the general value form, from the one specific commodity acting as universal equivalent, to the money-form, is a very small step. "The particular commodity, with whose bodily form the equivalent form is thus socially identified, now becomes the money-commodity, or serves as money."\(^ {57}\) This universal equivalent finally becomes gold - all other commodities, including our linen, become equivalent to the gold. As Marx notes again at the end of this chapter: "The simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money-form".\(^ {58}\)
II

The Fetishism of the Commodity
From the preceding analysis of the commodity, wherein lies this 'fetishism'? Let us first note what Marx has to say concerning fetishism:

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour: because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour.

There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.

This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.  

The question is: how does this mystification of material processes and the resulting domination of man by these material processes come about? From the above we can see that Marx is quite clearly saying that it is not any one of the various factors of the economic equation, i.e., quality, quantity, etc., which creates the 'enigmatic character of the product of labour' when it is a commodity, but rather the very form 'commodity' itself. Marx expressed the peculiar qualities of this form very clearly:
1. the equality of all sorts of human labour is expressed objectively by their products all being equally values.
2. the measure of the expenditure of labour-power by the duration of that expenditure, takes the form of the quantity of value of the products of labour.
3. the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social character of their labour affirms itself, take the form of a social relation between the products.

The commodity-producing society must have the above-mentioned characteristics in order to be considered a commodity-producing society and that very economic system causes the estrangement of the worker from that which he produces. All human labour of varying kinds is reduced to the lowest common denominator as abstract human labour in order to compare the products of such specific human labour as values. The carpenter, through his product, is considered equal to the assembly-line worker. Beyond the stripping away of the very 'humaneness' of such human labour in its specific characteristics, only the products of such labour appear to be in any kind of direct relation - they must be in order to be comparable as values on the 'free market'. Underlying this whole relation is the fact that the producers of the commodity 'own' the commodity despite the fact that they do not directly labour upon the production of the commodity. Beyond that, the 'free market' system allows the illusion that these 'owners of private property' are themselves independent producers of various commodities. The metaphysical web begins to take on 'substance', though hardly substance of a satisfactory nature.

The commodity, therefore, appears to have the very real
characteristic of a manifestation of a social relation rather than being the result of such a social relation. In other words, there is no connection, in fact, between the physical properties of the commodity and the fact that it is a commodity, but the worker sees the social relation which must have taken place in the production of the commodity as being just such a physical property. Very real relations between men become transformed into fantastic relations between things. The product of labour is given a psyché and becomes independent of man the labourer. It is no wonder that Marx insists that the only suitable analogy to such a world is to be found in the religious world. It is no wonder that Marx should insist upon just such an analogy within his discussion of commodity fetishism. This I will return to presently. For the moment let us analyze more closely the characteristics of this fetishism.

As we have examined the commodity, we have seen that it has use-value and exchange-value. But it has also become clear that, while the use-value of the commodity is an aspect of the commodity, the very nature of the commodity may be said to exclude its use-value.\textsuperscript{64} What do I mean? The commodity does not possess the objective characteristic of exchange-value, Marx says, precisely because it is only in the act of exchange that the commodity is a commodity as value. While it must be useful, an object of utility, in order to be also a commodity the very nature of being a commodity can also be said to exclude its use-value if we examine the commodity in exchange as value. Why is X commodity being produced? In order to exchange it.
If X commodity were not going to be exchanged, if the manufacture of X commodity had as its goal the immediate satisfaction of a particular want of its producer, would it still be, speaking precisely, a commodity? It appears not. While it is necessary for the commodity to be an object of utility, it is not necessary for it to be an object of utility for its producer - for him, as a commodity, it fails to be a use-value and begins to be a commodity, if we can loosely use such a phrase. The opposite is the case for the producer of the commodity for which our initial producer is going to exchange his commodity. We can see that, as use-value there is nothing mysterious about a product of human labour, but, as a commodity, as an exchangeable quantity of a product, mystery abounds! As the reality of the product becomes blurred as commodity, so too does the use-value of the product become abstracted from its existence as commodity.

The Fetishism of commodities, then, has its origins "in the peculiar social character of the labour that produces them". Since a commodity-producing economy revolves around the labour of private individuals or groups of individuals working independently, it follows that the summation of labour of all these individuals will form "the aggregate labour of society". Since those who labour to produce the commodity do not come into contact until the commodity is exchanged, it follows that they will perceive their own labour, not as a social characteristic, but rather as an individual characteristic. Similarly, since the only social contact that occurs is indirectly through the exchange of commodities, it also
follows that the social character of each commodity-producer's labour will appear to be a contact between 'things' rather than a contact between man. It is thus that there appears to be "material relations between persons and social relations between things". 67

From this two-fold characteristic of the commodity, we can see that, at the moment of production for exchange, "the labour of the individual producer acquires socially a two-fold character". As Marx notes, this labour is for both "satisfaction of definite social want . . . as a branch of a social division of labour that has spring up spontaneously" and "satisfaction of the individual through the established social fact that various useful labour is exchangeable and therefore equal". 68 This equality of various kinds of labour occurs, as we have already noted, through the consideration of its lowest common denominator, abstract human labour, but the fact that the exchangeability of a commodity is present in its production appears to be determined by its value. In other words, because the commodities confront each other as values, so too are the various kinds of labour embodied in the commodities equated. It is not seen that the article is the 'material receptacle of homogenous human labour'. 69

Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object of utility as a value is just as much a social product as language. 70
As Marx notes, what the producer is concerned with in making an exchange is how much of his product will be exchanged for whatever quantity of another product. By custom these proportions become fairly stable and, from that point, appear to interact with each other on their own. Value is impressed upon the product and thus gains something independent of the producers who exchange the product. "To them, their own social relation takes the form of the actions of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them."71 But by the very social nature of the labour embodied in the commodity, "the labour time socially necessary for their production forcibly asserts itself like an over-riding law of Nature".72 Thus, the various kinds of private labour continually return to the amounts in which society desires them. And 'society' is not composed of the number of products which are exchangenable but rather of those who produce these products. The social nature of the labour embodied in the commodity asserts itself against the very equation which attempts to negate this nature. "The determination of the magnitude of value by labour-time is therefore a secret, hidden under the apparent fluctuations in the relative values of commodities."73 Since the nature of this labour embodied in the commodity becomes clearer in this 'assertion', it would seem that this would clear away "the mist through which the social character of labour appears to be an objective character of the products themselves".74 Marx notes that this is not so, precisely because "Man's reflections on the forms of social life and consequently, also,
his scientific analysis of those forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development. 75 Man starts with the results of development which he has already determined to be 'inviolable truths' and decides to understand their meaning devoid of their historical genesis. Thus the common universal equivalent, money, is understood as being directly exchangeable with any other commodity, but if we were to change this universal equivalent, as we have seen is historically possible, we can easily see how absurd this form really is. Can we imagine going into a country where the universal equivalent ('the universal incarnation of abstract human labour') actually were coats? Could we then take the money-form to be an immutable, inviolable truth, anymore? In fact, Marx wants to note that it is this 'ultimate universal equivalent' - money - which further "conceals the social character of private labour". This is the case because of the equation of the value of any commodity with a set price, namely the money form. Money is one of the 'inviolable truths' which helps to form the basis of the commodity-producing society. Rather than being seen as what it is - merely an efficient replacement for quantities of a certain product - it becomes a kind of 'transcendent entity' about which one cannot ask any questions. It is this kind of 'truth-mongering' which forms the basis of bourgeois economy. In fact, Marx asserts:

The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour as long as they take the form of commodities, vanishes
therefore, so soon as we come to know other forms of production.

Rather than examine various possible forms of production as Marx does, let us examine the one specific form that Marx notes which appears to be quite different from the commodity form. Rather than paraphrase this section I have chosen to quote it intact, despite its length, precisely because it seems so important:

Let us now picture to ourselves, by way of change, a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community . . . The total product of our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But another portion is consumed by the members as means of subsistence. A distribution of this portion amongst them is consequently necessary. The mode of this distribution will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers. We will assume, but merely for the sake of a parallel with the production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence is determined by his labour-time . . . The social relations of the individual producers with regard to their labour and to its products, are in this case perfectly simple and intelligible, and that with regard not only to production but also to distribution.

We can see from this description exactly what our commodity-producers are confronted with - there is a possibility of identifying labour as a 'social process' and not merely as the abstraction necessary for a commodity exchange economy. It is also obvious in this example that the inverted world of the
commodity-producer vanishes, i.e., social relations are 'simple and intelligible'. Marx thus provides us with a sketch of a possible alternative to the fetishized, mystical world of bourgeois political economy. It is this kind of sketch which further allows us to compare and be critical of the existing state of affairs.

Marx is insisting in this examination of the commodity-producing society that the life-process of society "is based on the process of material production". And this life-process remains mystical until the appearance is punctured and that life-process is seen as being one of "Production by freely associated men", not 'value' as embodied in various commodities. This life-process must also be regulated by those who are part of that material production "in accordance with a settled plan". Before this, though, a certain "material ground-work", itself "the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development", must hold. In other words, a certain kind of development must take place which forms the basis for material conditions calling for the regulation of material production within the given society. The capitalist, bourgeois society, it may be said, is a society in a state wherein the 'process of production' stands independent of man and wields power over the people who originally created just such a process. More than this, the uncritical attitude of the bourgeois intellect places this inversion in 'stasis' - it insists that mastery of man by the production-process is a "self-evident necessity imposed by nature". Just as some may
say that the Hegelian 'triad' stops at Prussia, so the bourgeois intellect asserts that all previous production-processes lead up to and historically end at the point of advanced commodity-production. So too does the bourgeois intellect look for outside solutions to what appears to be outside oppression, i.e., of man by the objects he creates and their resulting relations. 'Nature' is said to be one of the causes of this horrible inversion of the human production process. But as Marx points out: "Since exchange-value is a definite social manner of expressing the amount of labour bestowed upon an object, nature has no more to do with it than it has in fixing the course of exchange".  

If we examine any number of political economists and philosophers in the 17th to the 19th century we will find, not by accident, that 'nature' plays a considerable role in their discussions of society and its genesis.

