THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND HER RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS: 1969-1975

by

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ABSTRACT

The People's Republic of China
And Her Relations With The Countries of The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations:
1969-1975

The Thesis examines the evolution of the policies of the People's Republic of China towards Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, organized in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from 1969 to 1975.

The first central point of this study is an assumption that the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China towards Southeast Asia have been motivated by a dynamic interplay of two main factors: (1) Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao Tse-tung Thought, which dictate to China to behave as a revolutionary power which must assist the insurgent movements in the area in their struggle to overthrow the local governments; (2) national interest, which demands of China to safeguard the southern flank of her territory bordering on Southeast Asia through friendly relations, trade and other conventional instruments of diplomacy.

While the two main motive factors are mutually antagonistic and exclusive, the Chinese leaders are nevertheless attempting to bring them into a coherent policy under Mao's theory of the "unity of opposites," which believes that it is possible to reconcile these opposing tendencies into a

dynamic equilibrium through which both opposites could be promoted at the same time although not to the same extent. In other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic equilibrium as a continuum between them in a mix in which one or the other orientation predominates in different periods. Thus we might see China's conduct motivated in one period by mostly ideological considerations at the expense of the state-to-state relations, then we might see her policy in the middle of the continuum and suffering from immobilisime and just muddling through, or finally we might see her emphasising friendly ties at the expense of support of revolutionary movements at the other extreme point of the spectrum.

The mechanism which enables Peking to move from one pole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the following elements: (1) the result of an internal power struggle within the leadership in Peking between ideologically radical and moderate elements, which enables the victorious faction to initiate new policies; (2) Peking's assessment of the changing intentions and capabilities of the major powers in the area; (3) internal changes within the countries of the area and the changing attitudes of their governments towards China; (4) changing fortunes of revolutionary movements operating in the area.

The second major point of this study is an assertion that while China's conduct toward Southeast Asia after her foundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological considerations, the beginning of the seventies saw the

national interest reasserting itself as the leading motive factor. Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast Asia in terms of relevance of "long historical ties," casting herself into the role of a benevolent "older brother" who is entitled to respect and deference in exchange for patronage and protection. Hence the traditional echoes of the past are emerging ever stronger and influencing her postures towards the region, while the open support to revolutionary moevments is underplayed at the moment.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Thesis is to undertake a study of foreign relations of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the countries organized in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the termination of her Cultural Revolution in 1969.[1]

The examination of the existing literature concerning China's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia indicates that so far there is no single study available which would have focused upon Peking's ties with the countries of the ASEAN. Most of the available literature discusses China's foreign policy towards the sub-continent of Southeast Asia as a whole, focusing mainly upon the protection of her national interest in global terms rather than upon the ideological motivation in her conduct, while other studies concern themselves with Peking's ties with a particular country of the sub-continent, treating these ties in the form of a case study.[2]

Another shortcoming in the existing literature concerning Peking's policies towards Southeast Asia is the fact that its authors placed a great deal of attention upon the war in Vietnam and its implications for the policies of the major powers, particularly of China, while they ignored the "spill-over" effects of the war and their impact upon the countries neighbouring the immediate war theatre. In other words, an excessive attention has been placed on Peking's

relations with the continental and mainland area of Southeast Asia at the expense of studying its policies towards the peripheral and insular countries of the region.[3]

While these studies are useful in presenting us with a sectoral treatment of China's policies south of her border, nevertheless there is a great need for a new approach which would present us with an overview of her aspirations precisely in the countries bordering the former war theatre, i.e., the countries now organized in the ASEAN. Moreover, most of the available studies were written in the last decade, and are now by and large outdated. Finally, with the termination of military presence of the big powers in the area, there is a great need for a fresh appraisal of Peking's aspirations towards the ASEAN countries as they shape their own destiny in the aftermath of the Indochinese War.

It was because of all these reasons, to close an important gap in the existing literature, that this present study has been undertaken.

The first central point of this study is an assumption that the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China towards Southeast Asia have been motivated by a dynamic interplay of two main factors: (1) Marxist-Leninist ideology and Mao Tse-tung Thought, which dictate to China to behave as a revolutionary power which must assist the insurgent movements in the area in their struggle to overthrow the local governments; (2) national interest, which demands of China to safegurad the southern flank of her territory

bordering on Southeast Asia through friendly relations, trade and other conventional instruments of diplomacy.

While the two main motive factors are mutually antagonistic and exclusive, the Chinese leaders are nevertheless attempting to bring them into a coherent policy under Mao's theory of the "unity of opposites", which believes that it is possible to reconcile these opposing tendencies into a dynamic equilibrium through which both opposites could be promoted at the same time although not to the same extent. In other words, the Chinese leaders conceive the dynamic equilibrium as a continuum between the two extreme poles, their policy fluctuating between them in a mix in which one or the other orientation predominates in different periods. Thus we might see China's conduct motivated in one period by mostly ideological considerations at the expense of the state-to-state relations, then we might see her policy in the middle of the continuum and suffering from immobilisime and just muddling through, or finally we might see her emphasising friendly ties at the expense of support of revolutionary movements at the other extreme point of the spectrum.

The mechanism which enables Peking to move from one pole to the other of the spectrum is activated by the following elements: (1) the result of an internal power struggle within the leadership in Peking between radical and moderate elements, which makes the victorious faction to initiate new policies; (2) Peking's assessment

of the changing intentions and capabilities of the major powers in the area; (3) internal changes within the countries of the area and the changing attitudes of their governments toward China; (4) changing fortunes of revolutionary movements operating in the area.

The second major point of this study is an assertion that while China's conduct toward Southeast Asia after her foundation in 1949 was primarily based upon ideological considerations, the beginning of the seventies saw the national interest reasserting itself as the leading motive factor. Thus China talks with her neighbours in Southeast Asia in terms of relevance of "long historical ties", casting herself into the role of a benevolent "older brother" who is entitled to respect and deference in exchange for patronage and protection. Hence the traditional echoes of the past are emerging ever stronger and influence her postures towards the region, while the open support of revolutionary movements is underplayed at the moment.

In order to describe the manner in which these two main assertions of this Thesis are reflected in the conduct of China's relations with Southeast Asia, the study organizes the material under the following headings:

Chapter 1 describes the two main factors which motive her conduct towards Southeast Asia.

Addressing itself to the whole range of elements which constitute China's traditional aspects of the national interest towards the region, this Chapter deals with the

following topics: (1) question of historical continuity of her main values from period to period; (2) the external relations under the Tang Dynasty based upon a concept of "checking the barbarians with barbarians"; (3) the external relations under the Ming Dynasty based upon the practice of "Tribute System" as applied to her neighbours; (4) the external relations with Southeast Asia under the Ching Dynasty; (5) and the policies of various Chinese Governments towards the overseas Chinese settled in Southeast Asia.

Dealing with the ideological factors which motive Peking's conduct towards Southeast Asia, this Chapter deals with the theoretical concepts which call for and justify Peking's support to the revolutionary movements in the area.

Chapter II surveysthe development of Peking's policies towards Southeast Asia from 1949 to 1969. This period startted on a strong note in 1949 in which Peking was primarily interested in supporting the revolutionary movements in the overthrowing the existing systems in the area; in 1955 Peking began to emphasize the national interest aspect in its foreign relations by promoting friendly ties with the local governments under the Bandung Spirit; from 1958 to 1965 the Peking leadership muddled through a period of confusion and uncertainty; and between 1966 and 1969 China suffered a major internal convulsion under the Cultural Revolution and in her ties with Southeast Asia returned to revolutionary fundamentalism.

While Chapter I and II are introductory, Chapter III

addresses itself to the central problem of our study, i.e., the analysis of the factors which were responsible for the profound transformation of the domestic as well as foreign policy outlooks of the Chinese leadership between 1969 and 1971, and which in turn ushered in its present policies towards Southeast Asia.

Dealing with the domestic factors, the Chapter deals with the consolidation of the new leadership in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, and then with the power struggle and its main issues between the left radicals under Lin Piao and the moderate faction under Chou En-lai which resulted in the defeat of Lin and thus opened the way for a rapprochement with the United States after more than twenty years of hostility.

Analyzing the international factors which significantly influenced the foreign policy making process in China, the Chapter deals with the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Peking policies; the withdrawal of American military presence from Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the end of the war in Vietnam; with the worsening of the Sino-Soviet relations and armed confrontation of these two Communist powers on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers; and finally with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the main challenger of Peking's policies in Southeast Asia.

The last section of this Chapter surveys the responses of Peking to all these domestic and international developments and how these reflected themselves in a new set of policies

designed by the Chinese towards the area of our study. In view of this the section undertakes a country-by-country survey of relations of China with governments of the ASEAN countries, which started with "ping-pong diplomacy", and then ranged across the whole spectrum of policy postures from the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 1974 to much improved but still uneasy ties with Indonesia and Singapore. The increasing emphasis which Peking is placing upon the relevance of "historical ties" for its present day relations with these countries is highlighted.

The last Chapter of this study, Chapter IV, focuses upon the big power alignments which have emerged in the area and Peking's response to them. It explains the reasons which make China to insist that the Americans must maintain in the area a small but credible military presence; discusses the factors making the big powers interested in the area in the future; explains the essence of the Soviet plan on Collective Security in the area and the internationalization of the Malacca Straits through which the Kremlin hopes to extend its influence there; explains the origin and purpose of Malaysia's plan on neutralization of the area and responses of the great powers to it, with a particular emphasis upon Peking's reaction.

The Conclusion summarizes and generalizes upon the most important findings of this study, and makes a tentative assessment of the possible development of Peking's policies

towards the area in the future.

Concerning the material used in the preparation of this study, every effort has been made to draw upon the primary sources published in China and other countries of Asia, which are available at Brock University, and the Department of East Asian Studies at University of Toronto and York University. In this connection I have translated from Chinese many quotations and other references used in this study. Moreover, because of my own translations and general usages of certain standard terms can not accurately express their meaning in Chinese, I have used Chinese characters in the text when appropriate to avoid confusion.

Finally my many thanks to Professor Victor M. Fic who has assisted me in the formulation of this study.

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CHAPTER I

MAIN FACTORS DETERMINING THE POLICIES OF CHINA TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA

The policies of the People's Republic of China toward Southeast Asia are determined by a dynamic interplay of two main motive factors: one, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought; second, the national interest. While the ideological factor is relatively easy to understand, the national interest factor is far more complex because it consists of three elements.

The first element is the need of China to safegurad her territorial integrity on her southern border through the conventional political, diplomatic and military means.

The second element is the most inner needs of China to re-assert her role as a great power in the area which is entitled to respect and deference from her minor southern neighbours. These needs are the echoes of the past which are being increasingly evident not only in the formulation of her postures towards Southeast Asia but also in the style of her conduct in dealing with the individual countries of the area. These elements of her national and traditional culture, style and ritual are clearly evident in her conduct since 1971 in the form of paternalism, magnanimity and a sense of historical greatness, which make Peking to emphasize China's "historical

ties" with her neighbours and their great relevance in the present day situation, and as possible models for the future.

The third element of national interest which motivates China's policies toward Southeast Asia are the 12 million overseas Chinese who live in all countries of the area. For historical and cultural reasons China cannot write them off but must protect them because they were, are, and shall be considered as the living extension of her cultural self into the area.

The purpose of this Chapter is to deal with the ideological factors motivating the conduct of China towards Southeast Asia, as well as to explain the motives which in the past had informed her foreign policy outlook and which are having an ever increasing influence upon the formulation of her present day national interest and her emerging role of a "benevolent power" in the area. The Chapter thus discusses the problem of continuity in Chinese history, the main characteristics of the Tang, Ming and Ching concepts of foreign relations and the tribute system practised by them towards Southeast Asia; then it deals with the overseas Chinese and the protective role played by China in the past; and finally the ideological factors are analayzed.

(1) THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY IN CHINESE HISTORY:

Writing in 1969, John K. Fairbank posed a question about the historical continuity in the Chinese foreign policy:

> "If we ask the long-term question—What is China's tradition in foreign policy?—our query may provoke two counter-questions: Did the Chinese empire ever have a conscious foreign policy? Even if it did, hasn't Mao's revolution wiped out any surviving tradition?"[1]

Indeed, historical continuity and discontinuity in the foreign policy of Communist China is an extremely complicated problem, and it has been said that "it is stale and unprofitable to argue for continuity against discontinuity, and equally so to argue the reverse."[2]

Some scholars, such as Benjamin Schwartz, who disagree with the theory of continuity, argue that "while a traditional Chinese concept of the world proved remarkably durable over the centuries, it has been largely discarded today."[3] Ojha also maintains that both tradition and Confucian ideology no longer constitute operational factors in foreign policy formulation of contemporary China.[4] He says that China, due to her long history of being "bullied" by imperialists and due to her painful Japanese occupation, has became nationalist and that it was this experience of humiliation and suffering that turned her policy-makers to nationalism to seek the status of a big power which should be recognized by others.

Examination of literature which denies the importance of traditional influences on the present policy formulation of China reveals that most of the works agree with Albert Feuerwerker's view:

> "Even if the embassies of Richard Nixon and Tanaka Kakuei to the People's Republic of China were not sufficient evidence to lay to rest this vision of a People's Middle Kingdom, it

> would still be highly questionable that these alleged continuities from the imperial past are operative factors in shaping today's foreign policy."[5]

The core problem is not, however, whether these "alleged continuties are decisive" or, as Feuerwerker says, "operative." The question is "to what extent" the present foreign policy of China is being affected by the traditional factors in the form of subtle psychological values, attitudes and perceptions deeply internalized in the consciousness of her present day leaders. It is from this perspective that the present writer argues in favour of the proposition that the foreign policy conduct of China today is influenced to some measure by traditional elements inherent in her culture and past experience.

Firstly, although the Chinese Empire "had no foreign office and the dynastic record of the 'foreign office' is fragmented under the topics like border control, frontier trade, punitive expeditions, tribute embassies, imperial benevolence to foreign ruler and the like...",[6] it would be a mistake to ignore the influence of the tribute system of the Empire on the mere ground that China did not have the same form of foreign contacts as the Western countries had.[7] We might dislike the Sinocentric attitude evident in the imperial Chinese history, but we cannot ignore its influence and impact upon the present leadership of China.

Secondly, as far as leadership of the People's Republic is concerned, the watershed period between the late Ching Dynasty and the Republican period is relevant and meaningful

to the understanding of the influence of traditional values upon its present conduct:

> "... (the People's Republic of) China's leaders, though in ideological disagreement on certain issues, including many aspects of foreign policy, are all middle-aged or elderly men. All have been educated in large if varying degree within the intellectual and historical framework of traditional Chinese society; all are nationalists; most appear to have a singularly limited knowledge of much of the outer world (Chou En-lai obviously may be the exception); all appear to be conscious of their historical heritage."[8]

And lastly, we must not overlook the great capacity of China to absorb, mold and transform, and thus Sinicize, nearly every social phenomenon. We have seen that the process of Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism was completed at the 9th Party Congress in 1969, when the Thought of Mao Tse-tung were declared to represent the new ideological system of China. In fact, many scholars consider this system closer to the value system and practices of the Confucian tradition than to Marxism-Leninism, based upon European categories.[9] We have also seen that almost every social institution in contemporary China, although it had been originally predicated on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, has been by now completely Sinicized, and good foundations have already been laid in 1971 to Sinicize her relations with Southeast Asia, based upon the assertion of her traditional role of a benevolent older brother who is entitled to respect and deference in exchange for patronage and protection.

(2) <u>THE TANG CONCEPT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS</u>:

It would be impractical to trace the historical background of China's foreign relations to the very early days.[10] China was not a true and great Empire until the Tang Dynasty when the Empire was consolidated by Tang Kao Tsu (唐高祖). The significance of the Tang is that, politically, it tamed the northern normadic peoples of the Jung (戎), Ti (狄), and later Hu (胡); the Man (蠻) in the south and then the Chiang (羌) in the west. These "barbarians" no longer presented a threat to the "Chung Yuan" (中原), or the Central Plain area, where the Empire was situated. Since this consolidation of the Empire, the concept of unity was a central idea of her self-image. As C.P. Fitzgerald puts it:

> "From the Tang period onward the Chinese state remained far more ofter united under one dynasty than divided between two or more: the ideals of the united empire came to be regarded as normal and right, and these ideals were based on the traditional Chinese concepts, which made the empire the synonym of the civilized world, treating all beyond China as barbarians."[11]

The unity of the Chinese Empire was achieved throughout her history by two means: the demographic strength of the Chinese population and the geographical contiguity of the two halves of the country. Under these circumstances and with the unity of the written language, the Chinese culture began to flourish and mature during the Tang Dynasty. This self-image of historical greatness and cultural superiority of the Empire was preserved down to the Ching Dynasty. The Roman Empire had certainly a similar greatness and expansion, but its creativity was terminated by the Dark Ages. Moreover, the bilingual Roman Empire had found its unity

shaken, while China, on the other hand, did not have the problem of language which was crucial for effective and sustained rule. However, the most important factor which accounted for the continuity of the Chinese Empire was the ability of the Chinese to absorb the conquered people, to Sinicize them through the imposition of the unified writing system and Confucian ideology and to incorporate their elites into the imperial system. The Chinese did not learn from the "barbarians", but taught them to read and write.

It was during the Tang period that the Chinese Empire initiated contacts with foreign countries. Traders from other parts of the world came to China.[12] These residents served useful purpose in the Middle Kingdom but they held no position of equality. Such an attitude might seem arrogant, but it should be noted that the Chinese Empire at that time was not only self-sufficient in all aspects, but superior. Being such a safe and great Empire, the Tang Emperors had no necessity and desire for any imports from outside. The self-contained Empire also had no intention to conquer the other distant lands which, in its eyes, should be kept afar.[13]

In short, being self-centered and inward oriented, the frontier areas were to "keep the barbarians" out of the Middle Kingdom and under the control of the court,[14] and when necessary, use force to pacify them. The central idea of the Tang in its relations with the border areas, we may say a form of foreign policy, is best described by a principle of "playing-off one barbarian against another" (Ye-Yee-

Tse-Yee) (以夷制夷).

(3) THE MING AND ITS TRIBUTE SYSTEM:

Since the main concern of this Thesis is the discussion of relations of China towards Southeast Asia, an inquiry should be made also into the Ming Dynasty, which broadened the contact between the Empire and the Southeast Asian countries. The Ming Dynasty is important in this discussion because it was during this period that the "tribute system" was imposed frequently upon the neighbours of China. Inherited from the concept of the Tang Empire, the Emperors of the Ming followed the "rule of the Tang."[14]

External effort to conquer this Empire by force might have been successful at times, for examples the Kin (金) Tartars and the Mongol invasions, but they were unable to rule long.

When Hung-wu (洪武), the founder of the Ming Dynasty, consolidated his rule after ousting the Mongols, he started to gradually seek contact with Southeast Asia. In the year of 1371 his edict addressed to the states outside his Empire proclaimed the "Idea of Impartiality" (一視同仁) toward kings in the then Southeast Asia:

> "In the past, when the emperors ruled all-under-Heaven, all who were lit by the sun and moon, whether near or far, were treated with impartiality (i-shih t'ung-jen). Thus with China stable and peaceful, (the countries in, Ed.) all four directions were in their submission to China."[16]

Such ideal was based on the concept of the tribute system

which was "an extension to the inter-state relations of the principles governing relations between individuals."[17] In fact, these tributary relations had existed long before the Ming Dynasty. Putting it in simple terms, the tribute system was different from the concept of the nation-state system in the sense that it:

> "... involved both rights and duties. China had the responsibility of maintaining proper order in this family. She recognized the junior members (the external vassals) (外藩) (wei-fan) by sending special emissaries to officiate at the investiture of new tributary kings and to confer on them the imperial patent of appointment. China also went to their aid in time of trouble;..."[18]

Thus, such a system was based not on the recognition of equality among sovereign states as in the West, but was considered as a father-son or senior-junior relationship."[19]

Based on the concept of Impartiality, the system of father-son relationship was continuously and without obstruction practised by Emperor Hung-wu toward the periphery of China from Korea down to Southeast Asia. However, the system was disturbed in 1377, when Emperor Hung-wu's envoy to Srivijaya (Java) was killed; this made the "Son of Heaven" (天子) angry, making him immediately change his attitude toward the Javanese king who had dared to refuse to submit. Hung-wu declared:

> "Should the Son of Heaven became violently angry, (he can) send an officer with an army of ten thousand to execute divine judgement 'as easily as the turn of his palm...' Only Srivijaya obstructs our influence... This pitty little country, by daring to be willful and refusing to submit, seeks its own destruction..."[20]

Following this proclamation, Java was invaded and fell into the hands of the Chinese and remained under them for about two hundred years. Later, the Chinese who lived there followed "piracy as a calling, using the ports as retreats and strong points."[21]

Comparing the two proclamations of Hung-wu, it is understandable that the Idea of Impartiality was not an empty word but a concept of superiority backed with force.

Following Hung-wu's death, his son Yung-lo (榮祿) went one step forward to tighten the relations of China with Southeast Asia. The powerful naval forces that he inherited from his father provided him with an effective tool for naval expeditions in Southeast Asia:

> "Yung-lo went further. His envoys were asked to persuade all countries to submit to China. To Southeast Asia he first sent bureaucrats, but he soon turned to his trusted eunuchs to bring his largesse to the various rulers. This policy was partly to cut down the rigid formulities, administrative restrictions, and Confucian scruples and partly to simplify the tributary relationship by making it between one ruler and and another, not involving the submission of one government to another."[22]

Started in 1430, Yung-lo sent his first Eunuch Yin Ch'ing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade.[23] However, more important were the expeditions of 1405, 1407, 1409, 1414, 1417, 1421 and 1431[24] when the Emperor sent the Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho seven times to make his voyages down to Southeast and West Asia. Cheng Ho was thus praised as the builder of fame of the Ming court among the kings in Java, Calicut, Siam, Malacca, Ceylon and East Africa, becoming

a legend among the overseas Chinese up to the present days.

Emperor Yung-lo's justification for promotion of the tributary rule was no longer based on his father's Idea of Impartiality. Rather, it was based on a new "Idea of Inclusiveness":

> "This was the practice of giving largesse and hospitability in order to 'show nothing left out' or 'show no other separation' (世無外) (shih-wu-wai)."[25]

A detailed investigation of the reasons for Yung-lo's ambition explains that the sending of envoys to Southeast Asia was not accidental.[26] It is true that many historians do not regard his practice of tributary system as expansionism, for there was no intention of Yung-lo to bring these areas under his rule, and that while the Idea of Inclusiveness might sound Sinocentric and arrogant, it was merely an intention of the Emperor to know the outside world. In actual fact, however, had Yung-lo continued the maritime expansion after Cheng Ho's expeditions, it was very possible for the Ming court to achieve the status of the most powerful naval power, or the first colonial power, in Asia. J.D. Frodsham, when examing the foreign relations of the Imperial China, identifies this possibility quite clearly:

> "The importance of these expeditions, which were probably intended to bring most of the known civilized world under the suzerainty of the Chinese tributary system can hardly be over-estimated. Had they continued, the whole history of Southeast Asia might well have been entirely different, since it is doubtful whether the European powers, Portugal, Spain and Holland would have succeed in establishing themselves in that region in the teeth of Chinese opposition. By the fifteen century there were already considerable colonies of Chinese—the nucleus of the present overseas Chinese—scattered

> throughout Southeast Asia. If China had chosen to develop her maritime power, to proceed systematically with the colonization of the rich lands to her south and resist all intruders, the result on both Chinese and European history would have been incalculable."[27]

Why then the Ming court ceased to continue its maritime expansion after 1430? While it was possible that "China's long development had already reached its height and maturity on a self-contained and stabilized basis while Europe's great expansion was just getting started...,"[28] a more convincing explanation is given by Frodsham:

> "The Confucian literati, jealous of the power and presitage of the eunuchs who had been primarily responsible for these voyages, succeeded in having the expeditions discontinued on the ground that 'the treasure that was lavished on these undertakings brought no profit in return', dismantled the fleets, abandoned the overseas Chinese to the fate that was later to overtake them at the hands of the Spanish and Dutch, and most important of all, forced China into an isolationist policy form which she was not to emerge for close to four centuries and a half."[29]

Frodsham's analysis is convincing because throughout the imperial history of China the eunuchs were the only people near to the Emperors, continuously under attack from the court ministers and the gentry class.

Thus we conclude that the Ming contacts with Southeast Asia were really based upon the old concept of "rule like the Tang", and that the imperial Ming's intention was really to bring the area to submission to the court through the tributary system. An important element of this tributary system was the fact that the rule must be based upon an old Confucian maxim to the effect that the Emperor must

rule his vassals and protected states by virtue (te) (德), and that he must safegurad the specific status of each of them in the hierarchy of the "protected states". More over, should this "pecking order" be disturbed, or should the vassals refuse submission, then the Emperor could use force to restore harmony and order in the tributary system.

However, unlike the European powers who practised colonial invasions and direct rule over the subgucated people, the Ming court did not want to make this area its colonies in the Western sense.

(4) THE CHING AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:

Imperial China's tributary system continued during the Manchu period (1644-1919). Ch'ien Lung (乾隆), one of the greatest rulers of the Ching Dynasty, liked nothing better than to be compared with Tang T'ai Tsung (唐太宗), the true founder of the Tang.[30] The Ching Dynasty remained most of the time self-sufficient and needed nothing from the outside in its early reign. This could be seen from Ch'ien Lung's letter sent to the British King George III in 1793, when the former refused his request for permanent diplomatic and easier trade relations.[31]

It was this tradition of the Imperial China, which became soon a burden, which made the Ching Emperors to feel superior, to stand "intact, aloof, uninterested in the West, unwilling to lear, unable to believe that the barbarians had anything of value to communicate."[32] This imperial

attitude, however, could not be maintained long. The later days of the nineteenth century saw continuously the confrontation between the Western concept of the nation-state and the tributary system, which placed China under an increasing pressure of the West to give up the old practices.

However, the Southeast Asian kings continued sending the tributary missions to the Ching court even during the declining years of the Ching Empire. It was not until the onset of Western imperialism, when most of Southeast Asia became occupied by the colonial powers,[33] that local rulers terminated their tributary relations with the Manchu Government.

The regulations of the Ching tribute system were slightly different from the Ming's. Whereas the Ming court's real intention was to bring to submission the vassals and to regard them as distant, separate and incomparable to the Imperial China, the Ching tributary regulations were modified. Fairbank summarized this remarkable system as follow:

> "(a) non-Chinese rulers were given a patent of appointment and an official seal for use in correspondence;
> (b) they were given a noble rank in the Ching hierarchy;
> (c) they dated their communications by the Ching calendar, that is by the Ta Ching (大清) (Great Ching) reign title;
> (d) they presented tribute memorials of various sorts on appropriate statuary occasions;
> (e) they also present a symoblic tribute (貢) (kung) of local products;
> (f) they or their envoys were escorted to court by imperial post;
> (g) they performed the appropriate ceremonies of the Ching court, notably kotow;
> (h) they received imperial gifts in return; and
> (i) they were granted certain privileges at the frontier and at the capital."[34]

Understandably, the Ching court in its later years treated these tribute missions with greatest importance in the hope that its vassals would not fall under the control of the colonial powers, and between 1840 and 1908 the tribute missions continued to arrive from Korea, Siam, Burma, Vietnam and Nepal.

However, the Ching practice of the tributary system since the end of the Opium War of 1840 changed from demands for submission to dealing with the vassals in terms of strategic considerations. By signing the unequal treaty of Nanking with Britain in 1841, causing the perpetual leasing of the Hong Kong island, the Ching ruler realized that the external vassals could play an important role in protecting the Empire from further territorial loss under the pressure of the "gun-boat" policy of the Western powers. The later Ching Emperors therefore sought practical ways to protect China's southern border by treating the vassals as "buffers."

Under the pressure of the Western powers the court ministers realized the importance of the defence aspects of the tribute system, as aptly stated by one of the Ching officials:

> "The border provinces are China's gates: the tributary states are China's walls. We build the walls to protect the gates to secure the house. If the walls fall, the gates are endangered; if the gates are endangered, the house is shaken."35

In view of the defense function of the tribute system it would be wrong to believe that the Ching court was so

naive as to use this system only in order to "protect" itself from contacts with the "barbarians". The best illustration of this point is the fact that the "Office of the Barbarian Affairs" (理藩院) (Li-Fan-Yuan) was abolished in the later days of the Ching Dynasty, and instead a new Office of Foreign Affairs (總理衙門) (Tsungli Yamen) was established in 1888. However, because of the long time isolation of the Imperial China, the Ching court lacked the necessary diplomatic knowledge and experience to deal with the "barbarians", particularly the Western powers now entrenched in Southeast Asia and China herself. Created and controlled by Li Hung Chang, the Tsungli Yamen was not as successful as expected because the "old hands" of the tributary system were managing the organisation. Perhaps, the Ching court was really too slow to learn.[36]

By the end of the century not only the "walls" and the "gates" of the Middle Kingdon were unprotected, but even the "house" itself was flown opened and shakened. Siam terminated her tribute mission in 1853, Burma in 1875, Vietnam in 1883 and Nepal in 1908.

Although the tribute system had many advantages, at times it turned into a burden. As early as the Ming Dynasty it was reported that as one of the reasons that led to the downfall of the Ming Dynasty was the obligations of the tribute system to protect its vassals:

> "One of the causes for the dawnfall of the Ming dynasty said to be its extensive military aid

> to Korea in her defense against the Japanese invasion under Hideyoshe at the end of the sixteenth century. Relief missions from China, with messages of sympathy and commiseration from the emperors, were often sent to the tributary states, in the wake of such natural calamities as famines, flood, droughts, and typhoons."[37]

As this brief survey indicates, China in the past had extensive contacts with Southeast Asia through a system of tributary relations, which clearly defined the responsibilities of the protecting power as well as the duties of the protected states. China saw herself at the center of this system as the most powerful "elder brother", who was entitled to respect, deference and recognition for her special role.

While this role of China came under criticism from her present leaders in the past, after 1971 the theme echoing her special relations with Southeast Asia is emerging ever stronger in her dealing with various countries of the area. The most recent evidence of this trend are the speeches exchanged in Peking during the visit of President Marcos of the Philippines in 1975, in which both the Chinese leaders as well as Marcos placed emphasis upon the "special historical ties" between the two countries. It must have been music to Peking leaders to hear Marcos saying that China is the "natural leader of the Third World," including Southeast Asia,[38] implying that she should so be recognized and listened to.

If this trends continues, it can be expected that China would re-assert her traditional influence in Southeast

Asia not through the force of arms but through casting herself into the traditional role of the older brother who would demand from her proteges to play supporting roles.[39] Speaking in a contemporary idiom, China would appear building on her periphery a sub-system of friendly states which would be based upon an ever increasing assertion of her traditional role in Asia.

Moreover, since the Southeast Asian countries are the border areas of China, and since traditionally China had been practising the policy of "playing-off the barbarians against each other", her present leaders appear to maintain this concept as the best means for attaining balance of power in the area. It is not, therefore, surprising that Peking is using these countries to check the Soviet Union and its ambitions in the area at the present time.

This trend is also clearly evident in her effort to check the increasing penetration of Southeast Asia by the Soviet Union through insisting that the Americans must maintain their military presence in Asia, but small enough as not to threaten her and big enough as to pose deterent to the Soviets in the area.

(5) OVERSEAS CHINESE:

The overseas Chinese are one of the great mysteries in modern Asia. In political sense, however, they are more than that. The departure of discussion in this section starts by asking the questions: How did these people happen

to settle in the "Nanyang" (南洋), or the Southern Oceans of Asia?

The overseas Chinese have been described in the past as the "Fifth Column"[40] of the Communist China; the "Third China"[41] and the "Jews of Southeast Asia".[42] All these terms are inadequate and biased in describing the role of the overseas Chinese in present Southeast Asia.

The "Fifth Column" term was used during the 1950's to describe the overseas Chinese unjustly as a mere tool of Peking in its attempts to overthrow the local governments, and today this term has been dropped. The term "Third China" can never describe truely the overseas Chinese in this area. It is generally agreed that they are a cultural phenomenon, not a political one, and while they retain this Chineseness they are permanently settled in Southeast Asia which is culturally much different. The term "Jews of Southeast Asia" differs from the real Jews in the sense that the Jews are not an ethnic kin to the people of one of the great powers of the Middle East; the Chinese of Southeast Asia are Chinese, and China is not far away.[43]

Theoretically, the term overseas Chinese has been used by the Chinese officials "to embrace ethnic Chinese who could not claim any other national status in their foreign homes and thus, perforce, who were Chinese nationals by descent."[44] To a third party, however, the overseas Chinese is being defined as "a person of some Chinese ancestry who views residence abroad as compatible with Chinese cultural

identity and less certainly with some remote Chinese political orientation."[45] It is this latter definition that describes realistically the situation of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Because the overseas Chinese are considered by China as an extension of her cultural self into Southeast Asia, and because the overseas Chinese constitute significant minorities in all countries of the area, the relationship between Peking and the governments of the area depends upon the treatment each of them accords to these people. If the treatment is mutually agreeable, then the relations are friendly; if the treatment is unfriendly, then the relations are tense and hostile. Thus China's ability to yield influence in Southeast Asia depends on how the Chinese minority in the region adjusts or is allowed to adjust to the new situation.[46]

Migration of Chinese to Southeast Asia began early in the Ming period, but the main wave was seen only when the change of dynasty from the Ming to the Ching occurred. The present Chinese in the area are mostly immigrants from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien and Kwangsi, the great majority of them hailing from the first two provinces. It was probably due to the growth of population in the late Ching period and the contiguity of these two provinces that accounted for this migration.

Moreover, there was a political reason for this migration. Due to the anti-Manchu atmosphere among the Han (漢) people in Fukien and Kwangtung, the Manchu treatment of

of them was harsh.[47] However, it was only after 1786, when the British encouraged their settlement in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome.[48] The Manchu Government issued a citizenship law in 1909, defining the Chinese subject as "every legal or extra-legal child of a Chinese father or mother, regardless of birth place,"[49] thus setting down the principle of jus sanguinis as a basis of Chinese nationality. This law was inherited by the Republican, and later the Communist Government, of China.

From 1860 to 1930 a tide of Chinese migration flooded Southeast Asia. Disregarding the Manchu Law Code (大清律例) (Ta-ching Lu-li) which prohibited migration outside China, the Chinese people in southeastern provinces gave up the ancestor worship which tied them to the ancestral villages and continued to migrate to Southeast Asia as labourers. Under the practice of "coolie-trade" most of them were sold to the Philippines, Malaya, Java, and other countries. As Lea E. William describe the background of this trade:

> "About the middle of the nineteenth century, Southeast Asia entered a period of quickened transformation. The decline of mercantilism had heralded the death of Dutch and British company rule; conditions hospitable to free trade appeared. Corresponding with the opening of greatly expanded opportunities for private investment was growing demand for Southeast Asian products to feed western industrialization... Tin, tobacco and later, rubber production doubled and redoubled. So rapid was economic expansion that chronic labour shortages appeared. Indigenous peasants, by and large, were reluctant to leave their villages to work under the disciplined and often harsh conditions of large-scale mining and estate agriculture. Labour had to be recruited outside the region. India sent immigrants, but China sent vast numbers."[50]

Thus the Chinese labourers worked mostly in the mines and plantations, and having succeeded in making a living or in accumulating property in one generation, the father would usually return to the ancestral village in China to retire, while the second generation took over. Such a pattern of migration continued until the forties, when the Chinese became "trapped" and preferred to reside in Southeast Asia. Three important reasons made them choose to settle down: the business prosperity in the new countries; the continuation of the Civil War in the homeland, and the need for labour in the area.

In the course of a few decades, several important characteristics emerged among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

First, the overseas Chinese depended on the European powers for protection of their rights during the colonial rule, and when the colonial period was over the Chinese started to experience racial discrimination from the indigenous peoples.

Secondly, the majority of the Chinese people usually chose not to actively participate in local political process preferring to concentrate on the activities in the economic sphere instead. It was partly because of this that the local peoples in Southeast Asia after attaining independence controlled the political power, while the economic power to a large degree was in the hands of the Chinese. And until today it is a big question among the overseas Chinese whether they should participate actively in local politics so as to

protect their economic rights or not. This dilemma is particularly serious in Malaysia, where the indigenous people are aware of the Chinese economic power and the Kuala Lumpur Government has inssued special laws and regulations to prevent limit the Chinese from accumulating incresing economic wealth.

