THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAITH AND REASON
IN KIERKEGAARD'S PHILOSOPHY
(WITH ALMOST CONSTANT REFERENCE
TO THE POSTSCRIPT AND THE FRAGMENTS)

DEVAKI NAGARAJAN
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
BROCK UNIVERSITY

THESIS DIRECTOR
DR. D. L. GOICOECHEA
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Dr. D. L. Goicocochea for introducing me to Kierkegaard and for his guidance and encouragement in the preparation of this thesis, and to Dr. J. R. A. Mayer for his meticulous revision of the draft. I would like to thank Dr. Michael Horneyansky for the linguistic corrections.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>Faith and Reason</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Kierkegaard is often represented as an irrationalist and his philosophy of faith is regarded as a "leap into the lap of God" away from reason. The contention has a modicum of truth inasmuch as it draws attention to the pre-eminent role of faith in Kierkegaard's philosophy but is nonetheless a misinterpretation which has its basis in an inadequate understanding of the nature of faith itself.

The nature and role of faith and reason are expounded mainly in Kierkegaard's two chief philosophical works: Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The latter in particular contains a detailed exposition wherein two aspects of faith emerge; the "Socratic form of faith" and Christian faith, which is referred to as "faith sensu eminenti". Socratic faith is a leap, an act of the will in the presence of objective uncertainty; and Christian faith is the free affirmation of a phenomenon which objectively is a manifest absurdity. Both forms of faith are expressions of the source of existential certitude in the face of the inadequacy of reason. Reason thus loses its supremacy but is by no means annihilated for the source of existential certitude is "inwardness" which is the entire personality
affirmed, possessed and expressed in decisiveness, 
"an inwardness of the whole being for which thought 
possesses no other expression but faith". Of the 
personality thus concretized in the decisiveness 
of faith reason is necessarily a part. It remains 
active as the source of tension in the continual 
striving that is faith. It provides faith with its
'risk', its 'seriousness', its 'seventy thousand 
fathoms of water'. To overlook this element of 
tension or 'tremulation' is to misunderstand 
Kierkegaard's notion of faith. It is to lose sight 
of the fact that faith is essentially a 'militant 
certitude', a constant becoming. The uncertainty 
engendered by reason is thus essential to faith. 
Faith presupposes reason.

Nevertheless, the point of departure of 
Kierkegaard's philosophy is the repudiation of 
Hegelian pure thought which he often equates with 
reason itself. He writes:

"Let a doubting youth, an existing doubter, 
imbued with a lovable and unlimited youthful 
confidence in a hero of thought, confidently 
seek in Hegel's positive philosophy the 
truth, the truth for existence: he will 
write a formidable epigram over Hegel .... 
let him submit himself unconditionally, 
in feminine devotion, but with sufficient 
vigour of determination to hold fast to

1 Soren Kierkegaard, Either/or II, Tr. Walter Lowrie 
and Howard A. Johnson (Anchor Books Doubleday & 
his problem: he will become a satirist without suspecting it. The youth is an existing doubter. Hovering in doubt and without a foothold for his life, he reaches out for the truth in order to exist in it. He is negative and the philosophy of Hegel is positive—what wonder that he seeks anchorage in Hegel. But a philosophy of pure thought is for an existing individual a chimera, if the truth that is sought is something to exist in. To exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Denmark with the help of a small man of Europe, on which Denmark shows no larger than a steel pen-point—aye, it is still more impossible."

The search, then, is for the truth in order to exist in it, and it is on this criterion that pure thought, and also abstract thought, are found wanting. Far from yielding a life view, they in fact enslave existence itself. Pure thought swallows up the individual in an identity of thought and being; abstract thought reduces him to a shadow, with the result that the ethical, the decisive and the active, which is precisely the individual, is obscured.

"The objective tendency which proposes to make everyone an observer, and in its maxim to transform him into so objective an observer that he becomes almost a ghost, scarcely to be distinguished from the treacherous spirit of the historical past—this tendency naturally refuses to know or listen to anything except what stands in relation to itself..... For it is

The task, when, is to rescue the individual from objectivism and re-define and reinstate the ethical. But in doing so it must not be forgotten that the subject is an existing individual, a concrete entity, to "entire man" endowed with thought as well as feeling and imagination. The purpose thus is not to do away with thinking, which, at any rate, is an impossibility. On the contrary, the problem is to "interpenetrate existence with thought". It is in the limit of this criterion that Socrates emerges as the arch-individual, the arch-type of the "wise man" who employs himself not to deny existence but to exist more fully as an individual.

"Let us now look to see, less systematically and more sinfully, how he conducted himself while he lived, when he went about in public places and erected the Sophists, when he was a human being, and, even in the most ridiculous situation that has been preserved for costerily ..... When, because Xanthippe had torn his clothes and left the house, he threw a belt around him and appeared thus
clad in the market place to the great amazement of his friends, still in this situation remained a human being, and not nearly so ridiculous in his seat as he latter became in the System ..... Did Socrates so about talking of what are demands, did be understand the ethical as something to be discovered, or which had to be discovered by a prophet with a world-historic outlook, or as something to be determined by an egal to the ballot-box? No, Socrates was concerned only with himself, and could not even count to five when it was a question of counting votes."

Thus in Socrates have the exemplary existential thinker and in Socratic faith the mode of truth in which to exist. But there is yet another aspect of existence, namely, the religious, in which passion wherein truth abides reaches its full power. Thus, Christianity, which is capable of eliciting the response of the highest passion of inwardness on account of its para-tradiction becomes the supremely existential truth, and the task before the existing individual becomes "How to become a Christian". For no one is born a Christian but must become one. "In the animal world the particular specimen is directly related to the species as an example of it and participates immediately in whatever development the species may have.... But it is surely otherwise when an individual who is qualified as spirit and in relation to a transmission process. Or may we assume that Christian parents give birth to Christian children? Christianity at least does not; on the contrary, it assumes that children born of Christian parents are no less sinful than ones

4 C.U.P., p. 131 - 132.
born of parent parents. Spiritual development is self-activity ....... 5

Christianity thus becomes part of the existential dialectic and in the process is re-affirmed as an object of faith rather than a doctrine.

It is in the light of the preceding that the problem of faith and reason assumes its full significance.

In chapter one of this thesis I have attempted a restatement of the notion of faith with a view to bring out the dialectical tension in the two forms of faith. Chapter two contains an exposition of Kierkegaard's critique of reason and the application of objectivism to Christianity. The first section of the concluding chapter contains an exposition of the inter-relationship of faith and reason and the second section states Kierkegaard's notion of existential thinking and its application to Christianity.