At the same time, this kind of example, given above, of another form of production does not adequately answer the question concerning how such a state may come about. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss such a problem either but, by this kind of example and comparison with the existing commodity-producing form of production, we can begin to see more clearly the inadequacies of the capitalist system. What this paper is concerned with is how the fetishism of the commodity produces fetishized consciousness and what the results of fetishism are within the whole of capitalist society. We move from a description of the commodity and commodity-fetishism as purely 'economic facts' to a description of the fetishized consciousness resulting from these 'economic facts'. It is in
this vein that I would like to examine the relation between the earlier theory of alienation and the later notion of fetishism. Why this becomes an important relation revolves around the fact that Marx picks up the basis for his theory of alienation from the idealist Hegel and changes it into a materialist doctrine. At the same time, philosophy still attempts to appropriate this notion for its own ends. Even the idealist recognizes 'alienation' as a philosophical issue. On the other hand, very few philosophers will talk of the fetishism of the commodity as a philosophical issue. Yet, these two 'theories' may very well be said to be descriptions of the same material process. The following chapter engages in a slight digression to grapple with this important relation.
III

Fetishism and Marx's Theory of Alienation
As I have noted, up to this point we have a purely descriptive analysis but, I hope. I have underlined some areas of this description where it is becoming obvious that more than a mere description of an economic process is occurring. That is: the notion of economic process as separate from man's social and political existence should be discounted. Fragmented world-views of this kind are themselves indicative of the working of the system of commodity-production. It is with this in mind that two problems must be discussed. First, how better to describe and demonstrate the relation between what, at first sight, appears to be a more philosophic question, the theory of alienation, and the economic theory of fetishism. Second, how fetishism itself can be talked of as a problem for philosophy, that is, to demonstrate in some way that philosophy does not transcend the fetishism of the commodity and, in fact, is greatly affected by such 'economic facts'. The theory of alienation is usually seen as a more philosophical doctrine than the theory of fetishism. It is with this in mind that I now intend to discuss the theory of alienation and its relation to the fetishism of the commodity.

Marx's theory of alienation has generally been at the centre of the dispute concerning the Young vs. the Mature Marx. The general argument contends that Marx uses the word 'alienation' (Entfremdung and Entäußerung) in his earlier writings, and that he drops the words in his later writings, thus being the centre for verification of the notion that Marx's
earlier writings were still heavily influenced by Hegel and more 'humanistically' oriented and hence 'philosophical'. His later works, therefore, concern economics or at best are rather polemical attacks against various forces with which Marx disagrees. Thus the notion of alienation becomes fetishism in Capital, i.e., the alienation of man is said to be described 'humanistically' in the early writings and more technically, through economic fetishization, in the later writings. While there may be certain points in this view that are valuable, I will argue within this chapter that, in fact, there are few exact distinctions to be made between the early and late Marx and that the notion of alienation presented within the earlier writings outlines all the important basic elements that are developed in the later writings. At the same time, I am not going to argue that there is no distinction - there is, indeed, a development from the earlier writings to the later but the notion of alienation is not dropped from Marx's writings but is developed in a fuller fashion in the later writings. The basic argument in this chapter is not new - one source is I. Mészáros' excellent book on Marx's theory of alienation, but I hope to have developed this argument somewhat more precisely in the course of this chapter than Mészáros does in his book (especially since it it not the point of his book to properly present this argument - he merely mentions it briefly, but, nonetheless, I believe in such a short space he disproves the notion of a radical split between the early and the late Marx).
Marx presents the notion of alienated labour in concise form in the XXIInd part of the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844. This particular section is usually translated "Alienated Labour". It is Marx's intention in the whole of the manuscripts to uncover the mystery of political economy, i.e., using Hegelian dialectic 'turned on its head' he examines political economy and its jargon to find contradiction and fault. Thus, as he says at the beginning of this section, he accepts all of the presuppositions of political economy. From this he has discovered that "the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and to a most miserable commodity within the framework of commodity production. This, of course, is the first intimation of the very alienation of labour within this section and, as such, it anticipates *Capital* published in 1867, in its description of fetishism. Marx repeats the various short-comings of political economy basically centring around the kind of distinction Marx often makes: political economy describes the conditions very well but it does nothing towards changing them. From these shortcomings Marx decides to begin his explanation of the connections between 'the whole system of alienation'. Marx, the materialist, desires to begin this examination from something which is verifiable, i.e., is some kind of 'fact' and not from some kind of myth or 'legendary primordial condition'. The "contemporary economic fact" he begins from is that the worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more goods he creates. The more wealth the worker produces the poorer the worker becomes. "The devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation with the increase
in value of the world of things." While it is true that Marx's explanation of this economic fact is much fuller in Capital, it is basically unchanged in this representation. In fact, the more goods produced the less valuable is human labour. It finally becomes, in an increasingly technical society, the one replaceable aspect of the process, i.e., labour competes with itself as a commodity and the more labour available the less the producer must pay for it in relation to the profits he gains from the production and sale of the commodity. The result of the decreasing value of human labour is, of course, "that the misery of the worker increases with the power and volume of his production". Marx also outlines the possibility of monopoly from this particular kind of production. From the introduction of monopoly the worker's lot becomes even more difficult. In this case the capitalist may set both the level of wages and the level of prices. Further, within the monopoly system the smaller capitalist is forced out of business and becomes a worker. The distinction between those who have and those who have not is made even more obvious:

finally . . . the distinction between capitalist and landlord, and between agricultural labourer and industrial worker must disappear and the whole of society divide into the two classes of property owners and propertyless workers. Marx says at this point that private property is the basis for this whole commodity production and the system which is itself based upon commodity-production. As he puts it, "Political economy begins with the fact of private pro-
perty; it does not explain it". It is this fact which distinguishes Marx's method from that of the political economist. The political economist explains quite well those things he chooses to explain. The problem is that he fails to grasp the whole basis of the material processes which he explains. Thus, Marx insists it is up to 'us' to grasp the real connection between this whole 'system of alienation'. The final phrase there is very important - it points to the fact that alienated labour, as an economic fact, since indeed private property, capital and land are economic facts, leads to a whole system of alienation. In other words, as Marx points out in Capital, Vol. 1, commodity production inevitably leads to commodity fetishism and as a result the entire society is affected. Fetishism, the subject-object inversion inherent in fetishism, while basically an economic 'fact', once again is something that permeates every aspect of society. The whole section in "Alienated Labour" concerning the subject-object inversion inherent in alienation exactly mirrors the notion of fetishism as introduced later on. While it is out of the scope of this chapter to exactly correlate these two notions, a reading of some small sections underlines the relation.

This fact simply implies that the object produced by labour, its product, now stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of its producer.

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of man's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour.
And:

There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-embalmed regions of the religious world.

... the more the worker expends himself in work the more powerful becomes the world of objects which he creates in face of himself, the poorer he becomes in his inner life, and the less he belongs to himself. It is just the same as in religion.

Is it easy to see that the first passage of the latter pair comes from *Capital* and features a more economically-minded and 'scientifically oriented' Marx, and that the second passage comes from the *Manuscripts* and features a humanistic and Hegelian influenced Marx? I think not, and while those few quotations do not establish anything certain, nor are they conclusive, a cursory examination certainly seems to yield enough evidence to question the notion that the concepts of alienation and fetishism are strictly distinguishable, particularly along the lines of the 'Young vs. the Mature Marx'.

As I have said, it is not, strictly speaking, the intention of this chapter to conclusively prove this point but rather to raise enough problems to at least allow us to question the 'radical rift' theory of Marx's development and to be clearer of the relation between alienation and fetishism and hence the radical distinction made between philosophy and economics. If we briefly examine other sections of "Alienated Labour" we can see similar descriptions of the worker's plight,
resulting from the system of commodity production, to those
descriptions which are found in Capital under the discussion of
fetishism:

The alienation of the worker in his
object is expressed as follows in the
laws of political economy: the more
the worker produces the less he has to
consume; the more value he creates the
more worthless he becomes; the more
refined his product the more crude
and misshapen the worker; the more
civilized the product the more bar-
barous the worker; the more powerful
the work the more feeble the worker;
the more the work manifests intelli-
gence the more the worker declines
in intelligence and becomes the slave
of nature. 2

Political economy thus notes this relation between the
worker and his product indirectly, but fails to examine the
direct relation. Since it observes the material processes in-
herent in this relation and identifies the facts (note in
particular Marx's citation from Buret in "Wages of Labour"),93
it must note the horrific relation between the worker and pro-
duction indirectly at least; but to arrive at any conclusion
concerning the direct relation is completely out of the scope
of political economy. Why, we may ask? Because the political
economist has nothing to gain in the radical critique of such
relations. As Marx has noted of the philosopher, so too does
the political economist interpret the world, but the real pro-
blem is to change it. It follows that political economy merely
observes, while inherent in Marx's analysis is the notion that
one must also evaluate what is observed, i.e., strictly speak-
ing, mere observation is quietism and tacit agreement with what
is observed.

Today we may feel quite differently concerning the worker-production relation that Marx notes; that is, we feel that the worker in North America particularly is better off and, hence, that Marx's above statement is a rather radical evaluation of the contemporary workers' position. I would contend, and, of course, I am not alone, that the gist of Marx's comments can still be proven to be the case. While the worker in modern North American society may be 'better off', it is still the case that with every passing year the distinction between those with wealth and those merely subsisting does grow greater; that the more technological the work becomes, e.g., assembly-lines, etc., the less intelligent the worker has to be; the more refined the product the more misshapen the worker (e.g., recent discoveries of liver cancer in workers dealing with vinyl chloride). While today it becomes more difficult to see immediately this relation developing through alienation, if one examines the worker-production relation as a whole it becomes clear that not enough has changed for there to be any basis for a rejection of most of Marx's claims. Given proper hindsight we could contend that there are short-comings in Marx's analysis but then Marx had no pretensions towards being a prophet. Any shortcomings to be found appear to be caused more by historical limitations rather than lack of insight. Certainly alienation as Marx outlines it specifically and generally as a 'system of alienation', i.e., as fetishism permeating all levels of society, has not changed from the
time of Marx's analysis.

In "Alienated Labour", Marx notes four basic points of alienation running throughout the worker-production relation. Alienated Labour: 1. alienates nature from man; 2. alienates man from himself; 3. alienates man from species man; and 4. alienates man from other men. I will try to examine these briefly without repeating too many of the points previously made.