Thirdly, through the history of the overseas Chinese migration there was no protection of their rights provided by the home governments in China. The Ching Government restricted them to migrate, and during the Republican and Kuomintang rules there was Civil War which made it impossible to pay any attention to them from these Chinese governments.

Fourthly, the overseas Chinese always remained attached to their own traditional culture, especially preferring their children to receive Chinese education. The Nanyang University in Singapore was built in the 1950's for such a purpose, when China terminated in 1949 the opportunities for the overseas Chinese children to receive education there. This aspect, however, is becoming less and less significant now because the younger Chinese are under pressures from local governments to assimilate into the local cultures.

All these factors then combined to produce an extremely complicated situation for both the Chinese minorities as well as the governments of the countries in which they live:

> "How should the Chinese minority be treated by host countries? How should the Chinese behave as individuals and groups toward the national integrity and security concerns of

> host countries? How and with what criteria should minority ethnic rights be protected? Should the 1948 United Nations Human Rights Declaration be respected in the protection of national sub-cultures, languages and minority educational rights? What should be the long term loyalty attitudes on the part of the ethnic Chinese toward their land of ancestry? What assurances should be given and what policies should be pursued by the Chinese government to alleviate the fear and concern for national security of many Southeast Asian countries? How can the countries in Southeast Asia continue to discriminate legally against the Chinese in the field of commerce, business ownership, citizenship rights, and educational opportunities without aggravating inter-racial relations? How can the Chinese groups in Malaysia and Indonesia, for examples, be convinced that they will be given equal police protection in time of racial conflict or other national crisis?"[51]

While no attempt shall be make to answer these questions one by one, the problems faced by the Chinese can be grouped under three headings: economic, integration and political.

The origin of the prejudices against the overseas Chinese in the economic sphere is based upon another myth created after the colonial era which alleges that they are "controlling" the economies of the countries in which they live. It is not my intention to argue the issue of "control" and "ownership" of local economy here.[52] However, the central point of the issue is the following one:

> "... The Chinese, envied for their wealth and dominance in various field of economic life, find that preference is given to indigenous enterprises and that in certain fields alien (Chinese, Ed.) capital and skills are totally excluded."[53]

The problem of integration concerns more the relations between the People's Republic of China and the ASEAN countries in the sense that the Chinese minorities, particularly

those in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, are considered as "different people". The problem arises from their "Chineseness" and their lack of the "we-group" feeling which is perceived by the indigenous peoples:

> "What is perceived as the 'alienness' of the Chinese provides another theme in anti-Chinese sentiments. In an atmosphere charged with appeal to national unity and nation-building, the Chinese, whether China-born or not, are commonly felt to be 'different' from the rest of the population and this difference is held to be of quite a different order from the differences to be found among indigenous ethnic groups."[54]

The political question of the overseas Chinese constitutes the most serious problem which hinders further understanding between China and the ASEAN countries. Their involvement in the insurgent activities after 1949 and their cultural identification with China allegedly constitute a "potential threat" to the governments of the ASEAN countries:

> "One reason for the suspicion directed against the Chinese is a widespread doubt as to their loyalty. Every state in Southeast Asia demands political loyalty of its citizens. The Chinese are suspect not merely because they seem 'foreign', but also their country of origin is situated nearby and is larger and more powerful than the Southeast Asian states. The fear of a Chinese 'fifth column' has been lent colour by the extent to which the overseas Chinese have embraced Chinese nationalism. Successive Chinese governments have claimed overseas Chinese as Chinese citizens, even though these Chinese might never have visited China."[55]

New problems emerged for the overseas Chinese with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Peking did not abolish the Commission for the Overseas Chinese Affairs, a body dealing with the policy toward

the Chinese who had returned to China and those still abroad,[56] and in fact encouraged them to be "patriotic toward the fatherland." The policy also encouraged the overseas Chinese to "join and unite" with local progressive forces to strengthen and consolidate the "international peaceful democractic united front," which in a very subtle way hoped to turn them into a tool promoting revolutions in Southeast Asia.

On June 17, 1951, the People's Republic of China announced the following policies at the First Conference on the Overseas Chinese sponsored by the Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs:

> "1. Unite all returned and overseas patriotic Chinese to support the People's Republic of China;
> 2. Expand and encourage cultural interaction between overseas Chinese and local citizens;
> 3. Mobilize returned Chinese and their families to participate in land reform and production;
> 4. Give aid and financial support to returned Chinese when needed."[57]

In 1954, the Peking Government formalized its policy toward the overseas Chinese by inserting Article 98 in the Constitution which stated that China would protect the "legitimate rights and interests" of the overseas Chinese.

This policy, however, was amended shortly after the Bandung Conference in 1955 which marked a significant change from supporting revolutions in Southeast Asia to co-existence with the governments in power at that time for the following reasons.

First, Peking became convinced that revolutions could

not be exported. Secondly, Peking realized that when the overseas Chinese were involved in local revolutions, the movements could not win support from the local people. Thirdly, the fact that the overseas Chinese were only minority groups convinced the Chinese Government that they could not effectively mobilize the local people for a revolutionary action. Moreover, if the overseas Chinese were to be active in local politics, they must not be considered as puppets of Peking. Most important of all, it was important for Peking to prevent the local governments from imposing any discriminatory measures against the overseas Chinese which would make them to terminate sending financial support to their relatives living in China. Peking realized that any discriminatory policies of the local governments would harm its economy, which depended to some extent on the overseas Chinese funds flowing into the fatherland. According to Stephen Fitzgerald, each year these overseas Chinese sent from $10 to $100 million to their relatives in China,[58] which was an important source of foreign exchange.

It was in view of these factors that Peking changed its policy of urging the overseas Chinese to promote revolutions in Southeast Asia. The new policy was expressed by Chou En-lai on December 18, 1956, during his visit in Burma.[59] In a speech given at an evening party in his honour by the local Chinese, Chou urged them to opt for one nationality, and then remain loyal to the country of their choice:

> "In order to fully fulfill the spirit of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and to develop our friendly relations with the Southeast Asian countries, and to facilitate our people to reside and live permanently in their countries, our first task is to fully resolve the dual nationality conflict in accordance with voluntary individual preference. They must then be loyal to the country of their choice."[60]

This announcement did not imply that China would give up protection of the overseas Chinese who had opted for maintaining their Chinese nationality when unreasonably discriminated against by the local governments. Accordingly, Peking was co-operative in the resettlement of the returned Chinese who had difficulties in the countries of their residence, and as a result the Indonesian Chinese were well received in 1960 by the Reception and Resettlement Committee, created in Peking with Kiao Cheng-chih as its Chairman on February 4 of the same year.

The nationality problem is one of the most important issues that concerns the future relations between China and the ASEAN countries. Except for Singapore, where the Chinese are in the majority, the rest of the ASEAN countries are incapable of solving their Chinese nationality problem. Although Peking repeated many times that it would give up its claim to the overseas Chinese as its nationals, it is difficult for China to convince the ASEAN governments about her sincerity.

The plight of the overseas Chinese is further complicated by the regulations governing their acquisition of nationality of the countries of their residence. If nationality is said

to be defined as "the legal and political tie which binds individuals to a state and renders them subject to its personal jurisdiction,"[61] the majority of the overseas Chinese in the ASEAN countries are sufficiently qualified to receive the local citizenships because they are willing to accept the fact that they are no longer Chinese nationals loyal to China. They are, however, incapable of convincing the local governments of this fact.

International law gives rights to all governments to regulate nationality by municipal or domestic law. Thus the law of a state will determine the nationality of its subjects. To the overseas Chinese there are three ways to acquire their citizenship: through jus soli, birth within the territory of the state; jus sanguinis, birth to a parent who is a national wherever the birth occurs; and naturalization, a process by which a state confers its nationality upon an alien after his birth, usually upon the alien's request.

China's position on nationality of the overseas Chinese since 1949 has been vague. Legally, the Peking Government has inherited the nationality laws of the Koumintang regime, and it appears that it is following the Republic of China's Nationality Act of 1929 which states that:

> "Any person whose father was, at the time of that person's birth, a Chinese national is himself a Chinese national."[62]

Based on the principle of jus sanguinis, the act also provides for the loss of Chinese nationality when a Chinese

national wishes to acquire the nationality of a foreign country. This is, however, subjected to his obtaining a permission of the Ministry of Interior, which in the past was granted rarely.[63]

The nationality issue is not so serious in Singapore and Thailand. Since her independence in 1965 Singapore has, on the basis of jus soli, claimed all those who are born in Singapore as her nationals. Because of Thailand's long history of successful assimilation, the overseas Chinese in this country are well integrated into the Thai society. The issue, however, is still unsolved and forms a barrier in the relations between Peking on the one hand and Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines on the other.

The overseas Chinese in Indonesia remain a suspicious group to the indigenous Indonesians mainly because it is believed that Peking and the Chinese community in Indonesia were involved in the "Gestapu" in 1965, when the local Communist Party attempted to take over power. The Chinese in this country are now living as "warga negara asing", or non-citizens. They can become "warga negara Indonesia", or citizens only through the process of naturalization which is extremely difficult to attain. This, perhaps, was due to the Agreement of Dual Nationality signed with China in 1955:

> "In any event the dual citizenship agreement with China has been recently described in the more or less official Indonesian Review of International Affairs as 'one of the greatest blunders ever commited in Indonesia's recent diplomatic relations.'... the agreement 'im-

> posed on all Indonesian citizens of Chinese ethnic origin a second, but dominant, nationality, the nationality of a country for which the overwhelming majority of them was absolutely alien, of a country they had never even visited but whose nationality they were assumed to possess, invalidating even their original Indonesian nationality.' There had been no reason... for Indonesia to recognize the 'Chinese imperialist principle of jus sanguinis;'... it is hoped that by invalidating of the law would lead Indonesia to formally repudiate the principle of jus sanguinis and adopt the principle of jus soli in its nationality law."[64]

The Philippines is "unique among the three countries (Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) in the nationality respect in the degree to which access to citizenship for the Chinese has been restricted by judicial interpretation."[65] Manila confers citizenship upon Chinese neither through jus sanguinis nor jus soli. The only way that these people might obtain citizenship is through naturalization, which is also extremely difficult to obtain. The 1933 Naturalization Act sets out various qualifications which must be met by those applying for Philippine citizenship:

> "An applicant 'must be of good moral character' and 'must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well as the community in which he is living...
> ... Not only must the applicant for naturalization qualify as something of a saint, he must also be wealthy."[66]

Malaysia has a more liberal approach to citizenship. This is perhaps due to the fact that 35 per cent of the population, who are Chinese, are stronger in the economic

sphere. Compared with the Philippines and Indonesia, Malaysia has been wise to adopt the principle of jus soli, irrespective of Peking's policy, insisting that all Chinese born in Malaysia are naturally Malaysian and not Chinese nationals.

The overseas Chinese will remain an unsolved problem to most governments in the ASEAN area. Unlike during the 1950's when relations with Indonesia were friendly and progressive, Peking would not enter into any formal treaty or agreement with respect to the status of the overseas Chinese. Rather, it is believed that China would make use of her influence, deriving from her status of a big power, to convince the ASEAN leaders that it is in their interest to treat the overseas Chinese reasonably. To attain that, Peking would have to prove that it is not and would not support any activities of the overseas Chinese which are detrimental to the interest of the local governments.

(6) IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR:

After examining the various aspects of the national interest, both strategic as well as traditional, we have to look at the nature of the ideological factor which plays a role in the foreign policy formulation of China as a revolutionary power towards Southeast Asia.

Here again it is important to emphasize the degree of Sinicization which Marxism-Leninism had suffered at the hands of the Chinese leaders in the course of decades, and to reali-

ze that Peking's revolutionary aspirations towards Southeast Asia are not based upon the Soviet precepts but upon the concepts, ideas and formulaes of Mao's thoughts which are much closer to the spirit of Chinese politics.

While it is true that the Chinese leaders had accepted Marxist-Leninist ideology for mass-mobilization in their revolution during the 1930's and the 1940's, it would be wrong to say that in the 1970's Peking would like to see the revolutionaries in the world, and especially insurgencies in the ASEAN countries, to borrow this essentially European ideology without the modifications wrought upon it by the experience of China. While Mao had once embraced Marxism-Leninism as a means to save China from her fatal destiny, it should be noted that in fact he only made use of this ideology to suit the Chinese case.

Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao was reluctant to submit himself to the Soviet interpretation of Marxism. This was clearly seen from the Tsun-yi Conference (遵義會議) in January 1935, when the Moscow-trained "28 Bolsheviks" were ousted by Mao. Since this conference he was able to shake off the influence of the Moscow faction, headed by Wang Ming, who were sent by Stalin in a last bid to mastermind the Chinese Revolution and subordinate it to the national needs of the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's he impressed his own ideas upon the doctrine and completely remolded it in the light of the traditional Chinese tactics of war, because he believed that the

indigenous experience was more applicable in the Chinese conditions than the foreign theories and practices.

Hence it is because of their own experience of revolution that the Chinese leaders believe that its success would inspire the insurgent movements in Southeast Asia today, and reject the Soviet theories and practices for two reasons:

First, China does not proclaim as absolute the theory of "Peaceful Transition to Communism," as the Soviet Union has done since 1956 because in Peking's view it is disarming the revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia by forcing them to give up militant struggle. China is keen to distinguish the "peaceful co-existence" among states and "peaceful transition" to Communism as two diametrically different things.[67] She maintains that the former must be applied only at the diplomatic level among different countries, while the latter problem is for the local revolutionary movements themselves to decide. She simply regards the "peaceful transition" to Communism as an internal affair that should be decided upon locally. This means that Peking would support, and in fact does support, those revolutionary movements in the area which had decided for militant struggle and tactics.

Secondly, the Southeast Asian insurgencies and revolutionaries find unwise to follow totally the ideological formulations of the Kremlin because they do not want to become tools of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chinese are wise not to use the term "Mao-chu-i" (毛主義) or Maoism, while the Soviets use the term "Leninism", the Russian in-

terpretation of Marxism, to describe the "true" revolutionaries. As Ross Terrill puts it:

> "They do not refer to non-Chinese as being 'Maoists', the way other communists readily refer to followers in various countries as Leninists. When referring to their followers and admirers in foreign countries the Chinese may say 'revolutionaries', or friends of China', but not 'Maoists'".[68]

This is one of many ways in which the Chinese leaders are showing to the revolutionaries in Southeast Asia that they do not wish to impose their own ideology upon them, without considering its limiting application in other areas of Asia beyond the borders of China.

The pragmatic uniqueness of China's own ideology is best seen when we consider the main concepts applied by Peking in the ASEAN area. There are three outstanding elements of China's own Communism in this regard.

The first element is the notion of "Paper-Tiger". Basing itself on its own experience of national liberation, Peking regarded the American military presence in Southeast Asia as well as all colonial rules there as a Paper-Tiger which could be defeated. Shortly after her own national liberation war in 1949, China hoped that the Southeast Asian insurgencies would employ this notion in fighting for their own liberation. According to the Chinese Communists, revolutionaries should "despite the enemy strategically but take full account of him tactically."[69]

Since the Bandung Conference of 1955 China developed another concept of international relations—the United-Front-

From-Above. It is designed "to win over all possible adherents; to neutralize those who will not come over and who might provide support to the enemy; and in so far as possible to isolate the enemy."[70] Hence China's policy since the Bandung Era was broadened to build up diplomatic ties not only with the Communist states but also the neutral countries in Southeast Asia.

With Lin Piao's domination of the process of foreign policy formulation between 1965 and 1969, a new concept was evolved and applied towards the insurgencies in Southeast Asia. The concept was called the strategy of "People's War", the essence of which was the call upon the Communist Parties in the area to mobilize the local people under the appeals of patriotism and social justice in order to overthrow the local elites for their co-operation with the American political and military authorities in the area. Thus the American political, economic and military presence in Southeast Asia was the prime target of this strategy, in order to break through the isolation and containment which Washington was imposing against China. The revolutionary movements received verbal and other support primarily in those countries in the area the governments of which were "colluding with American imperialism" which was threatening the security of China. Thus the central element of the strategy of "People's War" must be seen as a tool to detach away the local governments from the alignment with the United States, and to met out punishment to those who were too

slow or reluctant to severe the American "connection".

The most recent theoretical concept used by China in formulating her policies towards Southeast Asia is the strategy of the "Third World". This strategic concept is based upon the assumption that while the United States ceased to present a threat to China's security after the announcement of Nixon Doctrine and American defeat in Vietnam, since 1969 the Soviet Union is emerging as the main challenge to China's interests in the area. In view of this, the main objective of the "Third World" strategy in Southeast Asia is to organize a new united-front-from-above among the states to keep the Soviet influence at bay, to agree to a small American presence, and to diminish support to the revolutionary movements as a reward to these governments in the area who join Peking's anti-Soviet alignment.

Thus by 1970 the process of Sinicization of China's relations with the revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia was accomplished, subjugating by and large and for the time being the support to them to the promotion of her national interest in the area. Thus all the theoretical concepts of Mao Tse-tung Thought—Paper-Tiger, United-Front-(From-Above), People's War and the Third World—applied towards Southeast Asia must be seen more as tools designed to safeguard security of China and less than ideological precepts for revolutions in this part of the world. How long this would remain so, and when and if China would re-assert the role of the revolutionary power, is another question, to be

touched upon in the conclusion of this study.

CHAPTER II

STAGES OF EVOLUTION OF PEKING'S POLICIES TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1949-1969

The evolution of China's policy towards Southeast Asia between 1949 and 1969 must be viewed in terms of the dialectical interplay of two major motive factors: (1) Chinese Communism, which compels China to act as a revolutionary power making her to assist in every way the Communist Parties in Southeast Asia in their efforts to overthrow the local governments and establish in their place Communist systems; (2) the national interest of China as a major power in the area which must protect her territorial integrity and cultural heritage and assert her historical role of a "benevolent and senior power" in the area.

While both these variables simultaneously influence the process of foreign policy formation of Peking, nevertheless one of them emerges as the dominant factor from time to time, giving a distinct character to the period in which it is paramount. Thus in one period Peking's postures are full of revolutionary rhetorics as well as practical assistance to insurgent movements inciting them on the path of revolutionary struggle, while in another period Peking emphasizes in its conduct the state-to-state relations, diplomatic ties, trade and cultural ties at the expense of support to the revolu-

tionary movements whose activities are toned down for a time being. Thus there is a kind of pendulum swing in Peking's postures towards Southeast Asia, in which the periods emphasising peaceful co-esistence, co-operation and friendship alternate with the periods of abuse of the local governments and harsh calls for their overthrow.

It is frequently impossible to clearly differentiate between these two variables which motivate Peking's conduct towards Southeast Asia, because they often merge in what the Chinese Communists call the "unity of the opposites" and mutually reinforce each other. However, for the purposes of our analysis it is possible to divide the evolution of Peking's postures toward Southeast Asia between 1949 and 1969 into periods in which one or the other motive factor appeared more pronounced, or periods of confusion in which the Peking leaders themselves were not clear in ordering their priorities, or the right mix, of the two apparently contradictory courses.

THE DIALECTICS OF IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

Looking thus from these perspectives upon Peking's postures towards Southeast Asia, the following periods may be indentified: (1) between 1949 and 1952 was the period in which the revolutionary and ideological motives clearly predominated; (2) between 1953 and 1957 was a period of the Bandung Spirit, in which emphasis upon peaceful co-existence and co-operation on the state-to-state level predominated;

(3) between 1958 and 1965 was a period of confusion and frustration, because of the unsettled domestic conditions; (4) from 1966 to 1969 was a period in which China returned to revolutionary activitiy both at home and abroad.

(1) PERIOD FROM 1949 TO 1952: REVOLUTIONARY FUNDAMENTALISM:

After the People's Republic of China had consolidated her power by driving out the Koumingtang to the island of Taiwan its leaders viewed their success as inaugurating a new stage in history in Asia. During this period, two reasons convinced the Chinese leaders to emphasize the ideological and radical postures in their foreign policy toward Southeast Asia.

The Chinese Communists were proud of themselves in winning the Civil War against Chiang Kai-shek and of their newly inedpendent republic, which emerged as a result of their tactics, and understandably wanted their experience of revolution to be recognized by their neighbours. They hoped that their model of revolution would gradually win the admiration of other peoples who were carrying on their liberation movements in Southeast Asia, by then still under the colonial control or else newly independent. The colonial and "bourgeois" governments in the area were of course not favoured by the newly born Communist giant. As a result, China's foreign policy during this period was mainly determined by ideological considerations aiming at the promotion of revolutionary movements. However, her national interest entered soon into

the picture to secure herself against external danger. Early in 1950 China concluded a Treaty of Friendship for thirty years with the Soviet Union, then in October 1950 entered into the Korean War. Her foreign policy at this time was regarded as one of "leaning to one side", i.e., to the Soviet Union, based upon the theory that the world was divided into two hostile camps:

> "By 1949, the anti-facist alliance of World War II had broken apart, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was well under way. The two superpowers and their allies faced each other across Europe; and in Asia, established governments, some colonial and others newly independent, battled communist party-led wars of national liberation. In a matter of months, international politics had taken on a bipolar configuration with the United States and the Soviet Union at swords' points around the world."[1]

Seeing the United States supporting the Taiwan Government and perceiving American policies as a threat to her periphery, China's principles of foreign policy were threefold: (a) unify the country and defend the Chinese border; (b) build a Communist society in China; (c) encourage the liberation struggles of the Communist parties in Southeast Asia. Thus the dominant character of China's relations with the ASEAN countries during the period from 1949-1952 was seen as aggressive and radical, persistently urging that revolutions should be carried out by the local Communist Parties.

Earlier in 1947 it was reported that the Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party, Chin Peng, and a group of his colleagues, had travelled to Hong Kong and China to

seek advice from the Chinese Communist Party.[2] As a result and two years later in 1949, the Malayan Communist Party, following the call from China, set down the party's program to struggle for a Malayan People's Democratic Republic which was in fact copied from the Chinese model of "New Democracy".[3]

During this time Thailand remained a revolutionary backwater because the liberal regime of Pridi Phanamyang was overthrown in 1947 and Pridi fled the country, turning up in Peking in 1954. Because of this there was not much to be expected from Thailand.[4]

In the Philippines, however, China supported the Communist oriented Huk movement. The latter, inspired by the success which the Chinese Communists attained in 1949, also called for revolution to overthrown the Manila Government.[5]

Turning to Indonesia, she became one of the most important allies of Peking during the decade since 1949, because of similarities learnt in fighting for independence through armed struggle. Although the Chinese Communist Party had won power through civil war while the Indonesian nationalists through driving out the Dutch colonialists, both countries recognized each other shortly after attaining independence in 1949. However, when China sent her first Ambassador to Djakarta she clearly demonstrated her aggressive attitude by exceeding all bounds of diplomatic propriety by letting her Ambassador to make public speeches criticizing the policies of the Indonesian Government then under the control of the anti-Communist Sukiman cabinet.[6]

The post-liberation policy of China was limited in scope primarily to the countries of the Communist World, the countries on China's borders, and other colonial and semi-colonial countries in Southeast Asia. It is, therefore, understandable that China was impatient about her southeastern neighbours and their slow process of liberating themselves from the external colonial control as well as internal "bourgeois" rule. During this time, moreover, China and the Soviet Union were honeymooning. Moscow agreed that Peking should play a more active and important role in the sphere of its own influence in Southeast Asia.[7] On the whole, the Soviet Union was not much interested in Southeast Asia in the post-war era because her attention was focused more upon Europe.

(2) PERIOD FROM 1953 TO 1957: BANDUNG SPIRIT:

The second phase in the development of China's foreign policy toward the Southeast Asian countries, which began in 1953, is normally described as the "Bandung Era". The most significant aspect of her policy during this period was the shift from the promotion of radical ideological goals to the promotion of her national interest primarily. This change was not obvious until 1955, when Chou En-lai led a Chinese delegation to Bandung in Indonesia where he assured the Southeast Asian leaders that China was willing to accommodate herself with them according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.[8]

This shift in her policy reflected the great changes which took place in China herself and in Southeast Asia as a whole. During this period the Chinese Communist Party had attained the consolidation of its power, and the foundations of a new society were firmly laid. She did not have to worry about her northern border because the alliance with the Soviet Union ensured her security. She had thrown back the United States forces in Korea and thus had emerged as an Asian leader capable of resisting the "United States imperialists." While the Korean War brought fame to China, her leaders realized that their country had a long way to go to recover economic strength after 30 years of civil war. In order to enable her to turn her attention away from revolutionary exploits abroad to domestic reconstruction, it was necessary for her leaders to secure years of peaceful international environment.

Moreover, when Stalin died in 1953, the ambitious new Asian giant was no longer willing to subordinate itself to the leadership of the Soviet Union within the Communist camp. Although the Soviet Union had supplied weapons to support China in the Korean War, this turned out not a brotherly assistance because China had to repay to Moscow every cent. Because by this time China had demonstrated that she was no inferior to Moscow in competing for influence in Asia, her ambition was now to extend her relations not only with the Communist countries in Asia but also with the neutral states. Because her national interest called for the

promotion of trade abroad, China started to broaden her diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian countries to import their primary products such as tin, rubber and others necessary to her economic development.

By 1952 China concluded that the armed struggles in Southeast Asia, except those in Vietnam, were not successful and in view of this limited temporarily her support to the revolutionary movements:

> "By 1952, the rebellions of the Huks and the Malayan Communist Party as well as those in the rest of Southeast Asia outside of Indochina had already been beaten. The Communist defeat in Malaya was achieved by a critical use of Commonwealth troops and in the Philippines by an important but less critical supply of military materials and economic assistance from the United States..."[9]

The defeat of the Communists in Southeast Asia was not only due to the military involvement of the extra-regional powers such as the United States and Britain. There were other specific reasons that hindered the revolutionary activities of the Communists. The Thai, Malay and the Philippine elites embraced neither an extreme form of nationalism nor extreme anti-Westernism. Nor the nationalistic leaders would be inclined to Marxism, making it thus difficult for foreign ideologies to take root. The Korean War might have appeared as a victory for China, but the war had also its unfavourable side effect: the leaders of Southeast Asian states started to believe that China would be an expansionistic power as she had demonstrated on the Korean Peninsula. Although later studies were to prove that during the early 1950's China was forced by Moscow to enter the war,[10] it was difficult to con-

vince the Southeast Asian leaders that Peking was not expansionistic and posed no threat to them.

Because of this, most of their governments had allied themselves with the United States. In 1954, the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) indicated that given the choice between the Socialist and Western camps, they preferred to ally with the latter. This event alerted China to the danger to her external security on the southern borders, and the emergence of the Bandung line was essentially a response to the United States' initiation of the SEATO:

> "The shift away from 'armed struggle' had been motivated to a high degree by the need for foreign political support against possible American military threats or pressures. In the spring of 1954, at the time of Dienbienphu crisis, Secretary of State Dulles began to construct a Southeast Asian Collective Defense Organisation (usually called SEATO, by analogy with NATO) so as to offer protection to the countries of the region, especially Thailand, against possible attack or subversion from China or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."[11]

Thus the Chinese "began to acquire a somewhat more sophisticated view of the world in general, and gradually recognized that the leaders of most 'neutralist' nations could not be viewed simply as 'running dogs' of the United States."[12]

The Southeast Asian countries during this period were confronted with the choice between Dulles' concept of a military alliance and Nehru's formula of friendship with China.[13] Thailand and the Philippines preferred the former, while countries such as Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon accepted

the latter. Malaya chose neither of these because it was under the protection of British troops, having a status of a colony.

Among the Southeast Asian countries Indonesia in the early 1950's was least antagonistic toward China, which provided a suitable spot for holding the most famous Conference of Asian-African nations in Bandung in 1955. She was geographically most distant from China, she was sympathetic toward the new Peking regime who was defying the West, and within her the pro-Peking Indonesian Communist Party enjoyed a strong position, a factor which the cabinet could not ignore in making the decision to sponsor the conference.[14]

The most significant achievement of the Indonesian Government during the conference was the signing of a treaty relating to the citizenship of the Chinese residents in the Republic. The overseas Chinese in this country had created a problem for the Indonesian Government because of their maintaining the Chinese nationality. From then on and until Sukarno stepped down from power in 1965, both China and Indonesia agreed that the overseas Chinese in this country had to give up the "dual nationality." In other words, they had to chose between accepting the Indonesian nationality, or retaining their old Chinese nationality. Moreover, China hoped that this agreement would set an example to other states in Southeast Asia with substantial Chinese minorities showing that Peking was no longer exclusively claiming overseas Chinese as its nationals.

Based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, China's ties with Indonesia blossomed and grew into an exemplary relationship:

> "After the Bandung Conference Premier Chou En-lai paid an official visit to Djakarta where on April 28, 1955 he and Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo issued a joint statement on Indonesian-Chinese relations. They re-asserted their intention to seek the realization of the objectives of the Asian-African Conference, expressed the satisfaction over the recent treaty on dual citizenship, hoped to develop extensive economic and cultural relations, agreed that their countries should co-operate to strengthen their mutual understanding, declared it was 'the inalienable right of the people of any country to safeguard their own sovereignty and territorial integrity' and expressed 'satisfaction over the fact that Indonesia and China are living peacefully together as good neighbours on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit."[15]

Follwoing this the Indonesian Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, who visited China in the same year, secured the support of Peking for Indonesia's claim to West Irian. The most important event of the Sino-Indonesian relations in the Bandung Era was, however, the state visit of President Sukarno to China in October 1956. "He was much impressed by what he saw, especially in the domestic field."[16] As a result the honeymoon between the two countries was expected to last long.

Concerning Malaya, China already in 1953-1954 had realized that the armed struggle in the country was not going well, and as a result Peking urged the Malayan Communist Party to enter into negotiationswith the Malayan colonial government. Peking insisted that unless the Malayan Communist Party, which was mostly composed of Chinese, broadened its

membership by recruiting other races of Malaya, the Communist insurgency ought to be delayed for the time being and the tactics of legal struggle ought to be applied. As a result of Peking's direction, Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party, Chin Peng, formally offered to negotiate with the "national bourgeois" political leaders of Kuala Lumpur on November 17, 1955. The negotiations were carried out in Baling by Tunku Abdul Rahman and David Marshall, Chief Minister of Singapore, but they failed because the Communist Party refused to surrender as a pre-condition for winning recognition from the government as a legal party. As a result, Chin Peng had to lead his men back to continue the struggle in the Malayan jungle.

To China the failure of the Malayan Communist Party to obtain an agreement from the Malayan Government to legalize the party was, however, a small loss compared to her success in Bandung. We have seen that the goal of Peking to be attained through the Bandung diplomacy was to promote its national interest of economic development, and that in view of this its revolutionary aspirations had to be toned down. Consequently, the Malayan Communists had to accept the new directions from Peking, and subordinate their own immediate goals to the long-term aspirations of China.[17]

The operational formula evolved between these two partners is well summarized below:

> "Whenever the armed struggle was going well in Malaya, Peking as well as the Malayan Communist Party had little interest in conciliation with the government; when things were going badly,

> however, they were inclined respectively to co-existence and constitutional struggle. If legality was denied the Party, it could choose a period of retrenchment and re-organisation; at the same time, Peking could pursue as far as possible government-to-government conciliation."[18]

Nevertheless, the colonial government in Malaya and the revolutionary government in Peking adjusted their policies to suit the Bandung Spirit and entered into trade relations. In 1956, the embargo on rubber sales to China was lifted by both Malaya and Singapore, while Peking reciprocated by reducing its support to the Malayan Communist Party.

Toward Thailand the peaceful co-existence strategy was promoted by China to convince Bangkok that its alignment with the United States was undesirable. During the Bandung Conference, when Foreign Minister of Thailand Prince Wan raised the question of dual nationality in Thailand, Chou En-lai replied that this problem was "left behind by the old China" and that the People's Republic was "ready to solve it." Later Mao Tse-tung said to a Thai "good-will mission" to Peking that "it is not the mistake of you (the Thais, Ed.) who make those pacts (SEATO, Ed.) but the mistake of the imperialists."[19]

Concerning the Philippines, during the Bandung Conference Chou made the same offer of a nationality treaty to Manila's chief delegate, General Carlos P. Romulo, and assured his government that China would not resort to aggression or indirect threats against his country. However the Philippines, unlike Malaya and Thailand, does not export important pri-

mary products such as rubber, tin and rice and therefore had very little to offer in terms of trade. Moreover, the geographical remoteness of the Philippines and the travel restrictions to China and vice-versa during the 1950's limited further communications between the two countries. The latter preferred to ally herself with the United States with whom it had a longer and closer relationship during the colonial days. In short, the attitude of the Philippines toward China was the coolest of all countries of Southeast Asia.

Toward Singapore China's attitude was not as enthusiastic as towards Indonesia and Thailand, mainly because Peking regarded the island as an inseparable part of Malaya. This was evident from her public comments on Singapore in the mid-1950's, when the trade unions and Chinese school disturbances were reported in Peking as the anti-British manifestations of the Malayan people. Nevertheless, the heavy Chinese population in Singapore attracted China's interests to trade with it. At the time of the riots in 1955, David Marshall, Chief Minister of the Island, was royally received in Peking; and when the Colonial Government became hostile towards Peking after it had arrested students and union leaders in Singapore in 1956, China said nothing, perhaps, because the peaceful co-existence was in the offing.

In sum, soon after the Bandung Conference China drew a sharper distinction between enemies and friends, pressing friendly governments to take a firm stand against the West

and putting pressure on those governments that would not do so. On the whole, her policy was friendly in the state-to-state relations. Promotion of trade was the major concern of her national interest during this period, although she was seeking friendly ties with the non-Communist countries for a "united-front-from-above" with them to break through the containment imposed upon her freedom of manoeuvre by the SEATO.

(3) PERIOD FROM 1958 TO 1965: INTERNAL TURMOIL AND CONFUSION:

China's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia during this period was a combination of frustration and confidence. She was frustrated because the short-term Bandung policy failed, except in Indonesia, due to the fact that most of the Southeast Asian governments preferred to ally with the United States to contain her. Another reason that made the Chinese leaders uneasy was the prospect of détente of the United States with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's initiation of the policy of "peaceful transition to Communism" during the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 was strongly opposed by the Chinese leaders, warning the Soviet Union that under the leadership of Khrushchev it was gradually slipping in the direction of "revisionism". However, her antagonistic attitude toward the Soviet Union was not publicly expressed during the early years of this period, for Mao and his colleagues adopted a wait-and-see policy toward Moscow, hoping that its leaders would change their attitude

to China.

In spite of the frustrations, there was also an element of self-confidence in her conduct during this period. She achieved a degree of security and pride from her domestic developments, mainly collectivization of agriculture, economic growth and new industrial build up. Internationally, there was a growing optimism among China's leaders when the Soviet Union orbited the first two earth satellites in 1957. Such events were viewed as confirming the emergence of a new world balance of power more favourable to the Communist World and thus encouraging forward postures in foreign policy. Two incidents during this period, moreover, demonstrated this forward and aggressive spirit. In 1959 she sent her army to suppress the Tibetan revolt; and in 1962 she fought a border war with India. Both incidents confirmed that China's vital interest of national security should not be challenged and that she was determined to fight back.

While between 1956-1958 China was unsure and tender about her ties with the Soviet Union, her position hardened in 1960 when the latter revoked military and economic assistance; as a consequence, her leaders began to doubt the nature of Soviet Socialism. Her new policy crystallised in 1965 with the publication of Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War" which called upon the Third World, as the rural areas of the globe, to encircle the urban areas of the world headed by the "imperialists and revisionists". Such a shift from the moderate policy based on the Ban-

dung Spirit was to show to the developing countries that China was prepared to fight the United States and the Soviet Union who had "colluded" against her and the developing countries. But already in 1964 Peking had recognized that in order to form a new united front in the diplomatic sphere, China had to change her tactics. As a result, the "Two Intermediate Zones" concept was introduced to win also the friendship of the countries in Western Europe, Oceania, Canada and the other capitalist countries.[20]

With respect to the Southeast Asian countries, China's policy mainly concerned itself with demonstrating to the Soviet Union that Peking should have an equal voice in the leadership of the Interntional Communist Movement based upon the following guidelines: (1) that China had an independent policy not restricted by the Soviet Union; (2) that the countries in Southeast Asia are in the sphere of influence of China because the Soviet Union became revisionist; and, (3) that insurgencies in the area would be supported should the Southeast Asian governments appear antagonistic toward China.

