Anti-Oedipus en-procés:
A comparative analysis of Kristeva and Deleuze & Guattari

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Abstract

The present thesis is an attempt to bring into dialogue what appear to be two radically different approaches of negotiating subjectivity in late Western Modernity. Here the thought of Julia Kristeva as well as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are fully engaged. These thinkers, the latter two being considered as one, have until now remained strangers to one another. Consequently much confusion has amassed concerning their respective philosophical, as well as social/political projects. I take up the position that Deleuze and Guattari’s account of subjectivity is a commendable attempt to understand a particular type of historical subject: late modern Western man. However I claim that their account comes up short insofar as I argue that they lack the theoretical language in order to fully, and successfully, make their point. Thus I argue that their system does not stand up to its own claims. On the contrary, by embracing the psychoanalytic tradition – staying rather close to the Freudian and Kleinian schools of thought – I argue that it is in fact Kristeva that is better equipped to provide an account of this particular subject. Considerable time is invested in fleshing out the notion of the Other insofar as this Other is central to the constitution of subjectivity. This Other – insofar as this Other is to be found in Kristeva’s notion of the *chora* -- is something I claim that Deleuze and Guattari simply undervalued.
Acknowledgements

For my family...
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Introduction –

Kristeva was once asked in an interview why she chose not to follow Deleuze when *Anti-Oedipus* was published in 1972, opting instead to pursue psychoanalytic training by undergoing therapy in 1973? Aside from replying that she was in fact receptive to Deleuze’s anarchism as well as the fact that she considered him to be perhaps the most original and radical of contemporary philosophers, she nonetheless defended the indispensible nature of the “father” as a psychoanalytic concept (both as a source and inhibitor of desire) that Deleuze rejected.¹

In an elegy to Sartre that Deleuze wrote and which serves as part of an essay on Sartre that Kristeva included as part of her *Sense and Nonsense of Revolt* Deleuze says of Sartre: “He was my master.” Aside from Deleuze lamenting “the sadness of generations without masters” he talks about the fact that Sartre provided a new language to a culture in need of new expression.² Kristeva remarks that this is not what one would expect from the author of *Anti-Oedipus*. Could this elegy represent an unconscious confession of a possible limit to his and Guattari’s notion of subjectivity? Has the psychoanalytic notion of the father been undervalued in their philosophy? Is Sartre Deleuze and Guattari’s father as Freud spoke of the father in *Totem and Taboo*? If so, are there other concepts within Deleuze and Guattari’s corpus that require a revaluation? I answer yes to all of the above.³

The above example is intended to set the tone for that which is to follow throughout the remainder of the present thesis. It is my explicit intention to highlight the
advantages one accrues by means of endorsing Kristeva’s interpretation of the constitution of subjectivity, predicated as it is on the adoption of specifically reworked versions of Freudian psychoanalysis and Hegelian negativity. One will find that these advantages are associated with the acceptance of the notion of the semiotic chora, a notion that Deleuze and Guattari fully reject.

The present thesis is divided into 7 parts. Part 1 is intended to continue where this introduction leaves off through illustrating the centrality of what is known as the “signifying process” especially how it is developed in Kristeva’s early work *Revolution in Poetic Language*, and how it relates to the constitution of subjectivity. The signifying process is a phenomenon that will allow for the present author to negotiate the asserted advantage Kristeva promises over that of Deleuze and Guattari without assuming outright Kristeva’s position *qua* psychoanalyst. I want to stress here that I will not hold Deleuze and Guattari up to purely psychoanalytic premises. Such a method would be preemptive and logically fallacious. By focusing on the “signifying process” I shall avoid this trap.

Part 2 situates the present study within the psychoanalytic tradition which is of considerable influence upon Kristeva as well as Deleuze and Guattari. In this section I will carefully consider the main contributions of Freud, Lacan, and Klein. Part 3 examines closer the theoretical differences (and similarities) between Lacan and Kristeva. Specifically the notions of lack and loss will be negotiated to determine to what extent Kristeva’s notion of loss is special with respect to Lacan’s lack. Part 4 provides an exegesis of the tradition to which Deleuze and Guattari are closely affiliated: affirmation. Part 5 examines the thought of the later Kristeva focusing on her “Trilogy of the 80’s.” Part 6 examines the “signifying process” as it is developed in the work of Deleuze and
Guattari. Finally Part 7 engages with all the foregoing in what I offer as a personal criticism of the notion of subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari advance in their philosophy.

In short, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection of the notion of the semiotic chora and their questionable account of the notion of the Other is detrimental to their overall philosophical project as one that purports affirmation and ecstatic *jouissance*. This thesis holds steadfast to the idea that only a philosophy grounded in a notion of negativity and the Other, such as Kristeva’s, can truly meet these goals.

**Part 1: The signifying process and the advantage of the drive**

Kristeva as well as Deleuze and Guattari were part of a generation that was attracted to psychoanalysis because of Lacan’s teachings. Lacan remodeled Freudian psychoanalysis by means of integrating linguistic theory developed by Ferdinand de Saussure as well as Claude Lévi-Strauss among other structuralists. However, Kristeva, asked in an interview as to whether she thought her emphasis on Freud (and a return to the notion of the drives) was a critique of Lacan, replied in the affirmative and that she believed, “Lacanians have neglected the role of the drive. The drive is clearly an imaginary construction (we can neither see it nor locate it), but it is an essential one that enables the analyst to remain at the crossroads between the symbolic and the somatic.” Kristeva’s return to the Freudian notion of the drives is an important move to consider especially when negotiating the status of the late modern Western subject, a subject that has otherwise been negotiated as a mere logical or social construction – an assemblage of shifting signifiers -- and so on.
Kristeva’s fascination with the drives is associated with a particular set of concepts that one finds within her general semiology (which she calls “semanalysis”); that is: “phenotext” and “genotext.” These two concepts represent a certain way of approaching a text. For Kristeva the phenotext is literally that which follows the rules or laws of grammar and syntax (punctuation, spelling, etc) or, in short, the “symbolic.” She writes: “We shall use the term phenotext to denote language that serves to communicate, which linguistics describes in terms of ‘competence’ and ‘performance’. The genotext, on the other hand, denotes the non-symbolic, signifying patterns, or flows, rhythms, and intonations inherent to a text. The genotext “includes drives, their disposition, and their division of the body, plus the ecological and social system surrounding the body, such as objects and pre-Oedipal relations with parents.” In short, the genotext embodies the “musicality” of the phenotext.

The above mentioned musicality of the phenotext holds important relevance for Kristeva and her understanding of the subject insofar as this inherent musicality renders the symbolic (a major aspect of what constitutes the subject) very unstable. This is a crucial element to Kristeva’s thought and therefore one must be careful when unfurling it. Kristeva suggests there are similarities that the musicality of a text shares with the echolalias and glossolalias (nonsense “baby talk”) of an infant, or pre-Mirror stage phenomena (more on the ‘Mirror stage’ later). Thus if we are to appropriate this framework we must flesh out an understanding of the pre-Mirror stage or pre-Oedipal phenomena that are relevant to the current discussion.

Kristeva notes that “the oral cavity is the first organ of perception to develop and maintain the nursing infant’s first contact with the outside but also with the other.” Here
Kristeva acknowledges her indebtedness to Freud for his observation that during the pre-Oedipal phase of development, the infant (or infans: pre-subjective infant) does not recognize any distinction between itself (e.g. its body) and the outside world (i.e. literally the milieu as well as ‘other’ individuals: the mother). I will expatiate to greater lengths upon Freud’s interpretation of the structures of “primary narcissism” in a later section.

The oral phase, or the “oral-ego” is intimately tethered to a correlative experience of pleasure, or what is known as the “pleasure-ego”. This, Kristeva posits, is because of the function the oral cavity serves: one of “incorporation and unification.” In wake of this the outside world is not recognized qua external reality.

However, later in development the forces of pleasure become displaced onto the anus in what is referred to as the “anal-phase.” Kristeva highlights the fact that Freud was rather silent on the subject of anality, insofar as he never says anything concerning the “drive bases” and/or pleasure associated with the act of rejection. As Kristeva points out, the anus, which is the last of the sphincters to be repressed, is in fact the most important when discussing the phenomenon of “rejection.” Rejection for Freud signifies the primordial basis for the inauguration of the symbolic. For example, before the linguistic representation of negation can be established, (e.g. the verbal “No!”), a “symbolic rejection” must manifest itself (e.g. the infant’s feces). That is all. Kristeva takes issue with Freud’s interpretation by saying that Freud has ignored the fact that “drives move through the sphincters and arouse pleasure at the very moment substances belonging to the body are separated and rejected from the body.” This process of rejection, inherent to the anal-phase “establishes an outside that is never definitively separate – one that is always in the process of being posited. But in doing so, it already runs counter to the
unifying pleasure principle and sets up the most radical exteriority.”10 Thus by pointing to
the associated pleasure experienced during the anal-phase Kristeva effaces a false
dichotomy erected by Freud which sees the symbolic function separate from the
generating process of pleasure of which it is produced. Kristeva goes one step further
than Freud by combining both the rejection of the anal-phase and the consumption of the
oral-phase through the notion of the drives and the pleasure therein associated.

This is where one begins to understand the incredibly subversive potential of the
Kristevan subject. Combining bodily expulsion and rejection (anal-phase) with “oral
pleasure, disturb[s], indeed dismantle[s], the symbolic function.”11 However the symbolic
function is not obliterated entirely. The symbolic for Kristeva is paradoxically
“maintained” in this unstable state. She explicitly states in Revolution in Poetic Language
that “the heterogenous parceling of the symbolic, which underlies the symbolic’s very
constitution ... constantly undermines it even while maintaining it in process.”12 I
emphasize “in process” here to draw attention to the fact that for Kristeva this dialectical
play between oral/anal is always-already incomplete because of anal drives that go non-
repressed during the latter’s phase. If we consider the fact that all of society and/or
culture is “written” by subjects (e.g. law treaties, scientific paradigms, ethical codes of
conduct, etc.) and that there exist non-repressed anality throughout these subjects and by
extension society then, the “semiotic devices which run through modern phenotexts ...
convey the struggle of a non-sublimated anality against the superego. Ideologically, this
transformation of the signifying chain attacks, provokes, and unveils repressed sadism –
the anality underlying social apparatuses.”13 There is an inherently subversive aspect to
the factors of late modernity that Western subjects take to be constitutive of their being.
Various social institution and political arenas are not absolute in nature but are in fact constantly under threat of collapse, constantly in process/on trial as Kristeva says.

**Admitting limitations: rejection of the semiotic chora**

Deleuze and Guattari reject the semiotic chora (ordering of the drives) that Kristeva endorses. To quote *A Thousand Plateaus* where Deleuze and Guattari explicitly reject the chora: "It is obvious that there is no system of signs common to all strata, not even in the form of a semiotic “chora” theoretically prior to symbolization".¹⁴ I want to point out here the fact that I recognize that Deleuze and Guattari would not perceive their rejecting the existence of the semiotic chora as a limitation to their philosophical system. All that I intend to establish by positing this reference of their rejection of the chora is to mark the fact that Deleuze and Guattari are indeed cognizant of their refusal to find value in the semiotic chora (i.e. the non-sublimated anality of the symbolic order). Because of this failure to find meaning in it they choose not to include it in their philosophical system.

However, (and this is crucial to the critique of Deleuze and Guattari to follow throughout this thesis), because they do not find value in the semiotic chora and thus do not include it in their philosophical system, I argue that such a philosophical system is indeed limited in what it allows the late modern Western subject as far as that subject’s relationships to the world, others, and indeed itself are concerned. I will fully introduce and thoroughly explain Deleuze and Guattari’s rendition of the signifying process (i.e. the constitution of subjectivity *qua* assemblage-of-enunciation) in a later section; however, for now let me set the tone for Deleuze and Guattari’s relationship to Kristeva. Not to put too fine a point on the matter (and by no means to I consider Deleuze and Guattari
adherents to the ‘formalist’ tradition) but Kristeva considers any philosophical/linguistic system that does not acknowledge the existence of the chora to be severely impoverished. She posits that, “the formalist theory of symbolism simplifies the signifying process by seeing it only as a text (in the sense of a coded or deviant distribution of marks), without perceiving the drive rejection which produces it, straddling the corporeal and natural on the one hand, the symbolic and social on the other, and found in each of them specifically.”15 As will be established later on, Deleuze and Guattari will champion a signifying process which adopts a version of Lacan’s understanding that the unconscious is structured like a language. What this means is that they hold that the subject is constituted by various strata of the symbolic and nothing more. Their approach entails being able to do certain things with the symbolic which would otherwise be attributed to the semiotic chora. This will also be fleshed out in full later. In short, these “postulates of linguistics” as Deleuze and Guattari would have it, illustrate what it is they understand for subjectivity to be predicated upon pure “affirmation” (a topic to be fleshed out later).

However before engaging in a discussion on affirmation, I must first continue explaining Kristeva’s interpretation of the signifying process by dissertating as to how this process is typical of her endorsement of the Hegelian dialectic vis the concept of “negativity.”

Kristeva’s concept of Negativity

Kristeva begins by clarifying the distinction between the concept ‘negativity’ and its affiliate ‘negation.’ “The concept of negativity, distinct from that of nothingness (Nichts) and negation (Negation), figures as the indissoluble relation between an “ineffable” mobility and its “particular” determination”.16 I will come back to negativity
in a moment, but first it is important to stress that ‘negation’ functions in or at a particular
‘moment’ (to borrow from Hegel’s lexicon) within self-consciousness. What this means
is that negation marks a specific transition, literally a moment or space, wherein
something that once was becomes something else. An example from Kojève will serve
well for this instance:

In his lectures on Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* Kojève begins where Hegel
does, with Sense-Certainty or that which immediately presents itself to consciousness.
Experience is predicated upon a constitutive loss for Hegel, suggests Kojève, insofar as
consciousness is completely “ek-static” to itself in the object that it perceives. Here
perceiving and contemplating are recognized as the same. Kojève writes, “The man who
contemplates is “absorbed” by what he contemplates; the “knowing subject” “loses”
himself in the object that is shown”.

Immediately it is evident that there is no clear
distinction between subject and object. In this state of being man does not exist as subject
*qua* subject, but for lack of better terminology, is alienated from himself *embodied* in an
object-in-the-world. Kojève’s next move is to posit a movement or a return of
consciousness back into itself from its dwelling in the world by means of the motivating
factor of an internal desire. This shift of consciousness dwelling in-the-world to dwelling
within-itself is a moment of negation.

However, negativity differs radically from negation insofar as Kristeva mentions
it to be the “indissoluble relation between an ‘ineffable’ mobility and its ‘particular’
determination.” Negativity is that non-conceptual space which establishes the very
possibility for the kind of movement or shift to take place which bears the name
Negation. Kristeva writes: “negativity constitutes the logical impetus beneath the thesis
of negation and that of the negation of negation, but is identical to neither since it is, instead, the logical functioning of the movement that produces the theses."¹⁸ She grants that the concept itself has its Idealist origins with Hegel but was adopted later by the young-Hegelians and dialectical materialists for their project of creating a veritable materialist account of history. Marx writes in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*,

> [T]he greatness of Hegel's *Phenomenology* and its final product, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle, is ... that Hegel conceives of the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as externalization and the transcendence of this externalization. This means, therefore, that he grasps the nature of labour and understands objective man, true, because real, man as the result of his own labour.¹⁹

Later in *Revolution in Poetic Language* she points out how negativity was moved from its ideal conceptualization in Hegel, through its materialist rendition in Marx, to being recognized as an inherent principle within all of life in Lenin. She writes, “Lenin underscores and accepts the notion of ‘inherent negativity’ as an *objective* principle – the principle of all physical and spiritual life – and not as a simple and ‘subjective craving to shake and break down what is fixed and true’.”²⁰

This objective principle of Lenin’s, she claims, misses the point, as it only retains one element of the subject’s ‘negativization’: “[H]is subordination, as a unit, to the social and natural process.”²¹ What this amounts to is a weakened version of negativity insofar as it does away with the problem of the subject *qua* subject and “retain[s] only the process of substance in a Spinozistic sense or the process of modes of production.”²² I intentionally include this reference to Spinoza from Kristeva’s text to indicate the similarities that may be highlighted between Spinoza’s view and that of Deleuze and Guattari, both of which there are rational grounds for believing Kristeva is skeptical of the latter. The above materialist interpretation of negativity by Lenin is problematic for
Kristeva because she sees this move as essentializing negativity in a pan-universalist manner. Lenin’s definition essentializes negativity in that he makes it an inherent property to all of material as well as spiritual nature; this totalizing nature qua one substance. This is equivalent to reifying the concept and thereby killing it, rendering negativity immobile. Negativity, in its true dialectal form “is precisely that which remains outside logic (as the signifier of a subject), what remains heterogenous to logic even while producing it through a movement of separation or rejection, something that has the necessary objectivity of a law and can be seen as the logic of matter.”

This is what defines negativity as “the indissoluble relation between.” Negativity cannot be reduced to a void of nothingness – a void wherein matter swirls about in organized chaos. Kristeva’s concept of negativity makes possible the very dichotomy “matter/void.”

Kristeva attempts to differentiate her understanding of negativity from other interpretations which, like Lenin, she charges with misrepresenting the case: “We must emphasize that our notion of negativity should not be confused with ... that [which] modern philosophy has attempted to displace by substituting the notion of difference and repetition.” The latter (i.e. difference and repetition) lack a definite indebtedness to history. What I mean to argue with respect to this point is that anything that is considered meaningful within Deleuze and Guattari’s signifying system is predicated only upon the prevailing social-symbolic system. That is to say, theirs is a position that is ignorant with respect to the historical processes that produced the prevailing symbolic. Kristeva stresses that “the sole function of our use of the term ‘negativity’ is to designate the process that exceeds the signifying subject, binding him to the laws of objective struggles in nature and society.” I am not saying that Deleuze and Guattari are ignorant to the importance
of history in the literal sense; simply that that they do not do justice with respect to history’s involvement in the constitution of subjectivity.

My motivation for including the above criticism of Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of “difference” and “repetition” is to begin situating negativity relative to their notion of affirmation. To better introduce Kristeva’s relationship to affirmation and thereby Deleuze and Guattari, consider what she has to say concerning Frege’s interpretation of negation. Kristeva writes that “it is undoubtedly Frege who most subtly elaborates the status of logical negation, concluding … this operation is ‘useless’ in the realm of ‘thought.’ […] Thought does not include its own production: ‘In thinking we do not produce thoughts, we grasp [fassen] them.”26 Unless one is Bishop Berkeley, it is evident that we live in a concrete material world that is also indeed littered with ideology (i.e. ideas, or non-material entities); therefore this one-sided, purely eidetic view does not fully account for the “ultimate nature of reality.”27 “If thought is what does not involve production, it can include no negation that is not already an affirmation.”28 But one will object to my trajectory here and interject that Deleuze and Guattari situate the subject within a world populated with material as well as ideas and that those entities are constituted in terms of production and anti-production. The point to take notice of is that Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of desiring-machines ‘producing’ and/or not-‘producing’ has fallen into the trap of a false dichotomy (i.e. production/anti-production) with no acknowledgement given with respect to what makes this production possible.

In short, what Kristeva does not agree with in Deleuze and Guattari’s system is the way they account for ‘breaks’ and ‘separations.’ Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus that “in order to resist linked, connected, and interrupted flows, it sets up a
counterflow of amorphous, undifferentiated fluid." That is to say any appearance of a break or separation – in sort, a negation – is really nothing but a positive process: "production" setting the stage for something new to be produced, and so on _ad infinitum_.

I will continue with a discussion on Deleuze and Guattari latter; however, the point that I want to make by drawing attention to this excerpt from _Anti-Oedipus_ is that theirs is a philosophy of society based purely on affirmation. Kristeva re-interjects herself into the dialogue by stating: "thought is always already the indistinguishableness of positive and negative; the negative is merely one of its possible components." Comparatively, any philosophy that bases itself on pure affirmation is only depicting one half of the equation. Kristeva’s negativity goes beyond this totalizing way of depicting the cosmos.

