TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO PSYCHOLOGISM

A Thesis submitted to
Brock University

by

MARGARET NEWTON

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
April 1978

© Margaret Newton, 1978
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work stands upon the labour and inspiration of the faculty and students of the Brock University Philosophy Department. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. James Hansen for his diligence at insuring that this work is fit to read. That he gave so generously of his practical experience, generated the spirit that carried the project to fruition. I would also like to thank Dr. Debabrata Sinha for encouraging high standards of scholarship. Finally, thanks must go to my husband, John, for his solid companionship during these last two years.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Subjective-relative Epistemology.</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Lebenswelt.</td>
<td>18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Transcendental Reduction and Psychologism</td>
<td>33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Conclusion</td>
<td>51.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>58.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I: SUBJECTIVE-RELATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
Husserl's work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, contains a medley of philosophical themes. One of the central ones is the explanation of how subjective experience can be basis of objective knowledge. Any philosopher who proposed such an explanation of episteme must be prepared to deal with its adjunctive problem of psychologism. By concentrating on Part III A of the Crisis, we will see how successfully Husserl was able to show that subjective experience could have universal objective dimensions.

John Wild characterized psychologism as being the family trait of relativism, skepticism, idealism, and subjectivism, or any philosophy that makes reason dependent upon something non-rational in character.

---

* Hereafter referred to as Crisis.


Most commonly, this problem is created because reason is thought to be dependent upon human will, an absurd consequence whereby the universal is dependent upon the contingent. We will show that Husserl designed the transcendental reduction of the Lebenswelt as his final response to psychologism.³

We will begin by outlining Husserl’s background discussions as found in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" and Part II of the Crisis of the psychologistic errors occurring during the course of the development of modern philosophy. These two selections provide a setting which show Husserl’s discovery of the Lebenswelt to be a response to what he saw to be the potential psychologistic error of his phenomenology. Second, we will closely examine the technique of investigating the Lebenswelt in Crisis, Part III A. Third, we will assess the extent to which the particular solution of the Crisis was effective in eliminating the psychologistic doubt possible of transcendental phenomenology.

³ The problem of psychologism to which we are referring is not equivalent to the specific formulation of the problem in Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. by J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 42. Psychologism, in that context refers to the claim that the empirical science of psychology ought to provide the basis for logic. When we use the term, "psychologism", we mean John Wild's broader definition.
Husserl's life-long approach to the problem of psychologism was primarily epistemological. He was interested in providing a critique of experience as an effort to answer the question of whether the data of experience could provide an adequate basis for objective knowledge. He was firmly convinced that objectivity was directly given to subjectivity without also believing that objectivity was merely conventional. Consequently, the bulk of the phenomenological exercises concerned the thematization of the knowledge situation by means of a technique of reflection. This reflection was to allow the phenomenologist to experience every objectivity in direct correlation with subjective activities. Phenomenology can in this manner be called a subject-related epistemological approach.

In "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", Husserl saw psychologistic epistemologies as a serious threat to philosophy. This was because he thought that philosophy ought to be science, episteme, which "in its ideal perfection, it would be reason itself, which could have no authority equal or superior to itself." Here Husserl

---

saw two basic types of psychologism effecting the development of modern philosophy: Naturalism and Historicism.

Husserl saw Naturalism, the view that every thing that is belongs to the "unity of spatio-temporal being subject to exact laws of nature"⁵; as the basic style of epistemology key for British empiricism and positivism. Proponents of the naturalistic stance claim that every object, to be known with certainty, must be measurable or mathematizable as if it were a spatial entity. This measurability persisted as the criterion of objectivity, even though Descartes showed the mental or the psychical to be mutually exclusive of spatially extended substance. Thereafter, it was difficult to give an account of mind. Naturalism deals with the psychical, mental, or subjective principles of the knowledge situation in the following ways: a) by straightforwardly reducing them to the physical, as John Locke did when considering mind to be a tabula rasa and ideas to be like physical events⁶; b) the psychical is con-

⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

⁶ Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 63.
sidered different from but parallel in operation to the physical, as in the manner by which the experimental psychologist looks for correlations between neurophysiological events and psychic events; c) positivism deals with the psychical or subjective by eliminating it entirely from its study by means of an absolute ontology of facts (hypothesized sense data). To Husserl, the effect of these three attempts was to "naturalize" reason, consciousness, and ideas by making them dependent upon contingent psycho-physical activity. For Husserl, these were absurd consequences because reason, consciousness and ideas had a universal status which made them contributors to to *episteme*. Naturalism reduces or eliminates the subjective elements because they are thought to frustrate the goal of objective knowledge in the form of mathematical exactitude, by introducing the doxic elements of personal whim and deceit. Yet, for Husserl, any form of naturalism could not result in objective knowledge because they could all be shown to be psychologistic.


Proponents of historicism, by supporting "the relative justification of every philosophy for its own time"\(^9\), do not believe \textit{episteme} to be possible. Though this view reduces all to spirit, the subjective principle, it understands this principle to be human or cultural, and not universal. Husserl saw epistemologies of this kind as being psychologistic because they reduced philosophy to anthropology or history.