The first point that Marx makes is that the "work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature". The result of this is that the worker does not fulfill himself in his work. Rather, he feels 'homeless' at work and at home only during the time he is not at work. His work is really forced labour and is thus not itself the satisfaction of a need but merely a means whereby other needs are satisfied. In other words, man's need for various basic things to subsist becomes the end of which work itself is the means. Work is not desired but rather, whenever possible, avoided. Further, when the worker is working he is not working for himself - at the time of work he belongs to whomever he works for. Thus Marx's famous statement: "We arrive at the result that the worker feels himself to be freely active only in his animal functions - eating, drinking, procreating . . . while in his human functions he is reduced to an animal". From alienation as an 'economic fact', we have the development of alienation as social relation. Thus, as man's nature is alienated from him through the objectification of his nature in the product of labour (a thing), he also becomes self-alienated. In this case his activity as a
worker in producing the thing (product of labour) "is directed against himself, independent of him and not belonging to him." Thus, the first kind of alienation deals with 'alienation of the thing' while the second is self-alienation.

Following from these two, Marx discusses man as a species-being. Since community is the end of man's activity both practically and theoretically, it follows that he has a relation with all other men as a species-being. Similarly, since man's nature is alienated from man himself, then species-life, i.e., man's common relation with all other men, is also alienated. Since it is through man's common elements, i.e., his nature and life activity, that he is in common with all other men, if these are alienated from him then so will his species-life be alienated from him. Following from the framework of independent producers set up in commodity-production, species-life becomes a means of individual life. Since individual life is an abstraction (species-life is the reality within any social relation), then making it the end of man's activity obviously perverts man's productive life. "Productive life is . . . species-life . . . It is life creating life . . . Life itself appears only as a means of life."

Alienated labour reverses the relationship, in that man because he is a self-conscious being makes his life activity, his being, only a means for his existence. Just as alienated labour transforms free and self-directed activity into a means, so it transforms the species-life of man into a means of physical existence.

Thus man, as he is related to all other men, his species-
life, becomes a means whereby he can continue his individual existence. Going to the factory to work, rather than being a meaningful aspect of man's life activity where man realizes his species-life through his social relation with other workers, becomes a mere means whereby one can continue oneself as an individual.

From these three forms of alienation it follows that man confronts other men as individuals - he will see no common bond, neither in their natures, the product of their work nor their species-life. Man is alienated from other men. "Thus in the relationship of alienated labour every man regards other men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds himself placed as a worker."

It is significant, once again, for any consideration of a severe break between the 'young and mature' Marx that he begins the next section with a summation of his previous analysis which does not seem to agree with the interpretation, i.e., the young Marx as not so concerned with economic facts. "We begin with an economic fact, the alienation of the worker and his production. We have expressed this fact in conceptual terms as alienated labour, and in analysing the concept we have merely analysed an economic fact." How is this a mere 'humanism'? How is this even Hegelian dominated? While this may be the basic Hegelian dialectic, it is indeed 'turned on its head' - it begins and ends with the material fact and not the Idea. Indeed, in the later work, the accent on dialectic is still there, but turning the Hegelian dialectic on its head
means more than just being more concerned with the material over the ideal in some simplistic way. Surely it also means a more complete internalization of this dialectic. Hegel 'uses' the dialectic throughout his philosophy in a way that it becomes readily recognizable, but inherent within the notion of dialectic is its radical critique, that is, the description of the process of motion in thought which is described as 'dialectic' is precisely a continuing process. As a continuing process one is forced to assert the inherent materialist element in dialectic precisely because praxis becomes the arbiter between this motion in thought and the 'objective world'. For Hegel this motion was basically of the Absolute Idea - its materialist element was itself precisely an element in thought. For Marx the dialectic is a materialist one - "the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought". 

Dialectic thus becomes more a whole expression rather than a slightly fragmented framework. The content itself becomes an expression of this radical critique, the so-called 'method' of dialectic as radical critique becomes consonant with its materialistic content rather than being at odds with an idealistic content. In this way Marx's materialism remains constant throughout all his work.

Marx originally states that the whole system of alienation derived from alienated labour is based upon private property. In examining alienated labour we see that the worker brings a man who is outside the work process into relation with labour, because, "the relation of the worker to work also produces the relation of the capitalist to work".
Since the worker, while working and working for someone else, is alienated labour, he thus brings the owner into relation with labour. Since he produces for someone else, the labour objectified in the product of labour belongs to someone else, simply because the product, once produced, now belongs to someone else.

Private property is, therefore, the product, the necessary result, of alienated labour, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself... The analysis of this concept shows that private property appears to be the basis and cause of alienated labour, it is rather a consequence of the latter... 

This statement, however, is not conclusive. Simply because private property at first appears to be the basis of alienated labour and then, through an analysis of this concept, appears to be the result, does not mean an either/or condition results. In fact, both are the case.

Only in the final state of the development of private property is its secret revealed, namely, that it is on the one hand the product of alienated labour, and on the other hand the means by which labour is alienated, the realization of this alienation.

That this follows from our previous discussion seems quite clear. It is significant, however, that this kind of analysis is precisely mirrored in Capital. Marx, particularly up to his discussion of fetishism in Capital, Vol. 1, introduces a particular aspect of a certain notion and then subsequently shows this to be incomplete. A specific example of
this is the distinction between his original definition of exchange-value and how he later demonstrates this definition to be rather limited or 'methodologically necessary', and then further defines and articulates the notion of exchange-value.

Over and above a kind of methodological similarity, the entire description of alienated labour, starting with the simple relation between the worker and his work, and ending in an entire 'system of alienation', exactly mirrors and describes what is more often implied in Capital.

In Capital, the exact forms of an economic system, commodity production, are examined and the relations between these forms are often shown to be analogous with other elements of the capitalist society. Marx thus implies the permeation of all levels of the society with a fetishism through analogy, or else he deals with fetishism as an economic process. In "Alienated Labour" Marx is still describing an 'economic fact', but he demonstrates the genesis of the alienated society through the development of the four forms of alienation. The link between the economic fact of alienation and the result of that alienation upon all levels of society is more simply described and more generally developed historically.

Norman Geras has noted that in Capital:

The roots of the phenomena grouped under the term alienation, are located in specific social relations and not in the fact that there is an ideal essence of man, his 'species-being' which has been negated or denied.

Herein, the difference between "Alienated Labour" and the des-
cryption of fetishism in _Capital_ is described thus: "In place of a concept of alienation founded on an essentialist anthropology, we have one tied to the historical specificity of forms of domination". While we can clearly see that there is a grain of truth in this description and that there is no "complete unity between the Manuscripts and Capital", at first it is hard to agree completely with this evaluation. The concept of alienation does not seem to be tied completely to an "essentialist anthropology"; rather, man's species-being is one way that he becomes alienated. However, at the root of the whole description of alienation is the primary alienation of man from his work, a condition contrary to the very essence of man as a labouring creature. In this sense there is an "essentialist anthropology" here, but of a completely different kind from what we would normally associate with these words. Do not forget that this is, at root, "an economic fact" and that the "whole system of alienation" is described as being derivative from a conceptual examination of this "fact". This is "essentialist anthropology" only in the most material and realistic sense, not in any undetermined, conceptually abstract sense. Thus we can see the difference between the theory of alienation and the notion of fetishism; but it is rather slight to be able to describe this as a "break" in the work of Marx. There does not seem to be any 'radical rift' between these two notions.

From what I have examined in this chapter I would say that there is a very smooth transition from alienation to fetishism and that it may very well be the case that there is more of a methodological distinction between the two than any
real distinction between what the content of the two theories describes. It seems to be, at heart, basically the same process of a subject/object inversion, of a description of the production of the commodity and the result of this production in mystification and finally domination of man by the very production process that he establishes. It is in this light that I do not always exactly delineate my discussion of fetishism and my discussion of alienation. At the same time, it does seem that Cerès is right in asserting that the two have a different "theoretical status". It seems questionable, however, that the two are so different that they do not both attempt to describe what is at base the same material relations. It is with this sense of the difficulty in exactly determining the differences between the two, while, at the same time, not wishing to commit the error of 'conflation', that I pass on into the next chapter, wherein I further investigate the material conditions which seem to be, at root, what do tie these two very similar 'theories' together.
IV

The "Fetishized" Consciousness
We have seen thus far what the nature of the commodity is, and I have briefly discussed the fetishism of the commodity per se. I have also examined the relation between alienation and fetishism, thereby hoping to erect some kind of structure in which the implications of fetishism for various levels of consciousness may be seen. The previous chapter on alienation allows us to see that what appears for many to be a philosophical issue is, at root, an economic fact and, at heart, is a different kind of description of the same material processes which fetishism also describes. What is left unsaid here is what is the nature of the consciousness that sees the world as fragmented entities. Today, to see philosophical issues as wholly separate from economic facts is a result of the existing commodity-producing structure. What we may call the bourgeois intellect is the consciousness that sees the world in this fragmented way. As Marx has put it:

The class having the means of material production has also control over the means of intellectual production, so that it also controls, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual production. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas, hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one and therefore the ideas of its domination.

This consciousness, in fact, does not see commodity fetishism as a problem for itself as consciousness. This is
the problem that has to be overcome, even in some slight way, in order to demonstrate that fetishism is a problem for philosophy. In this chapter, then, I intend to examine various examples of the bourgeois intellect, the reified consciousness, the fragmented world-view, the 'alienated' man. In his article on "Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism", Norman Geras points out that Marx's general criticisms designed to demonstrate the distance separating vulgar economy from classical political economy revolve around what Marx considers to be "the minimum necessary condition to be satisfied by any work aspiring to scientific status". It uncovers the reality behind the appearance which conceals it. We can take this essence-appearance distinction and apply it in quite general terms to an examination of fetishism and reified consciousness. On the one hand, Marx is describing what, in fact, the commodity is by nature, and how fetishism flows out of the nature of the commodity. This 'description', while being 'factual', penetrates the appearance of the commodity-producing society and gives us a picture of what is actually at work. Beyond this 'methodological requirement', however, something else is at work. There is more than a mere 'procedural rule' here, and that is that it becomes necessary to shatter the appearance in order to not only grasp the essence but to actually change that reality. One way that Geras puts it is:

It is because there exists at the interior of capitalist society a kind of internal rupture between the social relations which obtain and the manner in which they are experienced that the scientist of that society is confronted with the necessity of constructing reality against appearances.
Of course, the notion of fetishism cuts right to the heart of the essence/appearance distinction in capitalist society, because within this theory we see what are essentially 'things' become 'personalized', and people become thing-like. It is precisely this kind of inversion that is prefigured in the thought of many bourgeois thinkers but which is inadequately explained by them. The essence/appearance distinction was something that political economy appropriated, but political economy failed to go far enough in order to act upon knowledge of this distinction. In the same way, bourgeois philosophy has been concerned with this same distinction but has always come up with some abstract answer to what is essentially a practical, material problem.