Finally I want to draw the link connecting Kristeva’s concept of negativity to Freud and lastly commenting on what this means with respect to her notion of the subject-in-process. If, as Kristeva has derived from Frege, negation cannot exist internal to one’s conscious thought, then “the only place negation exists is outside the subject’s consciousness ...At this point it is evident that only a theory of the unconscious can propose a logical device within which ‘negation’ can be inscribed ... that which produces the signifying position itself.” This is where Kristeva begins to blend her adoption of Hegelian negativity with Freud’s thoroughgoing materialism. “The logic exposed above will become materialist when, with the help of Freud’s discovery, one dares think negativity as the very movement of heterogenous matter.” It is at this point that I will briefly comment on Freud’s article _On Negation_, and show its elliptical reference to Kristeva’s subject-in-process.
Prior to Kristeva, Freud put forth a case for negation’s importance for the onset of intellectual life. In his article *On Negation* Freud postulated a mechanism that made it possible for the infant to function in the world as a being predicated on symbolic pragmatism. Negation is interpreted in Freud as a symbolic representative for allowing the subject-matter of the unconscious to become manifest to the subject in analysis. Freud writes:

> There is a most convenient method upon which one can sometimes obtain a necessary light upon a piece of unconscious and repressed material. ‘What’, one asks, ‘would you consider was about the most unlikely thing in the world in that situation? ... If the patient falls into the trap and names what he thinks most incredible, he almost invariably in so doing makes the correct admission.’

The example goes on to argue that via the analysand’s confession that, for example, “that was not my mother in my dream”, the analyst is free to interpret the spoken material. The significance of the act of negation is that the repressed material could only be brought into discussion by way of the negation. This is a particularly good example (using that of the mother) for the pre-objectal mother, or the semiotic chora, is that which has been repressed due to the child’s separation from the mother and entrance into the symbolic (more on this later). It is here where Freud is careful to separate out the “intellectual” virtues of negation compared to that of the “affective”.

The act of stating a claim in the negative, (e.g. making a negative judgment as Freud puts it), is the only way for the subject-matter or the “image” of what has been repressed (or that which is outside of consciousness) to enter consciousness. However, the actual content of that which the image stands for is still repressed. The “actual content” pertains to the affective and the “image” the intellectual. By stating something in the negative I allow for that which is negated by the symbolic to be acknowledged as such. It is in a sense, at least insofar as Freud understands, an acceptance of that which
has repressed while at the same time understanding that the repressed still remains repressed as something forever unknowable and lost to me. Yet, we remain unsatisfied with this notion until such an attempt has been made to give form and coherence to this ‘outside,’ no matter how futile such an attempt might prove. Freud continues:

A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression; the ‘No’ in which it is expressed is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin, as it were ... By the help of the symbol of negation, the thinking-process frees itself from the limitations of repression and enriches itself with the subject-matter without which it could not work efficiently.34

The take home point in this digression into Freud is that negation literally symbolizes, or in any case attempts to symbolize, that which is wholly repressed and outside of consciousness. This wholly ‘outsideness,’ relative to consciousness (the Freudian unconscious), is similar to but not identical to negativity proper in Kristeva (but that would be to reify negativity within one side of a dualism: e.g. conscious/unconscious). On the contrary Kristeva’s negativity works at the border(s) of the conscious and unconscious. The subject’s relationship to both these realms is what characterizes Kristeva’s concept of the “subject-in-process.”

The Kristevan subject is one that is constitutively indebted to both modalities of the signifying process: the symbolic as well as the semiotic; one is never exclusively one or the other. The subject-in-process is at once constituted by the objective physical laws that situate it within a social community (e.g. family, culture, language, etc.) as well as by those ‘laws’ which remain forever outside of the logic of these social laws and yet allow for the very possibility of their coming-into-being (e.g. biology, matter, ruptures, decay, etc.). The following excerpt from Revolution in Poetic Language may help to polish off this introduction to the concept of negativity. The subject-in-process lives a “simultaneous existence [along] the boundary (which is the One) and the a-reasonable, a
relative, a-mediating crossing of that boundary; or the possibility of the constitution-unconstitution of One meaning-non-meaning, passing through categorical boundaries (‘inside,’ ‘one,’ ‘multiple,’ etc.) which is precisely what rejection brings about.” Before moving onward, notice the inclusion of the term ‘multiple’ that Kristeva considers a conceptual boundary. One might choose, as I will later, to draw the connection between this notion of the ‘multiple’ and Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a “multiplicity.” Might not the latter’s “multiplicity” be considered a “conceptual boundary” brought up and developed by the former (Kristeva)? A concept that is surpassed by Kristeva’s concept of negativity?


Freud

The thought of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, was rooted in a thorough-going materialism of late German romanticism. This period signaled a crisis in the traditional understanding of what it was to be human. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural selection played a great role in fueling this crisis. Darwin argued that human beings were not divinely created qua ready-made-human, but were instead the precipitate of a long gradual process of material evolution, subject to the random catastrophes of the surrounding environment. Freud’s project became one that attempted to reconcile the materiality of Darwin (and the individual-subject’s birth into this materiality) while trying to retain the singular aspects of the subject’s existence that escaped pure materiality. Adam Phillips, in his book Promises, promises: Essays on Psychoanalysis and Literature illustrates this sketch of Freud, “The psychoanalytic theory he found himself writing was science that sometimes sounded like literature. The
form chosen was the scientific treatise, the genre endorsed by the profession he wrote for; but the so-called content smacked of poetic drama, or fiction.”\(^3\) Freud’s case studies report the concrete material conditions of a subject’s life (science) while simultaneously chronicling the subject’s accounting with respect to that experience (art) which reads essentially as a fiction.\(^3\)

Upon being born into this thorough materiality a la Darwin, Freud postulated that the primordial experience of the infant is such that the infant does not recognize a distinction between its body and the surrounding milieu. There is no subject/object distinction, no interior/exterior; simply the “booming and buzzing” flow of experience. From his article *On Narcissism* Freud outlines how during this stage of ontogeny there is no subjectivity per se with respect to the infant: “I may point out that we are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed”.\(^3\) For example, the pre-subjective condition of the infant (Primary Narcissism) is such that when the feeling of hunger is “felt” by the infant, it is not felt by the infant as “in its stomach”, but “felt in general”. There is a painful tension afoot throughout the “booming and buzzing” that the infant desires to quell, or return to its original pleasurable state by suckling at the breast.

In his *Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (Fourth Lecture) Freud outlines that, “the child’s first choice of an object ... is directed in the first instance to all those who look after it, but these soon give place to its parents”.\(^3\) At first the child is thought to take both parents as love objects, but this soon gives way to a privileging of one; for infant boys it is the mother, and for infant girls it is the father. This is based on “some indication from its parents, whose affection bears the clearest characteristics of a sexual activity, even
though of one that is inhibited in its aim. This is the foundation of Freud's philosophy of love, triangulated under the umbrella myth of Oedipus. Freud continues to add that the seeds of this psychic structure will "continue to exercise a great and lasting influence from the unconscious" and is thus "no less actively at work in other regions of mental life." Freud suggested that the resultant identity (ego) that was carved out of this inchoate pre-subjective narcissistic enclave was the product of the Oedipus complex.

Freud's position was that the child's repressed sexual desires, triangulated between his/her parents, structured the psychic life of the individual. Freud came to this conclusion after observing his grandson (Ernst) playing with a reel attached to a piece of string. This is Freud's *fort-da* example. Freud observed that as his grandson would repetitiously toss the reel over the edge of a table, after which he would utter, "fort" ("gone"). He would then regain possession of the reel by pulling on the thread until the reel emerged from below the edge of the table and upon the reel becoming visible would shout, "Da!" ("there!"). In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud summarizes thus, "Throwing away the object so that it was 'gone' might satisfy an impulse of the child's, which was suppressed in his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother's going away from him [...] on the contrary he made it quite clear that he had no desire to be disturbed in his sole possession of his mother." Freud posited that this game was a symbolic expression by the young child to give form and coherence to his feelings toward his mother: *simultaneously desiring her presence and absence*. Freud's grandson behaved in this way because, as Freud would postulate for all infants, the child has "suffered a loss in regard to an object; what he tells us points to a loss in regard to his ego." The ego for
Freud is founded upon the loss of our primordial love-object during the stage of primary narcissism. Essentially the ego is established through the mourning of this loss.

The Oedipus complex, for Freud, fortifies the subject as such by shoring up the core of what defines subjectivity. Freud’s final topology, characterized famously by the Super Ego, Ego, and Id is the rubric under which the Oedipus complex is most commonly recognized. All three aspects to this topology, although perhaps not directly intended by its author, served to frustrate the traditional western Cartesian model of subjectivity. Kristeva will adopt this Freudian topology; however, she will modify it by choosing to focus on pre-Oedipal structures of subjectivity, of which she will refer to as “love”, “loss”, and “abjection”. These three moments, albeit identified independently of one another, in fact, operate -- structurally -- in concert. Before proceeding with a discussion of how Kristeva’s reconfigurations of the structures of subjectivity are fleshed out, I must outline the contributions made by Jacques Lacan, who was also a significant influence upon Kristeva as well as on Deleuze and Guattari’s thought.

Lacan

Lacan’s “return to Freud” heralded a re-creation of the Freudian paradigm to free it in a sense from its borderline biological determinism. The unconscious for Lacan is structured “like a language” and this linguistic rendition of the unconscious has to do with internalizing the language (desire) of the other as one’s own. Bruce Fink writes in *The Lacanian Subject*, a child is thus born into a preestablished place in its parents’ linguistic universe, a space often prepared many months, if not years, before the child sees the light of day. And most children are bound to learn the language spoken by their parents, which is to say that, in order to express their wishes, they are virtually obliged to go beyond the crying stage … and try to say what they want *in so many words*, that is, in a way that is comprehensible to their primary caretakers. Their wants are, however, molded in that very process, for the words they are obliged to use are not their own and do not necessarily correspond to their own particular demands.45
Freud never explicitly provided a model for how the unconscious worked outside of expressing that one could detect its presence by observing the use of jokes, slips of the tongue, and dreams. Lacan’s linguistic interpretation of Freud’s Oedipus complex culminates with this understanding of the unconscious. The words and desires we assumed to be ours are in fact, according to Lacan, not ours at all, but those of the Other. Since we are unaware that we have internalized these words and desires, of which we are conscious, there is no telling what we have internalized that we are unconscious of and that regardless exert some effect upon our actions. However, Lacan’s reworking of Freud’s paradigm goes much deeper than this and must be fleshed out in full through an explanation of the “real”, “imaginary”, and the “symbolic”, as well as his understanding of the “mirror stage”.

The child, for Lacan (as for Freud), does not experience a distinction between itself and its environment upon being born. This is the stage of psychological development which is labeled the “real” in Lacan. Lacan writes in his Écrits, “This fragmented body...is regularly manifested in dreams when the movement of an analysis reaches a certain level of aggressive disintegration of the individual”. The real prefigures the formation of the subject as such, and is structurally similar to Freud’s primary narcissism insofar as the real is characterized by what Lacan considers a “lack of a lack”. This statement makes sense in the light of knowing that for Lacan, the ego stems from lack; thus prior to the formation of an ego there is a veritable lack of lack. For lack to exist as such there would have to be a subjective experience of lack. Since there is no subject yet to experience a lack, the pre-subjective state of being, the real, is a lack of lack. The child eventually exits the real and enters the “imaginary” stage of
development when it recognizes that the mother is a wholly Other or a completely separate being. This occurs, perhaps through the absence of the breast. Some “event” in any case transpires which signals this split.

The imaginary is an ambiguous stage of development wherein the infant is caught in a stage where it recognizes that it is separate; however, it is separate without any discernible identity. The child is neither nothing, nor something. (Kristeva will return to this phenomenon of ambiguity in her discussion of “abjection”). The imaginary lingers until the child stumbles upon a moment of “stability” when it encounters its own image. This is what is called the “mirror stage” in Lacan. It is thought to occur between 6-18 months of development. The child recognizes a correlation between the movements of its “body” and the image of what it now understands as itself in a “mirror”, or “mirror” equivalent (for this model is not occulocentric), which it internalizes as its ego. Lacan writes, “the moment at which the mirror stage comes to an end, inaugurates, through identification with the imago of one’s semblable and the drama of primordial jealousy ... the dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations”. The image that the child seeks to identify with is only meant to “fill” the lack that is ever present to this child since its primordial separation from the mother.

The attempt to fill this lack will be extended to language and the “symbolic” by the introduction of the “father”. The father for Lacan, unlike Freud, is not necessarily the biological father or any human figure proper (although it could be: i.e. judge or teacher). The father is literally nothing more than a “symbolic” figure that stands in as the “love” interest of the mother. This symbolic signifier is called The “Name-of-the-Father” by Lacan. Fink tells us that, “In Seminar IV, Lacan goes so far as to suggest that the only
signifier that is able to serve a paternal function in the case of Freud’s “Little Hans” is the
signifier ‘horse’”. Due to this admiration on the part of the mother for the father, the
child then learns to identify with the father who ushers in the possibility of symbolically
expressing one’s desire through language, or simply a symbolic system. This is Lacan’s
linguistic reading of Freud’s Oedipal complex. The mother is that which is non-
symbolizable in-itself but instead makes possible the symbolism of the father. The
subject is nestled in-between these two like Oedipus. The controversy and struggle over
the Oedipal structure of subjectivity has proved fruitful for many writers since Freud.
This thesis chooses to focus on three such thinkers: Kristeva as well as Deleuze and
Guattari. I will now turn toward Kristeva’s corpus.

Klein

In similar fashion to Freud and Lacan, Melanie Klein factored quite strongly into
Kristeva’s contributions to philosophy and psychoanalysis. Recalling Kristeva’s criticism
that Lacan and his followers to have forgotten the value of the Freudian drives, she turns
to Klein who, compared to other psychoanalysts, remained truest to Freud.

Klein endorsed Freud’s structures of primary narcissism, noting that “the baby’s
first object of love and hate – his mother – is both desired and hated with all the intensity
and strength that is characteristic of the early urges of the baby.” Identical to Freud’s
hypothesis that the infans does not recognize any distinction between its body and the
mother’s body (i.e. any distinction between internal/external) the infans does not
recognize a distinction in the psychic economy of “love” and “hate.” These two emotions
are ambiguously intertwined in the “booming and buzzing” of pre-Oedipal development.
“When a baby feels frustrated at the breast, in his phantasies he attacks this breast; but if he is being gratified by the breast, he loves it and has fantasies of a pleasant kind in relation to it. In his aggressive phantasies he wishes to bite up and to tear up his mother and her breast, and to destroy her also in other ways.” This is what constitutes the “schizo-paranoid” phase for Klein. Following this phase the baby becomes aware that its endeavor to destroy the ‘bad’ breast, which is its source of anxiety and hate, is in turn damaging with respect to the ‘good’ breast, which is its sources of pleasure and gratification. Since at this phase of development an ‘imaginary’ substitute for the breast is just as gratifying as the actual breast, the baby will conjure up phantasies that it is in process of repairing the good breast which it is subconsciously aware it had been damaging. Klein:

If the baby has, in his aggressive phantasies, injured his mother by biting and tearing her up, he may soon build up phantasies that he is putting the bits back together again and repairing her. This, however, does not quite do away with his fears of having destroyed the object which, as we know, is the one whom he loves and needs most, and on whom he is entirely dependent. This ‘reparation’ is characteristic of the “depressive” phase. Klein refers to this phase as “depressive” because the infant qua subject is thrown into a state of guilt which carries over into its adult life which haunts it with a feeling that its can never fully repair the damage that it once inflicted upon the (pre-objectal-) mother. Quite literally this pre-objectal mother is forever lost to the now fully conscious child-subject and thus any return to this pre-subjective state to repair any damages is impossible. Nonetheless, Klein writes, “In my view, these basic conflicts profoundly influence the course and force of the emotional lives of grown-up individuals.” This notion of the loss of the pre-objectal mother is what ties Klein’s psychoanalytic theory to Kristeva’s notion of negativity.
In her book on Klein, Kristeva shows how these elements of Klein’s thought are in line with the notion of negativity that she adopts from Hegel. Kristeva writes, “the judging subject cannot exist without a lost object: by relying on memory, ‘I’ can signify the object only as it is – lost for the ‘ego who, as a result of losing the object, is held out as a ‘subject’ [...] it is a ‘dialectical’ negation.” The loss of the pre-objectal mother sets the subject in motion (‘process’) such that -- albeit in a depressive manner fraught with hauntings of ‘reparation’ – the subject is forever in the process of establishing connections with others, itself, and objects in the world only to transcend these connections because of an impending sense of guilt and failure. This point is reiterated in Revolution in Poetic Language when Kristeva writes: “Self-consciousness denies the object in order to return to itself, and loses sight of it only as a simple substance to realize its own unity with itself.” The only implication, however, for the Kristevan subject-in-process is that because during pre-Oedipal development there was no distinction between self/Other, through the act of losing the other (pre-objectal mother) the subject loses an aspect of itself.

The aspect of itself which the subject has lost by means of its loss of the pre-objectal mother is not something empirical; it is indeed “imaginative,” and thus cannot be grasped by any concrete means. That this lost aspect of the subject is ‘imaginative’ has to do with the fact that for Freud the intellectual and affective realms were dissociated from one another; the former made possible by the negation of the latter. Citing Hyppolite Kristeva writes, “the affective realm is only ‘mythical.’” What this means is that the lost aspect of oneself, the pre-objectal mother, can never present itself to one’s consciousness as complete. To further elaborate upon this point, the human subject cannot imagine that
which preceded the loss of the pre-objectal mother since at that stage there would have been nothing to remember. However, post-loss, the subject (in-process) constantly conjures up imaginary relationships that it ‘feels’ will satiate its desire to ‘repair’ its damaged narcissism. Insofar as these constructs of the self are imaginary in nature and forever in the process of being erected and demolished simultaneously they are to be considered illustrative of the process with which Kristeva interprets the late modern subject.

**Part 3: Lack and Loss, Or the theoretical differences between Kristeva and Lacan**

Given the benefit of having just discussed Klein’s influence upon Kristeva’s ideas it is important to delve deeper and explore how Kristeva’s adoption of Klein’s notion of “loss” differs (and itself is influenced by) Lacan’s notion of “lack.” Lacan wrote in *Écrits* that, “he [the subject] speaks now, but his speech has become suspicious because it is merely a response to the failure of his silence, when faced with the perceived echo of his own nothingness”.59 The ego is a “symbol” which is frustrating to maintain the status of insofar as it is arbitrary and always under threat of dissolution, for Lacan. Likewise Kristeva shows that as part of a linguistic discourse our subjectivity is always under threat of collapse and dissolution. She writes in *Revolution*: “The semiotic’s breach of the symbolic in so-called poetic practice can probably be ascribed to the very unstable yet forceful positing of the thetic”.60 The “thetic” in this case would serve as the act of naming the semiotic chora. The subject, coming-to-be a subject as such, is coaxed into the symbolic and commits veritable “matricide” by repressing the semiotic chora by utilizing language, the “symbolic”. This is parallel to Freud’s Oedipus complex situation, insofar as the pre-subjective infant has no desire to leave the milieu of primary
narcissism. Upon recognizing that the mother is not present the infant seeks satisfaction in the symbolic for that which it has lost in the pre-symbolic. This is the entrance into subjectivity proper for Kristeva. These are what one might consider the similarities between the two thinkers.

However, for Lacan the infant is left to give symbolic representation to the “lack” which taints its existence post-Mirror stage. Due to the fact that the infant has no symbolic way of knowing what it was to exist prior to the need for symbolic representation of itself (since that which is non-symbolizable cannot be represented using symbols) it is doomed to a life of frustration in its attempts to name the unnamable – itself (ego) as separate from the mother. Thus “meaning” proper for Lacan is not possible outside the symbolic or that which would count as Kristeva’s semiotic). This is where Kristeva differs significantly from the Lacanian school of thought, as she sees the semiotic as a conveyance of non-symbolic meaning.

What is it exactly, though, that counts as “lack” in Lacan? Furthermore, how does this lack differ from Kristeva’s (via Klein’s) notion of the “loss” of the pre-objectal mother? First it must be stated that the concept of lack in Lacan is intimately tied to his understanding of “desire.” In *Revolution in Poetic Language* Kristeva tells us that “defined by Lacan as ‘the metonomy of the want-to-be’ [manque à être], desire organizes its logical structure on what can be called nothingness or the zero in logic.” The use of the term ‘metonomy’ is meant to signify the connection that one signifier has with respect to another signifier that can be used synonymously in its place. From the Greek etymology meaning “change of name” Lacan’s “metonymy” recalls Freud’s theorization of ‘condensation and displacement.’ Whatever the case, desire is the ceaseless migration
of the subject moving from one imago (image of the ego) to another (or signifier to signifier) without there ever occurring a connection to the subaltern factors of their subjectivity. What this means, with reference specifically to Lacan, is that the "symbolic" and the "real" will never meet. For lack of a better expression, the two seemingly run parallel to one another \textit{ad infinitum}, their relationship negotiated by the "imaginary." In Kristeva, on the other hand, a meaningful connection is experienced within the subject through the act of positing the "thetic."