5 C.H.P., p. 308-309.
"...there must after all be something distinguished about subjectivity,"¹ Kierkegaard writes, because "faith inheres in subjectivity."² In considering Kierkegaard's notion of faith, therefore, it may be well to begin with his idea of subjectivity.

Kierkegaard puts forth the category of subjectivity as a corrective to Hegelian idealism. It is basically a reformation of a way to think experience anew, namely, that thinking right is understood as an adjunct to living. Thought begins as an effort to understand my relation to the world. I begin to think when I am faced with the fact of an external reality which contradicts my will and thus forces me to acknowledge its presence and compels me to curdle my will to its necessities. Thought has this primordial character of containing within it, or having as its purpose, a human objective. It is a relation between a subject and an object; to think at all is to affirm the reality of an 'I' and an 'other'.

But thought tends to divest itself of the 'human import. It acquires an attraction as an activity per se; it becomes an entertaining one. When this happens

¹ C.W.P., p. 118.
² Ibid, p. 118.
it loses its meaning as it has jettisoned the subject, the self, which is its anchor to reality. Thinking is an activity which requires meaning from its concern with matters which are of immediate significance to us. When I lose myself in my deepest concerns out of it, I sever its connections with objective reality. In de-linking thought from the ego, I also sever its ties with the other because I and my concerns are the bridge, the very foundation of my access to the other. Thought divested of the human significance thus becomes an exercise in futility. In Kierkegaardian terminology, thought loses its existential import. This is the implicit theme in Kierkegaard's notion of subjectivity and faith.

The very nature and purpose of thought, then, is to function as an auxiliary to existence. It is thus that the task of becoming subjective is an engrossing concern with "the simple things of life"; it "is the task of living". Kierkegaard illustrates this notion by four aspects of existence which have been so drained of their significance by non-existential thinking as to be reduced to commonplace; namely, marriage, death, immortality, and God-relationship. On a superficial scrutiny, it may

5 Ibid, Part II, Chapter I.
seem that these four subjects fall into two categories according to the nature of the enquiry that they invite. It would seem that thought has different objectives when it is confronted with the two types of questions. The question of marriage implies the possibility of action and therefore demands a decision. It calls for a kind of thinking which is intended to help one act. Common sense would tell us that if we pursue the matter assiduously, weigh the pros and cons of the problem carefully, we may eventually decide whether or not to marry. But death, immortality and God, on the other hand, fall into another category. Here thought cannot even purport to lead to action which will modify the event or object. None of these categories call for a decision. Whether or not one thinks about it, one must die. Death and its correlate immortality lie beyond the pale of human volition. Death is an inexorable, inscrutable event which overtakes every man sooner or later. Thought has not succeeded in unravelling its mysteries nor in stalling its advent. When I ponder over death in this manner, I do so to wonder at it, I think about it in a spirit of "aesthetic contemplation", Kierkegaard would say. I do not believe that thinking will make me immortal. Whether or not one thinks about it, one must die. Such is objective thinking.
And similarly the question of God in objective thought. Whether or not one believes in Him, or even thinks about the matter, God may or may not exist. If God exists he exists irrespective of my belief to the contrary; if he does not, he will not spring into being because I believe in him. In any case I shall never know enough to decide whether God exists or whether I am immortal. Kierkegaard agrees on this joint but does not on that account advocate the abandoning of the question. The inaccessibility of these problems to thought resists, in his view, an alternative which forms the basis of his category of subjectivity and its correlate, faith. The notion of subjectivity in fact obviates the remaining diversity of the two types of questions by re-defining the nature and role of decision. All decisions are alike in being deeds and are grounded in the "strenuosity" of faith, as we shall see.

Subjectivity in its essence is a shifting of the locus of significance from the realm of the external to the inward. It is a reversal of the focus of enquiry from concepts to the subject who conceives. When the simple man thinks about death, his concern is not with the abstraction, the event death, but with his own dying. Death for him is not a generality.
but the radical uncertainty of his own existence.

"...it is impossible to understand this uncertainty in terms of a mere generality unless indeed I, too, happen to be merely a human being in general." 7

When I ask, "Am I immortal or do I become immortal", the purport of the enquiry is: Do I become immortal, I, a finite entity of a certain finite and in a certain sense, definitive history. Reason errs most radically on this question. It is concerned as always with the object rather than the subject. But in its concern for objectivity reason fails to see that the object of enquiry is the subject himself. When I ask this question my primary concern is not with the concept "immortality". Indeed I do not see immortality as a concept, as an intellectual idea. When I first pose it, "Immortality" to me signifies an acknowledgement of my innermost reality as an experiencing individual and the wish and the hope that this existing self would be retained. But thought, in its hasty progress, tends to overlook this fact. It is not to confuse this question with another: what is immortality, and to launch into an adventure of speculation which converts what begins as a matter of fondest personal concern into a universal idea, a mere creation of the speculative
faculty. In the ensuing "ceaseless parade of the Idea through its course of thesis, antithesis and synthesis", the 'I' recedes into the background and is lost. It is forgotten that the question has significance only in the fact that I, the enquirer, exist and am finite. The key issues of philosophy, according to Kant, are freedom, immortality and the existence of God. Kierkegaard achieves a second Copernican revolution in the realm of philosophy by reinstating the 'I' through the notion of subjectivity, and in doing so, reverts attention to these problems which are of central concern to the existing individual. Indeed he goes further and defines existence itself in terms of these concerns.

At the beginning of the second part of the _Postscript_ Kierkegaard writes:

"Objectively we consider only the matter at issue, subjectively we have regard to the subject and his subjectivity; and behold, precisely this subjectivity is the matter at issue. This must constantly be borne in mind, namely, that the subjective problem is not something about an objective issue but is the subjectivity itself. For since the problem in question poses a decision, and since all decisiveness, ... inheres in subjectivity, it is essential that every trace of an objective issue should be eliminated." 9

---


The subject, thus, is the "subjective existing thinker" who is "infinitely interested in existing". But existence in itself and who exists is individual and the individual exists individuals is constantly in the process of becoming. The temporality of existence comes before the existing individual the fact of becoming and we are not to be at in action, until because the individual exists. But action implies decision and decision in turn must be executed by volition.