When Marx examines political economy in Capital, he notes that Political Economy has discovered what lies beneath the forms of 'value' and its magnitude but has failed to ask why this is the case. This is precisely because, as has already been noted, the form of this analysis is within the established framework: "they belong to a state of society, in which the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by him . . . a self-evident necessity imposed by Nature".111

If this is the case and the political economist sees the very meaning underlying these forms, how is it ever possible for him to change the problems ensuing from these forms? It is precisely because change is not the interest of the political economist that he can both uncover the form and yet fail to correct the problem. And it is precisely because the economist
may be misled by the 'fetishism inherent in commodities' that the same state of affairs may exist. As Marx has already noted: to make a scientific discovery re: the products of labour as value being material expressions of the human labour spent in their production, while marking an 'epoch in the history of the development of the human race', "by no means dissipates the mist through which the social character of labour appears to us to be an objective character of the products themselves". Thus, we might say that the fact that a discovery may be made concerning the basis of the forms of value and yet, that the problems inherent in these forms continue to be given free rein, tends to point to the very fetish character of commodities of which Marx writes. For, as we have seen, the fetish character of commodities results in a mystical inverted world which is accepted as the real world. The reality of the forms of value may be 'discovered', but, due to the standpoint of the political economist, the implications of this 'discovery' cannot be seen. Since the political economist, as representative of the 'bourgeois intellect', belongs to a particular state of society, it becomes clear that this society stamps upon him a limited way of viewing the world - for him "the process of production has the mastery over man, instead of being controlled by him". That which currently exists for the bourgeois intellect is the true world, and the forms of value inherent in this world are imposed "as self-evident necessity by Nature". As such, any prior forms of social production (or even alternative forms) "are treated by the bourgeoisie in much the same way as the Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian religions".
It is precisely within this 'inverted world' which is characterized by the limited world-view of the bourgeois intellect, that we can further examine the fetishism of commodities as a philosophical problem. The trouble in examining fetishism as a 'philosophical problem' occurs because of the very confines of the narrow world-view of such as the political economist as representative of the bourgeois intellect. Bourgeois philosophy is another aspect of the capitalist society which the bourgeois intellect tends to see as separate from the economic substructure of that same society. As such, in attempting to delineate a basically 'economic fact' as a 'philosophical problem', we have already overcome an apparent contradiction.

One problem of discussing this relation is that examples and analogy become more useful than logical proof. The very difficulty in disproving what is essentially an incorrect world-view, because of its very limits, asserts itself throughout this discussion. At the same time, the division of philosophy from economic facts for the bourgeois intellect, seems to point to an overriding fragmented world-view, and this itself begins to demonstrate the very fetishized nature of the bourgeois philosophical disposition. Paul Nizan has outlined this 'fetishized nature' very nicely in The Watchdogs:

The bourgeois thinker proceeds as follows: he begins by acknowledging the basic social conditions which cause men to revolt (although he does so in a very summary fashion, paying little or no attention to factual details) and then sets about justifying these conditions, or rather vaporizing them with a barrage of lofty rationalizations. He devotes all his efforts to discovering trans-
above the lives of those men or women working for him, there is no reason to assume that he will have any more regard for those men and women in any other aspects of his existence. If the commodity form is an accepted aspect, indeed an inviolable truth, of any society, then would not this inverted form become more obvious, and indeed permeate, other aspects of his society? Marx's suggestion, starting with the previous citation, is that this will be the case. In fact, "the religious world is but the reflex of the real world". It is exactly the rise of modern capitalism which coincides with the theological and philosophical rise of the abstract individual to an exalted position. Without going into the historical genesis of this rise, since it is outside the scope of this paper, I will briefly examine a few examples in order to demonstrate what Marx is talking about.

In relation to discussing fetishism as both theory and existing fact, it may be useful to discuss the link between fetishism as it comes about through the development of capitalism, and its concrete effects upon the worker during this same period of development. Georg Lukács, in "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat", briefly outlines just such a relation. Lukács points out that in the development of labour from handicraft industry to machine industry, "we can see a continuous trend towards greater rationalisation, the progressive elimination of the qualitative, human and individual attributes of the worker". Of course this elimination of the particular attributes of labour is exactly what
is involved in the developing of fetishism. Lukács describes this process very clearly and perhaps more empirically than I have already attempted to describe it. On the one hand, the process of labour becomes more abstract, rational and "broken down into . . . specialized operations so that the worker loses contact with the finished product and his work is reduced to the mechanical repetition of a specialized set of actions". At the same time, the period of time necessary for work to be accomplished (which forms the basis of rational calculation) is converted, as mechanization and rationalization are intensified, from a merely empirical average figure to an objectively calculable work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed and established reality. The resulting 'rationalization' goes so far as to analyze the work-process in terms of psychological realities:

This rational mechanization extends right into the worker's soul; even his psychological attributes are separated from his total personality and placed in opposition to it as to facilitate their integration into specialized rational systems and their reduction to statistically viable concepts. Every worker has his pay number and every number becomes part of the mathematically formulable conceptualization of each worker's relation to the 'rational' whole. The elimination of specific attributes of labour leads to mechanical labour which in turn leads to the very frightening 'statistical integration' of the worker into the work process. Quite literal-
ly, the worker becomes a 'cog in the machine', only this machine functions 'smoothly' using such cogs. It is no coincidence that the psychological examination of colour preference is used both to eliminate the possibility of the worker wasting time around the restroom while at the same time enticing him to buy certain products as a consumer.

Beyond this, however, Lukács is concerned with the 'principle' at work within this increasing 'rationalization' of the labour process which he says is based upon "what is and can be calculated". This increasing rationalization entails change in terms of both the subject and object of the economic process. In order for exact calculation to take place, in order for the "mathematical analysis of work processes" to occur, an "exact breakdown of every complex into its elements" becomes necessary. This breakdown occurs side by side with a "study of the special laws governing production". Lukács notes that this rational analysis must then "declare war on the organic manufacture of whole products based on the traditional amalgam of empirical experiences of work". The result of rationalization, this 'breakdown' of the work processes into its elements, could only mean one thing: the increasing specialization of labour in order to increase profit and the further de-humanizing of the worker in relation to the general work-process. Thus, "the finished article ceases to be the object of the work-process", precisely because the work-process itself is turned into "the objective synthesis of rationalized special systems whose unity is determined by pure calculation."
and which must, therefore, seem to be arbitrarily connected
with each other''.\textsuperscript{127} This is not to say that the 'management
consultant' brought in to bring about this increased speciali-
zation does not see this connection, but merely that the worker,
the one involved directly in the work-process, does not see
the whole of which he is a part. How does the worker identify
his work (say, riveting bolts into car frames), when the
finished product becomes the result of this "objective syn-
thesis of rationalized special systems"?

On the other hand, the result of this 'unity of special
systems' "destroys the organic necessity with which inter-
related special operations are unified in the end-product".\textsuperscript{128}
As a result, the specific 'special operations' themselves
apparently become increasingly economically autonomous. This
occurs precisely because the end-product, the commodity, is
seen relative to the various stages it goes through in pro-
duction, but never in each of these stages in relation to the
final 'whole' commodity. As fetishism describes the apparent
independence of the production process over man, so increased
specialization, as a result of fetishism within that particu-
lar production process, further imbeds this notion of 'inde-
pendent realities' within the contemporary social reality. So
too, the commodity becomes even further separated from its use-
value. "This goes hand in hand with the union in time and space
of special operations that are related to a set of heterogeneous
use-values."\textsuperscript{129}

Of course, this increasing "fragmentation of the object
of production necessarily entails the fragmentation of its subject. The work-process itself is increasingly rationalized and thus the worker becomes more specialized. Beyond the necessity of regarding concrete labour as devoid of particular qualities in order even to consider a commodity-producing system, this increased rationalization goes further to look back upon these particular qualities, i.e., human qualities, "as mere sources of error when contrasted with these abstract laws functioning according to rational predictions". 130 When man is viewed as merely part of the machine, it becomes inconvenient for the worker to be not machine-like. What is required is the full integration of man with machine as long as the worker ceases to be man. In no way is man clearly seen as master of this process; the apparent independence of the production process and its machines, while remaining 'apparent' in some theoretical way, becomes definitely 'real' for the worker. Again, for the worker, the one "incorporated into a mechanical system", this system is "pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws, whether he likes it or not". 131 This is, indeed, no mere 'metaphysical construction'! As conformity becomes the rule of thumb because of this perplexing, complex structure, so too does man's will become more lax. How is it possible even to relate to such a monolith? In this way man's activity "becomes less and less active and more contemplative". 132

It is this point which introduces what is central to this thesis - that man's loss of activity in the world, that is, in shaping the processes and forces which, in course, effect
his existence and activity, results in transforming "the basic categories of man's immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space". In order to better understand this it becomes necessary once again to return to material circumstances. Marx gives a very good description of just such a set of conditions:

Through the subordination of man to the machine the situation arises in which men are effaced by their labour; in which the pendulum of the clock has become as accurate a measure of the relative activity of two workers as it is of the speed of two locomotives. Therefore, we should not say that one man's hour is worth another man's hour, but rather that one man during an hour is worth just as much as another man during an hour. Time is everything, man is nothing; he is at the most the incarnation of time. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything: hour for hour, day for day... The result makes "isolated abstract atoms" of the workers involved directly in that production process. (This is a process, I need hardly point out, that is primarily a social process.) The accent is more and more
away from what is human in this process towards an accent upon
the "abstract laws of the mechanism which imprisons them".  

Again, I need hardly point out that the accent upon "abstract
laws" results in a more 'viable' system, which, roughly trans-
lated, means a higher rate of profit.

