Leviathan and the Seed of Religion

by

Graham Robert Howell

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts

Department of Political Science
BROCK UNIVERSITY
St. Catharines, Ontario

© G. R. Howell, August 2003
To my Family, Teachers and Friends.
Acknowledgements

First of all I would like to express my gratitude to my parents for their constant love and support. I would like to thank Professor Mathie for his guidance and wisdom, and his family for their warmth and hospitality, both of which made this thesis possible and my time at Brock invaluable. I would like to thank Professor Bradshaw for her selfless dedication to the success of all the graduate students, including mine. I would like to thank Chris Schacht for her patience and assistance, without which I am sure I would not have graduated. Finally, I would like to thank all the friends I have met while here who have made my two years here so rewarding and enriching, especially Patrick, Kristi, Ethan, Dan, Shelagh, Natalie, Sherri, James, and Clara.
Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: ON THE INTRODUCTION TO LEVIATHAN 6

CHAPTER TWO: DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE 29

CHAPTER THREE: JUSTICE AND THE HEART 44

CHAPTER FOUR: PASSION AND OPINION 64

CHAPTER FIVE: THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OPINION 79

CHAPTER SIX: THE SEED OF RELIGION 93

CHAPTER SEVEN: HOBBES AND THE CULTIVATORS OF THE SEED OF RELIGION 112

WORKS CITED 128

ENDNOTES 130
Introduction

The most generally acknowledged difference among the various presentations of Hobbes's political philosophy is in his treatment of religion. Each of the successive presentations dedicates an increasing amount of text to addressing the relationship between religion, specifically Christianity, and his political philosophy.¹ The significance of Hobbes's treatment of Christianity has been widely disputed in recent times.² Most commentators, however, recognize that regardless of Hobbes's private thoughts about God, Hobbes viewed Christianity as a threat both to the civil power and the modern scientific project.³ The way that Hobbes seeks to overcome this threat is of central importance for understanding his political philosophy.⁴ According to Leo Strauss, Christianity was a threat because fear of invisible powers (fear of God or hell) may be more powerful than fear of violent death, the passion upon which Hobbes's political philosophy is based. Overcoming this challenge "requires such a radical change in orientation as can be brought about only by the disenchantment of the world, by the diffusion of scientific knowledge, or by popular enlightenment."⁵ The three possible ways that Strauss believes Hobbes employed to bring about the required 'radical change in orientation' are linked. The dissemination of scientific knowledge could lead to both popular enlightenment and a disenchantment of the world. Be this as it may, this thesis aims to explore how Hobbes thought he could bring about the radical change in orientation required for the success of his political philosophy through an examination of his account of science and the seed of religion and its cultivators.
Though Hobbes treats religion in the section dedicated to man as man in all the presentations of his political philosophy, his account of the seed of religion and its cultivators is unique to *Leviathan.* This suggests that Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion is important for understanding his political philosophy as it is presented in *Leviathan.*

The argument for examining Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion based solely on the structure of the text of *Leviathan* is as follows. The state of nature is of prime importance for Hobbes’s account of the generation of the commonwealth. For this reason, and others, it is important for his political philosophy. Chapter eleven, Hobbes’s account of Manners, is an examination of “the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity.” The conclusion of Hobbes’s analysis of Manners’ is his declaration of “The Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their felicity and misery.” This conclusion is that men are by nature insufficiently equipped to live in peace and unity; the state of nature is a state of war. Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion begins in chapter eleven and ends in chapter twelve. One possible interpretation of this is that chapter twelve of *Leviathan* is a continuation of the account of Manners. This would place Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion at the centre of the argument which concludes with Hobbes’s account of the state of nature. The seed of religion is therefore important for understanding the state of nature. This thesis claims that the significance of Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion, and the rest of chapter twelve, cannot be understood, solely, as Hobbes’s account of why the fear of invisible powers is an insufficient basis to generate the commonwealth. The seeds of religion can never be abolished out of human nature and therefore any solution to the challenge posed by the
fear of invisible powers must consist in either the cultivation of the seeds of religion or an attempt to retard their growth. Therefore any satisfactory account of Hobbes’s civil philosophy in Leviathan, must account for Hobbes’s intent to cultivate (or retard) the seeds of religion.

For the purpose of this thesis the task of understanding Leviathan is two-fold. First, understanding Leviathan means understanding Hobbes’s intention in writing Leviathan. Second, understanding Leviathan means understanding the specific arguments and doctrines of Leviathan. However, these two separate tasks are connected: the parts must be understood in relation to the whole, and the whole cannot be understood without some understanding of the parts. More precisely, therefore, this thesis will look at a part of Leviathan, the account of the seed of religion, and its relationship to what we can discern about the whole.

To accomplish this two-part task, the thesis explores the significance of Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion in two ways. First, it turns to Hobbes’s explicit account of his intention in the Introduction to Leviathan to arrive at a broad notion of the whole of Leviathan. In his Introduction to Leviathan Hobbes claims that Leviathan contains the knowledge ‘required to rule a nation.’ To clarify this claim an examination of Hobbes’s account of knowledge, including his accounts of both civil and natural science, is required. The first three chapters of the thesis address this part of the task.

The second part of my task is to address the specific sections of Leviathan that deal with Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion and its cultivators. This requires more than an examination of chapter twelve of Leviathan since Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion begins in his account of Manners in chapter eleven. The second part of the task
therefore begins by examining Hobbes’s account of Manners in chapter eleven and ends with an examination of chapter twelve. The last four chapters of this thesis address this part of the task.

Concerning the first part of the task, addressing the intention or the whole of 
Leviathan, this thesis takes its starting point from the latter half of the Introduction of 
Leviathan: the section Hobbes dedicates to explaining his procedure in Part One of 
Leviathan. The first half of the Introduction of Leviathan sets out an analogy between the 
products of God’s art (nature including man) and the products of man’s art (most notably 
the Leviathan or Commonwealth). Man is the most ‘rational and excellent work’ of 
God’s art, nature. Man, imitating God’s art, creates an artificial man for his own 
protection and defence. This artificial man is the great Leviathan “or to speak more 
reverently the Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal God, our peace and 
defence.”7 There is no question that the Commonwealth is created for man’s peace, 
defence or protection. The question that does remain is this: is this Mortal God legitimate 
by man’s artifice or by God’s commandment? The Mortal God Leviathan is of ‘greater 
stature and strength than the natural, for whose peace and defence it was intended.’8 The 
meaning of this depends upon what exactly Hobbes means by ‘intended.’ If man is 
intended to make use of his reason to imitate God’s art and create the Mortal God 
Leviathan, then it could be said that God intended man to make an artificial man who has 
‘greater stature and strength’ than natural man. The first part of the Introduction is 
ambiguous precisely in what it says about the relationship between the invisible powers 
and temporal powers.
To clarify this relationship it is necessary to know more about what Hobbes means by the nature of the natural man and the nature of the artificial man. The task of Leviathan or Of the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil is to describe the nature of the artificial man. Hobbes divides his description of the nature of the Commonwealth into four parts: Of Man, Of Commonwealth, Of Christian Commonwealths, and Of the Kingdom of Darkness. In the Introduction Hobbes only comments on the first part, Of Man, which is a description of the matter and the artificer of the Commonwealth. This is Hobbes’s only explicit account of the method he is going to employ in his description of the artificial Man, the Mortal God Leviathan. Since the account of the seed of religion also falls in the first part of Leviathan, the part dedicated to describing Man, Hobbes’s introductory comments on the first part of his task are the logical place to begin this investigation.
Chapter One: On the Introduction to Leviathan

This chapter explores Hobbes’s comments on the method he employed in presenting *Leviathan*. Specifically, this chapter is an exegesis of the last seven sentences of the Introduction to *Leviathan*, and it aims discover clues as to how we are to read *Leviathan* as well as to clarify Hobbes’ intention in writing *Leviathan*. This exegesis will provide the basis on which the thesis is to investigate Hobbes’ political philosophy in general and his account of the seed of religion specifically.

“Concerning [the matter and artificer of the commonwealth, man], there is a saying much usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by reading books but men.”

Hobbes finds it necessary to address a popular maxim concerning acquiring wisdom about human beings. He finds it necessary because addressing popular maxims is useful in outlining an approach to acquiring wisdom, which differs from that which is popularly held to be true. It is useful first because it invites the reader to enter into a dialogue with the text. As in Platonic dialogues, which typically start with one of the interlocutors presenting a popular opinion and then another interlocutor presenting a challenge to that popular opinion, the reader is personally drawn into the argument by being led to question the popular opinion. Second, the popular opinion is a useful starting point if one’s intent is to replace an old way of thinking with a new way of thinking. If there is cause to doubt the popularly held truth, the mind must be open to considering the possibility of discarding that old truth and admitting a new truth. For heralds of new truths, beginning with popular opinion also has the advantage that the heralds need only
call into question those assumptions implicit in the popular opinion that they wish to challenge, leaving other assumptions untouched and unproblematic.

Hobbes thus begins with the maxim that wisdom is acquired through the reading of men not books. Implicit in this maxim are three propositions: the first is that there is wisdom; second that wisdom is an acquisition; and third that it is acquired through a kind of reading. None of these assumptions are explicitly proved or disproved by Hobbes. However, over the course of his consideration of the pursuit of wisdom, he silently drops the notion that wisdom is an acquisition and retains without challenge the assumptions that there is wisdom and that it is pursuable through a kind of reading. Though he does not explicitly challenge and then reject the assumption that wisdom is an acquisition, its rejection can be inferred from the fact that it is not necessary to Hobbes's final formulation of the pursuit of wisdom.

Let us begin by considering why Hobbes has implicitly rejected the notion that wisdom is a piece of property. In saying that wisdom is an acquisition, two possibilities about the nature of wisdom suggest themselves. One is that wisdom is like a piece of property such as a house, or a bird, or money. This implies that if it is imparted to someone else there is a loss on behalf of the giver and a gain on behalf of the receiver. The other possibility is that wisdom is not an acquisition that is open to scarcity in the same way as material possessions are open to scarcity. In teaching, for example, there is no loss to the teacher, in fact, more often than not, teaching incidentally aids the teacher to learn more, meaning he gets richer not poorer in wisdom through imparting it. But if the people think that wisdom is a material possession then they will be reluctant, unlike Hobbes, to impart it to others. Because the people believe wisdom is a possession, what
they seek to ‘possess’ is not actually wisdom. It is therefore better that the ‘wisdom’ seekers among the people jealously guard their ‘wisdom’ and abstain from imparting it to others, unwittingly making fools of their would-be students. In fact if the people secretly believe that wisdom concerning men amounts to the belief that it is better to do injustice than suffer it, it is clearly not to their advantage to teach others what they have learned. But some human beings want to be honored for what they possess. They know that wisdom is honorable and therefore cannot keep it hidden, but wish to impress others by displaying signs of their wisdom.

Hobbes implicitly maintains the assumption that reading is the proper means to wisdom. It is therefore necessary for a clear grasp of Hobbes’s understanding of wisdom to analyze the implications of this assumption. When one reads text, or listens to speech, one is searching for the meaning, sense, or reason, which the words are meant to communicate. If the means to wisdom is a kind of reading, then wisdom is a kind of understanding of meaning, sense, or reason. In Hobbes’s account of speech in Leviathan, he places great importance on the definitions of words for determining the sense of a sentence. No sense can be made of a sentence which states a connection between two words without first making clear the meaning of the two words to be connected and the word that is meant to connect them. As an example take the sentence Socrates is a man. No sense can be made of the sentence unless each word in the sentence, Socrates, is, a, man, are defined. Making inferences from a sentence without understanding definitions is both foolish and futile. Hobbes goes into some detail to explain what objects can and cannot be represented by words. This account is perhaps important for a full understanding of Hobbes’s account of science and language, but it is not centrally
important for understanding the difference between reading men and books.

Unlike Plato's Socrates in the Phaedrus, Hobbes in Leviathan does not examine the differences between spoken and written words. Rather, Hobbes’s treatment of speech in chapter four of Leviathan indicates a hierarchy of the greatness of the three human innovations: speech, the written word, and the printed word. The printing press is not a great innovation compared to the invention of letters, but the most noble and profitable invention of all was speech itself. With this ranking in place, (speech, letters, print), Hobbes then goes on to discuss four uses and four corresponding abuses of speech, leaving it to the reader to determine how these uses and abuses are different in written and printed form.

The ranking of these three innovations is determined by one, two or all three of the following criteria. The first possible criterion is the relationship of the author to the audience; the second is the logic connecting the innovations; and the third, their temporal connection.

The invention of speech is temporally and logically prior to both letters and the printed word. After giving an account of the origin of speech and an account of its general uses (as marks and signs), Hobbes indicates four special uses and four corresponding abuses of speech. The first use of speech is that it makes possible the acquisition of the arts and sciences. This is true because it allows us to “register what by cognition we find to be the cause of anything, past or present, and what we find things present and past may produce or effect.” It is this capacity in particular which makes possible the type of understanding peculiar to human beings. The abuse that
corresponds to this use is that human beings may err in the registry of their thoughts, which makes possible self-deception, ignorance, and absurdity.

The second use of speech is that it makes possible the communication of knowledge. This makes possible counsel and teaching. Both allow men to make up for their ignorance. If I wish to build a house, but have never built one before, I can seek the counsel of an architect who can then instruct me in how to construct it. The abuse, which corresponds to this use, is deception generally, but more specifically the use of metaphors and other imprecise speeches. Metaphors openly mislead by stating identity instead of similarity. Stating that our nature in its education and want of education is exactly the description of a cave and its strange dwellers, is to mislead in that it is not exactly like the description of the cave and its dwellers, but only similar to the description of the cave and its dwellers. Metaphors therefore, or more precisely similes and allegories can serve a pedagogic purpose. In Hobbes’s words some times an apt similitude is required to open the understanding.  

The third use of speech is that it can be used to signal intent or will to other people. This use of speech is manifest not only in appealing for aid from other people, but also in establishing a division of labor. I can signal my intent to build a house and my need for aid in doing so to the architect and he can then signal his intent to help me build the house. In building the house he can then signal to me to do work suited to my abilities, leaving for himself work more suited to his abilities, thereby making the construction of the house more efficient. This use of speech generally speaking is promise making. Promises are of great use in political life because they introduce predictability to human action. Specifically in *Leviathan*, it is a promise of each with
everyone else that generates the mortal God *Leviathan*. The corresponding abuse of speech is that it is possible to deceive others about your intent to honor contracts. The implications of this violation are so great that Hobbes deduces the natural law (or theorem) of justice against it.

The fourth and final use of speech is that it can please. Flattery and praise become possible with the invention of speech. This use of speech is significant in that human beings on Hobbes’s account have a tendency to call whatever pleases them good. It is this use of speech that makes rhetoric possible. The abuse that corresponds to this use of speech is that speech can also be used to displease, insult and dishonor, which is a potential cause of conflict. It is not clear that what Hobbes identifies as the use and the abuse in this section is correct. Displeasing speech can serve good as much as pleasing speech can be bad. This is perhaps most evident in education. The state of nature poorly considered, for example, is an insulting accusation of mankind. Though with the proper guidance it is an accusation meant to educate.\(^18\)

Though Hobbes gives little account of the difference between spoken and written speech in *Leviathan*, he does counsel his readers to correct and amend his account as needed.\(^19\) In Plato’s *Phaedrus*, Socrates does provide an account of the difference between written and spoken words. It is useful to examine this account and its relationship to Hobbes’s uses and abuses of speech to make clear other possible assumptions Hobbes is making in his teaching about acquiring wisdom.

The first two parts of Socrates’ critique of the written word are provided in a tale about an Egyptian king, and the last two parts are provided in images. The first critique is that reliance on the written word can be damaging to memory while reliance on giving
and hearing speeches exercises the memory. Though the written word can be a hedge against a failing memory: a good memory is needed to grasp the whole. The necessity of the memory for knowing is also indicated by Hobbes.

"Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth has need to remember what every name he uses stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will find himself entangled in words; as bird in lime twigs, the more he struggles the more belimed."^{20}

Memory is also especially important when dealing with established intellectual authorities; especially those that come from books. Because heavy reliance on writing can damage the memory it is important to keep close watch over what one is reading to be certain that the author has not carelessly set down his definitions.^{21} Added to this, in reading books it is prudent to be careful about reading long books in particular where it is more likely that what it presented early in the work will be forgotten as one proceeds.^{22}

This leads to Socrates's next critique of the written versus the spoken word. The written word makes it possible for the unwise to seem wise to the unwise. Some will read without proper method and instruction and therefore can seem wise if they are able to recall and quote various authorities. Hobbes's acknowledgement of this weakness is perhaps best seen in two slightly different quotations of Cicero's remark concerning philosophers.

"That there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers."^{23}

and

"There is nothing so absurd that the old philosophers (as Cicero saith, who was one of them) have not some of them maintained."^{24}
The first statement applies as much to Hobbes as it does any of the philosophers of the past. The second statement is different in that it focuses not so much on the books of philosophers but on the absurd claims the old philosophers maintained. Hobbes, by indicating that Cicero was one of these old philosophers is signaling to his readers that it must be determined for ourselves whether or not Cicero’s claim about the old philosopher’s is true. The combination of these statements at once cultivates a healthy suspicion of philosophers and fuels the drive to philosophize. By calling the authority of philosophers into question, arguments from authority are made suspect. Hobbes invites his readers to mistrust the authority of definitions. Rather it is essential to keep track in one’s mind of what each and every word one uses means. Hobbes gives the following warning to those who trust to the authority of books

“From whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves, but spend time in fluttering over their books, as birds that entering by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in.”

Hobbes’s analogy to money in this instance recalls our first consideration of knowledge as an acquisition. Words and their definitions are what Hobbes has here compared to money. On Hobbes account of knowledge it is words and their definitions, that those who seek knowledge as property will jealously guard. The opinion that knowledge is an acquisition also becomes manifest when one is particularly attached to the authority of one author. Those with favorite authors are predisposed to believe that
whatever their favorite author claims must be true. It is this unquestioned dependence on
the definitions of authors that does not allow the knowledge seeker to escape the
authority of books. Hobbes warns against this by stating: “For words are wise men’s
counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools, that value them by
the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatsoever, if
but a man.”26 Thomas Hobbes guards against this problem by exposing it and its
consequences to his readers.

Socrates’s third criticism of the written word is that writing is an image of the
spoken word and therefore can only serve as a reminder of the truth to one who already
knows. Socrates compares writing to a painting that seems like a real scene, though it
never changes and never speaks. The written word has this same quality in that it may
seem to say something wise, but without being able to question the word it is impossible
to know for sure whether the words actually says something wise. The painting is a two
dimensional representation of a three dimensional reality. To see the objects represented
in the painting as they are, it is necessary to be able to turn them and see them from
various different angles so as to know the object from all its possible appearances. On
this analogy the written word represents the truth in the same way. Words can only
present static one-sided visions of the truth. For words to be understood they must be
questioned and examined. The written word has no power to defend itself against
possible objections. It says the same thing always. But as the brief treatment of memory
given above shows, there may be ways to guard your readers against this objection by
counseling them to be mindful of the meaning of words.
Socrates's last criticism of the written word is that it is undiscerning. The image that Plato has Socrates use is that of a husbandman. The husbandman is careful about where and when he plants his seeds so as to get the best possible crop. The speaker is here portrayed as the husbandman and his speeches are the seeds he wishes to plant. The most effective use of speech, on this analogy, is to be a speaker able to pick the right audience for his speeches so as to produce the best result. What is exactly meant by best result in this image is ambiguous. The image would seem to hold as much for speeches seeking to please, as for speeches seeking to educate. The writer, as compared to the live speaker, is the one who plants his seeds at random and does not really care whether any result is produced. This image implies that speech, and what it means to convey, meaning or wisdom, are possessions that should be guarded and dispensed with care. It is a waste to write if the product is not going to be read by those who are capable of profiting from it. The written word can be preserved and can therefore potentially profit suitable audiences for all of posterity. The husbandman in the image has a limited number of seeds. Both writers and speakers have only a limited amount of time and therefore they should be concerned whether their speeches are reaching suitable audiences. The image counsels that writing or speaking with consideration of your potential audience and the time in which you live is essential for the speech to be effective. By writing in such a way as to prevent the unwise from using your work to seem wise to the unwise and to appeal to those types of people most suited to understand your thoughts is to overcome this criticism of writing. This is the political basis of the traditional esoteric/exoteric distinction. It is prudent to assume that Hobbes has written with these considerations in mind.27
The third and most recently invented medium of communication is printing. Though writing allows for the perfect reproducibility and distribution of the word, printing makes both these benefits of writing easy. Printing allows for mass reproduction of the word, increasing the potential size of audiences. It is conceivable, with the invention of printing that anyone and everyone capable of reading could read any given book. When an author knows a book is going to be printed he must be conscious of the fact that almost any one in a variety of different, times and places may read the book. The author can use this knowledge and attempt to make the work clear to 'even the meanest capacity' or it can be written in such a manner as to exclude and include different types of audiences with the use of different types of literary devises, to various different ends.

With the problems inherent in teaching through a written work outlined, we return to the Introduction of Leviathan.

"Consequently whereunto, those persons that can give no other proof of being wise take delight to show what they think they have read in men by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs." 28

Hobbes begins by censuring some of those that read men, and not books to acquire wisdom. This censure is aimed at those that wish only to gain honor for being wise. In reading men, by their speeches or their actions, it is possible to seem wise by making observations about the motives behind those actions or speeches. It is easy for a man to state more or less plausibly that he has discovered deceptive or mischievous motives in a man, or that the man is only acting the way he is for reputation, because action and speech can be interpreted in different ways. This type of observation has the appearance of wisdom because the claim presents itself as having seen through the
appearances to their true cause. Hobbes’s remark recalls Glaucon’s part of the challenge to Socrates in book two of the *Republic*, where he speaks of this frailty of human nature

“Indeed, all men suppose injustice is far more to their private profit than justice. And what they suppose is true, as the man who makes this argument will say, since if a man were to get hold of such license and were never willing to do any injustice and didn’t lay his hands on what belongs to others, he would seem most wretched to those who were aware of it, and most foolish too, although they would praise him to each others faces, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice.”

The problem with simply reading men, by their speeches or actions, to acquire wisdom is that what popular opinion publicly praises as good it secretly despises. Those that are unwise therefore can seem wise to the people by appealing to what the people secretly believe is true about human beings: that it is better to do injustice than have it done unto them. The rule of the people in reading other men, in assessing the merits of their actions and characters, is to assume that they always have Machiavellian motives. Sophists and Orators, such as Thrasymachus and Callicles, will espouse this view because it is a superficially plausible view congruent with most peoples’ understanding of themselves. The problem with the common approach to justice is that it is not conducive to the virtue of charity.

