Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJafri, Syed Rahat Ali
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-14T20:05:34Z
dc.date.available2013-05-14T20:05:34Z
dc.date.issued2013-05-14
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10464/4375
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensationen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherBrock Universityen_US
dc.subjectRisk Takingen_US
dc.subjectExcess Compensationen_US
dc.subjectCEO risk takingen_US
dc.subjectCEO excess compensationen_US
dc.subjectExecutive compensationen_US
dc.titleManagerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensationen_US
dc.typeElectronic Thesis or Dissertationen_US
dc.degree.nameM.Sc. Managementen_US
dc.degree.levelMastersen_US
dc.contributor.departmentFaculty of Business Programsen_US
dc.degree.disciplineFaculty of Businessen_US
dc.embargo.termsNoneen_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record