While a description of the historical development and
implications of such a system are useful, it is surely the
case that as this structure develops more thoroughly, that is,
as the commodity form becomes universally dominant within a
society, then the entire situation changes accordingly. "The
fate of the worker becomes the fate of society as a whole";
indeed, this fate must become universal because, otherwise,
bourgeois industrialization could not develop in this direction.
It depends upon the emergence of the 'free' worker who is freely
able to take his labour-power to market and offer it for sale
as a commodity 'belonging' to him, a 'thing' that he 'posses-
sees'. It is also fairly clear that the abstraction resulting
from this increased specialization, while being a fragmentation
of the production process, also results in just such a set of
circumstances for the worker, as implied by the words in in-
verted commas. The worker is 'free' in that he can bring his
labour-power to market, but what kind of freedom is this? In
the same uncritical manner, the worker's labour-power is
looked upon as being not a part of the worker as an individual
human being - it 'belongs' to him, it becomes an externalized
'thing' that he 'possesses'. It does not seem necessary to
reiterate the basic perversion of commodity fetishism in order
to demonstrate the relation between the above analysis and that notion. What has been described is the historical act of machines becoming 'personalized', as acting independently of man in the production process, and, conversely, man becoming 'thing-like', a part of the machine necessary for the production of the commodity.

It is not surprising that in such a context man should become alienated from himself and from his fellow man. All humanness has been subtracted from the essentially human social processes of production. The factory is the paradigm of the reified world and the result of this reified world upon consciousness is to make the factory the 'real' world and, of course, it is, but not in the way that it is perceived.

The increasing reification of society occurs with the increasing development of the capitalist mode of production. The producer is separated from his means of production, 'natural' production units are increasingly dissolved and destroyed - "'natural' relations which exhibit human relations more plainly are replaced by rationally reified relations". The implications of this are that "the principle of rational mechanization and calculability must embrace every aspect of life". Commodities, as I have noted, are no longer the result of 'natural' processes, but rather appear "as abstract members of a species identical by definition with its other members", and, further, "as isolated objects, the possession or non-possession of which depends on rational calculations". Thus occurs the fragmentation of the "whole life of society into particular acts
of commodity exchange". When this occurs, the 'free' worker comes into being precisely because he sees himself as being abstractly free from this production process. The fragmentation of the society appears to allow for greater freedom within that society - there is 'free' choice and no rules or laws definitely governing that choice or, for that matter, the application of the 'free' worker's labour within the general processes of production.

"Of course", Lukács notes, "this isolation and fragmentation is only apparent." Of course, one should note in response, this isolation and fragmentation have very real effects upon the worker. As such, their 'apparentness' becomes somewhat belied. At the same time, we cannot deny that "the real framework of every rational calculation is not merely subject to strict laws but also presupposes the strict ordering of all that happens".

The atomization of the individual is, then, only the reflex in consciousness of the 'fact' that the 'natural laws' of capitalist production have been extended to cover every manifestation of life in society; that - for the first time in history - the whole of society is subjected, or tends to be subjected, to a unified economic process, society is determined by unified laws.

It is this point that must be emphasized. If the atomization of the individual tends to follow directly from the commodity form of production, it must be pointed out that this atomization is 'in consciousness' and that the 'natural laws' of capitalist production are in fact the existing case -
there is a unity here, but it is concealed because of the very nature of that unity. As Lukács says: "if this atomization is only an illusion [but what an illusion!], it is a necessary one". It is only within a structure "of all things" and their obedience to "'natural' laws ... found to exist already in a finished form" as something immutable, that the immediate confrontation of the individual with society could be seen "in the form of natural and isolated acts of exchange between isolated commodity owners". The worker is no different within this structure - he is the 'owner' of his labour-power. It has become a commodity and is placed upon an 'open' market just like any other commodity; for the worker, though, his labour-power is his only 'possession'. As Lukács notes:

His fate is typical of society as a whole in that this self-objectification, this transformation of a human function into a commodity reveals in all its starkness the dehumanized and dehumanising function of the commodity relation.

I need hardly note that if we follow Marx's discussion of man as being essentially a labouring being, that this "transformation of a human function into a commodity" becomes more brutal. That by which man is man has become something entirely external to him. His 'essence' lies entirely outside and independent of him - in that case, it is no wonder that man in such a world should turn to peculiar pastimes!

Again, in History and Class Consciousness, Lukács provides us with a very good example of how reification may effect intellectual consciousness which appears to be outside
the immediate production process but which, indeed, is effected by the 'phenomenon of reification'. This is, indeed, an imprinting of fetishism upon the "whole consciousness of man". This is a kind of imprinting whereby man's qualities and abilities are no longer "an organic part of his personality", but are things which he can 'own' or 'dispose of', like the various objects of the external world. This reifying process causes all of man's qualities to be subjected to a similar treatment. Lukács' example is marriage, thinking of Kant's description, characterized by "the naively cynical frankness peculiar to great thinkers":

"Sexual community", he says, "is the reciprocal use made by one person of the sexual organs and faculties of another. . . . marriage. . . . is the union of two people of different sexes with a view to the mutual possession of each other's sexual attributes for the duration of their lives." 45

While this rational description of marriage may appear to 'get to the very heart of the matter', it is clear, as Lukács points out, that it is limited by its formalism: it is a rationalization of isolated aspects of life without any internal dynamic to bring about interplay between the various parts. The result is the creation of formal laws in order for man to rule those isolated aspects of himself which this formalism describes. This same kind of formalism is evident in Marx's quote: "Christianity with its cultus of abstract man". It is significant that Marx resorts to analogy in order to describe better fetishism and its influence upon all aspects of
capitalist society, particularly the bourgeois intellect. In fact, it seems that Marx's pointed barbs concerning Christianity become central to an understanding of the overall implications of fetishism, namely, the 'imprinting' mentioned above. It is the very 'possession' of one's soul with which the Christian is concerned. It is not an organic part of the whole but rather some isolated aspect which will finally be judged quite separately from the rest of man. While this 'judgement' may be concerned with the history of man, it finally inverts the world and fragments the individual at the point of judgement. This inversion and fragmentation at the point of judgement points back to the same fragmentation of the individual which must be present, in some sense, during the history of man up to this point. That is, there must be a viewpoint of the fragmented individual, that man is not an organic whole, but is rather composed of 'body and soul' and, in fact, that there are material conditions which make this notion some kind of an 'objective reality'. In the way that the use-value and exchange-value of the commodity yield a 'real' analysis of the commodity, it is also true that value is considered to be an objective characteristic of the commodity and its use-value, something separate from its material nature. Similarly, the Christian thought of capitalist society attributes the incorporeal soul with 'reality' and eliminates the very sensual, material nature of man. It inverts the world in a similar way in which Hegel inverts the world: the material is subservient to the ideal; the earth is destroyed and man 'exists'
in a peaceful heaven.\textsuperscript{146}

As I have noted, then, 'undifferentiated' or 'abstract' human labour brings us back to the 'abstract man' of Christianity. While value is the objectification of social unity, as such we are lead back to the paradox of the social relationship "that posits itself for itself, independent of the individuals which it ought to relate and mediate".\textsuperscript{147} Thus, the social relationship, while grounded in man's social power, i.e., as alienated social power, also dominates those individuals like a God because it posits itself above and beyond the mere individuals involved. As Feuerbach has also noted, with Christianity the individual is "at the same time not individual"\textsuperscript{148} because he also poses a relationship with Universal Being or God, so Marx notes that "wherever private production reigns, individual labour becomes social labour only by taking on the form of its direct opposite, the form of abstract universal labour".\textsuperscript{149} Similarly, the commodity, like the Christian, is the unity of the finite and infinite, the unity of opposites. As I have already noted, the commodity is both a use-value and not a use-value at the same time precisely because, inherent in the very nature of the commodity is the intent of production, for exchange - its use-value becomes negated at that point from the product itself, which, of course, must be 'useable' at the same time. What is pointed to from this discussion of value in the commodity and the fact that Marx poses a comparison with the 'cultus of abstract man' inherent in Christianity, is that 'value' is a metaphysical entity and that Marx "merely confines himself to noting that it is the
thing, i.e., the commodity itself or value, that is a scholastic entity, and not the concept which he, Marx, uses to describe how the commodity is made". Thus, this society, based on capital and commodities, is the metaphysics, the fetishism, the 'mystical world'. The objectivity of value, since it is non-material objectivity, does not exist, just as the immortal soul of the Christian does not exist. It is in this way that Marx can ground and make sense of his comparison of fetishism with Christianity; and it is precisely in the very metaphysical nature of the capitalist society that fetishism becomes a philosophical problem, or should one say that it becomes a problem for philosophy? For, if it follows that the very basis of the capitalist society is metaphysical 'non-material objectivity' which, in hard material fact, does not exist, and that every element of this society is permeated by this metaphysics, then so too will the philosophy of capitalist society be grounded in misconception. In fact, while we may say that the fetishized nature of the bourgeois intellect asserts itself through the nature of its fragmented world and thus point to the fact that economics and philosophy are intimately related and influence each other, how can we fully present an analysis of material fact couched in the terms of philosophical idealism? Surely, to do so would require an entirely new kind of philosophy - one which was based on material conditions. The problem is that it has been argued that the very nature of philosophy as the result of the development of the bourgeois intellect does not permit such a possibility. The notion of fetishism cannot be fully and properly described as a 'philosophy' problem precisely because it encapsulates the
very problem that philosophy itself faces: the need to turn the inverted world-view of the ideal over the material 'on its head', and begin philosophy anew grounded in a critical materialist view of the world. As Lucio Colletti notes concerning Hegel:

All 'true' philosophies are a form of idealism, materialism is Unphilosophie, anti-philosophy, and since discussion is possible only where there is a unity of principles, the history of philosophy is only the history of idealism, the history of the progressive realization of the Idea or Christian Logos, the history of the realization of God. 152

Thus, the history of philosophy is one merely of the integration of idea with idea, but not of idea with matter - "anders ist es freilich wenn Philosophie mit Unphilosophie streitet" (it is another matter when philosophy grapples with anti-philosophy). 153

While this kind of stance may appear unnecessarily radical, it is the very nature of present-day bourgeois philosophy which makes this stance necessary. It may be possible to revise such a position and merely assert that materialism is itself another philosophy which opposes all other non-critical, i.e., bourgeois, philosophies, but the implications of materialism pose the kind of reality which is radically different from the reality of the commodity-producing society. It is on this basis that such a stand may be successfully made. As Paul Nizan points out in the Watchdogs:

The philosophies produced by the bourgeois in power, when the spiritual hegemony of bourgeois thought has been established, are incomplete philosophies. They pay no attention whatsoever to the reality of poverty or the reality of servitude - one more reason why they are useful only to the oppressors. 154
Conclusion
A. The General Importance of the Notion of Fetishism

Up to this point, I have examined a) Marx's analysis of the commodity; b) how the nature of the commodity brings about 'fetishism'; c) the relationship between alienation and fetishism; d) the exact nature of fetishism according to Marx and the implications of this fetishism for the commodity-producing society (how the 'bourgeois intellect' is fetishized consciousness). Now it is obvious that the fourth part of this discussion is anything but clear and I claim that it is largely due to the enormity of the problem. The discussion is also limited by the approach that I employed in examining it. The problem I try to examine is how Marx views consciousness as being affected by an economic fact within a particular socio-economic framework. I contended that strict proof appears to be impossible - how can one directly prove that an economic fact causes a certain mode of thought within a particular group of individuals? In fact, this kind of proof seems to be irrelevant - the facts demonstrated in an analysis of several examples seems to tentatively approve the thesis. While recognizing the shortcomings of this analysis, I now desire to leave this area of discussion and move into some final considerations of the fetishism of commodities and its importance within the whole of Marx's analysis of the commodity-producing system.