Quite literally, Kristeva says, "we shall call [that] which produces the positing of signification, a \textit{thetic phase.}” However it is not simply the case the thetic is mono-axial; that is to say that it does not merely "contain[s] the object as well as the proposition, and the complicity between them." In linguistic terminology this would be a "synchronic" analysis of the thetic phase. The thetic is, however, intersected by another axis, one that would combine an element of "diachronicity" to the matrix of signification. This axis is the notion of "process" or what produces the thetic in the here and now. Kristeva credits Freud with having provided the groundwork for subsequent theorists in linguistics and psychoanalysis to think the relationship between the "thetic" and "process."

Lacan’s notion of desire does not allow for this connection of the symbolic to its own production insofar as Lacan elevates the subject out of the Freudian world of the drives and into the world of purely social "symbolic" signification. "[D]esire takes up the logic of Hegelian negativity through the notions of the first Freudian topography [condensation and displacement] but raises them out of their biological and material entrenchment into the domain of social praxis where ‘social’ means ‘signifying’. " But this elevation to the “social praxis” is understood by Lacan the “function of [a]
misrecognition,”⁶⁵(méconnaissance) insofar as the function of the social is a futile practice of erecting/demolishing essentially false images of the self. Thus Kristeva posits that in Lacan:

The negativity... positing the never saturated subject in process/on trial ... will be replaced by a nothingness – the ‘lack’ [manque] that brings about the unitary being of the subject. Desire will be seen as an always already accomplished subjugation of the subject to lack: it will serve to demonstrate the development of the signifier, never the heterogenous process that questions the psychosomatic orders.⁶⁶

Here it becomes evident in Kristeva’s interpretation of Lacan that he creates a subject that is wholly defined by only one side of a dichotomy: lack (compare to the symbolic, which attempts to fill the lacking subject). “The phallus totalizes the effects of signifieds as having been produced by the signifier.”⁶⁷ In any case, the subject is lacking – ontologically. Having heretofore introduced and explained Lacan’s notion of lack I will now further differentiate it from Kristeva’s concept of loss.

Lack, loss, and the difference in-between

The relative difference between Lacan’s lack and Kristeva’s loss can best be fleshed out by first making a reference to the notion of “empty signifiers.” The relationship between signifiers and signifieds is thought to be, thanks to the work of Saussure “arbitrary.” That is to say, there is no natural connection between word and world. For Lacan, what this means is that the subject, constituted by the signifier, is essentially “empty,” or predicated on lack. However, by introducing the semiotic into the mix, Kristeva provides a motivation for the production and specific utilization of such signifiers. She replaces the notion that signifiers are “arbitrary” with the idea that they “articulate.” She does not mean to suggest that indeed signifiers signify something natural in the world that can be pointed to empirically; she only means to suggest that signifiers have a certain motivation about them insofar as they are connected to the
semiotic rhythms of the body. Kristeva finds the "principle of this motivation in the
Freudian notion of the unconscious insofar as the theories of drives ... and primary
processes ... can connect 'empty signifiers' to psychosomatic functionings." Such a
linguistic theory is "clearly indebted to the positions of ... Melanie Klein in particular,"
the instinctual drives, as well as vocalic and intonational differentiations that other more
formalist theories exclude. 70

Through linking the semiotic drives of the body to the social functioning of the
symbolic Kristeva comes to argue over Lacan that there is a certain *jouissance*
experienced by the subject that the latter's subject is incapable of experiencing. This
$jouissance$ is experienced in the process of expressing oneself through poetic
language/writing.

This acute pleasure therefore coincides with a loss, a separation from the body, and the isolating of
objects outside it. Before the body itself is posited as a detached alterity, and hence the real object,
this expulsion of objects is the subject's fundamental experience of separation - a separation
which is not a lack, but a *discharge*, and which, although privative, arouses pleasure. 71

I want to draw the reader's attention to the emphasis placed upon the term "discharge"
and the association it shares with the act of rejecting or expelling the pre-objectal mother
during primary narcissism. The expulsion or *discharging* of poetic language from ones
body conjures up the archaic drives that traverse and penetrate one's body, especially
those orifices and sphincters, such as the anus (Kristeva has explained that this is the last
sphincter to come under ordering and repression) which we know are associated with
destruction. Compare this to Klein's "hate" aspect of the "schizo-paranoid" phase and the
pleasure that is derived via the biting and tearing at the mother's breast. The fact of the
matter remains that in Kristeva there occur upsurges of the semiotic in the field of the
symbolic in the form of the thetic. Furthermore the thetic does not pivot upon a single
(synchronic) axis but is intersected with a historical “diachronic” axis. Read
psychoanalytically: this “historical” reference is projected into the “deep structures” of
the subject’s constitution, that is to say the pre-Oedipal phase where the semiotic chora
reigns. This association with the semiotic and the jouissance that it entails is what
differentiates Kristeva’s notion of “loss” from the Lacanian subject which is forever kept
from accessing its own “real.”

The altered notion of loss that Kristeva advances provides her with an advantage
over that of Lacan (and by extension Deleuze and Guattari as I will describe in detail
later) insofar as for Lacan a certain kind of subject emerges: “the subject, precisely, of
desire, who lives at the expense of his desires, ever in search of a lacking object. The sole
source of his praxis is this quest of lack, death, and language.”

Lacan’s subject becomes
reified as a subject of desire (or lack). There is no “process” inherent to the subjects
being, s/he is simply “circumambulating” this lack, to borrow a technical term from
Lacan’s VII Seminar. Kristeva posits that Lacan succumbed to the same problematic that
Heidegger fell victim to when he affirmed his subject, a “Being-in-the-World,” qua
“man” as the kind of entity that was characterized as such based on their relationship to
cura [“care”]. In either case, Kristeva claims, “negativity is thereby tamed in a subject
who is posited there only as a subject anguished by an inaccessible sociality or
transcendence.”

The same is true with respect to Kristeva’s advantages over Klein
whose emphasis on the loss of the pre-objectal mother shares in a notion of materiality
that has its grounding in the economy of Freud’s Verneinung [negation]. This is not the
same as Kristevan negativity per se.
Pertaining to the potential advantage that this altered notion of loss (proper to Kristeva) has over Deleuze and Guattari, one might choose to refer to her comments in the ‘prolegomenon’ to her *Revolution in Poetic Language*:

Deleuze and Guattari, are right to stress the de-structuring and a-signifying machine of the unconscious. [...] What is readily apparent, however, is that their examples of ‘schizophrenic flow’ are usually drawn from modern literature, in which the ‘flow’ itself exists only through language, appropriating and displacing the signifier to practice within it the heterogenous generating of the ‘desiring-machines’.

Deleuze and Guattari’s capacity to stake their position that the subject is constituted purely symbolically (with no reference to the semiotic) is provided the very grounds for being staked in virtue of a fluid negativity. Their “rejection” of the semiotic is itself a moment of negation which can only take place in an un-namable external realm (Freud’s unconscious) which itself is postulated on the premise of an ineffable bridge connecting the two (internal and external realms). In short Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of the symbolic is such that it too possesses the properties of the semiotic, which would be an inherent contradiction. Through the positing of the “fouth term” of the dialectic, “negativity,” Kristeva salvages subjectivity from becoming reified as “multiplicity.”

**Part 4: Affirmation and Force: From that ‘Noble Sage’ to Rodez**

There is however another tradition with respect to negativity that has been philosophized upon since before the early moderns; it is the concept of ‘affirmation.’ Thinkers who have been affiliated with affirmation, like Hegel is associated with negativity, include: Spinoza, Nietzsche, Klossowski, and Artaud. I will contextualize the concept of affirmation through an exegesis of the tradition since Spinoza very shortly; however for now let me set the scene for how I understand the concepts to differ generally.
Deleuze and Guattari’s particular sympathies with regard to affirmation and its role in the constitution of subjectivity has to do with the developments that emerged out of the “new psychoanalysis” following Klein, of which Lacan was the leading figurehead. Kristeva explains how these intellectuals considered talk of the pre-Oedipal phase of development to be meaningless. Consider Lacan’s depiction of the “real” (i.e. the name he denotes the pre-Oedipal with) as that which resists representation. Also recall from Lacan that existential meaning only exists through the manipulation of the “symbolic.” In any case, Lacan and his followers set aside the pre-Oedipal and the domain of “primary symbolization, which they considered to be ‘mythical’. Pertaining specifically to the theoretical needs within psychoanalysis and philosophy Lacan et al. reformulated Freud’s Oedipus complex in terms of the newly established “Name-of-the-Father.” In short, talk of the pre-Oedipal became a moot point for this group. Any progressive or affirmative advantages gained by means of a detour through the “semiotic” (negativity) were no longer accorded the same value. One could thus conceptualize a philosophical system which utilizes only the properties of the “symbolic” and is thus based purely on affirmation. That being said, like negativity with respect to Hegel, Marx, and Freud, affirmation shares a history deeply laden throughout Western thought. It is now that I will turn to an exegesis of these contributors.

Spinoza

This is a rather depressing prognosis with respect to human subjectivity and civilization in general. Thinking in terms of negation and negativity was challenged early on in the early modern era – Deleuze argues – by Spinoza. In contrast to a humanism characterized by negation, Deleuze sees in Spinoza a philosophy of “joy”. The individual
is not fated to endure the faults of its own constitution, which would imply ‘passivity’,
but instead is empowered with the ability to ‘activity’ construct itself:

There is no Good or Evil, but there is good and bad [...] That individual will be called good
...who strives, insofar as he is capable, to organize his encounters, to join with whatever agrees
with his nature, to combine his relation with relations that are compatible with his [...] That
individual will be called bad, or servile, or weak, or foolish, who lives haphazardly, who is content
to undergo the effects of his encounters, but wails and accuses every time the effect undergone
does not agree with him and reveals his own impotence.²⁹

Spinoza insinuates that the human subject falsely “moralizes” experience through
internalizing a sense of guilt or inevitability in light of the calamity of which it is
surrounded. However this is a misguided perspective on experience Deleuze argues on
behalf of Spinoza. The ethical life, or “joy” of life is to be found “in the correlate of
speculative affirmation”, as opposed to negation and negativity. Nietzsche later adopts
this notion of affirmation in what Deleuze refers to as his “anti-Hegelianism”.³¹

**Nietzsche**

Nietzsche is the quintessential philosopher that Deleuze and Guattari draw upon
most significantly in developing their philosophy of subjectivity. Deleuze reads
Nietzsche’s interpretation of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic in terms of ‘forces’. “In
Nietzsche the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a negative
element in the essence”.³² Recall from the exegesis on Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel
that the relative positions of the master and slave are established in light of one of the
participants in the ‘fight to the death’ recanting their pitch to be recognized as the
essential value (self-consciousness; ‘slave’). This participant, the would-be-slave, fails to
go “to the limit of its power”,³³ and thus fails to become an ‘active’ force. Instead the
participant becomes ‘reactive’. This is equivalent to the ‘bad’ individual explained above
in the Spinoza.
The problem that Nietzsche perceives in the dialectic and thus negativity in general is thus: by structuring relations in terms of conflict or opposition (i.e. master/slave) negativity and the dialectic constitute a state of nihilism; that is to say, it pre-ordains a world "in which life is accused, judged, and condemned". The dialectic "presupposes its failure and impotence". In short it presupposes a decadent and reactive existence – which is equivalent to ‘slave’ or ‘herd’ mentality, or as Nietzsche puts it: “descending” as opposed to “ascending” existence. Deleuze writes that, "Nietzsche’s “yes” is opposed to the dialectical “no”; affirmation to dialectical negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour". For Nietzsche the human condition, the all-too-human condition, is to be reactive. This condition of reactivity is in a sense a self-incurred condition of strife and misery. The subject literally inflicts pain and hardship upon itself needlessly. Nietzsche contests that we can always will another way; an affirmative way. However we do not chose this. We chose to keep this affirmative power ‘within’ repressed. The following few comments will lead into my discussion on Klossowski and Artaud.

Nietzsche’s criticism of science, mostly biology, is that the way we practice science as a method of epistemological enquiry is determined in the way our consciousness is structured: reactively. "What happens is that science follows the paths of consciousness, relying entirely on other reactive forces; the organism is always seen from the petty side, from the side of its reactions". Nietzsche criticizes Darwin for casting the organism as the result of a passive process as compared to that of Lamarck who foretold an evolutionary structure wherein the organism was the sole conductor of it’s bodily constitution. I want to highlight this mentioning of the ‘body’ and elliptically refer back
to the master/slave dialectic for a moment. Both participants in the ‘fight-to-the-death’ were solely focused on being recognized as self-conscious and thus being elevated above their raw, natural, biological – bodily -- being. Thus the body becomes repressed.

To quote from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Nietzsche writes, “behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage – whose name is self. In your body he dwells; he is your body.”\(^8\) The active forces of the body have been repressed by the passivity of consciousness, by the ego. As far as Deleuze interprets Nietzsche, the ethical life (Spinoza) ought to be one that pursues active engagements. But what are these ‘active’ powers? Deleuze answers by appealing to Nietzsche: “appropriating, possessing, subjugating, dominating – these are the characteristic of active force”.\(^9\) It is to Klossowski’s and Artaud’s respective adoptions of these ‘active’ forces that I would now like to turn.

**Klossowski**

Pierre Klossowski was vital in bringing Nietzsche to France (similar to Kojève and Hegel). This was accomplished mainly through his book *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*. Therein Klossowski advances his argument that Nietzsche’s introduction of the “eternal return” is his most enigmatic concept. “To a significant degree, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* responds to and enlarges a problematic set up by Nietzsche throughout his *oeuvre*: the relation of the body to language”.\(^9\) For both Nietzsche and Klossowski language emerges as a product of the body but simultaneously represses the body. This is due to the economic value of language and the sign. The human subject achieves great things through communicating information to and from other individuals. I ‘ask’ a question; I am ‘answered’ in the others’ response. However, the language that is involved
in the economic system of exchanging signs produces false representations of the body. “Language encapsulates, but cannot encapsulate, the material conditions of its production.” The material conditions for the production of language are the impulses that drive the feral rhythms of the body.

Klossowski considers these impulses, as does Nietzsche, to be of singular value; completely unnamenable to economic exchange. “For Klossowski, the exchange of signs—both between and within particular languages—conceals and disavows the specificity of each body, and so begets an oppressive sameness.” Klossowski observes Nietzsche’s various illnesses and sees the body at war with itself. Klossowski writes, “If the body is presently in pain, if the brain is sending nothing but distress signals, it is because a language is trying to make itself heard at the price of reason.” The project for Klossowski became one that would seek to de-subjectivize the false construct that was the self/ego, by actively releasing the impulses of the body through a multiplicity of vociferous/discursive modes. This multiplicity within the body is what Klossowski refers to as “solecism”. “Solecism refers to the body working in two directions that oppose each other.” In order for this ethical project of releasing the body to become disseminated Klossowski’s fiction will aim to affect the reader on a corporeal level, where the reader feels the words that Klossowski writes. The reader will chose the visceral body over their misguided economy of language, now aware that the latter was purely reactive and oppressive (economic language).

Artaud

With regard to any philosophy of subjectivity constituted upon affirmation, Antonin Artaud occupies a special place. His descent (if it can be called a ‘descent’) into
insanity was chronicled through the horrific images that he produced of the human body during his stay at Rodez.

Artaud’s drawings... articulated the utter fragmentation of identity which he had endured through his incarceration and electroshocks. The surface of the drawings became an arena in which Artaud dispersed an imagery of decapitated body parts and organs, screaming mouths and jagged scars. These elements of a physical detritus were set against a threatening proliferation of electrical instruments and machine parts, of nails and spikes.95

These drawings were not negative rejections of life (given all the pain that Artaud had been forced to endure) they were in fact affirmations of the life inside him that had not been destroyed. Instead of dwelling negatively on what he was not Artaud chose to explore the remaining drives and forces of life within. As Stephen Barber writes, “Artaud had been digging into his body to discover what was left alive. In a drawing such as Box Up The Anatomy, only the discarded bones are left of the body – but even this autopsied debris can be seen to contain the traces of new human figures within it.”96 Although graphic and obscene, Artaud’s drawings, along with literary transgressions such as Klossowski’s Roberte ce soir and the rape scene of Roberte by the Colossus and Hunchback, serve to strike a cord, or ignite a visceral reaction within the viewer/reader and awaken an awareness concerning the multiplicity of selves within our bodies that are oppressed and waiting to become affirmed.

Part 5: Wandering depressives

Kristeva’s later thought

Recalling the introductory parts pertaining to Kristeva’s notion of negativity I will consider the “early Kristeva” to be sufficiently covered. In this section I will restrict my discussion only to Kristeva’s “later thought.” Kristeva’s later thought would be primarily articulated in three works during the 1980’s: Powers of Horror (1980), Tales of Love (1987), and Black Sun (1989).97 While never abandoning the notion of “process”
developed in her early work, Kristeva’s focus will shift slightly during this period toward stressing the importance of the pre-verbal moment prior to subject formation that is constitutive of subjectivity. For Kristeva, and alongside Beardsworth I take this constitutive moment to be the loss of the mother, or what the mother was to the infant prior to subject formation.

The reason that the separation from the mother is of such significance for Kristeva is because its marks the break with our primary narcissism. She writes, “The Freudian Narcissus does not know who he is at all and only invests in his image because he is not sure of his own identity […] Why is this organization unstable, on the border? Because it is still too dependent on the other – in this case, the Mother – from whom the subject is in the process of separating.” 98 Indeed for Kristeva, after our immediate separation from dependency upon the mother we are rendered without a definite identity. This is not to suggest that prior to separation from the mother the subject did have a proper identity and that it was this identity that is lost. What I mean to convey after reading Kristeva is more in-line with Heidegger’s notion of “thrownness” such that we are thrown into the world without any discernible nature or guidelines by which to live. 99

There is, for Kristeva, a condition of lack that results from the separation from the mother. This lack is constitutive; meaning that it can never be “filled” per se. This lack of an identity is constituted as such due to the fact that during the separation the infant literally lost that which he/she identified as itself – the mother. 100 This is what establishes the subject, for Kristeva, as a subject-in-process; a subject forever “on-trial” trying to establish an identity for itself. However the identity that this subject-in-process desires is one that is always already lost to it. Recall that the first “experiences” of the yet-to-be-
subject (*infans*) were purely affective and not symbolic. As such the world as we experience it symbolically is strange to us.¹⁰¹ It is strange to us insofar as these things that we see around us offer us no meaning, but instead only offer us opportunity to represent affective, pre-symbolic, experiences through which we can identify ourselves. One can never return to that stage of primary narcissism (with the mother). *The closest we can come to identifying with this unattainable identity is through experiences of loss, separation, breaks, ruptures, and so on.* These events are what Kristeva sees as repetitive within and constitutive of life throughout. There are, as have been mentioned earlier, three moments of pre-subjective/linguistic/oedipal development which Kristeva adds to the psychoanalytic and philosophical corpus: love, loss, and abjection. I want now to focus on expanding these concepts as they will set the foundation for my critique of the limitations of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of subjectivity.

**Love**

Kristeva asserts in *Tales of Love*, “all the philosophies of thought, from Plato down to Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, that have aimed to give the experience of love a strong hold on reality have pruned out of it what is disorderly in order to reduce it to an initiatory voyage drawn toward the supreme Good or the absolute Spirit”.¹⁰² What Kristeva means to articulate here is that for the most part philosophers have sought to situate love within an organized totality or system of thought that can be given “symbolic” meaning. Love in this sense becomes reified. By “reification” I understand the process of taking something abstract and rendering it material or concrete. Philosophers have been driven to understand the nature of love by demarcating what love is. They have sought to provide it with a recognizable identity. However, the desire to
characterize ‘love’ as ‘x’, ‘y’, or ‘z’ threatens to lead one down a reductive path; hence love becomes reified.