How is an existing individual to apprehend the truth? Nietzsche considered the traditional answers of realism and idealism. Both are indirect based on the premise that being is complete and finished. For only in such a case is the correspondence of reality and thought or the conformity of reality to thought possible. The two theories contain a double abstraction - the subject and the object are abstract real objects of the external power and the empirical objects. Thus until only in this phantom world, truth is an identity of thought and being because the two terms mean one and the same thing, and the theories reduce to an assertion that truth is. But, "an existing individual is constantly in process of becoming the actual existing subjective thinker constantly reproduces

10 Ibid., p. 268.
11 Ibid., p. 172.
12 Ibid., p. 271.
13 Ibid., p. 170.
14 Ibid., p. 169 - 172.
this existential situation in his thought and translates all his thinking in terms of process." 15

This fact introduces into the knowledge situation the uncertainty inherent in becoming. By the very fact that the knower exists and enquires, the dichotomy of subject and object is re-introduced. The categories of thought and being are once again separated because the existing subject exists in time. 16 This again opens up two alternative points of view: the objective and the subjective, the 'What' and the 'How'. From the objective standpoint, the subject and his interests are of no import; the subject's concerns must indeed be eliminated from the enquiry for it is in this that objective validity consists. But if I am thus objective, how do I act? For as an existing individual I must act and action pre-supposes purpose and interest. And it is precisely this element that objective reflection eliminates.

Since the problem is posed by existence, we must turn to experience to comprehend it. We noted that the primary character of thought is to further the individual's interests. Then I ponder over matters of existential import to me, reason reveals

15 G.W.P., p. 79.
16 Ibid., p. 171.
to me the values of the alternatives the problem permits. But it cannot reveal the significance the projected action has for me, for this is something I myself contribute as an existing individual. And it is this residue of interest inaccessible to reason which is the decisive factor in my decision. My interest is thus the starting-point and the ending-point in thought. It is this fact to which Kierkegaard points when he writes that "all interest, like all decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity."17

Furthermore, objectivity per se is also deficient in another way: it cannot be achieved by the existing individual. As an existing individual in the process of becoming, confronted with the "unfinished empirical object", he must contend with the radical uncertainty of the external world. In the world of becoming there may yet be a conformity of thought and object but this belongs only to the omniscience and eternity of God.18 On the finite individual, existence imposes a double contingency: that of the external world and the possibility of his own death. Kierkegaard writes:

"Thus constantly in process of becoming is the elusiveness that pertains to the infinite

17 C.V.P., p. 173.
18 Ibid, p. 170."
in existence. It is enough to bring a sensuous man to despair, for one always feels a need to have something finished and complete; ... The incessant becoming generates the uncertainty of the earthly life, where everything is uncertain. Every human being knows this, and at times gives it expression, especially on solemn occasions, and then not without tears and perspiration." 19

Thus, for the existing individual, objective knowledge can only be an approximation and hypothesis. 20

The conclusion that naturally follows is that my only source of certainty is my own subjectivity. Therefore the ambit of my knowledge is limited by my own existence because it centres upon it. But this is not a deficiency for it only point to and confirms the basic fact that thought has significance for me only in so far as it furthers my own existence.

Kierkegaard writes:

"All essential knowledge relates to existence, or only such knowledge as has relationship to existence is essential knowledge. All knowledge which does not inwardly relate itself to existence, in the reflection of inwardness, is essentially viewed, accidental knowledge; its degree and scope is essentially indifferent. That essential knowledge is essentially related to existence does not mean the above-mentioned identity which abstract thought postulates between thought and being; nor does it signify, objectively, that knowledge corresponds to something existent as its object. But it means that knowledge has a relationship to the knower, so is essentially an existing individual and for this reason all essential knowledge is

19 C.U.P., p. 79.
essentially related to existence. Only ethical and ethico-religious knowledge has an essential relationship to the existence of the knower." 21

Nevertheless, truth is identity of thought and being. The notion of truth as identity of thought and being poses a problem not because it is in itself false but because it is unrealizable for the existing individual by virtue of the fact that he exists. 22 The problem is that such identity is not possible for him in the finitude imposed by his temporality, and when thought sets out to achieve such unity it inevitably leaves the existing individual behind and wrestles with a phantom.

In order to realize complete certainty, therefore, the individual must transcend his existence. And the only moments when he achieves this are when he is "outside himself" in passion. 23 The locus of truth thus shifts from the object to the subject's relationship to it. 24 I can never now for certain whether an object is real or not, but if my interest in it is truly intense and passionate, I am in the truth. The guarantee of truth does not lie in the object; if this were so, truth would forever be inaccessible to me. The guarantee lies in the fact that I relate to it with passionate intensity; I believe in it. The

21 G.W.F., p. 177.
22 Ibid., p. 176.
23 Ibid., p. 176.
24 Ibid., p. 178.
answer, then, lies in my inwardness, "...that lovely in which the Deity dwells in the profound stillness where everything is silent." This inwardness is the source of decision.

It is in this notion that the seemingly diverse examples I noted at the beginning of this section receive their unity. Marriage best illustrates the existential predicament for it brings to the fore the problem of reflection vis-à-vis faith. Marriage must be the outcome of resolution for without that it would be no more than an impulsive action. But reflection brings out the uncertainty reality must always possess. Here as nowhere else one is faced with the inconclusiveness of ars una et ars contra. Ideally I should weigh the reasons in favour of marriage against those which oppose it and then decide. Kierkegaard writes in Stages on Life's Way:

"But to marry is to enter into a factual situation in relationship to a given reality: marriage is the most extraordinary concretion. This concretion constitutes the task of reflection. But may be it is so concrete ... that no reflection can pierce through it? In case this is assumed, one has thereby assumed at the same time that no resolution can ever be reached. A resolution, however, is an ideal. I have the resolution before I begin to act in virtue of this resolution. But how then do I get this resolution? A resolution is always reflective: if one does not give heed to this, language becomes confused, the resolution is identified with
an immediate impulse .... In a purely ideal reflection then resolution has ideally exhausted reality, and the conclusion of this ideal reflection is something more than a sua res summa, in short it is precisely resolution; resolution is the ideality brought about by a purely ideal reflection, it is the earned capital required for action." 26

In other words, the aesthetic ideality of reflection wherein the ideality is the possible, culminates in the ethical ideality of resolution which is an expression of the individual's reality, his inwardsness. The ideality of reflection is translated into the resolution to marry by the passion of love which is the given of the situation. "...without passion one never brings reflection to conclusion." 27 Decision is therefore a leap, an affirmation of a ledge of possibility reason does not bridge. This possibility is the individual's reality conceived by himself in thought. But the certainty which inheres in the individual's passion, which is the expression of the reality that is his inwardsness, does not yet efface the possibility that the external reality may not be conducive to his interests. Despite the certitude of his passion, the world is to him an unascertainable entity. In the face of this uncertainty, he must either renounce his love or accent the uncertainly with the courage born of faith in the benevolence and

26 Stages, p. 158.
omnipotence of God. Thus, decision is an act of faith, "a religious starting point" for the uncertainty presented by the future is such that "he must either let go of love... or believe in God." 29

Passion, again, is the decisive element in God-relationship. When the individual realizes the painful futility of the objective search for God, in that moment he has realized God for he has embraced him in faith. "It is then not so much that God is a postulate, as that the existing individual's postulation of God is a necessity." 30 And immortality is a similar necessity. To attempt to find objective proofs 'or immortality is absurd and futile. The individual's consciousness of immortality is its own proof. "Immortality is the most passionate interest of subjectivity; precisely in the interest lies the proof." 31 But in order for the question to exist the individual must become subjective. It is only in the repressive inwardness of subjectivity that the question can be posed "or it is where what its source lies.