It is true that Husserl worked within the legacy of Cartesian dualism, but he did not by-pall its epistemological difficulties. Instead, ever since the \textit{Logical Investigations}, he had faced up to the bipolarity of the epistemological situation, that it involved an irreducible correlation between subjective principles and objective principles. Husserl freely admitted that the apprehension of an object very often involved the conjunction of temporally situated subjective acts and atemporal objects (ideas). The paradigmatic illustration would be the operation of counting and the object number.\(^{10}\) Husserl, however, restrained himself from the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[9] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 77.
\item[10] Peter Kostenbaum, intro. to Husserl's \textit{Paris}
\end{footnotes}
psychologistic trap of claiming that subjective operations cause ideas. The investigations of Descartes suggested to Husserl the psychologistic problem in a nutshell, as "the problem of how rational structures engendered in my own reason (my own clara et distinctae perceptiones) can claim an objectively true, a metaphysically transcendent validity."¹¹ Husserl's response to this problem took the general form of claiming that the perceptiones, or what is given to subjectivity, were immanently rational¹²; that is, the essence of what is was straightforwardly given in experience. For that reason Husserl's approach differed significantly from the epistemological studies of both Hume and Kant, which also began from the given in experience. For Hume, one of the dominant characteristics of the perceptions of feeling and thinking, respectively impressions and ideas, was flux - one perception succeed-

¹¹ Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 81.
¹² Ibid., p. 90.
ed another. For this reason, the true apprehension of essence (the self identical nature of an object that persists through all its appearances) was impossible.\textsuperscript{13} The illusion of identity was preserved for Hume by the fiction (a notion without corresponding impressions or ideas) of substance or matter.\textsuperscript{14} That Hume made of identity an invention of the mind led to what Husserl called the bankruptcy of objective knowledge\textsuperscript{15}, the impossibility of directly apprehending the unchanging self-identical form of an object given in the flux of its appearances. In contrast to Hume, Husserl aimed at showing that essence intuition was possible, that the identical nature of a succession of appearances was somehow given to subjectivity.

On a different tact, Kant showed that what is given (sense data) were rationalized due to the pure forms of sensible intuition and the categories of the under-

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 87


\textsuperscript{15} Husserl, \textit{Crisis}, op. cit., p. 88.
standing, making the apprehension of the essential charac-
teristics of any object possible. Husserl was dis-
satisfied with Kant's proposed solution because it fos-
tered the psychologistic separation of rational norms
and sensibly intuitable data, instead of showing the
intrinsic relation of reason to intuition in experience.
The result of Kant's position was that sensibility pro-
vided the data from the "outside" world which were ex-
ternally logicized by the categories of the under-
standing. Since the categories of the understanding and the
pure forms of sensible intuition seemed to Husserl to
model closely the parameters of mathematized nature,
the implication was that prescientific experience was
non-rational. In this manner, Kant depicted reason as
being dependent on the contingent cultural event of
the birth of the positive sciences. Husserl wrote of
resulting position:

Natural Science is, to be sure, not
purely rational in so far as it has
need of outer experience, sensivility;
but everything in it that is rational
it owes to pure reason and its set-
ting of norms; only through them can
there be rationalized experience. As

16 Ibid., p. 93
for sensibility, on the other hand, it had generally been assumed that it gives rise to the merely sensible data, precisely as a result of affection from the outside. And yet one acted as if the experienciable world of the prescientific man - the world not yet logicized by mathematics - was pregiven by mere sensibility. 17

The characteristics of the epistemic ought to precede rather than follow what is called natural science. Husserl attempted to rectify the psychologistic problems of the epistemologies of Hume and Kant by first broadening the notion of phenomenon. Phenomena for Husserl were not merely the sense data from the "outside" world, but more generally were the givenness of any object, real or ideal, to awareness. Husserl also considered subject and object solely in terms of their functions for the epistemological situation. As a result, the subject was not a mental subject or mind or rational faculty, but consciousness of an object. The object was considered in a non-material fashion as givenness to consciousness. Subject and object were not causally related but intentionally related, so that for each act of consciousness there is presented something, e.g., an object in space, number, image, idea, etc. Accord-

17 Ibid., p. 93
ing to Aron Gurwitsch, intentionality is best understood as the objectivating of consciousness.\textsuperscript{18} Objective universal knowledge, for Husserl, in a further anti-psychological measure, was not concerned with the factual existence of the outside world, but with the truth and validity or \textit{Sinn} of the world.\textsuperscript{19} In this way, essence could phenomenally be given to consciousness by means of its objectivating principle of intentionality, as the ideal atemporal unity or the meaning of an object given in an indefinite number of presentative acts.\textsuperscript{20} Universal knowledge was experientially possible for Husserl because essences can be found among the data directly given to awareness.

That essences could be given phenomenally might prove experience to transcend doxic - relativist opinion, but is not Husserl's concept of essence psychologistic? John Wild and Herbert Marcuse think that it is, but Husserl was hardly the originater of this trend.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," \textit{Philosophic Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl}, op. cit., p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Husserl, \textit{Crisis}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 96.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 76 - 82.
\end{itemize}
Essence, once ontologically characterized by Plato and Aristotle as the self-identical form of a thing that persisted through all its changes, as a result of antiscoclastic Cartesianism, became a name for the ubiquitous characters of all intellectual possibilities. However, Husserl believed that he was overcoming psychologism by showing that experience has ubiquitous characteristics by means of which essence is given. He thought that a non-substantial, non-anthropomorphic characterization of subjectivity would emerge by investigating the universal style of givenness of the phenomena themselves.

Husserl was well aware of how easily the account of his investigations would fall into the logical absurdities of psychologism (that the subject invents objects, for example), especially if he did not take pains to differentiate the intentionality of the empirical subject, which is volition, from the intentionality of the transcendental subject, which is the objectivating function. Consequently, Husserl saw that his

investigations of the universal characteristics of phenomena required a different attitude or point of view from the one of everyday life. Husserl called this everyday attitude the natural or mundane attitude. The key characteristic of this attitude is that the human subject remains wholly ignorant of the intentional structure of objectivity. Objects tend to appear "out there" as if they were alienated from subjective operations. Husserl would substitute this with another fixed style of willing called the theoretical attitude, which is a reflection upon experience, to reveal the subjective "constitution" of each object, real or ideal, according to intentionality. The important thing about this reflective attitude was that it demonstrated that subjective operations were not produced ex nihlo by it, but rather by means of this attitude subjective operations thematically show themselves that they did happen to shape these objects that one has experienced. However, the theoretical attitude did not reveal trans-


cendental subjectivity as a thematic object. All that it did was reveal a system of intentional correlations that were neutral in terms of personal or cultural relativities which formed the sense (Sinn) of the world of experience (the Lebenswelt). An important step in Husserl's change of focus from the natural attitude to the theoretical attitude was his realization that the scientific outlook of the natural sciences was not a truly theoretical attitude because it dealt with naturalized objectivity—objectivity that was viewed as alien to subjective constitution.²⁴