“But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn to truly read; if they take the pains; and that is *noesce te ipsum, read thy self*, which was not meant, as it is now used, to continence either the barbarous state of men in power towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree to saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach us that for the similitude of thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another, whossoever looketh into himself and consider what he doeth, when he *think, opine, reason, hope and fear &c* and upon what grounds he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon like occasions.”
Hobbes now begins to reform the popular maxim so as to make possible not only charity, but also a true reading of men. A true reading of men does not therefore, at the very least, exclude a charitable reading of men. The true reading of men is both true and not uncharitable. The means to reforming the sophistical popular view is to request that men take the pains to read themselves. A kind of self-knowledge, or reading sense in one's self, will work to moderate the tendency to censure excessively and uncharitably one's fellow man. By counselling self-knowledge as moderation for uncharitable censures Hobbes is at least promoting the possibility of piously following the Christian teaching concerning charity. The popular sophistical wisdom implies discord between the Christian virtue of charity and wisdom; Hobbes strives to mend this disunity.  

Hobbes's formulation of the Delphic imperative implies a kind of equality. Instead of differentiating men by the differing objects of their thoughts and passions, Hobbesean self-reading guides one to consider the similitude between one's own thoughts and passions and those of other men. This creates a compassion, or fellow feeling, by making irrelevant, at least initially, the grounds upon which we might disagree with what others, think, opine, reason, hope, and fear. The focus of Hobbesean self-reading is not the objects of thought and passion, but the similarity of occasions when people think, opine, reason, hope and fear. By meditating on these similarities a true reading is achieved concerning the thoughts and passions of all men on the occasions they have thought about. This knowledge is not only about understanding what motivates human beings in a general and universal sense, but what motivates human beings on actual occasions. This method therefore moderates one's account of human nature because it is constrained by one's actual experience of human beings.
According to the Hobbsean formulation of the Delphic imperative we have already committed at least three errors in our analysis of Hobbes’s account of the pursuit of wisdom. The first is that we did not consider Hobbes’s account of the occasion that compelled him to write *Leviathan*. The other is when we consulted the *Phaedrus* for guidance in deducing Hobbes position on the relationship between the written and the spoken word, and the *Republic* for aid in understand the common opinion of wisdom, we did not consider what Plato signals about the occasions that lead Socrates to speak about these subjects. To remedy this error we shall turn to what is signaled about the occasions of each of *Leviathan*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus*, and what we may learn about these works, from those occasions.

*Leviathan* is dedicated to Sir Francis Godolphin, the brother of Sydney Godolphin, who was a friend of Hobbes. Both of the Godolphin brothers were on the royalist side of the English civil war, and one of them, Sydney, was killed in that war.\(^{31}\) Though Hobbes dedicates the book to Francis Godolphin, he only praises Frances’s brother Sydney. Sydney thought well of Hobbes’s studies and Hobbes valued Sydney’s opinions, both for themselves and for the worthiness of Sydney’s person. Hobbes does not provide us with any of Sydney’s opinions, but he does give an account of his virtue. Sydney possessed virtue, which disposed him to the service of God and the commonwealth, to civil society and to private friendship. Sydney’s virtue was not “acquired by necessity or affected by occasion, but inherent, and shining in a generous constitution of his nature.”\(^{32}\) The occasion, on which Hobbes presents *Leviathan* to the world, is solemn and in remembrance of an excellent and noble human being who was killed in a bloody civil war, which divided Hobbes’s homeland. *Leviathan* is presented to
England on an occasion of desperate circumstances. The civil power of England was not capable of preventing a civil war. Hobbes offers *Leviathan* as a defense of the civil power and believes that such a defense of the civil power should not be condemned by the civil power, because to do so would be against the interest of the civil power. To do so would be to reject the means to the end for which the commonwealth exists. Hobbes is constrained by his circumstances to defend the civil power. If the civil power was not in jeopardy and could defend the lives of its virtuous citizens, Hobbes's civil philosophy, as it is presented in *Leviathan*, would not be necessary. However, as shall be seen later, Hobbes is not only concerned with the English Civil war, he also concerned with signaling to his readership what he has read in himself, about the knowledge required, not only to rule England in the seventeenth century, but to rule any nation at any time.

The occasion of the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* are more complicated, because the occasion on which the author, Plato, wrote is obscure. It is obscure not because the dialogues do not contain clues as to their dramatic context, but rather because Plato did not write in his own voice. Plato wrote the *Republic* as a dialogue narrated in the first person, by Socrates. The *Republic* opens with an exchange between Socrates and Glaucon and a group of young men lead by Polemarchus, seeking Socrates’ company at a festival introducing a new goddess to Athens. The group persuades Socrates and Glaucon with a playful combination of force and persuasion to join them for dinner at Polemarchus’ house and then to join them at the festival. Upon arriving at Polemarchus’ house, Polemarchus’ father Cephalus’ begins a conversation with Socrates about the good life, which turns into a conversation about justice, which lasts the entire evening.
Plato wrote the *Phaedrus* as an acted dialogue representing a conversation just outside of Athens in a public park, between Socrates and Phaedrus. Socrates engaged in philosophy, never wrote a word, and was finally executed at the age of seventy by the Athenian state for religious innovation and corrupting the youth. Phaedrus was a young man who loved speeches and in particular loved the speeches of Lysis, a teacher of rhetoric. Rhetoric is taught by a number of prominent men of Athens as the political art: the art used to persuade the Athenians how to act. The power of this art can perhaps be best appreciated by keeping in mind that the Athenian assembly made its decisions based on the advice of rhetoricians and that around the time that Plato was writing the Peloponnesian War, a kind of civil war between the Greeks, was taking place. Phaedrus wishes to impress Socrates with what he fancies he has learned from Lysis’ book, which outlines his account of rhetoric. Socrates, seeing what Phaedrus is up to, asks Phaedrus to read from the book directly so that they can consider whether Lysis has spoken nobly about speeches. The dialogue proceeds to analyze Lysis’ account of speeches by first analyzing speaking generally and then writing in particular.

We were correct to use the *Phaedrus* for guidance in exploring Hobbes’s conception of the written versus the spoken word because Plato provides his account on an occasion, which seems to bear in mind the same problems that Hobbes addresses. Our analysis of the relationship between Hobbes and Socrates’ accounts demonstrated the utility of that comparison. The dialogic form, which Plato mostly uses, requires the same skills of interpretation that Hobbes calls on his readership to employ. Not only do the occasions of the Platonic dialogues and Hobbes’s writing seem to be significantly congruent, and the skills required for interpreting both authors the same, but also in
Hobbes’s judgment Plato was ‘the best philosopher of the Greeks.’\textsuperscript{135} In addition to this high praise of Plato generally, which in its very nature is an invitation for the reader to consult the Platonic dialogues, Hobbes explicitly invites a comparison between the central teachings of \textit{Leviathan} and the \textit{Republic}.\textsuperscript{36} “For [Plato] was also of the opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of the state, and change in governments by civil war, ever to be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers.”\textsuperscript{37} Hobbes in making this statement invites his readers to compare other aspects of the \textit{Republic} to \textit{Leviathan}, because the central teachings of Leviathan and the Republic cannot be understood without consulting the work as a whole. The danger of looking to authorities, however, should not be forgotten. The authorities must be used as signs for understanding the problems in one’s self, not as sources that are to be relied upon as necessarily espousing the truth.

Of course, we cannot forget that we have learned all of this from Hobbes. It would appear that we are constrained by the authority of an author once we engage with an author in order to discover the truth. This criticism is invalid as long as it is remembered that what is important in a study is not, in the first place, what some author has said, but to think through your own experience of the subject so as to be able to evaluate the truth of an author’s claim for oneself. As a reader of Hobbes who is concerned with knowing the truth about Hobbes it is necessary to start with one’s current understanding of oneself and other people and then cautiously follow Hobbes’s presentation to learn how Hobbes understands himself and the world. By following a great thinker one gains guidance to develop a free mind, not by memorizing their opinions or doctrines, but by engaging yourself with them.
Returning to Hobbes’s remarks in the introduction of Leviathan on acquiring wisdom, we see Hobbes continues to clarify what he counsels as a proper means for acquiring wisdom.

“I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all men, desire, fear, hope &c. for these the constitution of the individual and particular education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from out knowledge, that the characters of men’s hearts, blotted and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrine, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts.”

Hobbes, in this clarifying sentence to his method of self-reading, makes two subtle changes to the object the self-reader is to investigate. The first change is that while in the previous section quoted Hobbes speaks of both the thoughts and the passions of men, he now only speaks of the passions. The second change is that while in the previous section quoted Hobbes speaks of thinking, opining, reasoning, fearing and hoping, in this section he substitutes the word desire for thinking, opining and reasoning. At least two possibilities come to mind to explain these changes. The first is that Hobbes only wishes to clarify what he has said concerning the similitude of passion and does not wish to clarify what he has said concerning thought. This explanation is consistent with the emphasis that Hobbes has placed on the word ‘passions,’ (in the first line of the section quoted.). This explanation, however, appears to be insufficient in so far as it does not explain why Hobbes has not chosen to speak of thought. A second possible explanation for Hobbes’s omission of thought is that Hobbes wishes to dissolve the distinction between thought and passion. Thinking, opining and reasoning may be desires and therefore should not be thought of as distinct in this respect from other desires. Hobbes’s reading of the similitude of the thoughts and passions, and the grounds of the thoughts
and passions, may have led him to conclude that all thought is properly understood as passion.

If all thought can be understood as passion then it is not necessary to search men's minds to obtain wisdom, it is only necessary to search their hearts. But the human heart is blotted and confounded by nurture. To read men's nature a method must be discovered to distinguish nature from nurture. By looking to the similitude of the passions and the differing objects of the passions, the matter or human nature, is separated from how it is formed and distorted in individual men. Thought is responsible for all nurture. As has been indicated above, it is speech that makes it possible to distinguish men from other beasts. Dissembling, lying, counterfeiting and erroneous doctrine all become possible, as has been demonstrated above, by the power of speech. The uses and abuses of speech are what blot and confound the human heart. This distinction, between what is nature and what is nurture in men, is vital for reading their hearts and for understanding men as both the matter and artificer of the commonwealth.

To this point Hobbes's method indicates two legitimate types of evidence: passions and occasions. He counsels that we should be concerned with passions to determine what are common in the passions. The passions are also proper objects of investigation because it is through the desires, hopes and fears of men that the natural heart is revealed, undistorted by nurture. Passions and their relationship to occasions are taken into account so as to determine the range of possible human experience. Consideration of the relationship between passions and occasions provides the grounds for a practical reading of the human heart, a reading that aims to discover the means whereby to manipulate the passions of men.
“And though by men’s actions we do discover their design sometimes: yet to do it without comparing it with our own and distinguishing all the circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without a key, and be for the most part deceived by too much trust or too much diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good or evil man”.

Hobbes not only introduces the possibility of reading men by their speeches, but also the possibility of reading them by their actions. It is in examination of deeds that the practical part of Hobbes method of reading men moves to the foreground. After an understanding of the relationship between passion and thought is achieved, it then becomes useful to consider not only what passions are incited on what occasions, but also what occasions incite what actions and why. The motives driving speech as well as action are open the multiple interpretations. This is best thought of in terms of Glaucon’s account of the popular sophistical understanding of justice and injustice. Though it may be true that suffering injustice is better than committing it, the many do not agree and do not act as if this were true. If a good man reads himself to explain the action of another man, without consideration of the circumstances for the action and how the circumstances necessitate the action, the good man will be too trusting of the motives of the actor. The possibility that the action was committed for the sake of reputation, for instance, will not be entertained. The evil man on the other hand, will always assume the Machiavellian motivation in any action he observes. For him all just actions are committed for the sake of either the reputation of justice or from fear of injustice.

In examining, not only the occasions for passions, but also the occasions for action the Hobbesean is prepared to truly read the human heart. The occasions for action are useful in moderating the prejudices of the interpreter because often in examining
occasions the necessity of the action becomes apparent. This is especially the case if one understands the role that the actor is supposed to play. In attempting to truly read the actions of a king, for example, it is necessary to take into consideration the occasions within which a king must act. The domestic as well as the foreign circumstances may leave him little room in maintaining the commonwealth but to raise taxes to prepare for war. Observers of this act of the king may assume that the tax is raised to pay for his own pleasure. Through contemplation of the circumstances, as well as the role of the individual, some motives become more probable than others, thereby providing safe means for moderating the trust and the diffidence of the interpreter.

“But let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read in himself, not this or that particular man, but mankind, which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science, yet when I shall set down my own reading orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another will be only to consider if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of doctrine admiteth no other demonstration”

In this, the last paragraph of the introduction, Hobbes makes another change, but this time about the kind of knowledge he is describing. To this point Hobbes has focused on the knowledge that one man can have about another. This type of reading is possible when I read in myself not what I desire, hope, and fear, but that I desire, hope, and fear, so as to grasp the nature of human passion. In order to accomplish this I must abstract from my passions and thoughts about particular things on particular occasions, which I experience. In going through this exercise I will first realize that all my thought is another kind of passion and second, I will also be able to understand other men in similar situations as my self. This same sort of method is employed in attempting to determine
not only the passions of men but also their actions. I must understand the circumstances in which the action is taken to truly know the design behind the action, and thereby truly decipher the heart of the man who acts.

None of this seems to be what Hobbes is talking about in this last paragraph of the introduction. He is not speaking of reading this or that man, but all of mankind. He is speaking about the kind of knowledge a man who is to govern a whole nation must possess: kingly knowledge. Hobbes's civil philosophy, as it is presented in *Leviathan*, is a reading of human kind meant for one who would rule a nation. Hobbes states that this knowledge is hard to learn, more difficult than a language or a science. He implicitly explains the difficulty of learning this knowledge by indicating the only kind of demonstration that can verify its truth is to read it also in yourself. To clarify the character of this type of knowledge and Hobbes's approach to reading in himself all of mankind, it is useful to examine how Hobbes defines the words traditionally associated with knowledge generally and knowledge of political things particularly, not only in *Leviathan*, but also in *De Corpore*.

This chapter has shown that Hobbes has written in such a way that *Leviathan* cannot be properly understood if it is merely read at face value. *Leviathan* must be understood in light of the considerations Hobbes has left throughout the text on the inherent problems posed by trying to educate using the written word. The problems posed by the written word were exposed in this chapter by contrasting the Platonic view of the written word as presented by sections of the *Phaedrus* with various sections of *Leviathan*. This chapter worked towards showing that Hobbes has considered these problems and presents *Leviathan* with them in mind. This chapter also shows that *Leviathan* is
concerned with presenting the knowledge that is required to rule a nation. And that on
Hobbes’ account this political or kingly knowledge must first come from an
understanding of humankind or human nature. The Introduction to *Leviathan* is puzzling,
however, because it only seems to present an account of how to understand individual
men and not how to understand mankind. The following two chapters are an attempt to
clarify in finer detail what Hobbes means by kingly knowledge.
Chapter Two: Division of Knowledge

*Leviathan* presents a reading of mankind, which amounts to the kind of knowledge that is required for a sovereign to rule a nation. To be clearer about Hobbes’s stated purpose in *Leviathan* it is necessary to discern in broad terms what kind of knowledge Hobbes thinks a sovereign must possess. Learning the knowledge required of a sovereign is different from learning other kinds of knowledge. For example, Hobbes states that it is more difficult to learn than any science or language. An implication of this fact is that the knowledge required for ruling a nation is not wholly scientific knowledge. He also states that only those readers capable of following and checking his reading in and for themselves can establish its veracity. To clarify what Hobbes means by the knowledge required of a sovereign I will complete two investigations. The first is to compare what Hobbes says about civil philosophy in *Leviathan*, to what he says in *De Cive* and *De Corpore*. This comparison will highlight the distinctive characteristics of *Leviathan* relative to the other presentations of his civil philosophy. The second is to examine what Hobbes says about prudence, science, wisdom and philosophy in *Leviathan*.

Compared to the introductory materials of *De Cive* and *De Corpore*, those of *Leviathan* are modest, if not silent, on the scope of the significance of the knowledge they contain. In the Preface to the Reader of *De Cive* Hobbes does not boldly pronounce the birth of civil science. Rather he provides a four-part history of civil science, which illustrates the relationship of the state of civil science to mankind from ‘the remotest antiquity’ to the seventeenth century. The first period was a period of peace, a golden age, where the science of government was not discussed openly, but only in allegory or
fable so as to prevent the high and holy mystery of government from being contaminated by public debate. This was a simpler time than seventeenth century Europe where the power of the sovereign was respected and uncontested, and argument was not used to justify rebellion. Hobbes gives two accounts of the end of this age.

In the first account the golden age ended when Socrates fell in love with civil science and spurned and rejected other parts of philosophy judging only civil science to be worthy of his intellect. Many other men, such as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and soon gentlemen everywhere followed Socrates' judgment, and attempted to learn and debate the high and holy mystery of government. The effect of this mass effort to learn civil science was not, however, as one may expect. The great number of people attempting the question of justice led to many false opinions about the duties of subjects, which in turn led to regicides, rebellions and civil wars. Public debate about civil matters and the ensuing diversity of opinion has caused some two thousand years of conflict and catastrophe. The fact that argument and debate about civil science has not ended human misery argues against the utility, regardless of whether utility was Socrates' intention, of bringing philosophy down from the heavens and into the cities.

The second account Hobbes gives is mythical. "It was peace therefore, and a golden age, which did not end until Saturn was expelled and the doctrine started up that one could take up arms against kings." This statement is presented as a conclusion of the first account just presented. In order to see how this is the case the first account must be rubbed against the second as it were to see how they illuminate one another. Socrates's love for civil science in the first account is analogous to Jupiter's usurpation of his father's place as the ruling god in the second account. Socrates' father is the city of
Athens. Socrates’s love for civil philosophy took the place of his love for Athens. Therefore, when Socrates raised questions about justice, the truth about justice was more important to him than the authority of Athens. This is paradoxically shown in Socrates’s trial. Socrates was willing to question the Delphic oracles pronouncement that ‘nobody was wiser’ than him. This love of the truth forced him to question the oracle. He trusted his questioning more than the authority of the oracle. Socrates argues that though putting him to death would be unjust, he is willing to submit to the judgement of the men of Athens. This is a paradox because although Socrates believes that the authority of his questioning is more just than the city’s politics, he is willing to submit to the unjust punishment of Athens. Socrates’s death was a great example in deed of the superiority of philosophy. Socrates was not afraid of death. The two thousand years of turmoil, which followed Socrates’s death, was not so much caused by anything he believed or did. After all in the end he submitted to the judgement of his father, the Athenian people. But those after Socrates, those whom he warns the Athenian people about, were much harsher than he was about their judgment of the city. Socrates’ heirs, especially Aristotle, were not willing to put the city above their love of civil science. Aristotle fled Athens to avoid persecution. And it is not even Aristotle directly, who caused the turmoil. It was those after him, the many gentlemen among the Greeks, Romans and the English that believed that rebellion could be justified. But it was Socrates and his followers, who opened the possibility of an argument being made for the justice of rebellion and civil war.

The first period was clouded and shadowy concerning knowledge of government but the power of the sovereign was respected and secure from being challenged by argument. The second period was an attempt by Socrates and his followers to dispel the
shadows and discover the truth about the high and holy mystery of government. The third period was only partly clouded and partly clear due to the multiplicity of opinions spawned by the philosophic tradition initiated by Socrates. The forth period, which is made possible by De Cive, is an attempt to dispel all the clouds around civil science and show clearly “not only the royal road to peace but also the dark and shadowy ways of sedition; and nothing can be imagined more useful than that.”

The true civil science does not allow all types of questions about political matters. The question of the justice of a regime cannot be explicitly raised because investigating that question leads to investigations about the justice of one’s own regime, which in turn can be used as an argument to justify rebellion and regicide. Hobbes justifies his account of the duties of subjects not necessarily for any good it produces, but for the evils it prevents. Hobbes’s account of the history of civil science also shows that civil science must promote civility. Hobbes does not condemn the use of allegory or fable for teaching about government. He even goes so far as to interpret an ancient fable for us, showing how the ancients understood the problem of directly addressing the questions that politics must address.

In De Corpore Hobbes gives a justification of science, including but not restricted to civil science. De Corpore’s justification of civil science more clearly argues for the utility of civil science than does the account in ‘Preface to the Reader’ of De Cive. We shall begin by looking at Hobbes’s justification of science generally. Hobbes’s concern in De Corpore, in both the Epistle Dedicatory and the first section of part one, is the growth of the usefulness of science. He describes the state of science in the time prior to De Corpore using an agricultural metaphor.
The state of philosophy prior to the publication of *De Corpore* is to be compared to the state of agriculture in the ancient world. The production of corn and wine in the ancient world was not the organized enterprise it was in Hobbes's time. Vast planted and cultivated fields were unknown in ancient times. For the most part individual men lived on acorns. Some men were courageous and would try and seek out new means to nourish themselves. Those with little ability to reason or those who lack method for the most part fail and consume substances dangerous to their health. Some with stronger reason would have some success, but this was for the most part limited.

The analogy suggests that men have four powers that they can use to obtain the objects of their desires and needs. These powers are courage, natural reason, experience and method. Men before *De Corpore* lacked method. Natural reason alone is to be compared to the scattered state of wine and corn before it has been planted in an orderly manner. Natural reason can grow corn and it can learn to grow grapes and then make them into wine, but only sparsely, because of the dependence on the natural strength of reason and the fortune of good climate and weather. If one with strong reason is also courageous and inclined to try other types of food, he does so at risk to his health. Similarly if one does not have strong reason and is courageous, one also risks one's health. In this state both the natural reason of most men and the courage of all men, is wasted. The majority of men rely on experience and are constrained by circumstance. Experience is compared to acorns. Nourishment can be found through experience and it is safer to rely on experience than on reason mixed with courage. Experience may be tedious, and it may require more work to obtain results, but the results are sure to be obtained. Experience is more certain in its practical outcome than natural reason.
Hobbes wishes to change this state through the teaching of his *De Corpore*. Hobbes wishes to give to mankind the gift of method. When natural reason is combined with method, men gain the art of agriculture. They can now work together to cultivate reason and produce benefits greater than acorns, like wine and corn. Method saves natural reason from being wasted. But Hobbes is not concerned with educating the whole of humanity in the scientific method. He is explicitly directs his efforts to those with strong reason, courage and curiosity: the men who are “delighted with the truth and strength of reason in all things”. Hobbes’s addresses his discourse not to those who use their natural reason in some degree and for some things, but for the truth in all things. Nor does he wish to imply that his *De Corpore* will give these men the true philosophy. Rather, he wishes to “lay open the first elements of philosophy in general, as so many seeds for which pure and true philosophy may hereafter spring up by little and little.”