This change of policy was designed as a response of Peking to the new environment. Because China made no significant advances under the policy of peaceful co-existence except in Indonesia, and because of the worsening of her relations with Moscow, the foreign policy outlook of China started to underplay the "national interest factor" and instead emphasized the "revolutionary" and radical line.

The main issues of China's policy during this period were the intensification of the Vietnam War, the overseas Chinese, formation of Malaysia, formation of the Association of Southeast Asia, and finally, the prospects of the Communist Party of Indonesia.

In the mid-1950's Sukarno's admiration for China reached its highest point for three reasons: (a) Sukarno respected regimes such as of Peking because they were established through armed struggle against the "imperialists"; (b) he became disgusted with the futility and instability of a parliamentary government in his country; (c) he saw Indonesia as the leader of the Malay world, hoping that Peking would render the necessary support.[21] On the other hand and until 1965 when Sukarno was overthrown, Peking had to co-operate with him "since it lacked the means to buy him off or put effective pressure on him either through the Indonesian Communist Party or the Indonesian Chinese."[22] Moreover, Peking chose to co-operate with Sukarno for the reason that he was more than friendly with the Indonesian Communist Party which was the biggest Communist Party in Southeast Asia, consisting of millions of members, a potential force that might spread the Chinese style of Communism in Southeast Asia. The latter reason became particularly important when the Sino-Soviet relations turned hostile in the early years of the 1960's.

During the year of 1958 the harmonious relations between China and Indonesia were disturbed due to the seizure of

the Chinese residents' property, and in August of 1958 the Chinese businessmen suffered great financial losses due to a drastic currency reform. China protested in this connection and urged the Indonesian Government to treat the Chinese reasonably. On December 9, 1958 Chen Yi, Foreign Minister of China, wrote a letter to the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, proposing that "ratification of the dual nationality treaty be immediately undertaken so that the treaty could go into effect, that the Indonesian Government aggress not to discriminate against those overseas Chinese who did not acquire Indonesian citizenship in return for a pledge by China to encourage them to abide by the laws and customs of Indonesia."[23]

After the ratification Khrushchev visited Indonesia in February 1959, and indicated to the Indonesian Government that it had the right to treat the overseas Chinese in any way it like. The competition between the Soviet Union and China in Southeast Asia, and especially to influence Indonesian politics, became apparent. It should be noted that Sukarno by this time was closer to Peking than to Moscow because he had personally intervened to liberalize somewhat the conditions under which the Chinese could acquire Indonesian citizenship.[24] This pro-Peking attitude of Sukarno was further confirmed when Chen Yi visited Djakarta in March 1961, and signed there a Treaty of Friendship, a Cultural Agreement and a Joint Communique.[25] In return for Peking's continuous support of Djakarta's claim to West Irian, Indo-

nesia barred a Nationalist Chinese team from Taiwan from taking part in the Asian Games held in Djakarta in summer of 1962.

In addition to her policy of excellent relations with the Sukarno regime at the same time, the Peking Government supported Indonesia's "Confrontation" against Malaysia, opposing her formation. China's decision to support the Confrontation against Malaysia was not only due to her relations with the Malayan Communist Party who was fighting for "liberation of Malaya" but also to the fact that:

> "The Chinese government... encouraged Sukarno's 'crush Malaysia' policy because it considered it a means to the termination of British influence it Southeast Asia, so that finally Indonesia and China would become the two leading powers in that area, dominating the whole Asian political scene. This Chinese strategy was in harmony with President Sukarno's doctrine of the struggle between the new emerging forces and the old established order, which was focused on the elimination of all forms of colonialism, or, in other words, the termination of the British and American presence in Southeast Asia."[26]

At the same time China was successful in wooing the Indonesian Communist Party to stand on her side in the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. In spite of the efforts of the Soviet Union to cultivate the Indonesian Communist Party, the latter denounced Soviet revisionism on September 28, 1963 and stated that "the International Communist Movement was undergoing a period of 'selection, crystallization, and consolidation.'"[27] Following this announcement the Indonesian Communist Party leader Aidit re-affirmed in the spring of 1965 that China's line was correct:

> "The position of the Chinese Communist Party in the International Communist Movement constituted 'a red beacon light,' a signal that will become our line and our guideline."[28]

The full extent of China's influence on Indonesian internal affairs was revealed when Chou En-lai visited the country in April 1965 to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Bandung Conference, during which visit he urged its President "to comply with the Indonesian Communist Party's proposal to arm the peasants and labourers in order to intensify the struggle against imperialism and colonialism."[29]

Sukarno's dream to seek hegemony in Southeast Asia resulted in his conflict with the Indonesian military who strongly opposed the close relationship of the Indonesian Communist Party with China. A dramatic reversal of Peking's fortunes took place in September-October 1965, when the army suppressed a coup d'etat organised by the Indonesian Communist Party and massacred thousands of Chinese in its aftermath. With the downfall of Sukarno on March 12, 1966 the Sino-Indonesian partnership ended for ten years.

China's relationship with the Federation of Malaya was not friendly, although in 1957 she sent a congratulation to Kuala Lumpur on her Independence Day.[30] When Kuala Lumpur failed to extend diplomatic recognition, Peking returned to hostility.

Although both Malaya and Singapore imposed a ban upon import of publications from mainland China, they permitted a limited trade with Peking; however, cement and textile imports from China were restricted late in 1958.[31]

Following this, the Tunku Abdul Rahman Government closed the Bank of China Branch in Kuala Lumpur.

Because by the end of 1950's Peking gave up hope in cultivating the government of independent Malaya, it turned its alternation to the Communist Party again and extended it a significant support. On March 1, 1959, Radio Peking began language broadcasts in Malaya as well as Hindi, calling upon the non-Chinese races to support the Malayan Communist Party. In September of the same year Peking successfully won the support of the Malayan Communist Party in its dispute with Moscow, which was expressed in a greeting sent on the occasion of China's National Day on October 1.[32] In early 1961 Peking denounced the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia, in which Malaya was one of the members, by saying that Malaya had "all along been a state subservient to the United States."[33] In December 1961 both the Indonesian Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Party came out publicly to denounce the concept of "Malaysia," and when this was formed in 1963 Peking increased its support to the Malayan Communist Party. Peking now emphasized the importance of the inter-relationship among China, Malayan Communist Party, Indonesian Communist Party, Sukarno, North Vietnam and various Communist Parties in Southeast Asia, praising the Indonesian party as a model for "certain" other parties,[34] clearly indicating that the Malayan Communist Party should follow the example of the Indonesian Communists.

Since the end of "Emergency" in Malaya in 1960

the Malayan Communist Party intensified its guerrilla activities, and after being defeated in this effort by government forces it had to retreat into the jungle again. China, however, continued to give her support to the Malayan Communist Party in order to press the Kuala Lumpur Government into changing its hostile attitude towards her.

Concerning the city of Singapore, Peking opposed the separation of the island from Malaya because the separation resulted in "national and regional disintegration", continuously attacking the British and the Malayan Governments for permitting Singapore to separate itself from the Federation.

At the beginning of 1960 the leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore started to call for merger and formation of Malaysia, which would include the territories of Sarawak, North Borneo, Singapore and Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party opposed such a formation and regarded it as a creation of British colonialists for three reasons: first, because Singapore would increase the percentage of Chinese in the new state which in turn would made it more difficult for the Malayan Communist Party to gain support from other races; secondly, because the Chinese dominated Malayan Communist Party would be suppressed by the central government in Kuala Lumpur as Singapore would surrender the control of its internal security to Kuala Lumpur as a condition for the merger; thirdly, Lee Kuan-yew needed the entry into Malaysia in order to maintain himself in power under the pro-

tection of Kuala Lumpur, for he was facing opposition from the radicals in his own party headed by Lim Chin-siong.

Meanwhile, the military significance of Singapore was highlighted by the "visit" of an American marine contingent to the city at the time of the Middle East crisis in 1958. Peking charged that "Singapore has always been an important American and British base for interference against the Southeast Asian countries."[35]

In May 1959 the People's Action Party won a majority of seats in the election organized to make Singapore a self-governing territory despite the arrest of a prominent pro-Communist leader of the party, Lim Chin-siong by the British authorities. Immediately after Lim's release demanded by Lee as pre-condition for organizing a new government under his leadership, Peking greeted the new self-governing state of Singapore as a "victory of the protracted struggle", but it denounced the British for continuing their opposition against merger of Singapore with Malaya.

Two years after, the People's Action Party split into two different parties as a result of Lim Chin-siong's disagreement with Lee, and a new party, the Barisan Socialis or the Socialist Front, was formed under the leadership of Lim Chin-siong. Peking gave support to the new party until Lim was re-arrested, now by Lee Kuan-yew's government. During this time, "Malaysia" was denounced by Peking while Lee and Tunku Abdul Rahman were labelled as "running dogs of imperialists", until 1971.

Since the formation of the SEATO in 1954, Thailand chose to remain a close ally of the United States in assisting the latter in its military operations in Vietnam and Laos, for which role she was severely attacked by Peking, particularly during the mid-1960's.

It should be noted that before the intensification of the American engagement in Indochina, China had tried her best to convince the Thai leaders not to ally themselves with the United States, and that it was only because of the failure of her good will policy based on the Bandung Spirit that China started to support the Thai Communist Party and its insurgency.

China was hoping to win from the Thais a friendly attitude as early as 1959:

> "China is always willing to develop equal and mutually beneficial trade relations with Thailand on the basis of peaceful co-existence. Sino-Thai trade was suggested by the Thai side and it is now being destroyed by the Thai gevernment; it therefore has no influence whatever on China. On the contrary this action of the Thai government of returning evil for good will only harm its own interest."[36]

By January 1959 Thailand banned the import of all products from the mainland as a result of Marshal Sarit's successful coup d'etat which brought down Phibun's administration. Since that year, Sarit decided to abandon the promotion of friendly relations with Peking and instead turned to the United States completely. His decision was not only due to the internal instability caused by Communist activities which were now rapidly spreading, but also due to the

external pressure from Cambodia and Laos:

> "The Thai leadership again became concerned that China represented a threat to Thailand's integrity, this time by subversion through Cambodia as well as Laos. To some, this fear was confirmed by the joint communique signed by Chou En-lai and Sihanouk in July, which was interpreted as containing implied threats to Thailand. Also by 1958, communist activity in Laos and South Vietnam, backed in both cases by Hanoi, raised apprehension concerning the designs of the North Vietnamese and Laos communists on Northern Thailand, where the bulk of the population was not only related to the Lao but where 30,000 to 40,000 Vietnamese refugees continued to live..."[37]

From 1959 onward the Thai Government became clearly antagonistic against China. It criticized China for suppression on the Tibetan revolt in May. Peking retaliated by turning away from the Bangkok regime by accusing it of interference in China's internal affairs. In May 1959 Peking attacked "the Thai reactionaries" and charged them with instigating the "Laos reactionaries" to launch a civil war, warning them that "those who play with fire get themselves burnt."[38]

In early 1960's, because of the continuing Laotian crisis and Bangkok's increasing involvement with the United States' containment policy, China's attention was turned increasingly to Thailand.

In 1961, Peking received the Thai Communist Party representatives, during which visit a decision for armed struggle was made. This was the first time that the Chinese Government gave her "total support" to the Communist movement in Thailand since 1949. By 1962, after the American guarantee made to Thailand that if necessary it would defend

her unilaterally, Peking charged that Thailand was following a dangerous road because of her involvement with "intensified American military advantures" in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the Chinese-based clandestine radio Voice of the People of Thailand began broadcasting.

By 1965 the Thai Government had totally rejected friendship with China, continued its relations with the regime in Taipei by allowing the Koumintang elements to run operations from Thailand into China, maintained a Chinese-language radio station in Thailand, committed itself to the American policies of containment and isolation of China and opposed her vital issue in the international arena. On the other hand, China threw her full support behind the Communist Party to assist it in every way to overthrow the government in Bangkok.

By the end of 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's, China's policy toward the Philippines closely followed the line applied to Indonesia. The establishment of close ties of Manila with Indonesia, the assertion of Manila's claim to North Boreno and its opposition to Malaysia, all these coincided with a wave of anti-American sentiments in the Manila press during this period. Mainly due to Manila's remoteness from the turbulent Indochina, and because she was less involved in the war, China hoped to cultivate the Philippines, although the latter allowed the American bases to supply troops and materials to Vietnam.

Moreover, the split within the revolutionary forces

in the Philippines restricted Peking's support to these insurgent groups. The ideological dispute between Peking and the Soviet Union was debated in 1960 among various groups of Philippine insurgency:

> "In 1960 a new young group of Marxist-Leninist intellectuals in Manila began to organize and challenge the traditional Indonesian Communist elements for leadershp of the movement. These young Philippine intellectuals organized and operated through the development of pro-communist and anti-American popular front groups among labour, youth, and the peasantry. The leaders of these front groups divided into old pro-Moscow moderates, Maoists, and a group of leftist nationalists who were not communists."[39]

Peking maintained some distance from the Philippine Government until 1964 when the American action in Indochina posed a real danger to China's security and, as a result, she called in the People's Daily upon the United States to get out of the Philippines." While it praised the anti-American demonstrations in Manila and demanded the removal of American bases from the Philippines, it carefully avoided criticism of the Philippine Government mainly because the insurgent groups were not ready to re-organize and accept China's ideological basis for their armed struggle.

After the disaster of the Communists in Indonesia at the end of 1965, the pro-Communist elements in the Philippines lost their connection with the Indonesian Communist Party. Although they nominally joined together in 1967 in a united front, the question of strategy to be applied again divided and polarized them along the Peking-Moscow axis.

This period of China's policy mainly focused upon the

intensification of the Indochinese crisis and the continuous cultivation of Indonesia. Her ideological emphasis on the insurgencies in Southeast Asia was seen as a response to the onset of the Sino-Soviet dispute over the strategy of the International Communist Movement. It should be noted that her aggressive policy in the later years of this period was different from that of 1949-1952, when the Sino-Soviet relations had been good. During the period of 1958-1965, Peking ceased mentioning the "Two Camps" concept, which was the Soviet strategic concept, implying that China did not consider herself anymore a member of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.

As it was stated in the earlier discussion, China's foreign policy during this period was a mixture of confidence and frustration. Concerning Indonesia and until 1965 China treated the Sukarno regime as a case of successful "co-existence" policy. Her policy towards Thailand, on the other hand, was a failure mainly due to Bangkok's alliance with the United States, which made Peking frustrated and uneasy. But her model relations with Indonesia collapsed after the fall of Sukarno, and by 1965 she was completely helpless and isolated in the diplomatic activities in Southeast Asia. To combat this isolation, she turned to the insurgencies. Such a decision was made, therefore, as a response to the unfriendly attitudes of the Southeast Asian governments rather than predicated on the basis of ideological considerations. She preferred radical policy to form

a united-front-from-below in Southeast Asia for two more reasons: first, it was feasible to make use of the insurgencies, especially that in Thailand, to threaten the pro-American governments; second, it was desirable to strike a radical and revolutionary posture because it was necessary to show the Soviet Union and the Communist and revolutionary parties that the Chinese were "the real Marxist-Leninists."

(4) PERIOD FROM 1966 TO 1969: AGONY OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION:

The foreign policy of China during the period of the Cultural Revolution is a controversial issue. The main reason is that China was totally absorbed in the internal power struggle and therefore very little attention was paid to the external and international relations. Also,

> "During this period, Peking seemed to be making foreign policy primarily for the purpose of helping to deal with domestic problems, rather than in an attempt to seek political or economic advantage abroad."[40]

Thus foreign policy operation were a function of domestic politics which were used to justify the consolidation of power of one or the other factions struggling against each other, with Mao and Lin Piao, speaking for the revolutionary line, dominating the scenery. Regarding the debate between the two policy lines—revisionism and revolution—China's main concern in the international arena was to endorse any revolutionary activities in any part of the world, in order to expose the Soviet policy of "liquidation of the struggle". Peking's policy during this period was therefore

extremely ideological, aggressive and hostile. When diplomatic representatives were recalled to Peking from almost all countries for indoctrination, it was obvious that China intended to break away from the conventional conduct of diplomatic relations and customs and that she wanted to initiate a new practice to be recognized by other governments to the effect that the Chinese diplomats would enjoy the divine right to propagate the Thought of Mao Tse-tung at their posts abroad.

While the advocation of revolution instead of normal diplomatic relations dominated the scene of Chinese foreign activities at this time, this is not to say that Mao himself purposefully sought to create diplomatic incidents and make enemies of the important governments of the world. The Red Guards following blindly the slogan "to revolt is justified", disregarded the latter's pragmatic wisdom and attacked the returned Chinese diplomatic representatives in Peking without any justifications as to who deserved the punishment for being "reactionary". Mao's colleagues, especially Chen Yi and Chou En-lai, permitted the rampage. By July 1967 even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell under the control of the Red Guards.

The events of the Cultural Revolution clearly demonstrated the role which the struggle for power and the conflict of the principal factions had upon China's conduct of foreign affairs. Beginning with 1965, Lin Piao had established himself as an authority on the "People's War" and during

the Cultural Revolution he propagated the most radical posture in foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Chou En-lai had been closely associated with the policy of peaceful co-existence. Because of this, the latter definitely was out of control of his own Ministry, but it was not the time for him to speak out and oppose the Red Guards. He had to follow the radical line of Lin Piao to save himself and to wait until the dust of the Cultural Revolution settled down, when the new internal environment would enable him to return to his policy of co-existence which he held was beneficial for China's long term national interest.

At the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 and after the ouster of Liu Shao-chi from power in 1967, Peking began to lump the Philippines with Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia as areas where armed struggles had gained some success. Then in the midst of its Cultural Revolution in 1967 and with the radicals in control of the Foreign Ministry, Peking proclaimed that the international situation had never been better for armed stuggle and that a high-tide of revolutionary violence was sweeping Southeast Asia. During the course of the year the pro-Peking Communists in the Philippines, Burma, Sarawak, and Indonesia responded to China's exhortations with either new acts of violence or merely new proclamation of armed struggle, with one exception—under the cautious leadership of Chin Peng the Malayan Communist Party seemed not fully co-operative.

Before the September 30, 1965 coup d'etat in Indonesia China was confident that her partnership with that country would profoundly influence the future of Southeast Asia. The Chinese officials seeing the Indonesian Communist Party and the Sukarno regime hand in hand, praised the latter as a "creative revolutionary and an outstanding revolutionary personality." Until 1965, there was no evidence of any serious disagreement among the Chinese leaders over the general policy toward Indonesia.

It was obvious that Peking had high stakes in that coup for three reasons: First, the Chinese leaders, and especially Mao, sensed that Aidit was in a very dangerous position which resembled the one in which Mao's own party had found itself in the year of 1972, on the eve of its massacre by the Koumintang following a period of co-operation of the two parties. Mao and his colleagues hoped that the Indonesian Communist Party would be spared a similar ordeal and that its opponents could be destroyed in a pre-emptive coup. Second, China supported the premature coup also to relieve the deterioration of the situation in Vietnam. The control of Indonesia by the Indonesian Communist Party would transform the entire strategic balance of power in Southeast Asia. Third, although China had consented to Sukarno playing the role of a junior partner in Southeast Asia since the Bandung Conference, she was reluctant to put him on the throne. What Peking expected from Indonesia was the extension of the Communist control to the area of Southeast Asia in the long

run. Moreover, China understood Sukarno's ambition very well to the effect that his ultimate aim was his personal leadership over the entire Malaya world. Having to choose between Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party, Peking preferred the latter and, once this was decided, Sukarno had to go to be overthrown by Aidit.

The unsuccessful coup turned China from an optimistic expectation to frustration. After Sukarno's loss of power, the Peking press stopped calling him a "creative revolutionary", referring to him as a "bourgeois-nationalist" as before 1955. Further, China started to degrade his teaching, especially the Nasakom and Guided Democracy concepts in use since 1957.

Soon after the failure of the coup Peking avoided to maintained the revolutionary comradeship with the Indonesian Communists. However, as soon as the Cultural Revolution was mounted in 1966 the issue of Peking's failure in Indonesia was debated between the struggling factions in China:

> "The radical coalition with whom Mao was then allied tried in 1967-68 to exploit the failure of the Indonesian Communist Party in order to discriminate alleged revisionists at home and abroad... the attacks on the earlier policies were probably aimed also at Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi."41

The impact of the failure of the Peking sponsored coup in Djakarta in September 1965 resulted in important changes in the domestic as well as foreign policy outlook of Chinese leadership:

"The Indonesian event may have appeared to him

> (Mao, Ed.) as a confirmation of the danger of compromising revolutionary principles. Despite the fact that Mao himself had approved the Indonesian Communist Party's united front with Sukarno, the collapse of the strategy may have hardened his discrimination to pursue a path of revolutionary purity in China and the rest of the world."[42]

There was one more factor that enhanced the new united-front-from-below strategy toward Indonesia since the onset of the Cultural Revolution. The killing of thousands of overseas Chinese during the rampages of late 1965 further stimulated Peking's animosity toward the New Order of President Sukarno. Consequently, Peking's attitude toward his regime became brutally hostile, knowing that there was not much to be expected from his government.

As the Sukarno regime fell, Peking started to change its attitude toward the Indonesia Communist Party and in 1967 Aidit himself came under fire:

> "... although the line the Indonesian Communist Party was following coincided with the Maoist model, in 1967 the Chinese party and the rump Indonesian Communist Party's Central Committee in Peking denounced the Aidit leadership for having adopted 'the revisionist Soviet line of peaceful transition' and then having compounded this sin by involving itself in a 'putschist adventure' which 'violated organisational rules.'"[43]

This change was inconsistent with the previous Peking line towards the Indonesian Communist Party, probably due to the reason that shortly after the failure of the coup Moscow had started to blame China for her involvement and Peking had to defend itself. Moscow said that the incident "was inspired by Peking and provoked by Western intelligence,"[44]

while the masses of the people were not ready for revolution. In response, Peking explained in 1967 the failure of the Indonesian Communist Party by alleging that the party could have never attained a peaceful transition to power in Indonesia without taking over the army, a mistake experienced by the Chinese Communists in 1927. However, Peking did not give up and during the Cultural Revolution called for building of armed forces in the countryside and initiation of active violence in Indonesia, particularly in central and eastern Java. Thereupon the Indonesian Communist Party split into a pro-Peking and a pro-Moscow faction. The latter sent a delegation to Moscow in the middle of 1969 to attend the World Communist Conference, while the former mounted terriorist campaign against the local leaders in Indonesia under the direction of Peking.

Thailand during the period of Cultural Revolution offered an excellent playground for the application of the "People's War" strategy because it refused to recognize Peking since 1949. Moreover, the failure of Peking in Indonesia and the increased bombing of North Vietnam by the Americans provided additional justification for encouraging the insurgency in Thailand. The Peking press published continuously warnings aimed at pursuading the Thai Government to give up its alliance with the United States. It is important to stress, however, that the actual decision to encourage the insurgency in Thailand had been made long before

the onset of the radical policies of Lin Piao and before the seizure of control of China's foreign affairs by his group. The Cultural Revolution provided only an additional factor for further promotion and intensification of revolutionary activities in Thailand. It was clear, however, that:

> "Had the Vietnamese and Laotian wars been resolved on terms favourable to the Communist side in 1965 (before the Cultural Revolution, Ed.), the nature of Peking's relationship with the Communist insurgency in Thailand would have depended primarily upon the willingness of the Thailand Government to establish some minimum accommodation with the People's Republic of China."[45]

The origin of the revolutionary organisation in Thailand and the scope of its activities suggests that China's objective in supporting them was in fact her response to the Vietnamese War and the policies of the Thai Government:

> "... the revolutionary objective (in Thailand, Ed.) was an ideal explicit in Chinese Communist ideology, but forceful attempts to achieve it were adopted only when the Bandung policy toward Thailand had failed, leaving no other channel for the assertion of Chinese influence (upon this country, Ed.)."[46]

For example, on April 28, 1965, Peking said that the Thai Government was seeking "self-destruction" by allying itself with the United States,[47] and the Thai revolutionaries called Thailand a "new type of colony."[48] On October 7, 1965, Peking hinted that its support to the "anti-imperialist patriotic struggle" of the people of Thailand was the "inevitable outcome" of the Thai Government's policies.[49]

Throughout 1966, when the radicals within the Chinese leadership gradually won the dominant position, subversive activity in Thailand grew steadily in intensity. Guerrilla

activities, ambushes and propaganda campaigns for armed struggle in the villages all increased because Thailand was then regarded in Peking as the forward base of American "imperialism" in Southeast Asia which has been encircling China.

The ideological motivations inherent in the "People's War" completely dominated the attitude of the Chinese leadership during 1967-1969, which became a model of application of Mao's revolutionary doctrine. But it should be stressed that official and party prouncements from Peking scrupulously avoided any direct commitment of assistance to the Thai Communist Party. Were the leaders in Peking preparing the way for improvement of their relations with Thailand by this "marginal" support of the Thai Communists?

Turning now to Malaysia, the Malayan Communist Party was perhaps the slowest in responding to the events of the Cultural Revolution during this period because Chin Peng was believed not interested in being involved on either side of the power struggle raging in China. This assumption is based upon the fact that as late as 1967 his party believed that its policies were still going through a transitional form of struggle:

> "Our basic policy at the present stage of the revolutionary struggle within our country is neither to fight decisive battles nor to withdraw, but to advance forward step by step and to accumulate our strength at the same time. Tactically we should wage face-to-face struggles against the enemy; strategically, we should advance forward by meandering along.

> The people of the various classes being engaged in the revolutionary movement within our country are at neither the stage of high tide and the low ebb, but are at a stage between the high tide and the low ebb, in transition towards the high tide. The duration of this transitional period will be determined by the development of various kinds of contradictions within our country, by the speed at which the gap between the strength of the enemy and that of ours is narrowed and by the degree of repercussion cast by the international political situation, particularly the political situation in Southeast Asia."[50]

This statement did not pay homage to the Cultural Revolution. It even failed to mention the slogans of the Cultural Revolution which had called for the stepping up of the revolutionary activities in Malaysia. By and large the Malayan Communist Party was slow in responding to the radical rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, as is best evident from the fact that during the year of 1967, guerrillas on the Thai-Malayan border continued to avoid provoking the Thai authorities, and that it did not publicly espoused the Cultural Revolution until the end of 1967.

Such response of the Malayan Communist Party indicated that since the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party the former might have have been cautious and avoided any premature recognition of directives from Peking, or that there existed a disagreement between Peking and the Malayan leaders during the early period of the Cultural Revolution. "Chen Peng was probably skeptical about Peking's new radicalism, while others in the party pushed for closer alignment with the Chinese line."[51]

It was only in December 1967 that the Malayan Communist

Party came openly in support of Peking, with the result that in 1968 the Malayan Communist guarrillas began to provoke the Thai and Malaysian Governments by intensifying the insurgent activities on the Thai-Malayan borders.

However, the most significant aspect of this new militancy was the fact that now the Malayan Communist Party and the Thai Communist Party entered into co-operation and mounted co-ordinated attacks in the border areas against the positions of both governments, hoping thus to form a "liberated" area, or a base, for still large operations.

It was also at this time that Peking again began to emphasize the need for oppressed peoples in Southeast Asia "to co-ordinate closely with and support each other, some striking at its head (American imperialism, Ed.) and others at its feet."[52] On May 20, 1969 the New China News Agency severely attacked Kuala Lumpur because it "collaborated more closely with the United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism and intensified its anti-people, anti-Communist and anti-China counter-revolutionary policy." However, Peking carefully avoided any implication that China was responsible for protecting the Chinese community in Malaysia when the May 13 Racial Incident resulted in a massacre of the Chinese residents. This posture was much different from its policy between 1958 and 1965, when China sent ships to Indonesia to take the overseas Chinese back to the "fatherland" as a result of discrimination from the Djakarta Government. Did this new and significant posture reflect any new

political winds blowing in Peking as a result of the termination of the Cultural Revolution at the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in April 1969?

During the Cultural Revolution, Peking did not pay much attention to Singapore, probably due to its insistence that the island was an inseparable part of the Malayan Federation and also because the city did not fit into the concept of the "People's War". Peking simply did not bother about Singapore, having its sights fixed upon the rural areas such as Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines and not the tiny island of Singapore.

Nevertheless, when the city-state was forced to leave Malaysia, the announcement of its independence in August 1965 significantly deepened the contradictions between Sukarno and Peking. China merely considered the newly independent state as resulting from the "inner contradiction of the Malayan bourgeois leadership," while Sukarno viewed the emergence of the new republic as a "grand victory of his 'Confrontation' policy" by splitting Malaysia. Both Indonesia and China denied recognition to Singapore during 1965.

In response to the directives from Peking, all Barisan Socialis members in the new parliament in Singapore resigned in 1966, and soon its radical policy became reflected in the violent activities of this party. The resignation was the most important single mistake that the Barisan leaders

ever committed, because it deprived them of the support from among the masses of Singaporeans committed to the democractic process. Had they not blindly followed Peking's short-term radical line, soon to be abandoned by Chinese leaders themselves as incorrect after the termination of the Cultural Revolution, the Barisan could have challenged the government of the People's Action Party.

By July 1969 Lim Chin-siong seemed to realize the reality and cruelty of power politics in the young republic. The collapse of the Djakarta-Peking Axis and the complexity of the Cultural Revolution in China had embarassed and confused Lim. He gave up the long struggle and confessed that his party had "completely misjudged the mood of the people."

In fact, it can be said that the hurried resignation of his party from the parliament, and its subsequent armed struggle in the streets in emulating the radicalism of the Cultural Revolution, destroyed his party.

In sum, since independence of Singapore in 1965 the Marxists in this city-state realized that its take-over must wait until the fall of its countryside—Malaya.

Since 1965 Peking made little reference to the Philippines. But by the end of 1966, after the ouster of Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese press began to lump the Philippines with Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. No specific treatment, however, was given to the struggle of the Philippines' People's Liberation Army until the spring of

1967, when the radicals in China obtained complete control over the internal and external politics of China.

It was very likely that after the loss of Indonesia, Peking intended to cultivate the Philippines. Such intention, however, was restricted by the fact that the Philippines had little in common with Indonesia. Yet, the most disturbing phenomenon was the fact that the Philippines continued to recognize the Taiwan Government, an issue on which Peking could not compromise. Nevertheless, and in spite of its remoteness from the Chinese territories, Peking continued one aspect of Indonesia's diplomatic line during 1965 by placing a heavy stress on "People's Diplomacy", to win Manila's disengagement from the war in Vietnam in exchange for the benefits of trade relations with Peking.

The year 1966 saw the relaxation of the ban on travel to the Communist countries by the Philippine Government. There was a rush of the Philippine journalists, academicians and politicians to visit China, and they all returned highly praising the Communist regime. In March, 1966, after the debate in the Senate opposing the government sending 2,000 troops to Vietnam, Peking responded with appreciation given to the "enlightened" senators. One of them, Senator Katigbok, led an "explanatory mission" to Peking in the same month and was warmly received by Chen Yi. Katigbok was told that "there were no difficulties from the Chinese side to exchange diplomatic relations with the Philippines.[53] Chen Yi also said that the presence of American bases in the Philippines

should not prevent the opening of friendly relations between the two countries.[54] Chen Yi reportedly said that the major American bases threatening China were not in the Philippines, but in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and Taiwan.[55]

By mid-1966, when the Huk activities increased considerably, Marcos charged Peking that these activities were supported by China. However, "the substance behind the reports is impossible to fathom", and indeed, Marcos occasionally reversed himself and stated that the Huks received no aid from Peking.[56] In May, 1967, when Lin Piao was in control of the Cultural Revolution, China began to drop her "diplomacy-from-above" and changed to support the insurgency in the Philippines. On May 21, 1967, the Philippine Communist Party proclaimed her support for the Cultural Revolution and denounced the Soviet revisionism:

> "The Communist Party of the Philippines is committed to an uncompromising struggle against modern revisionist ruling clique at its center. There is no middle road between modern revisionism and the proletarian revolutionary line. The outlawed situation of the Party dictates clearly that there is no path to a national and social liberation except true armed struggle."[57]

As a result of this proclamation, Peking and Manila terminated their attempts of promoting friendly relations until August 1970, when Peking toned down its support to guerrilla activities.

CHAPTER III

RELATIONS OF CHINA WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE ASEAN SINCE 1969

The evolution of Peking's foreign policy entered into a new stage in 1969 for reasons to be emplained in this Chapter. While it is true that the formulation of its foreign policy continued to be based upon the dynamic interplay of ideological considerations on the one hand and the demands of national interest on the other, this interplay developed during the early 1970's into a highly complex system which effectively ordered the conflicting priorities into a coherent foreign policy outlook known as the "Third World Strategy."

As we have indicated in the introduction which attempted to explain the mechanism operative in the formulation of foreign policy of China, anytime a new group of leaders is propelled to power as a result of power struggle, this new group develops new initiatives in foreign policy.

We have seen that while Lin Piao dominated the conduct of foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution between 1966-1969, this policy was based upon the strategic concept known as the "World Revolution," which consisted of the following two main elements: (a) "People's War"; (b) "Class Struggles." These two elements in turn were actualized

through the application of "Dual Adversary" policy, which aimed at the hegemonistic tendencies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well through the support of the "Wars of National Liberation" and the application of policy labelled as "Anti-Imperialism."

With the onset of the new international and domestic climate this strategy known as the "World Revolution" was gradually abandoned, and after the fall of Lin Piao in 1971 China evolved a new and far more sophisticated system known as the "Third World Strategy," which features the following main elements: (1) peaceful co-existence; (2) assertion of her role as a factor in the tri-polar global balance of power; (3) anti-superpowers and anti-hegemonism policies; (4) competition with the Soviet Union over the influence in the Communist camp; (5) co-operation with the medium and small powers, especially of the developing world, in order to influence the trends in international politics; (6) co-operation through trade, cultural mission, sport events and others.

As far as the area of the ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia is concerned, Peking fully registered the profound changes which took place there since 1969. As a result, Peking is applying its new strategic concept of the "Third World" to that area, toning down gradually the policies which had been associated with the strategy of "World Revolution" and replacing them with "Peaceful Co-existence," "Anti-Hegemonism," and other elements of the new strategic outlook.

This Chapter analyses the factors which have brought about the change in Peking's foreign policy operations, explains the main features of the new strategic concept of the "Third World," and describes how this is being implemented in Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975.

(1) THE DOMESTIC VARIABLE:

In no other period was China's foreign policy so significantly influenced by the domestic situation than in the period since 1969. While two practical domestic problems faced the leaders of China before April 1969, when the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was convened to make new decisions on internal and external policies, it should be noted that her leadership before the Congress represented a combination of radicals, headed by Lin Piao, and of moderates headed by Chou En-lai.

The first factor to be tackled was the problem of economic re-construction after the Cultural Revolution. Although Liu Shao-chi's "clique" had been destroyed politically, allowing the victorious Mao-Lin group to resume the self-reliant policy in the economy by not following the Soviet model of development, the price for such a victory was high in economic terms:

> "Economic dislocation and disruption in the country's scientific and technical education during the Cultural Revolution may have encouraged some leaders to seek new economic programmes. Although the fundamental national priority remains agriculture, a new emphasis on the industrial sector, and particularly on

> its heavy dependence on modern technology, emerged after 1969."[1]

In order to regain her strength in internal economy the Chinese leaders realized that the policy of self-reliance was not enough, and that they had to look outward for help.

> "However contradictory it may appear to China's most proudly boasted ethic of self-reliance, the pattern of China's trade since 1969 clearly reflects the nation's determination to modernize more rapidly."[2]

Indeed, much of the proclamations emanating from Peking and directed to other countries since then have emphasised the importance of "mutual benefit" through trading. The principles of peaceful co-existence, which had originated at the Bandung Conference in 1955, have been dug out now to replace the call for revolution in the developing countries.