The phenomenologist, in an effort to bring about the theoretical attitude, tries to put out of commission all the presupposed theories the "unconsciously" shape his experience in order to have only the data before his awareness. This technique of epoche is a necessary step on the road to examining the intrinsic traits of phenomena because it is a way of avoiding cliché approaches to what happens in human experience. Clearly, focusing upon the data of experience thematizes the intentional structure of objectivity (givenness to awareness). First person constitution also had another

²⁴ Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 13.
virtue for Husserl. He was assured that objective certainty did not come from mathematizability but from first person givenness or self-evidence. Husserl found this to be the achievement of Descartes' Meditations:

Thus my whole life of acts - experiencing, thinking, valuing, etc. - remains, and indeed flows on, but what was before my eyes in that life as "the" world, having being and validity for me, has become a mere phenomenon and this in respect to all determinations proper to it. In the epoché all these determinations, and the world itself, have been transformed into my ideas; they are inseparable components of my cogitationes, precisely as their cogitata. 25

That is, since one can doubt the existence of an object, existence is a presupposed characteristic of experience: while the fact that one cannot doubt the cogito-cogitatum structure of objectivity shows it to be an objective certainty.

This first chapter has attempted to show that Husserl was aware that psychologistic epistemologies made objective knowledge, episteme, a logical absurdity. Yet Husserl, by realizing that subjectivity was correlative with objectivity, faced up to the psychologistic problem. We have also discussed some of the general

25 Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., pp. 77 - 78.
precautions that Husserl took to insure that his subject-related epistemology need not be psychologistic. These were that all investigations were to be based on apodictic data by refraining from relying on presuppositions; that data not be unduly restricted to sense data, thus eliminating the implication that ideas result from the outside world impinging on the mind; that phenomena, though in flux, can yield essence in the form of Sinn; and, finally, the attempt to differentiate the empirical subject from the transcendental subject.

In Chapter II we will discuss why Husserl could claim that the "situation" of subjectivity in correlation with the Lebenswelt was the universal and necessary basis of scientific knowledge. We will try and understand how Husserl, without committing the psychologistic error, built his case.
CHAPTER II: THE LEBENSWELT
As we saw in Chapter I, Husserl's diagnosis of the problem of psychologism involved inventing a method of "seeing" the universal aspects of phenomena. Husserl believed this tact would eliminate the mechanical epistemologies of external data impinging upon the mind or of mind imposing universal categories to form aggregates of data. In the Crisis, Husserl examined the universal field of all actual and possible phenomena which he called the Lebenswelt. This field included everything of which one can be aware. It was therefore not restricted by the dimensions of space, time and causality, as was the world of natural science. Husserl illustrated this universality of the Lebenswelt by claiming that it also included the phenomena of pre-scientific experience.

After showing that the dimensions responsible for the coherence of the "natural" world of the sciences were the result of the development of arbitrary conventions, Husserl had to find an explanation for the universality of the dimensions of the Lebenswelt. Husserl considered phenomena to be arranged in a universal field because of their ability to convey meaning. The specific psychologistic threat that the Crisis seems to have been designed to meet was that the objective world may be simply a personal invention of
meaning. This charge must be cleared by any thinker who claims that indubitable knowledge of universals can be based on subjective experiences. The question to be answered was, in Husserl's words:

how, throughout the alteration of relative validities, subjective appearances and opinions, the coherent, universal validity world - the world - comes into being for us. 26

This chapter will illustrate Husserl's attempt to overcome psychologism by showing that transcendental subjectivity is the functional prerequisite for there being a universal field of phenomena.

Part III A of the Crisis helps us become aware that the meaning of the world in its totality is pre-given or preintended before any individual subject apprehends any object, whether real or ideal. If we try to grasp the Lebenswelt as if it were one object, it becomes a thematic object for us. Everything that can be intuited (Anschaubarkeit) 27 would then be seen as all organized in the Lebenswelt according to the inten-

26  
Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 144.

27  
tionality of a transpersonal subjectivity.

Since in everyday life the intentional structure of world apprehension remains hidden to us, it is necessary for the phenomenologist to adopt a new outlook - the theoretical attitude. To the consciousness of human subjects engrossed in everyday life (Husserl's natural attitude), the world seems only to be "out there" in relation to subjective intuitions. It is easy to see that a psychologistic epistemology could result from this position - ideas could be considered the products of the causal interaction of mind with the "external" world. Husserl would also suspend the theories of the natural sciences because of their claim that intuitive experience is not univocal insofar as it varies from person to person. Mathematical entities, the true objectivities for the natural sciences, have two drawbacks which Husserl's search for the intentional structure of the Lebenswelt would override if successful. First: mathematical entities are not in principle experienceable. Second: the mathematical form-

28 Ibid., p. 145.

29 Ibid., p. 51.
ulation of the coherence of the natural world is merely a presupposition of Western culture. The analysis of the coherent organization of phenomena in a Lebenswelt in terms of intentionality would at least apply to all men in all time periods. In addition, all findings concerning the universal structure of phenomena would be directly grasped by the theoretical attitude and verifiable according to first hand evidence.

It is a difficult task to bring the whole of the Lebenswelt before one's awareness as one thematic object. Ordinarily, phenomena appear to us in a succession of data. The method of Husserl's theoretical attitude begins with a reflective view of this succession of phenomena. Enzo Paci described Husserl's reflection upon the data of awareness as an attempt to relive in the first person each item of experience as well as its mode of apprehension. This means that we would perceive all possible objects of awareness as if we were experiencing them for the first time. We would then re-experience the intentional structure of every object of experience. We would then realize that every cogitatum is self-evidently accompanied by a cogito.