At the beginning of this essay I mentioned that there is some controversy regarding the importance, the stature, of fetishism within Marx's writings. One side contends that fe-
tishism is 'one of the central points of Marx's entire corpus'
and the other side contends that fetishism is an "independent
and separate entity, internally hardly related to Marx's eco-
nomic theory". I would like to discuss this problem briefly
in order to attempt to settle this dispute in a somewhat reason-
able manner. I suppose that it is fairly clear, from what has
been written so far, that I find Marx's notion of the fetishism
of commodities to be central in understanding anything that
goes on in Capital and, as a result, central to an understanding
of Marx's economic theory. Marx's analysis of capitalism in
Capital is based upon the rudimentary analysis of Value which
occurs in the first forty pages of that book. I say 'rudimentary'
analysis because it is clear that the 'real' nature of Value
is not exactly as it is described in that first forty pages.
Rather, the analysis is an historical analysis - it does not
start with the 'real' commodity as we now have it (this is the
error Marx claims is often made by the political economist and
the philosopher), and then move backwards to rationalize its
existence. The analysis in the first forty pages of Capital
is rudimentary and quite often 'abstract', in the Hegelian
sense of the word, because that is the kind of analysis precisely
necessary in order to discover the meaning of value for the com-
modity in the capitalist mode of production. It is necessary to
tear asunder the veil of value in order to see what lies under-
neath. What the political economist considers to be 'real' is
not real, precisely because the knowledge that the political
economist possesses of the material object is prejudiced by a
particular socio-historical consciousness. This consciousness
is itself developed out of an interaction with the material objects that are in the world. Like the snake eating its own tail, this consciousness can never get at the root of the problem because it fails to see the material object as the limitation of its knowledge. The knowledge possessed by such consciousness transcends the object, according to those who possess such 'knowledge', and yet it is painfully clear, as Marx points out when referring to Hegel, that this 'transcendence' never touches the object: it is merely transcendence in thought. Thus, a fundamental basis is necessary upon which the world may be reconstructed in thought, for if what appears to be 'real' can be shown to be fundamentally 'metaphysical', then surely a meaningful epistemology may be developed based upon certain fundamental issues. The difficulty of this whole procedure is brought home when Marx introduces the notion of fetishism after those first forty pages. Herein lies the 'updating' of consciousness after the abstraction of the fundamental analysis. The introduction of fetishism breaks down the clean compartments of use-value/exchange-value; skilled labour/unskilled labour, etc. - it brings us back to the complexities of the real, material world as consciousness appears to apprehend it. While fetishism is clearly an 'economic fact', the implications of fetishism clearly have more impact upon man's consciousness than a merely 'factual relationship'. The entire possibility of apprehending the metaphysical as 'real', and the real material world as 'maya', the ultimate metaphysical illusion, is prefigured in Marx's discussion of fetishism. And, at the same time, Marx claims that it is the very nature of the commodity which causes this fetishism.
Thus, the whole analysis of the commodity upon which Marx is basing his examination of the capitalist mode of production, the very 'nature' of the commodity, is the foundation of the fetishism of the commodity. As such, I would contend that it is reasonably clear that the notion of fetishism is hardly "not internally related to Marx's economic theory". Surely, just as Marx's theory of alienation is central to his entire analysis of capitalist society, so too is fetishism, as heir to the concept of alienation, a central concept in Marx's economic theory.

The result of this kind of analysis seems to undercut the whole interpretation of Marx as a philosopher and Marxism as a philosophy. In fact, it seems quite clear that Marx was never really a 'philosopher' in that he did not merely 'interpret the world' and did try radically to change it. The whole point of the Marxist radical critique of the existing order is to bring about radical change, revolutionary change, even if it means having to change certain consciousness just as a means towards changing the world. This does not mean a kind of philosophical emphasis upon epistemology but, rather, it means the recognition of a need for a cogent radical epistemology and, indeed, the notion of fetishism seems to fulfill the need for a reasonable beginning. This kind of radical epistemology supersedes all the normal starting points because it roots itself in the material world and a recognition of man's rule in that world as a productive being. As a result, it also asserts that any consciousness or any conceptual framework which recognizes the fundamental basis for human life and human consciousness in the interaction between the material world and man, which
recognizes the pre-eminence of material conditions over the 
idealism which attributes 'ultimate reality' to human conscious-
ness, is fundamentally anti-philosophical. Indeed, I need hardly 
point out that Marx states in his "Alienated Labour": "Philosophy 
can only be realized by the abolition of the proletariat and 
the proletariat can only be abolished by the realization of 
philosophy." As I have already stated, this point of view 
is basically anti-philosophical because of the traditional 
nature of philosophy as representative of the bourgeois intellect. 
Only when philosophy serves the working class will it finally 
clear itself of this stain.

As Marx puts it:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, 
of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity 
and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, think-
ing, the mental intercourse of men, 
appear at this stage as the direct efflux 
of their behavior. The same applies to 
mental production as expressed in the lan-
guage of politics, laws, morality, reli-
gion, metaphysics, etc. of a people. 
Men are the producers of their conceptions 
ideas, etc. - real, active men, as they 
are conditioned by a definite development 
of their productive forces and of the 
intercourse corresponding to these, up to 
its furthest forms. Consciousness can 
ever be anything else than conscious 
existence, and the existence of men is 
their actual life-process. If in all ide-
ology men and their circumstances appear 
upside-down as in a camera obscura, this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-processes as the inver-
sion of objects on the retina does from 
their physical life-process.
B. Fetishism and Marx's Notion of Praxis

The kind of dualism that I have set up to this point, is one of philosophy (idealism) vs. materialism. Philosophy, as an example of the bourgeois intellect, is 'fetishized consciousness'. Materialism, Marxism, is fundamentally anti-philosophical because it is critical of the existing framework within which it finds itself. But this criticism does not stay merely on the level of the 'intellect', that is, materialism does not propose the criticism of consciousness as the ultimate aim of criticism - it seeks to change the social and economic reality which is the basis for this consciousness. The key notion lying at the basis of this swing from criticism of consciousness to criticism of the social and economic reality is the notion of praxis. While the theory of fetishism may be said to allow us to place existing ideologies within a specific, workable context, the notion of praxis becomes a final criterion for the criticism of either consciousness or the 'social and economic reality'. In order to examine properly the development of praxis within Marx's thought would take a great deal of work, for which I have not the space here. What follows is an examination of some of the key points in order to hint at this idea.

In James Hansen's The Dialectic of Praxis in Karl Marx's Das Kapital, we find a discussion of the relation between Hegel and Marx. Hegel, as the idealist philosopher, is involved with the 'analysis of consciousness'. Marx, on the other hand, is involved with the 'analysis of the conditions of consciousness'. Hegel's answers to the problems of man in his time, be-
cause he "works within the traditional philosophical framework", are solutions "which are essentially speculative". Marx calls for the realization of philosophy by its abolition and this abolition occurs through human action, not through mere thought. In fact, "the action of the proletariat is the only action which will realize what is possible for humanity within that given historical period". Thus Marx is asking for the realization "in social and economic terms" of "those ideals which had hitherto remained mere ideals, mere 'oughts', mere possibilities". "The union of philosophy and the material (historical action) is hereby called for". The reason, according to Marx, that philosophy had not been previously 'realized' "is the presence of certain specifiable socio-economic relations". The abolition of these socio-economic relations is what is necessary "if we are to get beyond a conception of philosophy (and the world) which is alienated to the extent that it cannot cope with its own foundations". The examination of philosophy by Marx, an examination of the foundations of bourgeois philosophy, brought Marx to "the recognition that philosophy had come to the end of its speculative tether". What is called for is a new philosophy which will replace the old. In effect, the old philosophy must become real for it to make sense, but this itself strains the limits of the old philosophy for it was never meant to become real - it merely explained, in a theoretical way, what was already accepted as 'real'. Thus, "Marx's conception of philosophy, which remains a philosophy insofar as he did not wish to allow all previous (abstract) thought on the subject of man and
his social relations to pre-empt the title, is a continuation by negation of all previous philosophy". 169 This may indeed stretch the limits of what we think philosophy to be, but only within this context can philosophy remain genuine labour. The 'actualization of philosophy' brings Marx "to a new foundation for all human action, namely, praxis". 170 Hansen goes on to elucidate this notion of praxis. A few important points will be noted here.

The process of the externalization of one's labour and the subsequent recognition of oneself through such an externalization forms the basis of Marx's radically new philosophy. This process is, in the most general case, referred to as praxis, i.e., praxis is the process of self-realization through the mediation of one's work. 171

Hansen emphasizes here that praxis is neither subjective nor objective - it undercut this kind of duality; rather, praxis is the unity of theory and practice.

Man acts through his state of being (which is necessarily historical) and by so doing may change both himself and his relations to others. Development is not a function of thought alone, nor is it a function of empty action, but is instead the function of the dialectical relation of thought and action vis-à-vis the productive relations through which man in society works upon his nature and the past products of nature. 172

It is the inter-acting relationship of knowing and acting which forms praxis, and it is this praxis which accomplishes man's self-realization. In other words, if this is not already abundantly clear, the alienation that Marx describes in the *Early Writings* and the fetishism of the commodity that he describes
in *Capital* are not inherent aspects of the human condition as the bourgeois social scientists and philosophers would have us believe. Through determined action in the world, man may overcome this 'alienation'. It is the specific nature of the commodity-producing economy "which vitiates the self-realization of man in society". And, of course, at the root of this vitiation is the concept of private property, an inherent aspect of the capitalist system. For Marx, it is communism, "the positive abolition of private property as human self-realization", which "is a necessary condition of creative self-affirming human activity".

