Abstract:
This essay reviews the decision-making process that led to India
exploding a nuclear device in May, 1974. An examination of the
Analytic, Cybernetic and Cognitive Theories of decision, will enable a
greater understanding of the events that led up to the 1974 test.
While each theory is seen to be only partially useful, it is only by
synthesising the three theories that a comprehensive account of the
1974 test can be given.
To achieve this analysis, literature on decision-making in national
security issues is reviewed, as well as the domestic and international
environment in which involved decisionmakers operated. Finally, the
rationale for the test in 1974 is examined.
The conclusion revealed is that the explosion of a nuclear device
by India in 1974 was primarily related to improving Indian international
prestige among Third World countries and uniting a rapidly disintegrating
Indian societal consensus. In themselves, individual decision-making
theories were found to be of little use, but a combination of the various
elements allowed a greater comprehension of the events leading up to the
test than might otherwise have been the case.