30 Enzo Paci, *The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
During the course of the displacement of the natural attitude for the theoretical attitude we learn that an object is not just an existent but can be more readily classified as Seinsgeltung or meaning-givenness.

Seinsgeltung, translated roughly as "being counting for us", was Husserl's word for the ubiquitous character of all actual and possible phenomena given to intentional consciousness. The methods of transcendental phenomenology strove to thematize the data of experience in their natures as Seinsgeltungen. To aid phenomenological reflection, Husserl advised that all metaphysical, existential or theoretical presuppositions about reality be suspended. These presuppositions were thought by Husserl to hide the intentional structure of objective knowledge. This they did because, though they did shape the meaning of our experience, we were not explicitly aware of the data immediately present to consciousness which would support these claims. In contrast, the reflective method decided to focus upon whatever data came from one's own conscious acts. Husserl hoped that this would be a way of proving that

31 Eg., a metaphysical presupposition - God created the world. Eg., an existential presupposition - the world exists out there. Eg., a theoretical presupposition - the world is a space-time causal matrix.
intentional directedness is an intrinsic trait of phenomena.

This task could not, however, be accomplished merely through concentration upon the apodicticity of one's own conscious acts. He had to demonstrate that knowing subjectivity, regardless of personal quirk or cultural taste, apprehends in the same way. The Lebenswelt could then be the intentional structure that was the univocal ground of objectivity.

The next step of the phenomenological method therefore involved purging the data from reflection upon one's own intuitive acts of their idiosyncratic traits. It must be possible to arrive at the characterization of the universal from the particular case, lest the universal admits of the exception of one's own experience. The universal or eidos was made thematic by means of the conceptualization of an ideal unity of all actual and possible cases by the technique of free variation. Husserl called the type of universal he was trying to make an object for study "eidetic", to distinguish it from being merely a generalization from experience, the mean average of a number of particular cases.

Free variation is a way of conceptually taking each phenomenon of experience out of its place in the
natural sequence of one's experiences so that it can be compared with any other phenomenon. In his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl used the technique of free variation to show that spatial-temporal existence was not an eidetic trait of objectivity. It was not so because it is possible to conceive of an object which does not exist, like the space ship to Jupiter, for example. Meaning-givenness, on the other hand, remains an eidetic trait of objectivity because it is not possible to conceive of an object which conveyed no meaning (Sinn) to consciousness. The eidos of perception, according to this test, became Seinsgeltung. Seinsgeltung was an apt characterization because every perception is necessarily a meaning-givenness. Every actual perception can thereby be regarded as an example of an ideal type - Seinsgeltung.

Free variation was also used in the Crisis to thematize the ubiquitous traits of the Lebenswelt. In this way Husserl hoped to differentiate his concept of the Lebenswelt from the popular concept of Weltanschauung. The Lebenswelt was to be much more than a generalization from experience by being the eidos of intuitive exper-

ience. The technique of free variation showed Husserl that every item that we confront in first person experience was inherently connected to other possible intuitive data. The implication was that the sequential flux of cogito-cogitatum has an inner coherency given to it. Ludwig Landgrebe called this eidetic property of the Lebenswelt that property of being co-meant. He gave the example that while intentional consciousness is explicitly focussed upon the viewing of a table, the table's location in the room, the room's location in the house, and the house's location on the street, are all co-meant. These additional appearances are possibilities that could be actualized at any moment if we only "looked" for them.

These co-meant possible appearances, though not explicitly present to consciousness, effect the sense of the actual presentation before one's consciousness. They form a horizon of meaning which extends to all dimensions of the Lebenswelt. In other words, in a way, the whole of the Lebenswelt accompanies each individual cogitatum. Because the phenomenological method lets us view the world as a univocality of mean-

---

ing rather than a universal field of existents, we are able to realize that the meaning of the world surpasses the data given to our own individual consciousness. That the horizons of the Lebenswelt are infinite and yet intended in totality showed Husserl that the explanation for the delineation of the range of possibilities lay in a universal intentionality. Landgrebe wrote:

In brief the world is the horizon of our total attitude - the later being understood as our intentional directedness in all our diverse acts. 35

Husserl's argument for universal intentionality took the form that if the cogitatum were infinite, then the cogito had to be infinite. The Lebenswelt, by being the totality of Seinsgeltungen, could not be the product of any one person's cognitive operations. Nevertheless, data presented to one's individual consciousness according to one's conscious activities were demonstrated to be related to all other possible Seinsgeltungen in terms of intentional directedness. To thematize this inner "logicity" of the totality of act-

34 Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 162.

ual and possible phenomena, Husserl designed the exercise of transcendental reduction. This method involved attempting to make the whole of the Lebenswelt appear before one's awareness as if it were one phenomenon.\footnote{Husserl, Crisis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 152.}

It would seem that the attempt at transcendental reduction accomplished two significant things. First: its impossibility demonstrated that the Lebenswelt could not be a product of individual cognitive activity. Husserl seemed to conclude that since one could not bring the totality of the Lebenswelt before one's consciousness, and yet phenomena coherently connect themselves with other phenomena, one's conscious acts were not responsible for the coherent meaning of the Lebenswelt. The intentional structure of intuitive experience was shown to surpass one's cognitive activity due to its structure of infinite horizons. That this state of affairs was made evident by means of the theoretical attitude must be the reason that Husserl called it the attitude "above the pregivenness of the validity of the world".\footnote{Ibid., p. 150.}
ness of the totality of phenomena was shown to be of another order than personal volition. It was by means of the transcendental reduction that Husserl was to clear phenomenology of the charge of psychologism.

Second, the transcendental reduction could be thought of as being responsible for a kind of distortion. This method could lead to an abstraction of the intentional directedness of the Lebenswelt to make of it the ego or transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental reduction accomplished this result in the name of finding a principle of explanation for the coherency of the flux of data present to one's awareness. While each phenomenon is present to natural awareness by means of the cogito-cogitatum structure, the whole of the Lebenswelt is given by means of the transcendental reduction as the structure ego-cogito-cogitatum.

