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CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

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dc.contributor.author Yu, Zhimin (Jimmy)
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-17T13:44:34Z
dc.date.available 2012-05-17T13:44:34Z
dc.date.issued 2012-05-17
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10464/4007
dc.description.abstract Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation. en_US
dc.language.iso eng en_US
dc.publisher Brock University en_US
dc.subject ceo compensation en_US
dc.subject compensation risk en_US
dc.subject corporate governance en_US
dc.subject board structure en_US
dc.subject ownership structure en_US
dc.title CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms en_US
dc.type Electronic Thesis or Dissertation en_US
dc.degree.name M.Sc. Management en_US
dc.degree.level Masters en_US
dc.contributor.department Faculty of Business Programs en_US
dc.degree.discipline Faculty of Business en_US


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