28 Stanza, p. 159.
30 C.U.P., p. 170.
The determinate of truth, thus, is not the objective content but the subjective mode of apperception. Truth lies in the passionate inward affirmation of subjectivity and this inwardness consists in appropriation. The truth of what I say is not judged by the 'what' of it but by my own relationship to it. If I have appropriated the idea so that my whole existence is an expression and affirmation of it, I attest to its truth in the very fact that I exist. This infinite passion of inwardness is its own content and its justification does not lie beyond itself. Subjectivity is truth. 32

But the certainty engendered by the infinitude of passion must be reserved and renewed by striving. The content of decision lies in passion but this voluntary contact with the infinite when translated in terms of existence in time results in striving. Decisiveness lies in passion but it must be realized in existence through effort.

In terms of subjectivity, truth is subjectivity or inwardness. But objectively, in terms of reason, truth is a paradox, the eternal manifesting itself in existence. That is, the fact that what is eternal should be present to an existing individual is paradoxical; truth, however, itself is not paradoxical. 33

32 G.W.F., p. 181.
33 Ibid, p. 183.
This is the key factor in the knowledge situation which escapes the attention of rationalists and idealists. Both agree that "truth is" but fail to notice the contradiction inherent in the fact, and the inescapable indeterminacy that it must thus present. Therefore the definition of truth as subjectivity must have as its corollary a parallel definition of truth in terms of reason as "objective uncertainty"; and a complete definition of truth, "a conceptual determination of the truth", must combine the two aspects and emphasize the antithesis. Thus Kierkegaard arrives at the definition: "An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth." 34 Kierkegaard calls this definition "a memento of the fork in the road where the way swings off." 35 The objective uncertainty and inwardness are directly related; the greater the uncertainty, the greater the passion of inward appropriation that it evokes. There is thus a dialectical tension between the two categories. The more uncertain a certain existential situation is in terms of reason, the more intensely must I believe in it for its truth is of interest to me. One must

34  C.U.P., p. 182.
once again bring to mind the key distinction between
the existential postulate and the concepts of pure
reason. My immortality and a mathematical proposition
do not stand in the same relation to me; I am
intensely interested in the truth of the one and
am indifferent, as a subjective existing thinker, to
the truth of the other. In the realm of the existen-
tial it is imperative to me that what cannot be
comprehended by reason be grasped by faith. Indeed
I must believe precisely because reason cannot grapple
with it. Thus it is that "the above definition of
truth is an equivalent expression for faith". Faith
is the existing individual's answer to the risk that
the uncertainty revealed by thought presents. By
reasoning I cannot decide; hence I must decide. Thought
can only present possibilities; decision can be
provided only by the immediate certainty that
resides in the individual's beliefs. Nevertheless,
there is the risk that external reality presents. It
may not correspond to my belief. The coherence of
thought and being is credible only to the speculative
philosopher. The existing individual must forever
contend with an externality which may or may not
relate positively to his decisions. Hence the
necessity of faith. The dialectical tension between
36 C.U.P., p. 182.
the objective uncertainty and subjective passion is such that faith preserves and renews itself by grasping the uncertainty. It is precisely the risk that necessitates faith; where there is no risk, there is objective knowledge and hence no need of faith. Once again Kierkegaard illustrates this notion by referring to belief in God: "If I am capable of grasping God objectively I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe." 37

The underlying theme of the preceding is the Kierkegaardian distinction between the 'ethical' and the 'aesthetic'. The ethical pertains to existence and therefore to action. It concerns the individual in existence and thus emphasizes the need for decision as opposed to mere contemplation. The ethical is thought yoked to reality, the actuality of the individual's existence, and its task, therefore, is to be decisive. To revert to the examples cited at the beginning: marriage is perhaps the most crucial decision in an individual's life because "to marry is to enter into a factual situation in relationship to a given reality: Marriage is the most extraordinary concretion." 38 The reality is given; therefore it

37 C.U.P., p. 182.
38 Stages, p. 157.
cannot be modified by me. Moreover, it is given but not known. Hence the decisive role of decision. But the existing individual's decisions are important only because of his own belief in his continuity without which his actions, and therefore his decisions, will have no significance. This belief in continuity is immortality. Fierkevaard writes: "For ethically everything culminates in immortality; without which the ethical is merely void and won't." And underlying the one is faith in God. For he "Deity... is present as soon as the uncertainty of all things is thought infinitely. For this reason one who really has an eye for the Deity can see him everywhere."  

Faith thus complements reflection. Reflection reveals the possibilities but faith effects the choice. So thus actualizes the possibility. The factor of decision inheres in the existing individual's passion which is his access to eternal truth. Reflection does not bridge the distance between the possible and the actual. From reflection to decision is not a gradual transition. It is a leap from the known possible to the unknown actual, made on the strength of faith. This is the role of faith in the realm of the 'ethical' according to Fierkevaard. And this faith entails striving.  

39 G.V.I., p. 156.  
40 Ibid, p. 80.
But there is another kind of faith which is a leap not from reason to certainty but a leap against reason. This is the faith of the religious or paradoxical-religious. In fact, Kierkegaard reserves the use of the expression "the leap" exclusively for faith in this context, in the Postscript, after the fashion of Lessing. The datum in the sphere of the paradoxical-religious is the fact of Christ; that God was born in the flesh as man. If the accessibility of eternal truth to an existing individual is a "paradox", viewed reflectively, the eternal coming to being in time is "absurd". The paradox differs from the absurd in its relation to reason. Reason accepts that "truth is"; to do so is not contrary to reason. The paradoxicality is only its availability to the existing individual despite the fact that objectively there is an uncertainty. But regarding the Incarnation there is no objective uncertainty: reason is certain of what it is confronted with and its verdict on it is that it is absurd. This is the only way in which reason can comprehend it or when it tries to explain it, it inevitably alters the subject and ends by positing something which is essentially different from that with which it started. Reason may attempt

41 C.U.I., p. 188.
to determine the fact of Christ as an historical event but when it does so it misses the essential contradiction which belongs to the event, namely, that that which is eternal has come into existence in time. It can set out on such a venture only by assuming that such an event is possible, which is absurd. Moreover, if it proves that the event is certain historically, what it proves is not that which it started out to prove. In this way what reason achieves is a correction not an explanation for it has supplanted the category of the absurd by another. The term paradox is thus reduced to a "rhetorical expression".