The ego was merely a ubiquitous pole of experience which, along with the cogito and cogitatum, made up

---


39 Koestenbaum, intro. to Husserl's Paris Lectures, op. cit., pp. LI - LII.
the eidos of experience, the Lebenswelt. As long as Husserl resisted the temptation to make of the ego a separate thematic object, the transcendental reduction stayed clear of the distortion of making the ego a substantive principle.

In the Crisis Husserl tried hard to confine his discussion of transcendental subjectivity to the discussion of the universal style of givenness of phenomena, rather than that of a new metaphysical entity. To accomplish this end he tried hard to keep within the constraints of the epoché by directing his attention to data given to the consciousness of the theoretical attitude. Although he dealt with the universal and the particular, he was merely pointing out the universal aspects of phenomena in the structure of the Lebenswelt. Husserl concerned himself with what he called the "how of the world's manner of givenness, its open or implicit intentionalities."40 It was only when Husserl wrote of transcendental subjectivity as if it were a principle of explanation that it seemed to leave the level of phenomena to take on the character of being a functional prerequisite for their being a univocal world of experience. In this way transcendental

40 Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 160.
subjectivity is meant to be the meta-level of phenomena and not a new ontological substance.

To emphasize that Husserl never actually studies anything other than the particular and universal aspects of phenomena in the Crisis, Part III A, we will review the steps leading to the transcendental reduction. Husserl began by directing his thematic attention to what was apodictically given to his awareness. These data Husserl found in the Cartesian manner to be acts of apprehension (cogito) in conjunction with objects of apprehension (cogitatum). If an object of apprehension, for example a theory, concept, or number could not be reproduced in one's experience according to the structure cogito-cogitatum, it was shown to be a presupposition (something foreign to the level of phenomena) rather than a true datum of experience. That phenomena were shown to have this bipolar aspect of "consciousness of" and "present before consciousness", led Husserl to his eidetic characterization of phenomena as Seinsgeltungen. By studying the universal traits of the totality of Seinsgeltungen, Husserl was able to characterize the universal aspects of the Lebenswelt as ego-cogito-cogitatum. Ego merely represented the universal aspects of the Lebenswelt itself - the intentional directedness of all phenomena.
There is a tendency to confuse this ubiquitous pole of phenomena with a substantial entity while reading the Crisis, because Husserl seems to conceive of the functions of human subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity as being parallel. Now, the function of human subjectivity in terms of the apprehension of an object ought to be a particular example of the universal objectifying function. In Husserl's words, "the natural objective world-life is only a particular mode of transcendental life which forever constitutes the world."\(^4\)

We have tried to illustrate in which aspects Husserl's work in the Crisis explored the subjective relative as the basis for objective knowledge and yet avoided psychologism. In the next chapter we will examine whether the methodology of the transcendental reduction can be free of psychologism. In particular, we will examine the technique of free variation to see if it provides adequate access to the universal aspects of the data of experience.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 175.
CHAPTER III: THE TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION AND PSYCHOLOGISM
The question to be answered concerns whether the Lebenswelt could be no more than a construction of the imagination. Presumably, the crux of the transcendental reduction was to show that the Lebenswelt includes possibilities of data too vast to have been invented by an individual person or culture. The Lebenswelt was to have been delineated as the univocal field of experience by horizons of infinite dimensions. In short, the Lebenswelt was to account for all particular experiences of individuals and thus was not to be determined by any particular one. Here we are questioning something Husserl questioned under the "paradox of Human subjectivity." Was the subjectivé pole of experience personal or universal - "Mensch oder letzlich fungierende.leistende Subjekt?"42

We must discuss whether the Crisis' examination of the Lebenswelt was successful in meeting the challenges of psychologism by assessing: 1. whether free variation was an adequate method of exhibiting the universal dimensions of personal experience; 2. whether Husserl had adequate reason for treating personal in-

42 Husserl, Die Kriss ..., op. cit., p. 130.
tentionality and universal intentionality as parallel structures and, finally; 3. whether that phenomenology seemed to become epistemology in the Crisis has any bearing on the question.

Paul Ricoeur has claimed that Husserl always used some form of the technique of free variation to make the eidetic aspects of experience thematically available to the phenomenologist. By means of this method, the phenomenologist was able to construct in his imagination a survey of conceivable modifications of what was immediately given to his consciousness. To find the eidetic traits of an object of awareness, for example, one would first modify in every conceivable way, the perceivable aspects of the data at hand. In this manner, if one could merely imagine an aspect it would then be counted as a possible datum of experience which should be somehow "included" in the conception of the eidos or universal. To arrive at the eidos of an object of awareness one would eliminate all those conceivable modifications which were not totally necessary for the meaning of an object of awareness. Its colour,  

---

size and shape, and position in space and time, would then be found not to be eidetic traits of an object of awareness because they can be eliminated and there can still be some sort of object in awareness. In other words, none of these traits are essential to objectivity. Husserl believed that the fact that the object is given to consciousness and that any objectivity conveyed some meaning were two eidetic traits.

Similarly, the examination of the eidetic traits of the aggregate of all conceivable objects, the Lebenswelt, was accomplished by the technique of free variation. Only those traits of the world of objects which could not be modified by the imagination without changing the sense of experience could be considered eidetic. Husserl found that the mathematical determinations of the world of science could not be considered to be eidetic according to this method. Husserl did not consider the fact that all the aspects of objects can be reduced to measurable quantities to be the most universal dimension of the world. Instead, he found the characteristic that no object can be in awareness unless its meaning is somehow shaped by all possible objects of experience to be more fundamental.

