DESIRE AND THE PATHS OF RECOGNITION IN HEGEL'S INSTERSUBJECTIVITY

By

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A thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

In the Department of Philosophy

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BROCK UNIVERSITY
June 2005

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This thesis poses two fundamental issues regarding Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity. Firstly, it examines Kojeve’s problematic interpretation of Hegelian intersubjectivity as being solely rooted in the dialectic of lordship and bondage. It is my contention that Kojeve conflates the concepts of recognition (Anerkennung) with that of desire (Begierde), thereby reducing Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity to a violent reduction of the other to the same. This is so despite the plenary of examples Hegel uses to define intersubjectivity as the mutual (reciprocal) recognition between the self and the other. Secondly, it examines Hegel’s use of Sophocles’ Antigone to demonstrate the notion of the individual par excellence. I contend that Hegel’s use of Antigone opens a new methodological framework through which to view his philosophy of intersubjectivity. It is Antigone that demonstrates the upheaval of an economy of exchange between the self and the other, whereby the alterity of the other transcends the self. Ultimately, Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity must be reexamined, not only to dismiss Kojeve’s problematic interpretation, but also to pose the possibility that Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity can viably account for a philosophy of the other that has a voice in contemporary philosophical debate.
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of recognition is the basis of Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity. But how does the relationship between the self and the other play out in the Hegelian dialectic? The problem of the other has become a central issue in contemporary continental philosophy, but what is at question here is whether or not Hegelian intersubjectivity has a conception of the other that resists modernity’s reduction of the other to the same. It is certain that Hegel clearly has a conception of the other in mind when he develops the concept of recognition. However, to what extent does Hegel’s concept of recognition commit the violence of a self-referential othering of the other? Can we speak of a Hegelian intersubjectivity that avoids the trappings of a philosophy of the other that is caught in the solipsism of self-reference? The concept of recognition provides some resolution to these questions. Of course, there are no concepts in Hegel’s philosophy that can be quickly and easily defined – recognition is no different.

This thesis aims to delineate these problematic assertions of Hegel’s dialectical framework. To fully appreciate Hegel’s understanding of intersubjectivity one must move beyond the idea that the dialectic of lordship and bondage accounts for Hegel’s rendering of intersubjectivity and a philosophy of the other. I will examine four distinct variations of Hegel’s rendering of intersubjectivity as the mutual recognition of the other, not in terms of the violent appropriation (sublation) of the other, but rather as the movement towards a philosophy of the other that maintains the alterity of the other while influencing the self’s development towards self-consciousness. I contend that much of the contemporary twentieth century Hegelian scholarship has been influenced through the conflation of the meaning of the terms of desire and recognition, and that this conflation
of these concepts has led to the dramatic overuse of the dialectic of lordship and bondage to account for Hegelian intersubjectivity. This excessive and erroneous use of the dialectic of lordship and bondage primarily occurs in Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel. However, it is evident that Kojeve’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit\(^1\) has extensively impacted contemporary philosophical discourse surrounding the issues of Hegel’s intersubjectivity and the philosophy of the other.

In much of the contemporary literature, the dialectic of lordship and bondage is used as the primary explanation to account for all forms of Hegelian intersubjective relationships. This is so, despite the extensive lexicon of Hegel’s works that propose radically different accounts of these intersubjective relationships. From Hegel’s first and most important distinction between the concepts of desire and recognition, to his discussion on the family, to the discussion of Antigone and the movement of love and sacrifice for the other, and finally to his epistemological accounts of the acquisition of knowledge and the development of self-conscious spirit (Geist), one theme emerges over and above all others: namely, that Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity is predicated on the self’s movement towards self-consciousness that, in every case, ultimately maintains the alterity of otherness over and above other motivations.

In the first section, I will examine the concepts of desire and recognition and demonstrate Hegel’s distinction between these conceptions and the development of the corresponding relationship between the self and the other. Initially, the desire (Begierde) for recognition (Anerkennung) is illustrated through the dialectic of lordship and bondage.\(^2\) In this relationship, the self desires that the other recognize the self as a being in and for itself. The self and the other are both willing to risk their lives so that they
may be certain of their own selfhood. The certainty of selfhood arises when one dominates the other, conquers the autonomy of the other, thereby relegating the other to a thing-like existence. This primitive sphere of recognition is characterized by the desire to consume (sublate) the otherness of the other, and thus results in a non-reciprocal relationship between the self and the other that exists only through domination and servitude. This is perhaps the most well known conception of recognition in Hegel, and has been greatly expounded upon by Kojeve. However, despite the popularity of this interpretation of recognition, this thesis will illustrate how and why Hegelian intersubjectivity cannot simply be reduced to this violent conception of the lord/bondsman relationship, and that Kojeve's adherence to this formulation of recognition is fundamentally flawed in its interpretation and approach. I will illustrate how Kojeve's seemingly deliberate misinterpretation of the concept of desire and recognition developed from the section on "Self-Consciousness" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* has led to the development of a contemporary misreading of Hegel's intersubjectivity that unduly emphasizes the violence of reducing the otherness of the other to the same.

A second conception of recognition appears in the relationship between the self and the other that arises through love. In this sphere, each is for the other what the other is for it.\(^3\) Namely, that the relationship between the self and other represents the union of two self-conscious beings that is predicated on the reciprocal recognition of the other as a free and autonomous individual. What is essential in this relationship is that the alterity of the other is maintained in the union of two consciousnesses, i.e., in the institution of marriage. What love illustrates is a movement beyond the simple desire *(Begierde)*\(^4\) of
consumption that is prevalent in the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Love supersedes the abstract negation of otherness inherent in desire by preserving the otherness of the other. Love finds its enjoyment, not in the consumption of the other, but rather, through the preservation of the other as other. In this mutual preservation, Hegel states, "each is conscious of their own singularity-for-self in the consciousness of the other." The love relationship develops the being for self of self-consciousness, not through the simple bifurcation of self, i.e., the duplication of the other as a mirror image of one’s self, but rather, through the recognition of being for itself that occurs through discovering one’s self in the other that is preserved as other. This relationship has its basis, according to Hegel, in the divine, which signifies a radical break from the violence of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Love signifies an attitude towards the other that preserves the alterity of the other, thus allowing for a reciprocal recognition by each self as other. Thus, in the unity of two individuals (marriage), the desire to sublate the other is negated, instead, the very condition of recognition of one’s self as a being for itself is predicated on the preserved other.

There is also a third form of recognition that goes beyond the attitude of reciprocal love. Although love has its basis in the divine, and thus represents a fundamental attitude of respect for the alterity of the other, an attitude that transcends the carnality of the desire to consume the other, the element of desire still lingers. Love presupposes a fundamental economy of exchange. The very nature of reciprocity is that the attitude of respect for the alterity of the other is an attitude that the self expects from the other in return. However, the form of recognition epitomized by the Antigone drama represents an attitude towards the other that raises the other beyond the economy of
reciprocity to a transcendent realm where the self is sacrificed for the other. This realm of sacrifice must be distinguished from the utilitarian sacrifice of life for the state. The Antigone drama illustrates the recognition of the divine origin of the other. This has a twofold implication: Firstly, it represents the recognition of the divine other through the finite other; and secondly, it is the recognition of the other as divinely other. The other is not simply a thing to be manipulated, nor is it simply a duplicate of the self. The other is not that which the self must annihilate, nor even expect anything in return. This third realm of recognition concerns the recognition of life via the seemingly senseless abstraction of death, and thus represents its claim in the ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). The other is that which silently calls out, and yet demands that the self answer. Antigone represents an attitude toward the other that is purely sacrificial. She expects nothing in return for her dedication to the other, her brother. She sacrifices her life without expectation of return. Hegel’s admiration for the Antigone myth discloses a fundamental insight into his position on the alterity of the other within his philosophy of intersubjectivity.

Finally, I will illustrate how Kojeve’s misreading has influenced Georges Bataille, who treats Hegel’s epistemological framework as being paradigmatically linked to the movements of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Bataille contends that Hegel’s treatment of absolute knowledge and death operates under the same structure as the dialectic of lordship and bondage. In other words, according to Bataille, Hegel’s epistemology operates insofar as one (whom Bataille polemically names the “Sovereign”) appropriates the knowledge of that which cannot be appropriated – namely, death and the absolute. Just as Kojeve interprets Hegel’s intersubjectivity as fundamentally motivated
by the desire for mastery over the other, Bataille interprets Hegel’s epistemology as fundamentally motivated by the desire (albeit in Bataille’s view, the comical desire) for mastery over all existence. Bataille examines the nature of sacrifice in Hegel’s dialectic and asserts that the primary import of Hegel’s claim to absolute knowledge is predicated on what appears to be a flawed account of the nature of death and the possibility of appropriating knowledge from the experience of death. However, because Bataille’s rendering of Hegel’s account of the absolute is based on the same conflation of desire and recognition as that of Kojeve, it becomes evident that what Bataille envisions as the ultimate failure of the Hegelian dialectic, namely the comedy of the paradigm of the master becoming the servant, is a problematic that Hegel carefully navigates. It will become evident that in Hegel’s epistemology, the structure of being is always already predicated on the determinate nature of becoming and that the recognition of the absolute is itself the recognition of the alterity of otherness within this process of becoming.

Ultimately, these distinct moments of recognition illustrate the variations of intersubjective attitudes that all have a place in the Hegelian dialectic. But to what extent does each particular attitude impact upon the whole of Hegelian intersubjectivity? This question is problematic only insofar as it presupposes that there is a singular unifying conception of intersubjectivity in the dialectic. This assumption undercuts the significance of the plurality of attitudes that are found in the dialectic. Although the differing intersubjective attitudes often collide with each other, as is the case with Antigone and Creon, which shows the collision of the divine and civic laws, neither attitude can be absolutely superseded. In other words, each attitude is necessary and fundamental. When speaking of Hegelian intersubjectivity, there is not one conception of
recognition that ultimately subsumes the other forms of recognition. The Hegelian dialectic is not defined by one form of recognition, but rather, is sustained by the plurality of forms of recognition.

2 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977) 111; Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964) 229. All subsequent references to Miller’s translation, Phenomenology of Spirit will be referred to as PhS, and all subsequent references to Baillie’s translation, Phenomenology of Mind will be referred to as PhM.
4 Hegel, FPS, 231.
5 Hegel, FPS, 231.
6 Hegel, FPS, 232; Hegel, ETW, 307; Hegel, PR, 112.
7 The divine has its implications not only with a recognition of otherness as Otherness, but also resonates with Hegel’s conception of the sacrifice as well as his conception of Time as the infinity of the finite.
8 This represents an inverse relationship to the dialectic of Lordship and Bondage whereby the otherness of the other is reduced to a thing-like existence that ultimately establishes a form of Recognition that fails before it begins. This will become evident through the following section.
9 PhS, 267-8; PhM, 467-8.
KOJEVE AND THE DESIRE FOR RECOGNITION

In the Kojevian interpretation, the concept of recognition has been reduced to the concept of desire in the analysis of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. According to Kojeve, Hegel’s intersubjectivity is solely rooted in the desire for recognition in the master/slave dialectic.¹ This has resulted in an interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic that represents the essential relationship² between the self and the other as purely oppositional, and whose telos lies in the domination of the other by the self. Kojeve’s analysis, while being consistent within the context of the “Self-Consciousness” section (IV A) in the Phenomenology, does not however, represent the sum of Hegel’s analysis of recognition. Kojeve fails to recognize the multiple forms of recognition in Hegelian intersubjectivity, and thus fails to account for the complexity of Hegel’s psychology.

Hegel begins his exposition on desire and recognition by identifying the primitive stages of the desire for recognition in the face of otherness. When consciousness steps out of the vacuous immediacy of sense certainty and perception, and realizes itself as a being for itself, it becomes aware of the uncertainty of itself in the face of the other that stands opposed to it.³ The other is also a being for itself, and it calls into question the very certainty of the self that finds itself in opposition. According to Hegel, this has a double significance:

Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.⁴ The other is that which negates the certainty of the self because the other is seen as a mirror of the self. The other is the duplicate image of the self, but it is not the self. At
the same time, the self sees the other as only this mirror image, and thus regards the other’s existence as mere reproduction of its own self. How and to what extent is this process of sublation of the other carried out? In other words, determining the extent of the process of sublation determines the overall structure of Hegel’s concept of recognition. To illustrate this I will show how Kojeve’s interpretation of recognition differs from that of Hyppolite, Taylor and Williams.

Robert Williams, in his book, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, states:

“It [the confrontation] signifies a loss of self, an alteration, or a shattering of immediate being-for-self. The self loses its immediate and naïve self-certainty. It is no longer in control of the situation. The presence of the (unknown) other alters and decenters its situation.”

Williams identifies the immediate reaction of the self as realizing its loss of “ naïve self-certainty” and the subsequent loss of control. The self longs to revive the certainty of its being. It longs to reassert itself over the unknown other that has decentered the being for self of self-consciousness. This resonates with Hegel’s statement:

Convinced of the nothingness of this other, it definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the truth of this other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires the certainty of its own self, as true certainty, a certainty which it has become aware of in objective form.

Hyppolite explains that the desire for recognition is the desire to return to the certainty of the self as a pure undifferentiated I. The only means to procure this return is through the act of sublating the other that calls into question the certainty of the self. However, the result of this return is that the certainty of the self is one degree removed. The certainty of the I is no longer a simple self-referential certainty, but is an objective certainty – it is a truth that has established itself amidst the alterity of otherness that
opposes consciousness’ mere identity of itself. Hyppolite’s analysis illustrates the consumptive character of the desire for recognition – that the only means to establish the truth of self-consciousness is to overcome the other that opposes it.

Kojeve however, goes further. His analysis of desire, although seemingly consistent with Hyppolite’s analysis, is far more radical. For Kojeve, “the I of Desire is an emptiness that receives a real positive content only by [the] negating action that satisfies Desire in destroying, transforming, and ‘assimilating’ the desired non-I.” Thus for Kojeve, the initial motivation of desire is a radical annihilation of the non-I (the other) by the self. What is striking in Kojeve’s analysis is the terminology of annihilation and the non-I. At this point, the other does not have the classification of an other-being, but is simply the objectified mirror image of the self. Thus, the other is not an other but is simply a non-I, relegated to a thing-like existence, to be annihilated at the whim of the being for self of a dominant self-consciousness.

Significantly in Kojeve’s analysis, the very notion of recognition becomes predicated on the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Desire for recognition becomes the desire for dominance in a power-relationship that is itself predicated on asymmetrical relationships, that is, each desires to be recognized as lord, as absolute being for self. This immediately implies an asymmetrical relationship because the desire for mastery assumes the existence of those whom the master rules, that is, the slave. What self-consciousness desires, therefore, is to appropriate the thing that calls into question the certainty of its self. Self-conscious desire desires that the non-I recognize the certainty of the self’s own being. According to Hegel, the self must be willing to enter into a life and death struggle to assure the certainty of the self. The self must fight to the death, if
necessary, to assert its dominance over the non-I. Through the life and death struggle, desire becomes the desire to be recognized as lord and master over the non-I. Kojeve states: “It is only by being ‘recognized’ by another, by many others, or – in the extreme – by all others, that a human being is really human, for himself as well as for others.”

However, the peculiar aspect of the desire for recognition is that it is contingent upon the existence of the other. Thus, what is essential is that the non-I continues to exist so that the self as lord may be recognized as lord. Kojeve thus states:

Their murderous action is abstract negation. It is not negation [carried out] by consciousness, which overcomes in such a way that it keeps and preserves the overcome-entity and, for that very reason, survives the fact of being overcome. [This “overcoming” is “dialectical.”] “To overcome dialectically” means to overcome while preserving what is overcome; it is sublimated in and by that overcoming which preserves or that preservation which overcomes.

Thus, the desire for recognition is the process of sublation, which is simultaneously the process of destruction and preservation. It is the sublation of the non-I into the self as the dialectical overcoming of the non-I that does not eliminate the being of the non-I, but rather, eliminates the autonomy of the non-I.

In this formulation, the bondsman is forced to recognize the dominance of the master. However, the master, through sublating the non-I as its bondsman fails to achieve its goal of recognition. The bondsman exists for the master as a thing, as a non-I, and thus lacks the qualification of being fully self-conscious. Kojeve states: “The Master, unable to recognize the Other who recognizes him, finds himself in an impasse. The Slave on the other hand, recognizes the Other (the Master) from the beginning.”

The relationship is thus asymmetrical and non-reciprocal. The truth of certainty of the master is predicated on the unessential consciousness of the bondsman that has, for the
master, only a thing-like existence, whereas the bondsman is free from the desire to be recognized, and free to work on its own existence as a being for itself. Hegel states:

"Through work (Arbeit), however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is."\(^{16}\) The bondsman is free to work (Arbeiten) on its own existence, seemingly free from the desire to be recognized by the other. Whereas the master predicates his/her existence, as Kojeve illustrates, on being recognized by the other or all others; whereas the bondsman's existence becomes predicated on the apparent independence of working towards its own concrete goals.

This is nothing more than an ideal moment. The bondsman’s independence is not sufficient to be characterized as truly independent. According to Hegel: "Since the entire contents of its natural consciousness have not been jeopardized, determinate being still \textit{in principle} attaches to it; having a mind of one’s own is self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in servitude."\(^{17}\) The bondsman’s freedom is only sustained by the fear of the master. The freedom that the bondsman recognizes through the confrontation with the other (the master) is nothing more than the freedom from the desire for recognition. The bondsman is incapable of becoming absolutely free from the service of the master.

In the dialectic of lordship and bondsman, it is only after the life and death struggle, where the bondsman submits to the master, that it becomes aware of itself as a being for itself through work. The transition here is the movement from the realization of self-consciousness that was attempted by the desire for recognition, but inevitably failed, to the partial realization of self-consciousness by the bondsman through work. Kojeve states:

\[\text{[T]his consumption, this idle enjoyment of the Master's, which results from the immediate satisfaction of desire, can at the most procure some}\]
pleasure for man; it can never give him complete and definitive satisfaction. Work, on the other hand, is repressed Desire, an arrested passing phase; or, in other words, it forms-and-educates.