Contemporary science has revealed certain paradoxes that are central to our conception of the universe. Things do not necessarily abide by Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle; for example light is both a wave and a particle. Likewise love is something that cannot be delimited neatly and placed within a static symbolic system as Kristeva asserts has been the case throughout western history in *Tales of Love*. Love is a very nebulous, muddy concept that virtually resists clear and definite articulation or identification. Conventionally love’s antithesis has been considered -- hate. But as Freud illustrates in his observations of child’s play, love and hate are veritably intermingled with one another (see “fort-da”).

Turning his observation to clinical psycho-pathology Freud focused on the “disorder” behind the speech of the patient’s actions. Psychoanalysis – the talking cure – would utilize the mishaps, slips of the tongue, jokes, and so on to postulate the existence of a plethora of repressed desires alive in the unconscious of the patient. Therefore that which philosophers attempted to totalize within a symbolic system of discourse was arguably the furthest thing from love. Freud’s experience of watching his grandson play with the reel/sting illustrates the point that love resists concrete identification.

These “games” can, however, evolve into greater problems for the subject in question, namely growing and morphing into debilitating neurosis. Without seeking an all encompassing panacea, Freud contended that by talking through the absurdities and fantasies enunciated through the speech of the patient, the repressed “reality” of their desires could be made evident for them. Upon understanding (if only a fraction of...) this
repressed reality, the patient could, through the mentorship of the analyst, construct his/her own conscious reality of, as Kristeva phrases it, “a more or less fragile border of your love life”. This mentorship or relationship between analyst and analysand is the “transference relationship.” It is the structure through which love can be used as a cure. Kristeva describes the structure of the transference relationship as, “two bodies listening and speaking to each other sight unseen”. The analysand is positioned facing away from the analyst. This is because in the exchange of speaking and listening the analysand becomes unable to think of any other object of his/her love than the one that presents itself then and there: the other, simply there, listening and present. The analysand does not want to know that the other “is only a doctor and furthermore that he is not ‘free’”. This love is developed to a point where it becomes unbearable and the analysand confesses their love for the analyst. The analyst then informs that, “No, it is not (only) me that you love, it is also, it is above all … so and-so”.

This person, this “so and-so” that the analysand really loves is what Kristeva refers to the lost “Thing” of primary narcissism, or of whom the analyst “offers himself [to] cathexis like an archaic mother under a hold as loving as it is deadly”. Before continuing further, some clarification:

(1) This relationship is caring. The “so and-so” which Kristeva calls the lost Thing is also referred to as the archaic mother because the “archaic mother” stands for the object-of-choice of the infans during the pre-verbal stage of development when the mother could not be identified as such. In other words, the lost Thing can also be considered on par with the chora in Kristeva’s corpus, insofar as both the lost Thing and the chora resist being “named” as such. Therefore during transference the analyst
functions as the archaic mother of pre-verbal development, prior to when the subject could be considered a subject proper. In the process of analysis the analyst helps the analysand form a coherent narrative that they can choose to adopt and practice as the foundation for their own life projects. It is in this sense that the transference relationship is caring.

(2) This relationship is deadly. Transference hearkens to a time in development where the child did not experience subjectivity as such since it was narcissistically fused with the mother in the mother/child dyad. The analyst also serves the function of the father. This is the function of the analyst that allows for the analysand to separate from the analyst after treatment. This is only made possible assuming the analyst falls in love with the patient. “For if I do not really love my patients, what could I understand in them, what could I tell them?”108, that is to say, what could the analyst tell the analysand regarding what they are capable of representing to themselves as their reality such that it will remain productive for them. This is “Countertransference.” Transference / countertransference is deadly insofar as the analyst could seriously damage the analysand’s capacity to break away as their own subject, if he/she becomes too carried away with their own power and desires of narcissistic fortification.

Although there are physically only two people present in analysis, or transference love, there are three people involved in the dynamic: “the subject (the analysand), his imaginary or real object of love ... and the Third Party, the stand-in for potential Ideal, possible Power”.109 Both of the latter are “played” by the analyst, respectively. This is the role of the father -- as mentioned above -- which functions as a site for symbolic generation (recall Lacan’s Name-of-the-Father). “The analyst occupies that place of the
Other; he is a subject who is supposed to know ... and as a consequence he will, in the cure, become the supreme loved one and first-class victim”.¹¹⁰ This is why the transference relationship (transference love) resists reification. Both Freud and Kristeva recognize that in the ‘love’ relationship, predicated as it is on a primordial relationship between Two, the love object is simultaneously loved and hated. For example, sex, as an act that is thought to be symbolic of the love shared between two (or more) individuals, is ironically something incredibly violent. Therefore sex is a certain manifestation of hate.¹¹¹

Take another example: Elisabeth Bronfen’s comments in Over her dead body: “At the same time symbolization, as one of the main ways of establishing a relation to the outside world and to reality, is grounded on violence, initially on the sadistic relation to the maternal body.”¹¹² This is what it means for the analyst to be the one who is suppose to know how to love. While serving the role of the one which is the object of the analysand’s love-cathexis (mother), the analyst also serves as the Third Party (father) who presents the subject-to-be with a symbolic discourse. By encouraging the analysand to simply speak in the mode of stream-of-consciousness (spewing forth the unconscious ramblings of condensation and displacement, free association, and so on) the patient is able to produce “a literature lacking an audience” but a literature which nonetheless grants the “cathartic effects of great art”.¹¹³ It is in this sense that Kristeva places the emphasis she does on art, literature (poetry especially) and psychoanalysis, and not philosophy proper, as a means of ethical self-transformation.

Loss
Kristeva’s work *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia* continues her critique of Freud’s account of the structures of primary narcissism. Her examination begins by fleshing out the theory that suggests affective “experiences” are maintain and/or transferred within the material of the body. “Deficiencies in the left hemisphere, which controls linguistic generation, lead to domination – temporary as it may be – by the right hemisphere, which controls affects.”¹¹⁴ The affects that are registered by the body are those “experiences” of the “booming and buzzing” of our pre-subjective narcissistic relationship with the mother. “I shall posit that the register of psychic and, particularly linguistic representation is neurologically transferred to the physiological occurrences of the brain.”¹¹⁵ The affects that were “pre-subjectively” experienced leave a trace upon our brains which is represented as a trace of something of which we can only understand as lost to us. Throughout history man’s attempt to represent this lost ‘entity’ has taken many forms. Whether it be represented as God or a transcendent signified, Kristeva suggest that it is our primary narcissism that allows for us to explore the world both inside and outside of ourselves through the playful work of art and literature; attempting to capture the lost “Thing” through our use of symbols.

However this process of continuously attempting to represent the lost Thing manifests itself in frustration (recall Lacan) and more radically in depression and melancholia for Kristeva. This is due to the fact that there is an “excess of affect” that “has thus no other means of coming to the fore than to produce new languages”.¹¹⁶ We constantly experience ourselves as moving from one symbolic system to another with the impending realization that these symbolic systems or paradigms are arbitrary and thus inherently meaningless. “With melancholy persons”, Kristeva suggests, “meaning
appears arbitrary [...] Meaning, however, is arbitrary.\textsuperscript{117} She uses the example of the word “LAF” and the fact that the letters LAF are completely unmotivated with respect to the meaning of “Laugh”. The meaning is what is important and when the power of the signifier to represent the meaning fails, it is time for the subject to establish another language or symbolic system that meets this need.

Signs that compose symbolic systems are arbitrary and their “origin” derives from the moment the infant loses the mother in primary narcissism. The infant comes to lament the loss of the pre-objectal mother through an immediate “denial” of such loss. Literally, Kristeva says, the infant responds, “I have lost an essential object that happens to be, in the final analysis, my mother,”...“But no, I have found her again in signs, or rather since I consent to lose her I have not lost her...I can rediscover her in language”.\textsuperscript{118} This is what Kristeva calls the “negation of loss” (along with the depression occasioned by mourning). There is a constitutive depression that is brought along with the inauguration of symbolic language; because, as the lost object is mourned, Kristeva adds, the mourning that laments the loss is incomplete. Depressed persons “disavow negation” she writes. They nostalgically fall back on/into the real object (The Thing) of loss that they do not manage to lose. As such these individuals remain painfully “riveted” to the Thing.\textsuperscript{119} The significance of what Kristeva is arguing for is that this depression is what characterizes all language as well as art; indeed the human condition. We are all depressives in search of love. This connects her notion of depression and melancholia with love in the previous section.

The act of denying negation is the act of an impossible mourning, and it is this impossible mourning that establishes an artificial/unbelievable language that is not
accessible to any signifier. This is what is meant by the notion of “traces” being left upon our subjectivity from the pre-subjective narcissistic state of development. “The result is that traumatic memories…are not repressed but constantly evoked as the denial of negation prevents the work of repression, at least of its representative part”. This is Kristeva fleshing out the claim that the dividing line that separates our ego from its origins (primary narcissism) is indeed more blurred than originally thought. The way that we understand ourselves as symbolic beings, organized and socialized through rituals as well as custom and habit is arbitrary. When we realize this we become seduced by the traces of our pre-subjective being. To fall victim to this seduction would guarantee our death and is typically manifested in the act of suicide. In this sense a depressive’s self-incurred demise is “taboo,” or in other psychoanalytic terms: “incestuous”.

The only objects for the depressed person are the “affects”. The affects, our moods and emotions, become our “love-objects” in a sense, or as Kristeva words it, staying true to the Kleinian tradition, the “partial object of depressed persons”. The depressive person, (who is “everyone” for Kristeva) becomes perverse with respect to their “love objects,” developing a sycophantic relationship to their affects. The end to which the depressive strives is a “narcissistic homeostasis”. They feel “a nonverbal, unnamable (omnipotent) hold over a nonobjectal Thing.” However this leads to borderline personality conditions, flirtations with suicide, and so on. This is why Kristeva sees psychoanalysis as pragmatic in the sense that it can be used to dissolve the “denial mechanism” that leads to melancholia. Through analysis, Kristeva suggests, a “genuine graft” of the symbolic can be offered up to the subject through the use of “discursive strategies” (hence the notion of the ‘talking cure’ and the efficacy of ‘transference’ as
championed in the previous sub-section). By working at the intersection of the affective/linguistic or symbolic/semiotic, as Kristeva is apt to phrase it, the analysand (subject) will best be able to form a meaningful narrative for herself that will effectively salvage her from the squalor of depression from which she will never truly be free. It is in this sense that psychoanalysis is a counterdepressant (Contra: Antidepressant) for Kristeva.

*Abjection*

Indeed psychoanalysis can be utilized as a counterdepressant, effectively saving the subject from the squalor of depression, or that limit of her ego where her sense of self threatens to decompose completely. This borderline state that threatens the stability of the ego and thus defines the greater part of Kristeva’s subject-in-process, is called abjection.

The most definite thing that can be said of abjection (if anything definite can be said at all about it) is that “abjection is above all ambiguity,” internal/external, loved/hated, true/false, and/or logical/illogical. However in its psychoanalytic function, “abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order to be – maintaining that night in which the outline of the signified thing vanishes and where only the imponderable affect is carried out.” We are drawn toward moments and sites of the abject everywhere we turn. They are psychically necessary, for they allow the subject to say “that is what I am not!” A corpse for instance is a moment of abjection. The corpse provides a definite representation of what it is to be a “living” body. However, throughout western history man has toyed with the idea of a definite boundary
with respect to death and the corpse. Take for example the cultural fascination the west
displays with respect to zombies, witches, and of course vampires.

Adam Phillips makes the bold assertion that “being a person is virtually or
potentially intolerable unless you are lucky enough to live in a time of war”.\textsuperscript{129} This claim
is less offensive when one considers it in light of what he mentions just prior, that “what
war confirmed, and the air raids in particular, was ‘...how very much easier it is for the
human mind to tolerate external danger than internal dangers’”.\textsuperscript{130} Phillips, drawing our
attention to the events of the Second World War (air raids in London), argues that there is
a constitutive aspect to the human condition such that we find it easier to psychically
manage external war than manage the war we are constantly fighting within ourselves
(the content of our repression). Kristeva, in \textit{Powers of Horror}, devotes great attention to
the writings of Céline; a writer who in the wake of the Second World War had this to say
about the condition of the subject: “Suffering as the place of the subject. Where it
emerges, where it is differentiated from chaos. An incandescent, unbearable limit
between inside and outside, ego and other. The initial, fleeting grasps: “suffering,” “fear,”
ultimate words sighting the crest where sense topples over into senses, the “intimate” into
“nerves.” Being as ill-being”.\textsuperscript{131} There is a sense in which war is inevitable and/or even
willed by the human subject. This is because war serves the function of the abject, or the
preconditions for the foundations of the ego. Since, as Kristeva posits, the mourning
which laments our separation from the pre-objectal mother is always already incomplete,
we are in constant need of these abject conditions to assert our independent sense of self.
The most radical realization of this hypothesis is found in the work of Klaus Theweleit. In the ‘foreword’ to Male Fantasies: Women, Floods, Bodies, History Barbara Ehrenreich articulates Theweleit’s disturbing thesis about the Freikorp,

The Freikorps-men hate women, specifically women’s bodies and sexuality. It would not be going too far to say that their perpetual war was undertaken to escape women; even the motherly battlefront nurse is a threatening intrusion in the unisexual world of war. This hatred — or dread — of women cannot be explained with Freud’s all-purpose Oedipal triangulation ... The dread arises in the pre-Oedipal struggle of the fledgling self, before there is even an ego to sort out the objects of desire and the odds of getting them: It is a dread, ultimately, of dissolution — of being swallowed, engulfed, annihilated. Women’s bodies are the holes, swamps, pits of muck that can engulf.

If the matricidal condition of war is set in motion by the pre-Oedipal stage of development than the need for war-like conditions, abject conditions, pervade beyond that of the select group of men in Germany who would later go on to form what would come to be known as the Nazi party. It is constitutive of the human condition. “The abject confronts us … with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her, thanks to the autonomy of language. It is a violent, clumsy breaking away, with the risk of falling back under the sway of a power as securing as it is stifling”. It is the enacting of the Freudian ‘death drive’; that is to say, the desire we have to return to that prior state inorganic being, characteristic of our narcissism. Kristeva writes, “The abject … takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken away — it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, and death. Abjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego). It is an alchemy that transforms death drive into a start of life, of new significance”.

Céline’s rendition of the suffering and trauma of the abject conditions of war are not meaningless, but instead serve a very important psychic function, for it is what connects the phenomenon of the abject to love. “A narrative is, all in all, the most elaborate attempt, next to syntactic competence, to situate a speaking being between his
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desires and their prohibitions, in short, the Oedipal triangle.” The act of superimposing a narrative atop utter chaos is an act of love. Even if this narrative is to depict chaos as “chaos”, it remains a representation of chaos nonetheless. Consider Kristeva’s argument that suggests that the subject’s utilization of the signifier in free-fancy allows for the depiction of non-representable non-sense to be made manifest (albeit symbolically) to the subject. However, it is this very content, the non-representable non-sense (or the “booming and buzzing” of pre-symbolic narcissism) which is desired by the subject. Composing a narrative allows for the subject to “flirt” with that which is forbidden to him, (the “incest taboo”) the pre-objectal relationship to the mother. He seeks to accomplish this by violating the phallic mark of the signifier, the symbolic, or the Name-of-the-Father. By using the signifier in ways that transgress its primacy of meaning and representation the subject can gain a tenuous glimpse of their repressed desires. Our desire to experience love with the lost object is made possible through narrative.

Kristeva extends her thesis on the abject to disquiet the boundaries within her own Freudian understanding of the psyche. She writes,

On such limits and at the limit one could say that there is no unconscious, which is elaborated when representations and affects (whether or not tied to representations) shape a logic. Here on the contrary, consciousness has not assumed its rights and transformed into signifiers those fluid demarcations of yet unstable territories where an “I” that is taking shape is ceaselessly straying. Kristeva erases the Cartesian dualism inherent within the psychoanalytic corpus to which she subscribes. The conscious/unconscious divide is an artificial construct. She sees this thesis fleshed out in works of literature (a la Céline) as well as works of visual art (painting in particular). Kristeva sees art as giving symbolic status to that which is usually considered “disturbing or un-representable, inexpressible, unsigned” or in other
words, the unconscious. Where the unconscious and consciousness begin and end is wholly ambiguous. 138

These are the three moments of pre-Oedipal development which for Kristeva have lasting implications for the status of the subject as one that is always already in-process, on-trial, and/or under analysis. It is now that I will turn my attention toward fleshing out the opposing camp, that of the anti-Oedipals: Deleuze and Guattari.

**Part 6: Schizophrenics**

In order to place this section in context I want to first state that Kristeva recognizes Hegelian negativity to be essentially tethered to the Freudian notion of the unconscious. In *Strangers to Ourselves* she writes that Romanticism as well as German nationalism (Herder's *Völksgeist*), "but especially the Hegelian Negativity – which at the same time restored and systematized, unleashed and bound the power of the Other, against and within the consciousness of the Same – might be thought of as stages on the way to the "Copernican revolution" that the discovery of the Freudian unconscious amounted to". 139 Deleuze makes explicit his position on the matter when he exclaimed, "what I detested more than anything else was Hegelianism and the dialectic". 140

**Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of the subject-of-enunciation**

The subject, for Deleuze and Guattari is structured linguistically, albeit in a radically different way compared to Kristeva. Quite generally, Deleuze and Guattari do not see language as being tainted with abjection or loss, and as such they do not see literature or poetry as acts of mourning. They choose to take up Lacan’s theory of subjectivity as constituted through language; however, they will rescind the castration complex associated with the signifier. There is no desire to which the signifier or the
Name-of-the-Father is prohibiting access with respect to the subject. In short, subjectivity does not originate from lack. They write in *Anti-Oedipus*, "Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is rather, that subject that is missing in desire".\(^{141}\) In light of the above remarks on Hegel's interpretation of language, Deleuze and Guattari would criticize Hegel for trying to get at the "particular" by means of the universal. All that are present are signifiers that simply float about a general assemblage of other signifiers. This interpretation of the linguistic construction of subjectivity is much deeper and complex than this and requires further clarification.

Deleuze and Guattari's schizoid theory of subjectivity, insofar as their subject is a "speaking subject", operates according to the nature of what they call "order-words." "The elementary unit of language – the statement is the order-word."\(^{142}\) I will elaborate upon order-words later, for now let it be considered sufficient to state that for Deleuze and Guattari language is first and foremost tied to power. This notion of power is meant to be understood in the sense that Foucault uses the term. It pertains to the ability of institutions and/or individuals to coerce others into acting in certain ways that said others would not otherwise have acted. I do not mean to suggest that there is a corporeal coercion or force persuading individuals to act in ways they would not otherwise choose. Power for Foucault as well as Deleuze and Guattari is all pervasive. It penetrates to the very core of the subject's constitution *qua* subject.

For Deleuze and Guattari there are three aspects to their philosophy of language, which when understood in concert significantly implicate how they understand the emergence of subjectivity. The three aspects of language are: (1) That the function of *all* language is the transmission of order-words; (2) The relationship order-words have with
what are known as “Assemblages of Enunciation”; (3) The mechanism by means of which these assemblages affect change through “Incorporeal Transformations.” I will now explain these in sequential order, explaining all technical terminology in the process.

Order-words are commands and instructions. However these commands and instructions are not solely directed toward an Other, such as from a teacher to student. Order-words are self-affective in nature. Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a school mistress challenging her students on an answer. A cursory inspection may suggest that the mistress is enforcing the proper code of knowledge into the minds of her students. However such is not exclusively the matter. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the mistress is also, and more importantly, keeping herself in check. She is enforcing her own code. “Language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience”.143 By challenging the students she is essentially challenging herself as well, reinforcing the structures of power that are dominating the situation at present.

The power that these order-words distribute in their use is not the product of any idiosyncratic experience or meaning therein. There is nothing personal that the statement is specifically endowed with. The order-word is nothing other than a tacitly accepted utterance generated by means of a collective. This is the “assemblage of enunciation”. As with other poststructuralist theorists, Deleuze and Guattari deflect from any notion of a unified subject. Instead they choose to fragment, or de-center the subject amongst the collectivity through which it lives. This is how Deleuze and Guattari can get away with their claim that there is no “subject” of Enunciation, or no “speaking subject” proper a la Kristeva. The subject is only a subject insofar as it acts as a conduit through which the utterances of the collective can spread and dominate. To be more precise, what this
means is that throughout time transient collectivities, or assemblages, will coalesce to form groups that resonate together and thus enunciate together. These enunciations are sets of codes and conducts, rules and regulations agreed upon using a multiplicity of glosses. No one in particular enunciates these rules or laws with one tongue, only the assemblage speaks. Thus when the individual speaks it is not their own words that they utter; they are the words that float throughout the assemblage. This is what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say “Language is not life; it gives life orders.”