The debateable element of this method is not its demonstration that experience is not primarily of atomic
objects but rather, always takes in a world structure. It is rather the presumption that one's imagination can have access to universals. A catalogue of all possible modifications of one's experience could be nothing more than a generalization from one's experience. The resulting "eidos" would then not preclude the doubt that it is a false "eternalization" of something which is in fact variable. The "universal type" so found, would then be conditioned by the particular case of one's style of apprehending. Husserl's concept of eidos, was supposed to condition the particular case in the manner of the relation of type to token. Furthermore, if the former were the case, the field of possibilities to be considered could then be the fantasy of the individual phenomenologist. It would seen that this second objection would not be so bothersome to Husserl. He could have easily considered the realm of possible fancy to be limited by the capacities of intentionality. No fantasy could be an object of awareness unless it were also an intentional object.

The method of free variation seemed to assume from the start that the eidetic aspects of experience can be thematic objects just like any other object. One was supposed to be able to confront these traits directly in one's awareness, after the transcendental reduc-
tion was completed. To do so, the phenomenologist starts from his own position of view by paying attention to the particular object present to his consciousness and then somehow moves to a new level of awareness where he can confront all possible objectivities at once in totality. In the transition he is supposed to find that subjectivity is a universal instead of a personal dimension of experience.

Objectivities generated by the imagination would have appeal for the phenomenologist. They seem not to be as shaped by contingent aspects of experience such as facts and so appear to be akin to the universal aspects for which he is looking. Although one can conjure up something never seen in waking life, eg. a pink elephant, it is debateable whether one could bring to mind something entirely different from what one has experienced in the past. In addition, data of the imagination are known to be the direct product of one's own subjective operations. For this reason they are not only vivid and thus good candidates for apodicity, but they are also free from the psychologist doubt that they originated from the "external world". Yet, all these advantages did not seem to compensate for the basic problem of making the data of fantasy the standard of all other kinds of objects. In acts of imag-
ination, objects appear before consciousness in correlation with personal intentions. We now have to examine how parallelly Husserl conceived of constitutive acts of transcendental subjectivity to those of the intentional acts of personal whim.

Husserl was convinced that subjectivity was ultimately non-personal because the meaning given through experience was too extensive and persistent to have been invented by one person. Husserl thought the "rational" of experience of Sinn was pregiven so as to make one's particular experience possible. As Enzo Paci expressed it, every relative representation inheres in the horizon of the world. What is meant is that the sense of a particular phenomenon depends upon its cohesion with other phenomena. This tendency seems self-evident upon observation of the coherency inherent in the stream of one's presentations to consciousness. Yet what is not so evident is Husserl's conclusion that it is the intentionality of the subject that strives for the system in every representation.

Much of the parallelism that seems to result in

44 Paci, The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man, op. cit., p. 82.
Husserl's conceptions of the personal subject (empirical subject) and the transcendental subject seem to have been the result of his insistence to work with evidence. Personal experience makes good evidence because it is vivid and immediate. Yet personal experience can be doubted when it comes to universal matters. Both Helmut Kuhn and Enzo Paci agree that the Lebenswelt is meant to delineate the conditions of all actual and possible experience. For Kuhn, the explication of the Lebenswelt would thereby include two axes of explanation. It would involve the intersection of the scheme of personal attitudes and anticipations with all those factors beyond the control of the individual.

It would seem that the principle of the transcendental ego is meant to be a third level of explanation which accounts for the two in their work of delineating the field of the Lebenswelt as being a univocality of meaning.

The transcendental subject becomes the subject of the objectivating function. Though personal whims actively colour the meaning of the world for the per-

---

45 See, Helmut Kuhn, "The Phenomenological Concept of Horizon," Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, op. cit., p. 120, and Paci, The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man, op. cit., p. 82.
son, and do effect the presentation of particular phenomena, one person cannot actively change the shape of the Lebenswelt. In other words, the world constituting functions responsible for the Lebenswelt can only incorrectly be attributed to the human ego. World constitution must in actual fact be an anonymous procedure.* For this reason, it was considered by Husserl to have been pregiven to all efforts of human apprehension and anticipations. The human ego is then passive to the "effects" of transcendental subjectivity.

It is then impossible that the transcendental subject can be made a thematic object for the survey of the phenomenologist. Yet personal experience does involve the intermingling of universal and particular elements such as those about which Kuhn writes. Though the Lebenswelt is not available to us in its totality as a thematic object, we do function in its midst as knowing subjects. For this reason, the individual subject must be able to passively intuit or "view" these universal aspects in the flux of data. The only problem is that these "essences" are strands in the total fabric of

* Here we have an example of how the natural attitude leads to less of a falsification than the theoretical attitude. To the natural attitude, world constitution seems an anonymous procedure.
experience and therefore cannot, without distortion, be taken out of context for thematic purposes.

The paradox of human subjectivity seems to be an understandable dilemma of the phenomenological method. The transcendental subject must be simultaneously similar to and different from the human subject. It must be similar in order to give the notion of transcendental subjectivity content. Transcendental subjectivity must somehow be connected to concrete evidence so that it is not thought of as being a theoretical construct. However, if it is too similar to human subjectivity psychologistic conclusions could be drawn from the phenomenological method.

One wonders whether Husserl could differentiate the results of his method from the pitfalls of idealism which Marvin Farber outlined in his essay, "The Idea of Presuppositionless Philosophy". Farber's point was that the absolute spirit to which Husserl's letzlich fungierende leistende Subjekt seems similar, can never be proved according to evidence. Rather, its necessity must first be demonstrated in order to justify thinking it to be absolute. In other words,

an argument for the absoluteness of spirit could well take the general form: if there were no such principle, then we would not experience as we do. Such reasoning, as can be seen, can only be loosely based on evidence by providing a justification for a present state of affairs.

In the case of the Crisis, there seems to be nothing there to prevent one from seeing the work as an answer to a rhetorical question. Husserl could have begun with the assumption that knowledge is directly based upon experience. From there he could have decided that the univocality of meaning was the form most applicable to experience. Finally, he could have seen that this reasoning led to the conclusion that the experienceable "world" must be informed by a transpersonal universal subjectivity. According to the above outlined argument, Husserl's analysis of experience according to evidence could be viewed as nothing more that the justification of his personal theory. This would then be a highly psychological reprecussion.