Here, Kojeve admits to an intersubjectivity that cannot escape conflict and can only deal with the other by alienating the self from the other. He states, "...there is no Slave without a Master. The Master, then, is the catalyst of the historical anthropogenetic process. He himself does not participate actively in this process; but without him, without his presence, this process would not be possible." This illustrates the significance that Kojeve places on the master/slave relationship and the importance of the psychology of mastery in this relationship. The possibility of the acquisition of self-consciousness can only come about through the desire for recognition. Without this as the "catalyst," there can be no evolution of self-consciousness. Thus, self-consciousness finds itself only through conflict, not through a mutual reciprocal recognition of another self-consciousness.

In the Kojevian analysis of the lord/bondsman relationship, the failure of recognition is predicated on the desire to sublate the other. But for Kojeve, there is no failure in this relationship. The master does not fail; his function is ultimately to begin the process. Kojeve states, "...all human, anthropogenetic Desire – the Desire that generates Self-Consciousness, the human reality – is, finally, a function of the desire for ‘recognition.’" The self desires recognition, and the only means to achieve this is to consume the autonomy of the other, to negate the essential nature of the other by forcefully relegating the other to a thing-like existence as a non-I. For Kojeve, the human reality, that is, the intersubjective reality is one that is ultimately predicated on this
violent relationship between dominant and submissive consciousnesses motivated by the desire to be recognized as lords qua self-consciousness.

What we see in Kojeve’s analysis is the subsumption of recognition under the category of desire. For Kojeve, the two terms cannot exist independently of one another. Recognition is nothing more than the desire to be recognized as master over all others. Kojeve’s analysis is actually distinct from Hegel’s characterization of the process of desire and recognition. Hegel explicitly affirms that the process of life is itself the process of the desire to be recognized by another, as he states: “self-consciousness is Desire,” and the satisfaction of desire is quenched through the recognition of and by the other. There is an inextricable link between desire and recognition in Hegel’s explanation, however, this link is not one in which the two terms become equivalent. In other words, although recognition begins with the desire to be recognized by another, recognition itself is not a mere process of desire – the process of consuming and annihilating the desired object. Yet for Kojeve, recognition is precisely predicated on the need to consume, dominate and annihilate the other as the means of acquiring self-certainty. Despite the fact that the desire for recognition ends in failure as the master fails to acquire self-certainty through his domination, Kojeve demonstrates his dogmatic adherence to his version of the desire for recognition as the founding principle for humanity and civilization.

What is at issue here is whether Hegel’s intersubjectivity can be relegated to Kojeve’s analysis of the master/slave dialectic. If it is the case that the desire for recognition is, as Kojeve states, that which elucidates our humanity, then Hegelian intersubjectivity is predicated on the violent reduction of the other to the same. But this
interpretation is not the only formulation of intersubjectivity in Hegel. Although Kojeve’s analysis is not structurally flawed, as it is relatively consistent with Hegel’s section (IV A), “Lordship and Bondage,” in the Phenomenology, it is clear that Kojeve overestimates the role of desire, under which he unabashedly subsumes recognition.

This is glaringly evident when compared with Hyppolite’s analysis of desire and recognition. Hyppolite begins with this quote\(^\text{22}\) from the Phenomenology:

Consciousness has, \textit{qua} self-consciousness, henceforth a twofold object – the one immediate, the object of sense-certainty and of perception, which, however, is here found to be marked by the character of negation; the second, \textit{viz.} itself, which is the true essence, and is found in the first instance only in the opposition of the first object to it.\(^\text{23}\)

Hyppolite then goes on to explain: “The end point of desire is not, as one might think superficially, the sensuous object – that is only a means – but the unity of the I with itself. Self-consciousness is desire, but what it desires, although it does not yet know this explicitly, is itself: it desires its own desire.”\(^\text{24}\) Hyppolite’s emphasis that what self-consciousness truly desires is itself offers a far more convincing and consistent psychological interpretation of Hegel’s concept of desire. Desire is immediately the desire to consume and enjoy through consumption the external object. However, as Hegel and Hyppolite both discover the goal of desire is not simply the consumption (negation) of an external object, but rather is that desire is the desire for one’s self. Desire seeks to reconcile one’s self with itself in the context of the radical otherness of life (the living process that sustains otherness) that opposes it. This analysis is drastically different from what Kojeve offers:

Desire is human – or more exactly, “humanizing”...To be \textit{human}, man must act not for the sake of subjugating a \textit{thing}, but for the sake of subjugating another \textit{Desire} (for the thing). The man who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess the \textit{thing} as to make another
recognize his right...to that thing, to make another recognize him as the owner of the thing.\textsuperscript{25}

Kojeve’s analysis of desire does not fully appreciate the import of this essence of desire. Kojeve remains insistent on his emphasis on mastery: The emptiness of desire can only be quenched by dominating all that is external to the self, including each other self-consciousnesses who exist for Kojeve as non-I’s.

Richard Lynch\textsuperscript{26} argues that Kojeve’s purposeful omission of the key passages that emphasize the mutual reciprocity of recognition that are explicit in the opening section of “Self-Consciousness” in the Phenomenology, consequently delivers a reading of Hegelian intersubjectivity that inaccurately favors the role of mastery in the development of intersubjectivity.\textsuperscript{27} In the opening section of Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, “In Place of an Introduction,” Kojeve’s analysis clearly omits reference to Hegel’s explication of the necessity of recognition to be a mutual recognition. Instead, Kojeve explains the concept of desire and immediately shifts his analysis to the master/slave dialectic.\textsuperscript{28} What follows is a problematic and “one-sided” interpretation of recognition. According to Lynch, the result of this analysis is an interpretation of the master/slave dialectic that overestimates the significance of this dialectical development.

Lynch states: “Kojeve, then, in neglecting Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition, has in effect reified the roles of master and slave.”\textsuperscript{29} Kojeve’s analysis substitutes the master/slave dialectic for the process of mutual recognition. Lynch goes on to state:

Having reified the Scheine of master and slave into actual social positions, Kojeve allows himself only one route to return to the real theme of Hegel’s discussion: the mutual recognition that makes self-consciousness possible through further struggle, first through work, which then leads to revolutionary class struggle, which ends in the utopian victory of the slave and opens into a promised land of liberated recognition.\textsuperscript{30}
Lynch suggests that the master/slave dialectic is nothing more than a *Scheine* (show) of one possible development towards self-consciousness. Kojeve, thus, misrepresents the significance of the roles of the master and slave by interpreting them to be actual, substantive social positions. This misrepresentation, Lynch states, allows Kojeve "to read these passages of the *Phenomenology* in support of his Marxist commitment to a revolutionary social vision, [in which] he chose to emphasize the struggle leading to a liberating revolution."^33

George Armstrong Kelly makes a similar argument regarding Kojeve's analysis of the master/slave dialectic. Although Kelly does not emphasize Kojeve's omission of the place of mutual recognition, he does question the rather "one-sided" interpretation of the master/slave dialectic given by Kojeve: "Lordship and Bondage is a 'moment' of *Selbstbewusstsein* that foreshadows society and has explicit historical ramifications. However, the view that the scenario represents a purely social phenomenon is one-sided and needs correction."^35 According to Kelly, the master/slave dialectic has a threefold implication. Firstly, it has the social ramifications, for which Kelly gives credit to Kojeve for elaborating. However, Kelly argues that Kojeve fails to accurately interpret the psychological ramifications of the inner struggle of consciousness that feels itself to be incomplete, and thus desires to be recognized by another. The third ramification that Kelly discusses is the interplay between the inner struggle, namely the self's desire for recognition, and the external struggle between the self and other that is played out in the struggle for recognition. Kelly's analysis holds that Kojeve interprets only the external struggle and does not provide an accurate examination of its inner psychological consequences. Kelly comes to a twofold conclusion:
Firstly, the slave-master dialectic is appropriate only to a certain stage of consciousness for Hegel, even though it is still cancelled and retained (aufgehoben); and comprehensive forms of estrangement; secondly, both principles are equally vital in the progress of the spirit towards its destiny: if Marx developed one side of this dichotomy, Nietzsche\(^{37}\) seized upon the other.\(^{38}\)

The first conclusion summarizes the above argument. The second alludes to Kojeve’s Marxian influence, namely that the development of the slave consciousness within the external (social) realm, is responsible for the development of history and culture. It is this Marxian influence that determines\(^{39}\) (or possibly is determined by) Kojeve’s “one-sided” interpretation of the master/slave dialectic.

We can then see one possible reason for why Kojeve would reduce the concept of recognition to the violent character of desire. This is an error that Hyppolite is careful not to make. For Hyppolite, desire is not predicated on this violent consumptive nature, it is “[that which] seeks itself in the other: man desires recognition from man.”\(^{40}\) Although semblances of this statement can be found in Kojeve’s works, the concept of recognition in Hyppolite’s reading is radically different.

Hyppolite does not reduce the concept of recognition to the concept of desire. Firstly, Hyppolite takes into account Hegel’s early Jena works that deal with the concept of recognition through love: “Love goes beyond the categories of objectivity and makes the essence of life actually real by preserving difference within union.”\(^{41}\) However, Hyppolite goes on to explain that in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel’s analysis does not revolve around this particular conception of recognition.\(^{42}\) The conception of recognition on which Hegel primarily focuses, according to Hyppolite, is the mutual recognition of two individuals who, “[in] reciprocally recognizing each other, creates the element of spiritual life – the medium in which the subject is an object to itself, finding itself
completely in the other yet doing so without abrogating the otherness that is essential to self-consciousness. Reciprocal recognition is thus the essential element for consciousness to return to itself – to become truly self-conscious. It is through this mutual recognition that consciousness escapes the empty formalism of identity (I = I) by going out, as it were, into the otherness (life) of other consciousnesses, and returning to itself to recognize itself in the process of identity in difference. This recognition can only be achieved through another consciousness that is wholly independent, and is freely and mutually recognizing me as I am recognizing it. If the other consciousness is viewed as an unessential consciousness, and it is viewed as a simple object, then recognition becomes impossible. In this instance, the other consciousness is no more meaningful than a scrap of food that is consumed and destroyed. In this case, recognition becomes reduced to the basic element of desire which is ultimately unfulfilling and empty. Thus, according to Hyppolite, for this mutual recognition to take place, both consciousnesses must be essential consciousnesses. This is the manner in which the subject becomes the object to itself, finding itself completely in the other.

In Charles Taylor’s analysis of Hegel’s section on “Self-Consciousness,” we see an even more dramatic separation between the concepts of desire, recognition and the ensuing master/slave dialectic. Taylor begins with the same quote as Hyppolite regarding the double object of self-consciousness. In this more stark separation, Taylor systematically defines the contexts in which the concepts of desire, recognition and the master/slave dialectic emerge. Desire begins as consciousness requires external things for subsistence. Taylor states: “He [a human being] is a being of desire. But in consuming what he desires, he seems to overcome this foreign reality and recover
integrity. Except that this integrity is not adequate to what he is." Taylor is thereby brought to Hegel’s statement: “Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” This is completely consistent with Hyppolite’s analysis thus far. However, Taylor differs from Hyppolite when he begins his analysis of the master/slave dialectic.

Taylor demonstrates the relative failure of the master/slave dialectic to achieve self-consciousness through recognition. Taylor exhibits the failure of the attempt at mastery on the part of the dominant consciousness to acquire a meaningful recognition of itself through the other consciousness that is the unessential consciousness. The benefit of the outcome of the master/slave dialectic is, according to Taylor, twofold: First, the slave is forced to toil with the materials of existence and is introduced to the discipline of work. This is a significant development, as Taylor states: “Conceptual thinking arises out of the learned ability to transform things. We learn to know the world of material reality, and ultimately our own minds, in trying to bend this matter to our design. Conceptual thought grows out of this interchange.” Secondly, the slave is introduced to the fear of death that imparts meaning onto the essence of life. According to Taylor, it is the fear of death that “shakes them loose, as it were, from all the particularities of their life.” It is this through this prospect of total upheaval that the slave comes to recognize its being as a universal being. The slave as universal being represents the slave’s recognition of its own finitude, namely, that death is inescapable not just for him/her, but
for all beings. This realization demonstrates the universality of life and of death.

Through the fear of death, the slave recognizes the ubiquity of the external particularities of its life and begins focus on its being as a universal being.

Where Taylor diverges from Hyppolite is his insistence that recognition and the master/slave dialectic are separate, but equally essential paths to self-consciousness.

The principle path to integrity [self-consciousness] lies through recognition by another; in the human environment a man can recognize himself in others. But now we see another important path; man can come to see himself in the natural environment by making it over in conformity with his own project. For in doing this we achieve another standing negation, a reflection of ourselves which endures. 54

Taylor distinguishes recognition as the first possibility for consciousness to achieve self-consciousness. However, the second path is through the development of the consciousness of the slave who develops his/her own self-consciousness from the materials of existence. For Taylor, although recognition may begin the process of the master/slave dialectic, albeit in a very primitive form, recognition is not what occurs through the development of this process. In the master/slave dialectic, recognition fails almost immediately. What is left is the development of the slave, through the fear of death and the earnestness of work, to acquire a new path to self-consciousness. Thus, from Taylor's analysis, Kojeve not only conflates the notions of desire and recognition, he also conflates recognition with the significance of the newly forged path of the slave through fear and work.

Williams also observes that conflict is only one possible outcome of the process of recognition. 55 Intersubjectivity may also take the form of love and reconciliation, that is, a mutual reciprocal recognition of other as other. He, like Taylor and Hyppolite, makes a distinction between the concepts of recognition and desire: "Recognition
(Anerkennung), unlike desire, does not essentially involve a reduction of the other to the same. Recognition involves a search for satisfaction in the uncoerced recognition of the other. By conflating this distinction and reducing the concept of recognition to desire, Kojeve is led to the hasty conclusion that humanity and human nature are predicated on the desire for mastery, the desire to consume the other that has been relegated to nothing more than an object (characterized as the non-I). He is mired in an interpretation of Hegelian intersubjectivity that can only be characterized as typically imperialistic and inherently violent. However, with Hyppolite’s analysis, we see a drastically less aggressive characterization of the concept of desire. For Hyppolite, desire is not this radical consumption through domination and annihilation, but is rather, the desire of self-consciousness to affirm itself amid the unknown alterity of life.

Kojeve’s analysis leads unequivocally to a conception of recognition that is defined by the asymmetrical struggle for dominance through power-relationships between the self and the other. It is this that Kojeve deems to be the founding principle of humanity. What becomes clear through this analysis is that Kojeve reduces the concept of recognition to his radical concept of desire. For Hegel, there is an inextricable link between desire and recognition, but the two terms are not equivalent. This is illustrated by Hyppolite’s analysis where he is careful to make the distinction between the concepts of desire and recognition, the latter is fulfilled only through mutual recognition. This is a distinction that Kojeve does not make, and as Lynch points out, Kojeve appears to purposefully omit Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition. This is a distinction that ultimately separates the concept of desire from the dialectic of lordship and bondage. This is also a position that is further taken up by Taylor.
Taylor explicitly distinguishes between Hegel’s concept of recognition that is ultimately predicated on mutual reciprocity and the dialectic of lordship and bondage where the attempt at recognition fails before it begins. According to Taylor, the dialectic of lordship and bondage represents a separate and distinct path to self-consciousness from that of recognition, which is ultimately, mutual recognition. It is clear that Kojeve overestimates the role of desire in his analysis of recognition. It leads him to commit to an intersubjectivity whereby the founding principle of humanity is one of domination, annihilation and oppression. It is evident that Kojeve’s interpretational liberties represent an inaccurate portrayal of Hegelian intersubjectivity.

Although Kojeve offers a highly motivational (radical) option for his Hegelian interpretation, one must be wary of the oversight by which Kojeve clearly analyzed Hegelian intersubjectivity. Furthermore, one must be cautious of Kojeve’s Marxist (Left-Hegelian) approach. Given Kojeve’s firm belief in the necessity of delivering philosophical discourse into the hands of political pedagogy, one must wonder if the oversights and omissions of Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel are not merely coincidental, but ambitiously deliberate. In all, Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel’s concept of recognition and desire should be read with great suspicion. His problematic approach to these concepts poses a formulation of Hegelian intersubjectivity that is almost unspeakably despotic, especially given our knowledge of the atrocities of Stalinist Russia and the ensuing economic failures of communism in the west. It becomes evident that Kojeve’s interpretation is not wholly consistent with Hegel’s philosophical stance, and that his interpretational liberties represent an inaccurate portrayal of Hegelian intersubjectivity. In turning to Hyppolite and Taylor, we can see the importance of
recognizing the multiple forms of recognition in Hegel’s corpus in order to acquire an accurate conception of intersubjectivity in Hegel’s thought. But one must question why Hegel chose to demonstrate a primitive form of recognition that immediately fails in the Phenomenology. Thus, we must examine the form of recognition through love that Hyppolite, Taylor and Williams suggest as being the more accurate conception of mutual recognition.

1 Kojeve, 8-9.
2 I say essential relationship because the domination is the initial motivation in the exchange between the self and the other in the analysis of the M/S dialectic. Of course, the subsequent development (transition) changes the perspective significantly mainly because the Master fails to realize the role of work and becomes dependent on the Slave for production while the Slave, through work, finds independence (alienation) from that which he works on and thus is less dependent on the Master. Of course, this is only an ideal moment because materially, the Slave is still wholly dependent on the Master for subsistence.
3 PhS, 104; PhM, 218.
4 PhS, 111; PhM, 229.
6 PhS, 109; PhM, 225.
8 Kojeve, 5.
9 PhS, 114; PhM, 232-3.
10 Kojeve, 9.
11 Kojeve, 14-5.
12 Kojeve’s use of the term “sublimation” appears to be used equivalently with the concept of “sublation.” I can find no evidence for Kojeve linking Recognition with the Sublime (spiritual or moral), which leads me to believe that he is using sublimation in a Freudian sense, meaning to redirect more primitive impulses towards a higher goal.
13 Kojeve, 15.
14 Kojeve, 21.
15 PhS, 116-7; PhM, 236-7.
16 PhS, 118; PhM, 239.
17 PhS, 119; PhM, 240.
18 Kojeve, 24-5.
19 Kojeve, 7.
20 PhS, 109; PhM, 225.
21 Kojeve, 7.
22 Hyppolite quotes from the Baillie translation and thus, for all quotes referred to by Hyppolite, I will use the Baillie and list the equivalent pages from the Miller translation.
23 PhM, 220; PhS, 105.
24 Hyppolite, 160
25 Kojeve, 40.
27 Lynch, 34.
28 Lynch, 34.
This is a position that Charles Taylor examines in detail: namely, that the Master/Slave dialectic is not an actual development of the process of Recognition, but rather, is a development of an alternative path towards self-consciousness. I will demonstrate Taylor's argument in greater detail following my analysis of Hyppolite.