All avenues of rationalization are thus effectively sealed and the existing individual is left with the question: Do I or do I not believe. The only mode of apprehension permitted by the absurd is faith for by its very nature it puts itself beyond the role of reason. Reason cannot only heighten its a paradoxical nature. The paradox must be affirmed by an act of faith and "held fast with the passion of inwardness". The risk inherent in all belief is enlarged immeasurably

42 C.U., p. 190.
43 Ibid., p. 196.
44 Ibid., p. 17.
in this eminent act of faith for what is at stake is the individual's eternal happiness. The uncertainty therefore intensifies the voluntary act of affirmation. Kierkegaard writes:

"The Socratic ignorance is as a witty jest in comparison with the earnestness of facing the Absurd; and the Socratic existential inwardness is as Greek light-mindedness in comparison with the grave strenuosity of faith." 46

What are the determinations of faith? How does it express itself? In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard illustrates the dialectic of faith through the story of Abraham. In Abraham are exemplified the two movements of faith - the readiness to give up the finite on the altar of faith and to regain it in joy in the belief that for God all things are possible. Both the movements are leaps for they are not achieved through gradual transition but through a decisive act of the will in the face of the Absurd. Faith is thus a "double-movement leap". 47 It is also the absurd for it puts the individual in an absolute relationship to God over against the universal or the ethical. The demands of Abraham's faith were such that he transcended the ethical dictum - Thou shalt not kill - in obedience to a higher command - Thou shalt obey. The

medi tine universal is thus nullified an faith becomes a faith which cuts the individual into a direct relationship to the Absolute. In this lies the bread of faith: when to it must be sacrificed the universal which relates the individual to other individuals. Second, in the second movement of the law, the law to the finite, the individual re-enters the universal through a gift of God. Indeed his faith is not complete until he makes his second movement and returns to possess the finite in joy in the bounty of God. It is thus that nature becomes a gift and a link in the believer's God-relationship.

We have thus arrived at two views of faith: faith as a complement to reason wherein truth emerges as the subjective inward accretion of an objective uncertainty, and secondly, as the act of grasping an event reason cannot countenance. Kierkegaard calls the former socratic faith in the Postscript, and the latter, Christian faith. In Philosophical Fragments he brings together the two notions of faith in his theory of error, wherein Christian faith — which he calls faith in the 'eminent' sense — brings as its corollary a new category, 'sin', which supersedes the socratic notion of forgetfulness.48

Quite briefly, the argument is as follows. In the Socratic theory of knowledge, the absence of truth is merely ignorance, or the individual has in him the eternal truth which returns to him in the form of recollection through the dialectic mediation of the teacher. Thus the individual possesses in himself the condition or the capacity for the apprehension of truth and the moment of truth has no significance. It is one in an eternal succession for the individual becomes conscious that he possesses truth eternally.

If the moment of truth is to have significance the absence of truth must be not ignorance but error. This would imply that the individual possessed the condition for the apprehension of truth and forfeited it through will. Error thus becomes sin. Further, while the individual is free to lose the condition of truth in sin by an act of the will, he is not similarly free to regain it by himself in the same way that the terms offered to a knight before the combat are not automatically his once he is vanquished in battle and taken prisoner, but can only be renewed at the pleasure of his adversary. Thus, in the Christian context, the condition for the apprehension of truth must be restored to the individual by the Teacher. This condition is faith.
On the part of the individual, faith consists in an act of acceptance since the love of the Teacher for the learner forbears from taking away his freedom and asks that He be received freely in faith.49 Nevertheless, faith is not an act of the will for willing is only possible without the condition of faith. Once the condition is given, the truth is apprehended by willing.50

This notion of faith as a condition for the apprehension of truth underlies Kierkegaard's answer to our last question in this connection. How is Christ known? The answer is contained in the notion of contemporaneity. Immediate contemporaneity can only be an occasion for belief in so far as faith itself is a condition that can be granted only by God. Thus the immediate contemporary has no advantage over the latter disciple, who must also receive faith from God. However, the immediate contemporary is a witness of a through His testimony serve as an occasion for the latter disciple. "The successor bears over of (this expresses the occasional) the testimony of the contemporary, and in virtue of the condition He receives from God."51

But in order to be thus meaningful, the testimony

49 *Ref. to*, Chapter II.
50 *Ibid*, p. 77 - 78.
should retain the paradoxical nature of faith or it will re-en-crate into the account of an historian or philosopher. To conclude:

"Only one who receives the condition from the God as a believer. (This corresponds exactly to the requirement that one must renounce his reason and on the other hand discloses the only form of authority that corresponds to faith.)" 52

Kierkegaard develops the notion of authority further in On Authority and Revelation. The gist of the thesis is that an apostle is one in whom is vested a transcendental authority. He is God's messenger, and herein lies the validity of his message. It is not to be scrutinized in terms of its content. To do so is blasphemy. It is also an irrelevance for a command is not received but must be met with the response of obedience or disobedience not with the spirit of critical examination. Such an attitude is wrong towards the words of a genius but is an impertinence in relation to apostolic utterances or for the validity of the latter consists solely in the fact that it is conveyed by divine ordinance. There is thus a qualitative difference between the genius and the apostle.

"Authority is a specific quality which comes from another place and takes itself so to speak specifically when the content of the saying or of the action is assumed to be indifferent." 53

52 Fraenkel, p. 129.
The only appropriate response to authority is commitment in faith and obedience or denial and disobedience. Kierkegaard writes:

"An apocryphic statement ... is what it is only by the fact that this or that man said it, a statement which does not at all demand to be understood or fathomed but only to be believed." 54

Hence the crucial importance of the Teacher over against his doctrine. In the context of Christian faith, this importance rests upon the fact that the Teacher is the repository of authority. "Authority", thus, "is either an apostolic call, or the specific quality of ordination". 55 This authority is paradoxical for it cannot be proved by reasoning. The apostle's word is his sole proof. If the apostle could prove his call physically, he would be no apostle.