47 This tact is similar to David Hume's to treat concepts not based on incoming data as fictions. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., p. 197.
The parallelism between the functioning of the human subject, which is thematically available to every phenomenologist by means of self reflective acts, and the functioning of transcendental subjectivity which is thematically unavailable to us, resulted in a number of disturbing confusions. The most confounding of these has to do with the eidetic character of phenomena to be meaning givenness (*Sinngebung*). It is difficult to know to what aspect of experience "meaning givenness" refers. The meaning of a word might be universal in the sense that it is standard, and yet be merely conventional. Husserl, on the other hand, claimed that the meaning givenness about which he wrote was universal in the sense of being prior to experience and the principle which makes experience possible. Meaning may also have the psychologistic implication of a personal interpretation or evaluation. Yet, meaning, as a translation of the German term "*Sinn*", could well have the more universal implication of the rational.

Though the connection between Part I and Part III A of the *Crisis* has not been clearly established, it is not improbable to think that they are linked in some manner. If they were so found, it would be easier to understand why Husserl could have kept meaning givenness and the difference between the human ego and the
transcendental ego ambiguous. In Part I Husserl discussed the loss of meaning for life; Lebensbedeutungkeit of the natural sciences and philosophy's traditional task of struggling for the meaning of man, Sinn des Menschen. The reader can get the personal level of experience mixed up with the eidetic level of experience when considering the relation of reason and freedom to life. One can construe from Part I, that human subjectivity is the seat of reason because it is man's rationality which is able to shape life. Yet this willful shaping of human life according to reason cannot be equivalent to the world constitution of the transcendental subject, though Husserl may secretly desired them to be. Part I coupled with Appendix VI, "The Origin of Geometry", reminds one of Kant's

48 Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaf- ten und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, op. cit., p. 3.

49 Ibid., p. 12.

50 Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 6.
beliefs concerning the relation of critical inquiry, morality, and autonomy in "What is Enlightenment". 51 Perhaps by showing the parallelism between transcendental subjectivity and the human subject, Husserl was hoping to restore faith in human reason and its capacity to free men from self-incurred tutelage. This would be an understandable response to the social and political ferment of Germany in the 1920's and 30's.

Finally we ought to question whether psychologism is a criticism possible of phenomenology. As Herbert Spiegelberg explained in his article, "Reality-Phenomenon and Reality", phenomenology makes no pretense to know reality. It only strives to study the character of the data given to subjectivity. 52 Accordingly, Spiegelberg believes phenomenology to be fully aware that reality may be other or in any case something more than what the data seem to inform us that it is. Phen-


52 Herbert Spiegelberg, "Reality-Phenomenon and Reality," Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, op. cit., pp. 84 - 105.
omenology, as such a study, could claim that essences were among the data of experience without at the same time claiming that the source of Sinn was subjective. Unfortunately, the phenomenology of the Crisis is not so straightforwardly non-epistemological and one wonders whether Husserl has opted for an absolute ontology of phenomena. He proposed in that work to start a science of "the universal how of the pregiven-ness of the world, i.e., of what makes it a universal ground for any sort of objectivity." The fact that Husserl attempted to carry out such an endeavour makes his work vulnerable to the charge of psychologism. It is true that Husserl did take precautions to ensure that the resulting epistemology not be psychologistic. The chief one is that of the epoché which remains in effect during the phenomenological reductions of the Crisis. Transcendental subjectivity is merely the metas-structure of the aggregate of phenomena, not a new level of reality. Husserl tried to show that since phenomena can be shown to have universal dimensions, they are acceptable candidates for being the basis of objective knowledge. This quite a different task from showing

53 Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 146.
that phenomena are in fact the basis of objective knowledge. Such a task would require the suspension of the *epoche*.

However, as we have attempted to illustrate here, it is often difficult to tell the difference between human subjectivity and transcendental subjectivity. As a result, Husserl's work in the *Crisis* very often *sounds* like it is trying to prove that reason has its source in human consciousness. This result is largely due to the attempt of the transcendental reduction to make the *Lebenswelt* a thematic object for us. It is here that the *epoche* might be considered to have been violated. Phenomenological reflection could fool the phenomenologist into thinking he had a reality before his consciousness. Since human subjectivity is an object included in the *Lebenswelt*, this task ought to be impossible. What we mean here is that all of the *Lebenswelt* may be an object of awareness except for the "portion" which includes the human subject as apprehender. Because of the vectorial directedness of the intentionality of consciousness, one's subjective operations cannot be made thematic objects to one's awareness. Now the impossibility of having the totality

---

54 See, Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the*
of the Lebenswelt as one thematic object for human subjects would by no means prove the subjective pole of experience to be non-personal and thus universal.

A more sympathetic view of Husserl's work in the Crisis would be that he never intended the Lebenswelt to be reduced to the pole of transcendental subjectivity, but rather was content that the eidos of experience be all that the structure ego-cogito-cogitatum implied. Reflection upon personal experience would yield the data of the flux of apprehending acts and appearances. Yet, by means of a theoretical study such as phenomenological reflection, we can see that this apparent chaos has the tendency towards two poles of organization. The first was the total sense of the object, cogitatum, which we can never have in one appearance due to the necessity that an act of perception is always determined by a perspective. The second is the ego or transcendental subject which constitutes the world of cogitationes as a coherent system of meaning.