This is an explanation that Lynch accredits to discussions with Richard Kearney.


Kelly, 194.

Kelly, 195.

Kelly's reference to Nietzsche here is rather vague. He does not expand on the relationship between Nietzsche and these "comprehensive forms of estrangement" or the "vital progress towards spirit." I am reluctant to venture a hypothesis regarding this vague statement because its treatment would take me too far a field.

Kelly, 214.

It is unessential whether Kojeve's Marxian influence determines his analysis, or whether his analysis determines his Marxian influence. Either way, Kojeve's analysis and conclusion remain the same, namely that humanity begins with the Desire for mastery, that history is then developed by the slave consciousness, and finally, that history will inevitably end with the complete reversal of the slave becoming the final master.

Hyppolite, 160.

Hyppolite, 164.

I will give a more thorough analysis of Hyppolite's statement regarding Love in the following subsection.

Hyppolite, 166.

Charles Taylor. Hegel. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 197) 148-70. All subsequent references to this work will state the author's last name and page number.

Taylor, 151.

See endnote 24.

Taylor, 152.

Taylor, 152.

PhS, 110; PhM, 226.

Taylor, 154-5.

Taylor, 157.

Taylor, 154.

Taylor, 155.

Taylor, 156.

Williams, 89.

Taylor, 155.

MUTUAL RECOGNITION THROUGH LOVE

Hegel’s analysis of love as a possible route towards self-consciousness began early in his career. In the late 1790s, Hegel began writing on the concept of love as the dominant theme of Christianity that leads to the possibility of an intersubjectivity of ethical equality. Hegel states:

A loving circle, a circle of hearts that have surrendered their rights against one another over anything their own, that are united solely by a common faith and hope, and whose pleasure and joy is simply the pure single-heartedness of love, is a Kingdom of God on a small scale.

Martin Gammon summarizes Hegel’s early concept of love as “[indicating] a completely shared sense of being with another, or a ‘living union between the individual and his world.’ This fundamental similarity or likeness (Gleiche), then, overcomes the positing of conceptual and ethical opposition between individuals.” The concept of love that emerged from Christianity unifies oppositional individuals by creating a community whose common bond lies in the developing and sustaining of an ethics, wherein the individual remains an individual, while simultaneously existing under the purview of a universal spirit that does not negate the independence of the individual. According to Gammon, Hegel’s early notion of love as the community of individuals that unite to form a “Kingdom of God on a small scale” is dominated by the concept of Gleichheit, meaning “to be like,” or “to resemble.” In this instance, mutual recognition is predicated on the Christian ideal of equality of humankind in the eyes of God.

The concept of love in the Early Theological Writings signifies Hegel’s attempt to identify the intersubjective psychology of the Christian community. According to Gammon, “This affirmative equality of likeness…should therefore be understood as a
mode of dynamic resemblance between individuals, which links them through a manifold of relative modifications...of difference within a united existential horizon, rather than through a posited opposition."^5 This conception of intersubjectivity is radically different from the analysis of the master/slave dialectic, as found in Hegel’s subsequent works. However, it is evident that Gleichheit, as a theme of intersubjectivity, is not meant to be opposed to the violently oppositional relationship of the master/slave dialectic. It is rather, as Gammon illustrates, ^6 opposed to the abstraction of the Fichtean concept of identity as A=A.^7

Hegel identifies the mediational component of the Christian concept of love as being the basis of a subjective/objective unification that supersedes the abstraction of Fichtean identity. In the communal bond of bread and wine, the unification of autonomous individuals is brought together. However, according to Gammon, the imagery of the last supper is not simply a symbolic representation of community:^8

Since Jesus calls the bread and wine, which he distributes to all, his body and blood given for them, the unification is no longer merely felt but has become visible. It is not merely represented in an image, an allegorical figure, but intimately linked to something real, eaten and enjoyed in a reality, the bread. Hence the feeling becomes in a way objective; yet this bread and wine, and the act of distribution, are not merely objective; there is more in the distribution than is seen; it is a mystical action.^9

Gammon suggests, “the bond of the community in objectified form – in bread and wine – dissolves the opposition of subject and object by manifesting the unification in something real, our communion with Christ in something actual."^10 For those who participate in this ceremony, the significance of the bread and wine is not merely iconic symbolism, but is rather a rite of transubstantiation that connects the community of individuals in the action of consumption through which each individual relates with the divine, and thus, is
communally linked with one another (individual to individual). This then, is the manner in which the community of individuals maintains its autonomy in becoming unified through the ritual action of divine communion via this sacrament. The bread as the objective element and the individuals as the subjective element fuse together in something higher – in the divine. Hegel states: "In this link between bread and persons, difference disappears, and with it the possibility of comparison. Things heterogeneous are here most intimately connected."11 Gammon summarizes this process: "Hegel articulates a mode of aesthetic demonstration which collapses the difference between subject and object in a mode of dynamic resemblance. The spectator is implicated in the ‘beautiful’ act of distribution in such a way that subject and object cannot fall apart in an opposition."12 In the Hegelian formulation, the unity of subject and object coalesce to become truth; this is precisely the development of the individuals in a community of love.

For Hegel, love unifies the multitude of divided individuals through the communal practice of the beautiful act (the reenacted rituals of the Last Supper). Love unifies these individuals into a community. Hegel states: "The more variegated the manifold in which life is alive, the more the places in which it can be reunified; the more the places in which it can sense itself, the deeper does love become."13 However, according to Hegel, the unification of the community of faith is limited in its scope and its ability to develop:

But the community cannot go beyond love itself. Apart from the relationship of the common faith and the revelations of this common possession in the appropriate religious actions, every other tie in objective activities is alien to the community, whether the purpose of such a tie be the achievement of some end or the development of another side of life or a common activity. Equally alien is every spirit of co-operation for something other than the dissemination of the faith.14
Gammon summarizes: "...love cannot also unite the realm of possession...consequently, the idiosyncratic relations of life, in the realm of possession, now stand opposed to the community of love (the community of faith), because the former rest on aims that are *merely similar.*"\(^{15}\) Hegel admits to the inability of Christianity’s communal bond of love in the community of faith as explicated through the religious rite of the Eucharist (and its transubstantiation) to firmly establish a self-consciousness that exists in the realm of life. Possession, wealth, social position and all other mundane aspects of life stand in opposition to the fundamental similarity (*Gleichheit*) of the self and other in the community of God. As the community develops and reaches its critical mass, the simple unification through rite (the consumption of the bread and wine) is displaced from meaning to mere iconism. The unity of the Christian community is one that establishes itself through the limited condition of ritual exclusivism that inevitably opposes itself to the conditions of life that are beyond religiosity. Thus, Hegel states: "This restriction of love to itself, its flight from all determinate modes of living even if its spirit breathed in them, or even if they sprang from its spirit, this removal of itself from all fate, is just its greatest fate."\(^{16}\) Gammon suggests:

In order to control this fate, the community must express its unity in "definite and strongly marked expressions," and thus, in a more and more powerful religious iconography. However, the ephemerality of the beautiful object, of “bread and wine,” is now hypostatized in the irrevocable duplicity of the resurrected image of Christ.\(^{17}\)

The irrevocable fate of Christianity thus lies in the iconographic representation of Jesus resurrected as Christ. The beautiful act of communion, the act which initially succeeded in advocating the action of the unification of the community, degenerates into symbolism.
The Christian ideal of love fails to provide an adequate form of mutual recognition because it falls into mere iconography. The community becomes one whose sole purpose lies in fulfilling the religious rites that inevitably oppose the fundamental aspects of life. Hyppolite suggests that one reason Hegel would choose to illustrate a form of recognition that inevitably leads to the tragic element of separation and strife (the dialectic of lordship and bondage) is that love fails to undergo the serious rigor of work and the fear of death. As we saw from Taylor's examination, these two elements, fear and death, can serve as adequate paths to self-consciousness.

Despite Hyppolite's reference to love as a possible viable option for the fulfillment of mutual recognition, he warns that love can become nothing more than mere sentiment. He cites a passage from the Preface of the Phenomenology: "The life of God and Divine intelligence, then, can, if we like, be spoken of as love disporting with itself; but this idea falls into edification, and even sinks into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative." This is precisely what occurs in the "Fate of Christianity." The development of the community through the communal rite of the Eucharist inevitably falls into iconographic symbolism. In order for the community to affirm itself through love, it must assert a dominant form of religious expression that excludes the various needs of life. In other words, life cannot be reduced to faith. In the Christian community, "the prospect of ethical equality has become merely restricted to the realm of faith, standing over against the mundane factual contingencies of life in the realm of possession." In the Christian community mutual recognition becomes possible only from within the confines of its religious exclusivity. Only those who are within the community can identify themselves with others within the
null
community. But even this identification within the community of faith is limited. Within the community, the mundane facets of life, namely possession, property and legality, already provide the impetus for a diversity of the community that divides itself beyond the scope of religious love. The reactionary consequences, as has been stated, are the need for stronger forms of religious expression through iconography and dogma. The attempt of the religious community to find mutual recognition through love fails to provide the adequate conditions for the development of self-consciousness.

This is echoed in Hegel’s treatment of the “Beautiful Soul,” the individual of the community of faith. This is a self-consciousness that is posited through faith, but has not toiled with the possibility of its own absolute negation in death. Hegel states:

Now, in so far as the self-certain Spirit, as a ‘beautiful soul,’ does not possess the power to renounce the knowledge of itself which it keeps to itself, it cannot attain to an identity with the consciousness it has repulsed, nor therefore to a vision of the unity of itself in the other, cannot attain to an objective existence.

The individual of the community of faith believes its own self’s existence to be self-certain. By identifying oneself with divine love, the individual through faith loves the other as other. However, as Hegel points out, the universal concept of love illustrated by the image of the Christ, represents an ideal that the individual is incapable of duplicating. The beautiful soul condemns evil and material possessions out of faith for the divine. However, its condemnation becomes its own hypocrisy:

In order not to lose its purity, the beautiful soul of the early writings refused to confront destiny; it declined to defend its independence in the world, as an active soul engaged in struggle, but it did not have the cowardice of the passive soul incapable of defending its rights. To avoid this dilemma, it did not locate its rights in the things of the world, it refused power and wealth, and above all sought the kingdom of God in the intimacy of its heart.
The beautiful soul capitulates its existence in the face of a confrontation with the reality of wealth, possessions and power. It opts for a communion with the divine that is ultimately sustained despite the evolution of the external world. As others begin to enter into civil society, the beautiful soul cannot partake of this reality because it would be contrary to the dogmatic principles of its faith. On the other hand, it cannot avoid the existence of the other who lives in civil society. The beautiful soul thus recedes into mere subjectivity, alienating itself from the external reality of others, thereby eliminating the possibility for mutual recognition and self-consciousness.

Although Hegel’s conception of love in the early Christian community of the beautiful soul is doomed to fail for its lack of scope and general opposition to the basic elements of life, what emerges from his analysis is the basic structure of mutual recognition that inevitably leads to the concrete embodiment of abstract morality – Sittlichkeit (ethical life).

Hegel will term this condition [absolute equality through the structures of possession, family and civil society] a kind of ‘self-equality’ (Sichselbstgleichheit), achieved through the interpellation of a thoroughly heterogeneous Other, in direct contrast to his youthful theory of ethical likeness with the divine. This notion of self-equality-in-otherness is the germinal formulation of the concept of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) that is so instrumental to the dialectical structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit.  

The interactions of love in the community of faith whose ultimate ethical quality is predicated on the likeness to the divine is too constricting for a general theory of ethical life. However, the concept of love demonstrates the foundation of the possibility of achieving a general theory of ethical life because it establishes a basis for mutual recognition. This is a basis that Hyppolite emphasizes as the necessary element for one to achieve self-consciousness through recognition. Hyppolite’s caution towards the
“insipidity” of love in establishing a basis for mutual recognition should not be understood as a condemnation of the concept of love.²⁷ Hyppolite’s caution should be read as being primarily directed towards Hegel’s early theory of ethical resemblance with the divine through the community of faith. The development of the concept of Sittlichkeit therefore, has at least in part, its basis in the concept of love.

Hegel develops the concept of Sittlichkeit as the explanation of the ground of ethical/moral relationships within a given culture. “It is a category in the sense that it is a basic type of union for that culture and serves to explain the possibility of the realization of ethical ideals in that culture.”²⁸ As the community of faith failed because of its exclusivist approach to life, Hegel turns to analyze the family structure within civil society. Within the structure of the family, Hegel reformulates mutual recognition under the purview of a concept of love that accounts for the dynamics of life. Williams cites a passage from one of Hegel’s early Jena works, *A Rough Sketch on Religion and Love (Entwurfe über die Religion und Liebe)*: “To conceive is to dominate...but only in love one is at-one with the object, neither dominating it nor dominated by it.”²⁹ Love represents an intersubjective relation whereby the alterity of the other is preserved while being simultaneously unified with another. Consequently, love does not attempt to eliminate the other, for it affirms the other as other and maintains the other as other,³⁰ even as love finds its actuality in the union of two self-consciousnesses. Within the family structure, the unity of two individuals in marriage represents the initial moment of mutual recognition. It represents the first moment whereby two individuals freely enter into a union of reciprocity. This is evident when Hegel states:

In essence marriage is monogamy because it is personality – immediate exclusive individuality – which enters into this tie and surrenders itself to
it; and hence the tie's truth and inwardness (i.e. the subjective form of its substantiality) proceeds only from the mutual, whole-hearted, surrender of this personality. Personality attains its right of being conscious of itself in another only in so far as the other is in this identical relationship, i.e. as an atomic individual.  

The concretization of love through marriage is predicated on the autonomy of two independent beings who freely and mutually recognize one another as independent beings in a relationship of reciprocal or mutual recognition. In marriage, individual personality is surrendered to form a single personality. However, in this surrender, the other is not sublated, but rather, each is for the other what the other is for it. The development of the family through marriage represents the concrete substantiation of mutual recognition. Within the union of the two independent beings, the otherness of the other is not annihilated, nor is it asymmetrically downgraded, as in the case with the dialectic of lordship and bondage. What occurs is the emergence of a universal individual (the married couple existing as one while preserving their own individuality) that is recognized within the world.

The concept of love for Hegel is not simple sentimentality shared between individuals out of basic carnal desires. Love is not the simple fulfillment of sexual or emotional desire. Hegel states:

Because the ethical principle is intrinsically universal, the ethical connection between the members of the Family is not that of feeling, or the relationship of love. It seems then, that the ethical principle must be placed in the relation of the individual member of the Family to the whole Family as the Substance, so that the End and the content of what he does and actually is, is solely the Family. 

This statement about the ethical principle of the family is partially misleading. The love that Hegel speaks of is that of mere sentiment. Love as mere sentiment must be
distinguished from love in mutual recognition. The ethical obligation of the family members is to form a unity of self-consciousness at a higher level. As love represents the basis of mutual recognition, the family represents the concrete embodiment of self-consciousness within society. This is evident in the Philosophy of Right:

The family, as the immediate substantially of mind (Geist), is specifically characterized by love, which is mind’s feeling of its own unity. Hence in a family, one’s frame of mind is to have self-consciousness of one’s individuality within this unity as the absolute essence of oneself, with the result that one is in it not as an independent person but as a member.34

If we return to Hyppolite’s analysis of the desire for recognition as the desire of consciousness to return to itself, we can see how the family represents the concrete embodiment of love as mutual recognition within the realm of life.35 “The social categories are the basic types of concrete acknowledgement (the Hegelian Anerkennung) between persons.”36 The individuals that unite in marriage fulfill each other’s desire for recognition, thereby fulfilling each other’s desire as a self-conscious unity. Hegel states: “their [the married couple’s] union [appears to be] a self-restriction, but in fact it is their liberation, because in it they attain their substantive self-consciousness.”37 If desire is the desire to be recognized, and recognition can only take place at the level of mutual reciprocity, then love and marriage that are expressed through the ethical substance of the family are, in fact, the essential developments of intersubjectivity for Hegel.

Paul Redding adduces the substantiation of intersubjectivity to the embodiment of self-consciousness through the social category of the family:

It is by virtue of participating within such normative social practices and submitting oneself to roles within them, that the participants in these interactions come to assume a form of agency in which they relate practically and theoretically to the world in a conceptually mediated way.38
The individuals that unite in marriage do so, not to discover their own self-consciousness, but, to embody their protean conscious identity. This is evident as Hegel states:

The knot is tied and made ethical only after this ceremony, whereby through the use of signs, i.e. of language (the most mental embodiment of mind Geist), the substantial thing in the marriage is brought completely into being. As a result, the sensuous moment, the one proper to physical life, is put into its ethical place as something only consequential and accidental, belonging to the external embodiment of the ethical bond, which indeed can subsist exclusively in reciprocal love and support.  

The individuals concretize their self-consciousnesses through the social categories in which they participate.

This...exemplifies something about the existential conditions of human intentionality: it is only by belonging to conceptually mediated normative social relations that we come to have more generally a conceptually articulated relation to the world, come to be capable of theoretical and practical forms of intentionality and judgment, and hence, of objectivity.