The second, but equally important domestic factor that had influenced China's leaders to adopt a more pragmatic attitude toward the world, was the need to settle the problem arising from the confrontation between the charismatic leaders and the bureaucracy. The charismatic leaders are usually capable of mobilizing the people into a mass movement; in China's case it was Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution. However, a long-term economic recovery through new policies and new management methods is always designed by the bureaucracy, the specialists and technocrats, and not by the charismatic leaders, and when a mass movement becomes a spent force usually confrontation between the two groups is on the agenda:

> "Yet the power of the charismatic leader is not absolute; over time the very success of his revolution creates within his polity the need for development of a breaucracy which may or may not fully appreciate the presence of the charismatic leader. Hence, a clash arises because the bureaucracy develops its own administrative routine, thereby institutionalizing the revolution's policy; moreover, it may develop political viewpoints about policy alternatives which contradict the preferences of the charismatic leader. However, as long as the latter lives, opportunities will exist for his view to prevail over those of the bureaucracy. But, over time, tensions between the leader and the bureaucracy may intensify and increase."3

While in the case of China Mao represented the charismatic leader, the fact that he was able to maintain his power ever after the Cultural Revolution was not only due to his charisma accumulated through the previous decades, but also because he placed the blame for the defects of the Cultural Revolution upon the shoulders of a "scapegoat" Lin Piao. Praised as a "comrade-in-arm" by the Reds Guards during the Cultural Revolution, Lin did not realize at its high tide that his close relationship with Mao would bring him destruction. Had he understood the unavoidability of a conflict between himself and the bureaucratic leaders headed by Chou En-lai, had he confined himself to the position of Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and had he supported the policies of the bureaucracy, perhaps he might have have escaped the tragic destiny after his unsuccessful flight into Mongolia. Mao is known as a skillful engineer in the Chinese power game. By the end of the Cultural Revolution Mao handed over all responsibility for this event

to Lin Piao, and latter blamed him for the havoc created, criticizing particularly Lin's own build-up through the publication of Mao's quotation in the form of the "little red book." The charge against the Vice-Chairman, that he had exploited Mao's personal cult for his own promotion into the top position in the party, destroyed Lin's image and reputation after his death. It also rescued Mao from involvement in the conflict between himself as a charismatic leader and the bureaucracy. Actually, by the time the lid on the coffin of Lin Piao was closed, Mao recaptured all his former influence and power.

However, the Chairman was keen to vote for Chou's demand that China return to moderate policies by 1969, and that the radical group and its policies, both internal and external, had to go.

> "For revolutionary generations (and even their immediate successors) do not easily surrender their ideological commitment to revolutionary change; but as may have happened in China throughout much of past decade, even high-level officials who come to power as a result of the Chinese revolution and believed in the need for revolution in China, have come to realize that it was not in China's interest to continue to support people's war movements in other countries. They may even have grown uncertain about the universal validity of Mao's Thought. The re-emergence of many, if not all, officials who at last partially held accommodative position toward the international system suggest that Chinese foreign policy may again be in the process of starting to 'turn out' at the beginning of 1970's."[4]

(2) <u>THE INTERNATIONAL VARIABLE</u>:

After evaluating the Theory of the People's War in

the context of the new conditions existing in the world, the Peking leaders in 1969 agreed that these ideological tools had to be stored up for the time being. The situation in Southeast Asia, particularly the ASEAN countries, had demonstrated that little had been gained as a result of the application of this strategy. The People's War, though successful in posing a threat to the United States in Thailand, was a failure on the whole because its ultimate aim of bringing down the existing governments in Southeast Asia had not been achieved.

There were good reasons for the Peking leaders to blame the "Lin Piao clique" as far as the Theory of the People's War and its application in Southeast Asia was concerned, because the harsh application of this theory had seriously hampered Peking's control of the Southeast Asian Communist Parties. Perhaps during 1967-1968 the Peking leaders had not recognized that the People's War would generate serious conflicts within these parties. Except for the Thai Communist Party which consistently followed Peking's line, the Malayan Communist, the Indonesian Communist Party, the Philippine Communist Party and most of the Indochinese insurgent organisations began to split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking groups shortly after the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, most of the insurgent leaders started then to reconsider the role of Chinese leadership in the International Communist Movement.

Peking's assertion of its ideological correctness is

usually followed by enforcement of strict discipline upon its allies. When tensions between the Soviet Union and China reach the point of crisis, the latter tightens her relations with the peripherial parties to seek support for her "united-front" policy. However, China did not realize that the call for unconditional acceptance of her ideology would also lead to tension within the parties in Southeast Asia. Frustrated by the threats that refusal to submit would be denounced by Peking, many parties intended to shift their support to Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Perhaps the most serious negative effect upon the Southeast Asian Communist Parties was due to the internal developments in China during 1967-1968:

> "The praise of personal cult, the purge and the the virtual destruction of the party machinary all contributed to the allienation of important parties..."[5]

Such negative effects forced Peking to choose one of the following alternatives: either continuation of support to the insurgencies, or normalization of relations with the existing governments. Peking decided to drop the former alternative, for "none of these movements was sufficiently large to make any impact on the political struggle within international communism, nor were any visible gains made agains existing local governments."[6]

It was at this time that Peking put forward her "Protracted War" strategy again. According to Mao, struggle with the reactionaries is a matter of protracted conflict. Using

the "Theory of Contradiction", Peking could explain that when conditions are favourable for armed struggle, it is necessary to co-operate with the reactionaries for a transitional and temporary period, as long as these reactionaries are not China's principal enemy. Further, according to Peking, such short-term coalitions are profitable to the insurgencies for the latter might make use of the coalitions between Peking and local governments to re-organize their parties and prepare for a new offensive.

Peking's decision in favour of co-operation with the governments in Southeast Asia was not only necessitated by the failure of the insurgent movements, but it was also based upon the consideration of the effects which the withdrawal of the Americans from the area would have upon the regional balance of power. Above all Peking must be ready to react to Moscow's aspirations in this part of the world aiming at the replacement of the American influence there.

During the 1950's, when the Sino-Soviet relations were "not antagonistic" and the Soviet fleet was inferior to that of the United States, Moscow had allocated the area of Southeast Asia to China as her sphere of influence. In the middle of the 1960's, after the Peking-Djakarta Axis had collapsed, the Russians gradually shifted their attention to Southeast Asia as a result of the fast development of their naval forces. By 1967 the Soviet Union was increasing its influence also by building-up relations with the Southeast Asian governments. In November 1967 Malaysia established diplomatic

relations with Moscow, followed by the Republic of Singapore in June 1968. The Philippines were continuously visited by Russian cargo ships and by cultural delegations between 1968-1970. Thailand signed a trade agreement with Moscow in 1970, and their relations continuously improved. These Russian activities alarmed the Peking leaders who regarded them as a thorn in their flesh. To respond to this challenge, China had to broaden her relations and extend areas of mutual co-operation with the conservative governments in Southeast Asia, "for only such a policy can provide a sufficient diplomatic leverage to impose effective restraints on the Soviet Union."[7]

The decision to enter into competition with the Soviet Union by broadening her diplomatic relations with the governments in Southeast Asia was based upon the proposition that China would be in a more favourable position in her rivalry with the Soviet Union, because of her historical and cultural influences in the area. Several other incentives prompted the Chinese leaders to make such a decision. First, China believed that Southeast Asia is an area of her "rightful" influence. Second, China believed that the technical and economic assistance that Indonesia, Burma and Singapore had received from Moscow was slight and that military assistance was next to nothing. Third, China was a more important trading partner for at least Burma, Singapore and Malaysia. Lastly, there had been Chou En-lai's assurances since the 1950's to several governments in Southeast Asia that

China would not interfere in the issue of the overseas Chinese and would treat them as a "domestic problem" of the countries concerned.

By 1969, Peking leaders perceived that Russia's eastward movement would be based upon five elements: (a) the claim that Soviet Union is an "Asian" power, justified to seek protection of her Asian territory; (b) that the Soviet Union would aspire to replace the United States in Asia after the end of the Vietnamese War; (c) that the Soviet Union would seek to restrict the Japanese economic influence in Southeast Asia; (d) that Southeast Asia was an important area for the expansion of Soviet navy; (e) that the Russians were interested in economic expansion in the area.

Confronted with these intentions of the Russians, the leaders of China were determined to put forth a new strategy which would not emphasise the importance of revolution, but a new "united-front-from-above", a strategy based upon the concept of the "Three Worlds". Before going on to the discussion of this concept, it is necessary to offer some observations of the events inside China since 1969, events that concerned themselves with the power struggle between the radicals and moderates.

(3) <u>THE POWER STRUGGLE VARIABLE</u>:

The decision to end the Cultural Revolution was made by Chairman Mao in late in 1968 by eliminating the Red Guards as a political force "in order to restore the party

and its apparatus as the leading element of the political system."[8] By this time Mao definitely viewed the Red Guards as no longer useful to him. In foreign policy he was facing two prospects formulated by two competing groups:

> "One side, probably led by Lin Piao, agreed that the classic Maoist dual adversary strategy of simultaneous political and ideological struggle, with military overtones, against both American 'imperialism' and Soviet 'revisionism', or 'social imperialism', must be maintained and would suffice on both fronts; there was no need for diplomatic gestures, toward the United States at any rate..."[9]

> "...The other side, probably led by Chou En-lai, apparently argued that ambassadorial contacts with the United States, which had been suspended since 1968, should be renewed in some of the countries with which China had diplomatic relations, as a political restrain on Moscow."[10]

As we have already seen Mao had opted for the latter course and cast his lot with Chou, but refrained from speaking publicly about his choice.

The clash between the Chinese and Russian soldiers on the Chenpo (Damansky) Island in March 1969 was a red signal to the Chinese leaders suggesting that the Russians might intend to upset by force their own 9th Party Congress, as the Soviets had suppressed the Czechoslovak 14th Party Congress by invasion in 1968. It should be noted that it was Lin Piao who directed the army in fighting the Chenpo battle, which so much enhanced his position within the Communist Party of China that he was nominated heir of Mao; his report to the Congress rung with affirmation of Maoist fundamentalism, including the dual adversary strategy discussed earlier.

While after the Congress Peking was still advocating its support for revolutionary movements in theory, in actual fact it moved away from the dual adversary strategy and began to "tilt" in the direction of the United States as a best potential counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Even before the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, already in July 1969, Peking had decided to orient itself on the United States, but without making its intention public. This might have been due to practical consideration to the effect that a public and premature acknowledgement would confer undesirable bargaining leverage upon the United States. But the most probable explanation maintains that an open contact with the United States should be postponed for a time, fearing that such contact might sufficiently alarm Moscow to precipitate its very attack that Peking was seeking so urgently to avoid. It was reported that after the Chenpo Incident the Soviet Union tested the United States "what would be its reaction to a Soviet destruction of China's nuclear installations, and that it was discouraged."[11]

By July 1969 President Nixon proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine, aiming at a reduced American military posture in Asia for the 1970's, to be coupled with an increased regional co-operation among Asian countries. At the same time, fearing that the proclamation of Nixon Doctrine would upset American friends in Southeast Asia, the United States made the last but temporary intrusion of her ground forces into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. It was generally regarded as a smoke-

screen for the withdrawal of the American forces to start soon. Understanding that it was a temporary intrusion, China sent no forces into Cambodia to fight the American soldiers but just protested. Nixon by this time came to the conclusion that the tendency of overestimating Chinese "expansionism" in Indochina was not correct and should be dropped. The Warsaw talks between the two parties, though cancelled by the Chinese on May 20, 1970 as a protest against the American intrusion into Cambodia, were resumed and an invitation for a visit was secretly extended by Peking to the United States President.[12]

By 1971 the conflict between Chou En-lai and Lin Piao inside the Communist Party of China heightened, following the secret Sino-American contacts initiated in 1969, by which time Lin Piao found himself in a much weaker position in combating Chou En-lai. The latter obviously realized that if his new policy was to be carried out Lin must go.

In mid-August 1971 Chou began a series of moves evidently aimed at Lin. A new set of the Communist Party Committees was set up on the provincial level under the directives of Chou to replace those destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. The Revolutionary Committees, those created by Lin, had to close down. At the same time Chou administered another blow to Lin Piao by announcing that Nixon was to visit China in 1972, destroying thus completely the "dual adversary" strategy of Lin. To prepare the Chinese people for normalization between the United States and China,

an important article written by Mao during the 1940's, entitled 'On Policy,"[13] was published and distributed in millions of copies among the entire population. The publication was arranged by Chou En-lai to reflect his current policy line:

> "... that China, when threatened by one imperialist adversary, should co-operate temporarily with a lesser adversary that was also at odds with the main enemy. This could be understood in several ways: as advocating co-operation with the United States against Japan, or as advocating co-operation with the United States against the Soviet Union, which since March 1969 has sometime been labelled 'social imperialist' in Chinese propaganda."[14]

Although the present day critics of Lin Piao are accusing him of being always pro-Soviet and anti-Mao, these charges are contrary to the events of 1969-1972. The latter charge is probably true that he intended to take away the chairmanship of the party from Mao. The former, however, does not appear true. In fact, before he was oustered by Chou and attempted to flee to Mongolia Lin Piao had been a <u>persona non grata</u> in Moscow because he was proclaimed Mao's heir at the 9th Congress and the main promoter of the "People's War" strategy which seriously contradicted Moscow's general foreign policy line. Most importantly, he was the one who directed the People's Liberation Army to fight the Russians in the Chenpo Incident in 1969.

In view of this, the possible reasons that led to the downfall of Lin Piao might be summarized as follow: (a) he opposed the opening of relations with the United States; (b) he created a "cult" of personality around himself that

became a real threat to Mao himself; (c) his military power threatened to reverse the Maoist, and Communist, principle to the effect that the party must always control the armed forces.

Considering all these factors, it was obvious that Lin's position vis á vis Chou was untenable and he had to be removed.

(4) SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE "THIRD WORLD" STRATEGY:

A clear rejection of Lin Piao's foreign policy toward the ASEAN countries was first confirmed by Chou En-lai, the winner, during a visit of the Philippine President's brother-in-law, Governor Romualdez, to Peking in 1972:

> "During the visit... in 1972, he was assured by Chou En-lai that the previous Chinese support for Philippine rebels had been a mistaken policy which was associated with the disgraced Lin Piao, and would not be continued."15

Such an open garantee made in 1972 must have impressed the ASEAN leaders with the expectation that China would no longer support the insurgent movements in their countries, and that instead diplomatic relations might replace it.

When the concept of the "Third World" was publicly proclaimed by Teng Hsiao-ping, former Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party purged during the Cultural Revolution, in his speech in the United Nations in the spring of 1974, many observers believed that it was not much different from the Bandung policy.

Unlike the Bandung policy, which had aimed at the United

States as the only enemy, the "Third World" concept is a broader idea. It sees both the United States and the Soviet Union as adversaries, but of unequal value, and it defines the Soviet Union as the principal, and the United States as the secondary, adversary of China. The Chinese insist that:

> "As a result of the emergence of social imperialism, the socialist camp which existed for a time after World War II is no longer in existence. Owing to the law of the uneven development of capitalism the Western imperialist bloc is disintegrating."[17]

Moreover, the Chinese believe that the present world is divided into three parts, or three sectors:

> "Judging from the changes in international relations, the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World."[18]

Unlike the Bandung policy, the "Third World" concept classifies the Soviet Union and the United States as the two "superpowers", which are struggling against each other for "hegemony" everywhere in the world. Keeping silent about her own capability as a great power, China puts herself in the category of the "Third World." She claims for herself the "international duty" to oppose the domination by the two superpowers:

> "China is a socialist country, and a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World... the Chinese Government and the people firmly support all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations in their struggle to win or defend national independence, develop national economy and

> oppose colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. This is our international duty. China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one."[19]

Seeing that the "Third World" has the majority of the population of the entire globe and that it is in this area that most of the new independent countries are situated, China hopes that through this concept she might win the support of the majority of countries in the present nation-state system. A new "united-front-from-above" is aimed at by this concept, hoping that by diplomatic relations with them China's influence would overtake that of the United States and of the Soviet Union. At present, any change in the status quo through violent means is therefore undesirable from Peking's point of view.

Constituting a part of the Third World, the importance of the ASEAN countries was expressed by the People's Daily on January 5, 1975:

> "Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia etc., are countries that constitute part of the Third World. Situated at the joining area of the Pacific and Indian Oceans their stragetic position as well as their abundant natural resources are important. These countries have been enslaved and exploited by colonialism and imperialism and, therefore, they bear the same destiny of the Third World countries. In the recent years, the Southeast Asian countries have continuously strengthened their relations with the other Third World countries to oppose big power hegemony."[20]

In terms of Peking's global strategy and China's historical role, the ASEAN countries occupy a very central position for initiating the "Third World" concept which intends to break down the bi-polar world. However, it

should not lead us to believe that China's ultimate goal in these countries is to create another new multi-polar balance of power system involving the other big powers.[21]

> "But China's policies toward the region are not simply a function of a variety of local factors and of Peking's intricate but fluid Third World strategy. In any case, it represents an amalgam of an aligned and non-aligned nations, of radical and conservative political systems, of deeply entrenched and highly vulnerable governments, Even when consistently pursuing the same objective an effective foreign policy toward these countries will require careful attention to these national variables."[22]

On the whole, the "Third World" concept is decreasing the use of the term "armed struggle", and the word "struggle" is used merely to describe the anti-American and anti-Soviet operations in the area.[23] At present, China encourages armed struggles only in Africa where insurgencies are more promising.[24]

The term "united-front," which China had been using since 1949, is now associated with the concept of the Third World. The content of the "united-front" is different in the 1970's from that of the 1966-1968 period. The former concept signifies a "united-front-from-above," meaning co-operation of Chinese Government with different political systems through diplomatic relations. The latter concept denotes a "united-front-from-below," meaning unification under the leadership of the Communist parties of insurgent groups at the grass root level for a massive revolution against the existing governments. Toward Southeast Asia, the former is preferred at the present time.

The remaining part of this Chapter will analyze the relations between China and the individual countries of ASEAN since 1969.

(5) CHINA-ASEAN CONTACTS SINCE 1969:

Because China had been isolated diplomatically from the ASEAN countries for more than ten years, it was difficult for her to initiate conventional diplomatic ties with these countries immediately. But the most important factor which complicated the establishment of diplomatic ties between Peking and its neighbours was the past history of their relations:

> "At the end of 1950's the leaders of China... were willing, for a complex of reasons, to establish a 'united-front-from-above' with the noncommunist and 'bourgeois' governments of these states. But shortly after Peking's diplomatic overtures had been rebuffed in 1959, a ten year period of radical internal development in China began, accompanied by the intensification of both the Sino-Soviet conflict and the wars in Indochina. The combination of isolationist policies toward China, the leadership's concern with its strategic interests in Vietnam and Indonesia, and its political objective of splitting the Communist Camp in Asia—all these led to growing hostility between Peking and the pro-Western states of Southeast Asia. China renewed its interest in the Communist parties in these states because they were useful tactical weapons to counter allied moves in Southeast Asia and also because the Chinese were then attempting to build their own Communist movement in Asia on the claim that Peking was more opposed to the United States and more diligently served the interests of fraternal parties, whether ruling or insurgent, than Moscow."[25]

In spite of this uneasy history between the two parties during the past ten years, many reasons urged the ASEAN

leaders to turn to China after 1969.

Strategically, the development of Chinese nuclear capability during the Cultural Revolution alarmed the ASEAN governments because their countries found themselves now within the range of Peking's missiles. They all started to question the wisdom of continuing the isolation of the People's Republic of China, and more crucially, questioned the credibility of the Western allies to provide an effective protection and defense.

The announcement of the pull out of the British forces East of Suez in later 1960's led the ASEAN governments to question whether the United States would do the same after the end of the war in Vietnam. By the time the Nixon Doctrine was proclaimed in 1969, these governments started to reassess the desirability of maintaining their security through alignment with any of the major powers. With the emergence of the Japanese economic influence in Southeast Asia they began to look for stability through a multi-polar balance of interests in the area rather than through taking sides in a bi-polar world. In view of these developments, the ASEAN leaders found a common desire to re-shape the security in the area, and thus the Chinese "Third World" strategy, which emphasises co-operation among all developing countries, found a fertile soil for a sympathetic reception.

The decision of the ASEAN countries to move slowly toward an accommodation with China was also due to the careful calculation of the possibility that Peking might win

the control of the Communist Parties. The ASEAN governments were carefully watching the deterioration of relations between insurgency and China. Assessing the battle for ideological supremacy between the Soviet Union and China, they predicted that China would prefer a realistic accommodation with them rather than ideological radicalism spoiling the prospects of co-operation. Consequently, since 1969, they have been indicating to China that her denial of support to the insurgencies would in a significant way facilitate the establishment of diplomatic ties.

The Chinese leadership understood well these signals coming out of Southeast Asia and reciprocated soon by the announcement of the "Chou En-lai Doctrine," in content similar to the Nixon Doctrine, to the effect that China was willing to terminate her support to the insurgencies in exchange of diplomatic relations and co-operation of the local governments with her in her "Third World" concept.

(i) MALAYSIA

Malaysia was the first country to recognize China in June 1974, followed by the Philippines and Thailand in 1975. Such move was not without reasons. By mid-1969, the Kuala Lumpur Government was suffering from the "May 13 Racial Incident", which was generally regarded as a massacre of the Chinese people by a government dominated by the Malays. It was believed that one of the reasons for Tun Razak's visit to Peking was to placate the Chinese community

in his country and thus to make it receptive for the election to be held in the middle of 1974. Another reason, of course, was President Nixon's announcement of the Guam Doctrine, as well as the announcement of the British withdrawal east of the Suez which made the Kuala Lumpur Government quick to sound out Peking about guarantees concerning both regional and internal stability. The recognition of Peking, moreover, would promote the prestige of the Alliance Party in Malaysia and assist it to win support from the Chinese citizens who represented close to 50 per cent of the electorate in the country.

By early 1974 the difficulties between Peking and Kuala Lumpur concerning diplomatic relations seemed solved, since the former had indicated that it would not support the Malayan Communist Party. Between 1969 and 1974, when governmental ties were under negotiations, the Kuala Lumpur Government was careful in dealing with China, first through unofficial contacts and later by sending its own officials to Peking. It is important to note, however, that after the communique was signed between Peking and Kuala Lumpur, and contrary to the promise not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the latter, China continued practising her two-side policy by recognizing the Kuala Lumpur Government while supporting the "just struggle" of the Malayan Communist Party at the same time. Such a support appeared verbal only because the Malayan Communist Party, in the transitional period, was isolated deep in the jungle.

Malaysia had shown interest in recognizing China as early as 1968 when the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, stated that if China would not encourage insurgent movement in his country his government would consider having diplomatic relations with Peking.[26] Rahman's statement elicited no positive response from China, probably due to the fact that the Cultural Revolution was still raging and because Lin Piao's "People's War" strategy dominated Peking's foreign policy. In March 1969 the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, set down his conditions for recognizing China:

> "If Malaysia's independence and integrity could be guaranteed by the big powers—America, Soviet Union and China—then we can look forward to a stable and peaceful future."[27]

Stepping into the year of 1970 Malaysia decided to play a more active role in her foreign policy through a non-aligned posture, by repeatedly expressing her desire to enter into friendly relations with China. The first friendly attitude of Kuala Lumpur was her abstaining in the United Nations in 1970 when the Albanian resolution proposing admission of Peking into that international body was voted upon, which was quite contrary to her former vote favouring the maintainence of Taiwan's seat in the organisation. During the Commonwealth meeting held in January 1971 in Singapore, Razak commented on the question of China as follow:

> "It is a fact that China for the most part has been excluded from the mainstream of international affairs for more than two decades. I do not think it is profitable, at this point of time, to go into the whys and wherefores of this,

> what is of more immediate relevances is that as a result, a natural result some might say, China does not accept the international order as it exists today and seeks to upset it because, in her view, she has been deliberately excluded. The countries of Southeast Asia are her immediate neighbours and are the first to live with the consequences of her policies."[28]

In the same month a clearer indication of trends towards the recognition of China emerged from Kuala Lumpur:

> "Malaysia accepts the fact that China has a right to play her part in the international forums and to have an interest in the affairs of Asia. Our support of China's membership in the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a clear manifestation of this belief... We want to see China's response, whether she for her part recognizes and respects our independence and integrity and our legitimate interest in Southeast Asia..."[29]

Peking was now in a position to respond more favourably to the initiations emanating from Kuala Lumpur because Lin Piao had no more decisive influence upon China's foreign policy, as is evident from the stream of sport teams, cultural delegations, technical experts and trade missions dispatched to Malaysia. Moreover, in February 1971 the Chinese Red Cross sent US$208,000 worth of relief aid for the Malaysian flood victims; in March the Hong Kong pro-Peking Silver Star Group (銀星藝術團) visited Kuala Lumpur and drove the local Chinese community into frenzy with joy; when the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement ended in April and was replaced by a looser pact consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and United Kingdom, Peking attacked only the British without commenting on the other members of the new pact.[30] The same month also saw the es-

tablishment of a Malaysian Consulate in Hong Kong to make easier her trade with China; and in May Malaysia sent her first unofficial Trade Mission to China since 1958.

On the other hand, Peking carefully called the Mission as a "Malaysian Group", indicating that it terminated its support to Indonesia's "Confrontation" against Malaysia and that it for the first time recognized the sovereignty and independence of the Federation of Malaysia. During the visit Chou En-lai met with its members and said that the overseas Chinese in Malaysia should live as Malaysians. The result of the visit was rewarding: direct trade with China instead of through middlemen in Singapore and Hong Kong; China promised to buy annually 200,000 tons of rubber while Malaysia would import Chinese consumer goods, machinery and agricultural equipments; and all trade between the parties would be handled by national shipping lines of the two countries. After the announcement that Nixon would visit Peking in 1972, China sent her own trade delegation to Malaysia, which called upon Razak to extend Chou En-lai's "best wishes to the Malaysian Premier." In October 1971, while a trade mission from Kuala Lumpur attended the Kwangtung Fair, the Malaysian delegation in the United Nations voted against the "important question" resolution which required a two-thirds majority to oust the Taipei Government from the Security Council.

By the end of 1971 China purchased 40,000 tons of rubber from Malaysia and during 1972 the Malaysian National

Co-operation approved 4,000 applications of Malaysian traders to import Chinese goods worth about M$110 million.

These cordial relations between the two countries were improved by another step in 1973. During that year most Southeast Asian countries were seriously hit by a rice shortage, and to express its concern Peking sold 100,000 tons of rice at a low price to Kuala Lumpur.

Despite this sympathetic attitude of China, the Malaysian Government was weighing the advantages and disadvantages of recognizing Peking. The Malaysians, and especially the Chinese Malaysians, remembered well the "May 13 Incident" of 1969, and in view of this more effort had to be made to improve the understanding between the Malay and Chinese races. Secondly, the problem of Communist insurgency was not completely solved, that there was no clear and definite answer from Peking that it would cease supporting the Malayan Communist Party.

Nevertheless, an unspoken accommodation between the two countries seemed to have been reached early in 1974, when Razak was ready to deal with China to undercut the revolutionary movement in his country by making it diplomatically unrewarding for China to maintain the existing level of her support. On the other hand, China was ready to apply the "Chou En-lai Doctrine" in the ASEAN countries, to convince them that no one would return from Peking empty handed if willing to accept the fact that China was now their "protector" and, most important of all, if they were willing to

support China's Third World strategy aiming at eliminating the influence of the Soviet Union from Southeast Asia.

China was ready to promote Malaysia into an example for other ASEAN nations to follow for several reasons. Since 1971 Malaysia, as the most active member of the ASEAN, was proposing that Southeast Asia ought to be neutralized and that the military presence of the big powers in the area should be eliminated. Malaysia was also enthusiastic in opposing the proposal of the Soviet Union and Japan to internationalize the Malacca Strait.

The final obstacles to Razak's visit to China were removed in early 1974 when Peking started to tone down its contacts with the Malayan exile organisations in the capital. The time was ripe, and all the Malaysian Premier had to do now was to jet to the Forbidden City.

However, the Malayan National Liberation Army was upset by these events, and annoyed and uneasy to see itself betrayed by its supporters in Peking, and to demonstrate its displeasure it destroyed 6-million dollars worth of construction equipment on the east-west highway between Kelantan and Perak States on May 30, 1974, shooting a Police Inspector-General a few days later.

These acts of violece were clearly directed at Peking, pointing out that the revolutionary struggle in Malaysia should not be sold down the river and warning the Chinese leaders against abandoning their ally. It seems that this warning was heeded in Peking because immediately after Razak's

departure for China Radio Peking broadcast support for the Malayan Communists.

However, it was too late for Razak's jet plane to make a U-turn and return to Kuala Lumpur.

Now in Peking, Razak signed a joint Sino-Malaysian Communique with Chou En-lai on May 31, 1974 of which the central point dealt with Peking's stand on the overseas Chinese.

> "The Chinese Government considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will, or acquired Malaysian nationality, as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality. As for residents who retain Chinese nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by the laws of the Government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there, and live in unity with them, and their proper rights and interests will be protected by the Government of China and respected by the Government of Malaysia."[31]

While the Communique clarified the legal status of the majority of the Chinese residents in Malaysia, it failed to resolve the position of those stateless Chinese variously estimated at between 150,000 and 250,000. The document was further criticized for not even hinting at the solution of the problems arising from the economic strength but political weakness of the Chinese population in Malaysia.[32] The political disability of the Chinese is the real problem because while they comprise almost 40 per cent of the population they are represented by less than 15 per cent of members of the parliament.

However, upon his return from Peking Razak said that the Chinese had assured him that "the Communist activities

are an internal affair of Malaysia and that the Government in Kuala Lumpur can deal with it as it pleases."[33]

While even after the arrival of the Malaysian Ambassador at Peking on January 13, 1975,[34] China maintained her ties with Malayan Communists, there is no public evidence that she called upon them to revolt. It seemed that soon the Malayan Communist Party reconciled itself to the diplomatic relations of China with Kuala Lumpur, as is evident from its letter of April 11 expressing sympathy on the occasion of death of Tun Pi-wu, a close comrade of Mao since the 1930's.[35] In return and shortly after the fall of Cambodia the Chinese Communist Party sent on April 29 a greeting to the Malayan Communist Party on it 45th Anniversary. The headlines in the People's Daily explained to the Malayan Communists two important points: (a) that the "brotherly" relations between the Malayan Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party would remain, although China had recognized the Razak regime through the state-to-state relations; and (b) that the Malayan Communist must understand the situation in Southeast Asia where both American and Russian hegemony was the crucial issue, hinting at the same time that the aim of Peking's co-existence policy is to combat the main enemy—the Soviet Union through the united-front-from-above.[36] However, the People's Daily on the same day published a greeting from the Malayan Communists celebrating the victory in Cambodia, which said that Cambodia's example would inspire the Malayan Liberation Movement in the future. On May 2 the Chinese Com-

munist Party published another latter of the Malayan Communist Party celebrating its own 45th Anniversary. The letter re-affirmed the position that the Malayan revolution would be carried out by means of armed struggle:

> "According to our country's (Malaya, Ed.) concrete situation... if our revolution is to be successful, we cannot follow the 'parliamentary democratic line,' nor the way of armed uprising in cities; we can only be successful to attain political power by encircling the cities from villages, i.e., through armed struggle. Therefore we must uphold this correct line under any circumstance."[37]

Yet, the position of the Chinese Communist Party was clear: it believed at this point that Malaysia was not ready for revolution, and that unless the Malayan Communist Party broadened it united-front-from-below to include different races of the country, the party was doomed to be confined in its struggle to the jungle. Although basically the Chinese Communist Party does not disagree with the strategy of the Malayan Communists, which is an exact copy of the Chinese experience of the 1930's, Peking advised the Malayan Communists on April 29, 1975 that:

> "... the Malayan Communist Party must and shall strengthen its consolidation based on Marxist-Leninist principles, sufficiently mobilize all races, all strata of masses of the people, unite all possible forces to fight the enemy together, and overcome various difficulties in order to achieve a new and greater victory."[38]

It should be noted that in 1975 the Chinese Communist Party was not satisfied with the activities of the Malayan Communists because these restricted themselves to mobilizing only the Chinese population of the country. Avoiding the use of the term "class-struggle," the Chinese Communists

urged the Malayan Communists to unite with other "strata of the masses of people," meaning with the Malays, Indians and other races. The leaders in Peking understand well that the fire of class-struggle in Malaya cannot be intensified for the moment, and that for a period of time this style of struggle must be postponed into the future. At the moment, China prefers to woo Razak's regime through the state-to-state relations, trade and other contacts.

By the end of 1975 China quoted with great relish from the Malaysian press any anti-Soviet postures, while trade and other contacts grew in extent. In August even the broadcast of the Malayan Voice of Revolution accepted the guideline of Peking to shift its attention from Razak's regime to attacks upon the Soviet Union and its diplomatic, economic and political activities in Southeast Asia.

(ii) THE PHILIPPINES

While preliminary contacts between China and the Philippines were initiated in 1969, it was not until 1974 that Marcos explicitly showed his willingness to enter into diplomatic relations with Peking. This willingness was expressed through the visit of Madame Marcos to Peking in September 1974. Seeing the accommodation and then full diplomatic ties between Kuala Lumpur and Peking attained in 1974 on the basis of reasonable terms of the Sino-Malaysian Communique, and then watching the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam

into the hands of the Indochinese Communists in April 1975, Marcos was alarmed and ready to move. In view of this he decided in June 1975 to seek guarantees from Peking that it would not support the insurgency in the Philippines in exchange for diplomatic ties with his country. Peking, on the other hand, appeared satisfied from the fact that the Philippines, this important member of the SEATO, decided to bow.

Looking at the background of these events, Marcos had said already in 1968 that by the time of the American withdrawal from Asia some arrangement with China would be necessary. However, when this time approached Marcos could not make up his mind, showing good-will at one time while criticizing China at other for supporting rebels in his country. China, on the other hand, carefully avoided any criticism of Marcos. During the riots of the pro-Peking students in Manila in 1970, Marcos' interest in a new China policy temporarily cooled off. To warm up Marcos' spirit, Peking sent US$83,000 as a contribution to flood victims in the Philippines in November, avoiding carefully to mention the insurgency in its press. In March 1971 Peking further showed its good-will by returning a hijacked Philippine plane to Manila within 24 hours. In return, Marcos permitted a ping-pong team to visit Peking in May, which was received by Chou En-lai who hinted that China was ready to enter into diplomatic ties with Manila. The prospect of new relations marked a high point in May 1971, when Marcos said for the first time

that he did not believe that China was trying to export revolution and intended to dominate Asia.

The end of 1971 saw a sudden change in Marcos. He suspended the habeas corpus and repeatedly stated that the armed insurgent movement in his country was supported by a "foreign power", meaning clearly China. In the United Nations Manila was the only country in Asia to vote against Taipei's expulsion from that organisation in November 1971. Following the position taken by the United States, Manila voted for admission of China into the United Nations but opposed expulsion of Taiwan.

When after China's admission into the United Nations there was a rush for recognizing her, Marcos changed his attitude once again and mounted fresh initiatives.

Throughout 1972 a stream of visitors from the Philippines went to China, while Peking sent its first ship to the Philippines with 2104 tons of relief goods for flood victims. Moreover, Marcos' brother-in-law, Benjamin Romandez, paid a 9-day visit to Peking, talked for two hours with Chou En-lai, and asked him three questions in Marcos' name:

> "Would the People's Republic of China agree to cultural, trade and other links, short of diplomatic relations? If not, would it agree to establish diplomatic relations without disturbing the existing relations between Manila and Taipei? And would the People's Republic of China refrain from stirring up overseas Chinese or other groups in the Philippines?"40

Chou's reply was clear: China would have no diplomatic relations with the Philippines if the latter continued her ties with Taipei; China would maintain her five principles

of peaceful co-existence; China does not believe that revolution can be exported; and that she would not interfere in the Philippine domestic affairs, including matters concerning the overseas Chinese.

By this time both parties realized that the main obstacle in the way of diplomatic ties stemmed from the internal unrest in the Philippines. However, when the martial law was introduced by Marcos in September 1972, the Philippine press did not blame Peking for the internal disturbances. From this significant event it would then appear that Marcos was now ready to walk toward China with slow but steady steps.

In 1973 the Philippines sent several delegations to Peking and the Kwangtung Fair, and in exchange Peking dispatched a trade mission to the Philippines. In the same year Chou En-lai said to a group of Philippine visitors that the "trade relations between the two countries can be immediately expanded and further developed into diplomatic relations in the near future."[41] By July 1973 export to China from the Philippines jumped to US$25 million, and when China started to explore her newly developed oil indurstry a considerable amount of petroleum was exported to the Philippines, while her sugar, coconut oil and wood were imported by China. Both were happy with such a development.