The philosophers of the present are not concerned primarily with discovery of the true philosophy. Rather they must be concerned with the difficulties in grasping the few and first elements of philosophy. They must be concerned to “weed out of men’s minds such inveterate opinions as have taken root there.” The obstacles of accomplishing this are great. Not only the eloquence of the past authorities but also the ‘poor, arid and in appearance deformed’ nature of dealing with the first grounds of philosophy. But Hobbes continues with the hope that the few who are “delighted with truth and strength of reason in all things” will be able to follow and spread his account of the first elements of philosophy.

Though the end for which Hobbes presents his first elements of philosophy is the
'pure and true philosophy' he does not explicitly defend it as an end unto itself. The end and scope of philosophy is to produce effects for the benefit of mankind, not for the delight that one man may get from the discovery of some difficult truth. The scientific or philosophic pursuit is primarily defensible in terms of its utility. The utility of civil science can be most easily grasped, not by the goods that it produces, like natural science, but by the evil that it prevents, war, especially civil war. A proper civil science can thereby justify itself if it can bring war to an end, by discovering not only moral philosophy, which are the proper duties of men, but also a way to teach and persuade the multitude to follow their moral duty. Hobbes concedes that there will be some who seek more than utility from philosophy and he counsels those so inclined to seek it elsewhere. Hobbes's civil philosophy does not take as a question what is good or fitting but rather claims to answer that question in choosing civil peace as the proper end for civil science.

*Leviathan* also employs the wine and corn analogy to illustrate the need for a useful civil science. After stating that reason is almost as old as speech, Hobbes claims that in ancient times some general truths were found. In fact, "the savages of America are not even without some good moral sentences." However, this does not mean that the savages of America are philosophers. Rather, men in the state similar to the American savage are likened to the condition of agriculture in ancient times. Most men because of their lack of method, lived on gross experience, and were forced to subsist on water and acorns. There were still some few that could make use of corn to eat and grapes to make wine, but not many. The majority were ignorant about their potential. They were ignorant of the fact that their reason could be cultivated and that they could learn to differentiate
error (weeds and common plants) from true benefits (corn and wine). Men could not obtain method because they lived in the absence of great commonwealths. They spent their lives pursuing the necessities and defending themselves against their neighbours. There was a want of leisure and leisure is the mother of philosophy.

Leviathan is not primarily concerned, as De Copore and De Cive, with presenting the true moral science. This has already been accomplished in De Cive. Though Leviathan claims to contain the true moral science, its explicitly stated purpose is not to only teach the true moral science. Leviathan is a reading of mankind, which contains the knowledge that is required to rule a nation. The reasons for suspecting that the sovereign requires more than just scientific knowledge have already been stated. Though Hobbes's claims that the science of natural justice is the only science that a sovereign and his ministers require, that is not to say that that is all the knowledge that a sovereign and his ministers require.

In chapter nine of Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes two types of knowledge. The first type of knowledge is fact and is called history or absolute knowledge and is the type of knowledge required in a witness. The other type of knowledge is of consequences, which is conditional knowledge, and it is this type of knowledge that is scientific. Scientific knowledge is conditional because it cannot be absolutely claimed. To take an example, the history of the Pythagoreans can be stated absolutely. Scientific claims are all conditional: If the figure be a circle, then any straight line through its center shall divide it into two equal parts. Scientific knowledge applies universal principles to particular instances. Science knows that all circles can be divided into two equal parts by drawing a line through their centers, but this can only be said to be true of particular
figures if it can be determined that they are in fact circles. Scientific truth is based on reasoning not on witnessing, and therefore can only be refuted through reasoning, not witnessing. The scientific claim about the bisection of a circle is not refuted if we were to show that no actual material circles exist. The historic claim that Pythagoras discovered that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the square of the two other sides of a triangle is potentially refutable through historic investigation, but the geometric claim itself is not. The ground for this division of knowledge is therefore whether or not the claim is provable and refutable by reason or by observation of particulars.\textsuperscript{52}

Hobbes appears to use the words science and philosophy interchangeably. Scientific reasoning is the knowledge required by a philosophy.\textsuperscript{53} Science and philosophy are concerned with the power to cause effects.\textsuperscript{54} But philosophy, as opposed to science, is concerned not only with how to produce any kind of effect, but to produce those effects that human life requires.\textsuperscript{55} Knowledge of what human life requires is traditionally considered to be architectonic knowledge, kingly knowledge. Knowledge of the human good, philosophy, is what organizes political life.\textsuperscript{56}

What mere human life requires and what the good life requires are not identical. Aristotle examines political life so as to determine the best political regime. Aristotle examines political life so as to present how it can be organized to cultivate virtue. Hobbes examines political life so as to present how the commonwealth can be best organized to provide the means to preserve mere life. Aristotle called political science architectonic because it decides what is good for the regime and what is not. Political science looked to the good of the whole. Hobbes's sovereign, educated in what is required to rule a nation, also looks to the whole and organizes his commonwealth accordingly. The nature of the
disagreement between Hobbes and the tradition would not appear to be over whether civil science is the proper science for organizing political life, but rather their disagreement is over which principle should be used in ordering political life, the good life or mere life.\textsuperscript{57}

In \textit{Leviathan}, Hobbes divides that which is called philosophy into two parts: natural and civil philosophy. Civil philosophy is again divided into two parts; one part is concerned with the rights and duties of the sovereign, the other with the right and duty of the subjects.\textsuperscript{58} In \textit{De Corpore}, however, civil philosophy is divided differently: one part, ethics, takes cognizance of the dispositions and manners of men and the other, politics, takes cognizance of civil duties.\textsuperscript{59} Though \textit{Leviathan} does not directly recognize ethics as part of civil philosophy in chapter nine (ethics is identified as a part of natural philosophy), the first half of the book is divided by this distinction into, ‘Of Man’ and ‘Of Commonwealth’.\textsuperscript{60}

Knowledge of ‘what human life requireth,’ is architectonic or sovereign knowledge: it organizes all human life.\textsuperscript{61} This is the basis of chapter nine’s division of civil philosophy into subjects and sovereigns rather than ethics and politics. Subjects have only one right and duty (and that is to be the matter of commonwealths)\textsuperscript{62} while sovereigns of necessity have many rights and many duties so as to have the means to shape the commonwealth. The sovereign therefore must have jurisdiction over all aspects of human life to judge what is conducive to the ends of civil society and what is not. The sovereign constitutes the essence of a commonwealth “which (to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense.”\textsuperscript{63}
Hobbes does not give one clear account of the exact character of the knowledge required to rule a nation. We may begin to see why this is the case by noticing that Hobbes does not account for wisdom in his chapter ‘On the Virtues that are Commonly called Intellectual’. Wisdom is not accounted for among the intellectual virtues because “[v]irtue generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence, and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized.”

Everybody knows that Hobbes said that putting science aside people are even more equal in mind than in body. Everybody recognizes this and to deny it is “but a vain conceit of one’s own wisdom... For such is the nature of men that however they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe that there be many so wise as themselves.”

Wisdom is not virtue because being generally considered equal it cannot be valued for its eminence.

Hobbes provides a clue as to how he understands his wisdom when he uses another ‘apt similitude’ to make the difference between sapience and prudence appear more clearly. To see this we need first recall what Hobbes generally means by prudence and science. As in the corn and wine analogy discussed above, Hobbes starts with a discussion about the condition of men without science: the state of raw experience. The condition of those that lack science or certain rules for their actions is like that of children who “having no thought of generation are made [to] believe by the woman that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.”

Reason in this state does not aid in the ordinary life of human beings. Without method to aid reason to discover how a thing is acquired and generated, the state of human beings is like that of a youth, credulous, infertile and impotent. From this it should not be deduced that natural
prudence is useless, especially in the absence of a true science and method in a given sphere of action. To have only prudence without science is superior to trusting a false science because "ignorance of causes and rules does not set men so far out of their way as relying on false rules..."\(^{69}\)

Prudence does not allow human beings to see the beginning of things and therefore does not provide a basis from which to reason about the causes of those beginnings. Prudence is acquired by experience of events and recalling the order of those events. Prudence has a power of prediction but it is not based on causes, it is based rather on recalling past experience. Every time you throw a ball up it comes down. Based on experience you 'know' the ball is going to come down after tossing it into the air.\(^{70}\)

Experience is to the truth as a woman’s tale of the cabbage patch is to the generation of human beings. Experience, like the woman, knows the truth about generation, but without method she will not tell. It seems rather that experience will not tell the child-like the truth about certain things. When the child grows older, he or she will learn through experience how children are created. But even that knowledge gained about birth, is not science, it is only a recognition that certain types of activity generally lead to certain results.

Prudence does not necessitate that the older are more prudent than the younger in all things; for prudence depends upon experiences of certain types of business.\(^{71}\) Prudence can tend to equality. Those with more experience of the world and more experience in given businesses are going to be more prudent then those with less. Beasts and Men alike can acquire prudential knowledge. It amounts to a kind of knack at guessing and therefore should not be confused with science or philosophy.\(^{72}\) Science is
attained through the cultivation of method. It has already been noted that science is made possible by speech, and that science is knowledge of consequences. Science understood in this way is concerned with knowing the means to produces effects.

Hobbes's analogy not only illuminates the difference between prudence and sapience but also the relationship of science to both prudence and sapience. The prudent man is the one who is endowed with a natural excellence at handling arms. With what has already been said about prudence the analogy suggests that all men are naturally equal in the use and dexterity in handling arms. Experience and contemplation of the example indicates differently, as any one who watches or plays sports knows: some have more raw talent than others. Peoples' thoughts differ in their speed, steadiness of direction, memory, judgment, and fancy. And all of these affect their ability to recognize and recall patterns in experience that accumulate into what is called prudence. The martial analogy suggests that prudence is used for the sake of action and not contemplation.

The sapient man also has a natural dexterity at handling arms and is concerned with action. Though the sapient man is prudent, his prudence is enhanced with science. What science adds to prudence is knowledge of the range of the possible in a given sphere of business. A science of earthquakes seeks knowledge of the possible range of the types and varieties of earthquakes and how they are all caused. A science of fencing seeks knowledge of the possible moves and counter-moves for all possible attacks and defenses with a sword. Science is not concerned with any given encounter in a business, but with a complete account of all possible encounters. Prudence knows how to handle arms through practice. The science of fencing knows all the possible ways to handle arms. Sapience combines experience with knowledge.
Both the sapient and prudent men have a natural skill at handling the fencer’s foil, which is a piece of artifice. Fencing is a type of combat, and combat is for victory. The foil is constructed as an enhancement of the natural human capacity for combat. This implies that prudence is not more natural than sapience simply because it is an aid to action. Both sapience and prudence employ the same artifice as an aid to the completion of their goal. The difference between the two is in how they employ that artifice. Sapience is a superior to prudence because it is more powerful or more effective. Men who seek sapience love victory or mastery. Philosophy or science and all pursuit of truth is therefore a pursuit of power and sapience or wisdom is the skill in the employment of that power. However, the skill itself is neutral on the exact end of employment. In terms of the analogy, it is at the fencers discretion whether to kill or dishonor his opponent.

The knowledge required to rule a nation would appear to be related to sapience in that a sovereign must understand the possibilities for action in political life. The physical limitations of the human body and the structural limits of the foil set the rules of fencing. Other rules may be added for tournaments and duels but a science of fencing must take into account that weapons are typically made to kill. Politics is different both in the magnitude and the kind of what is at stake. The rules are much harder to define especially without commonwealths where the condition is a state of war of every man against every man. A sovereign must understand the game of politics. He must be able to be the judge in disagreements between his subjects.\textsuperscript{176} He must be able to pass good laws and “it is in the laws of commonwealths as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of them. A good law is that which is needful for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous.”\textsuperscript{177} But most importantly he must understand the nature of
the players: he must understand human nature. A sapient sovereign will therefore have experience in sphere of human action, and a science of what human beings are capable of. A sovereign must understand the limits of politics. To grasp the limits of politics he must read in himself the heart of mankind.

This chapter has outlined Hobbes’ justification of civil philosophy by first addressing Hobbes’s account of the failure of traditional civil philosophy and then by discussing his account of the utility of his civil philosophy. Because of Hobbes’s critique of the tradition the primary concern for his civil philosophy is that it is useful to mankind. *Leviathan* adds the knowledge that is required to rule a nation, or knowledge useful for a king, to his civil science as it is presented in *De Cive*. The primary question is therefore what is useful to mankind that a king can provide. Once this has been determined what remains to be discovered are the means that a king can use for that end. The introduction of *Leviathan* suggests that a reading of individual men and all of mankind can determine the end for which kings ought to rule. The next chapter of this thesis addresses Hobbes’s judgment of the end for which kings ought to rule, peace. The remainder of this chapter attempted to define more clearly the nature of the kind of knowledge that a king must possess. To accomplish this Hobbes’s view of science, prudence, philosophy and sapience were differentiated and it appeared from this investigation that kingly knowledge is related in sapience.
Chapter Three: Justice and the Heart

This chapter presents an attempt to get a clearer notion of the end for which Hobbes believes the sovereign ought to rule, peace. This chapter takes as its starting point Hobbes's account of justice in chapter fifteen of *Leviathan*. This account was chosen because the problem Hobbes poses in the introduction of *Leviathan* recalls the problem of justice as it is presented by Glaucon in his challenge to Socrates in Book Two of Plato's *Republic*. A close examination of Hobbes's account of justice is the proper place to begin to discover why Hobbes believes the sovereign ought to make peace the end for which he rules.

Hobbes's method of ciphering the text of the heart of man makes a distinction between the actions of a man and his design or intention. Actions are imperfect ciphers to the human heart because they do not necessarily tell the man's intention; the text of the human heart is therefore left obscured, doubtful and open to interpretation if read solely through actions. If a man acts in a just way one does not know whether he acts from love of justice, or from fear, or from a desire to obtain the benefits of a reputation for justice. To know the man is actually just another way is required: one must be able to gain insight in to his heart. Justice is an important virtue to examine when trying to decipher the human heart because it is the primary virtue traditionally concerned, not only with proper human interaction (the proper actions of men towards and with other men), but also the proper ordering of the man himself, his soul. To properly understand the actions between individuals it is necessary to know the nature of all possible individuals. More than this, to be a king one must understand not any one particular man, nor even the sum of the different types of men, which would be sum of the parts of mankind, but mankind itself,
the whole. By examining generally Hobbes’s approach to the virtue of justice it will be discovered how *Leviathan*, generally speaking, approaches the political problem posed in the introduction to *Leviathan*: How does one read in oneself, not this or that man, but mankind?

Hobbes’s discussion of justice can be divided into two parts. The first part is an account of the ‘fountain and original of justice,’⁷⁸ which is the making and keeping of covenants, and the second part considers the justice of men, both in action and manner.⁷⁹ Both accounts occur at the beginning of chapter fifteen, which is entitled *Of other Laws of Nature*. It is not entitled ‘Of the other Laws of Nature.’ The status of the laws discussed in chapter fifteen is different than the first two discussed in chapter fourteen. Their status as laws of nature is in question. The subject as indicated by its title is the possibility of other laws of nature. The first chapter on natural law, chapter fourteen, is entitled, *Of the first and second Laws of nature and of Contracts*. The title implies that an order can be given to the first two laws of nature, one is clearly first and it is followed by a clear second: chapter fifteen cannot be read in the same way.⁸⁰

The first part, the fountain and origin of justice, is a consideration of justice as a natural law.⁸¹ The Natural laws are more properly understood as theorems which “are conclusions concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense” of men.⁸² The law of nature in which consists justice is deduced from ‘the [second] law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer such rights as, being retained, hinder the peace of mankind.’ This third law of nature is that men perform their covenants made. Justice has its origin in the performance of covenants. When Hobbes calls this third law of nature justice, he is identifying justice with its origin. By identifying justice with its origin,
rather than a completely just organization of human life, Hobbes makes possible the science of justice. This is properly the science of justice because science "is the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another, by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time." By identifying the origin of justice Hobbes can then seek to discover the power to maintain the necessary means to justice; the means to make men perform their covenants.

By identifying justice solely in terms of its origin parts of its being will be obscured. To grasp the whole of justice it is necessary to see justice in its origin and then observe its coming into being. Hobbes, however, does not present such an account as Plato does in the Republic. In Leviathan, Hobbes is not concerned with knowledge about the whole of justice, but with the knowledge required of a sovereign for ruling a nation. It is Hobbes's judgment then that the sovereign need not concern himself with the whole of justice. The reason for this is that this knowledge does not help the sovereign in his capacity as sovereign. The sovereign need only recognize the origin of justice so as to see that without a sovereign power there is no enforceable standard of justice. It is sovereign's responsibility to prevent his subjects from relapsing into the state of nature. Once a sovereign power comes into being, justice is enforceable and therefore comes into being for the first time. The sovereign power comes into being through a covenant, which obliges the members of commonwealth to obey the sovereign power. Justice as a natural law is therefore that which assists, in conjunction with the other natural laws, the bringing into being and maintenance of the sovereign power. Justice as a natural law is the command: "that men perform their covenants made." Justice as natural law, justice as
keeping promises, subordinates itself to the general aim of natural law: to find by reason conclusions and theorems that conduce to common peace and defense. The aim of justice as natural law is not justice, but peace. Justice itself is put aside in the natural laws, which means it appears that they cannot be the true guides for the moral virtues. This does not mean that they are not the true science of the moral virtues. Science here is understood as the quest for the power of creation. Justice as keeping ones promises is the scientific definition of justice, because ways can be discovered to make people keep their promises if they are not already inclined to do so. The science of moral virtue can only ensure the coming into being of the moral virtues understood scientifically, that is as the consequence of a chain of efficient causes. Part of being a virtuous person, however, is to consciously choose to act virtuously: the science of moral virtue shows you which actions are virtuous, but does not convince you to be virtuous.

The natural law of justice, keeping covenants, defines justice from its fountain and origin. Hobbes also considers justice terms of the actions and the manners of men. To clarify what is missing in the Hobbesian science of moral virtue it is useful to look at a possible objection to Hobbes's definition of justice as keeping promises. Justice as keeping ones word has been recognized to be a mistaken definition for the whole of justice. Socrates' poignant counter example to Cephalus about the man of unsound mind requesting the return of a weapon is seemingly sufficient to see that Hobbes's account is inadequate. However, on closer examination, Hobbes would have a reply. The justice of action, in a commonwealth, is determined by whether or not the act is legal and is therefore more clearly spoken of in terms of guilt. Hobbes would be able to reply to Socrates that the man returning the weapon would be guiltless as long as no law existed
in the commonwealth forbidding the return of the weapon. However, returning the weapon to the drunken man would be against reason and the law of nature: the man may use the weapon on you. Though Hobbes’s answer may give a justification for the right action in this case, withholding the weapon from the man, he does not establish why it is just to do so and unjust not to do so: the action is correct for self-preservation, not for justice. This Hobbesean defense of justice as keeping promises is based on peace as the good that rules justice. Justice understood as keeping promises is good, not because it is just, but because it is conducive to peace.

When the words of just and unjust refer to a man what is meant is that his manners conform to reason. Manners in this sense do not refer to any given action of a man, but to his character. To be clearer about the meaning of this, Hobbes suggests that it is useful to supplant the word righteous for the word just to describe the man whose manners are just. It becomes more plausible to separate action and character when we can say, because a man has committed an unjust act by mistake or from passion, he is not therefore divested of the title of righteous. But to gain the title of righteous it is surely necessary that the man perform just actions in a way that tends to shed all doubt about the sincerity of his intention.

“That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage (rarely found) by which a man scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise. This justice of manners is that which is meant where justice is called a virtue and injustice a vice.”

Hobbes is explicitly showing here what is meant when justice is spoken of as a virtue. The justice of manners is related to Hobbes’s definition of justice as keeping
promises in that it describes the man who lives with conviction and pride by Hobbes's definition of justice. The just man is not concerned with justice simply for his preservation or defence but rather because he 'scorns to be beholden for the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise.' The justice of a man, justice as a virtue, points beyond mere peace, defence and preservation towards self-sufficiency. Hobbes's account of the laws of nature is given such that their goodness is grounded in peace, and they are followed not for themselves, but for self-preservation. Justice of manners points to a good above peace: pride in self-sufficiency. Though the just man agrees with the definition of justice in terms of natural law, he does not agree with it for the same reason that it was deduced as a natural law. Hobbes's science of virtue cannot account for what is called virtue on its own terms.

To assist in reconciling the tension between the science of moral virtue and virtue proper, it is prudent to recall that Hobbes has deduced his laws of nature from his reading of the human heart. It also on the basis of this reading that he declares that he has discovered/created the true science of the moral virtues. To see what Hobbes has read in his own heart is to see why a true political science must reject consideration of the manners of men as grounds for the science of virtue, and instead focus on certain rules for action. The ground for the science of moral virtue is to show why it is reasonable in terms of self-preservation to act in accordance with the natural laws. This is not to say that the natural laws contradict or are inimical to the virtues. It is only to say that Hobbes science of moral virtue is not primarily concerned with the virtues as such, but with rules for action.90

Leaving momentarily the conflict which appears to exist between the true science
of moral virtue and virtue itself, it may help to clarify the issue by looking to *Leviathan*'s chapter explicitly dedicated to manners. In chapter eleven Hobbes defines manners as "those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity." Manners in this sense are markedly different from the common conception of manners: the rules for polite or civilized behaviour. Common manners seem conventional and even arbitrary due to their motley variety from region to region around the world. For many, no good reason appears as to why some peoples shake hands when they greet while others bow or salute. Hobbes identifies manners in this sense as 'small morals' implicitly leaving the title of 'big morals,' or at least morals proper, for his conception of manners. At first morals would appear to be the opposite of the trivial and arbitrary 'small morals.' Hobbes's morals are not trivial, they are essential for human kind's felicity; they are not arbitrary, but rigorously deduced from a clearly expounded account of human nature.

Small morals are only small relative to something that is bigger. Hobbes's 'big morals' may be considered to be small when compared to those morals concerned with matters higher than peace and unity, such as virtue. Hobbes's morals concerning living together in peace and unity may therefore seem reasonable and important in contrast to how a man should wash his mouth and pick his teeth before company, but the relative character of the bigness of these morals should not be overlooked. The full title for the chapter is *Of the difference of Manners* and would therefore appear to have at least a double meaning. On the one hand it shows the difference between small morals and morals proper, on the other hand it also shows the difference of morals between people.

Hobbes, in giving the name manners, even big manners, to the qualities that concern mankind's living together in peace and unity, is also making a point about the
role of custom and reason in political life. The name manners implies through its kinship to custom a certain degree of arbitrariness in what actually constitutes the qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity. It has already been shown that Hobbes holds that some of the rules in political life are like those of a game: it is sufficient that all the players agree such that they are willing to play. Whether this is a sufficient response to the uncertainty implicit in the concepts of morals versus small morals will be addressed in the next chapter of the thesis when Hobbes’s account of ignorance of causes is addressed.

