Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorAbedin, Mohammad Yameenul
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-04T15:46:43Z
dc.date.available2015-05-04T15:46:43Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10464/6368
dc.description.abstractThe paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBrock Universityen_US
dc.subjectCEO compensationen_US
dc.subjectpay-for-performanceen_US
dc.subjectFama-French 3-factor modelen_US
dc.subjectrisk takingen_US
dc.subjectpay-volatility sensitivityen_US
dc.titleEffect of executive compensation on firm performanceen_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US
dc.degree.nameM.Sc. Managementen_US
dc.degree.levelMastersen_US
dc.contributor.departmentFaculty of Business Programsen_US
dc.degree.disciplineFaculty of Businessen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record