That the words individuals utter are not their own but are instead the words of the collective implies that speech (and the language from which it is derived) is impersonal. This is in diametrical opposition to the position advanced earlier by Kristeva. In fact Deleuze and Guattari state explicitly that “language in its entirety is indirect discourse”. By “indirect discourse” they mean that language does not communicate first person experience or something novel, but instead reports. According to the latter we are all essentially delusional reporters under the impression that we are covering “breaking news.” Indirect discourse is hearsay insofar as it is “the presence of a reported statement within the reporting statement”. The reason why language spoken one-on-one is still impersonal – hearsay – is because “my direct discourse is still the free indirect discourse running through me, coming from other worlds or other planets”. The point that I wish to make here about Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of language might be made clearer in light of an elliptical reference to Kristeva’s amendments to what she perceived as the short-comings of contemporary linguistics.

The mechanism by means of which “assemblages of enunciation” affect change in the social stratum via order-words is explained by the phenomenon of “incorporeal
Transformations.” Deleuze and Guattari claim that, “words are not tools, but we give children language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes”. For these artifacts of language to have any power they must be situated within a proper milieu (i.e. shovels and pickaxes are powerful devices on a construction site or in the garden; not a kitchen). Deleuze and Guattari use the example of a judge’s proclamation of a man as “guilty!” The act of the judge’s ruling changes the man from being a mere “man” into a “guilty man”. By uttering the word “Guilty!” the judge affects a change upon the man that was not present seconds prior. Nothing has changed in the man but there is a difference to his character – the way he carries himself. He is now a “guilty man”. This is how language (“order-words”) implicates subjectivity through society.

Deleuze and Guattari do not agree with Kristeva that it is necessary to posit the importance of the pre-oedipal or pre-verbal stages of development to account for the “semiotic” in poetic and literary texts. They argue that intonations, rhythms, tones, stammering, musicality, pitch, are not constitutive of symbols, but are indeed “bodies” like any other bodies. Deleuze’s book on Spinoza illustrates this point clearly, “When a body “encounters” another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other”. The elements of linguistics, of language (semiotic or symbolic in Kristeva’s case) are all bodies that modify each other. Order-words, likewise, are bodies. For Deleuze and Guattari “bodies” come into contact with other “bodies” in the production of power. Stated in other words, when “semiotic” bodies collided/mix with “symbolic” order-word bodies the effect is an incorporeal transformation in the power of the statement. For example, Deleuze and Guattari note that, “in the course of a single day, an
individual repeatedly passes from language to language. He successfully speaks as “father to son” and as a boss; to his lover, he speaks an infantilized language; while sleeping he is plunged into an oniric discourse, then abruptly returns to a professional language when the telephone rings”. In the above example the manner by means of which the man speaks to his lover need not be considered “baby talk” (or infantile, in a regressive mode) because of some repressed incestuous desire to be one with the pre-objectal mother. It is simply a way to make his words mean one thing rather than another. The purposes intended -- to meld as one with his “present” love interest (not a replacement mother) – is achieved through the merely heuristic means of language.

The philosophy of language that Deleuze and Guattari propose is directly tied to their project of self-transformation, or simply the “productive” construction of subjectivity. They encourage using the artifacts of one’s own language (even incorporating elements from other languages) to open one’s “body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor”. This is fundamentally different when compared to the psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity that Freud or Kristeva advance, centering their focus on a loss that taints the subject with a feeling characterized by the death drive – that tacit sense of wanting to annihilate oneself. There is nothing in Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of subjectivity that insists it take a detour through negation before it is capable of erecting the future.

Consider Kafka, a writer that many critics have labeled pessimistic, desolate, dejected at the bleak human condition – the dignity of which has forever been lost.
Deleuze and Guattari answer these criticisms by producing a “productive” reading of Kafka’s oeuvre. They write that, “His inaptitude for marriage, his writing, the attraction to an intense and barren world are completely positive motivations from a libidinal point of view; they aren’t reactions in a derivative relation to the father”. Kafka’s writing is not to be considered a negative product of the loss of the mother or any other oedipalization. Kafka utilized those things which were present to him in his situation to produce what Deleuze and Guattari call a “line of flight”, or in other words a means by which to escape. This line of flight for Deleuze and Guattari is a purely positive and productive means of escape and not a concept that could be derived from a subject constituted through a lack. Kafka, if anything according to Deleuze and Guattari, was able to evade depression by writing some of the most controversial/revolutionary literature of his time.

Deleuze and Guattari consider these literatures, “minor” literatures. “Since the language is arid, make it vibrate with a new intensity”. There is no one minor language but a multiplicity of languages. Deleuze and Guattari cite New York City as a city that has no real language but a multiplicity of minor languages (e.g. black ghetto slangs, Hispanic/Jew mongrel type speech, Irish immigrants, etc). “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization”. A line-of-flight is created (a utilization and manipulation of the major language (i.e. English) such that a mode of speaking opens up that evades the codification (semantics and logic) of the majoritarian regime.
Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of language and subjectivity essentially has to do, as Freud and Kristeva’s does, with the production of the unconscious. The unconscious is a theme that both camps utilize albeit in radically different ways. Whereas for Freud and Kristeva the unconscious is “a continent hidden from the psyche,” Deleuze and Guattari perceive the unconscious as being produced in plain vision by the subject in question. Guattari writes that,

Gilles Deleuze and I have ... refused the Conscious-Unconscious dualisms of Freudian issues...that follow on the level of oedipal triangulation, castration complex, etc. We opted for an unconscious of superimposed, multiple strata of subjectivations, heterogenous strata of development ... An unconscious, thus, that is more, “schizo”, liberated from familialist yokes, and turned more toward the current praxis than toward fixations and regressions on the past.

The creation of minor literatures/languages is for Deleuze and Guattari a basis for ethical self-transformation or in other words the production of subjectivity. This is one of the most important aspects of minor literatures/languages as I understand the matter. I will now elaborate on these implications using Deleuze and Guattari’s case study of Kafka.

In the process of producing a minor literature Kafka was ultimately engaged in a process of constructing a multiplicity of subjectivities by means of desubjectivation. Deconstructing the subject “Kafka”, or what Kafka the man had become, is what Deleuze and Guattari consider an ethical practice. Throughout his writings Kafka rejects the traditional construct that he had internalized/maintained as Kafka. Instead he opens himself up and exposes himself to the various multiplicities that were present to him, from which the traditional understanding of subjectivity had repressed from his awareness. “[F]or a while, Kafka thought according to these traditional categories of ... the author and the hero, the narrator and the character, the dreamer and the one dreamed of. But he will quickly reject the role of the narrator, just as he will refuse an author’s or master’s literature, despite his admiration for Goethe.”
To better understand what multiplicities were present for Kafka to construct his subjectivity anew take, for example, some excerpts from some of his shorter stories: “I was stiff and cold, I was a bridge, I lay over a ravine.”\textsuperscript{160} “Consider us dogs, on the other hand!”\textsuperscript{161} A dog, a bridge, a beetle in “Metamorphosis”. Kafka no longer exists as Kafka the man, the subject, but is now poured into an endless series of different “becomings”. “Furthermore, there is no longer a subject of the enunciation, nor a subject of the statement...it is no longer the subject of enunciation who is “like” a beetle, the subject of the statement remaining a man. Rather, there is a circuit of states that forms a mutual becoming, in the heart of a necessarily multiple or collective assemblage”.\textsuperscript{162} The dog, bridge, and beetle form part of a collective. They are “bodies” moving about the same plane. They are “bodies” colliding with other bodies with the emergent property of constructing the “becoming-dog” of Kafka, the “becoming-beetle” of Kafka, or “becoming-bridge” of Kafka.

Subjectivity for Deleuze and Guattari, in short, is produced in a purely affirmative manner; not constituted as in permanent crisis because of a defining moment in pre-oedipal development. What I mean is that for Deleuze and Guattari the subject is defined “disjunctively”; that is to say, the subject is recognized as This ‘or’ This ‘or’ This ‘or’ This (where “This” represents a given assemblage). I am not one subject, according to Deleuze and Guattari, but a multiplicity of subjectivities. I have no limits, no boundaries; my possibilities are endless. The subject is never comported toward the world in a particular manner as is the Kristevan subject (\textit{qua} wandering narcissist or depressive-in-want-of-love).

\textit{Non-familial partial-objects}
Deleuze and Guattari are not naïve with respect to the importance that pre-Oedipal development has with respect to subjectivity, for it is during this time that the child is first inaugurated into a world of language. The point that Deleuze and Guattari take issue with is the resultant oedipalization that results after the completion of the 'pre-Oedipal' phase. The criticism that Deleuze and Guattari are leveling against Oedipus is that they see it as reductive. It eliminates "difference", present as it is in the form of contradictions, opposites, and pure singularities. What this means can be more succinctly put by paying closer attention to Deleuze’s doctoral thesis *Difference and Repetition*.

In these early excursions Deleuze isolates the stifling effects of Cartesian thought on the progression of Western thought. Deleuze writes that, "the 'I think' is the most general principle of representation – in other words, the source of these elements and of the unity of all these faculties: I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember and I perceive – as though these were the four branches of the Cogito. On precisely these branches, difference is crucified". The understanding of a single unified ego is what Deleuze and Guattari are poised to dismantle. The ego presents itself as an absurdly narrow vantage point by means of which to experience my various relations to the world – to difference (myself and others included).

Later in his collaborative writings with Guattari, Deleuze will take aim against the position of a unified ego, filtered as it had been through the sieve of Hegelianism as well as the emergence of ego psychology prevalent in the wake of Freud. Instead Deleuze and Guattari argue that our life is structured as a continuation of the primordial experiences of the *infans* (a pre-subjective subject). "From the very first days of his life, he [the child] immediately begins having an amazing nonfamilial experience that psychoanalysis has
The immediate experience of the child is fragmented not between the mother and father but between "partial-objects". Deleuze and Guattari state that the child does not experience the breast at which it suckles as the breast of its mother, the Mother; it experiences the breast as a "machine." This breast is quite literally a milk-producing-machine, a partial-object, which is connected to a milk-consuming-machine (the child’s mouth). These two ‘machines’ together form what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as an "assemblage". Deleuze and Guattari’s so called ‘hatred’ of Hegel and the dialectic is situated within this context. For Hegel these fragmented partial-objects flow into their opposites via negativity. They are defined by what they are not and as such are defined by a type of castration. Here it is important to understand that I draw a similarity between Hegel’s understanding of negativity (or the act/process of negation) and castration. That is to say I understand castration as characteristic of what it is to be defined by that which one is not. In the above example the opposite of the child would be the whole organism of the parent. Multiplicity and difference are reduced. In response to this Deleuze and Guattari take up and develop the schizoanalytic approach.

Schizoaanalysis is a practice of living that emphasizes desubjectifying, destructuration, deconstructing, etc., that which has become reduced to the same in order to liberate the multiplicity repressed within. What schizoaanalysis aims to show is that subjectivity may be constituted upon familial encounters of some description (partial-objects of a Mother and a Father) but that is not all there is to subjectivity as far as Deleuze and Guattari are concerned. In Chaosmosis, Guattari asks the question, “should we keep the semiotic productions of the mass media, informatics, telematics and robotics
separate from psychological subjectivity? He answers in the negative, asserting instead that, “technological machines of information and communication operate at the heart of human subjectivity, not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms”. Consider children born around the mid 80’s who will never have known a world without AIDS as well as the children born today who will never have known a world without cloning, the internet, and text messaging. Would these aspects of culture not, ask Deleuze and Guattari, have implications for the constitution of subjectivity? They agree that indeed it would. Their project is to flesh out what subjectivity might be when these once-ignored “extra-familial” aspects are considered significant to the constitution of subjectivity.

**Becoming a Body without Organs**

“Becomings” are a practice of reconfiguring the parts of my body, endowing them with certain speeds and slownesses, movements and rests unlike that of the molar entity “man”. There are multiplicities of said becomings that provide escape routes from “man” (lines-of-flight). Anything that is perceived as living in the shadow of man, is considered a veritable possibility for an act of becoming. For example becoming-woman, becoming-child (resists the “adult” connotation of man), becoming-black (resists the “white” eurocentric prejudice of man), and becoming-animal (resists the artificial construction of man as a “rational” animal). These practices of ‘becoming’ are radically subjective insofar as Guattari claims that, “we are not confronted with a subjectivity given as in-itself, but with a process of the realization of autonomy, or of autopoiesis”. The process of subjectification, to stay true to the title of Guttiar’s book, is quite akin to the properties of chaos theory. There is no *a priori* program, no matter how abstract, that constitutes the
subject’s status *qua* subject. Deleuze and Guattari’s state that *anything* can spark a becoming of subjectivity. For example, there is something about the “glasses” that throws the non-Jew into a veritable becoming-Jew.\(^{168}\) However *anything* could spark a becoming.

Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming is integral to another important concept in their corpus called the *Body without Organs* (BwO). At the same time that Deleuze and Guattari reject the notion of a chora they posit the need for an *in-between*, a zone of ambiguity through which becomings can maneuver. The BwO is according to Deleuze and Guattari, something that we are “forever attaining, it is a limit”.\(^{169}\) They continue to add that, “On it we sleep, live our waking lives, fight—fight and are fought—seek our place, experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love”.\(^{170}\) The purpose of the BwO is to make or become a joyous subject. There are no origins and no destinations for becomings or the BwO. They “cannot be conceptualized in terms of past and future. [...] It [becoming] passes between the two.”\(^{171}\) This is because “man constitutes himself as a gigantic memory”\(^{172}\) insofar as he connects the dots of events in history to construct a so-called narrative for himself.

“Any line that goes from one point to another in the aggregate of the molar system ... is a part of the arborescent system”.\(^{173}\) Man, or the subject that constitutes himself as such by connecting the dots is, in the eyes of Deleuze and Guattari, a Becoming-fascist insofar as they are excluding “Other” dots, or in other words: excluding ‘difference’.

Becomings and the BwO are Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt at an *anti*-Hegelian (non) dialectic. According to Deleuze and Guattari we should strive to resist this fascism
of man (Hegel). This is why lines of becoming are not composed of the points it connects but rather “passes between points.”

**Klein: anti-oedipalizing the infant**

The most important aspect of the schiozanalytic system of thought is that unlike Kristeva’s (*et cetera*) approach, desire does not stem from a lack or loss. Desire is that within which we are always-already situated as subjects. The process through which Deleuze and Guattari believe a child experiences its primordial relationships is important to fleshing out this claim. Psychoanalysis claims that the subject bases its future relationships (loving relations) upon its primordial relationships within the family. Although they acknowledge that there may be some truth to this hypothesis, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is not the whole picture. I will further elaborate upon this point in the following.

Contemporary psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic approaches to the unconscious would not be possible if not for the work of the British Object-Relations school, the most notable theorist being Melanie Klein. Deleuze and Guattari state that, “Melanie Klein was responsible for the marvelous discovery of partial objects, that world of explosions, rotations, vibrations. But … she has nonetheless failed to grasp the logic of these objects.” In short, partial-objects are the objects of the child’s world as it experiences them: an adumbration of affects, tingles, intensities, etc. These objects are characterized by these traits or sensations. Nowhere in these objects does one find a *meaning* linked to a familial integration. This is what I understand Deleuze and Guattari to be suggesting in their interpretation of partial-objects: Objects that are constituted as such by virtue of not being implicitly predicated on a specific relation to any one thing. Deleuze and Guattari
argue that rather than recognize the multiplicity that these objects are in their own right, Klein "oedipalizes" them; that is to say, forces them back into a "dominant reality" that has to do with the primordial mother/child and father relationship.

Klein documents the causal mechanisms, certain effects, expression, and idealist conceptions of partial objects which delimit the subject-child’s entrance into what she calls the "schizoparanoid phase." This schizoid phase, although "destined to play a role in totalities aimed at integrating the ego, the object, and drives later in life" also constitute the original type of object relation between the ego, the mother, and the father."177 It is this oedipalization that Deleuze and Guattari reject. Instead, for the latter:

The unconscious is totally unaware of persons as such. Partial objects are not representations of parental figures or of the basic patterns of family relations; they are parts of desiring-machines, having to do with a process and with relations of production that are both irreducible and prior to anything that may be made to conform to the Oedipal figure.178

Before proceeding, notice the term "desiring-machines." This is a technical and important term in Deleuze and Guattari. I understand desiring-machines to be entities that "produce" desire (jouissance). This is in opposition to Freud’s thesis wherein the subject is in a constant state of trying to quell the tensions that arise through one’s desire. Desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, is everywhere. There are no necessary structures to stifle (repress) desire. There are only desiring-machines. What I mean by this is that there are no necessary familial structures or hierarchical institutions that contain desire in the way that the triangulation of Oedipus works to contain desire. Desiring-machines freely wander, constantly engaging with new partial-objects and other desiring-machines, producing more desire. This is the mechanism of Deleuze and Guattari’s adaptation of Nietzsche’s “affirmation”.
Deleuze and Guattari give credence to the notion that it is not so much a question of “denying the vital importance of parents or the love attachment of children to their mothers and fathers” but rather to find out (1) whether everything the child touches is experienced as a representative of his parents (recall Freud’s “fort-da”), and (2) knowing how the child first comes to define the place(s) and function(s) the parents are going to occupy as special agents, related to other agents. 179 Deleuze and Guattari answer these questions in the following:

With respect to question (1) Deleuze and Guattari state that ever since the crib the mother’s breast and nipple, along with the child’s feces are simply desiring-machines connected to parts of the child’s body. 180 They subsequently put forth the argument which states that it is impossible to assert that the child lives among these partial objects and at the same time claim the child understands these objects to be parts of his parents’ bodies, or being representative of the parents themselves. Deleuze and Guattari state, “It [his mother’s breast] exists, rather as a part of a desiring-machine connected to the baby’s mouth, and is experienced as an object providing a nonpersonal flow of milk, be it copious or scanty”. 181 Apparently partial-objects and desiring-machines do not represent anything such as a lost Thing (as in Klein and Kristvea); although, according to Deleuze and Guattari, they do serve as a basis for relations or assigning agents places and functions. Deleuze and Guattari assert that these agents are not persons anymore than said relations are intersubjective. They are merely relations and agents of production and/or antiproduction. There is no need, according to Deleuze and Guattari, to retroactively assert that a breast is the breast of the mother’s and that this object imparted a necessary component to what will structure subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari state: “from the very
first days of his life, he [the child] immediately begins having an amazing nonfamilial experience that psychoanalysis has completely failed to take into account”. 182

Question (2) continues upon the notion of ‘relations’ established through desiring-machines and partial-objects. Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question: how does an Oedipus that is “…open in all directions to a social field, to a field of production directly invested by libido” 183 close up in the infamous triangulation? Deleuze and Guattari’s answer is that it has to do with the ‘relations’ that happen to be in place during the child’s infancy; that is to say, the child’s familial contingency. The “pre-oedipal” is characterized by a wide-ranging world of desire (nonfamilial relations between partial-objects and desiring-machines). Quite literally these sets of relations do not signify “parents” as such. The natural state for the child, say Deleuze and Guattari, is defined as “the point of view of immediate production.” 184 Oedipal relations are instead ascribed to “the parents” based on what Deleuze and Guattari call “the point of view of the recording of the process.” 185 It is a merely heuristic measure in order to help the child make sense of the dynamics within the family, and more importantly for Deleuze and Guattari, they have no long lasting implications for what would constitutively define the child’s subjectivity. This recording is unnecessary insofar as the conditions for ascribing specific relations to “the parents” with respect to the child are “contingent.” Some more clarification is no doubt needed.