Once small morals and morals are distinguished and before outlining the differences among human beings with respect to morals, Hobbes outlines a great similarity in moral matters: all men aim for the felicity of this life, which is continual motion and striving for the achievement and maintenance of the changing objects of the passions. This life of motion is the quest for securing, not only the means to ones current desire, but also ones future desire. However, Hobbes’s political philosophy is infamous (or famous) for admitting that in avoiding violent death one avoids the greatest evil. Hobbes would be open to other criticisms, for it may be true that violent death is preferable to defeat in battle or slavery.

In the commonwealth the king must determine what objects ought to be considered good and evil by determining the laws of the commonwealth. How this good is to be determined is of course a very difficult matter: it has already been shown that once the commonwealth is founded, a good law is one that everyone can agree to. But this understanding of the political good is surely insufficient since it depends upon the framework of the founded commonwealth. After all it is this framework that will
establish the functioning of the various powers of the sovereignty and therefore determine how laws are made. The question for the founder of a commonwealth, and also for the student of politics, is to understand the good in absence of the temporal power. The power to establish the law of good and evil is the source of what is considered good in a commonwealth. To put the question more particularly: What is the natural state of good and evil and therefore what is the state of manners before the institution of a commonwealth?

Because life is continual motion, felicity is not a satisfied state of mind. The mind will always be open to new fears and desires. Even in sleep we dream and so it must be concluded that only in death does the motion of this life cease.\(^2\) In this life there cannot be a greatest good or utmost aim that consists of achieving a satisfied or complete state of mind. No understanding of the good can stem from the object itself (all power, money, honour, knowledge and command included), but rather it is the man (in the state of nature) that determines whether or not a given object is called good. The standard that men use is whether the object is pleasing or not.\(^3\) Good and evil are judged by the individual and because the constitutions and educations of men vary so too will good and evil. Given this state of good and evil, however, three different types of good can be recognized. The first type is good in the sense that it promises a good, and in Latin is called *pulchrum*, in English, fair, beautiful, handsome, gallant, honourable, comely, or amiable. The second type is good for the effect or end produced, and is called *jucundum* in Latin or delightful in English. The third type of good is good as the means and is called *utile* or profitable.\(^4\)

This recalls Glaucon's three-part division of the good at the beginning of book
two of the Republic. Glaucon distinguishes goods for themselves, goods for themselves and for their effects, and lastly goods solely for their effects. Hobbes’s first kind of good, good by promise, is characterized by our use of the words: fair, beautiful, handsome, gallant, honourable, comely and amiable. All of these words refer to something good, but it is uncertain exactly how they are good. This type of good would seem to be what Hobbes is talking about when he speaks of the justice of manners. A just man is good, but not because he necessarily acts justly, but rather because he is disposed towards justice and his disposition gives his actions the relish of justice. Hobbes’s first three examples (fair, beautiful, and handsome), further highlight the character of this good. It is pleasant to behold the beautiful, so people call the beautiful good. In classical terms the human attraction to beauty is unintelligible if divorced from the idea of the good. Because beautiful things may be either good or bad, and human beings mistake the beautiful for the good, beautiful things can only properly be said to promise good. By placing beauty as a good in the same sense as being gallant and honourable are goods, Hobbes is implying that the goods of character are not good as ends or effects or means. Glaucon’s examples of enjoyment and harmless pleasure make clear what he has in mind by a good in itself. It would seem the pleasures of beauty are included in Glaucon’s good in itself. Both Glaucon’s and Hobbes’s examples suggest that they are thinking of a good that is delighted for itself and not necessarily for its consequences.

Glaucon’s second type of good, what Socrates calls the fairest of the three types, are goods for themselves and for their consequences. In this category Glaucon places, thinking, seeing and being healthy. The English word that Hobbes uses for this type of good is delightful. In the three paragraphs following Hobbes’s three-part division of the
good Hobbes clarifies what he means by delightful and it is the appearance to us of a certain type of motion.  

The motion within human beings is of two types, vital or animal. Vital motion is defined as motion “begun in generation and continued without interruption through their whole life, such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion &c”98. Animal motion is also called “voluntary motion as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such a manner as first fancied in our minds.”99 When we sense something, motion is carried through our sense to interact with both vital and voluntary motion. The appearance of this interaction to us is called, delight or trouble of mind, depending on whether the motion is agreeable to us or not. Appetites are the motions associated with the needs of vital motion and they seek certain effects or ends. The appearance of appetite to us is called pleasure or delight. Hobbes gives the Latin name of jucundum for good as effect or end because pleasure and delight is a motion corroborating, helping, and fortifying vital motion.100 If this were the extent of Hobbes’s account of pleasure one could assume that Hobbes’s good for end or effect means (at least partly) what Glaucon means by health, which is well-being of the body.

Hobbes, however, complicates this understanding because human beings not only have appetites, but desires: desires is the general name for the motion within us that seeks all different kinds of ends. Recall that individual men make judgments on what is good and evil based on what they have both appetites and desires for, and because the constitutions of men vary, judgements made from the nature of the object itself cannot be made into common rules of good and evil.101 When the vital motions are helped and fortified, delight and pleasure are experienced and this fortification is sensed as good.
From this fact Hobbes deduces that pleasure exists in appetite, desire, and love. His argument could give the impression that pleasure is the good. However, Hobbes never quite admits this. He admits that people call the objects of their desires and appetites good (regardless of whether they are or not). He admits that pleasure and delight are the sense of the good simply, but not because it is pleasure, but rather because pleasure is properly the sense of good only in the case when the pleasure is from the help and fortification of vital motion.

After this brief argument Hobbes divides pleasures and delights into two categories, the pleasures of sense and the pleasures of mind. This division has nothing to do with what Hobbes has identified as the only end or effect that is properly good. Not all pleasures of the sense are good, though the pleasures of jucunda are. The only way to tell whether any of the pleasures of the mind are good is if they happen to correspond to either Hobbes's first or third types of good. It is certain, however, that no pleasure of the mind is good as an effect or end, because the pleasures of the mind are separated from the pleasures of fortified vital motion by definition. The pleasure and pains of the mind therefore can only be either goods as promise or goods as means to the fortification of vital motion.

The significance of the difference between Hobbes's and Glaucon's second good is indeed great. Socrates places justice in this category. Rather, Socrates puts justice in a even higher category, for it is not only for its consequences but also for itself that justice is called good in the Republic. Justice cannot be a good as an end or effect on Hobbes's account. At best, if it prevents the destruction of vital motion, justice is good as a means to that end. This argument would seem to imply that medicine is the only science
capable of directly producing this type of good as an effect. Since Hobbes is concerned with reading the human heart it is perhaps fitting given his account of what is good as an end that the heart is the organ most often associated with vital motion. One assumes that in desiring to read the heart of man, Hobbes does not mean the literal heart, but rather wishes to decipher what is dear to mankind. It may be, however, that Hobbes has discovered that the body, not the soul, is what is truly dear to mankind.

Evidence for this reading is also present in how Hobbes presents the laws of nature. First, the primary right of nature is self-preservation by any means necessary, and is summed up as 'by all means we can, to defend our selves'. A law of nature is based on the right of nature in the following way:

“A law of nature (lex naturalis) is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to amount that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”

All laws of nature have this in common. So it is misleading to say, as I have said so far in this chapter, that the laws of nature are for the sake of peace. The natural laws are for the sake of preserving mere life, vital motion. The first and fundamental law of nature is ‘to seek peace and follow it.’ But this is the fundamental law of nature only because peace is necessary for the preservation of life. If it should happen that vital motion was impaired by peace, then peace would no longer be an end sanctioned by natural law. The second natural law dictates the necessary means to peace, which is the means of preserving vital motion, which is summed up by Hobbes’s correction of the law of the gospel, “whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that ye to them.” This law commands that men must combine to form commonwealths. These two laws are
the first and second laws of nature, because they most closely establish what is necessary for the preservation of vital motion. All of the other laws of nature, justice included, are deduced from the certainty of the first two laws.

Glaucon's third type of good is good only for its consequences or end. The examples he uses, exercise, medical treatment and wage labour are useful in showing the connection to Hobbes's third good, utile. The activity itself is painful or tedious or otherwise undesirable, but the end produced from the activity is good. The activity is therefore good as a means to the desirable end. Hobbes's definition of utile is consistent and coincident with this good as means. Hobbes even goes as far as to give this type of a good another name, profitable, which upon reflection of Glaucon's example of wage labour, shows that Hobbes and Glaucon have the same thing in mind when making this distinction. It is interesting to note that Hobbes does not indicate Glaucon's two other examples given the preceding argument about the central importance of jucunda in Hobbes's civil philosophy. If justice of manners is only a promise of good then the natural laws are useful as a means to the preservation of life.

Hobbes's analysis of manners, however, is not delivered in terms of the good. He does not declare: so that in the first place, for a general inclination of mankind, a restless desire for good after good that ceaseth only in the death. Hobbes denies a greatest good or utmost aim and asserts that power is a general inclination of all mankind. As has already been indicated, his refutation of the existence of a greatest good or utmost aim seemed only to rest on his denial that they could consist of a mind satisfied. The principle that life is motion is not sufficient to dethrone the sovereignty of the good and replace it with power.
At the beginning of chapter ten Hobbes defines the power of a man in universal terms (recall nothing on this earth is universal)\(^{106}\) as "present means to obtain some future apparent good, and is either original or instrumental."\(^{107}\) Power is good because it is useful or profitable. All human beings seek the means to their apparent goods, they do not seek their true good, but rather they seek the means to whatever it is that seems good to them. Original power is in either the body or the mind and instrumental power is acquired by original power or by fortune and the end of acquiring power is to acquire more and more power. Hobbes's statement of the general inclination of mankind is misleading then because it conceals what human beings actually seek: those things that are good as ends or effects. It may be true that mankind seeks power because it is useful, but they do so only because it is useful as a means to those things that they think are good as ends or that promise good. Hobbes's account of the difference of manners conceals what the ancients found most needful to examine and make judgements upon: the ends themselves, the reasons for seeking power. But the ends people seek (money, command, knowledge and honour) are not ends, but only means: they are power and are only good in so far as they are useful in obtaining good. The only end that is truly good is the helping and fortifying of vital motion. The minimum that can be done to help and fortify vital motion is to ensure that it is not hindered. Thus Hobbes aims to discover the power to bring about consequences conducive to peace. But in doing so Hobbes gives peace the place of the good as the end for politics. If peace is the political end, Hobbes must differentiate between types of power because some are more dangerous to the peace of the commonwealth than others.

Men not only disagree about what good and evil are at any given point in time,
but they also change their minds over time about what they call good and evil. Without an authority to establish some constant standard of the good, individual men will be in constant flux about what they ought to pursue. This flux dissolves the possibility of working together for any kind of stable common good. Hobbes’s civil philosophy succeeds or fails on his ability to convince as many people as possible that their personal defence is their natural right and that peace is the proper end of the political association. But the fact that he has to convince people that peace is good suggests that Hobbes’s assertion that all men think peace is good, is incorrect.  

"For the rule of manners, without civil government, is the law of nature; and in it, the civil law, that determineth what is honest and dishonest, what is just and unjust, and generally, what is good and evil. Whereas they that make the rules of good and bad by their own liking and disliking, but which means, in so great the diversity of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on, but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, to the subversion of the commonwealth."  

The rule of manners, without civil government, is the law of nature. Hobbes’s account of the laws of nature stem directly from his account of manners, which culminates in his statement ‘Of The Natural Condition of Mankind, Concerning their Felicity and Misery.’ Though all men in the state of nature seek what is good in their eyes, the only way to ensure the means to peace is to assume all men seek power: the means to the goods they desire now and for the future. This is a prudential maxim on
Hobbes’s part. The fortification of vital motion is the only good end, the only way to properly understand the actions of men when they appear to deviate from pursuing the fortification of vital motion is to see that they are ignorant of the true end: fortification of vital motion. Those who pursue honour or knowledge for their own sake are ignorant of their true good. Honour and knowledge are only good in so far as they pursue what human life requireth: which seems to be no more than bodily health,

What remains to consider is Hobbes’s rejection of the pursuit of virtue in the sense of manner, or character.

“But the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledged the same virtues and vices, yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable and comfortable living place them in the mediocrity of the passions (as if not the cause, but the degree of daring, made fortitude, or not the cause, but the quantity of a gift, made liberality).”

Hobbes and the moral philosophers of the past recognize the same virtues and vices. Hobbes and the tradition differ, however, on two points with respect to the moral virtues: their goodness and the reason they are praised. Hobbes does not explain here how he and the tradition differ in their accounts of the goodness of the moral virtues. Hobbes does explain what he believes is the reason that the moral virtues are praised: as the means to peaceable, sociable and comfortable living. Hobbes’s account of the moral virtues as ‘the true doctrine of the laws of nature’ takes as its end the conservation and defence of men. Hobbes’s account of the moral virtues will be praised. Though Hobbes does not give an account of either the ancient account of the goodness of the moral virtues or the ancient account of why they were praised, he does give some indication of how he believes the ancients understood the virtues.
Hobbes uses two examples, fortitude and liberality, to explain the difference between his and the old account of moral virtue. These examples are significant because Hobbes gives no account of either of these qualities as virtues in his account of the natural laws. How then can Hobbes claim that he and the tradition both recognize the same moral virtues? Hobbes does admit that his account of the natural laws in chapters fourteen and fifteen is incomplete. In the Review and Conclusion of *Leviathan*, he adds a twentieth law of nature obliging military service. However this law of nature is qualified by the phrase, ‘as much as it lieth in him.’ This suggests that Hobbes believes that not all human beings are equally courageous. This natural law, unlike the other natural laws, only obliges those men who are so constituted as to perform the obligation. The laws of nature therefore do not always state universal obligations. Human beings are not equal by nature in their obligations. It is for this reason that Hobbes does not present this law of nature in his explicit account of the laws of nature: it argues against the natural equality of mankind. This also proves that even though Hobbes does not count fortitude and liberality among the explicit laws of nature, which he calls the science of moral virtue, he does still recognize as the ancients did that they are virtues.  

Is justice of manners not praised as virtue in Hobbes science of virtue and vice because it is not conducive to the creation of *Leviathan*? It is not a ground to make people capable of living in peace and unity. Hobbes is concerned with understanding things in such a way so as to be able to have the power to bring them into being. If virtue in the sense of justice of manners is either not teachable or very difficult to teach, and it cannot be brought into being through any sure means, then Hobbes must reject it as a pursuable political good; it can only promise good and never deliver. Hobbes must only
concern himself with goods in the sense of *utile* and *jucundum*, not *pulchurm*, because it is those kinds of goods that science, which is concerned with power can bring into being.

If peace is the only true good because it preserves vital motion and therefore allows for motions to corroborate with vital motion, which is the only good as an end or effect, then Hobbes's political philosophy would be equally good for beasts as it would men. It is true that Hobbes must convince men that this is the good and in convincing them he uses reason, but reason in this sense is not something for itself, but only for peace, which protects our beastly good. Hobbes in reading his own heart has read that the only good that is applicable to all of mankind is peace. Hobbes's civil science would therefore appear to treat men as beasts. However, men excel beasts in their understanding and so men are far more dangerous than beasts. Through the use of words men can reason and thereby discover general rules or principles: but being capable of reason men are also open to absurdity.  

The only good is the good of the body. The good of the mind is only good in so far as it serves the good of the body. Science and Philosophy quest for the truths about the power to bring about consequences with "such effects that human life requireth." So far in our attempt to follow Hobbes's reading of his heart, there has been no indication of anything higher than the good of the body, which is a good as an end or effect.

This chapter has argued that Hobbes bases his civil philosophy on the account of the good presented in chapter six of *Leviathan*. The only good as an end in Hobbes's reading of mankind is the fortification of vital motion. The right of nature is based on the good as fortification of vital motion. The fundamental law of nature to seek peace is in turn based on this right. Justice as a law of nature is subordinate to the good implicit in
the right of nature, mere life. Justice is defined so it can be treated as a science in the sense discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis; the science of moral virtue seeks the power of creation. The political manifestation of the right of nature is peace. The end for which the king ought to rule is peace.
Chapter Four: Passion and Opinion

This chapter examines Hobbes’s account of manners as his assessment of mankind for their potential to live in peace and unity. With the end of the political association established it is now necessary to examine mankind for the means to that end. To accomplish this it is necessary to understand men in terms of what they do that might be contrary or conducive to peace. This chapter focuses on Hobbes’s account of men in terms of the objects they pursue and argues that the opinions of men are decisive in explaining their actions.

The fortification of vital motion, or the health of the body is the only political good that exists for mankind. There is no greatest good or utmost end for mankind that consists in a mind satisfied, but rather the political good consists in the fortification of the vital motion of the body. Civil philosophy aims to create the condition under which this good can exist, peace. All men, however, do not understand that the health of the body is the only good as an end. Rather, what appears good and evil for them is what pleases them and displeases them. Though bodily pain displeases and bodily health pleases these are not the only things that please and displease. Men therefore are confused or ignorant of what is truly good for them. Men seek ends contrary to peace. Men seek objects that are contrary to their political good. These truths about the relationship of mankind to the only true political good leads to the conclusion that men perpetually seek power. To be charitable, as Hobbes invites us to be, it is perhaps better to say men must perpetually seek power not because “a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he already has, or that he cannot be satisfied with moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he have at present, without the acquisition of more.”114
Men must seek power because it is through the acquisition of power that they hope they will be able to maintain their estate.

Hobbes's account of manners is useful because it assesses mankind's relationship to peace. Hobbes's account of manners divides the qualities of mankind into two. The first kind of quality is passion. The second kind of quality is opinion or knowledge of causes. The passions, or more specifically what pleases and displeases men, dictate what is considered good and evil, and the opinions of the causes of their pleasure and displeasure dictate how to obtain or avoid what is considered good or evil.

“For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies to range abroad and find the way to the things desired, all steadiness of the mind's motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no desire is to be dead; so to have weak passions is dullness; and to have passions indifferently for everything, GIDDINESS and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anything than is ordinarily seen in others is that which men call MADNESS.”115

It was this understanding of the relationship between thought and passion, which led us to conclude, in our consideration of the Introduction of Leviathan, that Hobbes believes the nature of men is discovered through reading their passions. Passion dictates what is thought about and what is sought; it indicates the natural inclinations of mankind. Recall in the Introduction Hobbes explicitly lists five different qualities of mankind: thought, opinion, reason, hope and fear. He then reduces the five qualities to three, desire, hope and fear. We thought the key to understanding this reduction was that the three words, opinion, reason, and thought were removed from the list because they could be replaced by one word desire, because thought, opinion, and reason can be equated with desire. However, this ignores the possibility that hope and fear may already contain
null
thought, reason, or opinion. Hobbes's reduction of thought to passion may therefore be more complicated than it would first appear. To reveal this complication, and to better understand the role of hope in Hobbes's account of manners, it is necessary to take a closer look at hope and fear.

Recall that the method outlined in the Introduction is concerned not only with discovering the heart of men, but also with understanding their actions. When Hobbes examines man's opinions and passions to determine their relationship to peace and unity, he is concerned with whether men's actions, as ruled by their opinions and their passions, are conducive to peace. Chapter six of *Leviathan* contains a discussion explaining men's actions.

Before men act, they deliberate. Deliberation is a summation or consideration of the desires, aversions, hopes and fears with respect to a given object. Deliberation ends when the summation of desire, aversion, hope and fear lead to the action or the action is thought impossible.\(^\text{116}\) This type of deliberation is as much present in animals, as in human beings.\(^\text{117}\) The last appetite or aversion in deliberation is called the will. The will is identified as the appetite or aversion immediately proceeding either action or omission of action. Whatever a man (or beast) wills is voluntary.\(^\text{118}\)

Men differ from beasts in at least one respect: they have speech. Deliberation can determine whether an action is possible or impossible. Men also possess another way of determining whether a thing is possible or impossible. Hobbes states that mental discourse or doubt also determines whether a thing will or will not be, or has or has not been.\(^\text{119}\) Hobbes distinguishes between deliberation and doubt in the following way.
"And as the whole chain of appetites in the question of good or bad is called deliberation, so the whole chain of opinions alternate in the question of true or false is called doubt."\textsuperscript{120}

What was previously indicated to be the work of deliberation is now indicated to be the work of doubt. Deliberation no longer determines action or omission of action, it now considers the question of good or bad. Deliberation is now only a consideration of a chain of appetites, not a chain of appetites, hopes, and fears. Hobbes no longer speaks of fear and hope, but now only speaks of opinion. The reason for this can be determined through an examination of the definition of hope and fear. Hope and fear are composite passions in that they are not simply appetites for an object, but appetites combined with opinions. “For an appetite with an opinion of attaining is called HOPE.”\textsuperscript{121} Conversely, “aversion with an opinion of hurt from the object is FEAR.”\textsuperscript{122}

Opinions in both of these cases, in deliberation and doubt, are about whether a thing will or will not be. Either the man believes he has the means to attain the object of his appetite, or he does not. Judgments of what will or will not be can be formed from either prudence or science. Prudential judgments, formed through experience and memory of events, do not rely on syllogism and are called opinion. On Hobbes’s account animals can form this kind of opinion. Scientific judgments, judgments made possible by speech, are formed through syllogism and reason. Humans are different from animals in that their actions can be based upon science.Humans may act by either prudence or sapience.

Thoughts and opinions are therefore more important in Hobbes’s civil philosophy than we first thought; not only for reading human beings, but also for ruling them. From our earlier discussion, in the first chapter of this thesis, it would have seemed implausible
for Hobbes to state, as he later does, "for the actions of men proceed from their opinions, and in the well governing of opinions consisteth the well governing of men's actions, in order to their peace and concord."123 Action proceeds from opinion, because hope and fear are part opinion. However, hope and fear are also part of passion. The truth of the primacy of opinion in determining the actions of men does not mean that passion is unimportant. Action is both natural and artificial. Hobbes's account of manners does not solely consist of a consideration of the different opinions of human beings. Rather, his account of manners is divided into four parts, considering both passions and opinions. The first part has already been considered, and is the determination that human beings seek power, not some dubious greatest good. The second part considers some passions of men, and how they relate to peace and unity. The third part considers men's want of science or want of knowledge about causes. The fourth part considers anxiety, curiosity and the seed of religion.