This notion of authority also disposes of attempts to establish the validity of the Scriptures by critical scholarship. Kierkegaard writes:

"People treat the Scriptures so scientifically that they might quite as well by anonymous writings." 56

whereas, as Kierkegaard writes in another connection,

"...this content exists only for Faith, in the same sense that colours exist only for sight and sounds for hearing." 57

54 On Authority and Revelation, p. 115.
55 Ibid, p. 111.
56 Ibid, p. 27.
57 Fragments, p. 128.
CHAPTER T/0

Reason

Kierkegaard's fundamental position in regard to the role of reason understood in the ordinary sense of reflection is as we saw it expressed in the Stages in connection with marriage. Reflection may reveal the possibilities available to us but a decision must spring from the certitude of passion. This fundamental assessment of reason is carried over into the mainstream of his philosophy the purpose and function of which is, as Kierkegaard writes, "to discover where the misunderstanding lies between speculative philosophy and Christianity". 1

To recapitulate. Reason exposes the potentialities of a situation. It may analyze the dimensions of a problem and reveal the possible courses of action open to us but it cannot state with any degree of finality whether one of these alternatives will lead to the desired goal. Certainty resides in the individual's passionate interest in the goal itself. This passion and the inwardness from which it springs are indeed the only certainty available to man. Decision is thus an act of faith, a leap in the face of the uncertainty the external world presents from

1 C.U.P., p. 216.
the springboard of the certainty of inwardness. This is faith in the realm of the practical and the ethical. From this basic standpoint follows the notion of subjective truth. Truth is accessible to man but not through his reason. Reason always approximates but never achieves certainty. Truth is by definition that which is certain and certainty is possible for man only in his inwardness. Truth is therefore inwardness and inwardness expresses itself as faith in the face of objective uncertainty. Truth is thus faith.

Corresponding to the two determinations of faith referred to in chapter one there are two aspects to truth in as such as truth and faith are equivalent expressions. The Socratic truth is comprehended by will, but the Christian truth must be given. When the absence of truth is forgetfulness, truth comes into being when the individual wills to recall it with the guidance of the teacher. But when ignorance is replaced by error and error is defined as wilful resistance brought about by will, truth becomes a gift of grace. Thus we arrive at the premise that outside of faith truth is inconceivable. In other words, faith implies scepticism. The basic

2 Fragments, p. 21.
distrust of reason that the analysis of the process of decision evokes culminates in a denial of reason as the sole organ of truth. Starting from the premise that reason does not procure certainty it is shown that it cannot do so because truth by its very nature is beyond its purview. Truth lies in the realm of faith.

Nevertheless, reason persists in its striving to know the unknown for it is its nature to do so. With passionate insinuation it seeks to attain something that was always beyond its reach for it is unlike it. This is the paradox of reason. It reaches towards an unknown that lies beyond its limits. This unknown is God.3

How does reason comport itself towards God? Kierkegaard considers this question by analyzing the classic proofs for God's existence. All rationalistic proofs for God's existence are futile for if God does not exist, His existence cannot be proved for to do so is to prove that something that does not exist exists, which is impossible. On the other hand, if God exists, it is superfluous to prove that He does.4 Indeed any attempt to prove the existence of God must begin with the assumption

3 *Fragments*, p. 49.
4 *Ibid*, p. 49.
that he exists. Thus proofs for the existence of God can only be attempts at proving that something that exists is God. But to proceed so deduce from existence that that which exists is a particular something is difficult for there is no necessary connection between god and the door in the realm of the particular. Unless we begin by assuming the existence of Napoleon and that certain actions were actually his, we can never conclude from those actions that they were his. All that we can prove is that those deeds were accomplished by a great general. From the 'great general' to 'Napoleon' is a leap inconceivable for reason to accomplish, and that is why in everyday life the proofs of existence are no more than 'proofs' of the nature 'some existing thing is a stone'; the accused whose existence is given is a criminal.5 What these proofs accomplish is to begin with existence and to show that certain concepts are applicable to the existing thing. "A criminal is one who commits actions of this nature. Therefore this man who acted in this fashion is a criminal." What we have achieved is a definition or description, a linking of an existing thing to an idea. And similarly the proofs for God's

5 _Fragments_, p. 50.
existence. All that they can legitimately claim to accomplish is to clarify the concept of God. They begin with the essence of God and explicate its content. But such a proof of existence is no proof at all for it does not touch upon the question of existence or factual being. What the proofs achieve is a tautology which serves to explicate the nature of God.

This analysis of the ontological argument is given a more explicit form in the Postscript. It is shown that unless the existence of God is assumed in the hypothesis, the argument would reduce to "a someone being not exist—if he exists". The "if" can be annulled only by accepting existence as a premise or by a leap from the 'must' to the 'does'. Reason cannot by itself lead to this step unless it is preceded by faith which accepts such existence. Essence or "ideal being" does follow necessarily from perfection for the perfect being must be, since being is an aspect of perfection. In this sense, "if God is possible, he is eo ipso necessary". But such being is ideal or essential. It is distinct from actual existence or "factual being" which cannot

6 C.U.P., p. 290.
7 Fragments, p. 52.
be proved. Factual being does not follow as a consequence from proof of ideal being. Thus the ontological argument side-steps the difficulty by confusing the issue, for what needs to be proved is not God's essence but his actual being. Thus,

"the idea of demonstrating that this unknown something (the God) exists, could scarcely suggest itself to the Reason. For if the God does not exist it would of course be impossible to prove it; and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it." 8

In so far as the physico-teleological proof first propounded by Socrates begins with the existence of God as the premise, it is superior to the ontological proof. Since God is a concept there is an absolute relationship between his existence and deeds. The difficulty that one encounters in passing from his deeds to the existence of Napoleon is not encountered here; for given this idea which is God, the existence of purpose in nature can only be ascribed to his divine wisdom. But here again we proceed from an idealization for the manifestations of purpose that we start with are to evolve idealization. 9 We never encounter in nature wisdom, perfection or purpose. Nature finds "only seeds of

8  Fragments, p. 40.
9  Ibid., p. 72.
frightening the enquirer and distracts him by many a digression. But Socrates begins with the explicit presupposition of God's existence.

"He always presupposes the God's existence, and under this presupposition seeks to interpenetrate nature with the idea of purpose. Had he been asked why he pursued this method, he would doubtless have explained that he lacked the courage to venture out upon so perilous a voyage of discovery without having made sure of the God's existence behind him. At the word of the God he casts his net as if to catch the idea of purpose."

He has made sure of God's existence by the dialectic of faith and employs reason to explicate the content of faith.