When it appeared to the leaders of both countries that relations between them could be raised to a semi-diplomatic level, Mrs. Imelda Marcos visited China in September 1974 with the result that Peking, seeing the Philippines suffering

from the oil crisis, promised to sell her "no less than one billion barrels of crude oil yearly."[42]

Early 1975 saw the highest point of contacts between the two countries, especially in January and February, during which time the insurgent movement that once had hindered their relations was not mentioned in the Chinese press, except on February 22 when the Philippine Communist Party sent a greeting to Chou En-lai wishing success for the 4th National People's Congress.[43] This, of course, the Marcos regime had to tolerate. In the meantime many Chinese delegations visited Manila. On January 5, a Chinese Trade Exhibition was held in Manila[44] and on February 16, Marcos received a Chinese physician for personal consultations.[45]

On March 2, 1975, seeing the deteriorating situation in Indochina and after consulting his cabinet and other high military officials, Marcos announced that the "Philippines is to normalize her relations with the People's Republic of China within 1975,"[46] adding that:

> "When the weather is warmer, I might visit Peking myself in order to actualize this normalization between the two countries."[47]

The puzzling expression "when the weather is warmer" might have meant two things: either the last stage of the war in Indochina through increased armed confrontation, or a warmer response from Peking. It was the latter assumption which proved correct because by that time Peking nearly caught the fish and would not let it go. On January 5, 1975 China reported and appreciated the Philippines' nationali-

zation of the American Esso Oil Company and praised this as "an act of justice of the Philippine people's struggle."[48] On the same day the People's Daily reported that the Philippine National Ochestra in Manila had played in its programme a Chinese hit piano piece called Huang Ho (黃河), the Yellow River, praising this as "a sign of a further understanding of the Chinese people."[49] Following the reception of the Philippine delegation of petroleum industry by high Chinese officials on March 21,[50] Marcos looked up to the sky and said to himself that 'the weather is warm enough for a visit of Peking."

As the developments were surging ahead, Peking announced on May 30 that Marcos was to visit China in early June.[51] Two days later, in order to emphasize this important shift in Manila's policy towards Peking, its press mounted criticism of the Soviet Union and its intention of expanding naval forces into Southeast Asia.[52]

Marcos arrived in Peking on June 6 and on the same day the People's Daily published four articles introducing the Republic of the Philippines to the people of China. One of them discussed the "long historical ties" between the two countries, particularly emphasising the contact during the Ming Dynasty.[53] Marcos met Mao Tse-tung and talked with Teng Hsiao-ping, but could not met Chou En-lai because the Premier was sick in hospital. At the banquet welcoming the President and Madame Marcos both Teng Hsiao-ping and Marcos recalled again the "length historical relations" between the two countries. Teng said that China would base her diplomatic relations with the Philippines on the following principles:

> "... it is possible for countries with different social systems to develop state relations on the

> basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. Our policy and stand are consistent and firm."[54]

Commenting on the situation in Southeast Asia, Teng said that China "noted" the proposal of the ASEAN on neutralization of this important area of the world:

> "We are glad to note the significant progress of the struggle of the people of Southeast Asian countries to safeguard independence and sovereignty. The Southeast Asian countries have won extensive international support for their positive position for establishing a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia and barring superpower interference and contention. We sincerely hope that these countries will unite more closely with other third world countries and play a greater role in international affairs."[55]

Teng Hsiao-ping particularly stressed the "wicked" intentions of the Soviet Union toward the area which followed on the heels of American defeat in Indochina and warned that:

> "What should especially put people on the alert is the fact that while one superpower has to withdraw after suffering a defeat, the other superpower, with unbridled ambition, is trying to seize the chance to carry out expansion by overt or covert means of contest into the area... The people of Asian countries, who have rich experience in combating imperialism, will see through superpower wiles and schemes, guard against '<u>letting the tiger in through the back door while repelling the wolf through the front gate</u>,'..."[56]

Marcos also spent a lot of time during his address on the "historical relations" of China with the Philippines, dating back to the Sung (960-1279) and the Ming (1369-1644) dynasties when a tributary system had been practised between these two countries,[57] and explained why the diplomatic relations had to be delayed until 1975:

> "Some years back it was said of the Philippines that we were apprehensive of Japan, fearful of China, watchful of Indonesia, and aggravated by India—so that Philippine policies were oriented toward lesser Asian countries and stronger non-Asian nations. Perhaps these were the genuine perceptions at the time. They were, in any case, a realistic basis for the premises of diplomatic dependence.
>
> It may be pointed out that as a people we are good and dependable friends and fearlessly loyal allies. Our national character is reflected in the policies of our Government, sometimes as we have learnt, to our great disadvantage. It is only when our friendship is repeatedly depreciated or taken for granted that we make an effort to do what is distaseful to us, to act as if selfishly, with a singular devotion to our strict national interests."[58]

And Marcos continued to hint that as his government's old policy of a close alliance with a superpower, the United States, would gradually decrease, he would re-examine the role of the Philippines as an Asian country:

> "So historical experience and realism both bid us to be more objective and less emotional, or if we are to engage our emotions it should be based on our authentic identity as Asians. It is on this basis that we re-examine the world, our region and ourselves. The old modes of thought can no longer sustain us or any other nation in Asia. We must review our alliance, reappraise our destiny, and, in a word, go out into the world."[59]

Marcos further indicated that he would support China's "Third World" policy, praising China as its leader:

> "I believe that China, with the depth of the moral outrage she has shown for the inequities of the past and the present, is the natural leader of the third world."[60]

On June 9, 1975 a Joint Communique was published which, after restating the principles of peaceful co-existence, declared in Article 2 that both countries would not inter-

fere in each other's internal affairs:

> "The two Governments hold that the economic, political and social sustem of a country should be chosen ony by the people of that country, without outside interference...
>
> The two Governments agree that all foreign aggression and subversion and all attempts by any country to control any other country or to interfere in its internal affairs are to be condemned. They are opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world."[61]

On the issue of the overseas Chinese, the Communique said that:

> "The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines consider any citizen of either country as automatically forfeiting his original citizenship."[62]

The Philippine President's visit to Peking thus ended almost 25 years of confrontation between Peking and Manila. After Marcos' visit and through the entire year of 1975, China did not even utter one word about the insurgency in the Philippines. Instead, she was interested in promoting the prospering trade exchange between the two countries, and in reprinting in her own press the criticism appearing in the Philippine press of the Soviet Union's political, military and economic activities in Southeast Asia. It was obvious that the Philippines began to lean on China, once an "itchy pillow", but now a "soft and romantic" cushion.

(iii) THAILAND

China's attitude toward Thailand in early 1969 consisted

of an expectation from her not to intervene and involve herself in the Indochinese War, and a pressure to give up her ties with the United States. However, as soon as moderate policies were introduced in China after the downgrading of Lin Piao, Thailand responded with her traditional flexibility and gradually started to bend her posture to the east. Throughout 1970 and 1973, and until Thanom Kittikachorn was forced to leave his country in October 1973, there was an intensive debate within the Thai cabinet over the China question. One side, headed by Thanom himself, maintained that the alliance with the United States was necessary and that Thailand should not recognize China at the moment. Another side, headed by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, argued that sooner or later Thailand would have to accept the reality that China could not be ignored and that in view of this she should recognize Peking as soon as possible for the sake of the long term national interest. Thanat Khoman's enthusiasm for travelling abroad to propagate the necessity of recognizing China led to his ouster from the cabinet by Kittikachorn in 1973. The latter was to hand over his premiership to Sanya Dhammasakti after the student unrest in October 1973. However, Sanya also found himself unable to handle the internal and external situations and had to resign, and it was only in January 1975 that the China issue was assigned the highest priority after Kukrit Promoj became the new premier. Understanding well that Thailand's security in the future would be affected by the attitude of Cambodia and

Vietnam, the new premier persistently urged the Americans to leave his country immediately. He realized that it was necessary to seek accommodation with the Communist big-brother, China, in order to use her influence to restrain the Communist neighbours hoping that the diplomatic ties with her would oblige her not to encourage the Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists to support the revolutionary activities in Thailand.

Until the Communist takeovers in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos, China consistently held that the withdrawal of American troops from Thailand was the pre-condition for her denial, or elimination, of support to the insurgent movement in that country. Shortly after the Communist victories, however, China started to reconsider her position concerning the withdrawal of American troops, because by mid-1975 she faced the dilemma of either the American or the Soviet Union's presence in Southeast Asia.

The result of this new assessment was the conclusion not to regard the United States as China's "main enemy" and the limited presence of its forces in Southeast Asia as a threat to Peking's security, but rather to consider Moscow's influence in the area as the main danger for the future. This was the new perspective that Peking was anxious to impress upon the governments of Southeast Asia in the new situation.

In February 1969, the national election saw the governmental party, the United Thai People's Party, to win a ma-

jority of 75 seats in parliament. Shortly after the election Thanat Khoman indicated that Thailand was ready to sit down for discussion with China, and that a stable settlement in Southeast Asia would require her participation,[63] which was responded to by the demand of the Thai Chamber of Commerce that the government should ease restriction on trading with China. Peking, however, was not ready to change its policy toward Thailand at this juncture, partly due to the fact the Lin Piao was still dominating the foreign policy process, and partly due to the fact that the Thais still maintained their relationship with the United States and assisted them in the Indochinese War.

By 1970 the creative and forward looking Thai Foreign Minister called for another Bandung Conference, and although the idea was premature China responded by toning down her support to guerrilla war in that country. In return, the Thai Government decided to withdraw its troops from Vietnam as well as not to send troops to help Lon Nol against the Sihanoukists and the Khmer Rouge. Both Hanoi and Peking were quite impressed by the new Thai policy. Moreover, when the former Thai Premier Pridi Phanomyong, who had been living for some 20 years in Peking, decided to leave China for an exile in Paris, the Thai Government awarded him a passport and a pension as well, which obviously signified that Pridi had given up, with the consent of Peking, the armed struggle in his country. Further, he was permitted to leave Peking with a mission to act as a go-between the two governments.

When Nixon called for "Asianization" of regional security in 1971, the Thai Foreign Minister criticized the decline of American economic aid to his country and the intrusion of the United States into the world rice market. During the "ping-pong diplomacy" in May Thanat referred to Peking as the People's Republic of China, first time a Thai official used such a term, meaning that Bangkok's relations with Taiwan would undergo a drastic change.

However, the Thai generals were not very pleased with the announcement of the planned Nixon's trip to China. Thanat seemed to have been holding back his advocation of normalizing with China when he said that he hoped that the Southeast Asian countries would not "jump on the bandwagon", and he was obviously under pressure from Kittikachorn to express the government's view that Thailand could not follow Washington's new policy towards Peking because Thailand was a small country close to China, having a Peking supported insurgency and a large Chinese community in it.

By the end of 1971, following the failure of the American resolution in the United Nations, the Thai delegation abstained rather than voting agaisnt the Albanian resolution which supported the admission of the People's Republic of China into this world organisation. Personal contact began in the United Nations immediately after the arrival of the Chinese delegation in New York. Domestically, the Kittikachorn regime was under a continuous pressure from the press and opposition, urging it to soften its attitude toward China.

Pridi, then in Paris, urged too Thailand to recognize China immediately. As a result, Thanom Kittikachorn removed the ban on Chinese trade in November 1971, relaxed the anti-Communist laws and allowed the sport and cultural exchanges with China. But the Thai Government insisted that formal diplomatic relations with China were not yet desirable. Despite the indications from China that she was willing to tone down her support to the Thai Communist Party, Kittikachorn insisted that his country would continue close ties with Taiwan and opposed publicly Thanat Khoman's demand for an immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with China. To foster his tight rule, the Premier and his generals dissolved the cabinet on November 17, dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, and declared martial law. Most noteworthy, Khoman's responsibility for foreign affairs was handed over to Kittikachorn.

Unlike the coup d'etat of 1958, the coup of 1971 had no external support from the United States. While the United States had supported Sarit's coup in 1958 because she was interested in winning Thailand over to combat Communism, 14 years later Washington was courting China and cutting back its military presence everywhere in Asia.

Seeing that the change of attitude of Kittikachorn's government would be a slow process, Peking applied again a pressure upon it through supporting the Communist insurgency in the country by revolutionary rhetoric. Such a pressure however, was more a ploy for bargaining with the Thai Govern-

ment to make it disengage itself from the Indochina conflict.

In fact, Peking was very eager to see Thailand going its way, and many informal contacts between the two countries developed despite Thanom's involvement in Indochina. In September 1972 Thanom permitted the Thai ping-pong team to visit Peking and Prasit Kancharawit, powerful director of Finance, Economy and Industry of the National Executive Council, was attached to it as an "advisor". He was received by Chou En-lai who told him that China, while not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, nevertheless supported the struggle for freedom of various peoples against foreign imperialism. This was a clear hint that the Thai Government should force the United States to leave their country if they expect from Peking to tone down its support for the Communist insurgency in Thailand. Chou further said that the overseas Chinese in Thailand should be loyal to the country of their residence and obey its laws. Finally, China promised to buy 60,000 tons of maize from Bangkok.

By the end of 1973 Thanom accepted the inevitable fact and decided to accommodate Peking with full diplomatic relations. But it was too late now, because he fell after the October uprising of the students in Bangkok. Acting as a care-taker government, the new premier, Sanya Dhammasakti, former Chancellor of the Thamasat University, immediately repealed the 1959 "Revolutionary Party Decree No. 53," which had prohibited any contacts with Communist states and dispat-

ched his Deputy Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan to Peking in December 1973.[64]

China was unable to follow the confusing internal politics in Thailand in 1974, and had to wait until the political dust settled and a stable leader emerged.

In January 1975 the People's Daily spent much space reporting upon the domestic and international position of Thailand. In that month Thailand experienced unrest again, and China made use of the situation for continuously attacking the United States. On January 5, 1975 the People's Daily reported that the Thai student and worker's movement was in fact an "anti-American struggle," but there was no mention of the "armed struggle,"[65] and on the same day the Deputy-Foreign Minister was received by Chou En-lai.[66]

On January 14 and 16, 1975, when reporting upon the worker's and peasant's unrest in Thailand, Peking criticized the United States again, but denounced the Soviet Union more seriously in the same reports for her attempt to dominate the Thai economy.[67] there was no comment on the Thai Government. This possibly meant that by January 1975 China was eager for an accommodation with the Thais almost at any price, as was further evident from the fact that although the Indochinese War was at its highest tide, there was no attack upon the Thai Government in Chinese press. The only report was a message sent by the Thai Communist Party to Peking congratulating upon the success of the 4th National People's Congress,[68] a message which any "bourgeois" govern-

ment would not object to.

Following the publication of a report on the reception of the Chinese Medical Society by the Speaker of the new Thai National Congress during its visit to Bangkok on March 11, 1975,[69] the People's Daily commented upon the results of the Thai elections held in January 1975, after a delay of about two months.[70] The publication of the results of the elections with such a delay implied that the Peking leaders were confident by that time that the new cabinet headed by Krukit Promoj would show friendly attitude to China.[71] This delay in reporting was probably due to the fact that during the intervening two months, Peking was reviewing the possible course which the new government might take.

From April to July, until Kukrit Pramoj's visit to Peking in July, the People's Daily published almost 10 articles on Thailand, mostly emphasising the necessity for the United States to pull out, attacking the Soviet Union's Collective Security Proposal, and only one protested against the Thai Government's action on the "Mayagues" Incident in which the United States made use of Thailand's territory for a military operation against Cambodia.

On April 14, 1975 China published a letter of the Thai Communist Party on the occasion of death of an old member of the Chinese Communist Party, Tun Pi-wu. On May 9, after the fall of Cambodia, the People's Daily praised her concept of the People's War and its successful application in Cambodia. But there was no indication that this strategy would be

utilized to overthrow the Bangkok regime. It only stated that it was a "strongest weapon" for national liberation movement. Reporting on student protest in Bangkok against the continuous use of Thailand by the Americans against Cambodia, Peking was signalling to Kukrit that his regime should get rid of them as soon as possible. Moreover, because by this time Bangkok and Peking were ready to enter into diplomatic relations, it might have been a smokescreen and a mere lip service to please the Thai Communist Party. Bangkok, however, understood well that not the United States but the Russians were the main concern of the Chinese then. In view of this, the Thai Foreign Minister played up the Chinese by stating on May 15 that "Thailand refuses to participate in any Collective Security organisation in Southeast Asia sponsored by the Russians."[72]

Obviously expressing dissatisfaction over the delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations since Kukrit came to power, the People's Daily published a statement of the Thai People's Voice on May 21,[73] to the effect that the "People's War was a magic weapon to beat imperialists and reactionaries," of which the latter part clearly referred to the Thai Government. Understanding well this hint, Thailand moved a step forward by entering into diplomatic relations with North Korea, a close ally of China on May 25, 1975, while the Thai press supported the Philippines in entering into diplomatic relations with China in early June.

Finally, Bangkok announced on June 29, 1975 that the

Thai Prime Minister was to visit China,[74] and following Marcos' return to Manila Kukrit Pramoj stepped into his shoes and went to the Forbidden City on July 1. He was too eager to shake Chou En-lai's hand in order to promote his own prestige at home.

China was to profit from Kukrit's visit too, of course, because the former used the occasion to attack the Soviet Union as vehemently as during Marcos' appointment. At the state banquet Teng Hsiao-ping, substituting for Chou En-lai, emphasised the importance of anti-hegemonism. He told the Thai leader to be watchful of the Soviet Union after the withdrawal of the Americans from Vietnam:

> "Now, this superpower (the United States, Ed.) has finally suffered irrevocable defeat... It is, however, noteworthy that the other superpower (the Soviet Union, Ed.) with wild ambition has extended its tentacles far and wide. It insatiably seeks new military bases in Southeast Asia and sends its naval vessels to ply the Indian and West Pacific Oceans, posing a menacing threat to the peace and security of the Southeast Asian countries. The spectre of its expansionism now haunts Southeast Asia, as it hankers for converting this region into its sphere of influence some day."[75]

During the banquet both Teng Hsiao-ping and Kukrit reviewed, as Marcos did, the long historical relations which existed between the two countries, emphasizing that "our two countries are close neighbours, and that there existed a kinship-like traditional ties between our two peoples." While Teng said that the "friendly contacts between our peoples can be traced back to more than two thousand years,"[76] Kukrit emphasized that, "In actual fact mutual understanding and sympathy between China and the countries of Southeast

Asia have existed since ancient times; in the case of Thailand and China, contacts between the Thais and Chinese go back thousands of years."[77]

On July 2, 1975 a Joint Communique was signed. Like the Communique signed with the Philippines, besides mentioning the five principles of peaceful co-existence as a basis of diplomatic ties, Article 4 states that both parties would not interfere in each other's internal affairs:

> "The two governments agree that all foreign aggression and subversion and all attempts by any country to control any other country or to interfere in its internal affairs are impermissible and are to be condemned."[78]

On the issue of the overseas Chinese, which is so central to the Thais, Article 8 states:

> "The Government of the People's Republic of China take note of the fact that for centuries Chinese residents in Thailand have lived in harmony and amity with the Thai people in conformity with the laws of the land and with the customs and habits of the Thai people. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that it does not recognize dual nationality. Both Governments consider anyone of Chinese nationality or origin who acquires Thai nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality. As for those Chinese residents in Thailand who elect to retain Chinese nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, acting in according with its consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by the laws of the Kingdom of Thailand, respect the customs and habits of the Thai people and live in amity. Their proper rights and interests will be protected by the Government of China and respected by the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand."[79]

Peking got what it wanted by entering into diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Thailand because the following months saw vehement and emotional attacks on the Soviet

Union mounted by the Thai press. Like the Philippines, the Thais bent with the prevailing eastern wind.

(iv) SINGAPORE

Compared with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, Singapore is less enthusiastic about recognizing the People's Republic of China. Probably due to absence of a revolutionary "liberation movement," it has not to worry about the threat from China. Further, Singapore has no diplomatic ties with Taipei, which makes Peking less antagonistic toward the Lee Kuan-yew Government. By 1970, the idea of re-unification with Malaysia became a non-issue, forcing the Malayan Communist Party to put Singapore aside for the moment in its plans. But a more important reason responsible for the Lee Government's delaying the recognition of China is the problem of national identity of Singapore. Having some 75 per cent of ethnic Chinese in its population, Singapore in the past was called the "Third China" by its neighbours. Lee and his cabinet fear that premature diplomatic ties with Peking would possibly generate a wave of Chinese chauvinism and thus make the countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia uneasy because of their ethnic composition. It is true that Malaysia had her diplomatic relations with Peking in 1974; but it is also true that this did not mean that the Kuala Lumpur leaders wanted the Singapore Government to follow in their steps too early. It is therefore understan-

dable to hear from Lee, even after the end of the Indochinese War, that Singapore would be the last of the ASEAN countries to recognize China.

However, it appears that Singapore had a tacit consent from China to delay recognition and diplomatic ties in favour of trade and cultural exchanges at this stage. By 1971 Singapore's trade with China beat the record of US$160 million, and since 1971 Singapore has been continuously sending her trade missions and technical delegations to Peking. On the other hand, China stopped describing the Malaysian and Singapore Governments as the "Rahman-Lee Kuan-yew-Razak clique" since 1971.

In May 1971 China did not respond when Lee charged three Chinese newspapermen involved in the "Black Operation" which glamorized Communism and stirred up communal and chauvinistic sentiments over the status of the Chinese language and culture in Singapore. Even after closing down the Eastern Sun, an English newspaper, alleging that it was financed by Peking, China's leaders remained silent, which made the people of Singapore hard to believe that Peking was not pulling the strings.

To extend a friendly gesture to the People's Action Party government after the incident, Peking received in October 1971 the first Chinese Chamber of Commerce mission, the first mission sent by Singapore since 1956. In Peking the Chinese officials agreed to send 10 vessels to Singapore every month to pick up cargoes destined for European ports

in order to break the monopoly of cargo shipping by the Far Eastern Freight, a European shipping fleet which was charging too much for cargoes from Southeast Asia. In response to this help the Singapore Government voted for China's admission into the United Nations, sending in November a ping-pong team to Peking. Besides these trade and cultural activities, Singapore was not interested in diplomatic and political relations with China. The officials in the republic insisted that the Communist threat in Malaysia definitely had a direct bearing on Singapore. Lee was extremely careful in dealing with the China issue, fearing that any political move would harm his effort of building the Singaporean national identity and that it might stimulate the opposition to exploit it.

In July 1972, when the Chinese ping-pong team toured Singapore, China acknowledged the legitimacy of the island republic in her press by reporting that Lee Kuan-yew, "the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore" had received the team. When the People's Action Party won all 65 parliamentary seats in the elections of September 1972, the Peking leaders were ready to deal with the government in a more formal way. However, Singapore was not ready and preferred non-official ties. Lee's attitude toward China after his successful elections was clear: he neither wanted to make the Communist giant angry by criticizing its support of revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia, nor was he willing to get closer to it other than with trading.

> "I do not see a Chinese navy, a Chinese Seventh Fleet complete with missile cruiser in the South Pacific or the Indian Oceans in the 1970's. More trade, particularly in the simplier manufactures—cheap garments, footwears, processed food, lathes and simple machinery, yes."[80]

In 1973, Singapore's trade with China reached another new record of US$300 million, not including trade through the colony of Hong Kong. Singapore's official position maintained that the diplomatic ties with Peking were only a matter of time, but that Singapore would prefer her ASEAN partners to take the initiative and make the first move.[81]

By mid-1974, after Razak's return from the successful China trip, Lee expressed his view on the China issue to the effect that he did not share Malaysia's confidence that China would always respect the sovereignty and independence of the Southeast Asian countries:

> "Once the influence of the other great power in the region had been effectively checked, China would probably seek to expand its own pressure and activities."[82]

Relating this fear to Singapore herself, Lee was still concerned with two old problems:

> "(1) The need to assure her neighbours that diplomatic recognition will not make her an 'out-post of Chinese influence'; and (2) the danger of arrival of Chinese chauvinism accompanied by communal tensions."[83]

Thus the relations between the two were restricted to trade and cultural exchanges for the time being. On March 14, 1975 the People's Daily published an article saying that friendly relations between Singapore and China were developing in trade and cultural events,[84] and concluded that "the

recent contacts have been developing fast."[85] This article further summarized the attitude of China toward Singapore during Rajaratnam's visit to Peking. During the dinner to welcome the Singapore guest, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua said on March 13 that both parties should further develop their "deep traditional, economic and cultral relations," while Rajaratnam replied that "historical and cultural traditions brought by the overseas Chinese have been acting as a bridge for understanding between China and Singapore."[86] Both parties seemed to realize that the time was not yet ready to exchange ambassadors, and each side was contented with the existing relations. The Singapore visitors were later received by Chou En-lai.

Following this, Singapore continued sending cultural delegations, including soccer and swimming teams, to China.[87] When the swimming team celebrated Singapore's Independence Day on August 9 in Peking, the party was attended by Chinese officials, indicating that China completely recognized the republic as a sovereign state and that if the latter was ready for diplomatic ties these could be established.[88] Later in the same month China showed another sign of her eagerness toward Singapore. On August 27 Chiao Kuan-hua invited the Singapore Foreign Minister and Tommy Koh, Singapore's Ambassador to United Nations, for dinner at the United Nations.[89] However, the Singapore side showed no interest in exchanging ties in the diplomatic level during the dinner discussion.

Despite the continuous approaches of Peking, Singapore

maintains a standstill on the matter of recognition. Her immediate reason is simple: that until Indonesia—the last Malay neighbour decides to follow the example of Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—her relations with Peking would remain restricted.

(v) INDONESIA

Among the ASEAN members, Indonesia seems to be the most troublesome partner for China.

The involvement of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1965 coup d'etat is a painful reminder to Indonesian generals. Being the biggest country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has not been satisfied with the diplomatic moves of the other ASEAN members, who are not comparable to her size and population. By 1974, and especially 1975, the other ASEAN countries were no more willing to respect Indonesia's attitude toward China.

Actually, Indonesia was not unmoved by the changed international climate since 1969 when the Nixon Doctrine, the entrance of China into the United Nations and the fall of of Cambodia and Vietnam, changed the main aspects of security in Southeast Asia. However, the changes in the leadership in China in 1969, and then after the fall of Lin Piao, were not sufficient to move the Indonesian generals to seek a closer understanding with Peking.

The Indonesian attitude toward Peking in 1970's was most unstable, swinging between unnecessary hostility and

extraordinary friendly postures. This vacillation had its impact upon her small neighbour, Singapore, which believed that it was better not to get too close to Peking in order not to upset Djakarta. It would be safe to say, therefore, that unless Indonesia makes a faster move towards Peking, Singapore might possibly be the last country to send her ambassador to China. The difficulties of China to convince General Suharto to visit Peking are not only due to the interference of the Chinese Communist Party in the coup of 1965 attempted by the Indonesian Communist Party. It is in connection with the overseas Chinese that the Peking leaders are unable to give a satisfactory answer to Djakarta. Perhaps the Indonesian generals are asking too much, in view of the fact that since 1965 there have been no signs showing that the overseas Chinese are threatening Indonesia's sceurity. It appears that the military regime in Indonesia is exploiting the overseas Chinese as a scapegoat to justify the delay in recognition of China.

Since 1970 Peking has separated its national from its ideological goals in regard to Indonesia, being more interested in convincing the Djakarta regime that it should not align itself with the United States nor establish close ties with the Soviet Union. Peking is thus less concerned with the domestic and internal problems of Indonesia than with her foreign policy. This assumption seems to be confirmed by her message to the Indonesian Communist Party in May 1970, hinting that the party should turn underground

for a time being. In the message the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party described the military coup of 1965 as a temporary setback and encouraged the party to adhere to the principle of protracted armed struggle.[90] This alarmed Adam Malik very much.

In April 1971, following the first sign of the Sino-American rapproachement, Malik said that Indonesia was taking certain unspecified steps to normalize her relations with China. However, there was a complete absence of news on Indonesian affairs from the Chinese side until January 1971; and in May Peking for the first time failed to mention the Indonesian Communist Party Anniversary in its media. Even when the Indonesian elections led the Golkar to victory in July 1971, China did not attack this party although it was sponsored by the military. In return, when Adam Malik served as President of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1971, he ruled against an effort by the United States delegation to vote separately on the two sections of the Albanian Resolution to seat China. Indonesia's action in the United Nations had not been favourable to China in previous years. Although in 1967 she had favoured admission of China into the organisation, yet in 1968 and 1969 she suddenly absented herself from the crucial vote. Even in 1970, when most of the Southeast Asian countries started to smile at the Communist regime in China, Indonesia's delegation to the United Nations was "present but did not participate in vote." This action, however, impressed Peking

and when the Vice-Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua arrived at New York, he first called at the United Nations on Adam Malik. However, the Indonesian Foreign Minister could not do much regarding the recognition, for the decision on this matter rested in the hands of the generals in Djakarta.

The policy aiming at the isolation of Peking was once again seen in November 1971, when Djakarta refused to participate in the harmless Afro-Asian Table Tennis Tournament, indicating that Indonesia again became one of the conservative forces in Asia. Moreover, until 1973, when the other members of the ASEAN were trading happily with China, Djakarta refused to join.

The reluctance of Djakarta to deal with Peking was expressed by Adam Malik at the Paris Conference on Vietnam in April 1973, who told the Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei that:

> "Indonesia would need time to educate its Chinese population to be loyal to Indonesia and not to have their orientation toward Peking."[91]

Such an openly antagonistic attitude toward the overseas Chinese in Indonesia put China in a difficult position despite the fact that the latter was willing to guarantee to Indonesia that she would not interfere in this issue. The way in which Malik expressed his concern suggests that Djakarta has its own difficulties with the overseas Chinese, and that this has nothing to do with the question of China's support to them.

The essence of the story is not the question of loyalty

of the overseas Chinese to Indonesia. It is true that the majority of the overseas Chinese have not clarified their own citizenship status; yet it is equally true that the government's policy in this matter has been marked by procrastination, indecision and a tendency to reinforce a popular suspicion of Chinese loyalties and of their life style. There is, moreover, little evidence that the Suharto regime has fashioned, or would fashion in the near future, a coherent programme for the political and economic integration of the Chinese community. On the contrary, the separate existence of this ethnic community is likely to be maintained as long as it provides a convenient scapegoat for local discontent. The January 1974 riots in Surabaya provided a typical example of this. While originally the student protest aimed at the Japanese domination of Indonesian economy, ultimately it was transformed into an anti-Chinese rally, allegedly manipulated by some anti-Chinese generals. Following several other similar incidents, Suharto even announced that the rioters would be treated as if they were "Communist terrorists." It is thus clear that "it is this kind of contrived ideological response, rather than the machination of the Chinese government, which is likely to retard the movements toward closer diplomatic relations (with Peking, Ed.), for it makes it exceedingly difficult for Peking not come to the defense, at least in verbal terms, of the beleaguered Chinese minority."[92]

To justify its policy of bucking the contemporary

international trends and to isolate China, Djakarta should produce better explanations than blaming the Chinese community. Suharto maintains that it is not necessary even to develop trade with China "since Indonesian and Chinese economies are essentially comparative, both of them relying on the sale of raw materials and the import of machinery and the technological know-how."[93] However, this is inconsistent with the decision of the Indonesian Government of November 1971 to lift the ban restricting private merchants from trading with the People's Republic, obviously designed to redress Indonesia's unfavourable balance with China through private trade.[94]

The possibility is slim that the Indonesian generals would change their policies towards China, even though they had supported her claim on the Paracel Islands where her navy clashed with the South Vietnamese in 1974.

Assessing the slow progress between Djakarta and Peking it appears that the vested interests of the generals are the main hinderance in the process:

> "There are reasons to believe, however, that this reluctance stems largely from the policies of the ruling generals rather than the orientation of career diplomats in the foreign ministry. Since the demise of the Sukarno government, the military elite has tended to rely for the success of its domestic politics on the good-will of Western powers principally Japan and United States, who have ensured the regular flow of foreign investment and foreign aid."95

As Justus M. Van der Kroef concluded in the Asian Quarterly, the American assistance or aid to Indonesia is more

than US$300 million annually;[96] the military assistance amounts to additional US$18 million;[97] and then there is the 60-men American Defense Liasion Group stationed to advice on counter-insurgency planning in Indonesia. In view of these benefits it is understandable that it would be difficult for Djakarta to give them up and to turn to China.

Seeing no signs of change in Indonesia's attitude, China maintains active ties with the Indonesian Communist Party. However, unlike during the years of 1967 and 1968, Peking treats these ties gingerly in order not to aggravate its already uneasy relations with Djakarta. Although many communications between the Indonesian Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party have been exchanged, these were merely congratulatory messages of small significance. Moreover, not a single reference to revolution in Indonesia appeared in the Chinese media in 1975. The three articles published in the People's Daily mentioned only the formal greetings sent by the Indonesian Communist Party to China's 4th National People's Congress, and a message congratulating on the victory of the Vietnamese Communists.[98] There was, however, a greeting from the Chinese Communist Party sent to the Indonesian Communist Party on the occasion of the latter's 55th Anniversary in 1975. The message stressed the importance of co-operation between the two parties in the future, which might possibly be interpreted as a hint that Peking would not tone down its support for the Indonesian Communists if Djakarta continues its present trend.

In early December of 1975, when Indonesia invaded Timor, the New China News Agency "advised" Indonesia to withdraw her army, claiming that both Indonesia and Timor are the "Third World" countries and should seek to solve their dispute peacefully.[99] This showed that the Chinese willingness to restore the Sino-Indonesian relations is still existing, despite the negative posture of Djakarta.

CHAPTER IV

BIG POWERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1969-1975

While it has been stated in the main hypothesis of this study that the international behaviour of the People's Republic of China is basically determined by her assessment of the intentions and capabilities of the other big powers as well as by domestic contingencies, this is especially true when dealing with the ASEAN countries, particularly in the 1970's. This Chapter intends to bring forth the discussion of some issues that involve this assessment of the external factors by Peking.

(1) BREAKING DOWN THE BI-POLAR STRUCTURE:

We have seen that one of the main goals of Peking's strategy in Southeast Asia from 1949 up to 1965 had been the elimination of American power and influence from the region.

The next stage in the development of Peking's policies towards this region was initiated in 1965 as a result of the unfolding and deepening conflict between the Soviet Union and China. As an upshot of this schism and antagonism between these two Communist giants Peking started to see Moscow as a dangerous rival, particularly in Southeast Asia, and responded to this new thread by Lin Piao's strategy of the

"People's War," based upon the concept of "double adversary," which placed the United States and the Soviet Union on the same footing as far as China's security was concerned.

By 1972 the evolution of Peking's policies towards Southeast Asia entered into its third stage, its policies being based upon the "Third World Concept." While this concept implied some kind of "multiple balance" to provide the security of Southeast Asia, there are clear indications that Peking did not wish to create in the area any new system of balance of power. This ambiguity in Peking's posture leads us to the question of what type of security system, a balance, or a situation, did the Peking leaders then have in mind during this period?

The term balance of power has been abused and misunderstood to the extent that "we cannot assume that all those who talk about a new power balance in Asia are referring to or anticipating the same thing."[1] The meaning of the term is vague in its multiplicity of usages. Regardless of its different usages of descriptive, conceptual and normative meanings,[2] the weakness of the concept as applied to Southeast Asia rests on China's perception of such a system as a "situation." Corall Bell argued as early as 1968 that the difficulty with such a system was its incompatibility with the presently dominant Chinese concepts of international politics.[3]

The type of balance that the present Chinese leaders hope to benefit from is therefore neither a system, nor a

situation, but an active policy which would balance one or more big powers through the application of the checks and balances derived from its own concept of the Third World. The belief that the People's Republic of China is not in favour of balance of power is therefore not at all true, because her leaders are seeking out a pragmatic meeting point between her Third World strategy and the balance of power concept. In other words, China is favouring such a meeting point in the sense and to the extent that as long as this is not contradictory to her own grand strategy of the united-front-from-above policy, she would not hesitate to combine with one or more big powers and adversaries, to achieve her anti-Soviet aims in Southeast Asia.

Adding China to the group of big powers, the future Southeast Asia would be under the influence of what Corall Bell calls "double balance,"[4] i.e., the balance among the regional states on the one hand, and the balance among the interested external powers, on the other.

It is easy to explain the reasons which led to the normalization between Peking and Washington, yet this rapport has old historical roots, because it is basically founded upon the revival of China's traditional behaviour under the maxim "to use the barbarians to check barbarians," a prime strategic guideline of the Imperial China. In this sense, it is not dissimilar in essence to the balance of power concept.