Hobbes's account of the difference of manners is a consideration of mankind in terms of those qualities that concern their living together in peace and unity. It is a consideration of mankind in terms of morals. Morals are not like 'the small morals'. Small morals are about petty matters, the particulars of which differ from place to place and time to time. Morals are about important matters, and do not appear to differ from place to place and time to time, rather they are about constant qualities of mankind. This implies that the difference between morals and small morals is not of degree, but of kind. However this is not the case. The ground for the distinction between morals and small morals is in their relative importance for peace and unity. Small morals are small morals because they are not a sufficient consideration of the qualities of mankind concerning
living together in peace and unity. Peace and unity are not arbitrary ends. It is good in the same way we determined natural law to be good: for the conservation and defence of men. The examples, which Hobbes provides to explain small morals (saluting, washing, and picking teeth in front of company) though seemingly innocuous in relation to peace and unity are revealing for understanding the difference between morals and small morals. As Hobbes has established in the previous chapter, “Of Power, Worth, Honor, Dignity, and Worthiness,” law and custom can be important in determining how men honour one another. Therefore, to determine more clearly the status of both morals and small morals it is useful to briefly review how Hobbes distinguishes between power, worth, honour, dignity and worthiness.

Power in chapter ten, as has already been discussed, is the present means to some future apparent good. The worth of man is “of all other things, his price, that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another.” The manifestation of the value or worth of a man is determined by how men honour and dishonour one another. Honouring and dishonouring depend upon the needs and judgments of individual men, which will vary from man to man, but also will vary in the different occasions men find themselves. The dignity of a man is the worth that is placed on him by the sovereign of the commonwealth. As opposed to worth and honour, what is honourable is not dependent on the judgment of others, but rather refers to “whatsoever possession, action, or quality [that] is an argument of power.” Finally, “worthiness is a thing different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert, and consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy; which particular
ability is usually named fitness or aptitude.\textsuperscript{129}

Though men are naturally apt to honour and dishonour one another according to their understanding of the power of other men, the sovereign does have the power to make whatever he pleases be a sign of honour.\textsuperscript{130} Law, and to some extent custom, are under the power of the sovereign, and it is therefore the duty of the sovereign to establish appropriate laws of honour.\textsuperscript{131} Small morals are matters that may be dealt with by the sovereign directly by law because small morals deal with matters of value or worth. As duelling reminds us these considerations are not insignificant; custom can be grounds for conflict.\textsuperscript{132} Morals, however, are not dependent on the judgments of another; they refer to matters of worthiness. Morals do not refer to the varying market values of men, but to the true fitness and aptitudes of men.

The qualities of mankind concerning their living together in peace and unity must be considered from two distinct perspectives. One perspective is that of the sovereign, and the other perspective is that of the subject (or in terms of the state of nature, potential subject). The difference between the two perspectives can be see in both the type of instrumental power needed to ensure their future desires, and the natural powers needed to obtain those instrumental powers. The sovereign will seek security with his natural and instrumental powers by laws at home, and by wars abroad. Once secure, the king may turn his attention to satisfying desires for fame from novel conquest.\textsuperscript{133} The primary activities of the king, using laws and wars to secure the commonwealth, are conducive to peace and unity. The establishment of peace is the only way that a sovereign can hope for security.\textsuperscript{134}

Subjects must be understood as comprising two groups. One seeks ease and
delight for the body, and the other seeks delight and recognition for abilities of the mind. Paragraphs four through nine of the chapter treat these two different kinds of subjects. In considering men, Hobbes is signalling to a king what he needs to know about his (potential and current) subjects so as to make laws and conduct wars. Those who are primarily concerned with the body, those who desire ease and sensual delight, will be inclined toward peace, because it can be hoped that by peace they will gain the means to their ease and sensual delight. This is also the case for those who seek to maintain their delight by their industry and the fruits of their labour; peace ensures that the fruits of their labour are safe. Those who fear their body to be in mortal danger also hope that peace will extinguish their fear. Men who desire knowledge and arts of peace are also inclined to peace because they may hope that the commonwealth will secure the leisure necessary for the pursuits of the arts and sciences. Though the desires and fears of these men widely differ, they are united by the hope that the peace of the commonwealth can allow them to pursue their desires.

Problems for peace and unity begin with those who compete over riches, honour and command. The men who are inclined to compete for these goods are also inclined to contention, enmity and war because they will be willing to kill, supplant, and repel one another to obtain the object of their desire. For those disposed to competition for riches, honour, and command, peace does not necessarily provide a hope that their desires will be fulfilled. The laws necessary for peace can, and often must, forbid the means that may otherwise be useful to acquire the objects they desire. These types of men, the competitors, fall under the second category of men: those who desire recognition for some ability of mind. Through victory in competition they desire to gain recognition for
their power and it is only through such victory in competition that they may hope their power will be recognized.139

The men who are devoutly concerned with honour and praise are of particular concern.140 Those in competition for praise, compete not only with the living, but also the dead who have gained great fame. The lover of praise is in competition with the men of antiquity because tradition is a demonstration (based on prudence not science) to the lover of praise that actions greater than those achieved by the men of the present are possible. Because he believes greater action to be possible he may hope to achieve great action. This inclines men to revere antiquity because they will wish to mimic or surpass the famous actions of the men of the past. These men will attempt to ascribe more than is perhaps due to the dead and ‘obscure the glory’ of the living.141 This is dangerous for a sovereign in so far as the types that revere antiquity will not be impressed by his actions, because they fall short of the actions of the men portrayed in the histories. Desire of praise can also incite men to laudable actions, in so far as they desire to please those who praise laudable actions. This is neutral with respect to peace and unity because it depends on the judgment of the one whom the lover of praise wishes to elicit. The lover of praise can be a powerful tool for the sovereign in Hobbes’s civil philosophy. Because the sovereign impersonates the combined power of all those who covenanted to place the sovereign above them, the sovereign is the most powerful. For this reason the sovereign’s praise will be highly sought by the lovers of praise.142

A peculiar subsection of the lovers of praise are those who desire to be praised after their death. Though this may seem fruitless in so far as the pleasure gained from earthly praise means nothing in relationship to the unspeakable pleasures (or pains as the
case may be) of the afterlife, this is not the case in so far as these men can gain pleasure from imagining the joy they would receive from the praise of posterity.  

After considering those that seek the pleasures of the sense and those that seek the pleasures of the mind, Hobbes considers the nature of all men in receiving and bestowing benefits, and suffering and inflicting harm. This part of his discussion is important in that it outlines what can be plausibly hoped (or feared) from one’s fellows should benefits be bestowed (or harm inflicted) upon them. In receiving benefits one is inferior, equal or superior to the benefactor, and there is either hope for requiting the benefit or there is not. If the receiver thinks himself equal or inferior and there is no hope of requital, he is inclined to counterfeit love and true hate. If the receiver thinks himself equal or inferior to the benefactor, and there is a hope of requital, he is inclined to love. If the receiver thinks himself inferior, and there is no hope for requital, the receiver is inclined to gratitude and love.  

This is of great significance from the perspective of the sovereign. If the sovereign believes that he has been benefited by being made sovereign by the covenant of all with all, the character of his rule would seem to depend on whether he believes ‘everyone’ to be superior or inferior to him. This will be determined by whether he believes it is possible to requite the benefit of the sovereignty to ‘everyone’ or whether he believes it is a benefit to be sovereign. Assuming the sovereignty is a benefit, the sovereign will love and be grateful to ‘everyone’, if he believes they are superior. The sovereign may think that ‘everyone’ is superior to him because it was their covenant that created the sovereign power he wields. However, on Hobbes’s account of the creation of the sovereignty ‘everyone’ does not exist as an entity until there is a sovereign. The
souvereign therefore must view each and every one of his subjects as his benefactor. The
souvereign as souvereign is superior to his subjects by definition because he embodies each
and every one of their persons. The souvereign, as a man, however is equal to each and
every one of his subjects. If an equal receives a benefit he cannot requite, he will secretly
hate his benefactors. The question is therefore, can the souvereign requite the benefit of the
sovereignty to each and every one of his subjects? One possible answer is that the
souvereign, as a man, can requite the benefit by being a good souvereign.

In inflicting harm one is equal, inferior or superior to one’s victim, and there is
either a willingness on the part of the victim to expiate the harm done or there is not.
Hobbes only considers two of the possible cases. The first is the case where the inflictor
(either equal, inferior or superior) does more harm than the victim can expiate. In this
case the inflictor is inclined to hate the sufferer because “he must expect either revenge or
forgiveness, both of which are hateful.”\textsuperscript{145} The other case is ‘fear of oppression,’ which
means that the potential victim expects to be done more harm (by either a inferior, equal,
or superior) than he can revenge, forgive or expiate. In this case the man is inclined to
either anticipate or seek aid by society for “there is no other way by which a man can
secure his life and liberty.”\textsuperscript{146}

Hobbes simplifies his consideration of affliction of harm to the two above cases
because it does not matter if the inflictor is an equal, inferior or superior to the victim.
Rather since the harm was inflicted, it is difficult to see how the victim can believe
himself to be superior to the inflictor. The fact that he was harmed is a sign of the power
of the inflictor. The reason for this is in Hobbes’s conception of the equality of human
beings. Men are not equal in benefits they can bestow upon one another, but equal in their
potential to do harm to one another. The worst harm one man can do another is to
humiliate and then kill him. The worst harm a king can do to a man is to humiliate and
then kill him. There is a natural limit to the harm that can befall a man because all are
equal in the potential to do harm. No man is safe from the possibility that his life may be
in danger from either 'secret machinations' or 'confederacy.'

The king differs from the individual because the king controls the greatest of
human powers.

"The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the power
of most men, united by consent in one person, natural or civil, that has the
use of all their powers depending on will, such as is the power of a
commonwealth, or depending on the wills of each particular, such as is the
power of a faction or of divers factions leagued."  

But the potential to increase one's power by making friends or confederates is in
all men. Though the possibility of compounding power is what makes the commonwealth
possible, it also makes sedition possible. So far men have been considered as if they
where all individuals, each acting for their own purposes, and we have tried to determine
whether pursuit of those purposes leads to either peace or war. This was determined by
whether, given the nature of the pursuit, the pursuer can hope to acquire the objects of his
desire under the laws of the commonwealth or not. This approach, however, does not
consider what is most needful in examining men for their potential for peace and unity. If
civil war is the greatest political evil, what must be examined above all else are those
types of men that are inclined to try and create confederations for purposes contrary to
the peace and unity of the commonwealth. It is needful to examine more closely those
who are in competition for command.

The commonwealth is not the only possible human association. Human power can
be compounded for other reasons than the protection of every man’s fundamental right. The union of men to protect the fundamental right, however, is the most powerful because the head of the union must have the right to use the means for the end which the union is made and to protect this end all such means must be granted. The nature of any given unification of individual men’s power depends upon ‘the wills of each particular’ man that consented to the union. The end for which the union is formed determines the means granted the leader of the union. The question for the sovereign is, what types of men are going to be able to create and lead unions of human power, and what are the possible ends for which these unions are made? Both of these questions must be examined to discover which men and which unions are dangerous to the sovereignty of the commonwealth.

Hobbes considers the first of these questions in chapters ten and eleven of *Leviathan*, and the second in chapter twenty-two. To understand the qualities of mankind that tend to peace and unity, it is most useful to determine what could incline men to submit to other men to obtain their ends. The problem here is not that men will submit to other men, but to understand which kinds of men Hobbes thinks will tend to lead the confederations of men. The qualities men possess, which dispose them to peace and unity, have already been discussed. What is necessary to look at now are the powers men will tend to seek in other men, which will determine their choices for those who would lead them. To answer this question it is useful to return to the distinctions made in chapter ten between power, worth, dignity, honour and worthiness.

Worthiness is a power or aptitude to accomplish something valued or deemed worthy. The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of
most men.\footnote{151} The greatest human power or aptitude is therefore what makes the compounding of other human powers possible. In thirteen paragraphs\footnote{152} Hobbes lists these powers, both the powers that compound and the powers that are to be compounded by consent between men. They are friends, liberality, reputation of power, reputation of love of country, any quality or reputation of quality which makes a man beloved or feared, good success, affability of men with power, reputation of prudence in war and peace, nobility, eloquence, form, sciences, and arts of public use and war. All thirteen of these are powers because those who lack them are disposed to either seek those who possess them or to serve those that possess them. The possession of these powers signals the power or aptitude for command.

Returning to Hobbes's consideration of manners, we see that Hobbes has now changed his focus. He began to examine some qualities of men that refer to leaders, especially military leaders. After considering doubt, vainglory, strong opinion of wisdom in government, pusillanimity and frugality, he considers eloquence and flattery. Eloquence is power because it seems to be prudence, and people tend to submit to the government of those who seem prudent.\footnote{153} Hobbes now indicates that eloquence also seems to be wisdom, and therefore, men will confide in the eloquent.\footnote{154} In addition to this flattery, which is pleasing because it is a recognition from another of your power, it inclines people to believe you are kind, which in turn inclines men to have confidence in you.\footnote{155} If added to these two qualities, kindness and wisdom, is a reputation for military skill, then men will be inclined, not only to confidence, but also to adhere and subject themselves to these military men. This is a beneficial combination in that the safety of the subject from the leader is guaranteed by the first two qualities, and safety from others is
guaranteed by the third.

This chapter has argued the following about Hobbes's understanding of men and their relationship to peace and unity. First, all men must be understood as seeking power. This understanding of men allows Hobbes to understand why men seem to seek ends contrary to their political good. Second, the chapter argues that men seek only those types of power that they can hope to obtain. Hope is a composite passion such that opinion determines whether the object will be sought or not. Third, this chapter argues that the political problem is the confederations of men created for purposes contrary to peace.
Chapter Five: The political significance of Opinion

This chapter examines Hobbes's account of the politically significant types of ignorance. Each type of ignorance is analyzed from a double perspective, that of the subject and of the sovereign. Each is analyzed for the political problem it poses and to see how different aspects of the civil philosophy presented in *Leviathan* address or solve those political problems.

To this point we have outlined which types of men are inclined to peace and which inclined to war and why. It is important to determine the proportion of each of these types of men among the human race at large so as to determine the potential for commonwealths and other confederations. For example, if ninety percent of people desire command and they all have the hope of acquiring it there will be little hope for peace. However, if those who desire command and hope to acquire it are relatively few compared to those who desire praise in arts and science, ease and sensual delight, and the fruits of their labour, then the potential for human confederations is great. Hobbes indicates that the latter case is the reality. The account of the state of nature in chapter thirteen of *Leviathan* therefore overstates the case on Hobbes's own terms. The true danger is not a war of all against all, but rather war between factions under the command of ambitious, military minded, and eloquent men. It is not in spite of those types of men, but because of them that Hobbes must make the state of nature worse than it ever could be. These types of men must learn to recognize the equality of men; they must learn that their command is a gift from a superior power, a gift that can perhaps be requited through the skilful performace of the duties of the sovereign. The commanding class of human beings needs an education in the nature of command.
The third part of Hobbes's account of manners addresses the opinions men hold concerning causes. Hobbes, however, does not so much consider various opinions people may or may not hold, but rather examines politically significant types of ignorance. There are four types of ignorance that have a significant effect on the potential for creating confederations and peace. Hobbes not only identifies these four types of ignorance, but also offers accounts to replace that ignorance with opinion, if not directly in chapter eleven, then in other places throughout *Leviathan*. If Hobbes's solutions to the political problem of ignorance are convincing then they will necessarily influence what commanders and individuals will hope.

First, ignorance generally, or want of science, "disposes, or rather constrains, a man to rely on the advice and authority of others." Want of science is want of power, and recognition of ignorance is recognition of lack of power. In terms of Hobbes's psychology, everyone is concerned with the truth in so far as they wish to gain the means to the ends that they desire. Ignorance is the recognition that one does not have the means to one's desired ends; ignorance is despair. But men's capacity for speech inclines them to seek counsel from one another to attempt to overcome their individual ignorance. Speech therefore gives men hope. Not all men, however, are pleased to put themselves at the disposal of others. These men, the proud, are therefore constrained to dispose themselves to another until such time that they believe themselves to command enough power to break the bonds of their constraint. Aside from the problem of the proud, men are also wary of the designs of other men. Men will therefore be particular in their choice of counselees. The counsellor must be supposed wise and honest. It has already been indicated that the appearance of these two qualities, wisdom and kindness, can be created.
through a combination of flattery and eloquence. Hobbes’s discussion of ignorance has a double meaning: first it signals to commanders to be weary of their own ignorance, but it also signals to commanders the kinds of ignorance to which men are liable.

The first kind of ignorance is ignorance of the signification of words. Hobbes calls this type of ignorance want of understanding. Understanding is defined earlier in chapter six as when a man, upon the hearing of a chain of words, has thoughts which match the words spoken. Men who lack understanding are therefore disposed “to take on trust, not only the truth they know not, but also the errors, and which is more, the nonsense of them they trust; for neither error nor nonsense can without perfect understanding of words be detected.”

This general type of ignorance has two politically significant sub-types. The first is that men place different names on the same things, depending on their passions. The example that Hobbes provides to illustrate this point is that men are liable to call private beliefs they approve of, opinion, and those they disapprove of, heresy. The example that Hobbes provides is significant because he is speaking not of public opinions, but of private ones, i.e., not of the opinions that are taught and explicitly sanctioned by the sovereign. When men disapprove of an opinion they call it heresy. By calling the opinion heresy it is given ‘a greater tincture of choler.’ However, this is certainly not the ordinary understanding of heresy. Hobbes addresses the ordinary understanding of heresy in chapter forty-two of Leviathan, in paragraphs 129-132. He approaches the problem of heresy there from the perspective of a Christian who is subject to a heretic king. Hobbes argues that it is against the law of nature to depose the king because he is a heretic. But heresy in the sense that it is spoken about in chapter forty-two does not appear to be the
same thing as spoken of in chapter eleven. A heretic in chapter forty-two is someone who appears to violate Christian law. Heretics teach or speak in ways contrary to Christian doctrine or God. Heresy in chapter eleven is only a speech, opinion, or teaching that displease the hearer. The standard of judgment is his passions. As Hobbes's discussion in chapter forty-two shows, there is a political danger in any claim that appeals to an authority higher than the political. If human beings have an inclination to call that which displease them heresy, they have an inclination to appeal to a higher power than the political to justify their displeasure. It is therefore necessary for the subjects of a sovereign to be taught that for the purposes of their actions, political authority is identical with the religious. It is also necessary for the subjects to be taught that disputes are to be judged by the sovereign and no other authority. 165

The second sub-type of ignorance concerning words is that it is difficult for men to distinguish the "one action of many men and many actions of one multitude." 166 Hobbes states that this distinction cannot be made without 'study and great understanding'. It could be said to be a test case for the student of Hobbes's civil philosophy. To illustrate the one action of many men Hobbes cites an example from Roman history. The decision of the Roman Senate to kill the conspirator Catiline is one action of many men. It is one action of many men because the Roman Senate is the representative of the Roman people. The Roman Senate is sovereign in Rome, and therefore is the real unity of all Romans; any one action of the Senate is in fact an action of all the people of Rome.

The murder of Caesar by a number of men, though some of them were senators, is different because it was not the act of the sovereign; it was the act of a faction. Factions
or confederations, however, are a kind of unification of the individual powers of men. There was a confederation to kill Caesar, and this confederation did have leaders (Brutus and Cassius). The difference between the unity of men in a sovereign and a unity of individual men for a purpose of lesser scope than the creation of a sovereign is that the unity required to establish a sovereign is considered to be a real unity because it requires all men to agree to give up their liberty to everything. Any confederation for a lesser purpose is not a true unity.

Hobbes does not indicate whether or not either of these murders was just or unjust. There was debate in Rome about each of these murders. Though many men, such as Cicero, Cato, Catalus and Caesar, attempted to persuade the Senate as to the justice of killing Cataline, once the Senate made the decision, it was the decision of all of them. This is the case regardless of the fact that some of those who attempted to persuade the Senate, such as Caesar, disagreed with the decision.\(^{167}\) Caesar's reason was that it was an unprecedented punishment.\(^{168}\) For Hobbes the question of justice does not need to be raised. Regardless of whether Caesar or Cicero was correct, it does not change the fact that the murder of Cataline was the action of the sovereign of Rome. In the case of Caesar's murder, the issue was whether or not Brutus and his conspirators acted as the sovereign representative of the Roman people. Brutus and his confederates tried to justify their actions by arguing they were ridding Rome of a tyrant. The Roman senate showed its disagreement with Brutus about his right to make that determination when the Senate refused to hear Brutus' case.\(^{169}\)

The next type of ignorance Hobbes treats is the ignorance of "the causes and the original constitution of right, equity, law and justice."\(^{170}\) Ignorance of the original
The text on this page is not legible or discernible.
constitution of right, equity, law and justice leads men to use custom and example as a rule for their actions. They believe that the action is unjust when they have previously seen the act punished, and just when they know an example of one who has acted that way and has not been punished. Hobbes does not disagree with this as a measure of injustice, but he does disagree with this as a measure of justice. To use custom or example as the measure of justice ("or as the lawyers which only use this false measure of justice barbarously call it, a precedent"), is faulty in the same way that children only use the correction of parents as a measure of good and evil manners. The purpose of law, and the correction of children by parents, is to teach the rule and its valid exceptions. The use of a precedent to justify one's action is an error because it rests on an analogy of circumstances. No two cases are exactly the same; therefore, it requires judgment, not argument from precedent to make the just choice. Hobbes goes on to state that children are actually in a better state than men because at least children follow the rule consistently while men constantly turn from custom to reason and back in an effort to justify their actions. Hobbes cites this propensity to argue from custom to reason and back again as "the cause that the doctrine of right and wrong is perpetually disputed, both by the pen and sword."  

In chapter one of this thesis we cited Hobbes's contention that good laws are like rules created for a game. Though this may be the proper method for determining good laws, it is not the cause and original constitution of right, equity, law and justice. The constitution of right, equity, law and justice is more akin to the rules and theorems of geometry than the rules of a game. Man's propensity to argue from reason to custom and custom to reason is perpetuated by the fact that men have a vested interest in the outcome
of the arguments of justice. Justice may be contrary to a man’s ambition, profit or lust. Hobbes makes an analogy to geometry to demonstrate the futility of this practice.

“For I doubt not but if it had been a thing contrary to any man’s right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, that three angles of a triangle should be equal to two angles of a square, that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of geometry, suppressed, as far as he whom it concerned was able.”

This is not the only time that Hobbes either implies or explicitly states that the rules and causes of the fundamental political things can be known with the certainty of geometry. Hobbes states the following about geometry: It is the only science that has hitherto pleased God to bestow upon mankind. It is the mother of all natural science: geometry provides the model for Hobbes’s account of science, which begins with definitions, and then proceeds in an orderly manner to deduce the consequences of those definitions.

Hobbes establishes the relationship between geometry and civil philosophy through an analogy to the art of building. The art of building is taken to be akin to geometry, and not to playing games such as cards or tennis. The rules for making and maintaining commonwealths consist in certain rules, such as those of geometry. After demonstrating from both reason and scripture that the sovereign power can be as unlimited as men imagine it to be, Hobbes brings forth a counter argument from practice.