Furthermore, from the proof to the existence is a "letting go", "a leap". The proofs for the existence of God proceed from the implicit or explicit assumption that he exists but the proof itself does not directly lead to demonstration of the existence. In fact it cannot, as long as I am engaged in proving it for to prove is to proceed by definite and consecutive steps. When engaged in proving something the mind anticipates all the moves and is unable to perceive the emergence of a new quality not derived from the preceding steps or necessitated by the following steps. To grasp this new quality, reason must suspend itself. Kierkegaard writes:

10 Fragments, p. 54.
11 Ibid., p. 54.
12 Ibid., p. 53.
"And how does the God's existence emerge from the proof? Does it follow straightaway, without any breach of continuity? Or have we not here an analogy to the behaviour of the little Cartesian dolls? As soon as I let go of the doll 'it stands on its head'. As soon as I let it go—I must therefore let it go. So also with the proof. As long as I keep hold on the proof, i.e. continue to regard it, the existence does not come out, if for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving it; but when I let the proof go, the existence is there. But this act of letting go is surely also something; it is indeed a remarkable contribution of mine. Must not this also be taken into account, this little moment, brief as it may be—it need not be long, for it is a lean. However brief this moment, if only in instantaneous now, this "now" must be included in the reasoning." 13

This receptivity that is derived from succeeding reason is again faith. Thus the proof for the existence of God must not only begin with faith but must also be complemented by faith. Existence cannot emerge from the proof unless it is perceived through faith. 14

13 *Fragments*, p. 3.

14 In the *Fragments* Kierkegaard explicitly denies the use of the word 'faith' for belief in God in the Socratic sense. He writes: "From the eternal point of view one does not have faith that the God exists (eternally is), even if one assumes that he does exist. The use of the word 'faith' in this connection enshrines a misunderstanding: Socrates did not have faith that the God existed. What he knew about the God he arrived at by way of recollection; the God's existence was for him by no means historical existence." (Ibid; p. 108) Nevertheless, in the Postscript, as shown in the previous chapter, he does refer to Socratic faith in God as faith and he makes a distinction between Socratic faith and Christian faith in regard to "strenuousness". The passage quoted above seems to emphasize this distinction.
Reason cannot comprehend existence for existence is not necessary. Coming into existence is a change. There must be a change that which changes. What which undergoes a change cannot be the necessary. For the necessary is by definition that which is. The necessary wherefrom cannot come into existence.

Conversely, that which comes into existence cannot do so by necessity for were it necessary it would be, and its coming into existence would thus be unrealized.

For one that will come into existence become necessary by coming into existence for that is a self-contradiction. Nothing becomes necessary. The necessary is. Thus,

"Nor that which comes into existence proceed by coming into existence for it is not necessary, for the only thing which does not come into existence is the necessary, because the necessary is." 15

But that which comes into existence must have a being prior to its coming into actuality. For coming into existence is a change. Nevertheless, this prior being must not change in the transition to existence for then what comes into existence is not this but some other subject. Also it is necessary that there be such a prior being for without it coming into existence would not be a change at all. Thus coming into existence

15 Fragments, p. 91.
existence presupposes a being which is a non-being and also is not necessary. Possibility is precisely such a being. Therefore "the change of coming into existence is a transition from possibility to actuality." 16

coming into existence is historical for in undergoing the change that is coming into existence the subject of change enters into a dialectic with time. In other words, it acquires a past, a present and a future. Of these, the past alone is historical for it alone is. 17 The present is not yet fully and the future has not happened. But to say that the past is, is not to imply that it is necessary.

16 *Fragments*, p. 91. The argument rests upon the presupposition that existence is a change, that it is a "coming into existence", a transition from one state to another. It therefore becomes necessary to posit a state prior to the change which is coming into existence. This must be so in view of the intended "Application" of the argument the subject of which is the Incarnation, which is by definition the eternal become historical. Further, in arguing that the necessary cannot come into existence because it is, Kierkegaard seems to commit the confusion of categories which he points out in connection with the classical proofs for the existence of God. The necessary is, in the sense that it has ideal being. From this it does not seem possible to deduce whether it can or cannot have factual or actual being because "the coming-into-existence kind of change....is not a change in essence but in being, and is a transition from not existing to existing." *(Fragments*, p. 91)

Further on in the same section, Kierkegaard alludes to this distinction when he writes "necessity....is not a determination of being but a determination of essence since it is the essence of the necessary to be". *(Fragments*, p. 92)

17 *Fragments*, p. 97.
Like all things that come into existence the past is a possibility turned into actuality. As such, only its actual content, the "thus" is necessary, not the "how". The possibility realized is one of many possibilities. The "thus" could have been realized differently for coming into existence takes place not by necessity but by freedom. For that which is necessary does not come into existence and that which has come into existence cannot be necessary.

The coming into existence of God, the Incarnation, is historical; as historical, it is not necessary. It is a free act.

How is the past known? An object can be known by immediate sensation or cognition but how do we know that it is historical, that it has come into existence and was a past? Since the past is not necessary it cannot be known by reason. Reason can apprehend only the necessary, that which is, whereas, the past is something that has come into being and therefore carries with it a two-fold uncertainty; that it was not and has come to be and that in doing so has "annihilated" a possibility in thus emerging into actuality. Also, this annihilation of a possibility is the negation of every other possibility for the "thus" of the object or the event precludes the possibility of its ever being otherwise, since the
"thus" has actually come into being.\textsuperscript{18} Reason can apprehend the possible but it cannot grasp the actual existence.

Coming into existence has an "elusiveness",\textsuperscript{19} an uncertainty which cannot be annulled by immediate cognition. By immediate cognition and sensation all that we know is that the object is present. Our immediate apprehension of a star is a certainty; but as soon as reflection enquires whether it exists, that is, if it has come into existence, we encounter an uncertainty which renders questionable the immediate impression of the star which to begin with was a certainty. A similar uncertainty attends the historicity of events. The "thus" of the event, that is, its content, is known, but whether it has happened is an issue which cannot be resolved cognitively. Therefore the historical presupposes a mode of apprehension which mirrors the uncertainty of coming into existence and resolves it in its own certainty. Such a mode of apprehension is faith. But such apprehension is not knowledge for faith is a resolution of the will, a termination of the uncertainty by a decision. But the decisiveness of faith must still countenance the possibility that the object or event

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Fragments}, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}, p. 100.
could have been otherwise. To believe in it, faith is not a conception on its object a necessity that does not belong to it. It affirms the existence of its object and at the same time conceives its contingency. For, "without denying the possibility of another "inhis", this present "inhis" is or belief most certain". 20

In its nature as an act of the will, faith is analogous to belief, for both are "states of mind". Faith annuls the doubt by an act of the will whereas the sceptic preserved the doubt by willing not to arrive at a conclusion. Both the believer and the sceptic agree that error is its root in the will but while the sceptic on this ground refuses to form a conclusion, the believer accepts the risk of error in willing to believe.