It is precisely this concept of praxis which permeates *Capital, Vol. 1*. In this, Marx continually analyzes the capitalist mode of production as it relates both to its internal coherence and presuppositions, and also to its nature as an economic system that not only prohibits the full development of human powers through production, but in fact creates the conditions of this self-negation of the human agent.

In this sense, the fetishism of the commodity comes into play within *Capital, Vol. 1*. Here the very nature of the commodity, the primary unit of production, is demonstrated to bring about fetishism, and fetishism as an 'economic fact' is implied as a social and political 'fact', i.e., as having a direct effect upon social and political thought and hence actions. Thus, fetishism causes praxis to submerge beneath the weight of the reification of the productive processes. The condition of creative praxis is that the labourers control their products and
not the other way around. Within the section on fetishism, Marx's outline of the 'communist' form of production is useful in understanding the kind of concrete possibility as alternative to the capitalist mode of production. Within this description we can see the concept of praxis coming to fruition. Here man controls the products of labour and realizes that he creates and hence can control the production process. Private property is eradicated and therefore the primary condition for alienation, fetishism and the veritable annihilation of praxis is eradicated. This mode of production, it must be noted, is no 'utopian' move backwards to some primitive production process. Rather, this mode means the transcendence of capitalism. Indeed, the very conditions which permit the existence of this communist mode of production must arise historically out of the capitalist mode of production.

The problems in discussing praxis on the level I am forced to discuss it here underlines the entire difficulty of this thesis. As Lucio Colletti ably warns us in his book on Marxism and Hegel, we should not consider Marxism a theory of praxis in that praxis becomes the mere "recognition of oneself through such an externalization [the externalization of one's labour]." 178 It is precisely the relation between logical reality and material reality which this paper has been both presupposing and explicating. Praxis, if it is to have any meaning for Marxism, must be primarily a materialist doctrine, that is, it must concern itself with 'reality' over and above logical reality. Being is predicated over thought. This is not to say that no relation exists between the two - that would be absurd - but, rather,
that what one is constantly referring to when one refers to concepts such as 'alienation' or 'fetishism' is the concrete result upon consciousness of real material economic forces. This effect is so deep-rooted that mere consciousness of alienation will not overthrow the results of that alienation upon consciousness.

Marx is saying that what must be overcome is the very real root of the problem of alienation and fetishism - the capitalist mode of production, and this overcoming obviously will not be brought about merely through thought. Praxis then becomes meaningful in the way that it is used, as both a theory and the working-out of that theory in material ways. The theory of praxis is also useful in positing a possible way of acting in accordance with a unified concept of the individual and his interaction with the state. The problem in discussing alienation and fetishism in this abstract way is precisely the very possibility of distorting these very concepts. How is it that what Colletti considers "the unifying theme at the basis of his (Marx's) entire work: the theme of 'reification' or 'estrangement' or . . . the theme of the hypostatization or substantiation of the abstract" could be entirely absent from all dialectical materialist thought? How could a whole branch of Marxism ignore this concept? Perhaps the answer lies in the very distortion of Marx present in those writings. I am not concerned with an explication of this possibility (Colletti does it quite well, anyway), but rather with a very real warning concerning the difficulty of distinguishing between a description of thought and 'being'. Colletti outlines exactly where I
would think such a discussion would start from:

There can be no thought unless something is previously given to be thought; which means that the objectivity of reality - or in other words the condition for there being a content to knowledge - is a condition for the existence of thought (since there can be no thought except thought with a determinate object). On the other hand if in this sense reality is the cause and thought the effect, it is also true that, in so far as what is 'thought' (pensato) is inevitably a product of thought (pensiero), what was at first cause now becomes effect and what was effect becomes the cause of its cause. Any attempt to evade this two-fold process, in which reality and thought appear alternately as limiting condition and that which has limiting conditions placed upon it, is only an illusion. Reality, in fact, is that which is objective, and the objective - contrary to idealism - is precisely that which is external to and independent of thinking subjectivity. It is no less true, however - contrary to empiricism or primitive materialism - that an indispensable condition for discriminating the objective from the subjective and, therefore, reality from illusion, is, most assuredly, thought - in a word, subjectivity itself. All of which means that induction and deduction here reciprocally imply and mutually require one another; for, just as reality is anterior and independent, and thought in relation to it is something on which limiting conditions are placed, so it is also true that we can only arrive at a recognition of that reality deductively, i.e., through a process from which reality emerges as the result of a sifting and a selection carried out by thought.

This thesis has attempted to explicate the notion of fetishism from precisely this point of view. To repeat, I see the concept of fetishism and its inter-related theories as being central to Marx's entire corpus. Further, I see the real processes
which are at the root of commodity-fetishism, the very state of commodity-production, to be the root cause of a whole 'system of alienation'. Fetishism, arising out of the processes of production of capitalist society, permeates all levels of that society, including consciousness of that society, within that society. As such, philosophy has no real justification for a claim to 'transcendence'. In fact, philosophy has been just as much an aspect of the bourgeois intellect as political economy. At the same time, a mere description of philosophy as ideology does nothing really concrete to change the conditions allowing the existence of philosophy as ideology. The plight of the worker is not to be changed through the adoption of a particular set of 'concepts'. Only when philosophy becomes 'useful' in relation to the ends of the working-class will it have fulfilled its historical function as 'radical critique'. That cannot occur as long as philosophy sees itself as a self-enclosed, elitist form of thought with nothing whatsoever to do with the 'dirty rabble'. Only when philosophy is based in a materialist viewpoint will it be truly realized.
FOOTNOTES


2. Idem.


4. Ibid., p. 35.

5. Idem.

6. Ibid., p. 36.


8. Idem.

9. Ibid., p. 37.

10. Ibid., p. 38.

11. The paragraph referred to is the second paragraph on p. 38, which begins "Let us now consider . . . ."

12. Ibid., p. 38.


15. Ibid., p. 39.

16. Ibid., p. 40.

17. Idem.


19. Ibid., p. 41.


22. Idem.
23. Ibid., p. 42. Marx's point here is that exchange makes no sense as a tautological relationship. Today, coats may be 'exchanged' for coats but only in some superficial way. Basically the same exchange relation holds - a commodity has some equivalent (or in our case 'universal equivalent' in the money form) and it is this mediation by which it is exchanged. Indeed, the quantity of labour embodied in coats may differ from one coat to another but, in general, concrete labour still must be reduced to its lowest common form, abstract labour, in order for two commodities to enter into relation with each other. Thus, the different quantities of labour (and, possibly, different quality labour) are brought down to a similar quality labour, 'abstract labour', in order to consider them relative in an exchange-relation. But the exchange-relation would make no sense in the first place if there were not some difference between the two commodities.

24. Ibid., p. 42.


27. Idem.

28. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

29. Ibid., p. 45. This, of course, points to the very 'unsubstantial reality' inherent in considering the commodity in exchange. The quantity of material wealth increases while the magnitude of value decreases precisely because that which determines the 'magnitude of value', homogenous human labour, is an abstraction. This is not to say that the process which occurred in creating the commodity is abstract but rather that a necessary abstraction occurs when considering the relations of commodities in exchange.

30. Ibid., p. 47.


32. Ibid., p. 48.

33. Ibid., p. 49.

34. Ibid., p. 48.

35. Ibid., p. 49.

36. Ibid., p. 50.

37. Idem.
38. It might be useful at this point to note more distinctly the difference between labour and labour-power that Marx is asserting throughout this discussion. Clearly 'labour' is the concrete human labour expended in the production of any article, whether the labour is skilled or unskilled, whether the labour is measured over a short or long duration of time. On the other hand, 'labour-power' is clearly "human labour in the abstract", the lowest common denominator whereby all forms of concrete labour are reduced to a common form and thus considered exchangeable via the mediation of the commodity embodying concrete human labour in its 'earliest' form. Now the problem arises that commodities are produced expressly for exchange - thus concrete human labour has already become, in some peculiar way, "human labour in the abstract" even before labour is expended in the production of the commodity. It is this point and its various forms and implications which lie at the root of the problem, be it 'alienation', fetishism, etc., and, of course, that this point is central to an understanding of capitalist production. On the other hand, due to the various complications that ensue from this originally simple distinction, in actual capitalist production, it is not always clear where one side of this relation begins and the other ends. I have endeavoured to use Marx's own words or terminology whenever encountering these two 'forms' of labour in the hope that this will allow a better understanding of Marx's meaning.

39. Ibid., p. 51.

40. Ibid., p. 52.

41. Idem.

42. Ibid., p. 53.

43. Ibid., p. 56.

44. Ibid., p. 57.

45. Idem.

46. Idem.

47. Marx's footnote reads: "Such expressions of relations in general, called by Hegel reflex-categories, form a very curious class. For instance, one man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is king." In explaining the value-relation via the coat and linen example, Marx illuminates this example through this footnote on Hegel. The value-relation is similar to this 'master-slave' relation and yet both, as Marx wants to make clear, are social relations "at bottom", not merely relations emanating from either man's 'willing' such a relation in an individualistic sense, nor any other such 'metaphysical principle'.

48. This emphasis on 'nature' or God by Marx is certainly justified and, in fact, is quite central to understanding (and, hence, linking) the relation between the value-relation as 'economic fact' and how this permeates, through different levels of mediations, all levels of society. In examining many of the philosophers and political economists of the 18th and 19th centuries, 'nature' and 'God' cover a host of discrepancies in both political economic theory and philosophy. The mystification apparent through the use of 'God' in various passages of various philosophies is noted by Nietzsche as well as Marx. In Nietzsche's writings one can clearly see how the creation of a 'God' parallels the eventual 'fetishism' of the commodity. Also see The Essence of Christianity by Ludwig Feuerbach, trans. by George Eliot, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). The use of 'Nature' is perhaps a little more subtle - I will allude to a few examples in a later footnote.

49. Ibid., p. 58.
50. Idem.
51. Ibid., p. 60.
52. Ibid., p. 61.
53. Ibid., p. 63.
54. Ibid., p. 64.
55. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
56. Ibid., p. 67.
57. Ibid., p. 69.
58. Ibid., p. 70.
59. Ibid., p. 72.
60. Idem.
61. Idem.