An example would be a child asking itself “What sort of thing is this breathing-machine on my body without organs?” As I have previously stated, a BwO is the experience the child has of her body without a superimposed understanding of it as a certain type of body. It is a body assembled out of the affects and intensities, etc., of the
world of partial-objects and desiring-machines. With respect to the question asked above, the only possible answer, Deleuze and Guattari posit, must be sought out in family relations, or with that relation “to the woman known as mommy”.186 This answer, just like the word ‘relate’, for Deleuze and Guattari, does not stand for a relationship that is produced naturally. On the contrary, it is “produced within the interplay of desiring-machines.”187 It is the child’s ignorance about the conditions under which their answers to their questions are generated: taking the relation between this “breathing-machine” and my “body without organs” to be a relationship between mommy-and-me; in other words the “only relation” that matters. “By boxing the life of the child up within the Oedipal complex, by making familial relations the universal mediation of childhood, we cannot help but fail to understand the production of the unconscious itself...For the unconscious is an orphan, and produces itself within the identity of nature and man”.188

For Deleuze and Guattari, the people or “objects” whom we love function as nodes of “connection, of disjunction, of conjunction”189 and flows of desire. It is left to the individual as to whether or not he/she chooses to slide into the Oedipal structure of subjectivity psychoanalysis tells us to adopt. Deleuze and Guattari argue that this prevents the productive flow of desire and its access to a veritable multiplicity of connections. As far as their political project is concerned this oedipalization stifles the affirmation or “free energy capable of fueling a revolutionary machine”.190

In the above exegesis I have sought to show how, like Kristeva, the anti-oedipal subject is established through the use of language, albeit in a radically different sense. Here and there I have alluded to certain issues within these concepts that are troubling upon initial inspection. It is now that I will dedicate the remainder of this thesis toward a
critical examination of the limitations of Deleuze and Guattari’s anti-oedipal project with specific interest in the notion of the Other.

**Part 7: A consideration of the concept of the Other and its limitation in Deleuze and Guattari**

Considering the influence Klein’s thought has had upon Kristeva as well as Deleuze and Guattari, it seems appropriate that Klein is where I shall begin this last part wherein I will illustrate the advantages Kristeva’s notion of a connectedness to the Other has over that of Deleuze and Guattari. Throughout what follows I will show that the Other for Kristeva has a more substantial and motivating force with respect to the subject and how that subjectivity is constituted, whereas Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of Otherness is tenuous and transitory. To illustrate this point I will make specific reference to Deleuze’s interpretation of the Other *qua* “simulacra,” from *Difference and Repetition*. After this I will dissertate on Kristeva’s adaptation of Klein by considering her writing in *Strangers to Ourselves*, wherein the Other is recast as the “foreigner.” Finally I will close with some considerations on the fact that I see Deleuze to be a thinker who struggles deeply with the concept of the Other. There are passages in *Difference and Repetition* that deserve careful analysis as they do suggest a thinker who is intrigued by the language that Kristeva fully endorses; however, is not fully convinced. Yet wants to be?

**Klein and the Other**

Recall that in Freud’s “primary narcissism” as well as Klein’s conception of the child’s pre-oedipal relationship to its mother, there is no conscious awareness or distinction made by the child that posits itself as separate with respect to the mother (Other). Quite literally then, it is safe to suggest – on behalf of Freud and Klein – that the Other is what contributes to my being albeit at a radically primordial level. Further recall
that for Klein, when the breast is suspected of not being present and the *infans* actively rejects the mother (and thus posits itself as independent) this effectively represses the primordial relationship with the (m)Other. This phase and its subsequent transition are extremely important for Klein, and Kristeva, for the pre-subjective “experiences” that the *infans* underwent during this time carry over into their adult lives. Klein writes:

> for in the first place we gain trust and love in relation to our parents, next we take them... into ourselves; and then we can give from this wealth of loving feelings to the outer world ... [H]atred, as we have seen, leads to our establishing frightening figures in our minds, and then we are apt to endow other people with unpleasant and malevolent qualities.\(^{191}\)

This is Klein’s purported understanding of the transmission of the unconscious from the pre-oedipal into adulthood. Those experiences, which the *infans* has endured at the hands of the (m)Other (or culture at large) and have contributed to the organizing of his/her bodily drives, greatly influence the manner of comportment that the child will have throughout his/her life.

One can see here the “ethical” import Klein places upon the (m)Other during pre-Oedipal development. I call this role ethical because the implications of a certain kind of ordering of the bodily drives will eventually play out in the events of the real world. If the pre-oedipal experiences, to which the mother has exposed the child, are skewed toward the “painful” end of the spectrum then the “reservoir” of experience the child has to draw upon later in life will be rather limited in scope. If, on the other hand, the pre-oedipal experiences are pleasurable and ‘loving’ then the child will be openly ready to engage with new and strange objects and so on later in life. What this means is that by being exposed to pleasurable and loving experiences during the pre-oedipal stage (and following phases) the body of the child becomes *primed* to *feel* a certain way in the world. It would be equivalent to learning multiple languages early on in life such that
one’s travels around the world might be more fluid and robust in nature; opposed to struggling to understand mere semantic variations between interlocutors.

Consider the implications of this model. If a child has been “colonized” with good and pleasurable pre-Oedipal experiences then they are more likely to project onto the world an amicable overtone when strife emerges on the horizon. Klein writes that “if love has not been smothered under resentment, grievances and hatred, but has been firmly established in the mind, trust in other people and belief in one’s own goodness are like a rock which withstands the blows of circumstance.” I find this references to the “blows of circumstance” to be helpful for critiquing Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of subjectivity and its relationship to the Other. The relationship the subject has with respect to the Other in Deleuze and Guattari is one based mainly on exploitation. The Other is a means by which I might be able to increase my body’s power (e.g. the “Good” in Spinoza). Correlatively the Other may prove “Bad,” in the Spinozistic sense of the term, with respect to my body and in fact decrease my power. The implications that Klein’s theory grants the subject is an aspect of “tenacity,” or in other words a motivation for sticking with the person with whom one might be with (e.g. a sexual/life partner). If every time we experienced a bad or painful encounter with the one we love, we would never be with anyone at all. We would all end up as isolated narcissi afraid to engage with an Other for fear they may hurt us. However insofar as Klein posits the pre-objectal mother as that entity which prepares the child for becoming engaged in the world, she is able to work around this potential problematic of the subject being a self-contained narcissus.

Klein takes Freud’s use of the “pleasure principle” and adapts it to fit her new model of the psyche. She argues that in wake of the pleasure principle, the child (or adult
in later years) will expunge into the external world (reject from itself) those experiences that are painful. This is the mechanism by which the external/internal dichotomy is established in Freud. Klein writes: “we so much dread the hatred in ourselves that we are driven to employ one of our strongest measures of defense by putting it on to other people – to project it.” Constitutive to the pre-Oedipal psyche of the child is the ‘bad breast:’ the breast which threatens to poison the infant or simply fail to be there promptly enough to satisfy the infants needs. This is what is being projected onto objects of the external world – not the bad breast per se – representations of the bad breast, or mental substitutions thereof. Klein is aware that a certain trace of unpleasant or outright painful experience is inevitable in development and thus it is part of what constitutes us as subjects that we expunge these painful experiences. However because these painful experiences are mixed with feelings of pleasure (characteristic of a distinctionless state of being) there is an uncanny sense of guilt that one perceives in the presence of these “bad” Others.

This guilt is felt because the infant feels guilty that the very thing that s/he has rejected is indeed the very thing that it needs in order to survive, or that which it loves. This internal feeling of guilt is hated by the infant because the feeling of having done something damaging to the thing that one loves and needs is unsettling. However this feeling of guilt and indebtedness is beneficial for the subject insofar as it provides the “motivation” seeking out and establishing “good” contacts that effectively quell these painful feelings. Klein: “[M]aking reparation – which is such an essential part of the ability to love – widens the scope, and the child’s capacity to accept love and, by various means, to take into himself goodness from the outer world steadily increases. This
satisfactory balance between ‘give’ and ‘take’ is the primary condition for further happiness." By essentially starting off in the whole; that is to say within a loss of love, love becomes the very thing that is sought out by the child throughout its life. Without such a loss to repair there appears to be no motivation behind out relationships; in fact they would appear rather meaningless in nature.

I will now move on to a critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the other as defined through an interpretation of what Deleuze calls in *Difference and Repetition* “simulacra.” Following this I will then consider Kristeva’s interpretation of the “stranger *qua* Other and contrast this notion against Klein as well as Deleuze and Guattari, showing how the former trumps the latter two.

**The Other and Simulacra**

Lutz Ellrich, in an article entitled *Negativity and Difference: On Gilles Deleuze’s Criticism of Dialectics*, shows that Deleuze overwrites Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave, endorsing the interpretation put forth by Nietzsche in his *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Ellrich writes, “Whereas the term “master” designates an active force that forgoes the negation of what it is not and relishes in its proper difference, the word “slave” designates a reactive force that hastens to involve itself in oppositional relationships with everything that it is not”. This hearkens back to Kojève’s reading of Hegel where it was illustrated that the master/slave relationship did not embody a mutual recognition. The master was recognized *qua* master by himself and the slave, but the master did not recognize the slave as an essential value in-itself. This is because the master is the *self*-affirmed value, and he is recognized as such. In not recognizing the slave, he does not recognize his negation. This allows the active master to self-reflexively
affirm himself. This self-reflexivity of the active master recognizing, or affirming, himself as the singular value (*qua* difference) is what is considered by Ellrich to be a “doubling of singularity”. “Sameness with itself amounts to the duplicity of the same”. 196 In other words, difference-in-itself is a production capable of manifesting itself without recourse or reference to its negation (slave). The fact remains, however, that the slave is in fact present. The master does not see (recognize) the slave’s presence because he projects onto the situation a “veil” so to speak that reflects back upon the master that which the master desires to perceive: a world that is for-self. This is the production of “simulacra” in Deleuze. The term “simulacra” is a technical and difficult term for Deleuze and therefore I will consider it some detail now.

In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze defines “simulacra” thus:

> By simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model of privileged position is challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is the instance which includes a difference within itself, such as ... two divergent series on which it plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of an original and a copy. 197

Because the master did not concede defeat in the ‘fight to the death’ he is not negated. The master is allowed to partake in the pleasures of nature without being forced to recognize a divide between his pleasures and the nature from which they derive. This is because he does not have to labour upon nature. The border that separates the joyous affects which are part of the master’s body from the joyous affects in nature becomes blurred. The joys of nature (impulses, drives, energies, powers, etc.) become his, and his joys become natures. As such the master sees in nature no distinction independent of his body; instead he sees the affects that compose his body dissolved and disseminated throughout nature. These dissolved and disseminated affects (or difference-in-itself) are what are called simulacra.
To reiterate in perhaps clearer terminology, that which is produced is the affirmation of the master as the One recognized in nature. The image of the master is doubled in-on-itself and cast out into the world. Nature is recognized as something valued in-itself only because the master sees himself (the only valued being) in nature. Thus nature becomes recognized by the master as "sameness-differentiated"; that is to say, "difference" as different manifestations of the same thing. This is what I take Deleuze and Guattari's equation PLURALISM=MONISM to be suggesting. 198

Ellrich, however, picks up on the fact that in order for Deleuze's theory of difference and multiplicity to work, Deleuze requires a mode-of-thought characteristic of the active master. For only the master can recognize difference free of negation. This thought must be capable of grasping both standpoints of the participants involved: master and slave. Ellrich writes, "The master's (aesthetic) differential thought is only capable of apprehending difference" 199 and thus cannot understand the participant's position on the other side of the relationship (the slave's). Likewise because of its position in the relationship, the slave "is not in a position to see what is proper to difference" 200. There is an Other out there in the world that goes unacknowledged by self-consciousness that self-consciousness (qua self-affirmative master, or difference-differentiated) is dependent upon. Self-affirmative consciousness chooses not to recognize its dependence upon an Other (the slave) since it can only perceive things qua simulacra. Thus the "differential thought of the master, consequently, cannot be the cardinal model of a theory" as Deleuze would have it. 201 Difference does not account for the Other's experience as an autonomous subject, because the Other does not experience the world as pure difference
but instead as that which it is not. This is because the slave labours upon nature and this involves negating what is present to it and reconfiguring it anew.

As Ellrich says, “Deleuze refuses to acknowledge this dialectic.” 202

The simulacra produced through the self-reflexivity of the master affirming itself are “projected onto the actual prevailing divergences and decentralizations” 203 between master and slave. Simulacra, by definition, simulate. In the present situation it is a case of simulating that which is actually present to the master though the master does not recognize it as such: the great divide between the master and slave. Ellrich writes, “by virtue of this structural property, the simulacra is in a position to simulate the identical, the similar, and the negative and thus to fulfill its essential task.” 204 It is my contention, in light of this reference to Ellrich, that Deleuze’s “simulacra” is negation rehashed. The corollary to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic is that the master becomes conscious of the fact that he is only master because of the slave’s slavishness. Therefore ‘dialectically’ the slave in fact becomes the master insofar as the aforementioned master was in fact truly slave. In order to prevent this dialectical subversion of difference existing as such (qua self-affirmed difference) Deleuze inserts ‘simulacra’ to prevent such an event from ever occurring. This preventative measure assures the active forces of the master and his self-affirmative project; however, it permanently negates the actual resultant conditions as they emerged at the end of the fight-to-the-death. That is to say, simulacra negate the autonomy and importance of the slave, or the Other, which nonetheless has implications for subjectivity.

The ironic part to Deleuze’s reading of the dialectic is that his desire for real and authentic difference leads him to posit the very thing he set out to do away with: the
negative. 'Simulacra' functions for Deleuze in a way that negation functions for philosophers of negativity. Ellrich continues to add that Deleuze “filters out the actually negative, but simultaneously generates the simulated negative”. In attempting to construct a philosophy of affirmation, Deleuze attempted to do away with the dialectic based on the understanding that it was reductive and did not allow for the proliferation of difference. This appears to be something that is inescapable.

One can already see the implications that Deleuze and Guattari’s absent endorsement of negation and negativity have with respect to Otherness. I will address these concerns in greater detail in the next section; however, for now I want to examine two principle issues concerning what I consider Deleuze and Guattari’s move of sneaking negation through the back-door. The first point of interest has to do with an ironic contradiction in their adopted Nietzschean position. Through affirming a “multiplicity” they are in fact endorsing a decadent life which is something Nietzsche rejected. The second point has to do with language.

**Affirmation and decadence**

I am skeptical to the consistency that Deleuze and Guattari are displaying within their own thought. They claim that a person is capable and indeed ought to explore the various selves within their Self. Consider Deleuze’s reading of Roberte’s rape by the Colossus and Hunchback in Klossowski’s *Roberte se soir* as well as Octave’s voyeurism. Deleuze contends that through the act of witnessing the rape Octave multiplies his enjoyment of Roberte through taking in the expressions of her transgressors. Likewise Roberte is thought to be opened up and enlightened to her various selves in her encounters with the rapists.
...when Octave establishes the law of hospitality according to which he “gives” his wife Roberte to his guests. He attempts to multiply Roberte’s essence, to create as many simulacra and reflections of Roberte as there are persons establishing relations with her, and to inspire Roberte to emulate somehow her own doubles, thanks to which Octave, the voyeur, possesses and is able to know her better than if he had kept her, quite simply, for himself.\cite{206}

Aside from the moral questionability of using this literary excerpt as model for an ethics of self-transformation, I find that this transgresses Deleuze and Guattari’s foundational belief in the primacy of affirmation. The act of wanting to produce multiples of both himself (Octave) and his wife Roberte, parallels the Christian believer who wants there so desperately to be another world, a world other than this one. This is not affirmation of multiplicities and simulacra; this is negation and denial of the Self that is.

I want to respond to the rebuttal which might argue that although Octave seeks to multiply both himself and Roberte an infinite number of times, the Christian believer seeks a multiple that ultimately has an end: Heaven; the latter is not characteristic of the eternal return that Klossowski championed in Nietzsche’s writings. The quantity of the multiples sought need not matter, for it is the structure of the multiple that is important. Nietzsche thought that any institution which purported to strive for another world other than this one was decadent and descending. Deleuze and Guattari are guilty of just this. Deleuze does state explicitly in \textit{Difference and Repetition} that “in every psychic system there is a swarm of possibilities around reality, but our possibilities are always Other […] This face expresses a possible world”.\textsuperscript{207} To be fair, in \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy} Deleuze does guard against the charge that this situation might be considered negative. Therefore he writes about “active negations”, where “Active negation … is the state of strong spirits which destroy the reactive in themselves, submitting it to the test of the eternal return and submitting themselves to this test even if it entails willing their own decline”.\textsuperscript{208} Nonetheless the structure of incorporating negation in some form persists and
thus to quote Horkheimer and Adorno again, it seems as though Deleuze and Guattari are endorsing a “consoling affirmation” to cover up a negation that they cannot avoid.

Language --

Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection of negation and their subsequent deployment of simulacra is highly complicated by language. Deleuze and Guattari write that “it is true that the other disposes of a means to endow the possibilities that it expresses with reality, independently of the development we cause them to undergo. This means is language”. Language is utilized as a tool that the subject can use to make manifest for an Other the possible world they open up for an other whom they encounter. However, languages capacity to open up a wholly Other world for an other, in Deleuze and Guattari, is thrown into doubt. This is because of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of language as the product of an “assemblage” and not the individual’s “inner life”. Gadamer shares my concern when he speaks of a lover’s discourse. “When we hear modern lovers talking to each other, we often wonder if they are communicating with words or with advertising labels and technical terms from the sign language of the modern industrial world”. How can the Other, in Deleuze and Guattari, open up a wholly Other world of possibilities to me if the Other is nothing more than a mere conduit through which the discourse of the “assemblage” speaks through everyone already?

This problem does not exist for Kristeva. When we consider a truly passionate and amorous relationship, language fails to convey what it is that I desire to say to my beloved. Thus language fails me in allowing for a “reality” to be conveyed – ready made -- to the other. The speech of the lover is that of a subject who is uncertain about what to say. The lover is “tongue tied”, stammers, makes noises, gasps, and so on. This attempt to
convey a reality is indicative of something that for Kristeva has been negated: the baby-talk or echolalias reminiscent of our “inexhaustible source of excitement;” 212 that is to say, the pre-subjective state of being. Kristeva writes, “Putting love into words ... necessarily summons up not the narcissistic parry but what appears to me as narcissistic economy [...]. It is a view that we cannot necessarily share with our partners but to which our dreams, our anguish, and our jouissance bear witness.” 213 Gadamer corroborates this point made by Kristeva when he suggests that “stammering is the obstruction of a desire to speak and is thus opened into the infinite realm of possible expression.” 214 As elated lovers we find ourselves in a state, a relationship, where the only authentic way we “feel” that we can express ourselves is by conjuring up the language of that love relationship that was our first; that of our primary narcissism. However this “impossible object, unnamable secret, absolute taboo” 215 is lost and therefore we stammer, since we cannot say anything about it.

Deleuze and Guattari do not acknowledge this “unnamable secret” and as such assume that the utility they assign to language in general (for purposes of conferring “reality on the possible as such”) 216 holds true for the speech of the lovers. Experience appears to support Kristeva’s insight. Even she confesses to this truth at the beginning of her Tales of Love, “No matter how far back my love memories go, I find it difficult to talk about them...”. 217

Kristeva salvages the notion of “drive” in the idea of the chora such that this “imaginary construct” can account for why our body and language appear unable to communicate that which we want to communicate to an Other. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari tell how “desiring-machines” break-down. What they fail to account for is
why they break down. Kristeva’s notion of the child’s relation to the primal mother accounts for this absent mechanism. In *The Feminine and the Sacred* Kristeva references along with the Greeks, Hannah Arendt’s distinction between *zoos* (biological life) and *bios* (the life to be told, capable of being written). She continues to say that, “the human body, and, even more dramatically, the body of a woman, is a strange intersection between *zoos* and *bios*, physiology and narration, genetics and biography”. Recall Kristeva’s articulation of how the mother brings about language in the infant (“Motherhood Today”). Language arises during a relationship which is non-representable as such to one’s consciousness and thus it is impossible to speak of. Deleuze and Guattari’s employment of simulacra is insufficient to account for how language opens up a wholly Other world for an other and is on par with what Allison Weir calls a “negative hallucination” of an unachieved identification. The other does not open up a wholly Other world for me so much as it represents that which is wholly unknowable ‘in’ myself. The Other is capable of achieving this even if they experience the inability to say anything at all.

**Kristeva and the strange Other**

By now it ought to clear that Deleuze and Guattari indeed do believe that the subject exists; albeit in a radically reconfigured way. The above discussion, which has touched on the topic of the Other *qua* simulacra has illustrated that the place of the Other remains external to the subjects singularity. This is of course not all that different from how many modern thinkers have conceived the place of the Other; that is to say: out there. What Deleuze and Guattari’s contributions have been to this tradition is to reevaluate what the Other has to offer the subject and how that is worked out. In any case,
because the Deleuze and Guattari's Other remains external relative to the subject, the present author argues that the power of the Other is greatly weakened.