For Hegel, the self-conscious identity of the subject is not predicated on abstract terms. In other words, according to Hegel, one does not enter into a marriage because that is what one ought to do. A man does not become a husband by virtue of being a man, and a woman does not become a wife by virtue of being a woman. Rather, a man and a woman freely enter into marriage so as to embody the ethical bond of mutual recognition through the formalization of reciprocal love and sensuous relations. Edward Halper attempts to dismiss the notion that Hegel’s concept of marriage is fundamentally rooted in the division of the sexes. Halper suggests that Hegel does not commit the error of predicing the essence of marriage on the division of sex roles:

Hegel delineates sex roles only after discussing the marriage ceremony, and...he speaks of marriage as a Concept that 'sunders itself' into male and female roles in order to become a 'concrete unity' (PR § 165). Though Hegel acknowledges some physical basis for the difference in sex roles, it 'acquires intellectual and ethical significance' through marriage. Apparently, sex roles are a product of marriage.
This reflects the significance of mutual recognition through love and marriage. Hegel carefully distinguishes between the autonomy of two individuals who freely enter into marriage, and their corresponding identities following the marriage ceremony. Hegel states:

If this ceremony [marriage] is taken as an external formality, a mere so-called 'civil requirement,' it is thereby stripped of all significance except perhaps that of serving the purpose of edification and attesting the civil relation of the parties. It is reduced indeed to a mere fiat of a civil or ecclesiastical authority. As such it appears as something not merely indifferent to the true nature of marriage, but actually alien to it.43

This distinction is consistent with the contention that Hegel's concept of mutual recognition, the reciprocal exchange between two autonomous beings, occurs in marriage. If this delineation were not made, then Hegel's conception of marriage would not involve the freedom of choice between autonomous individuals, but, would be predicated on a necessitated contract between male and female identities. Hegel states, marriage is a contract that transcends the standpoint of contract.44

According to Hegel, in love, there is a reciprocal recognition of the other as other, the unity of which (i.e. marriage) transcends the mundane bond of contract. He states: "[M]arriage, so far as its essential basis is concerned, is not a contractual relation. On the contrary, though marriage begins in contract, it is precisely a contract to transcend the standpoint of contract."45 This is a significant development in Hegelian intersubjectivity.

Firstly, marriage represents a union that is conceived beyond the domain of the polis in which trust in the other arises out of the civil contract. This is echoed in his early works, The First Philosophy of Spirit, where Hegel summarizes the transcendent realm of marriage:
Just as in marriage each [partner] is mutually in the consciousness of the other, so each is mutually consciousness in the other, as his/her whole singularity; and the spouses give themselves a wholly communal existence, in which they are not in the linkage with any one singularity (a particular purpose), but as individuals, according to the totality in which they belong to nature. This bond, as involving the totality of someone’s consciousness, is just for this reason sacred, and is wholly removed from the concept of a contract[.]46

In marriage, love and trust represent the very foundation of the union, which transcends mere contract. Marriage points to an intersubjective relation that need not stand inside the realm of conflict, domination and sublation, a realm to which Kojève’s intersubjectivity of the master and slave is relegated, for they cannot understand such a manner of relating.

Hegel’s conception of marriage develops a threefold implication. According to Redding, “Recognition – my recognition of others as participants within these practices and their reciprocal recognition of me, together with the implicit recognition by all of us of the normativity of those practices themselves – is precisely what constitutes this belonging.”47 The embodiment of love occurs in this threefold act of recognition. The first moment of recognition occurs between two individuals who enter into the marriage mutually recognizing each other in the reciprocation of love and the unity of two independent self-consciousnesses that form a single self-consciousness without annihilating the otherness of each other. The second moment of recognition is the recognition of the unified self-consciousness recognizing the rights of others to enter into this expression of reciprocal love. The third moment is the recognition of the universality of this embodiment of reciprocal love by all co-existent self-consciousnesses.

This threefold act of mutual recognition once again brings us back to Hyppolite’s assertion that the desire for recognition is a desire that longs to return to itself in self-
certainty. However, this return is not simply the positing of the external world in contrast to the internal world. Hegel’s dialectic does not operate on the simple subject/object dichotomy whereby the subject is the purely internal and the object the purely external. Rather, for Hegel the mediation of subject and object in determining identity is a formulation that blurs the distinction between subject and object. Hyppolite’s analysis of the “Otherness in Desire” reflects this blurred mediation:

The condition of self-consciousness is the existence of other self-consciousnesses. Desire is able to pose itself in being, to reach a truth and not merely remain at the subjective stage of certainty, only if life appears as another desire. Desire must bear on desire and discover itself as such in being; it must discover itself and be discovered; it must appear to itself as an other and appear to an other.48

Simon Lumsden states: “The subject comes to understand the relations that underwrite its own thinking as not merely its own. It renounces the exclusiveness of its being-for-self. It comes to understand itself in terms of the relations underlying the way it experiences itself and the world.”49 This is one of Hegel’s contributions to the development of the concept of intersubjectivity, and more importantly, to the inevitable union of philosophical discourse with social analysis.

The project of the Phenomenology went beyond the epistemological framework of the subject/object dichotomy, beyond the condition of thought that sought to link the empirical world in a univocal relation to the individual. “[T]he pathway of self-understanding as [Hegel] describes it in the Phenomenology is not concerned with mapping out an assumed set of internal relations onto the external world, but rather transforming the subject such that its character is perpetually self-transcending.”50 Hegel refuses to admit to some form of categorical imperative (a la Kant) to explain how the relationships between individuals ought to be. Hegel instead offers a theory of
...
intersubjectivity that explains the possibility of individual relationships within the realm of inevitable social interaction. The character of the subject as "self-transcending" demonstrates Hegel's insistence on the dynamic mode of existence of the individual, as he or she develops through his or her relation to and in the social realm.

With this in mind, the significance of Hegel's concept of recognition must be regarded as a primary in our reading of his philosophical corpus. The *Phenomenology* evokes the structural framework that elucidates the psychologico-existential possibility of social interaction among individuals. This structural framework is further elucidated in the concrete formalizations of family and society and their various manifestations. Hegel carefully weaves through these possibilities of *Sittlichkeit*, providing interpretations of various cultural models.

The concept of love is one of the more prominent themes that resonate throughout Hegel's works. It is evident that Hegel goes to great lengths to distinguish between differing manifestations of love and mutual recognition. In *The Early Theological Writings*, Hegel clearly expresses the fate of a philosophical account of intersubjectivity that fails to incorporate the elements of the common social realities of life. Hegel's account of the "Fate of the Christian Community" in this work is less a portrayal of the historical development of the early Christian community, as it is an account of the inability of a philosophical discourse to accurately develop a model of intersubjectivity that does not fully appreciate the complexity of what Hegel repeatedly calls the manifold, or the fluid medium of life. In contrast to this text, the *System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit*, which was also written during the early Jena period, develops the
theme of mutual recognition that became one of the most prominent aspects of
intersubjectivity in Hegel's works.

2 Hegel, ETW, 290.
3 Martin Gammon, "Dynamic Resemblance: Hegel's Early Theory of Ethical Equality," The Review of
4 Gammon, 316.
5 Gammon, 316.
6 Gammon, 316.
7 I will refrain from entering into an analysis of Hegel's relation to Fichte as the purpose of this section is
not to analyze said relationship, but rather, to establish the motives behind the development of Hegel's
early concept of intersubjectivity as Mutual Recognition through Love.
8 Gammon, 340.
9 Hegel, ETW, 249.
10 Gammon, 340.
11 Hegel, ETW, 249.
12 Gammon, 341.
13 Hegel, ETW, 279.
14 Hegel, ETW, 280.
15 Gammon, 347.
16 Hegel, ETW, 281.
17 Gammon, 347.
18 Hyppolite, 164.
19 For Hyppolite, as was illustrated earlier, mutual Recognition is the only viable route to self-
consciousness through the form of Recognition. In other words, the Dialectic of the Lord and Bondsman is
not an actually sustainable form of Recognition because of the immediate asymmetrical positions of Lord
and Bondsman that ultimately provide an unattainable route to self-consciousness through the basic form of
Recognition. Instead, in the Dialectic of Lordship and Bondsman, self-consciousness is attained through
work and the fear of death.
20 PhM, 81; PhS, 10.
21 Gammon. 349.
22 PhM, 675-6; PhS, 406-7.
23 PhM, 675; PhS, 406.
24 Hyppolite adds a footnote to this statement: “The dilemma was the following: either affirm the reality of
its rights and thus the rightness of reality, or leave reality and thus affirm the irreality of its rights. In
either case, one culminates with a tragic contradiction. (Hegel, ETW, 234)
25 Hyppolite, 515.
26 Gammon, 349.
27 I am uncertain if this is a distinction that Hyppolite makes explicit. However, the passage that Hyppolite
cites from the Preface of the Phenomenology, (see endnote # 73: PhM, 81; PhS, 10) would indicate that the
concept of Love that Hegel is speaking of is his early concept of Love in the community of faith.
29 Williams, 210. Note, the translation of this citation is Williams’.
30 Williams, 211. The exact quote is as follows: “Love does not eliminate the other, but affirms and
preserves it.
31 Hegel, PR, 115.
32 PhS, 269; PhM, 468-9.
33 This is a distinction that Hegel makes between love as Moralität and love as Sittlichkeit. Love as the
Kantian conception of Moralität is for Hegel a mere sentiment. If love is nothing more than mere
subjective sentiment then it does not necessitate any concrete embodiment. Love thus falls into mere
abstraction, as there is no distinction between the one who is in love and actualizes the sentiment through formal institutions (i.e., marriage) or perhaps maintains a secret love for another. Love as Sittlichkeit however, implies the actualization of Love through formalization. This implication is predicated on the mutual Recognition of two independent individuals.

34 Hegel, PR, 110.
35 “The end point of desire is not, as one might think superficially, the sensuous object – that is only a means – but the unity of the I with itself. Self-consciousness is desire, but what it desires, although it does not yet know this explicitly, is itself: it desires its own desire” (Hyppolite, 160 – see endnote 12).
36 Pinkard, 225.
37 Hegel, PR, 111.
39 Hegel, PR, 113.
40 Redding, 265.
42 Halper, 838.
43 Hegel, PR, 113.
44 Hegel, PR, 112.
45 Hegel, PR, 112.
46 Hegel, FPS, 232.
47 Redding, 265-6.
48 Hyppolite, 163.
50 Lumsden, 157.
51 Pinkard, 225.
52 “Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences; and the dissolution of the splitting-up just as much a splitting-up and forming of members. With this, the two sides of the whole movement which before were distinguished, viz. the passive separatedness of the shapes in the general medium of independence, and the process of Life, collapses into one another” (PhS 108).
ANTIGONE: THE DIVINATION OF THE TRAGIC

One of the most underrated aspects of Hegelian scholarship is the role of Antigone in, and its relation to, the Hegelian corpus. Victoria Burke, in her article, *Antigone’s Transgression: Hegel and Bataille on the Divine and Human*, gives a skillfully concise explanation of Sophocles’ *Antigone*:

In Sophocles’ narrative, Antigone, born of the incestuous union of Oedipus and Jocasta, seeks to perform a burial ritual for her brother, Polyneices, who was killed in battle in an act of rebellion against the state. Those who died in defending the city, including Antigone’s other brother Eteocles, are honoured with a proper burial. But Creon, the king, has decreed against the burial of Polyneices because he died fighting against the city-state. Antigone, acting in defiance of Creon’s edict and in allegiance to what she understands to be a higher commitment, performs a burial ritual for her brother and thus becomes the subject to the wrath of Creon. She is punished by being trapped in a cave. In the cave, she hangs herself and is discovered by Haemon, her fiancé (Creon’s son), who goes to retrieve her after Teiresias predicts the downfall of the city as a result of Creon’s action. Haemon impales himself on his sword after he finds Antigone dead. Eurydice, Creon’s wife, on hearing of Haemon’s death, kills herself.¹

For Hegel, the tragic portrays the ineluctable connection between, or more properly, the collision of the two fundamental aspects of human intersubjectivity: namely, that of the political sphere of the civic and the religious sphere of the divine.²

From what we have seen in the previous section, self-consciousness is fundamentally developed and motivated by its inclusion in a culture/society that cultivates it.

Civil society can be thus looked on first of all as a system of needs. Men have needs which they try to fulfill by work and effort. But in so doing they need the work and effort of others. They have to enter into exchange. But this system of needs is not something static...man exhibits his transcendence and universality (*PR* §190) in multiplying his needs and the means of satisfying them.³
The universality of the civic realm lies in the necessity of interaction between individuals. Hegel states:

When needs and means become abstract in quality, abstraction is also a character of the reciprocal relation of individuals to one another. This abstract character, universality is the character of being recognized and is the moment which makes concrete, i.e. social, the isolated and abstract needs and their ways and means of satisfaction.

We are bound to the universality of the civic realm, the external social world that simultaneously exists for us and despite us. On the other hand, as individuals, the inner sanctuary of mind (Geist) and its determinations represent the fundamental aspect of the individual who simultaneously exists for-itself and for the other (subject to the civic decree).

This level of social life expresses the dimension of man as an individual, that which destroyed the old Sittlichkeit of the city-state. But it represents an incontestable advance and an essential dimension for men. For it is the level on which man stands as an individual seeking his own fulfillment, and yet as an individual he does not remain within narrow horizons. Rather he is swept up in the ever-widening system of division of labour and exchange.

The civic and the divine (the universal and individual) are two constitutive elements of human intersubjectivity. Hegel clarifies the interrelation of the civic and divine as the necessary movement towards equilibrium between the universal and individual:

It is the Justice of human law which brings back into the universal the element of being-for-self which has broken away from the balanced whole, viz. the independent classes and individuals; it is the government of the nation, which is the self-affirming individuality of the universal essence and the self-conscious will of all.

The “human law” represents the law of the civic. In the Hegelian dialectic, it serves the dual purpose of uniting the plenum of individuals under the rubric of a community, inciting the individual to become part of the universal spirit, while existing as its own
being-for-self, viewing the individuals of the community as mere particulars of the universal spirit. Thus, the civic realm is both a constructive element that brings individuals together through culture and society, and also a destructive element that inevitably removes the individuation of individuality and substitutes that individuation for the mere quantification of human life as being a simple unit of the state.

This law of the civic realm however, is immediately contrasted with the justice of the individual represented through the divine:

The Justice, however, which brings back to equilibrium the universal in its ascendancy over the individual is equally the simple Spirit of the individual who has suffered wrong; it is not split up into two, the one who has suffered the wrong and an entity in a remote beyond. The individual himself is the power of the nether world, and it is his Erinyes, his 'fury', which wreaks vengeance. It is the recognition of the death of the other that discloses the fundamental aspect of the individuality of the self, and is that which challenges the power of the civic realm. As the civic realm may decree that a particular person give his/her life for the good of the state, and lives and dies as a mere unit of production for the state, the divine law, the law of the family, expresses the highest condition of love and duty towards the individuality of the particular. In other words, the divine law reconstitutes the significance and meaning of an individual human life.

Without the civic, the divine law cannot unify the alterity of individuals into one common community. However, without the divine, the civic becomes a dehumanizing factor in the lives of its inhabitants. Neither realm can be annihilated without having a direct impact on the other. According to Taylor, "the culture which lives in our society shapes our private experience and constitutes our public experience, which in turn interacts profoundly with the private." Hegel’s insistence on the unity and equilibrium
of these two realms signifies the realization that the culture of a community is inextricably bound to the private life of the family. Hegel uses Sophocles’s *Antigone* as a powerful example of the possible conflict between the civic and the divine that contributes to the development of self-consciousness through the recognition of the other and the recognition of death.

Sophocles’ *Antigone* becomes for Hegel, the exemplar of the tragic that contrasts the inevitable conflict between the state and individual, between the universal dominion of the public and the private dominion of the family.\(^\text{10}\) The significance of the tragic for Hegel represents the conflict between the ethos of two equally justified perspectives. It is this conflict that further elucidates the development of intersubjectivity for the self (the individual) and the other (the totality of otherness within the concrete embodiment of the social realm). Hegel’s rendering of the Antigone myth represents the paradigmatic expression of the inevitable collision between the inner and outer worlds, the collision of the subjective and objective realms that serves to delineate the otherwise static identity of human law and the civic decree. In other words, Hegel’s Antigone demonstrates the significance of performance in the concretization of ethical consciousness.

Antigone’s actions are on par with (but not equivalent to) the development of self-consciousness of the slave in the dialectic of lordship and bondage. The whole project of the *Phenomenology* centers on the recognition of the self amidst the alterity of otherness that stands opposed to it: “*Pure* self-recognition in absolute otherness, this Aether *as such*, is the ground and soil of Science or *knowledge in general*. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dwell on this *element*.”\(^\text{11}\)

Hegel explicitly emphasizes that philosophy needs to demonstrate the necessity of
intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness. However, the performance of the subject, the concretization of action, is fundamental to the ethical life. In the dialectic of lordship and bondage, the slave comes to the understanding of itself through the fear of death, and the recognition of its own work in the processes of life. In the “Preface,” Hegel’s famous passage about “tarrying with the negative” explicates this development:

This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it [Spirit (Geist)] into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called the Subject, which by giving determinateness an existence in its own element supersedes abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which barely is, and thus is authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this mediation.\(^{12}\)

The slave tarries with the possibility of its own demise, and thus comes to understand the meaning of its own existence through the possibility of its absolute negation. As a result, the slave recognizes its being-for-self as self-consciousness and is then free to toil with its own existence in the attempt to develop its own self-consciousness. With Antigone, another path for the development of self-consciousness is made evident. We have seen in Taylor’s examination of the dialectic of lordship and bondage, a separate path to self-consciousness from that of mutual recognition, yet Antigone exists as a self-consciousness that arises through the labour of the negative through mutual recognition. Antigone’s contemplation of the negative dramatically exceeds that of the slave. Whereas the slave contemplates the possibility of its own demise and is moved to act according to this motivation, Antigone, out of the love for her brother, not only contemplates the death of the other, that is, the rendering of death that negates the existence of an other, but also faces the contemplation and the inevitable performance of
her own death. Antigone willing (knowingly) sacrifices herself out of her love for the dead other.\textsuperscript{13}

Derrida's interpretation of Hegel's rendering of Antigone takes a different position. Derrida focuses on Hegel's insistence that the bond between brother and sister operates at a level that is unique from all other relationships.\textsuperscript{14} The brother-sister relationship is supposed to be devoid of desire for one another. It exists without the carnality inherent in the erotic desire for the other. According to Derrida:

\begin{quote}
Whence the infinite superiority of the bond between brother and sister. The family bond, to be sure, since blood speaks in it, but the only one that absolutely suspends all desire. No desire is level with consciousness – Hegel analyzes consciousness here – whereas consciousness was, in the other relations, essentially desiring. No desire, then, between singularities of the opposite sex, the "relationship in its unmixed form." Brother and sister "do not desire one another"...So they are, it seems, two single consciousnesses that, in the Hegelian universe, relate to each other without entering into war.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Derrida identifies the possibility of a relationship that is devoid of desire. Derrida implicitly refers to the duplicitous circumstances under which Antigone and her brother were born, namely the union of Oedipus and Jocasta. For Derrida, Hegel's rendering of Antigone as the purest example of family piety, which is illustrated through her willingness to die so that her brother's corpse will not be degraded, represents a bond between two individuals that is outside the possibility of merely conceptual intersubjective relationships because it is not based on desire or need. Equally problematic, is the idea that two siblings born out of an incestuous union are themselves, devoid of carnal desire for one another. Derrida goes on to state: "Given the generality of the struggle for recognition in the relationship between consciousnesses, one would be tempted to conclude from this that at bottom \textit{there is no} brother/sister bond, there is no
According to Derrida, if Antigone is the paradigm of love of the other, then the relationship in which this paradigm manifests itself (the relationship between brother and sister) exists in a vacuum, outside all other normative roles within the family (i.e., parent/child, brother/brother, sister/sister, husband/wife, etc), and outside the family within the civic realm. Therefore, one is left to assume that Antigone, the representation of the most sublime aspect of love and duty, is nothing more than a mythical figure. This clearly illustrates that Derrida is unwilling to explore the possibility that the bond of consanguinity between brother and sister (even those born out of incest) is greater than the fate that derives from the unspeakable union of incest. Furthermore, Derrida also denies that the bond of consanguinity is representative of the mutual recognition of the other, even the dead other.