Because China is profiting from American presence as

a counter-weight against the gradual intensification of Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia, there is no reason to believe that Peking would insist upon the complete withdrawal of the entire American military forces from the area.

This explains the reason why the Chinese leaders are really interested in the continued American presence in Southeast Asia even though Peking had an uneasy relationship with them since 1940's, when the latter combated Communism through Chiang Kai-shek. By the end of this decade we shall either see a gradual return to the promotion of the national interest theme in China's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, or there might be a return to the ideological emphasis, the promotion of revolutionary upheavals, should the internal environment of China change. However, two points are clear: (a) there is a very slight possibility for Chinese leaders to return and embrace the Kremlin leaders as during the early 1950's, though on a new basis; (b) the Sino-American relations shall continue developing as long as the basic contradictions in their ideology and social systems would not reach the "antagonistic" proportions and as long as the "Chou En-lai Spirit" continues.

With respect to the ASEAN countries, Peking is now interested in seeking co-operation even with the United States, assuming that the United States would continue a strong and viable presence in the Pacific area. In fact, as Robert A. Scalapino states,

> "Peking would have found little benefit in dealing with a weak, isolationist America. In its essence, the new Chinese policy relies upon a balance of power in which American strength is a central assumption."[5]

Although the examination of the Chinese media as recently as 1975 shows that Peking continues to attack the rivalry of both superpowers in Southeast Asia, the real meaning of such attacks should not be misread:

> "... the attack... is good politics, and will always have a considerable appeal to the small and weak states, especially when it is couched in stridently nationalist tones. Moreover, within the Communist world, a strong attack is the best defense against charges that Peking itself is 'selling out to American imperialism'—as of course the Soviets delight in claiming."[6]

(2) ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FOR BIG POWERS IN ASEAN:

The most immediate factor that attracts the rivalry in Southeast Asia is basically economic.

According to Arthur D. Little's Survey of the Potentials of the Southeast Asian Region, the area will be producing between 765 million to 1,305 million barrels of crude oil by 1980, and between 1,020 to 1,835 million by 1990.[7] Such an opportunity will undoubtedly inspire the United States' future investment. At an Asian Financial Forum held under the auspicies of the American Chase Manhattan Bank, its Chairman David Rockerfeller, who is also one of the biggest oil tycoons, predicted an investment of 35 billion dollars by the oil companies in Asia and Western Pacific in the seventies, most of it in Southeast Asia.[8]

Besides this estimate of increasing petroleum production, Southeast Asia and especially the ASEAN countries, are highly productive in metallic minerals which they export. In 1970 the region produced $578 million worth of such products, including 60 per cent of world tin output. It is estimated that the production of metallic minerals shall reach more than $3,000 in 1990.[9] There is also the rubber production from this region that accounts for almost 80 per cent of world market. One of the reasons that fostered the Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations in 1974 was Malaysia's intention to make China into an important buyer, in order to shatter the Anglo-American control of the market price.

Southeast Asia meanwhile is becoming the world's fastest growing developing region. The United States, Japan, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are pouring more funds into the area than anywhere else in the world. Foreign aid from these countries and financial organisations reached $25,000 million in 1970, and by 1980 the figure will reach $50,000 million.[10]

By the end of this decade it would not be surprising to see the four major powers to continue seeking opportunities from the Southeast Asian economic boom. Both the United States and Japan would try to absorb the region's oil, while China to corner the Malaysian rubber market. Only one power, the Soviet Union, would regard the importance of Southeast Asia mostly in military terms, because in economic sense she is a late comer into the region. Although recent

evidence shows that the Soviet Union is trying to compensate for this by extending her shipping trade with the ASEAN countries since the early 1970's, she has not decreased her military activities since the end of the Indo-Pakistan War, when a twenty-year Soviet-Indian Treaty of "Friendship" was signed in 1971 to allow the Russian navies to enter the Indian Ocean, an area right next to the ASEAN's Malacca Straits, One of the Indonesian experienced diplomats who served as ambassador to many countries, including Washington and London, confirmed in 1973 that there will be no decrease in Soviet military activities in Southeast Asia, because the Soviet intentions there are a part of her global design:

> "... the USSR will continue to strengthen her naval pressure in the Indian Ocean. This is being done for many reasons: to serve as a link-up between her western (Black Sea and Middle East) fleet and her eastern (Pacific) fleet; to counter the United States submarine-based polaris units in the area; to encircle and keep an eye on China's ally in the area (Pakistan); to control oil routes from the Middle East to Japan, Australia, Europe, and America; to control the trade routes from Asia to Europe."[11]

By expanding her naval forces in Asia, the Soviet Union believed that she would bring its major waters under control in the late seventies. In actual fact, Russian naval presence in Southeast Asia has escalated to the leading position recently, her warships, submarines, aircraft carriers, crusiers and destroyers which passed these waters came almost to 400 in 1974.[12]

All this existing and future competition of the big powers leads us to the conclusion that China's future policy

toward the ASEAN countries would depend to a large degree upon the attitudes of the big powers, as well as of the ASEAN countries themselves, but comparatively more upon the attitudes, intentions, and capabilities of the big powers, to the main regional issues: (1) Russian Proposal on Collective Security in Asia; (2) Russian Proposal on the internationalization of the Malacca Straits; (3) Malaysian Proposal on the Neutralization of Southeast Asia.

(3) THE RUSSIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY PROPOSAL AND THE MALACCA STRAITS:

From 1969 to 1975 China was persistently criticizing the Asian Collective Security Proposal made by the Soviet Union, aiming at replacing the American influence in Southeast Asia after its withdrawal from Vietnam. Such a proposal is important because of its potential as a new imlitary design to replace the American military presence in Asia and to encircle China on her southern and eastern borders. Although the Soviet proposal is not receiving much response from the ASEAN leaders, China definitely expects the ASEAN countries to reject it in exchange for further friendly relations with the governments in the area, especially of Singapore and Indonesia.

The proposal was originally initiated by V.V. Matveyev in an article in Izvestia in May 1969, and then elaborated upon the following month by Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow.[13] During the meeting the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union referred to the Warsaw Pact and said that:

> "Despite the pressing problems of the present international situation we do not push a system of collective security in those parts of the world where the threat of the unleashing of armed conflicts is concerned. Such a system is the best substitute for the existing military-political groupings.
>
> The Communist and the Workers' Parties of Europe, both the parties in power and those in

> the continent's capitalist countries, at their Karlovy Vary conference drew up a joint program of struggle for ensuring security in Europe. The Warsaw Pact member states have come out with a concrete security system for the peoples of Europe, the stability of border and peaceful co-operation among the European states. The CPSU and the Soviet Union will do everything they can to implement that program.
>
> We think that the course of events also places on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."[14]

The proposal was widely interpreted at that time as primarily aiming at China,[15] attempting to "deny the People's Republic of China's diplomatic influence in her natural periphery,"[16] although the Russians denied this and pointed out that China had been invited to participate."[17] It might be useful to trace the background of the proposal.

First, the proposal came into the being after the Sino-Soviet conflict on the Ussuri River in March 1969. At that time the Chinese moderate leaders decided to change the foreign policy of their country by cultivating friends in Asia. The Soviet proposal can thus possibly be regarded as a response to counter this new challenge of Chinese policy.

Secondly, the Russians have their economic interests in Southeast Asia and these interests can only be safeguraded when there is political stability. When the Americans completely remove their troops, a new security arrangement to maintain political stability would be required in the region, and the Russians see themselves as a replacement for the Americans.

A third reason for the proposal is due to the wish of

the Soviet leaders to expand their control and influence in Southeast Asia. Since the decline of Sukarno in Indonesia in 1965, the Russians lost one of the most important bases of the International Communist Movement. In spite of the dominant influence of China over the domestic and foregn politics of Indonesia immediately after the Bandung Conference, the Russian influence in Indonesia in the late 1950's and early 1960's was considerable. However, after the coup d'etat, both the Chinese and Soviet reputation drastically declined. In order to regain her influence, Moscow has been eager to cultivate relations with the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia through military assistance.

The fourth reason, and observed from a longer perspective, the Soviet proposal of Asian Collective Security arrangement was intended to promote the concept of non-alignment. The notion of non-alignment was defined by the Russians in terms of "possitive neutrality," which implies that the Third World countries in Asia should keep away from the Western-backed alliances, and instead display an inclination towards the Socialist Community. When positive neutrality is attained, it would facilitate absorption of its Asian friends into the Socialist Community as a sub-system.

Ever since the project was proclaimed in 1969 the Soviet Union avoided giving any concrete elaboration of its real meaning, leaving the Asian leaders to guess what kind of "collective security" it was talking about; in view of this, it could be considered merely as a weather ballon to test

the "atmosphere" prevailing in Asia.

It was not until 1972 that Moscow started to articulate more substantially its intention. In the spring of that year the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand, A.A. Rozanov, urged this "system of collective security" on the Asian nations assembled for the annual meeting of the ECAFE, giving the proposal an economic and commercial dimension as well as a political one.[18] During the ECAFE meeting in Toyko in 1973 the Russian delegates intended to undo some of the damage caused by the vagueness of the proposal, when A.E. Nesterento announced that it was not a project aiming at China:

> "In our view, the People's Republic of China would be a full fledged member of such a system of collective security."[19]

But this statement was not repeated sufficiently, frequently or strongly enough by Soviet leaders to erase the impression that their real intention was to isolate China from her Asian neighbours.[20] However, the transparent anti-Chinese aim of the Soviet proposal was explicitly underlined when Brezhnev accused the Chinese in Alma-Ata in August 1973 of "hegemonistic aspirations... evidenced above all by their activities in Southeast and South Asia, including the old idea to create, under Peking's patronage, a kind of military and political group of states in Southeast Asia."[21]

(i) <u>THE ASEAN VIEW ON THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL:</u>

Generally speaking, any regional arrangement must meet the pre-requisite of a "collective consensus," or of a "collective will," of the countries in the region themselves.

That is to say, the perception of security by the countries themselves will determine the workability of such a proposal. Limiting ourselves first to the region of Southeast Asia, we find that the Russian proposal has not, as yet, received favourable responses from the leaders of its countries.

Shortly after the Asian Collective Security proposal was made by Brezhnev, Tun Razak of Malaysia expressed his neutral position by rejecting the speculation that Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean would pose a threat to the countries in the region. This calculated attitude was mainly aimed at Peking to test its response, to warn Peking not to support the Malayan Communist Party, as well as to indicate that should China continue supporting the Communists in Malaysia, the Kuala Lumpur government would turn for assistance to the Russians. Yet, when Razak's effort to win Moscow leaders for his neutralization project failed[22] after a discussion in the Kremlin in 1972, he shifted his position and indicated that Malaysia would not welcome the Russian presence in Southeast Asia. "To bring the big countries in Asia into such a scheme," said Razak to Malaysian correspondents after discussing the matter in the Kremlin, "will be to bring in problems which we small nations may find difficult to solve."[23]

The next year, when the Soviet Union proposed that the Malacca Straits should be internationalized, Razak further refused to promote the Russian project, saying that "Malaysia has its own neutralization proposal for peace and secu-

rity in the region, which we regard as more practicable and feasible and which we think the Soviet Union should have no difficulty in accepting."[24] In addition to the above reason given by the Prime Minister, the Malaysians do not wish to involve themselves in a project which is a function of the Sino-Russian dispute. Ghazali bin Shafin, another high Malaysian official, said in Singapore in October 1973 that:

> "The Soviet Union... appears to be moving in the Pacific region with a design and a purpose. This may be because she has never really played a role in the Pacific or because there is a clear and undivided focus of attention and interest brought about by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, Soviet interest and activities are invariably analyzed within that perspective. It would seem that any Soviet initiative that is designed or even only as to appear to further the Soviet cause in the dispute is not likely to gain the support of countries in the region. This factor is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has much to contribute to the development of the region."[25]

As for Indonesia, the Malacca Straits are as vitally important to her as for Malaysia, and therefore the proposal on internationalization was not favourably received by Djakarta. The armed forces' daily published in Djakarta, Angkatan Bersendjata, summed up the perception of security in the region on October 14, 1969 in these terms:

> "We in Indonesia believe that no Southeast Asian is eager to join the Soviet defense system. The initiation is unwelcome."

Two years later, when President Suharto was interviewed by C.L. Sulzburger of the New York Times in March 1973, the President expressed himself critically by calling the propo-

sal a part of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a term which the Soviet leaders do not like to hear:

> "We want ASEAN to strengthen regional independence and avoid having this area become a regional cockpit. Therefore we automatically reject the Brezhnev Doctrine."[27]

This arguement was further evolved by Adam Malik in September 1973:

> "The Soviet Collective Security was 'biased to one side,' and any genuine collective scheme should include China, United States and the Western European powers, not merely the Asian states and the USSR."[28]

When Soviet Deputy Minister Firyubin paid a visit to Indonesia early 1974 President Suharto refused to support the idea which the Kremlin had been pressing upon him as a solution to the region's defense problem.[29] The Straits Times in Singapore reported the attitude of the Indonesian Foreign Minister on March 8 and 11, 1974 to the effect that "we do not want to reject the idea, but it is still not clear to us."[30]

Singapore's attitude to the big powers in the area has been flexible because it is dictated by her determination to survive.[31] Her foreign policy has been described as the most pragmatic among all the Southeast Asian countries. In response to the Russian proposal Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew said in 1973 that Singapore would make use of the other big powers to check Moscow's future movements in Southeast Asia. He once suggested in Tokyo that joint naval forces comprising the American, Japanese, Australian and Western European fleets be formed to counter the growing Soviet

naval presence in the area.[32] Although Lee's proposal of joint naval forces of different powers sounded too ambitious, it nevertheless clearly indicated that he would not appreciate the Russian to play a dominating role in Southeast Asia through their Collective Security system. When the Foreign Minister of Singapore was visiting Australia in 1974, he made a comment upon the vagueness of the Soviet scheme:

> "We say in principle, like all these things, like the Ten Commandments, that the Collective Security Proposal is a good idea."33

Thailand has been described as the slowest of all the regional countries to adjust to the changing power configuration in the area. Yet, when the Russian Collective Security proposal was broached, the former Foreign Minister of Thailand was quick to respond to expose the intention of the Soviets. Thanat Khoman stated in 1969 that despite the changes in the American, Soviet and Chinese foreign policies, Thailand does not want to "live with a crocodile," meaning the Soviet Union, just to "avoid a tiger," meaning China.[34] And during a trip to the United States early in 1970 he said that Brezhnev's proposal for Asian Collective Security advanced in June 1969 "seems to envisage the eventual occurance of a power vaccum which would be filled by a large nation presently inimical to Russian interest, clearly implying China."[35]

Being a member of the ASEAN the Philippines also see local co-operation more important than any endorsement of

Soviet Union's proposal on Collective Security.[36] In conclusion, there is a great deal of negative consensus towards the proposal of the Kremlin on the new security arrangement in Southeast Asia.

(ii) CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET PROPOSAL:

Since the Russian Collective Security proposal is aimed at China, and since the United States would be less active than in the previous decades in Southeast Asia, China naturally is the only country who is most concerned about the proposal. The Peking leaders are extremely antagonistic towards the Soviet proposal not only because the Russians failed to invite China to join their scheme in 1969, but also because Peking views the proposal as a new kind of containment, far more dangerous than that of the Americans during the 1950's, when the SEATO was formed to limit the Chinese influence in the Pacific area.

Peking denounced the proposal in 1969, immediately after its appearance, as an "anti-China military alliance... picked up from the garbage heap of the warmonger Dulles."[37] The Chinese view on the subject was never better expressed than during Sir Alec Douglas-Home's visit to Peking in November 1972. During the meeting the Chinese leaders said that China was eminently interested in the improvement of the relations with India through the help of the British Government. They further said that Peking was attempting to convince the Indian Government not to allow a Russian naval presence in

the Indian Ocean, but that these attempts to cultivate India failed. Instead, the Soviet-Indian relations became ever closer.

From 1972 to 1975 Peking changed its tactics and would not attack the Soviet Collective Security proposal directly. Realizing that the Russian proposal concerned all Asian countries, China decided not to oppose it unilaterally, because such an opposition would be less effective than letting the other Asian countries denounce it in their media.[38] Hence, since 1972, "Peking has skillfully reproduced statements published in the media in other Asian countries and used private contacts with foreign dignitaries and journalists in an effort to counter the Russians."[39] She has been most successful in employing the smaller Asian countries, particularly the ASEAN members, to criticize the Russians between 1973 and 1975.

(iii) THE MALACCA STRAITS:

Strategically, China does not treat the Soviet proposal on Collective Security as an isolated issue. Although the People's Republic of China has been criticizing the proposal indirectly, she is treating another issue, the problem of internationalization of the Malacca Straits, in a different way. She is attacking openly and directly the internationalization as a "plot." To understand the connection between the Soviet proposal on Collective Security and Moscow's position

on the Straits, we must explore the central point of the debate over internationalization and de-internationalization of this waterway, which is raging among the countries of ASEAN, Soviet Union and Japan.

Beside the fact that the Malacca Straits are important for the west-east shipping fleets that prompted the Japanese once to called them "the life-line of Japan,"[40] the Straits are also important as a military strategic as well as natural resource:

> "... if we bear in mind that the naval rivalry of the two superpowers, America and Russia, America has the advantage of two Alantic coastal frontages, the Atlantic and the Pacific, and thus need not go through the Malacca Straits to get to the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the shortest route between the Indian Ocean and Russian naval elements based in Vladivostok on the Western Pacific is the Malacca.
> ... There is currently underway an active search for offshore oil throughout the entire Malaysian coastline. This is also true of the Indonesian coastal area."[41]

Realizing the importance of the Malacca Straits to their own national interests, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed an Accord, claiming that the Straits are not an international waterway in November 1971:

> "(1) The three Governments agreed that the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal states concerned;
>
> (2) The three Governments agreed on the need that a body for co-operation to co-ordinate efforts for the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore be established as soon as possible and that such a body should be composed of only the three states concerned;
>
> (3) The Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that the Straits of Malacca

> and Singapore are not international straits, while recognizing their use for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. The Government of Singapore takes note of the position of Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia on the point."[42]

Citing the principle of internationa law and the case of the Corfu Channel, the Accord states that international shipping through the Straits should be subjected to the principle of innocent passage, which implies the right of the adjacent states to stop vessels which they consider might pose a threat to their own security or vital interest. This principle was later rebuffed by the Soviet Union who maintained that the Straits of Malacca should be subjected to the principle of free passage, implying that all ships, whether armed or not, are entitled to pass unmolested. Singapore's position on the Accord was different from Malaysia's and Indonesia's because Singapore just "took note" of its provisions, due to its location as an international port, i.e., were the Straits to lose their international character Singapore's economy would be badly harmed because of its dependence on international trade. As L.C. Green states:

> "Since shipping coming from the north to Singapore by the shortest route must pass through the Straits of Malacca, the assertion that it is no longer international opens the door to the possibility of the two coastal states issuing stringent restrictive regulations, the effect of which might well be to cripple Singapore completely as an international port of any significance. While not suggesting that this is in fact the intention of either Indonesia and Malaysia, it is possible to see that this might well be to the advantage of such a port as Penang—and with the development of oil exploitation at Dumai and Sungaipakning, especially if refineries are developed there too, this may constitute a further

threat to Singapore economy."[43]

Despite the fact that it did not completely agree with the positions of Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore shares a strong "community of interests" with both concerning navigational safety and control of oil pollution caused by the tankers that pass through the Straits.

The joint statement of the three states predictably ran into opposition from the Soviet Union and Japan a few months after. Oleg Troyanovsky, Russian Ambassador to Japan, met the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister in March 1972 and was quoted as stating that the Malacca Straits were "an international waterway which must be kept open for free passage by foreign ships."[44] Subsequently, a Soviet diplomat visited Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur early in 1973 and repeated the Soviet position that Moscow could not accept the "de-internationalization" of the Straits.[45]

Alongside with her proposal of Collective Security, the Soviet Union was eager to claim the Malacca Straits as an international waterway because "these Straits represent the only maritime link in winter between its European and Siberian ports, since passage through the Arctic Ocean is blocked by ice."[46] Her claim that the Straits are an international waterway is based upon the fact that she recognizes only a 3-mile territorial limit for both Malaysia and Indonesia, and that she disregards their claim to the territorial sea of a 12-mile limit. However,

> "The Russian position seems odd,... in view of the fact that the USSR has officially declared

> for itself a 12-mile territorial limit in 1921 and this claim has also not been ratified by a recognized international authority. The Soviet view seems rather belated considering the fact that Indonesia extended its territorial sea limit to 12-miles in 1957 and Malaysia did likewise in 1968."47

The Russian view on the matter is closely co-related to Kremlin's conflict with China since 1969. The support which Moscow had extended to the Japanese to claim the Straits as international waters in 1972 also coincided with Nixon's visit to Peking in the spring of that year. It is clear that the Russians were worried over the Sino-American détente and impatient to extend their naval presence in the east through the Malacca Straits and under the cover of their Proposal on Asian Collective Security.

Of course, Peking would not delay its criticism of the Russians for claiming the Straits as an international waterway. Shortly after Nixon's visit the New China News Agency critically pointed out that it was "absurd" that the Straits should be internationalized. It said:

> "This attempt aimed at interfering in the affairs of the Straits is encroaching upon the sovereignty of the states on both sides of the Straits and the Governments of Malaysia and Indonesia... It is by no means accidental that Soviet revisionist social-imperialism cherishes ambitions for the Straits of Malacca—the main passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. In recent years, the Soviets carried out frantic expansionist activities on the sea trying its utmost to build up naval hegemony in the vast area from the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the West Pacific to the Sea of Japan; of late quite a number of Soviet warships entered into the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca and carried out furtive activities there, thus severely threatening the security of various countries in the area."48

The Agency continued:

> "At present, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism is colluding with the Japanese reactionaries who claims that 'the Straits of Malacca is the life-line of Japan' to peddle the 'internationalization' of the Straits. This has further laid bare its ambitions for expansion and aggression."[49]

(iv) PEKING IS USING THE ASEAN COUNTRIES:

Putting the Soviet Collective Security proposal and the issue of Malacca Straits together and viewing them from the perspectives of the big powers— America, Soviet Union, China, and Japan—it seems that the Soviet Union placed itself into an untenable and embarrasing position. Among the four major powers only the United States failed to express its position on the Malacca Straits.

The accommodation achieved by President Nixon with China released the United States from the troublesome turmoils in Asia and guaranteed to the Chinese that the Americans are no longer interested in rivaling Peking in Southeast Asia.[50] It is for this reason that the United States has not said much about the Soviet proposal on Collective Security since its birth in 1969. Nor would she join the Soviet Union and Japan in insisting that the Malacca Straits must be internationalized. Although Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, did say that the "United States feels we should have and must have freedom to go through, under and over the Malacca Straits,"[51] yet he did not, like the Soviet Union and Japan, rebuff the

Malaysian-Indonesian claim to a 12-mile territorial sea.

It could be further inferred that this official statement made by the Admiral took into consideration the remaining naval forces of the United States in the Pacific Ocean. The suggestion of the 12-mile claim of the coastal states, therefore, would be acceptable to the United States on the condition that her naval and air fleets would not be blocked or stopped by either Malaysia or Indonesia. It is important to note that the American position on the Straits of Malacca, though understandably based on the "view of its worldwide interests,"[52] has not been attacked by Peking, in a sharp contrast to Peking's castigation of Moscow.

Following Nixon's visit to Peking Japanese Premier Tanaka said to Chou En-lai during his visit that Japan was not regarding the Malacca Straits as her "lifeline" in a military sense. Ever since Tanaka's visit to Peking the Chinese press stopped accusing Japan of "militarism," and the denouncement of Japan's "ambitions" in the Malacca Straits was dropped. China by this time entered into diplomatic relations with Japan and normalized her relations with the United States, winning thus two potential allies to lessen the threat from the Soviet Union.

The establishment of ties with both the United States and Japan enabled Peking to accentuate its attack upon the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, on the question of the Soviet proposal on Collective Security China thinks unwise to attack the Soviet Union unilaterally, preferring to re-

print from the media of other Asian countries' criticism of the proposal, while on the other hand she supports openly the Indonesian, Malaysian and the Singaporean positions on the issue of Malacca through critical denouncements of Moscow. The latter behaviour of China is possibly due to the fact that she wanted to show a friendly attitude and thus to make sure that no ASEAN member would lean to the Soviet side after the Vietnamese War. China, therefore, plays her cards well in the diplomatic game. She understands well that when their interests are concerned none of them would permit any one big power to dominate the regional affairs. Moreover, these countries have also realized that for stability's sake they must oppose the entry of the Soviet Union into the area; China is simply much nearer. This then provides the common denominator for the de-internationalization of the Malacca Straits between Peking and its neighbours in Southeast Asia. In this regard Peking has been very successful, which in turn strengthens its image that it would support the smaller nations in resisting the bullying by the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union.

Some months before Malaysia, as the first country in the ASEAN organisation, entered into relations with Peking in 1974, the Chinese media began to woo all ASEAN members by attacking the Soviet Union's "furtive" activities in their countries. An article written by Hsiang Tung in the People's Daily under the title "The Soviet Revisionist Social Imperialists' Expansion in Southeast Asia," presented a long

list of grievances on this score. The writer cited a dozen or so ports in the Indian Ocean in which the Soviets had acquired facilities, and criticized the recent upsurge in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the countries of Southeast Asia:

> "In the name of 'trade' they dispatched 'merchant ships,' 'trawlers,' and warships to show their flag in various Southeast Asian ports. Under the pretext of 'overhauls,' and 'replenishment' of fuel and provisions, they tried to grab the right to use various Southeast Asian ports and turn them later into military bases as a foothold for further expansion in Southeast Asia. To acquire the right to use the port of Singapore, the Soviet revisionists have sent a 'shipping experts delegation' and a 'shipping delegation' to conduct subversion and disruption there. All this had aroused the vigilance of the Singapore authorities. In Malaysia, the Soviet revisionist ambassador took advantage of his diplomatic privileges to make frequent tours of Malaysia's remote area in his scheme to acquire the rights to use Malaysian ports. In Thailand Soviet revisionist diplomats conducted activities along the coastal lines of the Isthmus of Kra in Southwestern Thailand, thus arousing discontent from the Thai government. The Soviet revisionists have also stretched their claws to Indonesia and the Portuguese-occupied part of Timor Island. Disregarding Indonesia's sovereignty over her territorial waters, the Soviet revisionists sent their 'trawlers' to run amuck in Indonesian territorial waters. Furthermore, it was disclosed that they are making painstaking efforts to build a naval base in the Portuguese-occupied part of Timor Island and for this purpose have held frequent consultations with the Portuguese authorities. What warrants particular attention is that in recent years, the Soviet revisionists have loudly trumpeted 'internationalization' of the Malacca Straits."53

As Wilson concluded, these moves were to secure for the Soviet fleets "based in Vladivostok free passage through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean to join forces with the Mediterranean and Black Sea fleets in an attempt

to establish hegemony in the vast waters."[54]

It is clear that all ASEAN countries preferred to extend friendly attitudes to China rather than to the Soviet Union by 1975, because China was in a much better position to challenge the Soviet Union in Asia at that time. She could rally the ASEAN members to join in her anti-Soviet compaign because since Razak's visit to Peking in 1974 most of them were eager to seek the same contacts with Peking as Malaysia had done. In view of this, the pro-Peking orientation of their press attained in the meantime launch into severe criticism of the Soviet Collective Security proposal, which criticism was adroitly picked up by Peking and prominently displayed and reprined in its own press in bold letters.

On January 5, 1975 the People's Daily published an article entitled "The Southeast Asian Countries Open an Anti-Hegemonic Struggles Together with the Third World Countries," citing the unfavourable official views of some countries of Southeast Asia toward the proposal on Collective Security System of the Kremlin and its activities in the region:

> "... Under the cloak to develop trade and cultural exchanges, the Soviet Union sends large groups of officials to Southeast Asian countries to say good word for, even by publishing advertisements in newspapers to sell, the Asian Collective Security System. However, the social-imperialism's effort of such peddling has received cold responses and objections from the Southeast Asian governments and public opinion. The Thai Foreign Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, had said in April 1974 that Thailand did not agree with the Soviet proposal on the Asian Collective Security System. The Philippine President Marcos in January 1972 told the Senate that: 'the security of Asia must basically rely

> upon the Asians.' The Foreign Minister of Indonesia Adam Malik said in 1974 that the purpose of the Soviet Union to build the 'Asian Collective Security System' is to secure the position of a superpower in Asia, the Soviet concept of Asian security is built upon the foundation of 'political hegemony.' Trying in vain to peddle the Asian Security System directly, the Soviet social-imperialism has changed its techniques by suggesting to sign 'Treaties of Friendship' with Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia; its purpose of attempting to trap these countries into the Asian Collective Security has also been refused. Referring to the Soviet suggestion concerning thesekind of treaties, Tun Ismail, former Vice-Prime Minister of Malaysia, pointed out that 'a lot of dirty business' is 'being done under the name of friendliness.'"[55]

On February 29, 1975, when Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore held the Ministerial Conference to discuss the Malacca Straits, China again supported these three countries on protecting their rights, and agreed with their proposal that a control of pollution in the Straits should be instituted.[56]

From May 1975 onward China's press intensified its policy of quoting from the media of Southeast Asia to criticize the Soviet Union. Quoting from an article in Modern Asia, the People's Daily said on May 13 that:

> "The Soviet Union's initiation of the Collective Security Proposal is aimed at putting Asia under Russian hegemonism... If the Asian Collective Security Proposal really aims at building peaceful relations under the principle of equal mutual benefit, then it must be based on the foundation that no country should seek hegemony in Asia. Then why the Soviet Union is so antagonistic against the efforts of China and Japan to put an article on anti-hegemonism into the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Friendship and Peace, which is under negotiations?"[57]

One of the Chinese Communist newspapers in Hong Kong

Wen Hui Pao, joined Peking in denouncing the Soviet Union in June 1975. In an article written by Hsiao Yuen, entitled "The Proposed Soviet Asian Collective Security," the author quoted a Chinese newspaper The Orient News published in Manila to the effect that:

> "In recent years, Moscow persistently has been saying good words to the Asian countries regarding its Asian Collective Security Proposal, urging them to join the system. Yet until now, among the Asian countries only Mongolia publicly agreed to join the system. Even country such an India, who had signed a 'Treaty of Friendship' with the Soviet Union, has only verbally said that she would support the plan of Asian Collective Security System. In actuality India, too, maintains a cold attitude toward the system."[58]

It should be noted that at the time at which the Philippines had exchanged diplomatic ties with China, even Manila was ready to sing the song of denounciation, when Teng Hsiao ping told Marcos in June 1975 to be watchful of "letting the tiger in through the back door while repelling the wolf through the front gate."

In Peking's eyes the Asians should be watchful of the Soviet Collective Security proposal for it is not different from the purposes of the SEATO, in which some Asian countries had colluded with the "western imperialists" to contain China, and because the Soviet leaders are trying to change the SEATO from a "star-spangled banner" into a "polar-bear banner."[59] On June 26 Peking made use of another media from Southeast Asia to charge the Russians. Reporting from a Chinese paper Kuang Hua Yit Pao of Malaysia, the People's Daily commented that "the intention of the Soviet Collec-

tive Security Proposal is to 'attain the same hegemonic ambition as another superpower.'"[60] On July 4, another Malaysian Chinese newspaper, Sin Pin Jit Pao, was quoted by Peking to the effect that when "the Pacific fleet of the Soviet Union departs from Vladivostok through the Sea of Japan and the Malacca Straits to the Atlantic Ocean,... it is a threat to peace...; the Soviets intend to substitute for the Americans and play their role in the oceans."[61]

Starting in August 1975 Peking extended the practice of quoting from Malaysian and Philippine presses to the Thai and Singaporean newspapers on the Soviet proposal. By this time, Thailand became another country of the ASEAN nations who had just entered into diplomatic relations with China while the Foreign Minister of Singapore had visited Peking in March 1975.

The editorial of August 27, 1975 of a Thai Chinese paper, The China Press, was reported by the People's Daily on August 30, saying that after the European Security Council meeting in Helsinski held in July the Russians were infusing their "wicked" Collective Security proposal into Asia:

> "The so-called Asian Collective Security is another trick of the Soviet social-imperialists. It is more vicious than the 'Co-prosperity in Greater Asia' (大东亚共荣圈) proposed by the Japanese during their imperial days. No wonder that the Asian countries are not interested in it... they fear that they would fall into the trap of the Soviets... The Asians are not so stupid as not to recognize what is good or bad for them and let the Russians to have a chance to put their hands in Asia."[62]

Remembering the SEATO, which had been dissolved after

the end of Vietnamese War, another Thai paper, now an English one, The Nation, said that "the ASEAN countries would not accept the Soviet proposal on the Collective Security to militarize Southeast Asia again." Also this was reported by China in her press on August 30, 1975.[63]

(v) SUMMARY:

Viewed from the quotations published in the People's Daily it is interesting to note the tactics used by Peking in its verbal war with the Soviet Union. Very seldom Peking published its own criticism of the Russian proposal on Collective Security System for Asia. It is important to emphasize that the People's Daily quoted mainly from the Chinese papers published in Southeast Asia. Further to note is the fact that while the ASEAN governments had been once hostile to China, in 1975 they allowed the local Chinese papers to publish many pro-Peking articles and editorials. Some years ago two Chinese newspapermen in Manila, Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung (Yu Chang-chen and Yu Chang-keug), had been deported by Marcos to Taiwan for publishing materials favouring China. Singapore had detained Lee Yao-cheng of Nanyang Siang Pao, a popular Chinese newspaper in Singapore, for similar reasons in 1971. Even in Malaysia the situation has changed, where due to her racial plurality and domination of politics by the Malays the Chinese newspapers had a hard time to survive.

Thus while most of the ASEAN nations had established

diplomatic ties with Peking, the basic question is whether their leaders would really change their attitudes towards the Chinese minorities in their countries. To this writer, the answer at the moment is in the negative.

The real winner, however, is Peking. It has secured recognition from the governments which had been known for their hostility toward the new China in the past on the one hand, while on the other it has made an adroit use of their Chinese press for mounting a severe attack upon Moscow and its Collective Security proposal to keep it out of the region. Contrary to a popular belief, the Chinese in Southeast Asia were, are and shall remain a tremendous asset to the People's Republic of China. First, in the past two decades many of them had joined the local Communist Parties, and are still in their ranks, in order to promote Peking's objectives through revolutionary war, while others were an important source of foreign exchange by sending remittances to their relatives in China. Second, in the 1970's a new dimension was added to the usefulness of the overseas Chinese to Peking through the use of their press for waging its war on the Soviet Union in order to keep it out of the area which is of such a strategic importance to its security. This conclusion is contrary to the view of Stephen Fitzgerald, a distinguished student of China, who maintains that the overseas Chinese are a burden rather than an asset to Peking.[64]

Whether the ASEAN peoples and their governments would remain leaning upon China and against the Soviet Union in

the long term is too early to say. However, at least with respect to the Collective Security, all ASEAN countries are deaf toward Moscow's proposal.

This was well expressed by Dick Wilson, a long time observer of Southeast Asian affairs:

> "Since the Soviet presence and influence in the region is waxing rather than wanning, any Soviet backed proposal tends to be seen as a means of maximizing that greater presence. The fact that any such development would be regarded by China as provocative adds another damper to its attractiveness. And the fact that the Brezhnev proposal would include Japan, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and even China in one single Collective Security network would mean that the big Asian powers would be given an authority in Southeast Asia that Southeast Asians are anxious to deny them."[65]

We can perhaps conclude this section of our study with an observation that as far as the security in Southeast Asia is concerned, the conduct of Peking has all the attributes of a great power. It is building a string of friendly ties with the countries on her southern border, it is welcoming a credible but not predominant military presence of the United States in the area, and it is waging an uncompromising struggle against the Soviet Union if not completely to exclude it then at least to reduce to a minimum its influence in the area.

Here the interplay between the national interest and ideology is heavily loaded in favour of the former, with a few traces of the latter. It is all power politics and national interest and no ideological and revolutionary rhetoric.