On the other hand, opposed to the Other being external to the subject, Kristeva situates the Other *within* the subject, and indeed makes this internalization of Otherness constitutive to her notion of subjectivity. In *Strangers to Ourselves* she recasts the Other in the notion of the "foreigner." She writes:

> [A] foreigner is neither the romantic victim of our clannish indolence nor the intruder responsible for all the ills of the polis ... Strangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, the time in which understanding and affirming founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, we are spared detesting him in himself.20

Kristeva is picking up from where Klein left off, while simultaneously making significant advances on Klein. For example although the internalization of the Other (i.e. the foreigner) smacks of Klein's account of the internalization of the "good" and "bad" mother/breast, Kristeva points out in *Revolution in Poetic Language* that "psychoanalysis acknowledges that the pre-Oedipal stages Melanie Klein discusses are 'analytically unthinkable',”221 while, however, not being wholly inoperative. What this means is that although Klein pointed to the phenomenal effects of the internalization of the mother, she failed to provide an sufficient mechanism for how this internalization worked its effects.

What one finds in Kristeva's interpretation of the internalization of the Other that one does not find in Klein is an idea of "motivation." I mean motivation here in the sense that there is an underlying force at play (e.g. the semiotic chora) that pushes the subject forever onward, never letting s/he remain static. This is an advantage Kristeva has over Deleuze and Guattari, for the latter propose on *Anti-Oedipus* the fact that "It is at work everywhere [Desiring-Production]"222 but they do not provide a mechanism - regardless how abstract - for what sets that Desiring in motion. Kristeva's split subject is constantly
engaged in being forced to negotiate the confrontation of its own wholly unknown semiotic drives with the thetic, the latter being what the subject posits during the signifying process in order to recognize itself *qua* subject. “In other words, the subject must be firmly posited by castration so that drive attacks against the thetic will not give way to fantasy or to psychosis but will instead lead to a ‘second-degree thetic,’ i.e., a resumption of the functioning characteristic of the semiotic *chora* within the signifying device of language.” Thus the subject’s understanding of, or ability to recognize themselves as a discernible subject is constantly frustrated; frustrated to the point where the subject appears foreign (Other) to itself.

The incorporation of the semiotic chora as constitutive of the subject in Kristeva, which is brought about by the child’s need to find satisfaction in language to compensate for the loss of the mother, “configures” the subject such that they are forever “motivated” onward while never being certain of who or what they are. The Kristevan subject is literally a foreigner in a strange land. She writes in *Strangers to Ourselves*: “Without a home” the subject “seeks that invisible and promised territory, that country that does not exist but that he bears in his dreams, and that must indeed be called a beyond... The foreigner, thus, has lost his mother.” The decision to include the latter reference to the loss of the mother is strategic insofar as it is meant to conjure up the influence Klein impacted upon Kristeva. A major difference between the two thinkers, however, is that whereas Klein thinks that these neurosis brought about by the feelings of guilt can be somewhat exercised with respect to the internalization of the Other, Kristeva does not see this as the case.
For Klein this internalization is pathology; for Kristeva it is what constitutes our subjectivity. We can indeed work with this disposition, but we can never do away with it.

With the Freudian notion of the unconscious the involution of the strange in the psyche loses its pathological aspect and integrates within the assumed unity of human beings an otherness that is both biological and symbolic and becomes an integral part of the same. Henceforth the foreigner is neither a race nor a nation...Uncanny, foreignness is within us: we are our own foreigners. Kristeva’s arguments do not conflate with the Freud Civilization and its Discontents who asserted that human-kind will essentially remain dissatisfied and miserable -- sublimated, as their drives are, to the development of culture. Kristeva utilizes the psychoanalytic notion of transference and projects it against the backdrop of the negativity which allows for her subject to be. “It is through unraveling transference – the major dynamics of otherness, of love/hatred for the other, of the foreign component of our psyche – that, on the basis of the other, I become reconciled with my own otherness-foreignness, that I play on it and live by it.” Kristeva assumes certain psychoanalytic premises that position her in some ways as a pessimist with respect to the “human condition,” she does make the appropriate amendments to Freud’s theory such that her optimistic Marxism can shine through brighter; wherein the process of working toward a better “condition” can at least be conceived – if only it remains ‘imaginary.’

Finally here I want to state what I perceive to be one of the most significant advantages that Kristeva’s conception of subjectivity has over that of Deleuze and Guattari’s. The latter do indeed advance a well argued case for the status of a radically de-structured – anti-Oedipal – subject. This de-subjectivized subject is one that they claim will resist the static, stifling, taming effects of being a subject proper. What I mean by “subject proper” is nothing more than shoring up of a subject based on some underlying constitutive factor. Take for example Kristeva’s reading of the Heideggerian
subject being constituted upon *cura* [care] or the Lacanian subject as one defined in terms of desire (indeed a subject of desire). With respect to the Heideggerian subject, “care this becomes the ‘basis on which every interpretation of Dasein which is ontical and belongs to a world-view [*Weltanschaulich*] must move’. “ Deleuze and Guattari’s subject is no different and thus no less tamed than the Heideggerian or Lacanian subject.

Deleuze and Guattari’s subject is one that is firmly “rooted” in such concepts as “assemblages,” “multiplicities,” and “packs.” The subject may indeed be one that is mobile and fluid but it can only be interpreted as such through explicit (symbolic) concepts such as those listed above. Quite simply, *too much* can be *said* about the subject in Deleuze and Guattari. Kristeva is not susceptible to the same criticism as this because of the fact that she endorses and modifies Hegel’s notion of negativity. Insofar as the process of negativity cannot be named or spoken of in any sense whatsoever, there is a fundamental characteristic of the subject in the latter’s thought which resists conceptualization of any kind. Kristeva writes that “the foreigner has no self. Barely an empty confidence, valueless, which focuses his possibilities of being constantly other ... I do what *they* want *me* to, but it is not “me” – “me” is elsewhere, “me” belongs to no one, “me” does not belong to “me,” ... does “me” exist?”

Kristeva does not allow for there to be any foundation (even the condition of an “assemblage” or “multiplicity”) from which to conceive a subject. This is what makes Kristeva subject-in-process so radical and progressive in nature: her adoption of negativity via the material embodiment of the unconscious.

*Deleuze’s Other-structure, or a reluctant chora?*
The present thesis has advanced Kristeva’s interpretation of the subject as advantageous over that of Deleuze and Guattari’s. Throughout this thesis I have also proclaimed cautious skepticism with respect to the latter in general. However I want this final section to be somewhat conciliatory in nature; however, if full conciliation is indeed impossible or shown to be recalcitrant, let it at least serve as an attempt to bridge an otherwise unbridgeable gap between to philosophers. This final section attempts to show that there is an aspect to Deleuze and Guattari that is extremely sympathetic to the indebtedness one has with respect to the Other in the constitution of ones subjectivity; so much so that one can see Deleuze – especially in his early solo work – flirting with the notion of an internalized Other as the precondition for the possibilities of being.

Until now it has been understood that Deleuze and Guattari are hostile to the role the Other plays with respect to the constitution of subjectivity insofar as the Other is implicated in any serious way when it comes to – let us say – the ordering ones drives. Earlier I examined the function of the Other as it is embodied in the form of the lifeguard, for example, and the excerpt of ‘learning to swim’ from Difference and Repetition. To go beyond this and to set up my commentary to follow, consider the status of the “apprentice” as it is conceived in Deleuze’s early work:

The apprentice ... raises each faculty to the level of its transcendent exercise. With regard to sensibility, he attempts to give birth to that second power which grasps that which can only be sensed. This is the education of the senses. From one faculty to another is communicated a violence which nevertheless always understands the Other through the perfection of each [...] We never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think.230

Deleuze’s point is well received that it is indeed impossible to say exactly how someone will learn a particular concept or become a philosopher, etc., and in this sense he is justified in calling into question many of the pre-established institutional practices that are assumed to “organize” the human condition “for the better.” That being said, he is
equally misguided in thinking that he can sidestep these “negativities,” having developed an interpretation of subjectivity founded on the concept of affirmation. For any system, schizoanalysis included (as well as psychoanalysis), is going to impose upon its object a certain structure necessary for any observation to occur in the first place.

Consider Werner Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle.” By virtue of the mere presence of a perceiving subject within a given system, that same system has already been structured in a way whereby the perceiver has projected onto the system values and meaning that are relevant to a particular human world. Perhaps what remains “behind” or “beneath” these projected values and meanings is something akin to the substantia occulta that Locke theorized about. However I tend to think that this occult substance is best interpreted as being purely ineffable – whereby to even name it substantia occulta is going too far. Listen to Heisenberg’s thoughts on the uncertainty of words:

[The] intrinsic uncertainty of the meaning of words was ... recognized very early and has brought about the need for definitions, or – as the word ‘definition’ says – for the setting of boundaries that determine where the word is to be used and where not. But definitions can be given only with the help of other concepts, and so one will finally have to rely on some concepts that are taken as they are, unanalyzed and undefined. 231

Heisenberg concludes that in our use of language we must inevitably rely on words that remain undefined. They are indeed there – present in the sentence and conveyed in the meaning – but they themselves go completely undefined or noticed as such. They make possible the other words in the sentence. This analogy is meant to implicate the role of the semiotic chora, or the wholly Otherness constitutive of our subjectivity, that goes completely undefined or spoken of. On the contrary, I suggest that Kristeva successfully sidesteps this issue with her re-introduction of the chora and the fact that one can never say anything about it: “although the chora can be designated and regulated, it can never be definitively posited: as a result, one can situate the chora and, if necessary, lend it a
topology, but one can never give it axiomatic form."\textsuperscript{232} Kristeva takes that which Deleuze rejects – violent training – and recasts it in terms of a necessary trauma; that is, the loss of the pre-objectal mother.

However, a close reading of Deleuze reveals language that one ought to be suspicious, especially with respect to what has just been determined concerning Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the Other as an apprentice that enforces a violent training. Recall the concept of simulacra and how the Other is cast in terms of this simulacra in Deleuze and Guattari. Further recall that the implications of this interpretation were such that the Other (and the I) were no longer conceived in terms of subjects per se, or organisms, but as Body's without Organs freely exchanging energies, intensities, and so on. Deleuze then says: "that the Other should now, properly speaking, \textit{be anyone, neither you nor I}, signifies that it is a structure which is implemented only by variable terms in different perceptual worlds – me for you in yours, you for me in mine."\textsuperscript{233} This is important, for it shows an overall weakness in Deleuze's argument for rejecting the internalization of the Other within the subject.

If the Other is "neither you nor I" but instead "a structure" which is implemented and which traverses and penetrates through each and every "anybody," then the Other – insofar as it exists – must be posited transcendentally and thereby constituting a "space" within which the multiplicity of intensities and energies can be exchanged between various Bodies without Organs. This prospect is corroborated by the following in \textit{Difference and Repetition}: "It is not even enough to see in the Other a specific or particular structure of the perceptual world in general: in fact, it is a structure which \textit{grounds and ensures} the overall functioning of this world as a whole."\textsuperscript{234} The essence of
“grounding” and “ensuring” are terms used which possess “nurturing,” one might dare say, “maternal” overtones. Like Kristeva, Deleuze remains resolutely ambiguous with respect to what is actually said of the Other. What is known, however, is that it has a constitutive function insofar as it “grounds” the overall functioning of the world as a whole – the world of course being that which the subject is fully integrated within and implicated throughout.

Finally, and this I consider to be the most damaging with respect to Deleuze and Guattari’s case that the Other is not internalized and thereby minimally – if at all -- constitutive of subjectivity. Deleuze writes that “Notions necessary for the descriptions of this world...would remain empty and inapplicable if the Other were not there to give expression to those possible worlds in which that which is (for us) in the background is pre-perceived or sub-perceived as a possible form.” This excerpt almost reeks of Berkeley’s Idealism, insofar as the world and the objects therein are maintain because they are perceived by the mind of God when no Earthly subject is around to perceive them. Deleuze claims that the Other, which cannot be denoted anywhere (and thus neither subject not object) serves a similar role as does Berkeley’s God. The Other perceives a possible world (i.e. pre-perceived or sub-perceived) such that by means of the exchange of energies and intensities I might then be opened up to and exposed to these worlds. In any case, in order for the subject to exists qua multiplicity and/or pack in Deleuze and Guattari, an Other (according to the latter) must be implicated in order for the notion of this subject to be “full” of meaning and be “applicable” to the world at large. Since the Other is neither I nor you but somewhere and nowhere in-between it must at some point
converge, penetrate, or intersect with the subject *qua* multiplicity/pack. Operationally this interpretation holds the same weight as the internalization of the Other in Kristeva.

The notion of “*internalization*” is further hinted at when Deleuze annexes the concept of “rupture” into the dialogue.

The delineation of objects, the transitions as well as the *ruptures*, the passage from one object to another, and even the fact that one world disappears in favour of another, the fact that there is always something else implicated which remains to be explicated or developed – all this is made possible only by the Other-structure and its expressive power in perception. In short, it is the Other-structure that ensures *individuation* within the perceptual world.\(^{236}\)

In order for change in the prevailing structures of the subject to occur, whether it is the structure of a multiplicity or pack, there must be a rupture of some description. However in order for this rupture to occur and thus be considered a rupture proper, there must be a boundary posited. Thus even though it is a drastically re-worked model for subjectivity with fuzzy logic and indeterminate borders the Deleuze and Guattarian subject retains the essence of a thetic boundary and thus one that can be penetrated by the “*internal*” motions and force of an Other-structure.

**Conclusions (-en-procès)**

Žižek wrote that, “those who want ‘free sexuality delivered of the Oedipal burden of guilt and anxiety’ proceed in the same way as the worker who wants to survive as a worker without a capitalist; they also fail to take into account the ways their position is ‘mediated’ by the Other”\(^{237}\). This allows Žižek to state his conclusion that, “in short, anti-Oedipus is the ultimate Oedipal myth...”\(^{238}\). This excerpt functions like the Lacanian “*Thing*” around which I will “*circumambulate*” my concluding remarks with respect to the above critique. The most general of my conclusions is that although full of promise and practicality, for I truly consider it a “practical philosophy,” Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of subjectivity as founded upon pure affirmation is held in check by certain
limitations; specifically pertaining to the Other and the subject’s position relative to this Other. More specific conclusions on this matter are summarized below:

(1) Deleuze and Guattari under-value the notion of loss that Kristeva is privy toward. This loss – that of the pre-objectal mother -- is constitutive of human subjectivity. It is the “event” that accounts for the subject’s being as one that is perpetually in process (i.e. Kristeva’s subject-in-process). The death of Addie (the mother) in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying sets in motion an entire chain of events that transcend the family borders. Reflecting on their mother’s death, Dewey Dell laments, “I heard that my mother is dead. I wish I had time to let her die. I wish I had time to wish I had”. Dewey Dell’s loss of Addie (the mother) is a perfect when explaining how the subject becomes such. Before the structures of the symbolic and our culture imprints upon us a certain subjectivity the pre-subjective ordering of the maternal chora organizes subjectivity on a primordial level. However this primordial organization is marred by a haunting notion of loss. For that is what it takes to move us from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic. We can never fully recover from this trauma -- this loss. There are certain losses, separations, breaks, and ruptures, constitutive of life that simply cannot be affirmed. This is what makes Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical project questionable at best.

(2) Deleuze and Guattari’s desire to articulate a philosophical system founded upon pure affirmation required them to refute the existence of negation and negativity. This was shown to be problematic insofar as a philosophy devoted to pure multiplicity might be looked upon as “decadent” in the Nietzschean sense of the term. The rejection of the negative and negativity also triggered doubt with respect to the authentic nature of one’s language insofar as language opens up a possible world (of the Other) for the
subject. If there is no negation and consequently no inner space to the subject (Other), what world is it exactly that is being made available for an Other? Indeed there cannot be a world of the Other in the strictest sense.

(3) Otherness. Deleuze and Guattari do away with the other insofar as they do not acknowledge the other as a wholly Other. The Other is important to develop as a concept because it implicates upon our moral being. Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of the Other (qua simulacra) does not allow deep relationships to develop. The Other is another partial-object by means of which I might strengthen my BwO. This relation to the Other is superficial and transient; it is the only way for the Deleuze and Guattarian subject to enact the ethical life the authors espouse.

(4) The notion of negation that Kristeva salvages with respect to subjectivity in the form of loss of the primordial love-object (pre-objectal mother) provides a motivation, movement, or drive; an unrepresentable guide or purpose for our actions in the world. With Deleuze and Guattari, however, there is nothing motivating the subject to take up one endeavor over the other. As such there is a fundamental meaninglessness underpinning any action Deleuze and Guattari assume in order to “become” something else. The negation that constitutes Kristeva’s subject is preferred insofar as one’s actions are not inherently meaningless but motivated by the currents of the semiotic forever driving the subject onwards into relationships in hope of recovering (but forever failing to attain) the love of loss.

The “motivation” that this loss instills within our life is characterized by that which is unknown – *our own* unknowableness. Beardsworth calls this “unacknowledged suffering”. Unacknowledged suffering, no matter how depressing such a concept may
seem, is unavoidable -- indeed necessary. It is what allows the subject to engage in a
caring relationship with itself. Even Francis Bacon, an artist on whom Deleuze wrote a
book stated that his experience of painting followed a similar logic: “I like being alone –
left with my own despair of being able to do anything at all on the canvas”.240 For
Kristeva, art is an ideal occasion to cultivate and experiment with the pangs of
unacknowledged suffering. In a sense, the notion of unacknowledged suffering salvages
the notion of a private or “sacred” space that one does not easily locate in Deleuze and
Guattari. This might be a topic of interest on which one might chose to pursue further
research, insofar as the sacred allows for a sight that is inaccessible to the socius, a socius
which in Deleuze and Guattari the subject is instantaneously connected to at all times
through the practice of achieving a BwO.

I would like to conclude this thesis with some reflections on why we ought to
prefer Kristeva’s psychoanalytic paradigm to Deleuze and Guattari. The conclusions
drawn above have illustrated some vital limitations with an understanding of subjectivity
founded upon pure affirmation. By assuming the psychoanalytic line of thought, Kristeva
salvages many important concepts that are helpful when analyzing human behaviour. Her
salvaging of the Freudian death drive and negation allow for a much more effective
platform on which to found a basis for long lasting resistance to de-humanization and/or
de-subjectivization.

Kristeva’s account of the subject does possess the elements necessary to resist co­
option by the prevailing powers. Considering that subjectivity is constituted upon a
primordial moment of loss, the subject is never satisfied with the status of their being.
Insofar as the subject is never satisfied it can never possibly be coaxed or seduced into
becoming (even temporarily) a certain kind of subject. The subject is depressed and in need of constant change. The desire for constant change is a result of the Kristeva subject being poised on the brink of total collapse. To prevent that from actually occurring, the subject is constantly in the process of erecting symbolic discourses in hopes that they will meet the subject’s desire for narcissistic satisfaction. Not even the fragments of the “old” power structures hold potential for the depressive. The depressive, in a state of permanent mourning for the lost Thing, completely starts over; this time with an entirely new set from which to conjure up or create meaning. Kristeva writes,

> the work of art that insures the rebirth of its author and its reader or viewer is one that succeeds in integrating the artificial language it puts forward (new style, new composition, surprising imagination) and the unnamed agitations of an omnipotent self that ordinary social and linguistic usage always leave somewhat orphaned or plunged into mourning.  

However it must be emphasized that the ability to start over is only made possible by a psychic structure that allows for that function. This ability to return, or restart is what I consider genuine revolt. It is also the only way that the power and dignity of the individual might be salvaged in a postmodern era where hope seems futile.

Finally, consider Kristeva’s research on the etymology of the “revolt”. Kristeva’s understanding of revolt is implicitly tethered to the act of “returning to...”. This is in line with Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition that is predicated upon returning to the origins of psychic organization. Consider Kristeva’s account of the revolutionary potential in poetic language and how it is made possible through an understanding of the repressed workings of the chora. Kristeva writes that, “the poet is put to death because he wants to turn rhythm into a dominant element because he wants to make language perceive what it doesn’t want to say, provide it with its matter independently of the sign, and free it from denotation”. The poet consciously or
unconsciously distorts the symbolic and thus distorts the conventionally accepted mode of what constitutes subjectivity. However this process of growth and change is made possible only because of the repressed workings of the semiotic chora, the loss of the Mother, inscribed upon the psyche of the child. Deleuze and Guattari were so concerned with dismantling and putting to rest the Oedipal “father” characteristic of Freudian psychoanalytic theory that they did not adequately take into consideration the implications of a “mother”... the semiotic chora.
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* And associated texts for further reading


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END NOTES

1 See Kristeva, Revolt, She Said, pp.21-25
2 Kristeva, Sense and Nonsense, p.158
3 I am sensitive to the criticisms that many may have regarding this example from Kristeva’s text. Such a criticism might argue that when one dons the spectacles of psychoanalysis one will see the structures wherever one looks. “There’s the father...there’s the father...there’s the father!” However I do not find this to be a convincing rebuttal. It was Freud’s project to account for the ways people behaved and one of the reasons for certain behaviours was the structure/function of the “father”. Even if one’s project is to develop a post-structural ethics of self-transformation (Deleuze and Guattari) there is a tacit assumption made that this new discourse is only made possible by the death of one father and the institution of a new one. The pattern is the same.