Derrida's reading of Hegel's Antigone suggests a close connection with the dominant theme of the dialectic of lordship and bondage:

Unique example in the system: a recognition that is not natural and yet that passes through no conflict, no injury, no rape: absolute uniqueness, yet universal and without singularity, without immediacy; symmetrical relation that needs no reconciliation to appease itself, that does not know the horizon of war, the infinite wound, contradiction, negativity. Is that the inconceivable? According to Derrida, Hegel's claim of Antigone as the paradigm of love and duty, a relationship that exists completely devoid of the carnal desire to sublate, or as Kojeve states, annihilate the other, represents an implausible form of Hegelian intersubjectivity. However, Derrida's reading seems to suggest that the very condition of intersubjectivity is predicated on the same conflation of desire and recognition that we have earlier seen in Kojeve. In other words, if intersubjectivity is predicated on the grounds of a Kojevian analysis of the desire for recognition, then the possibility of mutual recognition, even that
of the brother/sister relationship is impossible.\textsuperscript{19} If this is the case, then the role of the feminine may become equivalent to that of the slave.\textsuperscript{20} Once again, the emphasis on the dialectic of lordship and bondage surfaces as the dominant structural analysis of intersubjectivity. In relying on this analysis, one must undermine the plausibility of Antigone as a self-conscious being. Derrida explicitly raises this issue:

To this great opposition (the law of singularity/the law of universality) is ordered a whole series of other couples: divine law/human law, family/city, woman/man, night/day, and so on. \textit{Human} law is the law of day (light) because it is known, public, visible, \textit{universal}; human law rules, not the family, but the city, government, war; and it is made by \textit{man} (\textit{vir}). Human law is the law of man. Divine law is the law of woman; it hides itself, does not offer itself in this opening-manifestation (\textit{Offenbarkeit}) that produces man. Divine law is nocturnal and more natural than the law of universality, just as the family is more natural than the city. Once more, the family appears as the most \textit{natural} degree of the ethical community.\textsuperscript{21}

What is at issue for Derrida is the possibility of a reciprocal relationship between asymmetrical (dissymmetrical) figures within the \textit{Sittlichkeit}. Derrida thus raises, what he sees to be, a fundamental problem in Hegel’s analysis of the Antigone myth: The relationship between brother and sister seems to be the only relationship to exist outside of the desire for recognition. The binary opposition of the male and female (and its other various equivalences, i.e., civic/divine, etc.) leads to a disconnect between the discourse of the male and female. In other words, there is an essential rift between the male and female in their ability to recognize one another. This analysis develops from Hegel’s rendering of one of the essential characteristics of the female being that of undeveloped consciousness. In the \textit{Phenomenology}, Hegel states that the sister,

\ldots has the highest \textit{intuitive} awareness of what is ethical. She does not attain to \textit{consciousness} of it, or to the objective existence of it, because the law of the Family is an implicit, inner essence which is not exposed to the
daylight of consciousness, but remains an inner feeling and the divine element that is exempt from an existence in the real world.\textsuperscript{22}

Kelly Oliver states: "...it is primarily woman, as wife, mother, and sister, who is identified with these unconscious and irrational aspects of the family."\textsuperscript{23} In Derrida’s analysis, the relationship between the brother and sister that Hegel claims to be of the highest ethical import, is nothing more than an impossible myth. Taken from the logic of the desire for recognition, the female (the sister) who is supposed to represent the essential consciousness of the individual does so as an imposter. The feminine (sister) never acquires the ethical individuality that she is supposed to represent. The feminine (sister) exists merely as a conduit for the male (brother) who is self-conscious and active in the civic realm.

But here we see that Derrida’s interpretation is dogmatically predicated on Kojeve’s conflation of desire and recognition that inevitably draws upon the conception of Hegelian intersubjectivity that is solely based on the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Derrida fails to account for the possibility that the intersubjective relations of male/female, brother/sister, etc., do not enter into the life and death struggle. Furthermore, Derrida fails to acknowledge the possibility that Hegel’s conception of intersubjectivity is directed by anything other than the dialectic of lordship and bondage. But as we have seen, mutual recognition is, for Hegel, the unfolding of conceptually mediated roles that delivers an intersubjectivity with a plausible account of the dynamics of family life and social relationships that are guided, not by the desire to sublate (annihilate) the other, but rather, by the awareness of alterity within the normative social roles of individuals within the society or culture.\textsuperscript{24}
So the question remains, how is one to interpret Hegel’s account of the Antigone drama? Antigone’s sacrifice represents the demand for mutual recognition by all others. This is precisely the role of reconciliation that develops out of the drama of the tragic. The relationship of reciprocity, where each is for the other what the other is for it, illustrates an intersubjectivity that has its basis in the divine. This is not an ideal moment representing a perfect form of intersubjectivity. Rather, it is the very foundation of intersubjectivity. For Hegel, the family, as the unity of the sacred, is the “unconscious inner Notion [of the ethical order].” It is unconscious because at the level of family, it has not yet attained the actuality of substantiation in the polis. In other words, divine law does not take the concrete form of the written laws of the state, thus, they are not self-conscious, but unconscious. The divine law of the family, the *Penates*, represents the decree of the love for the other that becomes the primal aspect of reciprocal recognition. The ritual practices of the burial ceremony according to the divine law become the final and most supreme example of the duty of the *Penates*. Hegel states: “This last duty thus constitutes the perfect divine law, or the positive ethical action towards the individual. Every other relationship to him which does not remain one simply of love but is ethical, belongs to human law.” The ethical basis of the *Penates* lies in the recognition of the death of the other. This ethical basis represents a powerful example of the recognition of otherness in Hegel’s works. Hegel states:

Although human right has for its content and power the actual ethical substance that is conscious of itself, i.e. the entire nation, while the divine right and law has for its content and power the individual who is beyond the real world, yet he is not without power. His power is the abstract, pure universal, the elemental individual which equally draws back into the pure abstraction which is its essence the individuality that breaks loose from the element, and constitutes the self-conscious reality of the nation - draws it back into the essence which is its ground.
The death of the other becomes the primal aspect of the recognition of otherness. Although the *Penates* are constituted as the unconscious law, they are not meant to be taken as unessential. The burial ceremony represents the performance of the recognition and love of the other. It signifies the preservation of the individual as individual. The state views the individual only as a part of a whole. The family however, recognizes each of its members as living, feeling and loving individual persons. Even in death, family members maintain that loving recognition of the deceased.

According to Hegel, the state stands opposed to the divine law because it demands that the individuality of the family be incorporated into the universal edict of the polis. From time to time, the state violates the individual families' right to independence by demanding the expenditure of a family member's life in war on behalf of the state. The intrusion of the state into the family, asking for the ultimate sacrifice of life in war, relegates the individual's life to a thing-like existence. The one who dies on the battlefield does not die as an individual of a particular family, but dies as a particular unit of the state. This is comparable to the situation of the dialectic of lordship and bondage, whereby the state (as master) demands that the family (as slave) recognize its authority. What distinguishes this from the dialectic of lordship and bondage is that the presence of the divine law maintains a reciprocal recognition of the other, even in death. Whereas the manifestation of intersubjectivity in the analysis of the dialectic of lordship and bondage only accounts for the singular relationship between competing individuals, the dynamics between the civic and the divine, or the state and the family, represents many different manifestations of intersubjectivity.
The collision of the civic and the divine implicates a plurality of affected relationships. The collision of the civic and the divine causes reactions between individuals within a family, families with other families, individuals with other individuals, and finally, individuals with the polis. This is evident in the Antigone drama where the relationships are between brother and sister (Antigone and Polyniceis), sister and sister (Antigone and Ismene), husband and wife (Creon and Eurydice), parent and child (Creon and Haemon), individuals (Antigone and Haemon), and all those incorporated in the universal (the city-state of Thebes).

The conflict between Antigone and Creon represents the tragedy of two opposing, but just duties. Hegel states: "[T]hat consciousness which belongs to the divine law sees in the other side only the violence of human caprice, while that which holds to human law sees in the other only the self-will and disobedience of the individual who insists on being his own authority." Both sides have an equal claim of right. The tragedy is that both sides view their respective duty as absolute. Their binary oppositions create mediations only in the form of destruction. The two sides are equally just and equally guilty, thus they must both face the same fate. The further implication is the effect that this outcome has on all the characters involved in the drama. Neither Antigone nor Creon confront each other as isolated individuals. Hegel in this context accounts for the dynamics between the various social paradigms that are inherent in intersubjectivity. The Antigone drama illustrates the manifold interrelations that are affected through the conflict of the civic and the divine.

So why would Hegel use Antigone as the exemplar of the individual as divine? What separates Antigone from other powerful female figures, such as Clytaemnestra in
Aeschylus' *Oresteia*? One possible explanation given by Hegel is that the relationship between the brother and sister is one that cannot be rejuvenated: "The loss of the brother is therefore irreparable to the sister and her duty towards him is the highest." Hegel cites this from *Antigone*:

Not for my children, had I been a mother, / Not for a husband, for his moldering body, / Would I have set myself against the city / As I have done. And the law sanctions me. / Losing a husband, I might find another. / I could have other children. But my parents / Are hidden from me in the underworld, / So that no brothers' life can bud and bloom / Ever again. And therefore, Polyneices, / I paid you special honour.

However, this explanation seems rather facile in demonstrating the importance of Antigone as the exemplar of the individual and the divine. If one analyzes Antigone from the backdrop of other female characters of Greek mythology, Antigone becomes more than just the figure of sisterhood, and she is also more than a strong female character, as is the case with Clytaemnestra. Antigone becomes, at least for Hegel, the representation of the individual as divine, for two reasons: Firstly, that Antigone is more than just a weak female playing the role of the sister is evident, given the distinction between the personalities of Antigone and her sister Ismene. Secondly, that Antigone is more than just a strong female character, willing to challenge the civic realm, as does Clytaemnestra, is evident through the explicit premeditation of Antigone's acknowledgement that she is guilty before the civic edict, but nevertheless commits the deed of burying her brother.

As the sister of Polyneices, Antigone feels the irreplaceable bond between herself and her brother. However, Ismene is also the sister of Antigone and Polyneices. So, why does Ismene not hold the same significance for Hegel? In the exchange between
Antigone and Ismene, Sophocles makes a distinction between two different female voices. Whereas Ismene states:

If, in defiance of the law, we brave / the power of the commandment of a king. / O think Antigone! We who are women / Should not contend with men; we who are weak / Are ruled by the stronger, so that we must obey / In this and in matters that are yet more bitter.\(^{35}\)

Antigone replies:

My crime is innocence, for I owe the dead Longer allegiance than I owe the living. / With the dead I lie forever. Live, if you choose, / Dishonouring the laws the gods have hallowed.\(^{36}\)

The voice of Ismene represents that of a weak female character, incapable of opposing the civic decree. However, Antigone’s response to her sister discloses a radically different perspective. Antigone clearly represents a powerful character in the drama, as she is juxtaposed to her weak sister early in the play. Antigone, unlike Ismene, has a self: she has recognized her identity through the Recognition of the absolute negation of her brother, and ultimately, comes to the Recognition of her own absolute negation due to her love for her brother. This is so because Creon had forbid anyone to bury the corpse of Polyineices, the punishment for said crime being death. Antigone recognizes the role of death and its signification not only for her own existence, but also for the existence of the other.

The conflict between Antigone and Creon is far more than just the collision of male and female perspectives.

The conflict between Antigone and Creon, as Hegel sees it, illustrates the logic of the metaphysical conflict between these poles, and the role of Antigone’s action is to mediate between them. What is at stake here is not the alleged logocentric privileging of the ‘male’ pole of these dualities over the ‘female’ pole. After all, Hegel’s treatment of the conflict between the divine and the human is precisely “a clash between equal powers” in his view. At stake, rather, is the relation between the opposed
terms in the most-well-known binary oppositions that Western
metaphysical thinking has to offer, and the moment of identity that binds
them.\textsuperscript{37}

Antigone represents the clash between opposing forces within the \textit{Sittlichkeit}. She is not
helplessly subsumed under the auspices of the civic realm (and its other variations as
human law, male discourse, etc). "[I]t is clear that she [Antigone] is acting out of a
deliberate allegiance to something which she takes to be higher than the law of the land,
higher than rationality. It is also clear that Antigone's action is a sacrifice."\textsuperscript{38} As self-
consciousness, she is the necessary force that has the power to oppose the domination of
a one-sided metaphysical explanation of human interaction.

Antigone realizes – at least in Holderlin’s translation and in Hegel’s
interpretation (which could have been influenced by Holderlin’s
translation) – that the restless drive for civilization, knowledge, and
humanity is driven by a passionate and carnal impulse. She also sees that
the ‘innocent’ decency and devotion that compelled her to bury her
brother were grafted onto a disturbing passion and that without this
passion there is no goodness, no desire, no knowledge. Having
comprehended this paradox, she dies not so much by Creon’s hand, but by
her own.\textsuperscript{39}

Antigone recognizes the inevitable conflation of desire and love (the inevitable conflation
of the civic (universal) and the divine (individual) realm), and as such, is not simply an
unconscious being led by her natural impulses.

Antigone’s character represents something greater than that of a strong female
character like Clytaemnestra. She does not challenge the civic authority merely out of
the need to avenge a loved one’s death, as Clytaemnestra avenges the death of her
daughter Iphigeneia. Rather, Antigone, borne out of the incestuous relation of Oedipus
and Jocasta, peers through the binary opposition between the civic and the divine, day
and night, consciousness and the unconscious. “She now stands at the edge of the
terrifying abyss of nothingness. But instead of collapsing under the terrible truth that she 
is the unspeakable fruit of incest, she does utter it and thereby constrains it. Her utterance 
is recognition...grasping the true essence of her being." Antigone is guilty before the 

law of nature. She is the generation of an unnatural union between mother and son who 
are also wife and husband. However, she is not constrained by this fate, but rather 
acknowledges it. In addition, Antigone recognizes her guilt before the civic law for 
burying Polyneices. Yet this does not relegate her to subservience before that law either. 

Antigone is perhaps the most self-conscious being in Hegel's works. She is guilty before 
the natural law, as well as being guilty before the civic law. Her guilt is manifest by her 
knowledge of the inevitable punishment that arises from the burial of her brother. She is 
not like her father, who acknowledges his guilt only when (and I use Hegel's expression) 
"the light of day ensnares the ethical self-consciousness." Antigone is guiltier than 
Oedipus: she acknowledges the full responsibility of her actions, prior to committing 
them. Her blood is on her own hands; the sacrifice she makes is one not drawn out of 
tragic circumstances, but rather is committed with the full realization of the consequences 
of her deeds. Hegel states:

But the ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt more inexcusable, 
if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it takes 
them to be violence and wrong, to be ethical merely by accident, and, like 
Antigone, knowingly commits the crime.

Antigone is not the innocent weak female like Ismene; and she is more than the strong-
willed character of Clytaemnestra. Antigone is guilty of knowledge, violence, and 
ethically challenging the civic decree; she is guilty of all these, but remains divinely 
justified in her actions. Hegel goes on to state:
Doing directly expresses the unity of actuality and substance; it declares that actuality is not an accident of essence, but that, in union with essence, it is not granted to any right that is not a true right. The ethical consciousness must, on account of this actuality and on account of its deed, acknowledge its opposite as its own actuality, must acknowledge its guilt.\textsuperscript{43}

Antigone acknowledges both her right and her guilt. The divine edict demands that she exist as an individual, capable of loving the other, and of mutually recognizing the rights of the other; the civic edict demands that she exist in the universality of society and follow the rule of human law. Her actions though, are just because they are essential to the divine edict, but she is guilty because she breaks the civic edict. She exists simultaneously as just and guilty. Her guilt provides a powerful explanation of the signification of the deeds she commits. She buries her brother fully aware that it would inevitably lead to her death. She is thus forced to recognize the full implication and meaning of death, not only her own, but also the death of the other. She stands in the face of the most terrifying abyss, and willingly (knowingly) sacrifices herself.

Antigone represents not only the recognition of negation (death), but more importantly, she represents the performance of negation as sacrifice for the other. "It is common to interpret Hegel’s Antigone as a victim in a drama in which (male) self-consciousness is the victor."\textsuperscript{44} However, Antigone’s sacrifice must be interpreted through the lens of Hegel’s insistence on the recognition of negation and the performance of negation as the basis for the development of ethical self-consciousness. "Buried alive, the daughter of Oedipus was doomed to die by suffocation, and in making a noose of her virgin’s veil she brought on suffocation by other means. She gained twice, by contriving her own death, and by condemning Creon to the defilement that he wanted to avoid."\textsuperscript{45} As such, "Antigone does more than mediate (male) Spirit with itself, and that she can,
indeed, be interpreted as the victor." Antigone transcends the realm of the feminine (sister); she is beyond the apolitical, unconscious existence that is supposed to be allotted to her as woman. Hyppolite illustrates: "Death is the movement of the individual into the universal; in merely living nature, the species transcends the individual in a way such that this negation appears external. The individual does not carry his own death within himself." However, Antigone is the exception. Through her desire to bury her brother, Antigone is aware of the death of the other qua other, and in an attempt to maintain the other out of a love for the other she performs the rites of burial to supplant meaning onto this indifferent phenomenon of nature. In regard to Antigone acting for her family, Hegel states: "The Family keeps away from the dead this dishonouring of him by unconscious appetites and abstract entities, and puts its own action in their place, and weds the blood-relation to the bosom of the earth, to the elemental imperishable individuality." More importantly, Antigone, through the recognition of her own existence, takes her life (and death) into her own hands. Death comes to her, not by some external act of nature, but rather by her own hands. Not only is Antigone aware of the implication of her guilt by performing the rites of burial for her brother, she controls her own death, and thereby thrusts her existence into the universality of death and the political.