(4) MALAYSIAN NEUTRALIZATION PROPOSAL:

The states in Southeast Asia have been slow in undertaking any major regional initiativies for security arrangement because of the long history of involvement of external powers in the area. The failure of such alignments in the past, and the rejection of the recent Soviet Collective Security Proposal, prompted the leaders in the ASEAN countries to start initiatives for a new security configuration in the area. The declaration calling for neutralization of Southeast Asia is one of such examples. Nuetralization was proclaimed and in principle accepted by the five members of of the ASEAN on December 4, 1971. The declaration states:

> "1. that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially the necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Power;
>
> 2. that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship."[66]

The Declaration of Neutralization in fact had been proposed by Malaysia earlier in January 1971, at a Commonwealth Conference held in Singapore. During the conference the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, urged that "neutralization of Southeast Asia will be the region's only salvation."[67]

Before going into the discussion of the viability of the neutralization project viewed from the perspectives of

the regional countries and the big powers as well, it is necessary to briefly discuss the background and significance of the Malaysian scheme. Neutralization is not a new concept in international politics. There were many countries in the world that once were declared neutralized;[68] and in Asia, too, neutralization was not new to U Nu's and Ne Win's Burma and to Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Cambodia, two of the most convincing and authentic examples of neutralism and neutralizatiy[69] in an Asian context.

What makes the Malaysian proposal important for the future international politics in Southeast Asia is not only the fact that it was the first time that a group of nations, not just one nation, proposed the neutralization of the whole region. However, it is important also in the sense that the proposal has come at a time when in Southeast Asia a rapid change in the security configuration of the major powers is under way:

> "It comes at a time of rapid and profound change in the Asian balance of power, when the Indochina War may be nearing a comprehensive settlement and relationships between external powers and the region are in flux. It is a period during which the United States is clearly searching for some new Asian configuration and the Soviet Union has advanced its own grand blueprint for the area. Neutralization has recently been the focus of renewed interest in Europe in the context of an effort to build a stable continental security arrangement there. Finally, the Malaysian-ASEAN plan constitutes the first neutralization proposal concerning Southeast Asia to originate from within rather than outside, the region."[70]

The Malaysian declaration proposing neutralization of the region is different from the previous security arrange-

ment in Southeast Asia in two ways. Internally, the project intends to bring all Southeast Asian countries, i.e., the ASEAN, and the four nations in Indochina and Burma, under the collective arrangement under which each state within the region would respect others' sovereignty and territorial integrity, not participate in activities likely to directly or indirectly threaten the security of others, promote regional co-operation, devise methods of ensuring peace among themselves and accept full responsibility for peace, present a collective view to the outside powers, agree that the United States, Soviet Union and China should be excluded from the region, that they recognize Southeast Asia as an area of neutrality, exclude it from their own power struggles, guarantee that neutrality and work out ways of making that guarantee effective.[72]

(i) THE ASEAN VIEWS ON THE MALAYSIAN PROPOSAL:

The Malaysian authorship of the neutralization proposal was mainly due to the intention of Tun Razak to erase the images of many Asian leaders that Malaysia's foreign policy bas been consistently pro-West.[73] Succeeding Tunku Abdul Rahman as Premier in 1971, Tun Razak thought that it would be unwise to continue the British line in foreign affairs, and in view of this picked up the neutralization idea which had been once rejected by Tunku in the Malaysian Parliament in 1968. Following this, he visited many neutral countries, such as Belgium and Austria, and consulted their leaders on

the possibility of Southeast Asia's neutralization. Also a book written by Cyril Black (et al.), published by Princeton University and entitled Neutralization and World Politics, had significantly influenced Razak's planning for neutralization in the early months of 1971; the book was "known to Malaysian policy-makers and had played a role in the formation of their proposal."[74]

When Malaysia proposed this concept she was more concerned with her own interests, although the far-sighted Malaysian Premier did intend to promote regional co-operation in Southeast Asia. Michael Leifer views its background:

> "..., it can be argued that the neutralization proposal was a product in large of special Malaysian interest rather than of general requirements. It emerges as the personal response of the late Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Ismail, to the prospect of British military withdrawal and to the implication of the Nixon Doctrine. It was made possible, above all, by Malaysia's new relationship with Indonesia—which, following the end of Confrontation, had been transformed from one of bitter antagonism to one of de facto alliance. The assurance of the political benevolence of neighbouring Indonesia, together with the interposing shelter from the perils of Indonesia provided by an amicable Thailand, contrasted with Malaysia's sense of apprehension about the prospect of internal disorder realized in the light of the dedicate inter-communal balance of Malaysian society, the neutralization was geared in large part to the exclusion of extra-regional forces which might exploit communal feelings, and in particular local Chinese alienation, to challenge the legitimacy of a system of government which reflects a constitutionally entrenched Malay political dominance."[75]

Although Leifer has offered this insight into and explanation of the background of the Malaysian proposal, he missed one important point. The point in question is the

fact that it was also the improvement of the Sino-Malaysian relations since 1971 that had allowed Razak to advance his idea of neutralization to the other ASEAN members. Her insistence that neutralization of Southeast Asia must have the guarantee from the People's Republic of China made many people to guess that Malaysia was making use of the plan to show her good will to Peking, hoping that the latter would withdraw its support from the local Communists operating in Malaysia. In spite of Indonesia's advice to Kuala Lumpur that Malaysia should learn from the 1965 Indonesian Communist Party coup and be cautious in making friends with the Communist China,[76] Razak did not give other ASEAN members an advanced notice which he had promised when he travelled to Peking in 1974. His impatience to establish diplomatic ties with China to win her support for the Malaysian proposal of neutralization was strategically planned, disregarding the views of the other ASEAN members:

> "The twin elements in the attraction of neutralization for Malaysia were as a carrot-and-stick for China and as a beacon by which Malaysia could claim regional leadership and international respect."[77]

The proposal indeed was a tactical initiative to release the present Kuala Lumpur Government from the embarrassment of being called pro-West. It can be taken as a devise addressed to Razak's fellow citizens of different races to promote unity which was deeply affected since the May 13 Incident in 1969. As Dick Wilson explains:

> "The Malaysian position on neutralization is one, clearly, of unremitting approval; indeed, as the author of a glamorously attractive regional plan that has brought her name to world attention in a serious and flattering light, Malaysia is never likely to jettison her ideas on this subject. When things go badly for neutralization, it can be explained that it was only intended as a long-termed goal and as providing a context or a framework within which regional tactics and strategy in the new era could be plotted. When things go well for neutralization, it can be taken as a vindication of the Malaysian plan. Either way Malaysian public opinion is satisfied and the momentum of regional leadership in foreign policy can be maintained."[78]

Indonesia is the one who was most dissatisfied with the Malaysian proposal, not because she disagrees with the principle of neutralization but because of the psychological feeling of being thumbed down by a neighbouring country who is not as big and as populous as her. The Indonesian generals were unhappy to see a second-rate country like Malaysia to initiate such a regional arrangement without consulting them in advance, because Indonesia expected to play the leading role in the regional affairs.

If we try to look at the Indonesian contemporary history, we might find that the Indonesians have not only been proud of their bigness, but also of their ambitions. Not so many years ago they were able to persuade the big powers to force Holland to surrender the soverignty of West Irian; they dared to challenge the British armed might by openning Confrontation against Malaysia in 1963; and finally Indonesia was the only Southeast Asian country who openly forged an alliance with China to antagonize the

United States and the Soviet Union during the later days of Sukarno. In terms of national power, Vietnam and Indonesia seems to be the only two countries who posses the capabilities to challenge the future regional stability in Southeast Asia, should they decide to do so. The former possessing the abundant weaponry supplied mainly by the Soviet Union during the Vietnamese War, would find only Indonesia a comparable opponent for competition for a sphere of influence. While as of now Indonesia is friendly with other ASEAN members[79] she might, however, find herself acting as a major regional power to claim leadership in the ASEAN area.

Another reason that makes Indonesia uncertain about the Malaysian approach to neutralization is the latter's suggestion of having China as a guarantor of security in Southeast Asia. She could not forget China's involvement in her internal politics during the Sukarno era when the country was almost driven into the Communist camp. Indonesia also does not feel that in the long term perspective the other big powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, would be able to provide guarantees of neutrality of the region.

Differing from Malaysia, Indonesia's view on the future security configuration in Southeast Asia can be seen from Adam Malik's speech at a meeting of the Press Foundation of Asia held in Bali in September 1971, three months before the Kuala Lumpur Declaration:

> "In my view, three alternatives are open to us. First, we could align ourselves with any one or a combination of powers whom we would trust to help secure our safety and well being; second, we could obtain the concurrence of the major powers to declare Southeast Asia a neutralized zone, free from big power interference; third, we could develop among ourselves an area of indigenous sociopolitical and economic strength."[80]

The first alternative was rejected by Adam Malik on the ground that it was not feasible and not different from the situation during the colonial days. The second option, much favoured by the Malaysians, was not acceptable either. Thus Malik sees only the third option desirable:

> "I strongly believe that it is only through developing among ourselves an area of internal cohesion and stability, based on indigenous sociopolitical and economic strength, that we can ever hope to assist in the early stabilization of a new equilibrium in the region that would not be the exclusive 'dictat' of the major powers. However dominant the influence of these big powers may be, I think there is and there should be scope for an indigenous Southeast Asian component in the new, emerging power balance of the region. In fact, I am convinced that unless the big powers acknowledge and the Southeast Asian nations themselves assume a greater and more direct responsibility in the maintainence of security in the area, no lasting stability can ever be achieved."[81]

The Indonesian Foreign Minister's insistance that the regional security should not rest upon the assurances given by external powers but attained through developing an internal cohesion and stability, based on indigenous sociopolitical and economic strength, implied two things. Firstly, Indonesia does not want to depend on the external powers' guarantees; she dislikes military pacts of any kind. Secondly,

Djakarta thinks that having excluded the big powers' influence from the area, Indonesia would automatically become the "number one" to talk about the regional security affairs since she is the biggest among the ASEAN members. When Lee Kuan-yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, suggested in Bangkok at the beginning in 1973 that the United States should maintain military presence in Thailand, Adam Malik snapped back:

> "If Indonesia was asked to provide military bases for foreign countries, we would certainly say: 'Go to hell.' It should also be asked why Lee Kuan-yew asked for military presence in Thailand, not in his own country."[82]

The Indonesian position on external military presence in the region maintains that foreign military bases must be "temporary" and should not be "intensified." After the Bangkok comment, when Singapore wanted to invite the Soviet Union to replace the American role in Southeast Asia, an anonymous Indonesian Defense Ministry official was quoted as saying that the "existence of a big power naval base in Singapore would obstruct the creation of a neutral Southeast Asia."[83]

On the whole, the Indonesian attitude toward the big powers is a realistic one, as Malik said in a San Francisco address recently:

> "We are not that unrealistic as to assume to be able to eliminate all major power interest or influence from our region. On the other hand, however, all sides must come to the realization that while the interests of the major powers may be important, they are not vital or of direct consequence to their

> security, and certainly do not warrant direct intervention as was done in the past."[84]

Singapore seems to be the most positive among the Southeast Asian countries in responding to the Malaysian proposal, though she has agreed with the other ASEAN members to sign the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971. It is because of the separation from Malaysia in 1965 when Singapore was forced by Kuala Lumpur to leave the Federation, and because being a Chinese populated city-state, that Singapore has been carefully watching the diplomatic movements of Malaysia. Unlike the Indonesian position, Singapore is reluctant to support any self-help policy in Southeast Asia. The fact that she is the smallest state among the regional countries persuaded Lee Kuan-yew and his colleagues to seek external help to balance off the bigger regional and mainly ethnically Malay states. To the People's Action Party, the neutralization plan is clear enough to imply a future domination of Southeast Asia by the bigger regional powers. Had Singapore's population been of Malay origin, this fear would not exist at all. The history of the region shows that racial conflicts and their subsequent "spill-over" have never been successfully checked. The remembrance of the May 1969 Riots in Malaysia is still fresh in the minds of the Singaporeans; the People's Action Party leaders are still worrying that one day Malaysia and Indonesia might join together to crash the young republic.

Basically, Singapore wants the extra-regional powers

to station considerable military forces in the region, preferably in Thailand. Lee is the one who advocated the "time-gain" theory during the 1960's, suggesting that if the United States could involve herself in Vietnam long enough to balance off the other powers' involvement, then this would give time to the nations in the region to strengthen themselves politically, socially, and economically, and thus assist in the solution of their external and internal problems.[85] When the Nixon Doctrine was proclaimed it forced Lee Kuan-yew to hold back his theory for a while, and as a result he started to show more co-operative attitude to the regional states rather than maintaining that the United States must continue her presence in Vietnam. His recent rappoachement with Indonesia is an indication of his willingness to get closer with the regional countries. Following Lee's visit to Djakarta in 1973 and following Singapore's support for Indonesia's position on the Malacca Straits, both Singapore and Indonesia seem to agree to forget the painful history of Confrontation when Singapore was part of Malaysia. The Singapore-Indonesia détente achiev- in 1973 was another sign showing that Singapore would like to make use of the Indonesians to check the Malaysian ambition in the region.

Contrary to the Malaysian concept of regional security, Singapore insists that it would be desirable to have more than one power's military presence in Southeast Asia. Lee would like to see not only the Americans, but also Russians,

Japanese, Europeans and Australians, to be present in the region. In the words of Rajaratnam, Singapore's Foreign Minister, Singapore regards herself as the "global city," a "brain center" in Southeast Asia to function as "a spark plug" for the economic and social well-being and better quality of life in Southeast Asia. To maintain this position, she dislikes to give up her existing benefits gained from international contacts with the major extra-regional powers. The fact that the ideological content and label of "neutralization" does not offer any substantial benefits to the young republic made the Singapore leaders turn a deaf ear to Razak, and to work their own way to prosperity.

The recent relations of Singapore with Malaysia have not been good. First, the joint Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA) was split into separate national airlines in 1971. Second, the long history of interchangable currencies of both countries ended with the separation in 1973. Third, the Stock Exchange and the Straits Times were no more operating as unitary organisations by 1974. Most serious of all, the invitation of the Israeli advisers to Singapore to build up its defense forces had antagonized the Muslim leaders in Kuala Lumpur, resulting in the cancellation of facilities and space for Singapore air force and jungle warfare training in Malaysia. All these recent events are enough to indicate why both Malaysia and Singapore are thinking differently toward the neutralization plan.

Singapore's position on the Kuala Lumpur plan is simple.

She does not want to follow wholeheartly the new "ideological label" of Razak and thus permit a vaccum to emerge in Southeast Asia. Apparently she agrees with the Malaysians on the principle of neutralization, saying only that it is an "excellent idea." Besides this lip service, she has been playing the role of "devil's advocate," acting as a "troublemaker" who is asking difficult and pointed questions on neutralization; and she insists that the terms must be clearly defined and that hard analysis, not "vague and hopeful banalities," be the basis of decision.[86] She even poured cold water on Razak by asking indirectly the workability of the project:

> "Is not security more likely to be achieved by encouraging the countervailing presence of several big powers rather than by trying to exclude them? i.e., through a balance of power rather than neutralization?"[87]

To the People's Action Party leadership, in sum, neutralization is an excellent idea, and "what a good thing it would be if it could only be realized, and that one should hope for the best but plan for the worst."[88] Singapore prefers realistic means for security; she will not involve herself too much in the Malaysian proposal.

The students of Thai politics agree that Thai foreign policy has been consistently an expression of its traditional ability of accommodation. Her policy of identifying herself with the United States for the containment of China during the 1950's and 1960's had a tremdous impact upon the other Southeast Asian countries which were not involved in the

Vietnamese War. She had long been regarded as an important member of the SEATO, a vital piece in Dulles' "Domino Theory" to resist the Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. And, indeed, the Thai leaders were doing well with the United States until 1969, when the Nixon administration decided to make a drastic change in its foreign policy in Asia, determined to withdraw from the battlefield of Vietnam through the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine.

When the Malaysian proposal for neutralization was first announced Thanom Kittikachorn, the then Prime Minister of Thailand and his military junta were fairly hostile. The determining factor that changed the Thai leaders' attitudes was Peking's entrance into the United Nations in late 1971, and ever since this Thailand became accommodative by agreeing to accept the neutralization in principle. But this does not mean that Thailand would work hand-in-hand with the Malaysian Premier to realize the plan. Although Thanat Khoman was one of the most energetic workers in bringing all ASEAN foreign ministers to sign the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in the end of 1971, he stress two years later when dismissed by Thanom that "he did not consider himself supporting a view of neutralization or neutrality that would embrace non-alignment, non-involvement, or not leaning on one side or the other."[89]

After Thanom Kittikachorn was forced by the students to give up the premiership and to leave his country later in 1973, the new Foreign Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan,

made a slight change in the attitude, affirming the Thai support for the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. But it should be understood that the change "was accompanied by some irritation on the part of the Thai opinion to the effect that the country was being pushed by its friends for their own purposes."[90] Some ASEAN members, especially Singapore and Malaysia, were regarded by the Thai leaders as intending to make Thailand as a buffer-state against the Vietnamese Communists while they benefited by trading with them.

Following the appearance of civilian government in early 1975 under the leadership of Krukit Promoj, Thailand further changed her policy by altering her image of China as a threat to her security. The new Thai Premier gradually came to believe that hostility of Peking to Thailand was not permanent, but was a product of the Thai alliance with the United States.[91]

Whether and when the United States forces in Thailand would withdraw completely is another matter, but Michael Leifer saw the situation in 1974 in the following terms:

> "The Thai government, with its present civilian government and its current commitment to democratic institutions is certainly not willing to remove American military presence stationed in the country despite the uncertainty of countervailing power it affords and the significant, if not substantive, decline in its standing complement. There has also been no indication of any willingness on the part of Thailand to repudiate the SEATO alliance, which in its bi-lateral Thai-American interpretation of March 1962, serves as the institution vehicle for the fullfilment of American commitment to Thailand."[92]

Had the Thieu regime and Lon Nol rule not been defeated

in 1975, Michael Leifer's prediction made a year earlier would have been probably valid. Yet history is cruel. The recent unstable events in Thailand since the end of the Vietnamese War have shown that Thailand would at the end accommodate herself with the Communist regimes in both Cambodia and Vietnam. The recent dissolution of the SEATO has shown that the Thais will have a difficult time in seeking a new form of security arrangement in the region of Southeast Asia.

Yet, whatever happens to Thailand from the new Communist regimes in Indochina, it would be naive to believe that Thailand would accept the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. To the Thai Government the Razak proposal is "a beautiful document but it has no teeth."[93] What the Thai leaders want is a new kind of security guarantee to hold the Vietnamese penetration. Krukit Promoj had established diplomatic ties with China in order to elicit help from the latter to restrain the Communist activities, but this is not enough. The Thais would be asking for more from the Malaysians, not being satisfied with the absence of military commitment in their proposal on neutralization in the region. Although Thanat Khoman is no more in the Thai Foreign Ministry, he is respected for his attitude toward neutralization. He argued that armed neutrality would be the best guarantee if Southeast Asia is to be neutralized:

> "Neutral nations are required by their neutrality to prohibit the establishment of foreign military bases on their soil. But shunning military allian-

> ces does not mean that the neutral nations should allow themselves to be caught militarily unprepared completely."[94]

As long as the new Thai civilian government is merely a care-taker government, and until the internal situation returns to normal, the neutralization would command a low poriority in the Thai foreign policy considerations. What seems to be more urgent to the Thai leaders is whether the Vietnamese would launch another attack on their territory; so far they are not much interested in the long-term argument whether Southeast Asia should be neutralized.

Like Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, the Philippines has been giving only a tentative support to the Malaysian proposal, because of their own political quarrels with the Kuala Lumpur Government.

Shortly after the formation of Malaysia in 1963, which included Sabah, Manila protested violently that Sabah was its own territory with the result that its unsuccessful claim over this land left a deep scar on the relations between the two countries. When the ASEAN foreign ministers gathered at Kuala Lumpur in November 1971, the Philippine Foreign Minister Romulo raised the issue by asking Razak:

> "The Philippines wants to know if the neutralization plan would 'prejudice territorial boundaries'..."[95]

Not only the Sabah issue prevented the Philippines from supporting the neutralization project, there is also the alignment factor that hinders Manila from accepting the Razak plan. Because the Philippines were one of the

most faithful members of the SEATO, it is difficult for the Manila Government to give up its ties with the United States suddenly, although the organisation has been disolved recently.

But Marcos found it helpful to accept the neutralization plan in principle in order to win his political prestige at home. To ease down the harshness of the demand for the Americans to leave the country, he has to show signs that Manila is not totally ignoring the possibility of neutralization in Southeast Asia. In 1973, for example, he started to indicate a more friendly attitude toward the Malaysian plan by saying that "the principal threat and danger to the stability of our government is internal subversion; there will not be, for the next ten years, I believe, external aggression."[96] His colleague, Romulo, followed by saying that "the elimination of the United States bases in the Philippines will give the country a more flexible stand in the international relations with other countries."[97]

But there is no evidence of serious efforts from Marcos demanding the United States to withdraw her bases from the Philippines, fearing a financial loss from the closure of these military stations, including the Subic Bay Naval Base and the Clark Air Force Base, two of the most important American armed stations in Western Pacific. The realistic calculation of Marcos is that these military stations have been providing 26,000 jobs and spending some US$130 million a year in the Philippines. Certainly Manila would not like

to suffer the experiece of Singapore when the British withdrawal from its bases much worried the Lee Kuan-yew Government at the end of 1969.

Manila would most likely continue to press on Malaysia over the sovereignty of Sabah, and continue to allow the United States to station her troops in the Philipines, though it might have to come to agree that the withdrawal should be gradual. Toward neutralization Manila has no disagreement with the other three ASEAN members that the proposal should be treated as a long-term objective or an "intellectual" arguement. In short, Manila is not so unrealistic as to give up suddenly the existing benefits derived from the American bases in the country. Its view corresponds with the view of the other three ASEAN members, except Malaysia, that balance of power is still the best policy for Southeast Asia.

(ii) ATTITUDES OF THE GREAT POWERS TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION:

After Tun Razak replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Soviet Union found an "unexpectedly sympathetic ear"[98] in Kuala Lumpur when the latter proposed neutrality and non-alignment. The Moscow leaders had been waiting for reactions of the Asians to their proposal of the Collective Security System since its proclamation in 1969, while Razak waited for response from the big powers on his neutralization project. Thus it was logical for the Soviet Union to perceive the Razak plan as having

some common elements with her own Asian security scheme.

Yet, the Malaysian Premier thought that under no circumstances would he like to relate his neutralization plan to the Russian project. One important reason for his visit in Moscow in late 1972 was to gain support from the Kremlin for his own neutralization proposal. He failed. His hope of receiving Russia's "sympathetic understanding" of his plan did not come to fruition,"[99] and instead the Russians advanced once again their own idea of "insuring collective security in Asia."[100] These conflicting aspirations of both parties were expressed in a joint communique, a document in which "each side had expounded its own plan but gave no indication of any meeting of minds on the question of neutralization."[101]

In spite of the disagreement between Kuala Lumpur and Moscow over the interpretation of the Collective Security System and the neutralization plan, the Soviet Union did not reject the Razak plan totally. The reason is that the neutralist "tendency" of the Malaysian Premier did not contradict the Soviet socialist ideology aiming to promote non-alignment in foreign policy. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration was thought by the Russians to be nullifying the regional security organisations of the Western powers.[102] Moreover, the Russians were not eager to implement their own plan because "should the collective security proposal fail to gain acceptance, neutrality will be preferable in the Soviet view to a series of regional security alliances in

which the Western powers would play a marginal role."[103]

Not until 1974, when Malaysia established her diplomatic ties with Peking, had the Soviet Union worried too much that the Malaysian/ASEAN project might turn out against Moscow. However, the events that followed Razak's tour to Peking made the Russians uneasy, because even Thailand and the Philippines, once the most anti-Peking pro-West countries in Southeast Asia, set up their diplomatic ties with China.

Even for the Russians Razak's proposal was not satisfactory because it was only tangentially connected with Moscow's concept of "positive neutrality." The fact that the Malaysian proposal was a vaguely worded document deliberately designed to provide a lowest common denominator for covering a wide range of preferred concepts of neutralization, none of which could easily be reconciled with the Soviet style of collective security, would probably damper the aspirations of the Russians in the insular Southeast Asian area for the time being. Moscow might possibly continue to intensify its economic and cultural activities in this area and at the same time might turn her attention to Indochina where a bloody war has just ended.

Turning now to the attitude of the United States, Washington disliked the ASEAN countries to name the United States as one of the big powers which might be involved in a "future rivalry" in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, Washington worried about the excessively neutralistic statement made by the ASEAN countries in No-

vember 1971. Before the Kuala Lumpur meeting Razak had visited the United States but received from President Nixon no sympathy for his neutralization proposal. The United States strategic considerations before the Declaration had been expressed by James Morgan in the Far Eastern Economic Review to the effect that "neutralist declaration might be exploited by isolationist elements in the United States."[104] "It would," some American diplomats in Southeast Asia argued, "strengthen the neo-isolationist lobby in the United States and make it more difficult for the administration in Washington to continue to convince the Congress of the need to maintain forces and give material support to the noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia."[105]

The official American position in this matter was to encourage regional initiatives concerning security, but as long as they were consistent with the Nixon Doctrine. She envisioned Southeast Asia as moving naturally toward some sort of collective non-alignment but saw the regional security and stability as a pre-condition, not as a product, of such an evolution.[106] Thus any premature absence of military balance in the area would not be desirable by the United States. Former American Secretary of State, Williams P. Rogers, expressed this in March, 1972:

> "... (The United States recognizes neutralization, Ed.) as a long-term goal,... the area as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality... However, the effectiveness of any plan ultimately to reach this objective will depend on the secure independence of Southeast Asian nations and on the attitudes of their neighbours."[107]

Ambassador William H. Sullivan, one of the most influencial decision makers in the United States Department of State before his appointment to the Philippines, also maintained in 1973 that "it is 'essential' for the United States to retain its military presence in the area so as to reassure its friends that they were not abandoned."[108]

Politically, the United States can be expected to continue to be counted upon as an anti-Communist ally by the ASEAN countries, and it would be idle to speculate that she would let them go Communist. Economically, to protect her investments in the area, United States sees any premature withdrawal of her forces from the area as not practical. Returning from Peking at the end of 1975 President Ford reaffairmed in Honolulu the so-called "New Pacific Doctrine" to the effect that the United States will continue to consider the East Asia, including Southeast Asia, an important area of its economic and trade activities.[109] He recognized that the United States trade with this area had exceeded in 1975 her transactions with the European Economic Community and was growing at over 30 per cent a year.[110]

To conclude, Malaysia's neutralization program is not the type of a security arrangement that the United States hopes to see in the present Southeast Asian situation. Although President Ford promised Peking that "the Americans share opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia,"[111] it does not mean that the Americans would agree with the Razak plan and withdraw entirely their military presence from

Southeast Asia:

> "It is fairly clear from all this that the Americans are not unsympathetic toward the reasoning behind the Malaysian neutralization proposal. They would, however, undoubtedly prefer not to have the plan made so specific; they dislike the United States being placed equally with the Soviet Union and China as big powers whose actions in the region are harmful to the region, and they perhaps suffer from some unconscious resentment at the first major independent diplomatic initiative to be made in the modern period by a group of Asian countries usually regarded as friendly toward the United States."[112]

(iii) CHINA'S POSITION ON NEUTRALIZATION:

Turning now to Peking, it has been a customary practice of its leaders not to endorse any vague and airy scheme for resolution of regional or international conflicts until they fully understood its nature and how this could be used to isolate their major enemy in the diplomatic arena. In view of this, any security arrangement that would limit China's freedom of manoeuvring in international or regional activities would receive a critical review from Peking, as the Russian Collective Security proposal experienced.

Toward the Malaysian/ASEAN neutralization proposal, China's attitude has been more careful. Unlike her severe attack upon the Soviet Union's security project, the People's Republic of China did not respond to the Malaysian scheme until 1973, when the developments seemed to favour the Chinese side.

Because she is the weakest in terms of military capa-

bility compared with the United States and the Soviet Union, China saw the Malaysian scheme as implying an "artificial exclusion" of her role in the neutralization of Southeast Asia when this had been declared in Kuala Lumpur:

> "The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the neutralization arrangement places the guarantor powers on equal footing, thus artificially excluding China... from the workings of intra-Asian diplomacy."[113]

In this sense, the Chinese reservation regarding the ASEAN Declaration seems to correspond with that of some leaders in the ASEAN countries. As Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew remarked in Djakarta later in 1973, China as a guarantor of Southeast Asia's neutralization should, as a pre-condition, develop a strong naval force first.[114] Whether Lee's statement influenced the Chinese leaders' determination to show her naval strength by fighting the South Vietnamese regime for the sovereignty of the Spartly Islands (Nan Sha Ch'un Tao) and the Paracel Islands (Hsi Sha Ch'un Tao) in early 1974, must be only guessed. However, it is safe to assume that China would not be totally ignoring the ASEAN Declaration because it is the first security plan which was originiated by the countries of Southeast Asia themselves. Of course, Peking should give special treatment to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration if it wishes to woo the Third World countries to her side and to be "self-reliant in the anti-hegemonic era." Acting as the "natural leader" of the Third World, to use President Marcos' words, China does not want to show her

appetite explicitly and too early. Her position toward the Declaration has been more sophisticated than that of the other powers.

Since China's main concern in her diplomacy in the 1970's has been the assessment of the Soviet Union's intention on her periphery, she would not hesitate to woo the ASEAN countries if their neutralization scheme is not contradictory to her grand strategy of united front. Peking's position on the matter was first expressed informally to a group of Japanese newsman in March 1973 when they talked with Liao Ch'eng-chih, a senior adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry:

> "China supported the principle of neutrality featuring national independence, diplomacy, and peace which the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have worked out. These countries, however, sometimes want to improve relations with China, but at other times they step back, saying they are afraid. We do not fret, rush, or threaten, and we will watch the development in regard to this situation."[115]

This informal position was slightly changed in June 1973, when Chen Ji-sheng, Director of Southeast Asian Affairs the Chinese Foreign Ministry, visited Bangkok accompanying a Chinese table-tennis team. The Thai Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Pan Wannamethi, told the reporters after Chen Ji-sheng had talked with Chatichai Choonhavan, the Thai Foreign Minister, that "China had welcomed the ASEAN declaration of peace, freedom, and neutrality for the region."[116] Chen was also quoted as saying that "China did not wish to see any power dominating Southeast Asia but rather wished to see a region free from interference."[117]

These pronouncements, however, should not be regarded

as an official attitude of Peking; at best they can be treated as appeasement given to the ASEAN countries who were muddling through to the exchanges of diplomatic ties with China. Also, if China really supported neutralization then why the Peking officials did not talk to the Malaysians directly during their many visits to Kuala Lumpur since 1971, and instead were making hints to the Thais? It is clear that although the authorship of neutralization rested with Razak, Peking thought that by 1973 Thailand was more important than Malaysia in terms of strategic calculations, because the Thais were undecided since the Paris Accord of 1973 whether to continue their policy of containment of China or normalize with her. As far as Malaysia was concerned, on the other hand, Peking was sure that the diplomatic exchange was a matter of time.

Finally, China's position became clear when Malaysia, as the first member of the ASEAN countries, initiated the diplomatic relations with Peking in May 1974. During Razak's visit in Peking Chou En-lai referred sympathetically to neutralization when welcoming him:

> "The Malaysian Government's position for the establishment of a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia gives expression to the desire of the Southeast Asian people to shake off interference and has won support from many Third World countries. The Chinese people sincerely wish the Malaysian peoples still greater victories on their road of advance."[118]

This statement was later quoted by Malaysian officials as a demonstration of China's "support and acceptance" of neutralization. The Malaysian officials also said that Chou

En-lai had privately "supported" neutralization, "provided that the foreign bases... were dismantled in good time."[119]

It is understandable that the Malaysians were not too happy with the attitude of the Chinese towards neutralization of Southeast Asia because Razak had already failed to gain support from the Kremlin, while the United States showed no intent of withdrawing its bases prematurely from the area. On the other hand, Peking did not wish Razak to return to Kuala Lumpur to tell his fellow members in the ASEAN that China does not support neutralization. Therefore, the careful statement of Chou En-lai might possibly be taken as a limited appeasement. Moreover, Chou only said that "the Chinese people sincerely wish...," not the "Chinese Government." It is easy to understand the meaning of the phraseology because the Peking leaders clearly differentiate between the "government" and the "people." Secondly, instead of involving China in the Malaysian plan, Chou only said that neutralization "has won support from many Third World countries," but there was no mention of the People's Republic of China.

Nevertheless, China extended her sympathy to the Malaysian plan "to shake off foreign interference," which tactically brought the plan to correspond with her "anti-hegemonic" postures.

The Peking leaders continued to denounce the Soviet Collective Security Proposal by quoting the ASEAN Declaration of neutralization. The People's Daily on May 20, 1975,

reported the foreign ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur which discussed the neutralization plan. Following the exchange of diplomatic ties with the Philippines and Thailand, Peking again maintained its position on the subject in a sympathetic way. In an article "Letting the Tiger Through the Back Door While Repelling the Wolf Through the Front Gate," the People's Daily commented on July 29, 1975:

> "The proposal on establishing a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia put forward by the Southeast Asian countries in recent years is in accord with the national interests of these countries and peoples to safeguard their sovereignty and independence and to oppose the contention between the two hegemonic powers."[120]

On August 15, the Peking Review made another comment on the neutralization proposal by relating it to the Soviet Collective Security Proposal:

> "But now Moscow has changed its tune, chanting that the neutralization proposal is 'consonant' with its Asian Collective Security System.' This is really ridiculous.
>
> The proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia and the 'Asian Collective Security System' are two diametrically opposed ideas. There are no 'common points' or 'consonance' between them. The Soviet Union's design, in its own words, is to have the neutralization proposal 'included' in the framework of the idea of an Asian Collective Security System. In fact, it is trying to bring Southeast Asian countries into the orbit of the Soviet Asian Collective Security System."[121]

It is, therefore, clear that Peking's standpoint is to utilize the Malaysian scheme for its attacks upon hegemonism in Asia, particularly that of the Soviet Union. Since the announcement of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, Peking's attitude has been consistent with its Third World

strategy to the effect that because the Soviet Union intends to "insure Collective Security in Asia," Peking quotes the neutralization proposal saying that the Southeast Asians do not welcome the Soviet project for they prefer their own security arrangement. But Peking cannot fully support the scheme because the Malaysian proposal is vague and not precise on how to achieve neutralization. Moreover, China does not wish to be a guarantor as the Soviet Union and the United States; she is weak in military capability; she does not think that the complete American withdrawal is desirable for the regional security, although she has been consistently "anti-hegemonistic;" and, last of all, to act as a guarantor would imply intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, and of course she would be reluctant to accept the Malaysian invitation to act in such a role.

To assess China's position, perhaps she is less negative than the Soviet Union and the United States. Her sympathy given to the proposal probably reflects the concerns of the Peking leaders to the effects that "China would undoubtedly find it advantageous to be freed from concern over 2,000 mile frontier with the states of Southeast Asia."[122] Of course, the Chinese "welcome" neutralization in Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

The materials presented in the preceding pages and analyzing the relations of the People's Republic of China with the ASEAN area of Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975 leads us to the following main conclusions:

The Nixon Doctrine, the termination of war in Indochina and the withdrawal of the American military presence from Southeast Asia have profoundly transformed the external environment of China on her southern border, eliminating thus what Peking leaders have considered the greatest threat to the security of their country during the last two decades.

The internal power struggle within the Communist Party of China in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 propelled to power a group of moderate leaders, who understood this transformation and responded to it by a set of new and imaginative policies, which in turn aided this process.

The essence of these new policies was an effort to enhance this newly won security of China by entering into diplomatic relations, trade and other friendly ties and cultural contacts with the governments of states organized in the ASEAN.

Seeing the decline of American power in Southeast Asia and the friendly postures emanating from Peking, several governments in the area reciprocated by a willingness to

enter into diplomatic, commercial and cultural ties with China. An important element in this decision was a hope that by entering into friendly relations with Peking China would stop supporting the insurgencies in their countries, or at least tone down her verbal and material support.

The process of entering into the friendly ties with the governments of the area was greatly aided by the assurances offered by Peking that it considers the question of the overseas Chinese living in their countries as an internal matter, not to be interferred into.

This process of raprochement was further aided by an adroit use by Peking of its ties with the revolutionary movements operating in these countries; the support to these movements was toned down in order to coax the governments into, or reward them for, friendly orientation towards Peking, while it was stepped up to met out punishment and coerce them to detach themselves from the American "connection" and start looking towards China.