By concentrating on the question of whether the discussions of the Lebenswelt in Part III A of the Crisis
can be a response to psychologism, it would seem that we have come across the limitations of the phenomenological method. We have shown that psychologism is ultimately a problem for epistemology and metaphysics which are both out of the scope of the phenomenological sphere of study. We have shown the phenomenological discussions of the Crisis to be more of a preparatory study of the problem of psychologism. At best, Husserl could only have shown that the aggregate of data possible in human experience has a trans-personal universal organization. He would have to suspend the epoché to give a full account of how subjective experience leads to scientific knowledge. In the concluding chapter we will discuss these limitations of the phenomenological method that prevent the Crisis from being a full response to psychologism.
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION
The positive contribution of the discussion of the transcendental dimensions of the Lebenswelt was that it provided an enriched notion of what constituted exact science for Husserl. The science of essence was shown in the Crisis to be based upon the eidetic structures of the Lebenswelt. Instead of ignoring subjective experience as do the positive sciences (which can only reveal probabilities for Husserl), by means of the concept of the Lebenswelt, Husserl strove to reveal how intuition of universal truths could be a subjective experience. During the course of this work we have tried to examine this venture in terms of how well Husserl was able to extricate his study of the Lebenswelt from the charge of leading to subjectivist epistemology. We concede that transcendental phenomenology can provide a convincing demonstration that the Lebenswelt has a universal intentional structure. However, we are uneasy that the methods of transcendental phenomenology seem to hide the vitality of human experience from thematic focus. The phenomenologist knows he began his study by examining his experience. Yet, can he prove that the results of his study are not merely theoretical constructs by referring the meta-structure of the Lebenswelt back to his experience?

After the transcendental reduction has been per-
formed, we have problems relating the raw material of phenomenological study, personal experience to the resulting transcendental structures. The best examples of this problem include: the relation of evidence to the eidetic structures of experience, the paradox of human subjectivity, and finally the relation of the world of everyday experience to the Lebenswelt.

Husserl's predilection for studying the transcendental aspects of experience never quite corresponded to his insistence upon verification by self-evidence. Both were necessary elements of phenomenological study, yet it seemed as if they were often mutually exclusive priorities. Husserl thought that if the phenomenologist took the proper precautions, phenomena would self-evidently show their natures and functional efficacy to reflective consciousness. The primary precaution was to eliminate presuppositions about the nature of objectivity. Husserl believed that presuppositions hid the actual working natures of phenomena, especially the meta-dimension in which he was most interested. Presuppositions were not based upon phenomena so they allegedly had no place in phenomenological study. The problem with phenomenological evidence was that it was private. The data of my experience showed itself before my own reflective consciousness. Yet, the effica-
cy of the transcendental structure of the Lebenswelt explained that of necessity my experience is similar to that of every other human being.

Husserl, as an antidote, (as I discussed in Chapters II and III), hoped to show that phenomena had a formal meta-structure that was universal, without introducing any elements foreign to the phenomenological sphere or making the account overly personal. In this way Husserl tended to trade off the concrete material of his studies, the data of his experience, for the meta-structures. However, an account of the universal structures too divorced from personal experience could be suspect of being itself a presupposition.

Similarly, the problem of the paradox of human subjectivity was a result of transcendental phenomenology's attempt to avoid the psychologistic dangers of being overly personal as well as the other extreme of working with theoretical constructs. Husserl was well aware that in order for transcendental phenomenology to have a concrete basis, on some level, the human subject and the transcendental subject would have to refer to the same thing.55 Man as knower would be

55 See Husserl, Crisis, op. cit., p. 202 and Paci, The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man, op. cit., p. 139, on Fichte's conception of the meet-
the subject for which the Lebenswelt is the object and at the same time man would be another phenomena found within the dimensions of the Lebenswelt. Since the phenomenological method required that one remained within the epoché by viewing man as a phenomenon, this meeting point of the empirical subject and the transcendental subject eludes the phenomenologist. Phenomenology provided a technique for studying man as a phenomenon and the meta-structure of phenomena in general, but has not a methodology for studying the concrete man in whom the empirical ego could very well be reconciled with the transcendental subject. The paradox of human subjectivity would then only be an apparent paradox created by the phenomenological method. That is, as long as the epoché is in force, the paradox remains.

The third disturbing problem for the transcendental phenomenology of Part III A of the Crisis is the relation of the everyday world of experience to the Lebenswelt. Phenomenology begins with a reflection upon the every day world of experience and ends with the Lebenswelt. In the course of this process, the epoché is established which prevents the phenomenologist from considering questions of existential reality and its metaphysics. As a result, the phenomenologist
seems to have lost the possibility for relating the two "worlds".

The gap between everyday experience and the Lebenswelt ought not to exist. Reflection upon experience should bear a relationship to events of everyday life. In other words, phenomenological reflection ought not to create new structures. Rather it should clarify those already operative in human experience. Yet, phenomenology is so vulnerable to the effects of presuppositions that it resorts to the artificial separation of these two spheres by means of the epoché. Common sense would tell us, however, that no position can be free of presuppositions.56

Transcendental phenomenology leaves the critic with the feeling that it is a study that is out of proportion. Phenomena have a place in the area of epistemological study. Yet phenomenology studies the Lebenswelt in isolation from all other subjects of philosophical study as if it were vitally important. This isolation only increases the illusion of the disproportion.

tional importance of phenomena. Philosophy, of all studies ought to have the integrity to be open-ended.

Finally, many of the problems considered by trans­
cendental phenomenology seem to be caused by its methods. In this way, phenomenology can be accused of inventing problems and their solutions. For example, before un­
dertaking the phenomenological reduction, one knows that world constitution is an anonymous procedure. No one can invent the objective world or even the Lebens­
welt. After the transcendental reduction, it seems that the world might have been constituted by the trans­
cendental subject. This doubt is what introduced the psychologistic elements that we are questioning in Part III A of the Crisis.

In conclusion, the psychologistic doubt that is possible of the findings of Part III A of the Crisis, concerning the relationship of transcendental subjec­
tivity to the Lebenswelt, is to think of them as the­
oretical constructions divorced from experience. Husserl never wanted to depart from experience in the above way, rather he wanted to clarify human ex­
périence. Husserl's goal would be reached if we could be assured that the meta- dimensions of the Lebenswelt do refer back to experience.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