This political action, by one who is ethically obligated to stay out of the political realm, destroys the harmony between nature and 'second nature' (or politics)...Antigone's action is a contradiction. All she wants is to maintain the piety of the family...but her action being itself political, makes that impossible. Antigone's actions in killing herself, thrusts her existence into the political realm. Her suicide is a political act as much as it is a recognition of her impending death. This is evident by the last words that Antigone utters: "If this pleases the gods, then I shall learn
That sin brought death upon me. But if the sin / Lies in my judges, I could wish for
them / No harsher fate than they have decreed for me."  
Antigone recognizes the
injustice of Creon's edict. She challenges this injustice and knowingly sacrifices
herself for her conviction. In so doing, she becomes a character who represents
simultaneously the unity of the divine and the civic, and the individual and universal.

Antigone's sacrifice rendered in the Hegelian dialectic discloses Hegel's
insistence on the necessity of mutual recognition between all people within a community
and the polis. I am not arguing that Hegel equivocates the duties of male and female, as
this is obviously a step that he never makes. However, Antigone is the exemplar of the
love of the other because she willingly (knowingly) sacrifices herself out of her love and
duty towards her brother. Although this relationship between Antigone and Polyneices is
one within the family bond, the performance of Antigone's sacrifice places her actions in
the foreground of ethical life and the mutual recognition of otherness. She is an exemplar
of the love of the other because she transcends any mere economy of exchange via her
pure form of sacrifice, which is the sacrifice of one's self for the dead/negated other.

Antigone does not ask for retribution for her sacrifice; her sacrifice implies the
overcoming of an economy of exchange. Her death and her suicide negate the demand
for a profit from her actions. Rather, she cedes her life purely out of the love for another.
Thus, Antigone is for Hegel the exemplar of mutual recognition because she represents
the highest expression of love for the other.

Hegel's use of the Antigone myth evinces a much more complex psychological
understanding of his concept of intersubjectivity. Sacrifice and the contemplation of
one's own existence in the face of an impending death that has been willingly brought

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upon oneself make Antigone a pivotal character for Hegel. Hegel uses the Antigone myth to offer a radical break from the violent underpinnings of a self-referential philosophy of intersubjectivity. What is offered instead is a philosophy of the other that transcends the economy of exchange.

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2 For Hegel, the civic and the divine are representations of the universal and individual par excellence. They become exemplars of the most significant aspects of human experience that are ultimately inextricably bound together.
3 Taylor, 432.
4 Here, Knox cites the reason for Hegel terming recognition as abstract: "Recognition is termed an ‘abstract’ relation because two people who recognize each other still preserve their independence. A society bound together by the ties of recognition alone is still a society of independent units and their social tie is only a formal one, unlike the marriage tie, which links the parties in substance" [T.M. Knox. Translators notes, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, by G.W.F. Hegel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) 355].
5 Hegel, PR, 127.
6 Taylor, 433.
7 PhS, 277; PhM, 480.
8 PhS, 277; PhM, 480-1.
11 PhS, 14; PhM, 86.
12 PhS, 19; PhM 93-4.
13 Antigone willingly sacrifice herself out of duty towards her brother and to divine law. Her sacrifice can be viewed simply as the performance of her role as sister/woman to the utmost degree. This is a position taken by Irigaray (Ethics of Sexual Difference) to illustrate the problematic character of woman in Hegel’s analysis. Namely, that woman exists merely to deliver man into immortality through the rites of burial. In Irigaray’s analysis, woman serves as a tool for the erection of the monument of the male ego after death (Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993) 106-7). Therefore, the relationship between the female (sister) and the male (brother) is an non-reciprocal relationship. Whereas Antigone recognizes the role of the other to respect the Penates, no one recognizes Antigone’s role to the same ceremony. Certainly, Hegel identifies Antigone as sister and woman (PhS, 274-5; PhM, 476-7), however, Hegel explicitly defines Antigone, insofar as she becomes the individual par excellence; as a being whose ethos is fundamentally necessary, and equal to the civic realm (PhS, 277; PhM, 470-80). In my view, what makes Antigone a monumental figure for Hegel is that she is precisely not a weak, secondary female character that exists to serve the male ego. Rather, Antigone exists as a powerful force in the dialectic. She represents for Hegel, the power of the individual (the divine) who recognizes the other and loves the other to the point of sacrifice. The fact that the house of Creon and Thebes is destroyed illustrates the injustice of Antigone not being mutually recognized by the civic (male) realm. One cannot underestimate the significance of Hegel’s insistence on the equilibrium between the civic and the divine.
14 PhS, 275; PhM, 477.
16 Derrida, Glas, 149.
17 Derrida, Glas, 150.
18 Kojève, 5.
19 Here, one could reassert Irigaray’s criticism of the disconnect between the male and female, namely that the female serves as a conduit for the male’s self-consciousness (see footnote 13, Chapter 4).
21 Derrida, Glas. 142.
22 PhS, 274; PhM, 476.
24 Redding, 265-6
25 PhS, 268; PhM 467-8.
26 The Penates are according to Hegel, only a Vorstellung, a moment of representational thought that manifest the sacred union of love in marriage. The representation of the sacred is thus the divinities that represent love, however, this does not render the sacred to the level of Vorstellung. The sacred rather is that which transcends the Vorstellung, it is that which lies beyond any finite determinations, it is the infinite.
27 PhS, 271; PhM, 472.
28 PhS, 271-2; PhM, 473.
29 PhS, 272-3; PhM, 475.
30 PhS, 280; PhM, 485.
31 PhS 114-5; PhM, 232.
32 PhS, 275; PhM, 477.
34 PhS, 284-5; PhM, 492.
35 Sophocles, In. 59-64.
36 Sophocles, In. 74-77.
38 Burke, 539.
40 Rosenfield, 122.
41 PhS, 284; PhM, 491.
42 PhS, 284; PhM, 491.
43 PhS, 284; PhM, 491.
44 Burke, 538.
46 Burke, 538.
47 Hyppolite, 343.
48 PhS, 271; PhM, 472.
50 Sophocles, In. 857-860.
51 We are later told this by Tiresias’ conversation with Creon: “Your edict brings this suffering to the city, / For every hearth of ours has been defiled / And every altar” (In. 939-940). And, “The dead are no concern either of yours / Or of the gods above, yet you offend them. / So the avengers, the destroyers, Furies / Of Hades and the gods, lurking in ambush, / Wait to inflict your sins upon your head” (In. 1001-5).
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BATAILLE AND HEGEL

Bataille’s criticism of Hegel develops from the same strand of thought as that of Kojeve. However, Bataille’s critique of Hegel attempts to uncover a much deeper metaphysical problem within Hegel’s system. Bataille questions Hegel’s system, not through the use of the logic of the categories of the dialectical structure, that is, the interplay of being and nothingness, and identity and difference. Rather Bataille questions Hegel’s ability to viably speak about the absolute.

In the final section of The Phenomenology, Hegel summarizes the final stage of the development of conceptual thought (Begrieffen):

Finally, as conscience, it is no longer this continual alternation of existence being placed in the Self, and *vice versa*; it knows that its *existence* as such is this pure certainty of itself. The objective element into which it puts itself forth, when it acts, is nothing other than the Self’s pure knowledge of itself. These are the moments of which the reconciliation of Spirit with its own consciousness proper is composed; by themselves they are single and separate, and it is solely their spiritual unity that constitutes the power of this reconciliation. The last of these moments is, however, necessarily this unity itself and, as is evident, it binds them all into itself.¹

Hyppolite asserts that,

What is at issue here is all human experience: theoretical, practical, aesthetic and religious. Human experience allows the self to discover itself and substance to reveal itself to the self. This experience necessarily takes place in time, for within consciousness ‘the whole, although not conceived of, precedes its moments’.”²

However, Bataille finds this development of Hegelian epistemology specifically problematic. In *Inner Experience*, Bataille states:

To know means: to relate to the known, to grasp that an unknown thing is the same as another thing known. Which supposes either a solid ground upon which everything rests (Descartes), or the circularity of knowledge (Hegel). In the first case, if the ground gives way...in the second case, even if assured of having a well-closed circle, one perceives the
unsatisfying nature of knowledge. The unending chain of things known is for knowledge but the completion of oneself.  

Bataille questions whether or not to have said something about the absolute is to have already said too much. For Bataille, the Hegelian project appears to speak of the absolute in such a way that Hegel himself becomes the “sovereign Sage” for whom even the absolute becomes synthesized within the system. The dissatisfaction of knowledge, according to Bataille, is that Hegel’s apparent “circular, absolute knowledge is definitive non-knowledge. Even supposing that I were to attain it, I know that I would know nothing more than I know now.” It is the grand system, the organization of the absolute through, or perhaps more suitably, in discourse, that represents for Bataille the comedy of grasping for that which remains absolutely elusive. According to Bataille, the knowledge of the absolute is not simply a difficult concept to be grasped, it is always already beyond our grasp.

What is at question here is whether Bataille’s rendering of Hegel’s absolute knowledge does in fact levy a criticism against Hegel’s philosophical project. In order to approach this question with some clarity, one must analyze the influence that Kojeve’s reading of Hegel had on Bataille. The question in this context thus becomes an issue of whether Bataille is influenced by Kojeve’s conflation of desire and recognition. If we return to Taylor, we recall the possibility of developing two completely different approaches to Hegel’s knowledge of the Absolute. Taylor states: “Recognition (Anerkennung), unlike desire, does not essentially involve a reduction of the other to the same. Recognition involves a search for satisfaction in the ‘uncoerced’ recognition of the other.” Thus, if we approach Hegel’s methodology for knowledge of the absolute, we must, according to Taylor (and Hyppolite), differentiate between a concept of the
absolute that is defined by the desire to appropriate (to speak for) the absolute within an all-encompassing system, and a concept of the absolute where recognition of the alterity of the other allows for the "uncoerced recognition" of the absolute alterity of being. It is my contention that Bataille erroneously commits his critique of Hegel along the same grounds as Kojeve in terms of the desire to appropriate the Absolute within the system. This appropriation of the absolute is established through the same structure as the dialectic of lordship and bondage, where knowledge becomes servile to the one seeking it, namely Hegel.

However, according to Hegel, in order to attain any knowledge of the absolute, dialectical conceptualization demands the recognition of identity in difference. It is through the oppositions of being and nothingness that the becoming of determinate being is elucidated. But one must ask the question: How does this correspond to absolute knowledge? What must this dialectical interplay be in order to attain absolute knowledge? In terms of Hegel’s dialectical methodology, the identity of the absolute requires the difference of an absolute negation. Thus, knowledge of the absolute necessitates the death of the one who seeks it. For Bataille, Hegel’s apparent completion of the system that attains absolute knowledge can only come about with the death of Hegel; all that Hegel has left to do after completing the system is to die. Bataille views Hegel’s claims about absolute knowledge to be structured under the same theme as the struggle for recognition between Kojeve’s version of the lord and bondsman. Bataille sees this struggle for recognition as a comic spectacle whereby two consciousnesses enter into a fight to the death to gain the certainty of self-consciousness, but somehow both
escape the death. Bataille sees Hegel as using this same deception to account for the movement towards absolute knowledge.

However, Bataille’s critical interpretation of Hegel’s claim to absolute knowledge through the Aufhebung fails as a criticism of the Hegelian project. Hegel’s Aufhebung recognizes its own limitations, such as the impossibility of deriving knowledge from actually experiencing one’s own death. The recognition of this limitation is, firstly, explicated through the ontological account of the acquisition of absolute knowledge in the flux of becoming. Secondly, the recognition of this limitation is explicated through the epistemological account of identity and difference. Thirdly, the limitation of sacrifice is comprehended by Hegel through what we have seen earlier as the exemplary nature of Antigone’s sacrifice for the other, where Antigone transcends the desire for profit from her own suicide, and rather offers her life out of her love for the other. The recognition of these three limitations to the Aufhebung undermines Bataille’s criticisms. Death does play a role in the Aufhebung, but not in the form of a comical spectacle from out of which emerges the laughter of the Bataillian non-knowledge.

Bataille believes that the absolute knowledge that Hegel claims is representative of the dethroning of God so that Hegel may take His place. Bataille states:

And so the idea of an eternal and immutable God is in this perspective merely a provisional end, which survives while awaiting something better. Only completed history and the spirit of the Sage (of Hegel) – in whom history revealed, then revealed in full, the development of being and the totality of its becoming – occupy a sovereign position, which God only provisionally occupies, as a regent.9

In this polemical statement, Bataille expresses his interpretation of the Hegelian system and the notion of absolute knowledge. This reading holds that Hegel (the Sage) represents the demarcation of the end of history itself, the end of time. Through
achieving absolute knowledge, Hegel displaces God from the throne of the eternal and immutable, and thus Hegel becomes the eternal and immutable sovereign over history and the world. This notion of sovereignty represents, for Bataille, the problematic of sacrifice which points to the limitations of the Aufhebung, and to the resultant failure of Hegel’s claim to absolute knowledge. How could it be possible for a finite being who, upon “tarrying with the negative”\(^{10}\) – contemplating one’s existence as a finite being through the face-to-face encounter with the dialectical opposite of being itself that is death – possibly recover himself from such an abyss. Bataille cites the opening to the famous passage in the Preface of the Phenomenology regarding death: “Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, Beauty hates the understanding for asking of her what it cannot do.”\(^{11}\) According to Hegel, it is the strength of reason alone that is capable of recovering self-consciousness from the most dreadful of all negativities. Death cannot be mediated through the experience of sense-consciousness. One requires rational comprehension to pull oneself from the abyss that the negativity of death rends in being. From this Bataille states: “only one necessity emerges in a precise fashion: there can be authentic Wisdom (absolute Wisdom, or in general anything approaching it) only if the Sage raises himself, if I can put it this way, to the height of death, at whatever anguish to him.”\(^{12}\) By the very nature of the dialectical system, actual knowledge can only be attained through the recognition of identity and difference, presence and absence, being and nothingness, life and death. Thus, attaining absolute knowledge requires that the one seeking it must enter into the absolute negation that is death. Through this dialectal interplay of absolute being and nothingness, actual
knowledge of the absolute can be mediated. However, this willingness to appropriate absolute knowledge requires the willingness to absolutely negate oneself – to sacrifice oneself. So how is it possible to recover from one’s own death? Bataille states: “the problem of Hegel is given in the action of sacrifice. In sacrifice, death on the one hand, essentially strikes the corporeal being; and on the other hand, it is precisely in sacrifice that ‘death lives a human life.’”\(^{13}\) Thus, according to Bataille, in Hegel, sacrifice is called on to perform this paradoxical double role. On the one hand sacrifice represents the willingness to enter into the dialectical struggle and negate oneself; on the other hand, in order to appropriate absolute knowledge, the death that occurs in sacrifice must continue to live in order for such an appropriation to take place. I must end my life in order to attain an actual knowledge of the absolute.

For Bataille, this reveals the impossibility of knowing one’s own death, which also represents the impossibility of knowing the absolute. He states:

> The privileged manifestation of Negativity is death, but death, in fact, reveals nothing. In theory, it is his natural, animal being whose death reveals Man to himself, but the revelation never takes place. For when the animal being supporting him dies, the human being himself ceases to be. In order for Man to reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would have to die, but he would have to do it while living – watching himself ceasing to be. In other words, death itself would have to become (self-) consciousness at the very moment that it annihilates the conscious being.\(^{14}\)

The animal nature of sense-consciousness (mere experience) is that which must be sacrificed in order for the dialectical process of the understanding to appropriate the absolute via death. However, at the very moment of the sacrifice, the rational aspect of existence is also sacrificed, which eliminates the possibility for the appropriation of the absolute to take place. Thus, the recognition of the negativity of death cannot come from the absolute negation of the self, for it can only come about through the spectacle of
tragedy, or the substitution of one’s carnal being for one’s self. It is only through this event that actual knowledge is attainable: it is, as Bataille states, “the spectacle of sacrifice [that] makes humanity manifest.”¹⁵

According to Bataille, pure unmediated experience in the Hegelian system is always subordinate to the discourse of logic – the Aufhebung. However, the act of sacrifice is a paradoxical event wherein the subject, who, in order to attain knowledge of the absolute, must absolutely negate himself. “If the subject is not truly destroyed, everything is still equivalent. And if it is destroyed, the equivalent is resolved, but in the void where everything is obliterated.”¹⁶ Thus, one can never achieve the knowledge of the absolute that Hegel claims to achieve. On the one hand, if the subject does not annihilate itself, then the significance of the sacrifice is nothing more than a devalued simulation of the horror of sacrifice. On the other hand, if the annihilation of the subject occurs and the sacrifice is a true sacrifice of the self, all knowledge of the experience of death will inevitably be lost in this void of absolute negativity. Therefore, the only manner remaining in which one can attain absolute knowledge is through the spectacle of sacrifice whereby the sacrificer is not the sacrificed, but, utilizes a substitute for him/herself. This spectacle can occur through the use of the sacrificial animal, or the drama of tragedy. Jean-Luc Nancy writes that for Bataille “art comes to supplement, to relay or to sublate, the impasse of sacrifice.”¹⁷ Bataille states:

In art, desire returns, but it is, at first, the desire to annul time (to annul desire) while in project, there was simply rejection of desire…In art, man returns to sovereignty (to the expiration of desire) and – if it is at first the desire to annul desire – barely has it arrived at its goals, than it is the desire to rekindle desire.¹⁸
Art serves as the closest approximation to experiencing sacrifice. However, the experience that art provides fails to extinguish the desire to appropriate knowledge or truth because it fails to extinguish the subject itself. The supplement can never be sufficient enough to qualify as an absolute negation. For Bataille, the satisfaction for the desire for the absolute will always remain elusively beyond the grasp that the approximation of art can provide to the subject.