“The greatest objection is that of the practice; when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war? In those nations whose Commonwealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed but by foreign war, the subjects never
did dispute of the sovereign power. But howsoever, an argument from the practice of men that have not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes and nature of Commonwealths, and suffer daily those miseries that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be inferred that so it ought to be. The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths consisteth in certain rules, as doth arithmetic and geometry; not, as tennis play, on practice only: which rules neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure have hitherto had the curiosity or the method, to find out.”¹⁷⁸

Hobbes argued that civil philosophy is possible: that knowledge about politics is possible. He believes he has demonstrated this from reason and scripture. It therefore remains to be demonstrated from history or practice. The argument from history is that subjects have never or rarely acknowledged the power of the sovereign, which Hobbes claims is necessary for the establishment of a secure commonwealth, the mortal god Leviathan. The argument from practice is that politics is an eminently practical art and can only be learned through experience and practice.

Hobbes refutes the argument from history in the following way. Though it may be true that subjects have rarely acknowledged the power of the sovereign, it is true that in all lasting commonwealths the subjects never questioned the sovereign power. Never questioning the sovereign’s power and recognizing the supremacy of the sovereign power are not the same thing. The reason that subjects do not question the sovereign power is not necessarily that they recognize its power. It is perfectly plausible that they do not question the sovereign power because the sovereign power has done nothing questionable in the judgment of the subjects. However, one reason that subjects may not question the sovereign power is because they recognize the supreme authority of the sovereign. In fact, teaching that the sovereign power is supreme may be a more or less sure way that
the sovereign will not be questioned. Therefore, the fact that men have not recognized the sovereign power in the past does not mean that they should not (or will not) recognize it in the future.

The argument from practice is a straw man. Hobbes is not arguing that politics is not an art of practice; both building houses and tennis play are practical arts, but there is a science to building houses that is different from the science of tennis play. Earlier we examined Hobbes’s distinction between sapience and prudence. The difference between sapience and prudence was clarified through Hobbes’s analogy to fencing. In this regard there seems to be little difference between fencing and tennis. If there can be a sapience of fencing, there can be a sapience of tennis. Learning the sapience of either game requires first the knowledge of all possible scenarios, and then practice at implementing that knowledge. Though the art of ruling may or may not be like this kind of art, it is certain that the knowledge of making and maintaining commonwealths is not. Rather it is likened to the art of building houses. In short, Hobbes agrees that the art of maintaining commonwealths is a practical art, but he also argues that it is not a solely practical art: the practice of maintaining commonwealths can be informed by the science of maintaining commonwealths.

Hobbes clarifies the meaning of his architectural metaphor in a number of places scattered throughout *Leviathan*. Part of the matter of the commonwealth is man. Men will eventually desire with all of their hearts to form themselves into a lasting edifice.

“For men, as they become at last weary of irregular jostling and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts to conform themselves into one firm and lasting edifice; so for want both of the art of making fit laws to square their actions by, and also of humility and patience to suffer the
rude and cumbersome points of their present greatness to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able architect be compiled into any other than a crazy building, such as, hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.\textsuperscript{179}

All that is required is an able architect with the art of making laws “to square their actions by.” The matter is ready to form a commonwealth when it finally grows weary of “irregular jostling and hewing one another.” One of the tasks of the master architect is to prepare the material from which the artifice is to be made. Once the edifice is in place, a good law may be one that all can agree to, but the question remains as to what kind of laws are needed to square off the actions of men? The kind of law that is required to prepare the matter for the construction of a commonwealth is a natural law in general, and specifically a fifth law of nature.

“A fifth law of nature is complaisance; that is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections, not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity and irregularity of figure takes more room from others than itself fills, and for hardness cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of nature will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary, and for the stubbornness of his passions cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto.”\textsuperscript{180}

Laws of nature are different than civil laws because they are eternal. Laws of nature are not known from a proclamation of the sovereign, but are found out by reason.\textsuperscript{181} Though the study of the natural laws is the science of moral virtue, the essence of natural law can be made known to even the meanest capacity through the golden rule:
"do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself."  

The way that the sovereign is to form the matter of the commonwealth is through the education of the people in the rights of the sovereign authority. The sovereign is therefore well advised to educate his citizens in natural law, as well as the fundamental laws, and to that end he may pass a law concerning the education of citizens. Not only does Hobbes’s teaching of the state of nature and the natural laws compel men to conform themselves to the commonwealth, but it also compels men to recognize the need for the sovereign to have absolute power. Education in the natural law prepares the material to be formed, but what gives the edifice its form, and what maintains the edifice? This is found in those other laws which the sovereign should educate his subjects in, the fundamental laws.

"For a fundamental law in every Commonwealth is that which, being taken away, the Commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved, as a building whose foundation is destroyed. And therefore a fundamental law is that by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the sovereign, whether a monarch or a sovereign assembly, without which the Commonwealth cannot stand; such as is the power of war and peace, of judicature, of election of officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the public good. Not fundamental is that, the abrogating whereof draweth not with it the dissolution of the Commonwealth; such as are the laws concerning controversies between subject and subject."

The rights of the sovereign are what establish the basic structure of the commonwealth. The types of laws that are best determined in the same manner as the rules of games are laws that are not fundamental, i.e., those that concern disputes between subjects. The laws that are necessary for forming and maintaining the commonwealth are the laws that dictate the use of the power by the sovereign. However, no law can ultimately dictate the use of power by the sovereign because the sovereign has the power
to change the laws. The sovereign is ultimately ruled by his conscience and his knowledge of the science of natural justice.\footnote{186}

To complete his refutation of the great objection to the contention that civil philosophy is possible, Hobbes invokes another image using the savages of America. Hobbes provides this argument in the context of his discussion of those, similar to those that believe justice is a mere word, who believe “that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those essential rights which make sovereignty possible.”\footnote{187}

“Wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage people of America should deny there were any grounds or principles of reason so to build a house as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time and industry produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building is derived from principles of reason, observed by industrious men that had long studied the nature of materials, and the diverse effects of figure and proportion, long after mankind began, though poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute Commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: which, whether they come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of them, or be neglected by them or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little.”\footnote{188}

Part of the counter-argument that Hobbes makes against his own claim that rules can be discovered to sustain the rights of sovereign is that up to Hobbes’s publishing of them, none have been discovered. This is an argument from experience: an argument from prudence. All of the commonwealths we have knowledge of from history have relapsed into disorder, therefore there appears to be little realistic hope that this historical trend will cease. Hobbes compares this mistaken despair to the state of building among the savages of America. Simply because the Americans have never built or seen any
building built to last as long as the materials from which it is built, does not mean that it is impossible to build such an edifice. Egyptians know that buildings can be built to last as long as their materials because they have evidence that this is possible in the great wonders of the world, such as the great pyramids. As Egyptians have discovered the art of building, Hobbes has discovered the art of maintaining commonwealths.

Hobbes’s discovery/invention of civil philosophy is different from his discovery/invention in natural science. The key to the improvement of natural science is method. Method in natural science removes mankind’s reliance on individuals with strong reason and courageous curiosity. However, the case of civil science is different: mankind must rely on Hobbes’s discovery of the rules for making and maintaining commonwealths. Just as the science of geometry was the only science that appeared to be improved upon from ancient times by the efforts of men with strong reason, so too is civil philosophy improved by Hobbes. In geometry, no experimentation or observation is necessary to prove or disprove a hypothesis once the fundamental axioms are established. Civil philosophy, as with geometry, is analytic. The axioms of geometry are established from reason and intuition of spatial relationships. The axioms of civil philosophy are established from reading the heart of man to discover what he truly ought to hope from politics. Given the discovery of the true hope, and a proper reading of the nature of man, the necessary rules to realize this hope can be deduced.

This chapter has analyzed four types of politically significant ignorance that Hobbes outlines in chapter eleven of Leviathan. Our analysis suggests that the knowledge of making and maintaining commonwealths, as opposed to making laws, is analogous to architecture. The clues for understanding the implications of this are scattered throughout
Leviathan and an attempt has been made to gather these clues and make sense of them as a whole. This chapter is a continuation of our analysis of chapter eleven of Leviathan and shows how Hobbes means to change the actions of men by changing these four key opinions. The next chapter will analyze the fifth and final type of politically significant ignorance.
Chapter Six: The Seed of Religion

This chapter contains a textual exegesis of Hobbes’s account of the seed (or seeds) of religion in chapters eleven and twelve respectively of Leviathan. The aim of this exegesis is to discover the significance of Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion given what has already been uncovered about Hobbes’s intention in writing Leviathan.

To this point we have covered the first three parts of Hobbes’s account of manners. We now turn to the fourth. Hobbes, after having outlined four different politically significant types of ignorance, investigates those aptitudes of human nature potentially capable of overcoming ignorance. Ignorance is to be understood in distinction to scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of the causes necessary to bring about effects.\(^{190}\) The aptitudes of men capable of overcoming ignorance are those that lead men to investigate causes. On Hobbes’s account there are two possible reasons for investigating causes, two reasons for overcoming ignorance. The first is anxiety over future times, and the second is curiosity or the love of knowledge of causes.\(^{191}\) Regardless of the reason for investigating causes, a profound investigation of causes leads one to the belief in one eternal God.\(^{192}\) Therefore, ignorance is not only understood in distinction from scientific knowledge, but also in distinction from knowledge of God’s existence. A lack of curiosity about causes evokes in men a fear of the invisible powers they believe to be responsible for their good and evil fortunes. This is what Hobbes describes as the seed of religion in chapter eleven.\(^{193}\) Hobbes breaks off his consideration of the implications of the lack of curiosity to address the matter of the seed of religion in chapter twelve. He signals this new beginning with a new chapter specifically dedicated to religion (chapter
In examining men's lack of curiosity Hobbes comes to the conclusion that "Fear of things invisible is the natural Seed of that which every one in himself calleth Religion." With the seed of religion thus defined, Hobbes states that it is cultivated in different ways by different sorts of men to the end of ruling them. Given that it appears Hobbes has adequately covered the subject of the cause of the seed of religion in the final paragraphs of chapter eleven, and then has indicated his next topic to be its cultivators, one would think that chapter twelve would have begun with the subject of the cultivators of the seed of religion. Hobbes, however, does not consider this subject until the twelfth paragraph of chapter twelve. The first eleven paragraphs of chapter twelve comprise a second (or expanded) account of the seed of religion.

As noted in the previous chapter, chapter eleven of Leviathan consists of four parts. The first part, paragraphs one and two, establishes the axiom that men are 'first of all' seekers of power. The second part, paragraphs three through sixteen, examines the significance of the passions (and opinions) for peace and unity. The third part, paragraphs seventeen through twenty-three, examines some politically significant types of ignorance. The fourth part, paragraphs twenty-four through twenty-seven, examines anxiety, curiosity and the seed of religion. Anxiety and curiosity, the passions analyzed in this section, are of special interest because they are the passions specifically concerned with opinion. They are the passions that cause men to delve into notions of what was or was not, and what will or will not be. And as our examination of the other three sections of chapter eleven has shown, opinions about these matters are fundamental in determining the actions of men; in turn, this means that they are fundamental for understanding political life. This conclusion concerning the importance of opinions about what was and
was not, and what will be and will not be, will only be reinforced as we examine the seeds of religion more closely.

Regardless of why men investigate causes, the investigation leads men to the idea of God. Curiosity about causes, and the causes of causes, leads the curious one to the idea that there must be “some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal, which is it men call God.” This line of reasoning back to an eternal God would seem to work best when thinking in the abstract. We ask what caused object X and then ask what caused the cause of object X until we are left with either an uncaused cause or an infinite regress. Hobbes piously suggests that this investigation into causes leads to the former and not the latter of these possibilities. A profound investigation into causes leads to the idea of a creator.

Though curiosity may lead one to the idea of a creator, it is not clear, first, that it necessarily leads one to an account of creation, and second, if it does lead to an account of creation that it need be identical to the biblical account. At minimum Hobbes would have us believe that any apparent disagreement between science and revealed religion is apparent, and can be explained by either showing the science to be bad, or showing the interpretation of the revealed account to be false. Hobbes is clear that it “is impossible to have any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal...” If one were to take away the assumption of a created universe, and then proceed to investigate causes, it is unclear why any profound inquiry into cause must lead one to a belief in God. Why cannot profound inquiry into causes simply lead to an infinite regress, and thereby a belief that not a first creator, but the universe is eternal? Hobbes does not entertain this possibility, though some
commentators have noted that he seems to assume that the universe is eternal (in a few places) throughout *Leviathan*.²⁰⁰

For our purposes it is enough to note that Hobbes *seems* to subscribe to an account of creation in this passage, and seems to indicate that science, or at least profound inquiry into causes, can lead one rationally to a belief in God. In any case, if reason can lead the curious to a belief in God, reason cannot discover His nature.²⁰¹ Hobbes uses another simile to open our understanding on this point.

“For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there which men call fire and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of Him in his mind.”²⁰²

The structure of Hobbes’s explanatory simile is threefold. Profound inquiry into causes leads to a belief in one Eternal God. Hearing men speak of a fire, and then being warmed by the fire they speak of, leads one to know that the fire exists, but not to know the nature of the fire. Seeing the visible realm and its order leads one to believe there is some cause of nature’s order, but it does not lead one to know the nature of the cause of that order. I will consider each part of the analogy in turn and then the analogy as a whole.

In the first analogy, the capacity for sight is likened to the capacity for knowledge of God. Man is born blind, without the capacity to know God. If men do not have the capacity to know God, then how does he (or how can he) *rationally* know God exists? He
is led to a belief in God from listening to men speak. The human capacity for speech is what makes cognizance of God’s existence possible. Hobbes does not specify what it is that men are speaking about in the analogy. If they are talking about God, then we must assume for the time being it is because they were jointly engaged in a profound investigation of causes, and have come to the conclusion that there is one eternal God. Knowledge that there is one eternal God is like the knowledge that a blind man has of fire. He cannot see it, and therefore, he cannot know it as those who can see it know it. He can, however, feel the warmth of the fire, and know that there must be something that causes the warmth. Men are lead by other men through speech to the warmth of the fire.

What this means in terms of the analogy is unclear, because the content of the speech of the men who speak about the fire is unclear. It could be that these men are simply talking about God, a creator, or the causes of their fortunes. These men could be speaking about these matters because they are anxious about their futures. As already noted, anxiety is one impulse for investigating causes. Hearing men speak of their anxiety for a future will lead them to speculate about the causes of their good and evil fortune. If they are men who lack method or strong reason, they will be inclined to suppose some cause for their fortune, and that cause could be called God. Men can also be brought to feel God, as it were, from their profound investigation into causes. The thought of the one God is the heat of the fire. The fire itself must then analogously be God. One way that blind men gain knowledge of their surroundings is by touch. Knowledge of the spherical nature of a ball can be obtained by feeling it: sight is not necessary. However, if the blind man tries to know fire in this way, he will be burnt, and if he continues in the painful attempts at knowing the fire in this way, he will eventually be burnt to death. The most
we mortals can know is that God exists, and that He is powerful. This interpretation of the analogy suggests, however, that the fire represents God, and the heat of the fire represents our thought about God. This implies that God causes men's thought of God. This would only be true if we are correct that the men in the analogy are engaging in a profound investigation into causes, and if God causes that profound investigation (if God causes (or is the cause of) men's reason).  

Hobbes adds a second analogy, apparently to clarify the implications of the first analogy. This second analogy contrasts the men speaking to the sight of the visible world, and the feeling of the heat of the fire to the recognition of order in the world. Instead of being led to God through speech, as in the first analogy, men are now led by their recognition of the order of the visible universe. Recognition of the order of the universe is seemingly different from what Hobbes earlier called a profound investigation into causes. A profound investigation of causes is initially said to bring one to the belief in a first mover. Hobbes is here implying, through the contrast of the analogies, that a profound investigation into causes leads to the recognition of the order of the world, which in turn leads to the belief that something (God) orders the universe. It may be that a profound investigation into causes leads one to both conclusions: that God using his art on nature has made and continues to govern the world.

If God made the world, then our natural knowledge of him can only be discerned from that which he has made (the world, including us), and the fact that he did make it. Just as in archaeology, artefacts are examined for their possible uses so as to discern something about the needs of the people that designed and used them, so too do human beings examine the world to gain natural knowledge of God or first things. We are left
with investigating His art and nature. For Hobbes, we only understand the things we can make. Even if the order or function of a thing can be discovered, it is not known scientifically until the causes necessary to bring about that order are discovered. We must look at the universe as a product of God’s art, as serving some function. God created both the world as a whole, and its most admirable part, us. We must therefore ask, why did God make us? We can only judge this by what we do. We must discover what we are capable of, and given that, we must discover what we ought to do (if it turns out we ought to do anything). The first thing we must do then is to know others and ourselves so as to discover the purpose for which we are made. In trying to know ourselves, we find, in distinction to the other animals, that we have speech. As discussed in the first chapter, speech has both uses and abuses. In fact, it is because we are given speech that God and our purpose become a problem. Speech allows us to question our maker. Though speech is problematic for us, it also has the power to lead us to some knowledge of the existence of God (we hear men speaking and are led to the fire). This does not, however, prove rationally that there is any divine sanction for any given way of life: this does not help answer the problem: what are we to do? However, the simple fact that we are compelled to ask these questions, perhaps compelled to do so by Divine design, suggests that reason can discover the answers, and even if reason cannot, Hobbes suggests that reasoning from scripture can.205

Though reason can arrive at knowledge of one eternal God, not all people believe in one God. Hobbes therefore provides an explanation for the heathen belief in many gods. He suggests that the primary reason for belief in gods is from little or no investigation into natural causes.206 Without investigation into natural causes men have
little or no measure about what actually does or does not have the power to cause them
good or harm. Ignorance inclines men to fear. The scope of what the ignorant will hold as
possible causes of harm influences the scope and degree of what they will fear. More than
this, men will tend to praise and blame these powers as good or evil, as good or evil
fortune falls upon them. From ignorance, men are not only inclined to follow other men
who they suppose to be wiser than themselves, but they will also be inclined to worship
invisible powers. This fear and its consequence are what Hobbes calls the seeds of
religion. This is Hobbes's account of the seed of religion in terms of manners.

Hobbes provides another account of the seed of religion, or rather the seeds of
religion, in chapter twelve of Leviathan. The account of the seed of religion bridges
Hobbes's account of manners to his account of religion. As has already been mentioned,
Hobbes seemed to have already covered the subject of the seed of religion in the final
paragraphs of chapter eleven, and he already indicated his next subject to be the
cultivators of the seed of religion. The issue of the seed or origin of religion therefore
links chapters eleven and twelve together. Recall also that Hobbes account of manners,
chapter eleven of Leviathan, assesses mankind for their potential for peace and unity, and
the declaration of that assessment is found in chapter thirteen of Leviathan. Hobbes's
account of religion is therefore a continuation of his account of manners.

Chapter twelve does not argue for one seed of religion, but for four seeds of
religion. The argument begins as follows.

"Seeing there are no signs nor fruit of religion but in man only, there is no
cause to doubt but that the seed of religion is also only in man, and
consiseth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree
thereof, not found in other living creatures."
Hobbes does not give an example of a sign or fruit of religion here, though his discussion of the seed of religion in chapter eleven is consistent with his definition of religion in chapter six. "Fear of powers invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, RELIGION... And when the power imagined is truly as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION." The signs of religion must therefore be in human behaviours only explainable by a fear of invisible powers. Fear is a composite passion of opinion and aversion such that opinion determines the aversion. Hobbes's double account of the origin of the opinion that invisible powers are in fact responsible for good or evil fortune has already been discussed.

A sign generally speaking is an aspect of prudential judgment. It is not an infallible indicator of cause, but conjecture from experience that there appears to be some kind of relationship between certain events. A sign of religion would therefore be an event that argues for the existence of fearful invisible powers such as the worship of invisible powers. A sign, however, is different from a fruit. The term fruit implies not only a useful product, but also a useful and necessary product for human beings. Fruit is both useful and nourishing. One possible fruit of the seed of religion is that men who recognize it can "nourish, dress, and form it into laws, and add to it, of their own invention, any opinion of future causes events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others..."

Another possibility suggests itself upon the recognition of the congruence of the metaphor of the seed and the fruit with the agricultural metaphor of chapter forty-six. It may be that the seed of religion can be cultivated into science. Hobbes's claim that "it is
peculiar to the nature of man to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see, some more, some less, but all men so much as to be curious in search of the causes of their own good and evil fortune." Hobbes's use of the word 'peculiar' in this sentence would suggest, through contrast with the previous sentence, the difference between men and beasts is one of kind not degree. Earlier in this thesis it was suggested that men are different from beasts in men's capacity for speech. Speech makes one of the types of understanding, which is peculiar to man, possible. Beasts, as well as men, are capable of prudence. The type of inquisitiveness to which Hobbes is here referring must be scientific, or there must be another type of inquisitiveness that is peculiar to men. If this is not the case, then dogs, as well as men, would be capable of religion.

In chapter three of *Leviathan*, Hobbes describes another type of inquisitiveness, which is pre-scientific because it is not dependent on speech. After showing what kind of regulated trains of imagination are common to beasts and men, Hobbes states that "the other is when, imagining anything whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can by it be produced; that is to say, we image what we can do with it, when we have it." This kind of regulated train of imagination has clear parallels to Hobbes's definition of science in chapter five of *Leviathan*. If it is in this type of understanding that Hobbes grounds the seed of religion, then both religion and science have the same origin.

"Secondly, upon the sight of anything that hath a beginning to think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather sooner than later." Recalling our earlier discussion of the importance of the human recognition of beginnings for both science and prudence, we see that the seed of religion has a special
relationship to science (rather than prudence). Prudence observes the sequence of events and makes guesses about the causal relationship between those events. Prudence does not investigate cause with reason. Science upon the recognition of a beginning seeks with reason to discover the power(s) to bring that thing into being. If curiosity about beginnings is the natural basis of the seed of religion, it is ambiguous as to whether it is the human capacity for science or prudence that is responsible for it. The answers to the questions one asks upon the sight of a thing with a beginning can be answered in terms of prudence or science. Because Hobbes has indicated that the seed of religion must be peculiar to man and because there is neither sign nor fruit of religion in beasts, one is tempted to infer that Hobbes must be indicating something about the kind of understanding that is peculiar to man, in terms of science. Though this must be true in some sense, he need not mean here science as it is defined at 1.5.17, but rather the kind of regulated train of imagination mentioned above, which appears to be the origin of science.