While the United States is no more considered by Peking the main enemy of China in Southeast Asia, this place has been now assigned to the Soviet Union who, Peking believes, is penetrating the area to replace the American presence and to confront China in the south and thus complete her encirclement.

In view of this, Peking is making every effort to keep the Russians out of the area by deepening its relations with the local governments as well as by favourably res-

ponding to the local schemes calling for neutralization of the region but without the participation of extra-regional big powers in them.

The major theme which is emerging from these efforts of Peking empasizes the contemporary relevance of the "historical and traditional ties" of China with the region; this emphasis then casts China into the role of a major power, an "older brother" and "natural leader" who is entitled to respect and deference, and should be listened to by her smaller neighbours on her southern periphery.

Thus the relations of China with the countries of the ASEAN countries underwent a complete metamorphosis between 1949 and 1975. While in the period following 1949 Peking had placed more emphasis upon the ideological factors in its relations with the area and unreservedly supported the armed insurgencies aimed at the overthrowing of the local governments by force, between 1969-1975 the national interest emerged as the main factor motivating its effort to build a sub-system of friendly, or neutral states, on her southern periphery through friendly contacts with their governments and at a partial expense of support to the insurgent groups.

The Peking leaders thus attained between 1969-1975 the reconciliation of the two opposing tendencies in their relations towards the region in a new equilibrium, in a new mix, in which the national interest outweigh the ideo-

logical considerations. The pendulum thus swung across the spectrum to the other extreme, leaving the ideological motivations at the low level of activity, but as a formadable potentiality. But this analysis is valid only until today.

It is in this connection that we must never forget that because the foreign relations of China, as everything else, are based upon Mao's Theory of Contradiction, the equilibrium is not a static but a dynamic concept which implies that the relations between the two opposing tendencies, in our case the mix between the national interest and ideology, is not permanently fixed but that it is in a flux, changing according to the new circumstances as they emerge. This operational code, in which change is inherent, thus poses the question of the future relations of China with that part of Southeast Asia which is organized into the ASEAN.

In order to offer even some tentative answer to this question we must attempt an assessment of the direction of development of some central factors which inform and influence the foreign policy making process in China towards the region of our study today.

First to look at is the likelihood of a new power struggle in China which could propel to power a new leadership, which in turn could initiate new policies towards the region. While it is true that the present policies, known as the Chou En-lai Doctrine, came under severe fire

and criticism from the left radicals, this crisis bas been solved early in April 1976 by the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-ping and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng to be the Premier and the First Vice-Chairman of the party. There is every indication that while both wings of the party have been defeated by this new appointment—the left represented by Wang Hung-wen and the Shanghai Group and the right wing by Teng Hsiao-ping and his followers—the new Premier is committed to the continuation of the moderate course in the spirit of the Chou En-lai Doctrine. Thus continuity of the present policies and stability of the top leadership in China are going to be on the agenda for a foreseeable future.

The second factor to look at is the possibility of changes in the attitudes of the countries of the area towards Peking. It must be remembered that many countries of the region rushed to undertake the pilgrimage to Peking because of two reasons. First, the decline and withdrawal of American power from the area; and second, a hope that by entering into friendly ties with China Peking would deny support to the local insurgencies.

The recent developments, however, indicate that Peking itself is not interested in a complete withdrawal of the Americans and prefers, for its own security, the continuation of their small but viable presence in the area. This then might slow down the march on Peking by the local governments who might read this as an essential weakness of

Peking's strategic position, and that the ascendancy of China as a paramount power in the area is not inevitable.

As far as the support of the local insurgencies is concerned, the governments of the area are much disturbed by the realization that Peking can escalate its support to them anytime it is to its advantage, and fear that it would do it in the future if and when the conditions are right. In fact, there is a feeling of disappointment in Malaysia and Thailand over the continued though low support of Peking to the insurgencies in these countries, and over the question to what extent Peking can effectively restrain them. Because of this, Thailand is showing good will towards Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos in the hope of being able to put the damper on the insurgent activities not through Peking but by direct relations with them.

Thus while Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines feel that Peking got the better part of the bargain by winning their recognition and feeling let down by Peking's continued support to the insurgencies, Indonesia and Singapore do not believe that it is possible to make China drop her support to these movements in exchange of diplomatic recognition. In view of this, their relations with Peking would remain in a limbo for the time being, particularly so because of the prospect of the complete collapse of the American power in the area did not come through and because the prospect of China immediately emerging as the dominant power in the area was grossly overestimated.

Turning now to the great power relations in the region as the third factor, it is certain that Peking will continue insisting that the Americans must maintain a meaningful military presence in the area, and that the Soviet penetration of the region would remain the dominant concern of Peking's policy planners. In view of this, Peking will be making every effort to minimize Kremlin's influence in the region by deepening its ties with the local governments through diplomatic, trade, cultural and other means. In this connection the Chinese ethnical press in the area would be harnessed to spearhead the propaganda attacks upon the Soviet Union, and there is every possibility that Peking would attempt to turn some sections of the overseas Chinese into pressure groups to exert themselves with their governments in order to keep the Russians at bay.

It is in this area of the great power relationship that Peking would encounter two serious contradictions. The first contradiction is inherent in Peking's insistence that the Americans have to maintain their military presence in the area in the sense that this insistence compromises Peking's moral leadership of the revolutionary movements because Peking is "colluding" with an "imperialist power" and is therefore not better than Moscow and its <u>détente</u> with the Americans. Thus in the eyes of the revolutionary leaders in the jungles of Southeast Asia Peking's image of an uncompromising fighter against "hegemonism and imperialism" is seriously tarnished.

The second contradiction which will emerge for Peking

is inherent in its competition with the Soviet Union over the leadership and direction of the revolutionary movements in the area. Peking's efforts to cultivate the governments of the region, for strategic reasons, and at the expense of support to the revolutionary movements places it on the same footing with the Kremlin, whom Peking is charging precisely with the same crime of subordinating the interests of the local revolutionary movements to the national interest of the Soviet state. Thus to differentiate itself from the Kremlin, Peking would have to maintain a more revolutionary stance in its relations with the local insurgencies. We must not also discount the possibility that the Kremlin itself, in its competition with Peking, might take initiative in this respect by making use of North Vietnam, where the Kremlin had scored against Peking and where it is firmly entrenched, for supporting the insurgencies in the area, particularly in Thailand, by proxy so to say.

Looking now at the assessment of the fourth factor at play, Peking's relations with the revolutionary movements in the area, it is important to understand that it is not selling them down the river in exchange of the state-to-state relations. Since 1969, Peking has been toning them down in order to make use of them as tools to affect the state-to-state relations, but at the same time keeping their potential ready for a bloody revolution when the situation might demand so. The latter contingency is not on the agenda for the time being, as Peking has to entrench itself more

firmly on the diplomatic front. However, the competition with the Soviet Union over the leadership of these movements imbues this factor with a very uncertain character. Moreover, these movements have a logic and will of their own which might seriously reduce the manipulative power of both the Kremlin and Peking over them, and prompt the movements to act on their own.

The last factor to look at is the prospect of neutralization of the area. While we have seen that all members of the ASEAN are in favour of the proposal in principle, the project is in a state of stalement because of lack of concerted policies on its implementation. And it is most unlikely that any significant progress shall be made on this score in the near future, which suits Peking well. Peking would not like to see the Soviet influence being institutionalized in the area under the cover of the local security arrangement sponsored by the major powers, or witness a re-introduction of large scale American military power under the same guise.

To summarize, because of the factors explained above we can expect that for a foreseeable future China is going to continue on her present course towards the area, i.e., deepening her diplomatic, trade, cultural and other relations with its countries, while toning down the physical activities of the insurgent movements but keeping their revolutionary potential in the state of readiness. How long the present period of smiles is going to last, and what policies might

replace it, is impossible to say.

Would China develop into a Communist power of the Soviet style, which ruthlessly subordinates the interests of the fraternal parties and revolutionary movements on the alter of national interest of the Russian state? Would China succumb to the pulls of her national tradition, casting herself into a role of the Middle Kingdom, which leaves the states on her southern periphery to exist on their own and without interference as long as they do not permit their territories to be used by any power hostile to China as a staging area? Or would China reassert her comitment to the revolutionary ideology and to her role of a revolutionary base in Asia and plunge head on into an activity of revolutionary fundamentalism in the area as in 1949, and then under the influence of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969, at whatever cost?

APPENDIX

Founding Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), August 1967

(Press Release No. 16 of the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, August 8, 1967)

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among the countries of Southeast-East Asia and convinced of the need to strength further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation:

Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region:

Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good beighbourliness and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture:

Considering that the countries of South-East Asia

share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and insuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples:

Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development:

Do hereby declare:

First, the establishment of an association for regional cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian nations:

2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter:
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields:
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and reasearch facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres:
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples:
6. To promote South-East Asian studies:
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

Third, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established:

A. Annual meeting of foreign ministers may be convened

as required

B. A standing committee, under the chairmanship of the foreign minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members the accredited ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between meetings of foreign ministers

C. Ad hoc committees and permanent committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects

D. A national secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the annual or special meetings of foreign ministers, the standing committee and such other committees as may hereafter be established

Fourth, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes:

Fifth, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.

Done in Bangkok on August 8, 1967

For Indonesia:	(Signed) Adam Malik Presidium Minister of Political Affairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
For Malaysia:	(Signed) Tun Abdul Razak Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of National Development
For the Philippines:	(Signed) Narciso Ramos Secretary of Foreign Affairs
For Singapore:	(Signed) S. Rajaratnam Minister for Foreign Affairs
For Thailand:	(Signed) Thanat Khoman Minister of Foreign Affairs

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

[1]The ASEAN includes five nations in most of the Oceanic Southeast Asian area: Indonesia, Malaysian, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore. See Appendix, pp. 220-4 of this Thesis.

[2]For example, Sheldon W. Simon, The Broken Triangle, Peking, Djakarta and the PKI, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969.

[3]For example, Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation, University of California Prss, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, England, 1970.

CHAPTER I

[1]John K. Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3, April, 1969. p. 449.

[2]Ibid., p. 450.

[3]Benjamin I. Schwartz, Communism and China—Ideology In Flux, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, pp. 1-46.

[4]Ishwer C. Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in An Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair, Beacon Press, Boston, 1970, pp. ix-xiv.

[5]Albert Feuerwerker, "Relating to the International Community," in Michael Oksenberg, (Ed.), China's Developmental Experience, The Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, March, 1973, pp. 43-4.

[6]Fairbank, op. cit., p. 449.

[7]Ibid., p. 450.

[8]Norton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in Tang Tsou, (Ed.), China In Crisis, Vol. 2, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 74.

[9]See for example Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution And the Chinese Political Culture, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971. Also Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

[10]For example, K.C. Chen mentioned in the introduction to "Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations," in his collection on Foreign Policy of China, the early experience of inter-state relationship. Though it is worthwhile to note that since the Spring and Autumn Period (Ch'un-ch'iu) (春秋時代) of 722-481 B.C. and the Warring States Period (戰國時代) of 430-221 B.C., China knew how to deal with other states, yet these experiences can by no means be regarded as international diplomatic contacts. Rather, I would suggest that the Tang (618-907 A.D.) signifies the beginning of true Imperial Chinese foreign relations. See King C. Chen, (Ed.), The Foreign Policy of China, East-West Who? Inc. in Co-operation with Seton Hall University Press, N.J., 1972, p. 8.

[11]C.P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, Oxford University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1969, p. 13.

[12]Ibid., p. 20.

[13]Ibid., p. 19.

[14]Ibid., p. 23.

[15]Ibid., p. 25.

[16]Wang Gungwu, "Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay" in John K. Fairbank, (Ed.), Chinese World Order, Harvard University Press, Mass., 1965, p. 50.

[17]Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, China's Entrance Into the Family of Nations, The Diplomatic Phase 1858-1880, Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 3.

[18]Ibid., p. 4.

[19]Ibid., p. 5.

[20]Wang Gungwu, op. cit., p. 52.

[21]Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1965, p. 16.

[22]Wang Gungwu, op. cit., p. 55.

[23]Victor Purcell, op. cit., p. 16.

[24]Loc. cit.

[25]Wang Gungwu, op. cit., p. 54.

[26]Seven reasons had driven the Ming Emperor in this regard: search of his nephew from whom Yung-lo had taken his throne; show the power and wealth of the empire; search of treasure; desire to know what Timor (Tamerlance) and other Mongols were doing in the Far West of Asia, fearing that they would remove the influence of the Ming Empire upon its vassals; personality of Yung-lo and his greed for glory and the rivalries and politics of the inner and outer courts. See Wang Gungwu, op. cit., p. 55.

[27]J.D. Frodsham (Translator and Annotater), The First Chinese Embassy to the West—The Journals of Kuo Sung-t'ao, Liu Hsi-hung and Chang Te-yi, Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, Ely House, London, 1974, p. xxi. Frodsham's elaboration should be criticized before confirming his judgement of the possibility of the Ming to develop into a colonial power. He intentionally omits to name Britain as one of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia in the later days of its history, and refuses to put this most active colonial power, who had conquered many lands in this area, on the list of the European countries who all scrambled the region of Southeast Asia during this period. As a matter of fact, until the end of the Second World War, not only Portugal, Spain,and Holland, but Britain as well, all had their own colonies in this vast area. Secondly, we cannot agree with him that "By the fifteen century there were already considerable colonies of Chinese..." It is obvious that here he regards the area of Southeast Asia as colonies of Emperor Yung-lo. As was stated earlier, the tributary functionary was based on father-son relationship or senior-junior relationship and therefore readers should not be confused by Frodsham's analysis. At the most, for the Ming court, Southeast Asia could be regarded as its potential vassal. This potential, however, had never been developed and actualized into the status of colonies. As Authur Huck correctly states, "The Celebrated tribute system, whatever else it may have been, was certainly not a colonial system as that term has been understood in the

west." See his The Security of China, Columbia University Press, New York, 1970, p. 25.

[28]Fairbank, op. cit., p. 454.

[29]Frodsham, op. cit., p. xx.

[30]C.P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 25

[31]Ibid., p. 32.

[32]Loc. cit.

[33]For example, French in Vietnam, Dutch in Indonesia and British in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits Settlements and Burma.

[34]See Fairbank, (Ed.), The Chinese World Order, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

[35]Edgar Wickberg, (Compiler), Historical Interaction of China and Vietnam: Institutional and Cultural Themes, International Studies, East Asian Series, Research Publication, No. 4, Center for Asian Studies, The University of Kansas Press, 1969, p. 26.

[36]Frodsham, op. cit., p. xvi.

[37]Immanual C.Y. Hsu, op. cit., p. 4.

[38]Peking Review, Peking, June 13, 1975.

[39]Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," op. cit., p. 451.

[40]Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 14.

[41]C.P. Fitzgerald, The Third China, The Chinese Community in Southeast Asia, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1965.

[42]C.P. Fitzgerald, China and Southeast Asia Since 1945, Longman, London, 1973, p. 98.

[43]Loc. cit.

[44]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 24, 1975.

[45]Leo Goodstadt, "The Overseas Chinese, A Model of Stability," Round Table, No. 259, July 1975, p. 251.

[46]Lea Williams, The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, (A Volumn in the Series, "The United States and China in World Affairs") Published for the Council on Foreign Releations by the McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1966.

[47]Victor Purcell, op. cit., p. 25.

[48]Loc. cit.

[49]W.E. Willmott, "The Chinese in Southeast Asia," Australian Outlook, Vol. 20, No. 3, December 1966, p. 260.

[50]Lea Williams, op. cit., p. 39.

[51]David W. Chang, "The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Chinese Point of View," Asian Profile, Vol. 2, No. 4, August 1974, p. 357.

[52]For a more detailed disscusion of the issue, see James J. Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy, Eastern Universities Press, Singapore, 1960.

[53]Charles Coppel, "The Position of the Chinese in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia," in The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, Report No. 10, Miniority Rights Group, London, 1972, p. 19.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid.

[56]David W. Chang, op. cit., p. 363.

[57]Loc. cit.

[58]Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese— A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1972, p. 123.

[59]David W. Chang, op. cit., p. 364-5.

[60]Ibid., p. 364.

[61]Charles Coppel, op. cit., p. 16.

[62]Ibid., p. 20.

[63]Loc. cit.

[64]Hugh and Ping-ching Mabbett, "The Chinese Community in Indonesia," in The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, op. cit., p. 5.

[65]Charles Coppel, op. cit., p. 22.

[66]Ibid., p. 23.

[67]See Peaceful Co-existence--Two Diametrically Opposed Policies, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (VI), (兩種根本對立的和平共處政策——六評蘇共中央的公開信), Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1963.

[68]Ross Terrill, "China's Aims in Southeast," in Ian Wilson, (Ed.), China And The World Community, Angus and Robertson, in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney, 1973, p. 201.

[69]Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1970, p. 41.

[70]Op. cit., p. 42.

CHAPTER II

[1]Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, Peking's Support For Wars of National Liberation, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1970, p. 10.

[2]J.H. Brimmell, Communism in Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, London, p. 210.

[3]Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements, Praeger, New York, 1974, p. 258.

[4]Loc. Cit.

[5]Ibid., p. 256.

[6]Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1945-1965, Mouton, the Hague, Paris, 1976, p. 203.

[7]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 260.

[8]The five principles are: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful Co-existence.

[9]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 260.

[10]For an excellent discussion of China's entrance into the Korean War, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, The Decision to Enter the Korean War, The Macmillian Co., New York, 1960.

[11]Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949, (New and enlarged Ed.), The Macmillian Co., New York, 1972, pp. 75-6.

[12]A. Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage, China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1974, p. 251.

[13]Harold C. Hinton, op. cit., p. 76.

[14]Russell Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1954-1958, Archon Books, Reprinted 1968 by arrangement with Harper and Row, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 141.

[15]Op. cit., p. 144.

[16]Loc. cit.

[17]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 279.

[18]Ibid., p. 280.

[19]David A. Wilson, "China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung," China Quarterly, July-September, 1967, pp. 110-20.

[20]According to the concept of the "Two Intermediate Zones," there is an intermediate area between the United States and the Soviet Union "whose leaders are not colluding with the American imperialism for world domination." The intermediate zone is composed of two parts. One part consists of the independent countries and those striving for independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; it is called the first intermediate zone. The second part consists of the whole of Western Europe, Oceania, Canada, and other capitalist countries and is called the second intermediate zone. Countries in this second zone are said to have a dual character. "While their ruling classes are exploiters and oppressors, these countries themselves are subjected to the American control, interference, and bullying. They, therefore, try their best to free themselves from American control. In this regard they have something in common with the Socialist countries and the peoples of the various countries." See "All the World's Forces Opposing US Imperialism Unite!" (全世界力量团结起来打敗美帝国主义) Editorial in the People's Daily, Peking, January 21, 1964. An English text of the editorial appears in Peking Review, Peking, January 24, 1964, pp. 6-8

[21]Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, The George Washington University Institute for Defense Analysis, Macmillian, London, Melbourne, 1966, p. 430.

[22]Loc. cit.

[23]Ibid., p. 433.

[24]Loc. cit.

[25]Loc. cit.

[26]Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, op. cit., p. 408.

[27]Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, p. 109.

[28]Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, May 1963.

[29]Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, op. cit., p. 441.

[30]New China News Agency, Hong Kong, August 29, 1957.

[31]A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, Harper and Brother, New York, 1960, p. 242.

[32]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 287.

[33]People's Daily, Peking, Editorial, March 12, 1961.

[34]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 300.

[35]New China News Agency, Hong Kong, "Commentator," August 22, 1958.

[36]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 285.

[37]Op. cit., p. 276.

[38]People's Daily, Peking, May 30, 1959.

[39]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 322.

[40]Peter Van Ness, op. cit., p. 235.

[41]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 124.

[42]Op. cit., p. 125.

[43]Op. cit., p. 123.

[44]Moscow Radio, March 16, 1967, quoted in Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 122.

[45]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 291.

[46]Loc. cit.

[47]People's Daily, Peking, March 23, 1968.

[48]Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, No. 3443, pp. 34-5.

[49]People's Daily, Peking, October 7, 1965.

[50]The Path of Violence to Absolute Power, Kuala Lumpur Government "White Paper," 1968, quoted in Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 312.

[51]Loc. cit.

[52]People's Daily, Peking, March 23, 1968.

[53]New China News Agency, Hong Kong, March 14, 1966.

[54]Quoted in Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 324.

[55]Loc. cit.

[56]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 324.

[57]New China News Agency, Hong Kong, May 6, 1967.

CHAPTER III

[1]William G. Saywell, "Reflections of a New China Hand," International Journal, Vol. XXIX, 1973-74, p. 330.

[2]Loc. cit.

[3]Daniel Tretiak, "Is China Preparing to 'Turn Out'?: Changes in Chinese Levels of Attention to the International Environment," Asian Survey, March 1971, Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 222.

[4]Op. cit., p. 237.

[5]Joseph C. Kun, "Peking and World Communism," Problem of Communism, November-December, 1974, p. 40.

[6]Joseph Camilleri, Southeast Asia in China's Foreign Policy, (Occasional Paper No. 29), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, April 1975, p. 12.

[7]Op. cit., p. 15.

[8]Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest—An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949, Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited, Don Mills, Ontario, 1970, p. 283.

[9]Op. cit., p. 284.

[10]Loc. cit.

[11]Op. cit., p. 290.

[12]Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, A Dell Book, Dell Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1972; Chapter 9, "The China Breakthrough", pp. 248-303.

[13]The article was originally published on December 25, 1940; see Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works, Vol. 3, International Publishers, New York, pp. 215-24.

[14]Harold C. Hinton, The Bear At the Gate, Chinese Policy-Making Under the Soviet Pressure, AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1971, p. 4.

[15]Victor C. Funnell, "China and the ASEAN: The Changing Face of Southeast Asia," World Today, Vol. 31, No. 7, July 1975, p. 306.

[16]Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-ping, At the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, (April 10, 1974), Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1974.

[17]Op. cit., p. 2.

[18]Op. cit., p. 3.

[19]Op. cit., p. 21.

[20]People's Daily, Peking, January 5, 1975.

[21]Joseph Camilleri, op. cit., p. 3.

[22]Op. cit., pp. 18-9.

[23]Speech By Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, op. cit., p. 8.

[24]Op. cit., p. 7.

[25]Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia, Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements, Praeger, New York, p. 332.

[26]Straits Times, Singapore, August 20, 1968; quoted in Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 338.

[27]Straits Times, Singapore, March 11, 1969; quoted in Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 338.

[28]Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 4, 1, March, 1971; quoted in Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 338.

[29]Straits Times, Malaysia, January 16 and 17, 1971; quoted in Camilleri, op. cit., p. 25.

[30]New China News Agency, Peking, April 19, 1971.

[31]New China News Agency, Peking, May 31, 1974.

[32]Camilleri, op. cit., p. 27.

[33]Ibid., p. 28.

[34]People's Daily, Peking, January 14, 1975.

[35]People's Daily, Peking, April 11, 1975.

[36]People's Daily, Peking, April 30, 1975.

[37]People's Daily, Peking, May 2, 1975

[38]People's Daily, Peking, April 30, 1975.

[39]People's Daily, Peking, August 15, 1975.

[40]Jay Taylor, op. cit., p. 348.

[41]Japan Times, Toyko, May 16, 1973.

[42]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 4, 1974, p. 52

[43]People's Daily, Peking, February 23, 1975.

[44]People's Daily, Peking, January 5, 1975.

[45]People's Daily, Peking, February 17, 1975.

[46]People's Daily, Peking, March 3, 1975.

[47]Loc. cit.

[48]People's Daily, Peking, January 5, 1975.

[49]Loc. cit.

[50]People's Daily, Peking, March 22, 1975.

[51]People's Daily, Peking, June 1, 1975.

[52]People's Daily, Peking, June 3, 1975.

[53]The mentioning of such historical contacts during the Ming Period was believed to be a reminder to the Philippines that now Marcos was repeating the tributary missions practised by the Philippine kings centuries ago.

[54]People's Daily, Peking, June 10, 1975. Also see "At Banquet Welcoming President and Madame Marcos, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's Speech (Excerpts)," Peking Review, January 13, 1975, p. 9.

[55]Loc. cit.

[56]Loc. cit.

[57]In his speech, Marcos said, "But if we speak of discovery we must remember that China knew the Philippines as early as 977 A.D. The records of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) and the Ming Dynasty (1366-1644) referred to the flourishing trade between our two countries. The Sultan of Sulu, Peduca Pahala, visited Peking in 1417, died in Shanghai and was entombed in the Ming Tombs outside Peking. The Chinese writers Chao Ju-kua and Wang Ta-yuan referred to the Chinese-Philippine trade in the year 1255 and 1349." See loc. cit.

[58]People's Daily, Peking, June 10, 1975 and Peking Review, January 13, 1975, p. 9.

[59]Loc. cit.

[60]People's Daily, Peking, June 10, 1975 and Peking Review, January 13, 1975, p. 9.

[61]Peking Review, Peking, op. cit., p. 7.

[62]Peking Review, Peking, op. cit., p. 8.

[64]Asian Research Bulletin, Singapore, Vol. 3, No. 81, January 31, 1974, p. 2404.

[65]People's Daily, Peking, January 5, 1975.

[66]People's Daily, Peking, January 6, 1975.

[67]People's Daily, Peking, January 14, 1975.

[68]People's Daily, Peking, January 28, 1975.

[69]People's Daily, Peking, March 12, 1975.

[70]People's Daily, Peking, March 21, 1975.

[71]People's Daily, Peking, March 23, 1975.

[72]People's Daily, Peking, March 20, 1975.

[73]People's Daily, Peking, March 22, 1975.

[74]People's Daily, Peking, June 30, 1975.

[75]Peking Review, Peking, July 4, 1975, p. 11; see also People's Daily, Peking, July 1, 1975.

[76]Peking Review, Peking, July 4, 1975, p. 11.

[77]Peking Review, Peking, July 4, 1975, p. 12.

[78]Peking Review, Peking, July 4, 1975, p. 8.

[79]Peking Review, Peking, July 4, 1975, p. 9.

[80]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, (Year Book), 1972, p. 282.

[81]"The Thought of Lee Kuan Yew," in "Focus on Singapore," Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, August 13, 1973, pp. 6-7.

[82]Camilleri, op. cit., p. 31.

[83]Kawin Wilairat, Singapore's Foreign Policy, (Field Report No. 10, 1975), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, June 1975, p. 101.

[84]People's Daily, March 14, 1975.

[85]Loc. cit.

[86]Loc. cit.

[87]People's Daily, Peking, April 27 and August 10, 1975.

[88]People's Daily, Peking, August 10, 1975.

[89]People's Daily, Peking, September 29, 1975.

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CHAPTER IV

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[5]Robert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1974, p. 357.

[6]Ibid., p. 360.

[7]Cited from Colin Chapman, "Towards a New Pacific Alliance," in the Year Book of World Affairs, 1975, (Published under the Auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs), Stevens and Sons, 1975, p. 89.

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[13]Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," Asian Survey, XIII, No. 12, December, 1973, p. 1075; and V. Pavlovsky, "Collective Security: The Way to Peace in Asia," International Affairs, Moscow, July 1972, p. 23.

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[17]See footnote 9.

[18]See Far Eastern Economic Review, April 8, 1972.

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[22]See p. 160 in this thesis.

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[25]Malaysian Digest, October 31, 1973, p. 10; cited in Dick Wilson, op. cit., p. 111.

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[27]New York Times, March 18, 1973.

[28]The Mirror, Singapore, September 10, 1973, p. 2.

[29]Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIII, September-October, 1974, p. 42.

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[31]Chan Heng Chee, Singapore, the Politics of Survival, Oxford in Asian Current Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1971, Chapter 4.

[32]Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia," op. cit., p. 50.

[33]John Knight, "Australia and Proposal for Regional Consultation and Co-operation in the Asian and Pacific Area," Australian Outlook, Vol. 28, No. 3, December 1974, p. 269.

[34]Cited in Astri Suhrke, "Smaller-Nation Diplomacy: Thailand's Current Dilemma," Asian Survey, May 1971, p. 438.

[35]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, March 26, 1970, p. 26.

[36]Arnold L. Horelick, op. cit., p. 279.

[37]Peking Review, July 4, 1969; see also Melvin Gurtov, "Sino-Soviet Relations and Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter, 1970-71, p. 491.

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[39]Loc. cit.

[40]The importance of the Straits to Japan is due to her dependence on the Middle-East oil. Some 90 per cent of Japan's oil supplies of about 200 million tons come through the Straits from the Middle East. Throughout the year 1969, Japan imported 146 million tons of crude oil, 87 per cent

from the Middle-East, and 11 per cent from Indonesia. At least 70 tankers of over 200,000 tons had passed through the Straits. See M. Pathmanathan, "The Straits of Malacca: A Basis for Conflict or Co-operation?" in Lau Teik Soon, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 186.

[41]M. Pathmanathan, "The Straits of Malacca: A Basis for Conflict or Co-operation?" in op. cit., p. 187.

[42]L.C. Green, "International Law, The Malacca Straits and Offshore Oil," in Victor M. Fic, (Ed.), Strategies for Social Change—Focus Upon Malaysia and Singapore, (Papers and Proceedings of a conference held on November 22 and 23, 1974 at Brock University, Canadian Council on Southeast Asian Studies of the Canadian Soviety for Asian Studies,) 1975, p. 58.

[43]Ibid., p. 59.

[44]M. Pathmanathan, "The Straits of Malacca: A Basis for Conflict or Co-operation?" in Lau Teik Soon, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 187.

[45]Michael Leifer and Dolliver Nelson, "Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca," in International Affairs, London, Vol. 49, No. 2, April 1973, pp. 194-5; see also M. Pathmanathan, "The Straits of Malacca: A Basis for Conflict or Co-operation," in Lau Teik Soon, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 186.

[46]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 14.

[47]M. Pathmanathan, "The Straits of Malacca: A Basis for Conflict or Co-operation?" in Lau Teik Soon, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 192.

[48]Ibid., p. 188; also see L.C. Green, "International Law, The Malacca Straits and Offshore Oil," in Victor M. Fic, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 60.

[49]L.C. Green, "International Law, The Malacca Straits and Offshore Oil," in Victor M. Fic, (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 60-1.

[50]In the Joint Sino-American Communique of Shanghai, both promised not to seek hegemony in Asia. See Document 11, "The US-China Communique at the Conclusion of President Nixon's visit to China, February 1972," in Sudershan Chawla (et al.), op. cit., pp. 151-4

[51]M. Pathmanathan, "The Straits of Malacca: A Basis for Conflict or Co-operation?" in Lau Teik Soon, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 188.

[52]Ibid., p. 193

[53]People's Daily, Peking, March 21, 1974.

[54]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 120.

[55]People's Daily, Peking, January 5, 1975; see "Tun-nan-ya-kuo-jia Tung Kwang-ta Ti-san-si-chieh Yi-tao Kai-chan Fan-pa-tou-cheng" (The Southeast Asian Countries Open Out an Anti-Hegemonic Struggles Together with the Third World Countries), in Tang-chen Ti Kuo-tze-sin-zie (The Present International Situation), Vol. 3, October 1974-January 1975, San Luen Book Store, Hong Kong, January 1975, p. 57.

[56]People's Daily, Peking, February 23, 1975.

[57]People's Daily, Peking, May 13, 1975.

[58]Hsueh Shih-shih (Learning the Current Affairs), published by Wen Hui Pao, Hong Kong, Vol. 12, No. 542-545, 1975, p. 40.

[59]Chi-shih-nein-tai Yueh-kan (The Seventies Monthly), Hong Kong, September 1975, p. 33.

[60]People's Daily, Peking, June 26, 1975.

[61]People's Daily, Peking, July 4, 1975.

[62]People's Daily, Peking, August 30, 1975.

[63]Loc. cit.

[64]Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese—A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1972.

[65]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 41.

[66]Sudershan Chawla (et al.), op. cit., Document 8, "The

ASEAN Declaration on the Neutralization of Southeast Asia, November 1971," p. 164.

[67]Allington Kennard, "The Crusade for the 'Neutralization of Southeast Asia,'" Commonwealth, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January, 1973, p. 1.

[68]The record of historical significant cases is: Belgium (1839), Luxembourg (1867), Austria (1955), and Laos (1962). Minor examples include the city state of Gracow (1815), the Independent State of the Congo (1855, Honduras (1907), the Vatican City State (1929), a variety of non-sovereign territories, (e.g., Antartica), and numerous waterways. See Cyril E. Black, (et al.), Neutralization and World Politics, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1968, pp. 18-33.

[69]As defined by Marvin C. Ott, "Neutrality is a traditional and reasonably precise concept in international law referring to the rights and duties of non-belligerents in wartime;" while "Neutralism shares with neutrality a posture of non-participation in an ongoing conflict; but it is a political, not legal term." See Marvin C. Ott, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia: Analysis of the Malaysia/ASEAN Proposal, Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1974, Southeast Asia Series No. 33, Athens, Ohio, 1974, p. 2.

[70]Ibid., p. 11.

[71]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 5.

[72]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[73]Ibid., p. 7.

[74]Marvin C. Ott, op. cit., p. 29. "This book was the outgrowth of 1966 study commissioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In a covering letter to President Johnson, Senator Fulbright commended the original study to the President and noted that theretofore 'no significant work had been done in this field.'" Cited in footnote 4.

[75]Michael Leifer, "Regional Order in Southeast Asia," Round Table, No. 225, July 1974, pp. 311-2.

[76]Stephen Chee, "Malaysia's Changing Foreign Policy," in Trends in Malaysia II, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974, p. 37.

[77]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 67.

[78]Ibid., pp. 66-7.

[79]During a seminal conference held in Singapore in mid-1971, when one of the participants, Peter Lyon said that: "Vietnam and Indonesia will doubtless be trying to rule the local roosts...," Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister replied, "Well, thank you so much indeed, Mr. Lyon, for awarding Indonesia with a major power status. Indonesia, together with the other ASEAN member countries, is trying hard to prevent your prediction becoming a reality." (Laugthers). See Lau Teik Soon (Ed.), op. cit., pp. 201-2.

[80]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, September 25, 1971, pp. 32-3.

[81]Loc. cit.

[82]Bangkok Post, January 18, 1973. Cited in Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 58.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Adam Malik's speech, "Balance of Power in Southeast Asia," The Asian Student, San Francisco, September 27, 1975.

[85]Robert Shaplen, "Southeast Asia—Before and After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, April 1975, p. 541.

[86]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, December 4, 1971, pp. 5-6.

[87]Francis L. Starner, "Search for Survival," Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, September 19, 1968, p. 555; and Harvey Stockwin, "The Sum of the Five Negatives," Ibid., September 26, 1968, pp. 629-31.

[88]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 75.

[89]Japan Times, Tokyo, April 22, 1973.

[90]Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 75.

[91]Loc. cit.

[92]Michael Leifer, op. cit., p. 315.

[93]Bangkok Post, November 30, 1971. Cited in Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 74.

[94]Thanat's earlier remark in the Straits Times Kuala Lumpur, June 16, 1971: "How can we think that Asian nations can be more successful than the countries in Europe?" Cited in ibid., p. 76.

[95]New Nation, Singapore, November 28, 1971. Cited in ibid., p. 69.

[96]Bangkok Post, March 26, 1973. Cited in ibid., p. 69.

[97]Asian Research Bulletin, June 1973, p. 1842.

[98]Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 12, December 1973, p. 1078.

[99]Ibid., p. 1079.

[100]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 3, 1972, p. 5.

[101]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, October 3, 1972, p. 5.

[102]Alexander O. Ghebhardt, op. cit., p. 1079.

[103]Loc. cit.

[104]James Morgan, "Peace in Their Time—And Terms?" Also James Morgan, "Surprise for Investors," Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, July 3, 1971, p. 60.

[105]Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, December 4, 1971. See James Morgan's report.

[106]Marvin C. Ott, op. cit., p. 28.

[107]Cited in Dick Wilson, Neutralization of Southeast Asia, p. 104.

[108]Ibid., p. 106.

[109]Far Eastern Economic Review, Editorial, December 19, 1975, p. 10.

[110]Loc. cit.

[111]Loc. cit.

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[116]Asian Research Bulletin, July 1973, p. 1910.

[117]Loc. cit.

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[119]M.G.G. Pillai, "Blazing the Peking Trail," Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, June 10, 1974.

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[121]See the article "'Asian Collective System' is a Pretext for Expansion," Peking Review, August 15, 1975, p. 21.

[122]George McT. Kahin, "The Role of the United States in Southeast Asia," in Lau Teik Soon, (Ed.), op. cit., p. 80.

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