Art itself thus displaces the gaze once again: ‘apparent’ cruelty is a singularly ambiguous effect. It is limited to the simulacral, and at the same time it matters only through the cruelty, the horror that it brings out, and which (so to speak) means something – in any case, only has force – if it is not simulated.\(^{19}\)

Art will always remain, for Bataille, the simulation of sacrifice, and thus, will always remain as a comic spectacle of sacrifice.

What results from this comical spectacle is, for Bataille, the awakening of laughter over the complete discontinuity between reason and unreason (between knowledge and non-knowledge). The one who seeks absolute knowledge believing the task to be completed through the spectacle of sacrifice, rather than through the actual sacrifice of the self, becomes the occasion for laughter.

For Bataille’s laughter is just such an “altering incumbence of exteriority.” It is that powerless element over which consciousness has no power, that element which changes thought on the basis of its very passivity and inactuality.\(^{20}\)

The question Bataille asks, is how one can derive knowledge through one’s own sacrifice? If one sacrifices one’s self, then one can no longer possess absolute knowledge.

So what can be said of the absolute knowledge that Hegel claims to attain? Sovereignty, as the appropriation of absolute knowledge, is only accomplished through
the negation of that which is not dialectically equivalent to the absolute. Thus, according to Bataille, "the sovereignty of sacrifice is not absolute either. It is not absolute to the extent that the institution maintains within the world of efficacious activity a form whose meaning is, on the contrary, sovereign."21 It is the illusion of sovereignty that is in all actuality preserved only by the discourse that attends it. Hegel's absolute knowledge is thus placed in a position that is servile to the institution of the discourse that maintains the illusion of sovereignty.

In its most primitive form, the individual desires certainty and truth despite the alterity that surrounds it. The most primitive variations of the concept of desire and recognition emerge (as we have earlier seen) as the struggle for life and death between the lord and bondsman. Once again the dialectic of lordship and bondage must be revisited to see the structure of Bataille's criticism of Hegel. Lisa Trahair's essay, "The Comedy of Philosophy: Bataille, Hegel and Derrida," emphasizes the nature of this structure:

For Bataille, the master-slave dialectic is not merely one dialectic among others. He takes it to be the model for the dialectic in general. Whether rightly or wrongly, for Bataille it defines the nature and role of negativity throughout the Phenomenology. Hence the seriousness of his laughter; its object is both specific and fundamental. Beyond the relation between domination and servitude, it goes to the very heart of Hegelian negativity, undermining the success of the dialectical method and its ability to institute reason, truth and meaning.22

In the dialectic of lordship and bondage, and the emergence of this relationship, there occurs a reversal of supremacy between the self-certain being for-itself and its overcome opposition. The truth of the lord is that he/she has won the certainty of his/her freedom as a being that is for-itself. The lord believes him/herself to be the essential self-consciousness that is independent of otherness. Through this independence the lord
believes that he/she has won absolute freedom within the universal. But this state does not sustain itself. The lord is only the master in relation to the bondsman. The certainty of the lord is predicated upon the dominant relation to the bondsman, whereas for the bondsman, the desire to be recognized as an independent being for-itself has been sublated. The bondsman thus exists purely through his/her work. Through work, the bondsman is separated from the things that identify existence as such, thus negating the desire for the static identity that produces the lord’s illusion as a being-for-itself. Bataille envisions the same process occurring in the attempt to appropriate absolute knowledge.

He states:

Indeed by definition what is sovereign does not serve. But simple discourse must respond to the question that discursive thought asks concerning the meaning that each thing must have on the level of utility. In principle, each thing is there to serve some purpose or other. Thus the simple manifestation of Man’s link to annihilation, the pure revelation of man to himself (at the moment when death transfixes his attention) passes from sovereignty to the primacy of servile ends.²³

The comprehension of the absolute through the recognition of one’s own annihilation will, for Bataille, always remain servile to the boundaries of discourse. Thus, the absolute becomes nothing more than a finite linguistic operation. When the Sage realizes that the absolute knowledge that has been acquired is nothing more than a syntactical and semantical operation, the Sage’s position of sovereignty will be dethroned.

However, Hegel does not attempt to become the sovereign Sage of Bataille’s critique. When Bataille states, “the sovereignty of sacrifice is not absolute either. It is not absolute to the extent that the institution maintains within the world of efficacious activity a form whose meaning is, on the contrary, sovereign”, he ends this statement with, “A slippage cannot fail to occur, to the benefit of servitude”²⁴ He goes on to state:
Sovereignty in Hegel's attitude proceeds from a movement which discourse reveals and which, in the Sage's spirit, is never separated from its revelation. It can never, therefore, be fully sovereign; the Sage, in fact, cannot fail to subordinate it to the goal of a Wisdom which supposes the completion of discourse.²⁵

For Bataille, this inevitable movement from sovereign to servant represents the comedy and utter failure of the Hegelian project. "Bataille argues for the general comicality of the task Hegel set himself. He sketches a double caricature, claiming that Hegel usurps the sovereignty of the divine and at the same time downgrades God to the status of regent."²⁶ The revelation of absolute knowledge must remain within the boundaries of discourse. Thus, the one who attains absolute knowledge, the sovereign Sage, is always already indebted to the discourse, the system that reveals said knowledge. In other words, Bataille's critique rests on the idea that since Hegel bounds discourse within his system, the movement towards absolute knowledge is illusory. This is the comedy of the master becoming the slave; but Hegel does not dispute this.

Hegel's methodology actually shows that absolute knowledge never claims to transcend the discourse that reveals it, but only becomes a moment within the discourse. What is central to Hegel's Aufhebung is that Hegel is not developing a philosophy of identity. Hegel is not attempting to discover the static identity of absolute knowledge in order to appropriate it; rather, the Aufhebung represents the very becoming of identity-indifference that is itself the recognition of the unceasing restlessness of determinate Being. It is this recognition of determinate being that demonstrates Hegel's movement towards absolute knowledge.
Recognition plays a central role in Hegel’s *Aufhebung*. Hegel illustrates the recognition of determinate being through the existential perspective of desire that manifests itself through the becoming of life:

Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of the shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement of those shapes or becomes Life as a process. The simple universal fluid medium is the *in-itself*, and the difference of the shapes is the *other*. But this fluid medium itself becomes the *other* through this difference; for now it is *for the difference* which exists in and for itself, and consequently is the ceaseless movement by which this passive medium is consumed: Life as a *living thing*.  

The individual must recognize himself within the “simple universal fluid medium” of life – the universal. It is through the recognition of one’s own individuality that one comes to the realization of oneself as a being-for-itself. However, life presents innumerable “shapes” that elucidate sheer otherness for the self-consciousness. In order for self-consciousness to attain the truth of its being as in-and-for-itself, it must reconcile the shapes of otherness with itself. Hegel states: “In the sphere of Life which is the object of Desire, negation is present either *in an other*, viz in Desire, or as a determinateness opposed to another indifferent form.”  

Jean Luc Nancy states:

> Becoming is the movement of the other and in the other, and the other is the truth of becoming. Desire is therefore not merely unhappy relation to the other. In the unhappiness of lack, just as in the satisfaction of possession or of consummation, there is but one isolated side to desire. The truth of desire itself is still other: it is precisely *to be other*, it is alterity as infinite alteration of the self that becomes.

In the existential realm of the individual and otherness, the quest for truth is represented through the desire for the certain recognition of one’s individuality within the alterity of life.

For Hegel, the reality of death discloses the highest sense of the divine, which itself discloses the highest sense of individuality, as we have seen through the family and
Antigone. However, the derivation of meaning from death is not that of the seeming paradox of the one who dies yet continues to live, appropriating a positive knowledge of life, nor is the derivation of meaning simply through the spectacle of public performances of drama and tragedy. One does not simply recognize the emotional impact of the abrupt rupture that death entails by viewing actors on stage. Hegel recognizes the facile nature of drama as being synonymous with the Vorstellung, the form of thought as picture-thinking. According to Hegel, "in this picture-thinking, reality does not receive its perfect due...because it lacks perfection within itself it is a specific shape which does not attain to what it ought to show forth."30 The spectacle (Vorstellung) of drama and tragedy is never sufficient to inculcate the actual and dreadful reality of death. Rather, the acquisition of meaning from death takes place outside of the realm of the civic/universal.

According to Hegel, death acquires a rational significance within the family structure:

The duty of the member of a Family is on that account to add this aspect, in order that the individual's ultimate being [his death], too, shall not belong solely to Nature and remain something irrational but shall be something done, and the right of consciousness be asserted in it.31

The absolute significance of death is felt by the members of the family of the deceased; it is only the family member32 who is fully capable of rendering meaning from the death of an individual. The burial ceremony becomes that action whereby the family can mourn the loss of their loved one, while rendering significance from the rupture caused by the annihilation of being. Though the burial ceremony is itself a form of spectacle (Vorstellung), it is one in which the participants (the remaining members of the family) are affectively shaken to their core. However, within the performance of the burial, there
is work involved in actualizing the meaning of death through the ritualism of the ceremony:

The accomplished deed completely alters its\textsuperscript{33} point of view; the very performance of it declares that what is \textit{ethical} must be \textit{actual}; for the \textit{realization} of the purpose is the purpose of the action. Doing directly expresses the unity of actuality and substance; it declares that actuality is not an accident of essence, but that, in union with essence, it is not granted to any right that is not a true right.\textsuperscript{34}

The burial ceremony contextualizes and concretizes the otherwise abstract negation that is the death of the family member. The deceased is absolute negation, but through the ceremony the family recognizes the impact of absolute negativity insofar as they become capable of both appropriating the experience of death, while releasing the desire to maintain the physical connection with the other (the deceased).

Nancy aptly elucidates the difference between the Bataillian spectacle and the significance of Hegel’s burial ceremony:

Knowing then, will not be a representation (\textit{Vorstellung}: positing of an object before and for a subject of knowledge, conforming to its ‘vision of things,’ that is, to its meager limitation), but a presentation (\textit{Darstellung}: ‘position there,’ put in place and on stage, exposition, upsurge of the being-subject as such), and consequently the negation of every and all given presence, be it that of an ‘object’ or of a ‘subject.’ Not given presence, but the gift of presence — such are the stakes.\textsuperscript{35}

The knowledge that is acquired by the family via the death and burial of the beloved does not represent an absolute cognition of presence; family members do not leave the ceremony with an absolute affirmation of life just because they have “witnessed” death. Rather, the knowledge that the family members acquire is a recognition of the “gift of presence”; it is the recognition of the finite nature of every individual’s existence.

Finitude is not a ‘moment’ in a process or an economy. A finite existence does not have to let its meaning spring forth through a destructive explosion of its finitude. Not only does it not have to do so; in a sense it cannot even
do so... It cannot be sacrificed because, in itself, it is already, not sacrificed, but offered to the world. There is a resemblance, and the two can be mistaken for one another; and yet, there is nothing more dissimilar.36

What Bataille fails to understand, or perhaps understands all too well, is that Hegel recognizes this seeming paradox. Bataille conflates Hegel’s notion of absolute knowledge with an omnipotent-omnipresent cognitive awareness of all reality. It appears that what Bataille perceives as absolute knowledge is the cessation of history and the determinate becoming of the absolute itself. Whereas according to Hegel, the dialectical process (Aufhebung) that attends to the acquisition of absolute knowledge is not simply the manifold through which one attains absolute knowledge. The Aufhebung represents the very possibility of attaining absolute knowledge insofar as it represents the very structure of the absolute. Hegel states: “The self-knowing Spirit [Wissen] knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself.”37 Absolute knowledge is not the acquisition of an omnipotent-omnipresence that allows one to break outside the very structure of being. Absolute knowledge is the recognition of that very structure of being and the phenomena that occurs within said structure. “Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.”38 The recognition of the absolute is the recognition of the essence in which the becoming of nature, the subject, actuality, etc., are all entwined. This recognition of the flux of becoming is the recognition of life itself. What is essential in this recognition is the difference between the representation of this flux occurring either in terms of an epistemology rendered through a teleological account of being or in terms of a hermeneutical rendering of being.
For Hegel, this distinction plays a central role in understanding the methodology of his system. The interpretation of the Hegelian system depends on how one interprets the acquisition of absolute knowledge, either in terms of teleology or hermeneutical ends. According to Hegel, a teleological relation is one in which the relation itself is external to the related terms.\(^3\) In other words, the mediation is one that finds itself outside of that which constituted its own mediation. For example, it is the subject that believes itself to be separate from the observed phenomena. This externality of the subject is such that the essence of the object exists apart from the subject’s experience of said phenomena. In terms of _Aufhebung_, from the Bataillian perspective, the essence of the mediation - that is absolute knowledge, the omnipresent-omniscience - is not correlative to the constituent elements, i.e., the structure of thought that is in-and-for-itself. It is the idea that the subject does not impact the development of otherwise objective phenomena; it is the idea that the subject can appropriate otherness without impacting upon the essence of said otherness. Yet for Hegel, the structure of thought is such that the in-itself can be identified only insofar as there is the recognition that the knowledge that is acquired is a “movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself.”\(^4\) At the moment that the subject recognizes (attains a cognition of) the in-itself, the in-itself has already been negated and passed over into the for-itself.

When we give ourselves up to be limited and unfree, the place into which we can withdraw therefrom and get back into freedom is the place where we are certain of ourselves, the region of pure abstraction, the region of Thought. So, when we mean to speak of things, we call the Nature or Essence of them their Concept – and this exists only for thought: but of the concepts of things we cannot say that we govern them, or that the thought-determinations of which they are the complexes serve us; on the contrary, our thought has to limit itself in accordance with them, and our arbitrary choice or Freedom ought not to try to frame them after its own fancy. In so far, then, as subjective Thinking is our own-est and innermost
act, and the objective concept of things constitutes their own reality, we cannot get beyond that own act of ours, we cannot stand above it, and just as little can we get beyond the nature of things.\textsuperscript{41}

The recognition of this movement of identity-in-difference of the in-and-for-itself represents the continuous flux in which the attainment of cognition, even absolute cognition, is determined.

This process of reflection represents the limits of cognition, absolute and relative.

Thus Hegel states:

Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself – not an original or immediate unity as such – is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its ends also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual.\textsuperscript{42}

It is through this process, that the essence of the mediation is correlative to its constituent elements. In other words, since the elements are of the in-and-for-itself, the cognition is then produced from that synthesis. Cognition, even absolute cognition, must be understood as a moment in the continuous flux of being that is in-and-for-itself. Absolute knowledge does not escape this process of determinate being to become, as Bataille envisions, knowledge that is outside of the structure of being. Bataille’s vision of absolute knowledge is that it is an appropriation of the absolute that preserves the absolute as such, insofar as the absolute is maintained in a stasis, transcendent to the restlessness of becoming. However, for Hegel, the absolute does not escape this structure of becoming; absolute knowledge is not outside, but rather develops in the process of becoming. The absolute does not escape the temporal flux of being.

In the Logic, Hegel clearly explicates the process of the Aufhebung:

Thus Becoming stands before us in utter restlessness – unable however to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness: for since Being and Nothing
vanish in Becoming (and that is the very notion of Becoming), the latter must vanish also. Becoming is as it were a fire, which dies out in itself, when it consumes its material. The result of this process however is not an empty Nothing, but Being identical with the negation – what we call Being Determinate (being then and there): the primary import of which evidently is that it has become.\(^{43}\)

The recognition of absolute knowledge is the consummation of the materials that add up, so to speak, to the very total of being in the moment of recognition. However, this moment is always already a moment that "has become" – a moment which is only a moment that has been passed by in the flux of becoming that is the determinate structure of being.

Thus, we return to the desire for recognition and the movement towards the absolute:

That is what desire names: relinquishment as appropriation. But appropriation is the grasp (the concept) of this: that the proper happens as letting go. At this point, it becomes necessary to posit that this grasp – the grasp of letting go – cannot be the doing of consciousness as such...[they] demand that understanding relinquish itself.\(^{44}\)

Desire is an appropriation which occurs within the *Aufhebung*, not as the simple identification of the absolute, but rather is in every instance the understanding appropriating a concept (*Begriff*). The nature of this appropriation is that it never attains an absolute stasis that transcends the becoming of being. All cognition is prone to the becoming status of determinate being. Each appropriation is then equally a relinquishing:

Such is the first and fundamental signification of absolute negativity: the negative is the prefix of the *in*-finite, as the affirmation that all finitude (and every being *is* finite) is, in itself, in excess of its determinacy. It is in infinite relation. This is first of all what thought reveals, and what it neither questions, founds, nor represents. But that thought neither questions, founds, nor represents – this signifies that it does not work from the outside of things, but is itself the restlessness of things.\(^{45}\)
The recognition of death through the burial ceremony illustrates the nature of absolute negativity (infinity) as the fundamental structure of determinate being (finite individuality). It is within this tarrying between being and nothingness, between the finite and the infinite, that the recognition of the absolute is possible, not as that which stands outside of this process of becoming (Aufhebung), but rather within the restlessness of that becoming.

This however opens the question of whether the absolute is nothing more than a concept among other concepts within being thereby rendering the absolute as relative. In other words, does Hegel reduce the absolute to such a mundane concept that it renders the absolute to finite meaning? If one holds that the absolute must transcend the mundane as a concept above all other concepts, then one admits to the formalization of the static identity of the absolute, and thus agrees with Kojeve and Bataille. However, if one admits to the place of the absolute as bounded within the restlessness of determinate being, then one also admits to the reduction of the absolute as a relative term. If one stops here, Hegel’s philosophy remains trapped between the realist/idealist debate. But Hegel’s thought forces us beyond this reduction. Nancy states: “The one who thinks that he has resolved Hegel’s discourse by proclaiming that its major concept is a word, a “word,” a bon mot, would cut a sorry figure... Should one, on the contrary, imagine being able to make Hegel a laughingstock... would still be offering empty words.” The absolute is, for Hegel, beyond the reduction to discourse, yet not beyond the ability to be comprehended by self-consciousness; it is not simply a beyond, nor is it a concept to be appropriated. Hegel states:

[The] goal [of Absolute Knowledge] is the revelation of the depth of Spirit, and this is the absolute Notion. This revelation is, therefore, the raising-up
of its depth, or its *extension*, the negativity of this withdrawn ‘I’, a negativity which is its externalization or its substance; and this revelation is also the Notion’s Time, in that this externalization is in its own self externalized, and just as it is in its extension, so it is equally in its depth, in the Self.47

Nancy argues that Hegel’s thought must be interpreted through a broader conceptual scope than traditional interpretations have provided.