"Thirdly, whereas there is no felicity of beasts but the enjoying of their quotidian of food, ease and lusts, as having no foresight of the time to come, for want to observation and memory of the order, consequence and dependence of the things they see, man observed how one event hath been produced by another, and rememberth in them antecedent and consequence, and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune are invisible) he supposes cause of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth, or trusted to the authority of other men, such as he thinks are his friends, and wiser than himself."219

Though the type of understanding that the capacity for prudence allows does not distinguish beasts from men, men's capacity to fear for their future does. Though men
enjoy some of the same delights as beasts, they also ‘enjoy’ knowing they are not only secure now, but in the future. This aspect of human nature was central to Hobbes’s account of the nature of human felicity, and his account of the power-seeking propensity of human beings.\(^{220}\) The premises that Hobbes used in his investigation of manners are reintroduced in the context of his account of religiosity, and thereby continues to flesh out their implications for human life.

The causes of good and evil fortune are invisible, and it is for this reason that man cannot assure himself of the causes of things. Prudence is not sufficient to assure men of the true causes of their good and evil fortune. Prudence is not sufficient to bring men to true religion.\(^{221}\) Without true religion men can never feel assured of their future good, they can never feel absolutely felicitous. As the agricultural metaphor discussed earlier in the thesis shows, most people are not suited to use reason to explore the possibilities for improving their future good. For progress to be made in science, a rigorous method is needed.

After clarifying these three aspects of human nature, on which the seed of religion is based, Hobbes explains how they combine to form the seed of religion as the fear of invisible powers. The first two aspects of human nature, peculiar to human nature, curiosity and the contemplation of beginnings, combine to form anxiety. The subject of anxiety was first introduced in chapter eleven, and it was described as an impetus to inquiring into causes, because knowledge of causes made men better able to order their present situation to their advantage.\(^{222}\) Anxiety therefore is not to be understood in distinction to curiosity, as it was ostensibly presented in chapter eleven, rather, anxiety is a species of curiosity. Man in an anxious state is constantly concerned with securing
himself against evil and procuring the goods he desires.\textsuperscript{223} One would be tempted to say that man in this state of anxiety fears that life may become “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”\textsuperscript{224} From the combination of these two aspects of human nature, Hobbes claims “that every man, especially those that are over provident, is in a state like that of \textit{Prometheus}.”\textsuperscript{225}

“For as \textit{Prometheus} (which, interpreted, is the \textit{prudent man}) was bound to the hill \textit{Caucasus} (a place of large prospect where an eagle, feeding on his liver, devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the night), so that man which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity, and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.”\textsuperscript{226}

The ostensible purpose of the Prometheus fable is to show a fearsome consequence of contemplating beginnings in combination with curiosity. Hobbes has already provided in chapter eleven, and provides again in chapter twelve, what he believes to be the rational consequence of the contemplation of beginnings: recognition of the existence of one omnipotent God. The Prometheus fable aims to show a possible conflict between prudence (curiosity) and the human concern for safety. The Prometheus fable is meant to signal to the reader a significant potential conflict within the human psyche concerning the impulses of the rational part of the soul.

Traditionally, Prometheus (literally, fore-thought, not prudent man as Hobbes interprets it) represents the protector and benefactor of mankind. Some accounts even claim Prometheus was the maker of mankind.\textsuperscript{227} The story behind Prometheus’ predicament is that Zeus, the king of gods punished Prometheus. Hesiod gives no account of the justification for Prometheus’ punishment.\textsuperscript{228} Hercules frees Prometheus from
Caucasus, with Zeus’ consent so that the glory of Hercules would increase on earth. As Hesiod states, “the gods keep hidden from men the means of life” and the rest of the tale concerning Prometheus, is a tale of a titanic attempt to give men the means of life.229 The first episode is Prometheus’ attempt to trick Zeus into accepting the worst part of a sacrifice. Zeus in his rage at Prometheus’ trick keeps the power of fire from mankind. Prometheus, still defiant, and with the aid of Athena, steals the secret of fire and gives it to mankind. Zeus eventually discovers this treachery and devises a revenge on mankind. Prometheus, to protect mankind, captured many great ills, such as plagues and earthquakes in a jar, which he and his brother Epimetheus (literally, after-thought) kept. Prometheus then warned his brother not to accept any gifts from Zeus knowing that Zeus wished to make trouble for Prometheus and mankind. Zeus ordered that Pandora (literally, all-given) be made with all of the god’s help, and given as a gift to Epimetheus. Pandora was made extremely beautiful, though foolish and mischievous. Epimetheus forgot his brother’s command and accepted the gift. Pandora, in turn, opened the jar and released upon mankind all of the ills which Prometheus had captured. The only thing remaining in the jar was hope.230

Prometheus in his striving against Zeus put mankind in its perilous state, forever toiling to maintain its existence. Prometheus, in Hobbes’s depiction, represents mankind in this state and Hobbes’s interpretation of Prometheus’ name as prudent man suggests that Hobbes attributes mankind’s fate to the inability of prudence to provide mankind with the security it desires. Hobbes’s account of the failings of prudence has already been noted earlier in the thesis, so it leaves to be discovered what else this fable is supposed to show.
The fable of Prometheus, leaving aside the tradition and focusing on Hobbes’s actual presentation of it, contrasts the state of Prometheus during the day to his state at night. First, it is the man who “continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth,” is like Prometheus: in an anxious state and over provident. This is the description of man Hobbes uses to introduce the Prometheus fable. Hobbes’s interpretation of the fable, however, drops all concern about procuring the goods. The man who “looks too far before him, in care of future time, hath his heart all day long gnawed on by the fear of violent death, poverty or other calamity.”\textsuperscript{231} The Prometheus fable is therefore not like the agriculture analogy, which showed the superiority of science over prudence in procuring benefits. The Prometheus fable is not concerned with showing where the hope of mankind should properly be placed; rather it shows the power of fear, the power of “aversion with an opinion of hurt from an object.”\textsuperscript{232} Mankind’s anxiety comes from ignorance about the causes of good and evil fortune in the world. If he does not know the causes, he cannot defend himself against them.

Hobbes’s interpretation of the fable of Prometheus contrasts man awake and anxious to man in the peaceful state of sleep. The only repose for the over-provident man would seem to be sleep. In chapter two of \textit{Leviathan}, however, Hobbes deals with the human capacity to dream and the relationship between dreaming and the waking world.\textsuperscript{233} Sleep could just as probably, if not more probably, bring bad dreams, nightmares. Unlike Hobbes’s account of the state of nature, Hobbes’s account of the Prometheus fable makes things appear better than they actually are.

In explaining the Prometheus fable, Hobbes switches from the liver of
Prometheus to the heart of the human being. As outlined in the first three chapters of *Leviathan*, the heart and the brain are the two centres which receive information from the senses. The heart represents what is dear to mankind. Our earlier investigation into Hobbes's account of the good suggested that bodily health is the only true good as end for mankind. As our earlier discussion of Hobbes's ethics showed, it is the relationship between opinion and passion, or men's hopes and fears, which determines the goods they will actively pursue. The Promethean man is gripped with an irrational fear. Reason, as Hobbes indicates, would not lead one to anxiety, but to knowledge of the existence of one omnipotent God. In terms of the Platonic psychology, the blotted and confounded heart of men represents the spirited part of the soul: the part of the soul disposed to anger, fear, hope, envy and pride. The Promethean man is a man whose soul is ruled by its spirited part. The particular ordering of the soul, the spirit above the rational part, the heart above the brain, is the arch nemesis of *Leviathan*, that King over all the sons of Pride. It could be said to be a Herculean task to overcome this type of man and establish a sure and secure rule.

This state of anxiety and fear is also a state of ignorance. "This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes (as it were in the dark) must have needs for object something." The gentiles gave this object the various names of their gods; it is in this sense that the poets are correct in saying that the gods are created by fear. Though fear is the origin of the gods for the gentiles, the "acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their virtues and operations." This argument gives the impression that in the rational understanding of God he is eternal,
infinite and omnipotent. This, however, is deceptive. It is only true that it is easier to account for the acknowledgment of one God from curiosity than from fear. This does not mean that the acknowledgment of one God cannot come from fear. The rhetorical effect of this passage is to associate ignorance with polytheism, and monotheism with reason. Its message, however, is that monotheism is congruent with an investigation into natural causes.

Hobbes lays out a more complicated version of the seed of religion. While the first account given in chapter eleven spoke of the seed of religion, chapter twelve speaks of the four natural seeds of religion. Each of the four seeds of religion is a consequence of Promethean men. The four natural seeds of religion are: opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and lastly, taking things causal for prognostics. I will briefly examine all four.

The first part of the seed, opinions of ghosts, comes from the recognition that the causes of good and evil fortune are invisible. Upon the recognition that the causes of good and evil fortune are invisible, man naturally seeks to understand the nature of those invisible powers. Men wish to understand what it meant by an invisible power. Hobbes frames the problem here in terms of the second politically significant type of ignorance outlined in chapter eleven, which is ignorance of the signification of words. Men speak as if spirits and ghosts are incorporeal, yet at the same time they insist that these spirits can affect the material world. For Hobbes this is a contradiction; if the spirits exist, they must corporeal, because all that exists has body.

The second part of the seed of religion is ignorance of secondary causes. Because the causes of good and evil fortune cannot be seen, men are prone to guess at the cause of
their fortune from inferences from sequences of events, or from details of those events. One of the examples Hobbes uses to explain himself is the Athenian desire that another Phormio lead a battle, because the Phormio of the past was successful. Men in this case are not using their reason to determine the causal dependence of the name Phormio to military success, but rather they are simply guessing the cause of military success to be in the name of a general. This second seed of religion is a consequence of the third type of ignorance Hobbes discusses in chapter eleven. The third part of the seed of religion is grounded in the human capacity for reverence and worship. People are devoted to that which they fear, and as such, have a tendency to honour what they fear in the only way they know how, the way they honour each other. This of course is irrational, as Hobbes later outlines in his account of the proper way to honour God. The psychological grounding for this irrational practice was examined in our investigation of chapter eleven’s account of the ignorance of causes in general. If people do not understand something they will tend to listen to an authority they trust.

The fourth and final seed is taking things causal for prognostics. Men have a propensity to prognosticate about the future from past events on the basis of one of two events. More than this they will also trust to the prognostications of those they trust. This seed of religion recalls our discussion of the relationship between opinion, hope and fear. If men are willing to rely on spurious evidence or the opinion of another who they trust, they will be at the mercy of the insufficiency of such prudence, or the good-will of those whom they trust.

There are three major conclusions to be drawn from this chapter. The first is that
Hobbes's account of the seed and seeds of religion are part of Hobbes's account of politically significant ignorance and therefore apart of his account of manners. Hobbes's chapter on religion must therefore be read as part of the argument moving towards Hobbes's state of nature. The second major conclusion is that the psychological basis for the seed of religion is the same as the psychological basis for science. This suggests that the problem posed by the ignorance of causes, which leads to the seed of religion can be addressed through the cultivation of science. This is most clearly seen in the relationship of Hobbes's account of the seeds of religion to various doctrines presented in throughout *Leviathan.*
Chapter Seven: Hobbes and the Cultivators of the Seed of Religion

In paragraph twelve of chapter twelve, Hobbes returns to the subject that he introduced in the last paragraph of chapter eleven:

“...those that have observed [the seed of religion and] have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws, and to add to it, of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of the future events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.”²⁴⁰

The fruit, which the cultivation of the seed of religion has born in Hobbes’s time, has been so diverse that the ceremonies of one religion look strange to another.²⁴¹ Along with the diversity of ceremonies, there also exists a variety of opinions about the causes of good and evil fortune. Hobbes highlights the extent to which the seed of religion can be cultivated to absurd levels through his account of the diversity of the kinds of divinities in the religion of the Gentiles. In Hobbes’s view, the religion of the Gentiles and the Christian religion represent the fruits which have hitherto been possible to cultivate from the seed of religion. Hobbes gives the appearance of wishing to restrict the cultivation of the seed of religion to the production of the Christian religion. There may be a sense in which this is true in the final analysis; however, contrary to Hobbes’s efforts, his laws of nature and his account of the nature of government are not obviously congruent with revealed religion. Also, as the discussion of the seed of religion shows, there is a potential conflict between what science determines to be the truth about ghosts and secondary causes, and what the established Christian philosophy, as based on the texts of Aristotle, maintain as true. Hobbes’s account of the seed of religion is such that
not only religion, but also science can be cultivated. The use of the agricultural metaphor from chapter forty-six also suggests this connection. The search for true religion (the search to imagine the invisible powers as they are) is a legitimate goal within the principles of Christian religion as set out in *Leviathan.* Hobbes, however, also makes it clear that there should be no contradiction between faith and science. Invoking the famous dispute between the Church and Galileo, Hobbes states:

> "And every day it appeareth more and more that years and days are determined by the motions of the earth. Nevertheless, men that have in their writings but supposed such doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for and against it, have been punished for it by the authority ecclesiastical. But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true religion? That cannot be, if they be true."  

Comments such as these about the relationship between true religion and science, as well as those comments about the truth of his laws of nature from scripture, demonstrate that Hobbes’s intention was, at the very least, to make his doctrine *seem* orthodox. His doctrine must seem orthodox because on Hobbes’s own terms, at least part of his account is novel. He writes both in the Dedicatory Letter and in the Review and Conclusion about the effect of his new doctrines concerning Christian commonwealths. The evidence for suspecting that Hobbes believes his teaching concerning all commonwealths is a novel teaching has already been cited and discussed.

Hobbes gives two accounts of the founding and the causes of dissolution of commonwealths in *Leviathan.* The chapters in *Leviathan* usually considered to cover the subject of the founders of commonwealths are chapters seventeen through twenty. The chapter usually considered as being Hobbes’s full account of the dissolution of commonwealths is chapter twenty-nine. Nowhere in these chapters does Hobbes
explicitly give an account of how the education of the citizens of *Leviathan* is to be conducted. In chapter thirty of *Leviathan* Hobbes indicates that the proper place for the study of his book is the university, because it is there that the youth and the future rulers of the commonwealth can most easily be taught it. But many of Hobbes's doctrines, such as the doctrine of the state of nature and the natural laws, are not effective in the institution of the commonwealth unless a great portion of the population are educated in the truth of them. In chapter thirty, Hobbes provides an account of how the laws of nature can be shown to be congruent with the Ten Commandments. This account could serve as a basis to teach the public about the rights of sovereignty through the institution of the Church.

The seeds of religion "can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them by them by the culture of such men as for such purposes are in reputation." Hobbes in chapter twenty of *Leviathan* suggests that the commonwealth "can be secured at least from perishing of internal diseases." This implicitly leaves only foreign invasion as a possible cause of the dissolution of the great Leviathan. If the seeds of religion can never be abolished from human nature and all of the domestic problems of the commonwealth can be overcome leaving only foreign invasion as the cause of the dissolution of the commonwealth, then Hobbes must have found a way to overcome the problem of the seeds of religion. The second account of the founding of commonwealths in *Leviathan* is located in chapter twelve. This account, unlike the later accounts, seems to be concerned solely, not with founding institutions, but with the relationship between the characteristics of the sovereign and the stability of the commonwealth.
Hobbes cites two different kinds of men who cultivate the seeds of religion; Those who would have nourished and ordered the seeds of religion by God’s commandment, and those who have done so by their own invention. Both have done it to make men more “apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society.” Though Hobbes claims their ends to be identical, he places the former of these two cultivators under the subject of divine politics, and the latter under human politics. Hobbes’s prime example to represent those that have founded religious commonwealths in human terms are the founders of the religions of the gentiles. Those that have endeavoured to do so by Divine command are Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour. In chapter twelve, Hobbes outlines how the gentiles were successful in founding their commonwealths.

Hobbes gives an extended account of the how the gentiles dressed and nourished each of the four seeds of religion. Here it will be shown how various arguments throughout Leviathan demonstrate how Hobbes nourished and dressed the four seeds of religion for his own ends of making men more apt for peace, laws, obedience, charity and civil society. First, we shall consider opinions about ghosts, or more specifically, opinions about the powers that cause the good and evil fortunes of men. Hobbes’s account of science gives a clear account of what is to be considered real. The idea of incorporeal substances is shown to be absurd. In fact, Hobbes goes so far as to say that all that exists in the universe is corporeal.

“The world (I mean not the earth only, that denominates the lovers of it "worldly men," but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body is likewise body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is no part of the
universe: and because the universe is all that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere. Nor does it follow from hence that spirits are nothing: for they have dimensions and are therefore really bodies; though that name in common speech be given to such bodies only as are visible or palpable; that is, that have some degree of opacity: but for spirits, they call them incorporeal, which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed to God Himself; in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best His nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him.\textsuperscript{248}

Hobbes’s materialism is in this way linked to his political doctrine. The causes of peoples’ good and evil fortune cannot be the gods, but the substance of the world, nature. It cannot be the gods acting on nature because what can act on nature must be part of nature. Thus we come to face Hobbes’s infamous atheism. Though Hobbes insists that we ought to attribute existence to God, it is unclear how we can rationally do so in this context. Hobbes also denies the otherworldly in other ways with his materialism. He cannot, like Plato, insist that the world of the idea or form of a material thing that has extension and dimension is more real than the material thing itself.\textsuperscript{249} Hobbes’s materialism gives him a way of refuting all attempts to appeal to powers that are not of this world. He also uses this doctrine in his account of miracles, which will be considered in our investigation of the causes of change in religion.

The second seed of religion is related to the first and can be grasped under the name ignorance of second causes. This seed of religion is entirely due to a lack of science. With method and time, science will inform our experience. The opinions we hold about the causal relationship between events will be grounded in a science concerned only with the material of this world. Science will eventually prove its superiority in prudential terms. The works of a science dedicated to power will prove to prudential judgement that the scientific account is the true account. Hobbes’s account of science
gives a way of working through the problem of secondary causes.

The third seed of religion is devotion to what men fear. Men will either attempt to honour the divinity they believe caused their calamity in an attempt to curry favour with it, or they will trust to one they believe wiser than themselves. Men’s fear of natural calamities, such as disease, starvation, and poverty can be overcome once public opinion is formed by science. Hobbes’s science, though in his time considered a small power, will with the progress of science become a big power capable of protecting or caring for men afflicted with bad fortune. Men will honour and be devoted to those who have scientific power. Hobbes’s sovereign, in turn, is charged with addressing calamities caused by human agency. The threat of the state of nature should prove fearful enough to ensure that most of one’s own subjects follow the law. To guard against the dangers of other commonwealths, the sovereign will do well to ensure that his commonwealth is prepared for war.

The fourth seed of religion is a mistake common to men. It comes from the tendency to mistake causal things for prognostics. Again Hobbes’s science, both political and natural, is equipped to provide defence against this seed of religion. It is useful for the sovereign to keep this seed of religion in mind in that it will give him a sense of what people may believe are the causes of given events.

The founders of the religion of the gentiles, or those who were only considering keeping the people in peace and obedience, were sure to follow three principles to secure their regimes. All took the care: “first to imprint in their minds a belief that those precepts which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god or other
spirit (or else that they themselves were of higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might be more easily received).”

Hobbes’s arguments for the congruency between the findings of natural science and religion have already been indicated. The second half of *Leviathan* takes as its task the demonstration of the congruence of his account of natural law with the revealed religion.

“Secondly, they have had a care to make it believed that the same things are displeasing to the gods which are forbidden by the laws.”

Hobbes’s accounts of sin later demonstrate his use of this principle in his own teaching.

“Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals, by which they were to believe the anger of the gods might be appeased, and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness, earthquakes, and each man’s private misery came from the anger of the gods and their anger from neglect of their worship, or forgetting or the mistaking of some point of the ceremonies required.”

This is more problematic in terms of Hobbes’s civil science; he seldom speaks of ceremonies in *Leviathan*. He does, however, speak at length about law and obedience to law. Hobbes notes that the peoples’ disobedience to the laws could be cited by the sovereign as a cause for the misfortunes of his subjects. This would not place blame on the sovereign, but rather on the criminals of the commonwealth.

Hobbes’s account of the causes for change in religion is also useful for understanding how sovereigns secure the obedience of their subjects. Changes in religion come about by changes in peoples’ opinions. The best way to maintain religious opinions in the people is for the sovereign to guard against the possible causes of change to those
opinions. Hobbes outlines four failures the sovereign must guard against if he is maintain
the faith of the people in the doctrines of religion; they can be understood under four
headings: wisdom, love, sincerity, and divinity.

   The first failure “which taketh away the reputation of wisdom in him that formeth
a religion (or addeth to it when it is already formed) is the enjoining in belief in
contradictories; for both parts of contradiction cannot possibly be true…” A number of
different faculties and powers are considered by Hobbes to have the appearance of
wisdom: prudence, fear, good success, and eloquence. Because the reputation
for wisdom derives from the appearance of wisdom, Hobbes is counselling more than just
teaching logically consistent doctrines. The sovereign must be eloquent, inspire fear, and
enjoy good success in his actions. Later Hobbes states that the enjoining of
contradictories is an argument for ignorance. This is the case even if “he shall propound
as from revelation supernatural; which revelation a man may indeed have of many things
above but nothing against natural reason.” The question would seem to change from
concern that contradictions will be discovered in doctrine to that which can properly be
above natural reason. Of course this cannot be determined by reason, so it is unclear what
the effect of Hobbes’s caveat amounts to: either it means that one need not worry about
contradictions at all, so long as are clearly signalled to be above reason, or there is a
rational criterion for determining what is above reason, which is to contradict the notion
that it is above reason. If nothing above reason can be against natural reason then it seems
that the sovereign ought best endeavour to remove all contradictions from his doctrines,
even those above reason. The only doctrines Hobbes indicates to be properly above
reason are the nature of God as omnipotent, eternal and infinite; the mysteries of the
Christian religion,\textsuperscript{263} and many things in God’s word (though in the same paragraph Hobbes states that natural reason is the undoubted word of God).\textsuperscript{264}

The second failure “which taketh away the reputation for sincerity is the doing or saying of such things as appear to be signs that what they require other men to believe is not believed by themselves...”\textsuperscript{265} This is scandalous because vices, such as injustice, cruelty, profanes, avarice, and luxury, argue against the sincerity of the sovereign and undermine religion. Worse than this, if the sovereign is not punished by the invisible power for violating the precepts of the invisible power, how are the people to be expected to fear the invisible power and expect that it will punish lesser discretions?\textsuperscript{266} Sincerity, along with wisdom and humility, Hobbes later calls the first elements of power.\textsuperscript{267} Hobbes’s gives the following response to those who would wish to distance themselves from his teaching. Hobbes implies in this quote that if you disagree with what he says, it is best to refute him by saying that he is foolishly being honest.