5 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language p.87
6 Kristeva, Ibid. p.86
7 Ibid. p.154
8 Ibid. p.148
9 Ibid. p.151
10 Ibid. p.148
11 Ibid. p.149
12 Ibid. p.159
13 Ibid. p.152
14 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.65
15 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language p.154
16 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.109
17 See Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p.3
18 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.109
19 Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy”, p.109
20 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.110
21 Ibid. p.111
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid. p.112
24 Ibid. p.117
25 Ibid. p.119
26 Ibid.
27 I place this phrase in scare quotes (“””) to emphasize that while I may use them discursively I am well aware of the reservations that Kristeva as well as Deleuze and Guattari hold with respect to the notion of metaphysics in general.
28 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p.119
29 Deleuze and Guattari Anti-Oedipus p.9
30 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language p.130
31 Ibid. 121
32 Ibid. 113
33 Freud, On Negation, p.181
34 Ibid. p.182; Also consider Agamben’s comments on the Negative in his Language and Death, “Inasmuch as he is speaking and mortal, man is, in Hegel’s words, the negative being who ‘is that which he is not and not that which he is’ or, according to Heidegger, the “placeholder (platzhalter) of nothingness.”(Intro, xii)
35 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language p.159
36 Phillips Promises, promises, p.1
37 Consider Freud’s case studies of The Rat Man, Wolf Man, as well as little Hans and/or Dora.
38 See Freud, On Narcissism, p.69
39 See Freud, *Five Lectures*, p.50
40 Ibid. p.51
41 I want to stress that for Freud, love is not pure bliss. Instead it is quite ambiguous. Kristeva will later, take up this notion of ambiguous love and expand upon it further. Consider Miguel de Unamuno’s comments on love and its relationship to suffering, “The most tragic thing in the world and in life, readers and brothers of mine, is love. Love is the child of illusion and the parent of disillusion; love is consolation in desolation; it is the sole medicine in death, for its is death’s brother ... Love seeks with fury, through the medium of the beloved, something beyond, and since it finds it not, it despair.” See his *Tragic Sense of Life,* (p.132).
42 See Freud, *Five Lectures*, p.50
43 See Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, pp. 15-16
44 See Freud, *Mourning and Melancholia*, p.256
45 Fink, pp.5-6
46 See Freud, *The Unconscious*, where he does say that, “just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perception is subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with the phenomena perceived but never really discerned, so psycho-analysis bids us not to set conscious perceptions in the place of the unconscious mental process which is its object. The mental like the physical, is not necessarily in reality just what it appears to us to be”. p.104
47 Lacan, p.78
48 Consider Cixous’ criticism of the suggestion that woman lacks lack in her article “Castration or Decapitation”. “What psychoanalysis points to as defining woman is that she lacks lack. She lacks lack? Curious to put it in so contradictory, so extremely paradoxical, a manner: she lacks lack. To say she lacks lack is also, after all, to say she doesn’t miss lack ... since she doesn’t miss the lack of lack. Yes, they say, but the point is “she lacks The Lack,” The Lack, lack of the Phallus. And so, supposedly, she misses the great lack, so that without man she would be indefinite, indefinable, nonsxed, unable to recognize herself: outside the symbolic. But fortunately there is man: he who comes ... Prince Charming. And it’s man who teaches woman (because man is always the Master as well), who teaches her to be aware of lack, to be aware of absence, aware of death. [...] Without him she’s remain in a state of distressing and distressed undifferentiation, unbordered, unorganized, “unpoliced” by the phallus ... incoherent, chaotic, and embedded in the Imaginary in her ignorance of the Law of the Signifier. Without him she would in all probability not be contained by the threat of death, might even, perhaps, believe herself eternal, immortal.”(p.46)
49 Lacan, p.79
50 Fink, p.56. “horse” is obviously not the actual biological father of Hans, nor is “horse” Hans’ father’s proper name. The signifier “horse” only serves the “paternal function”, as Lacan would have it, of the Oedipal father in Freud who separates the mother/child dyad such as to introduce a gap between the child and the mother. Here “horse” signifies a desire that is blocked by the “horse”, and that is a desire for the desire of the mother (incest taboo).
51 Throughout, Deleuze and Guattari will be considered and treated as the same thinker, although it is acknowledge by the present author that there are striking differences in their respective thoughts.
52 Klein, *Love, Guilt, and Reparation* p.306
53 Ibid. p.308
54 Ibid. pp 308-309
55 Ibid. 309
56 Kristeva, *Melanie Klein*, p.173
57 Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* p.133
58 Kristeva, *Melanie Klein*, p.173
59 See Lacan, p.206
60 Kristeva, *Revolution*, p.62
61 Ibid. p.130
62 Ibid. p.43
63 Ibid. p.44
64 Ibid. pp.130-131
65 Lacan, *Ecrits*, p.80
Kristeva, *Revolution*, p.13

Ibid. 47

Ibid. 22

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. p.151

Ibid. p.132

Ibid. p.129

Ibid. p.133

Ibid. p.17

Kristeva, *Melanie Klein*, p.172

Ibid.

Ibid. 173

Deleuze, *Practical Philosophy*, pp.22-23

Ibid. p.29

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.8. “Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche’s work as its cutting edge”.

Ibid.

Ibid. p.59

Ibid. p.33

Ibid.

Ibid. p.9

Ibid. p.41

Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p.34

Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.42

Faulkner, Joanne. (2007). “The vision, the riddle, and the vicious circle” p.44

Ibid. p.45

Ibid.

Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, pp.24-25


Barber, *The Screaming Body*, p.53

Ibid. pp.53-54

Sara Beardsworth refers to this set as Kristeva’s Trilogy of the 80’s

Kristeva, *Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt*, p.46

I do not wish to engage in a lengthy critique of the distinctiveness of various thinkers and their systems of thought, however, I must state that by asserting the similarity between Kristeva and Heidegger above I do not consider Kristeva to be a phenomenological-existentialist. Nor would I suggest that Heidegger was sympathetic to the psychoanalytic paradigm to which Kristeva subscribes. I only wish to illustrate a philosophical or structural similarity in their thought, purely for clarification.

See *On Narcissism*, Freud’s articles. Therein he articulates this stages and it’s characteristic borderless structure where the infant does not recognize a difference between itself and Mother.

The notion of the symbolic for Kristeva is reminiscent of Freud’s notion of the Uncanny. Consider the following article from his article of the same name, “The condition under which the feeling of uncanniness arises … is unmistakable. We – or our primitive forefathers – once believed in the possibility of those things [animism] and were convinced that they really happened. Nowadays we no longer believe in them, we have *surmounted* such ways of thought; but we do not feel quite sure of our new sets of beliefs, and the old ones still exist within us [repressed] ready to seize upon any confirmation.” See Freud, *The Uncanny*, pp.401-402

Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, p.8

Ibid.

Tales, p.9

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. p.10

Ibid., p.11
Although Sartre rejects Freud's understanding of the unconscious (and one cannot infer that by extension also Kristeva's) Sartre adopts and adapts this paradoxical notion of love and hate into his existential philosophy. Consider his discussion of "Concrete Relations with Others" in *Being and Nothingness*, pp.474-534. Sartre articulates a subject who during the sexual act is made aware of their own 'facticity,' that is to say, they are made aware of their being a mere thing-in-the-world. They are being made an object. Furthermore Sartre posits that the subject desires this to a certain extent (Masochism). As such, the subject attempts to regain their freedom or 'transcendence,' through dominating the other subject of the sex act (sadism). Sartre posits that the subject attempting to regain their own transcendence by taking it from the other derives a sense of joy or pleasure from this act. In any case, both Freud and Sartre notice this phenomenon in some regard.

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109 Ibid., p.13
110 Ibid
111 It is rather difficult to say what the most appropriate examples of the abject would be, so I suggest looking toward the paintings of Marc Chagall for an idea of what the abject is and the impact that it exercises on the human psyche. Chagall produced multiple paintings that exude the abjection. *The Newspaper Vendor* (1914)\textsuperscript{28} does not depict a sad man, a lonely man. The look on the man's face shows a man who has never left Vitebsk,\textsuperscript{128} his homeland, Motherland. He is an independent ego, yet has not been called upon to show himself as one to the outside world. His wandering eyes are not in a relationship with anything or anyone as two separate subjects engaging with one another. Likewise *Father* (1914)\textsuperscript{128} and *Soldiers with Bread* (1914-1915)\textsuperscript{128} depict men with no "borders." His eyes stare off into emptiness (staring off into space). What these characters represent for us is the unsatisfying nature of a life (if it can even be considered life) tainted by the abject.

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131 *Powers of Horror*, p.140; Also consider Adorno's comment on the relationship between "Truth" and "Suffering" in *Negative Dialectics*, "Where the thought transcends the bonds it tied in resistance --- there is its freedom. Freedom follows the subject's urge to express itself. The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth." (p.17)

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138 Another psychoanalyst, (but unlike Kristeva also a visual artist), Bracha L. Ettinger has painted a series of art works in which this idea of symbolizing the non-symbolizable is perhaps made clearer. The particular
series to which I am referring is called the *Eurydice* series. It is based upon the Greek myth of Orpheus and his bride to be Eurydice. I will briefly explain the myth with the intent that it will help knit together the three pre-Oedipal moments implicit in the structuration of subjectivity for Kristeva, showing how they are connected and work together. (See Hamilton, Edith p.142 for an extended account)

***Eurydice and Orpheus...or, one faint word, "farwell."***

Eurydice was the bride of Orpheus. However immediately following the marriage the bride was walking about in a meadow with her bridesmaids and she was stung by a viper which killed her. Orpheus, overwhelmed by his loss, could not endure it and vowed to descend into the world of death and bring her back. During his underworld adventure he "struck his lyre" and all obstacles were rendered harmless for no one under the spell of his voice could resist his demand for Eurydice. The "Gods who rule the dark and silent world" summoned Eurydice and gave her to Orpheus, but under one condition: that Orpheus not look back at her until reaching the "upper world". Ascending from Hades he is convinced that she was right behind him but the desire to look back just to make sure was stultifying. Once he fully ascended into the joyful light of day he immediately turned around to see her but it was too soon; Eurydice had not exited the doorway yet and so slipped away into the darkness again. He could not see anything definite of her, she was blurry and dark. "Farewell" was all Orpheus heard. Orpheus tried to rush after her and enter the underworld again, but was denied by the Gods. He was left wandering alone playing his lyre until a band of Maenads came upon him and killed him, "tearing him limb from limb".

The moment Orpheus looses Eurydice simultaneously marks the presence of the three moments of pre-Oedipal being constitutive of subjectivity for Kristeva. The last image Orpheus saw of his love object Eurydice was a blurry, dark, indeterminate image. Until that moment he had taken for granted the times he could simply look upon her face. Now, any time he desires to conjure up her image it will be a representation. In a sense it is as though she never existed, for the only thing that is present to him now is a fictitious depiction of a love-object that he calls "Eurydice". The blurred final image of Eurydice is the moment of abjection. Ettinger's paintings show an indeterminant subject blurred. The painting conveys a sense of frustration upon its viewer. A feeling that suggests, "I've almost got it...maybe...no...wait! No...". The loss of a loved one, suspended in abeyance; abjection.

139 Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, p.169
141 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.26
142 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.76
143 Ibid. Deleuze and Guattari's argument that language is solely to be obeyed in the intersubjective phenomenon of communication (communication of orders, etc.) is complicated and deeped by Kristeva in a way that I think allots the subject a sense of freedom that one does not find in Deleuze and Guattari. Consider an excerpt from Maggi's book on Maria Maddalena, *Uttering the Word*: "Maria Maddalena believes that human language is not synonymous with communication, but rather with exclusion. What she says resembles our language, but it does not coincide with it"(p.22). By citing Maddalena, I am not suggestion that Kristeva is a mystic. What I am suggesting, however, is that Kristeva is sensitive and sympathetic to the necessary Unnameable which allows for language to exist in-itself. This is a concern that has escaped traditional "rational" linguistics, and thus is a phenomenon that has been kept quite private within a sub-set of mystic thinkers. I see Kristeva as a thinker who is trying to work with this aspect of mysticism in a way that has been neglected western philosophy and linguistics throughout history. Consider what Roland Barthes (Kristeva's doctoral advisor) has to say concerning this ignorant gesture of the west. "This superficial dismissal of mystical literature derives from the fact that the academic "fascism",... perceives that mystical literature defies every expression of "knowledge"."(Maggi, *Uttering the Word*, p.37). Deleuze and Guattari, in their attempt to evade and/resist the fascist within, may have fallen victim to one that evaded their attention!

144 Manuel De Landa in his book, *A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History*, (New York: Zone Books, 2000) articulates this tendency of systems of matter, (linguistic, economic, biomass) to self-regulate themselves through random fluctuations and temporary coalescences: "Western societies transformed the objective world (or some areas of it) into the type of structure that would "correspond" to their theories, so that the latter became, in a sense, self-fulfilling prophecies "(p.273). In short for Deleuze and Guattari,
there is no constitutive moment for anything; only retroactive (ad-hoc) fictions that simply lead th subject
awry. They see psychoanalysis as one such fiction.

145 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 76
146 Ibid. p.84
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Take Derrida for instance. Derrida asserted that “words can do no more than point to, or conjure, the
absence of that about which they speak. That about which they speak – life, love, the material world, even
language itself, is other to words”(Oliver, *The Portable Kristeva*, p.xx). Oliver, in her introduction to *The
Portable Kristeva*, writes that Derrida lamented the inability to inscribe the uninscribable. Furthermore
Derrida dreamed of a writing that would be “a transfusion of the living body”(Ibid.) but nonetheless
rescinded this as a possibility. Although Derrida’s chose to represent this property of signifiers as “floating”
or “shifting” by manipulating the format of his written texts, even puncturing holes through an entire
such ways. For the latter, it is obvious that these signifiers point to nothing else than other signifiers (there
is no need to insert obtuse spaces in-between text or puncture holes through books). Regardless, Deleuze
and Guattari do endorse the disconnect (of Derrida above) between the human body and words as used in
language. Kristeva on the other hand understands this problem in a different manner. Contra to Deleuze and
Guattari who argue that “language is not life” but instead “gives life orders”, Kristeva argues that language
is life. There is in Kristeva an implied “personal” aspect to language that is not acknowledged in Deleuze
and Guattari. This is made possible by her understanding of the chora and the drives; in other words: the
semiotic. Oliver writes that “Kristeva’s theory more optimistically addresses the problem of the
relationship between language and bodily experience by postulating that, through the semiotic element,
bodily drives manifest themselves in language”(Oliver, *The Portable Kristeva*, p.xx). Kristeva answers to
Derrida’s problem of inscribing the uninscribable. In a sense Kristeva is showing how the “uninscribable”
always makes its way into language.

However because this personal aspect of language is only made possible through the semiotic (chora) and
Deleuze and Guattari reject the semiotic (as Kristeva interprets it) the latter are left with a subject with no
capacity to assert itself as a self-affirming subject: how can a subject affirm itself if it cannot do so on its
own (personally)? The purpose of this brief criticism of Derrida (and Deleuze and Guattari) was two-fold:
(1) help demarcate the difference of Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of language with respect to that
of Kristeva, and (2) foreshadow a suspicion that the model Deleuze and Guattari postulate, will in fact,
implose and render their project problematic.

150 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.76
151 See Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, p.19
152 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.94
153 Ibid. p.160
154 Deleuze and Guattari, *Toward a Minor Literature*, p.9
155 Ibid. p.19
156 Ibid. p.16
157 See Genosko, *The Guattari Reader*, p.196
158 Ibid. p.197
159 Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p. 18
160 See Kafka, Franz, *The Complete Short Stories*, p.411
161 Ibid. p.279
162 Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka*, p.22
163 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.138
164 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.47
165 Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, p.4
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid. p.7... Autopoiesis, albeit in a different sense than that of Francisco Varela.
168 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.292
169 Ibid. p.150
170 Ibid.
I say most notable because both Deleuze/Guattari and Kristeva use her as a point of departure.

Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 44

Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, etc. This link between simulacra in Deleuze proper is to be recognized in Deleuze and Guattari’s equation PLURALISM=MONISM. Deleuze and Guattari are monists; that is to say, that for them the world of experience is One. This Oneness of the world is, however, only capable of being experienced through the transient coagulations of bits and pieces of the components of which the One is composed. This is what an assemblage is. More precisely the one can only be experienced, or conceived as such, through the Many. In other words, PLURALISM (the Many) is what MONISM (Oneness) is composed. Thus PLURALISM=MONISM. This seems to be the influence that Deleuze brought to the table in his collaboration with Guattari. The philosophical framework through which the equation PLURALISM=MONISM could be established as such in *A Thousand Plateaus* was first advanced in *Difference and Repetition* by Deleuze in the concept of simulacra. For Deleuze proper simulacra were the PLURALISM (the Many) through which MONISM (Oneness) could be recognized. In other words simulacra are the PLURALISM and the master’s self-affirmation of himself (qua difference-differentiated) such that the master does not recognize his negation (which is embodied in the slave) is MONISM. Self-affirmation is the only thing there is for Deleuze and Guattari (Self=Difference=Simulacra). If there was to be an attempt at self-criticism internal to this present thesis, I would consider reevaluating this assumption that I have made (that is to suggest that Deleuze’s concept of simulacra can be carried over into the collaborative writings with Guattari). However, for the present thesis I will consider the above explanation sufficient to account for how this assumption is accounted for.
Ellis 109

204 Ibid. Also see Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, p.301

205 See Ellrich, *Negativity and Difference*, p.486; Also consider the remarks made of Jean Baudrillard in his *Fragments*. Baudrillard, one of the most infamous voices of the post-modern era even recognizes the need to retain a notion of constitutive 'Negation': Jean Baudrillard *Fragments* "Everything, before taking place, should have the chance not to take place. This suspense is essential, like the negative of a photo. It is this negative which enables the photo to have a meaning; it is this negative which enables it to take place—never the first time, always the second. For things have meaning only the second time, like baptism in anabaptism, like form in anamorphosis. Hence the fantasy that there will always be always be a second meeting, another chance, in another world or in a previous life."(p.33)

206 Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, pp.282-283

207 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.260

208 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p.70

209 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p.93

210 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.261

211 See Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p.16

212 Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, p.202

213 Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, pp.267-268

214 See Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p.16


216 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.261

217 Kristeva, *Tales of Love*, p.1


219 See Oliver, *Ethics, Politics, and Difference*, p.86

220 Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, p.1

221 Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, p.50

222 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.1

223 Kristeva, *Revolution*, p.50

224 Kristeva, *Strangers*, p.8

225 Ibid. p.5

226 Ibid. p.181

227 Ibid. p.182

228 Kristeva, *Revolution*, p.128

229 Kristeva, *Strangers*, p.8

230 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.165

231 Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy*, p.169

232 Kristeva, *Revolution*, p.26

233 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.281

234 Ibid.

235 Ibid.

236 Ibid.

237 Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, Pp.79-80

238 Ibid. p.80

239 See Faulkner, *As I Lay Dying*, p.120; Also, Dewey Dell continues to add, "That's what they mean by the womb of time: the agony and the despair of spreading bones, the girdle in which lie the outraged entrails of events"(p.121).

240 See Sylvester's *Interviews with Francis Bacon*, p.194

241 Kristeva, *Black Sun*, p.51

242 Kristeva, *Sense and Nonsense of Revolt*, "The Latin verb volvere, which is at the origin of “revolt,” was initially far removed from politics. It produced derivatives with meanings – semes – such as ... “turn,” “return” [...] the Latin verb revolve engenders intellectual meanings: “to consult” or “reread”*.p.1;3

243 Kristeva, *Desire in Language*, p.31