Now it is indeed this unrest that gives Hegel’s text its greatness and its strength. Simultaneously, he immobilizes and exhausts the entire effort of thought in a sort of enormous tautology of the concept (and it is in this way that it has become banal to call “Hegelian” everything in thought that seems closed, satisfied, and imperialist), and he stirs, shakes, renders unstable this tautology and ceaselessly relaunches its *logos* in the desperate flight of its own meaning and its own truth. But this flight is that of the True or of the Good such as the System appeared to have posited them. It is not a flight toward an always more remote horizon, toward an interminable accomplishment: it rather means that the True and the Good are *already there*, already accomplished, but their accomplishment is the *Unruhe* (restlessness) itself, and thus the eternal return (if it is permitted to link Hegel and Nietzsche)48 of the effort of thought that is its own meaning.49

Hegel’s absolute signifies the continual rethinking of the relationships between the “extension” of the external world and the “depth” of the Self. It is the continual recognition of the alterity of life. It is the recognition of the dynamic flux of intersubjectivity between the self and the other.

The absolute is between us. It is there in itself and for itself, and one might say, the self itself is between us. But “the self itself is unrest”: between us, nothing can be at rest, nothing is assured of presence or of being – and we pass each after the others as much as each into the others. Each with the others, each near the others: the *near* of the absolute is nothing other than our *near* each other.50

Hegel’s absolute comprises all these aspects of thought and existence. It demands of us that we continue to rethink the speculative uncertainty of a concept so that we arrive back where we began, but, as Hyppolite says, “one step removed” or perhaps one step closer to the alterity that surrounds us.
PhS, 481-2; PhM, 792
Hypopolite, 579.
This remarkably resembles Kierkegaard’s treatment of the paradoxical man of faith. For Kierkegaard, having faith is having the passion for the absolute certainty of that which is objectively uncertain (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript* 203). Specifically, if one is even capable of comprehending the absolute (or faith in Kierkegaard’s terms) one would be completely incapable of communicating such a sentiment.
Bataille, IE 108.
Derrida claims that the “always already” of the absolute eliminates the possibility of knowing the absolute. In his essay, “From Restricted to General Economy,” Derrida sides with Bataille: “The blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be organized the representation of meaning, is the point at which destruction, suppression, death and sacrifice constitute so irreversible an expenditure, so radical a negativity – here we would have to say an expenditure and a negativity without reserve – that they can no longer be determined as negativity in a process or a system” Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy,” *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978): 259. Taylor, 155.
This is the most elemental of the dialectical oppositions and is elucidated in the *Science of Logic*, Vol. 1 (94-97).
PhS, 19; PhM, 93-94
PhS, 19; PhM, 93.
Bataille, HDS, 13.
Bataille, HDS, 18.
Bataille, HDS, 19.
Bataille, HDS, 25.
Nancy, TU, 29.
Bataille, IE, 56.
Nancy, TU, 29.
Bataille, HDS, 26.
Trahair, 161.
Bataille, HDS, 26.
Bataille, HDS, 26.
Bataille, HDS, 27.
Trahair, 159.
PhS, 107; PhM, 223.
PhS, 110; PhM, 225.
Nancy, HRN, 61.
PhS, 412; PhM, 688.
PhS, 270; PhM, 470.
I am working with a broad definition of family that is not exclusive to the blood-relatives of the deceased. I believe that this expanded definition of family remains consistent with Hegel’s conception of family. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel states, “The family, as the immediate substantiality of mind, is specifically characterized by love, which is mind’s feeling of its own unity” (110). This relationship is plausibly accountable for various forms of intersubjective relationships that are beyond the husband/wife, parent child, child/child relationships, of which, may include the friendships between peers, colleagues, fellow citizens, etc., all with various levels of connection to one another.
The referent here is Antigone and her justification for breaking the civic edict by burying her brother. However, this represents the absolute significance that Hegel places on the performance of the burial
ceremony. Following this statement, Hegel cites Antigone, “Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred.” He then goes on to state: “With this acknowledgement there is no longer any conflict between the ethical purpose and actuality; it signifies the return to an ethical frame of mind, which knows that nothing counts but right” (PhS, 284; PhM 491). Hegel thus demonstrates the prime import of this ritualism.

34 PhS, 284; PhM, 491.
36 Nancy, TU, 35.
37 PhS, 492; PhM, 806.
38 PhS, 11; PhM 81-82.
39 PhS, 156; PhM, 294-5.
40 PhS, 10; PhM, 80.
41 Hegel, SOL, 44.
42 PhS, 10; PhM, 80.
44 Nancy, HRN, 63.
45 Nancy, HRN, 12.
47 PhS, 492-3; PhM, 806.
48 Once again I am unwilling to elaborate on the connection between Hegel and Nietzsche for it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
50 Nancy, HRN, 78-9.
CONCLUSION

From the outset, the major theme of this project sought to address one of the most common misrepresentations of Hegel’s dialectical philosophy, namely, the influence of Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegelian intersubjectivity rooted exclusively in the dialectic of lordship and bondage. The influence of Kojeve’s interpretation has characterized an entire strain of thought that has served as a spring-board for philosophical endeavours that utilize Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity as the paradigm for modernity’s violent appropriation of otherness to the same. From thinkers such as Marx, Merleau-Ponty, Bataille, Heidegger, Levi-Strauss, Levinas, Derrida, and so many others, Hegel’s philosophy has been characterized as the demarcation between an antiquated philosophy of the other that centers on the self-referential othering of the other, and a progressive philosophy of the other that seeks to maintain the alterity of the other. The result of these developments is that much of the contemporary literature on Hegel has followed the interpretation of the violent appropriation of otherness by the same that is epitomized by the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Essentially, Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity has been interpreted solely through this framework. Inevitably, the complexity of Hegel’s philosophy has become equivocated through this conceptual lens, erroneously reducing Hegel’s philosophy to the violence of appropriation, and missing its relevance to a positive philosophy of the other.

This project has elucidated four examples that clearly provide evidence to the effect that Hegel approaches the philosophy of intersubjectivity through a comprehensive analysis of varying manifestations of intersubjective relationships, all of which ultimately
operate under the auspices of the desire for mutual recognition that maintains the alterity of otherness. This is a position that is shared, albeit explicated through differing methodologies, by thinkers such as Jean Hyppolite, Charles Taylor and Jean-Luc Nancy. However, the issues surrounding Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity are not solved by a choosing of sides; one cannot simply follow Kojeve or Hyppolite, choosing one interpretation over the other. In other words, this issue is not so much a debate, as it is an exercise in clarification that seeks to discredit and demystify the notion that the dialectic of lordship and bondage is anything more than a primitive example of the desire for recognition. The dialectic of lordship and bondage serves to elucidate, not a philosophy of intersubjectivity, but rather the initial development of the awareness of the role of work (Bildung) in developing a pathway to self-consciousness. All other formulations of the dialectic of lordship and bondage that act as representations of intersubjectivity provide terribly inaccurate portrayals of Hegel’s understanding of intersubjectivity.

Although Kojeve’s work on Hegel revived Hegelian scholarship in the twentieth century, it played upon the sentiment of loss, death and the dehumanization of post-war Europe. Kojeve found in Hegel’s account of the dialectic of lordship and bondage an explanation of human intersubjectivity that emphasized the primal aggression and desire for dominance and power that seemed to characterize the contemporary socio-cultural experiences of his time. What became striking in Kojeve’s formulation of Hegel’s dialectic of lordship and bondage is the way in which Kojeve defined the desire for recognition as purely being the desire to sublate the other in such a way as to annihilate the otherness of the other. Kojeve found desire to be the primal motivation behind intersubjectivity, and that the basic element of desire is the implication towards the
consumption (destruction) of the desired object. Kojeve assumed that Hegel's "dialectical sublation" that sought to acquire the certainty of self-consciousness was itself the paradigm for all human interaction. Thus, for Kojeve, the desire for recognition was ultimately the desire for mastery over the other. In this formulation, what emerges is the conflation of the concepts of desire and recognition, where recognition is subsumed under the desire to consume, sublate and annihilate the other.

However, one must compare Kojeve's interpretation with that of his teacher, Hyppolite, whose interpretation of Hegel's account of intersubjectivity takes on a far less radical, yet in my view, far more convincing psychological interpretation of recognition. According to Hyppolite, desire is simply the feeling of need that seeks to consume and enjoy the consumption of an object. However, in the desire for recognition, the true object of desire is not the simple consumption (negation) of an external object, but is the discovery that desire is the desire for one's self. True desire seeks to reconcile one's self with oneself in the context of the radical otherness of life, the living processes that sustain otherness and which opposes the self. Hyppolite identifies the inability of desire to satisfy the abstraction of its need. Once the external object is consumed, the satisfaction thereafter is lost, and so the consumption inherent in desire fails to maintain its satisfaction. Hyppolite clearly identifies Hegel's insistence that the desire for recognition is ultimately the desire for mutual and reciprocal recognition between the other and the self. This is the ultimate reason why the dialectic of lordship and bondage immediately fails in its attempt to satisfy one's desire to be recognized. Furthermore, it is evident that Kojeve's analysis of Hegel's desire for recognition clearly omits Hegel's discussion on the necessity of recognition to be mutual and reciprocal, which thus highlights Kojeve's
problematic interpretation. What emerges from this critique is that Kojeve conflates the notion of recognition with that of desire. Although the two concepts are linked together, recognition itself cannot be reduced to desire. Recognition can only become a pathway to self-consciousness, if it occurs through the development of mutual reciprocity.

In Taylor’s view, Hyppolite is on the right track, but does not go far enough. Taylor identifies the dialectic of lordship and bondage as representing a completely separate path towards self-consciousness from the development of self-consciousness through mutual recognition. According to Taylor, the dialectic of lordship and bondage clearly fails as a movement towards recognition, and so becomes a representation of the development of self-consciousness through the earnestness of work (Bildung). For Taylor, although Recognition may begin the process of the dialectic of lordship and bondage, albeit in a very primitive form, recognition is not what occurs from this process. In the dialectic of lordship and bondage, recognition fails almost immediately. What is left is the development of the bondsman, who through the fear of death and the earnestness of work acquires a new path to self-consciousness. Thus, from Taylor’s analysis, Kojeve not only conflates the notions of desire and recognition, he also conflates recognition with the significance of the newly forged path towards self-consciousness of the bondsman through fear and work.

We also saw that Williams’ account of recognition signifies the necessity of mutual reciprocation in the development of self-consciousness. He, like Taylor and Hyppolite, makes a distinction between the concepts of recognition and desire: “Recognition (Anerkennung), unlike desire, does not essentially involve a reduction of the other to the same. Recognition involves a search for satisfaction in the uncoerced
recognition of the other." By conflating this distinction and reducing the concept of recognition to desire, Kojeve is led to the hasty conclusion that humanity and human nature are predicated on the desire for mastery, the desire to consume the other that is nothing more than an object (reductively characterized as the non-I).

What Hyppolite, Taylor and Williams elucidate, contrary to Kojeve, is that the desire for recognition represents a completely separate pathway to self-consciousness than that merely found in relying on the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Furthermore, the concepts of desire (Begeirde), recognition (Anerkennung) and work (Bildung) cannot be conflated as equivalent concepts. Although desire motivates recognition, recognition itself can only occur through mutual reciprocity whereby the other is maintained as other, and cannot simply be reduced in the desire to consume and destroy otherness.

One must turn to Hegel’s analysis on the family and the community of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) to account for the development of self-consciousness through mutual Recognition. For Hegel, love represents the successful development of the desire for recognition. One can find this expressed in the early Christian community. However, the interaction of love in the community whose ultimate ethical quality is predicated on the likeness to the divine, the community of faith, is too constraining for a general theory of ethical life. However, the concept of love demonstrates the foundation of the possibility of achieving a general theory of ethical life because it establishes a basis for mutual recognition. This is a basis that Hyppolite emphasizes as the necessary element for one to achieve self-consciousness through recognition. Thus, “civil society” (Hegel’s terminology) and the institution of marriage represent the initial development of mutual recognition whereby the other is united with the self, but this happens while maintaining
the individuality of its otherness. We see this in Hegel’s view of marriage. The concretization of love through marriage is predicated on the autonomy of two independent beings, freely and mutually recognizing one another as independent beings in a relationship of reciprocal recognition.

Paul Redding aptly summarizes the development of self-consciousness via mutual recognition within the community of ethical life: The first moment of recognition occurs between two individuals who enter into marriage, mutually recognizing each other in the reciprocation of love and the unity of two independent self-consciousnesses that form a single self-consciousness, and do so without annihilating the otherness of each other. The second moment is the recognition of the unified self-consciousness recognizing the rights of others to enter into this universal expression of reciprocal love. The third moment is the recognition of the universality of this embodiment of reciprocal love by all co-existent self-consciousnesses. These differing moments of recognition all allude to the varying aspects of the normative roles of individuals within a family, community or society. The concept of love as the basis of mutual reciprocal recognition represents one of the more prominent themes that resonate throughout Hegel’s works. Hegel goes to great lengths to distinguish between differing manifestations of love and mutual recognition.

With all of this in mind, the significance of Hegel’s concept of recognition must take a more prominent role in our viewing of his philosophical corpus. The Phenomenology evokes the structural framework that elucidates the psychologico-existential possibility of social interaction among individuals. This structural framework is further elucidated in the concrete formalizations of family and society, and their
possible expressions. Hegel carefully weaves through these possible manifestations of *Sittlichkeit*, explaining interpretations of various cultural models.

What is often overlooked in Hegelian scholarship is his insistence on Antigone as representing the individual *par excellence*: she is the ultimate expression of the collision of two fundamental attitudes within the *Sittlichkeit*, namely, the civic (universal) and the divine (individual). For Hegel, Antigone represents the highest possible form of recognition because she willingly (knowingly) sacrifices her own life for the life of her brother. The sacrifice of one’s life for the other demonstrates this exemplary action of the love for the other. Although Derrida calls into question the family bond as being the occasion that predicates this sacrifice, it is evident that Hegel’s insistence on Antigone as being the highest representation of the divine/individual illustrates that her character is more than just that of the dutiful sister to the dead brother. Furthermore, Derrida’s critique of Hegel’s rendering of the Antigone drama is predicated on the same conflation of desire and recognition that we had earlier seen in Kojeve. Derrida’s interpretation is dogmatically predicated on Kojeve’s conflation of desire and recognition that inevitably draws upon the conception of Hegelian intersubjectivity as solely based on the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Derrida fails to account for the possibility that the intersubjective relations of male/female, brother/sister, etc., do not necessarily enter into the life and death struggle. Furthermore, Derrida fails to acknowledge the possibility that Hegel’s conception of intersubjectivity is directed by anything other than the dialectic of lordship and bondage. But as we have seen, mutual recognition is, for Hegel, the unfolding of conceptually mediated roles that deliver an intersubjectivity with a plausible account of the dynamics of family life and social relationships, which are guided, not by
the desire to sublate (annihilate) the other, but rather by the awareness of alterity within the normative social and cultural roles of individuals.³ Antigone is viewed as the highest example of the recognition of otherness through her willingness to sacrifice her own life out of her love for the other.

It is thus the action of sacrifice, the performance of negation that illustrates the significance of Antigone in Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity. She is an exemplar of the love of the other because she transcends an economy of exchange for the purest form of sacrifice, which is the sacrifice of one’s self for another. Antigone does not ask for retribution for her sacrifice; her sacrifice implies the destruction of an economy of exchange. Her death and suicide negates the demand for a profit from her actions. She cedes her life purely out of the love for the other. Thus, Antigone is for Hegel the exemplar of mutual recognition because she represents the highest expression of love for the other. This fundamentally moves us away from an interpretation of Hegelian intersubjectivity that is rooted in violence and appropriation. It further discredits the idea that Hegel’s system aims to appropriate all of existence by ending history through the appropriation of the absolute. What it posits is the idea, that for Hegel, the absolute signifies something more than just a concept to be appropriated and understood. The absolute becomes the unifying thread of intersubjectivity, nature, existence and thought itself.

Bataille’s philosophical criticism aims at Hegel’s development of the epistemological movement towards absolute knowledge. For Bataille, Hegel achieves knowledge of the absolute, or in Bataille’s terminology, mastery over all existence, in the same manner as that of the dialectic of lordship and bondage whereby the bondsman
achieves self-consciousness before and despite his/her servility to the lord. This is what Bataille sees as the comedy of the slave becoming the master, or in epistemological terms, it is the paradox of acquiring knowledge of the absolute through a dialectical opposition that is not equivalent to an absolute negation. Bataille questions Hegel’s approach to dialectically move towards the absolute, because that would entail the dialectical negation that is on par with the absolute, namely death. Thus, if one is to acquire knowledge of the absolute, it could only arise through the death of the one who seeks it.

However, this criticism assumes that the movement towards the knowledge of the absolute is equivalent to the desire for mastery over all existence, which is predicated on the movements of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Once again the conflation of desire and recognition blurs the motivations behind Hegel’s philosophical position. Hegel’s methodology reveals that absolute knowledge never claims to transcend the discourse that attends it, for it only becomes a moment within such discourse. What is central to the Aufhebung is that Hegel is not developing a philosophy of identity. Hegel is not attempting to discover the static identity of absolute knowledge in order to appropriate it: The Aufhebung represents the very becoming of identity-in-difference that is itself the recognition of the unceasing restlessness of determinate being. Recognition plays a central role in Hegel’s Aufhebung. Hegel holds that the recognition of determinate being through the existential perspective of desire manifests itself through the becoming of life.

If Hegelian scholarship is to progress, it must do so beyond the interpretation of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. To continue interpreting Hegel’s philosophical
movements through this conceptual lens is to deny the intricacy of Hegel’s philosophy. One must move beyond the Kojevian school of thought that supplants all analysis of Hegel’s philosophy with an exhaustive (and exhausting) account of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of intersubjectivity is just one illustration of the flawed over-usage of the dialectic of lordship and bondage. It is clear that Hegel’s account of intersubjectivity intricately weaves through various cultural models and elucidates various manifestations of intersubjectivity that are possible through the development of recognition (Anerkennung). Ultimately, recognition is the recognition of the alterity of otherness within the boundaries of life as the determinate structure of the becoming of being.

2 Taylor, 155.
3 Redding, 265-6
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