“If notwithstanding this [his doctrine concerning the Christian Religion], you find my labour generally decried, you may be pleased to excuse yourself, and say, I am a man that love my own opinions, and I think all true that I say.”\textsuperscript{268}

The third failure “which taketh away the reputation of love is the being detected of private ends...”\textsuperscript{269} Hobbes is clear to indicate that love, in this sense, is to mean not only affection, but also action for the good of other people. The people must believe that the founder or leader is labouring for their good. Hobbes’s civil philosophy, as it is presented in \textit{Leviathan}, aims to accomplish exactly this, the benefit of mankind.\textsuperscript{270} This is argued not only in \textit{Leviathan}, through its arguments about science and the benefits of a properly established sovereign, but also in \textit{De Corpore} where the utility of civil science is
most clearly argued.

The fourth failure is when the founder or the leader claims to be divinely inspired, he must prove his divine calling by the operation of miracles. This category is treated under another four sub-categories: miracles, justice, virtue of priests, and labour for the happiness of the people.

The necessity of a miracle to secure the inward consent of the hearts is the first subject that Hobbes treats in the matter of securing the peoples’ belief in the supernatural character of the founder. Hobbes is quick to state that miracles are only needed to secure inward consent concerning the supernatural characteristics of a founder, not those that can be clearly attributed to nature. This is important, given the uncertain force of Hobbes’s claims that certain doctrines of the Christian religion are above reason. Those aspects of Christian doctrine that are above reason will only be inwardly consented to if these supernatural signs or miracles can be given. Hobbes does not dwell on the significance of this claim for Christianity, but he dedicates chapter thirty-seven, in the section dealing with Christian commonwealths, to “Miracles and their Use.”

Hobbes begins the chapter by stating that miracles signify “the admirable works of God; and therefore, they are also called wonders.” From this understanding of the signification of miracles, Hobbes claims that to understand miracles it is necessary to first to recognize what works invoke wonder in men. Of the events that invoke wonder in men, some are merely strange or rare, and others cannot be imagined to have been produced by natural means. Events, which in the past have evoked wonder, cease to evoke wonder once a probable natural cause for the event is found. That which qualifies as a miracle is therefore dependent on the experience and the knowledge of the one
witnessing the event. Men who are generally ignorant of natural causes, or men of little experience in the world, will be more apt to identify strange events as miracles. Men of this sort are easily abused by simple tricks. Hobbes uses four examples to demonstrate his point; I will only comment on his first. Eclipses used to be considered miracles, but once astronomy discovered that eclipses were predictable, they ceased to be a sign of the divine will concerning any given human action. What this example shows is that the realm of what is considered possible and impossible can be diminished through the promotion of science. By reducing the range of phenomena that people could consider impossible, the people become easier to rule through purely natural reason. However, it then also becomes more difficult to rule men through precepts claimed to be above reason.

To further demonstrate his point about miracles, Hobbes cites two biblical passages, each of which, upon reflection, casts the role of miracles into new light. The first example cited is from Exodus, during Moses’s forty-day absence from his newly liberated people on Mount Sinai. The people Moses had liberated from Egypt had all witnessed the miracles, which led to their liberation (the parting of the Red Sea for example), but without a skilled leader to maintain the faith, they were no longer satisfied to worship the one God, but slipped into idolatry and worshipped a golden calf. Faith, in this instance, was restored when Moses returned from Sinai bearing the Ten Commandments. The Bible does not state that any miracle that the people could observe occurred upon Moses’ return. The people were brought back to the worship of God by Moses’ power as a leader and not by miracle. The Lord only spoke to Moses and not the people.
The second example is from Judges. This example is said by Hobbes to show that because all who witnessed the great miracles of the exodus from Egypt had died, the people lapsed into worship of Baal. Though this is the explanation given in the Bible for the loss of the peoples’ faith, it does not seem to be congruent with the explanation of the worship of the golden calf. All who worshipped the calf witnessed the miracles and yet they still lapsed into idolatry. This passage would seem to highlight our reading that it is not the miracles, but the quality of the leader, which matters in maintaining the peoples’ faith. This point can be seen in Judges if one consults the passages immediately prior to the one cited by Hobbes. These passages emphasize the life and the death of Joshua who was the leader of the Jews.

Hobbes cites another biblical passage to prove his next point about maintaining the peoples’ faith. Hobbes claims this section is meant to show that the administration of justice should be done fairly, and judges should not receive bribes and judge unjustly. Hobbes interpretation of the story is that it was the unjust sons of Samuel who caused the people to dispose God and replace him with a king in the manner of nations. This is slightly different from how the Bible presents the story. It was not the people that demanded the change of rule, but rather a group of elders. Though the elders’ request angered Samuel, he prayed unto the Lord, and the Lord replied that the people have not rejected Samuel, but rather they have rejected God. God tells Samuel to speak to the people and describe for them the manner of the kings of nations. Samuel follows God’s command and tells the people about the all the unpleasant actions the kings of nations perform. The people responded that they still wished to have a king,
"That we may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us; and go out before us, and fight our battles.

(21) And Samuel heard all the words of the people, and he rehearsed them in the ears of the Lord.

(22) And the Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto their voice, and make them a king. And Samuel said unto the men of Israel, Go ye every man unto his city."

The implication of Hobbes's phrase, 'if justice fails, faith fails', would seem to be that the Lord sanctions the peoples' desire to rule themselves without any divine intervention. Though it appeared to be failure of the sons of Samuel that caused the people (or the elders) to desire a king in the manner of nations, this is not God's interpretation. God claims the cause of their unrest is that they have lost faith in Him, not Samuel.

The third and fourth elements essential to the maintenance of the faith of the people are related. The third addresses the planting of the Christian religion or the transition from the religion of the gentiles, and the last addresses the power of the pope. I will leave the fourth and address some of the particulars of the third.

The success of the planting of the Christian Religion is related to some of the mistakes of the religion of the gentiles. The growth of the Roman Empire allowed the apostles and the evangelists to preach Christian doctrine in places where the religion of the gentiles once held power. Part of the success of that preaching is due "to the contempt into which for the priests of gentiles of that time had brought on themselves, by their uncleanness, avarice, and juggling between princes." Hobbes is invoking a lack of sincerity and love as the reasons for the weakness of the religion of the gentiles. Hobbes goes further than this and even suggests that the abolition of the Church from England was 'partly' for the same reason. The cause of this third loss of the faith of the people is
the failure of the virtue of the priests.

In this chapter I briefly examined the four seeds of religion and have shown how Hobbes's account of science disenchants the world. If the world is disenchanted, the only things that are to be feared are corporeal and the Leviathan is the supreme earthly power. The second part of this chapter examined the causes of the change in religion. Hobbes argues that if the founders or the rulers of a religion fail in any of these aspects his rule will fail. This account was shown to be a demonstration to the sovereign that he best rule using three of the four principles. The four qualities are wisdom, love, sincerity and divinity. The analysis shows that Hobbes's treatment of these qualities indicate that the sovereign best appear to possess wisdom through consistent policy, love for his subjects by doing good for them, and sincerity by following the laws he expects his subjects to obey. The sovereign must be eloquent, inspire fear, and enjoy good success in his actions. Lastly the chapter analyzed the three causes of change in religion and has shown how Hobbes's civil philosophy guards against each.

You will recall that we introduced our investigation into Hobbes's account of the seed of religion and its cultivators by framing the question in terms of Hobbes's treatment of Christianity. We have sought in this thesis to understand how Hobbes might have thought it possible to effect the 'radical change in orientation' that Leo Strauss suggests is necessary for the success of Hobbes's political philosophy. The three possibilities Strauss put forward were disenchanting the world, dissemination of scientific knowledge, or popular enlightenment. All three of these solutions affect men's opinions about what will or will not be, or what was and was not. Hobbes's understanding of the relationship between passion and opinion, as understood in chapters eleven and twelve,
account for the possibility of changing peoples’ opinions in the way Strauss suggests is necessary. More than this, the power of modern science and its orientation to the possibility of miracles restricts the possibility of cultivating the seed of religion as long as science is held in public esteem. The dissemination of science, understood as Hobbes understands it, has the effect of disenchanting the world. The particulars of exactly how this is accomplished with respect to the doctrines of the Christian religion can be seen, for example, in Strauss’ account of Hobbes’s Christian theology. The last possibility is the possibility of popular enlightenment. What exactly this would mean for Hobbes in the context of the interpretation I have proposed is unclear. To this point in our investigation we have examined the relationship between the passions of men and their opinions. Though we have given some account of what Hobbes means by reason in Leviathan, this has by no means been investigated to the point where we can draw any firm conclusions about the possibility of popular enlightenment. This investigation would take us to a more detailed consideration of Hobbes’s account of sense, imagination, language, reason, science and the state of nature.

The thesis also spends some space trying to understand the structure of the first part of Leviathan so as to understand Hobbes’s argument. Hobbes’s account of manners and religion in chapters eleven and twelve of Leviathan are to be read as an argument whose conclusion is stated as the state of nature. It is argued that chapters eleven and twelve of Leviathan contain a reading of mankind to assess whether mankind is capable of living in peace. Men’s actions are determined by their passions and opinions such that it is their opinions that ultimately govern their actions. This makes Hobbes’s civil philosophy possible. Men also must be understood, in the first place, as seekers of power.
It was discovered that the greatest of human powers are created through confederations of men. The political problem is then confederations of men and not the war of all against all that the state of nature presents. The state of nature then becomes the solution to the political problem rather than the problem itself.

This thesis has also argued that *Leviathan* contains the knowledge that is required to rule and nation and should be read taking this aim in mind. The thesis attempts to define the character of that knowledge in distinction to the true moral science as embodied in the natural laws. Briefly, the end for which the sovereign should rule is peace because peace is the necessary condition for bodily health, which is the only good common to all men. The science of moral virtue takes this good as its end and seeks the means to that end. The kings do require the science of moral virtue but they also require the science of making and maintaining commonwealths. This art is analogous to architecture and consists of the knowledge of which laws are fundamental. It was discovered that the sovereign ought to learn a number of other kinds of knowledge, including eloquence and military skill. Lastly, the sovereign ought to make his subjects believe that he is wise, sincere and that he loves his subjects.
Works Cited


Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated, with notes and an interpretive essay, by Allan Bloom. New York,


Endnotes

1 See for example, Johnston, page 114-115 and Strauss, page 71
3 See the first section of Seaman for his assessment of the current literature on Hobbes and Christianity.
4 In addition to the authors already mention see also Mansfield, Harvey. “Hobbes and the science of Indirect Government.”
5 Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History, page 198.
6 The chapters in the three main presentations of his philosophy are, chapter 11 of part one of the Elements of Law, chapter 11 of De Homine, and of course chapter twelve of Leviathan.
7 Leviathan, 1.17.13
8 Leviathan, Introduction
9 Leviathan, Introduction.5. Unless other wise stated all citations refer to the Curley edition of Leviathan. The first number in the citation is the section, the second is the chapter number, the third is the paragraph number.
10 1.4.3
11 4.46.16 and 4.46.17
12 In addition to the sections cited above, sections 1.4.6 through 1.4.25 plus his account of the causes of absurdity in science at 1.5.8 through 1.5.16 are the core of Hobbes teaching concerning the role of words in language.
13 1.4.1
14 1.4.3 and 1.4.13
15 1.4.3
16 1.2.10 and 1.3.11
17 1.8.8
18 1.13.10
19 Introduction and 1.4.13
20 1.4.12
21 1.4.13
22 1.5.16
23 1.5.7
24 1.46.11
25 1.4.13
26 1.4.13
27 See for example, part two of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, Strauss’ On a Forgotten kind of Writing, and the prologue of Craig’s The War Lover.
28 Introduction, 5
29 Republic, 360c-d
30 Socrates in the Phaedrus tells Phaedrus that he follows the maxim of the Delphic Oracle, to know himself, rather than to spend his time trying to prove and disprove m irrelevant things. The inscription at the Delphic Oracle keeps Socrates pious (Phaedrus, 229c-b). See also the Apology of Socrates (especially: 20d-24d and 28d-32d).
31 See Curley’s footnote on the Sydney and Francis Godolphin, as well as the ‘Review and Conclusion’.
32 Leviathan, dedicatory letter
33 The English civil war was also the reason for publishing the third part of his Elements of Philosophy, De Cive, before the other two supposedly prior parts. This does not mean, however, that the contents of De Cive are only relevant to the English Civil war, for Hobbes also claimed (in the Epistle Dedicatory of his Elements of Philosophy) that his De Cive marked the birth of civil philosophy. De Cive should therefore be read as both the solution to the English civil war in
partial, and the solution to the problem of the lack of a science of the rights and duties of citizens.

[34] See also Craig, *The War Lover*, chapter one. There is evidence in the *Republic* that it is also set in a turbulent time in Athenian history. The setting of the dialogue, the Piraeus, which is the home of the Athenian navy, suggests a place significant for both the military and trade of the Athenian Empire. Cephalus, whose home is the setting for most of the action of the dialogue, is an arms dealer. This evidence is enough to plausibly suggest that both *Leviathan* and the *Republic* were written with the problem of war in mind. It is also worth mentioning that two brothers Glaucon and Adiemantus’ feature centrally in the Republic.

[35] 4.46.11

[36] See Mathie’s *Reason and Rhetoric in Hobbes’s Leviathan* about the role of the ship of state image from the *Republic* for understanding the relationship between reason and rhetoric in *Leviathan*, as well as Mathie’s ‘*till Sovereigns be Philosophers*’: *Politics and Philosophy in Hobbes’s Leviathan*, which considers, among other things, Hobbes’s claim that he and Plato both believe that in order the human misery to end sovereigns must be philosophers.

[37] 2.31.41

[38] Paraphrased from the Preface to the Reader of *De Cive*, section 2.

[39] *De Cive*, intro, 6

[40] The *Crito* opens with Socrates asleep in prison days before he is sentence to be executed by the judgment of the men of Athens. A rich friend of Socrates’ *Crito*, bribes his way into jail and is prepared to bribe the guards to allow Socrates to escape. In the ensuing discussion Socrates’ convinces Crito that the Athenian law must be obeyed, even if it is unjust. The sections I am referring to here are in the part of the Dialogue where Socrates conducts a mock conversation with himself as the persona of the laws (*Crito* 50c-51b).

[41] In the *Apology of Socrates*, Socrates tries to make it seem like he believes in the same god as the city does. Socrates never actually says this and an examination of his discussion with Meletus in conjunction with his account of the oracle, shows that Socrates obeys a different god than the men of Athens do. This is perhaps most clear in Socrates willingness to question the Oracle’s pronouncement that ‘no one is wiser than Socrates.’

[42] *Apology*, 39c-d.


[44] The word that is use in *De Corpore* is philosophy and not science. This appears to be different from *De Cive* where the word has been translated as science. As shall be seen later philosophy, at least how it is presented in *Leviathan* seems to presuppose a kind of knowledge that is not contained in mere science.

[45] *De Corpore*, 1.1.1

[46] Hobbes does seem to suggest that philosophy is end in itself in the corn and wine analogy. Though corn suggests utility, wine suggests pleasure for pleasure sake.

[47] *De Corpore*, 1.1.10


[49] 4.46.6

[50] 1.15.39

[51] Compare 1.9.1 of English to Latin *Leviathan*. In the Latin *Leviathan* Hobbes divides histories into two different types, natural and civil. He does not go further in his discussion of history as knowledge, claiming that it does not ‘pertain to our purpose.’

[52] This understanding of the division of knowledge seems to hide the possibility of the modern scientific experiment, where an hypothesis is refuted based on reasoning about a controlled set of particulars.

[53] 1.9.1
De Corpore, chapter 1 section 9. This difference between Leviathan and Hobbes’s Elements of Philosophy should be explored. For Leviathan there is a scientific distinction to be made between subject and sovereign while his Elements of Philosophy only recognises the distinction between man and citizen. This may indicate that Leviathan has more to say about the art of rule than his Elements of Philosophy. From the diagram in Leviathan it is not clear that there is a connection between natural and civil science through the study of man, though it can be inferred.

In the Latin version of Leviathan the difference between it and the rest of his philosophy is diminished. At 1.9.9, Hobbes makes it clear that civil philosophy comes from the study of man, which is a branch of natural philosophy. The Latin Leviathan also indicates a number of subjects that properly belong to the study of man, which Hobbes does not treat in De Homine: logic and rhetoric.

Ethics, Book 1 section 2.

See 1.14.4. Subjects are also supposed to be capable of being the artificers of commonwealths but in practical terms it is perhaps more accurate to say that they must be open to be formed into a commonwealth. The fundamental law of nature and the sum of right of nature satisfy this. It is perhaps in this sense that subjects only have one right and one duty. All of the other laws of nature would seem to work better as principles for a sovereign to follow to keep the peace that the law of nature demands subjects seek.

“But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent natural use and dexterity in handling arms, an another to have added to that dexterity an acquired science of where he can offend or be offended by his adversary in every possible posture and guard; the ability of the former would be to the ability of the latter as prudence is to sapience; both useful but the latter inoffurable. But they that trusting only the authority of books follow the blind blindly are like them that, trusting the false rules of a master of fence, ventures presumptuously upon a adversary that either kills or disgraces him” (1.5.21).

Though Hobbes gives the laws of nature an order and number in the margin as well as in the text of chapter fifteen, the status of this numbering is not significant in the same way as it is in chapter 14.

The first chapter of De Corpore, in the sixth article, Hobbes makes an argument for rejecting past science on the grounds that it was useless. After claiming that the ancients could not teach their moral philosophy in such a way as to have it followed and thereby eliminate civil strife, and after claiming that even if it were properly taught its teachings though delightful are not universally true, Hobbes adds the following statement:

"Now that which is chiefly wanting in them [books of old moral philosophy], is a true and certain rule of our actions, by which we might know whether we undertake or not is jut or unjust" (De Corpore, 1, art 6).

Even this is not quite correct for Hobbes given that he would agree that the fear of "what dreams may come when we have shuffled this mortal coil" are politically significant.

Hobbes parallels with this account of the good and account of evil. Turpe being evil in promise, molestum, unpleasant and troublesome being evil in effect and end, and inutile, unprofitable and hurtful as evil in means.

In the Symposium, near the beginning of Socrates’ conversation with Agathon Socrates’ asks why people want the beautiful. Agathon could not answer the question. Socrates asks after whether Agathon knows why people want the good, Agathon answers to be happy. Socrates never clarifies why people want the beautiful: it seems that this can only be understood in terms of the good.

This is perhaps the basis for the Hobbes’s claim in the Review and Conclusion of Leviathan that the twentieth law of nature, “that every man is bound by nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.” Hobbes states that this law of nature can be drawn as a consequence from some of those that are determined in chapter 15. When faced with the choice of lapsing into the state of nature or aiding to maintain the power which has to this point maintained your life man is bound by nature to follow the later
course. Though the state of nature is the state of war, it appears that war in the ordinary meaning is still preferable to the state of nature.

Liberality is not considered as a law of nature because it is dependent on whether one has wealth or not. Hobbes even suggests that frugality is a virtue among the poor.

Hobbes does not consistently use the word power in this sense. He also uses the word to mean authority or supremacy. The two meanings would seem to be linked in so far as one cannot have supremacy without power in the sense of means. The terms would appear to differ significantly in the sense that some men gain pleasure from contemplating their power (in the sense of supremacy).

The secondary activities of the king, desire for fame and novel conquest may not be conducive to the peace and unity of the commonwealth. After all these aims cannot be met but by war.

Hobbes does not consider the possibility that the receiver is superior and there is a hope for requital. This is because if there is hope for requital the giver can hardly be considered superior.
This would seem not to be terribly important in the state of nature. From the natural equality of men proceeds diffidence. Though all else being equal each individual man must only be concerned with battling another man’s individual power, once any man has created for him self ‘a convenient seat’ “others may be probably expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also his life and liberty. And the invader is again in the like danger of another” (1.13.3) The real problem here is confederations of men attacking one and another. It is after paragraph, however, that Hobbes, draws a more radical conclusion about the state of nature. From the men’s diffidence ‘there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is by force or by wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he so no other power great enough to endanger him.” (1.13.4). If all men think this is true then it does not matter who is a natural commander and who is not. But if all men think this is true, then confederations are not really a problem at all instead it will be a war of everyone against everyone. It is from this understanding of the state of nature that Hobbes builds his commonwealth. But, as I argue above, this state of nature is much worse than it ever could be. The practical manifestation of the state of nature is civil war, which is only possible with warring factions.

The more prominent places where Hobbes gives expanded accounts of the knowledge that enlightens the ignorance he outlines in chapter eleven are Hobbes’s account science and cause in the early chapters of Leviathan and his account of the fountain and origin of justice in chapter fifteen. I will further substantiate this claim upon discussing the four political significant types of ignorance.
This fact may bring one to believe that Hobbes’s work is as useless as the Republic of Plato, because the sovereign must also be a philosopher. For an account of Hobbes’s claim to have overcome the difficulties Plato thought to exist in the central claim of the Republic see Mathie’s ‘Politics and Philosophy: ‘till sovereigns be philosophers.’

This is the form Hobbes explicitly takes in his approach in presenting his civil philosophy. The change in the form of Leviathan would therefore seem therefore to be important for outlining the art of rule, which is contained in Leviathan, and apparently absent from De Cive.

See Strauss, Leo, What is Political Philosophy? page 191. The sections that Strauss refers to is the end of chapter twenty-eight and the beginning of chapter twenty-nine 29,

Hobbes does claim that reason is the undoubted word of God. 3.32.2

Leviathan, Introduction

1.12.11 Hobbes’s comment in the margin of paragraph eleven suggest more than one seed of religion, though his actual words in the paragraph seem to suggest that they merely represent four parts of the seed of religion.
Ovid, *Metamorphoses*

228 Aeschylus’ tragedy claims that the cause for Prometheus’ punishment was his gift of fire to mankind, which he stole for mankind.

229 Hesiod, *Theogeny* 11.42

230 This account is a paraphrase from the accounts given Hesiod’s *Theogeny* and his *Works and Days*.

231 1.12.5.

232 1.6.16

233 1.2.5 and 1.2.6

234 In connection to this it is interesting to note how the book of Job describes the heart of Leviathan. This quote is placed above the engraving placed at the beginning of the Leviathan: “His Heart is as firm as stone; yea as hard as a piece of the nether millstone” (Job 41.24).

235 1.12.6

236 1.12.6

237 1.12.11

238 1.11.23

239 2.31.14-28

240 1.11.27

241 1.11.11

242 3.32.2.

243 4.46.42

244 Dedicatory Letter and R & C, 14

245 1.12.23

246 2.29.1

247 1.12.12

248 4.46.15 See also chapter 34 paragraphs 2 and 3


250 1.10.14

251 1.12.20

252 1.12.20

253 1.12.20

254 2.27.1 through 2.27.3

255 1.12.20

256 1.12.25

257 1.3.7

258 1.4.24

259 1.10.8

260 1.11.13

261 1.12.25
Interestingly Hobbes claims that the Greeks called these tricksters *thaumaturgi*. This is the same word used to describe those bearing the models that cast the shadows for the people in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (*Republic*, 514a-515b).