62. The 'form' of the commodity has been examined in the previous chapter. What is significant here, though, is that fetishism is not something which 'appears' afterwards - it does not emanate from some aspect of the commodity that we have already examined. Rather, this fetishism arises out of all of the various relations which make up the commodity - the very 'form' of the commodity itself.

63. Idem.
64. 'Nature of commodity', i.e., as something produced exclusively for exchange and only indirectly for use.

65. Ibid., p. 72.

66. Ibid., p. 73.

67. Idem.

68. Idem.

69. The point, then, is that the product is 'material' and not the kind of 'metaphysical entity' which it appears to be when we talk of value. At the same time, because the product is the 'receptacle of homogenous human labour', there is a tendency to negate its material existence. In fact, since the product is considered merely in the light of exchange, i.e., homogenous human labour, its material existence becomes 'lost'. The 'material receptacle' becomes a metaphysical entity because of the very nature of the labour it is said to embody but which, in fact, is merely an abstraction.

70. Ibid., p. 74.

71. Ibid., p. 75.

72. Idem.

73. Idem.

74. Ibid., p. 74.

75. Ibid., p. 75.

76. Ibid., p. 76.

77. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

78. Ibid., p. 80.

79. Ibid., p. 82.

80. This theme of the role of 'nature' in the social philosophies and economics of 17th to 19th century thinkers could be a study which itself would take at least a thesis in order to elucidate all the pertinent points. For my purposes I only intend to point to the way in which allusions to 'nature' tend to mystify various points in these thinkers' works while also hiding a multitude of 'sins'. In John Locke's works the 'state of nature' is the original state in which men find themselves - a state of freedom in which men order their individual actions and "dispose of their Possessions and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the will of any other Man". Equality is also a primary characteristic of this 'state of nature'. The problem with this state is that it does not ensure the proper conditions for the protection of property. Man enters into a 'Compact' bringing about "one body Politick" in order to preserve his property rights and to ensure that these rights will be upheld within his interactions with other men. The 'state of nature' is then ultimately a primary condition which ensures that certain individual characteristics will be upheld even within the agreed confines of a contractual relation. In other words, man's 'primordial condition' of freedom and equality will be recognized as being extremely important, even immutable, despite the fact that certain freedoms must be relinquished in order to unite into some common 'Body Politick'. This kind of thinking finds its logical conclusions underlined in Herbert Marcuse's essay Repressive Tolerances. It is the tension that exists between man's 'natural rights' and the desire to protect property whereby he relinquishes some of these 'natural rights' that is central to the background of Marcuse's paper. Absolute tolerance may become repressive tolerance precisely because of the obfuscation of this tension. The 'state of nature' becomes nothing more than an attempt at giving absolute justification to a certain historical socio-economic system.

If we examine Thomas Hobbes' work we find a similar use of the 'state of nature' - some primordial condition from which it follows that certain property relations and hence a certain political system must necessarily follow. This necessary system, it is insinuated, is thus totally justified and, in effect, an absolute unchanging condition for man's 'self-realization'. Of course, since such 'states of nature' are purely metaphorical 'hypostatizations' some doubts may arise as to the validity of such attempts at 'absolute justification'. In any case, it seems as unlikely that certain 'eternal truths' may be gleaned from the examination of such hypostatizations as it is unlikely that "Value is a property of things".

I have not the time to go into these matters any further here. Reference to C.B. MacPherson's The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), is useful.

81. In relation to the young vs. the mature Marx controversy, I would like to note the following concerning the 'philosophical humanist' vs. 'scientific economist' bifurcation. In examining Alienated Labour we would come to the following conclusions: Man is a productive being by nature. Man should fulfill himself in his work and that work should be voluntary and enjoyable. Man should feel most at home when working. When working man finds himself in a social relation in which he can identify with his fellow workers and see their common bond - then he finds his essence, his species-being through the work relation which brings him into contact with his fellow man. If this is what 'being human' would entail, outside the capitalist 'system of alienation', then surely the subject matter of any 'humanism'
would describe man's work relations and economic circumstances. On the other hand, if we have a 'system of alienation' which is the case in capitalist society, then any analysis of man's condition which describes itself as 'humanistic' will have to be highly suspect. Philosophy itself in such a society will be suspect - it will deal with man as he is, fragmented or, at least, with some one aspect of this fragmentation (witness the radical bifurcation in the philosophies of Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Sartre, to name just a few that come to mind). It is thus necessary to reject so-called 'humanist' philosophy precisely because it describes no real human being at all. Man's essential function is in his life-activity and species-being - it is the analysis of these economic factors which is humanistic. It follows that the very notion of 'humanism' itself must be redefined and placed within a proper perspective just as philosophy must be radically altered in order to still be of any use to the real human being, the proletarian. Thus the whole bifurcation of Marxist humanism vs. Marx's scientific economics must be rejected from the start. How is 'humanism' any different from a discussion of economic facts? Or is it that this bifurcation emanates from the alienated consciousness?


83. Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. and ed. by T.B. Bottomore (New York, McGraw Hill, 1964), p. 120.

84. Ibid., p. 121.

85. Ibid., p. 120.

86. Idem.

87. Idem.

88. Ibid., p. 122.

89. Marx, Capital, p. 72.

90. Idem.

91. Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p. 122.

92. Ibid., pp. 123-124.

93. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

94. Ibid., p. 125.

95. Ibid., p. 126.

96. Ibid., p. 127.

97. Idem.
98. Ibid., p. 128.
99. Ibid., p. 129.
100. Idem.
101. Ibid., p. 131.
102. Idem.
103. Idem.
104. Idem.
106. Idem.
110. Ibid., p. 71.
111. Marx, Capital, I, op. cit., p. 81.
112. Ibid., p. 74.
113. Ibid., p. 81.
114. Idem.
115. Idem.
117. Marx, Capital, p. 79.
118. This is hardly as facetious as it sounds. Since men and women become mere 'cogs' in the productive process, and, in fact, are regarded only in that they labour for x-hours and produce y-commodity, it is not too difficult to imagine that this 'mechanization' of man in his very 'life activity' will be reflected in the owner's attitude towards the worker. Lukács talks of this in "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" from
History and Class Consciousness trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), and, of course, Marx also clearly and precisely talks of this in his chapter on "Alienated Labour" in Early Writings, op. cit. Modern examples such as the Karen Silkwood case which concerns workers in nuclear power plants in the U.S. also fortify this belief.

119. This relationship concerning the rise of the 'individual' in philosophy (e.g., Descartes and Hobbes, and Locke in social philosophy particularly), the increased accent upon the individual in religion (the rise of Protestantism via Luther), and the historical rise of modern capitalism, has been outlined or talked about by various philosophers. Some good examples are: C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, op. cit.; Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972); parts of Lucio Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, trans. by Lawrence Garner (London: NLB Press, 1973).


121. Idem.

122. Idem.

123. Idem.

124. Idem.

125. Idem.

126. Idem.

127. Idem.

128. Ibid., p. 89.

129. Idem.

130. Idem.

131. Idem.

132. Idem.

133. Idem.

134. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

135. Ibid., p. 90.

136. Ibid., p. 91.

137. Idem.
138. *Idem.*
139. *Idem.*
140. *Idem.*
143. *Idem.*
144. *Idem.*

146. This argument is based upon Lucio Colletti's arguments in *Marxism and Hegel, op. cit.*, p. 276, ff.

151. *Idem.*

155. It may be useful, in this regard, to remember some of the writings of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein asserts that a particular 'Weltanschauung', "the foundation of well-founded belief", is not itself susceptible to direct proof. Philosophical, logical proof reaches a point -"the rock bottom of my convictions", which itself is outside the possibility of being proven (On Certainty, trans. and ed. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), p. 35e.) In this way, the 'real, material world' asserts its independence of whatever I might like to think about it. In fact, Wittgenstein clearly emphasizes 'practice' as the determining circumstance for the truth or falsity of the application of any proposition and, of course, as a result, our knowledge of the world. This is not to say that Wittgenstein is entirely without shortcomings in this regard, but there may be some insight gained here into the kind of proposed method.

157. 'Abstract' here means 'une-sided', i.e., taking either the subjective or objective side of a particular issue out of context and regarding it as the 'truth' or 'reality' of that issue. Obviously, certain kinds of abstraction may be entirely necessary in order to examine an issue - the point is not to forget the larger 'whole' from which the 'parts' are derived (as, for example, Aristotle described the relation between the Polis and the individual in the Politics).

158. In this regard I would like to note some quotes from Istvan Meszaros' book Marx's Theory of Alienation, op. cit., pp. 289-290: "No society can persist without its own system of education. To point to the mechanisms of production and exchange alone in order to explain the actual functioning of capitalist society is quite inadequate . . . the crucial issue for any established society is the successful reproduction of such individual's whole 'own ends' which do not negate the potentialities of the prevailing system of production . . . in addition to reproducing, on an enlarging scale, the manifold skills without which productive activity could not be carried on, the complex educational system of society is also responsible for producing and reproducing the framework of values within which the particular individuals define their own specific aims and ends. The capitalistically reified social relations of production do not perpetuate themselves automatically. They succeed in this only because the particular individuals 'internalize' the outside pressures: they adopt the overall perspectives of commodity-society as the unquestionable limits of their own aspirations . . . Thus the positive transcendence of alienation is, in the last analysis, an educational task, requiring a radical 'cultural revolution' for its realization . . . As we have seen, Marx strongly stressed the objective ontological continuity of the development of capital embodied in all forms and institutions of social interchange and not merely in the directly economic second order mediation of capitalism. This is why the task of transcending the capitalistically alienated social relations of production must be conceived in the global framework of a socialistic educational strategy . . ."

159. Karl Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p. 133.


162. Ibid., p. 29.

163. Ibid., p. 31.

164. Idem.
165. Idem.
166. Idem.
167. Idem.
169. Idem.
170. Ibid., p. 32.
171. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
172. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
173. Ibid., p. 67.
174. See Chapter 3 and the discussion of private property in Marx's "Alienated Labour" in Early Writings, op. cit.
176. Idem.
177. Ibid., p. 71.
178. Lucio Colletti, Marxism and Hegel, op. cit.
179. Ibid., p. 281.
180. Ibid., p. 119.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Marx, Karl. The German Ideology. In Writings of the Young
Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. Edited and translated by

Grounds for Introduction to the Critique of