"When faith resolves to believe it runs the risk of committing itself to error, but it nevertheless believes. There is no other road to faith; if one wishes to escape risk, it is as if one wanted to know with certainty that he can act before going into the water." 21

In his will to doubt, thus, the free sceptic remains the rejection of reason and his "starry .... was to reform an existential attempt to abstract from existence". 22 Thought, though it abstracted

20 Fragments, p. 103.
21 Ibid., p. 103 n.
22 C.U.E.p. 22.
fro. existence, were not totally unrelated to it in as much as there was an inter-relationship between thought and existence. If thought led to the positing of scepticism, scepticism became a way of life. It became an ethical choice. Thus even the sceptics among the Greek thinkers had due regard for the task of living. Reserving existence, severing altogether the ties of thought with living is therefore the unparalleled distinction. Kierkegaard could say, of speculative philosophy. His critique of this letter focuses upon two aspects of it:

Cartesian abstract thought and Hegelian mere thought.

The deficiency of abstract thought lies in its inability to grasp existence. This, however, must be so, for the particular delimit thought: it is in the process of becoming. As long as the particular and the actual are bracketed off from reality, reality presents a suitable subject for thought. But the problem thus outlined is a falsification for the particular as a part of reality. Abstract thought or ratio non only does not envisage reality in its totality but it eliminates the problem altogether by obviating the contradiction between the particular and the general in the very process of abstraction. Thus the 'I' in the Cartesian cito consequens is a
"nunc ego" which exists not as an actual human being in time but sub specie aeterni, so that the proposition is a mere tautology. Thought eliminates the particular individual because it cannot think the particular. From this it proceeds to deduce that the particular has no reality or that cannot be thought i.e. not real, since thought corresponds to reality.

The real is the general and an is an. Therefore the interests of the particular individual have no relevance to abstract thought and disinterested thinking is viewed as a virtue. Since thought is incapable of concerning itself with the particular, thinking in its higher form must be distinguished by a total absence of any divorce from the particular. The very limitation of abstract thought becomes its virtue. Thus it follows that the problems of the living individual are not fit subjects for thought. Because of this unconcern the abstract thinker marries "but without knowing love or its power" and his "marriage will have been as impersonal as his thought". For the same reason, when abstract thought considers immortality, it inevitably leaves out the particular individual and proceeds to analyze the concept.

23 C.U.P., p. 281.
24 Ibid., p. 288.
"A picture is worth a thousand words.

"Never does it "goe to totally success."

And yet, it retains a certain significance in etymology. Since it is the way the doctor . . ."
The idea of the identity of thought and being can only apply to purely ideal existence. The existence coincides with the concept. Such is the real of Ideas. But an is an Idea. For is his existence totally from, of Idea like that of a rose. His is an ideal to existence and hence the notion of identity of thought and being does not apply. Thus,

"existence is always something particular, the abstract does not exist. From this to draw the conclusion that the abstract is without will, it is a misunderstanding; but it is also a misunderstanding to confound because ever raising the question of existence, or reality in the sense of existence, in connection with the abstract. Then an existing individual raises the question of the relation between thought and being, thinking as existing, and philosophy explains that it is one of identity, the answer does not reply to the question because it does not reply to the questioner." 28

Fact or, when he can be identical only with what I finished and complete. It is by virtue of this reason that our thought concerns itself excessively with the past. But from the standpoint of the existing individual it is impossible to understand the past as a totality. The finitude of the existing individual subjects his understanding of the past to a quantitative determination so that the treat and not the good emerges as worthy of remark. This must be so for only God has access to the motives of man; the existing 28 C.U.P., p. 294.
individual can only know actions, and that too only partially. Thus,

"For God, the apprehension of the historical is interpenetrated by his knowledge of the inmost secrets of conscience, alike in the greatest and the humblest. If a human being seeks to occupy this standpoint he is a fool; if he refrains from such an attempt, he will have to content himself with a survey of the more prominent items, and this is precisely what makes the quantitative the decisive factor in the selection. That the ethical is present in the historical process, as it is everywhere where God is, is not on this account denied. But it is denied that the finite spirit can see it in truth...." 29

Further, the knowledge of the historical must always remain an approximation, for the material is infinite. It constantly changes and increases. Therefore a beginning is an arbitrary limitation. 30

The historical is uncertain and there can be no conclusive knowledge in regard to it. It is for this reason that attempts at establishing the authenticity of Christianity objectively as an historical truth are bound to fail. Moreover, even the most exhaustive critical examination of the Scriptures can only hope to prove the authenticity of the canon in terms of philology and such other criteria of scholarship. But, for the believer, the authenticity of the canon rests upon inspiration. And inspiration is a quality that cannot be proved. 31

29 C.U.P., p. 126.
31 Ibid, p. 29.
certainty, assuming that it can be attained, will not succeed in converting a non-believer nor will it be of use to the believer. On the contrary, it will endanger the believer's faith by removing the uncertainty,

"...in this voluminous knowledge, this certainty that lurks at the door of faith and threatens to devour it, he (the believer) is in so dangerous a situation that he will need to put forth much effort in rect fear and trembling, lest he fall a victim to the temptation to confuse knowledge with faith. While faith has hitherto had a profitable schoolmaster in the existing uncertainty, it would have in the new certainty its most dangerous enemy. For if passion is eliminated faith no longer exists, and certainty and passion do not go together". 32

And so also attempts at proving that the present Church is the Apostolic Church. As soon as a claim to authenticity is based on historicity, uncertainty invades the issue and makes a decision impossible.

Speculative philosophy treats Christianity as an historical phenomenon. But the historical is the past and the past reveals itself with an uncertainty that reason cannot resolve. Thus the historical cannot be known and does not have an immediate

conceivably; it is an object of faith. Further, since the historical phenomenon in this case is a contradiction, i.e., since contemporaneity does not confer an advantage; for the immediate contemporary as well as the later crucible Christ was revind an object of faith. The fact that so many hundreds of years have intervened and evidence have attested so it does not make Christianity necessary. The past is not necessary and does not become necessary by being an event. And what is not necessary lies beyond the scope of reason.

Active Christianity is a chimera because Christianity is not a 'given'. It is an entity each individual must realize for himself. It is a spirit and therefore can only be understood by a spiritual act. For "only the like is understandable by the like".  

33 Fragments, Interlude.
34 C.D., n. 1.
The problem of faith and reason has its root in the commonly observed incongruity between thought and action. One finds oneself

"...sitting at a desk and writing about what one has never done...writing de omnius duotandum and at the same time being as credulous existentially as the most sensation of men". 1

Ordinarily life proceeds upon an implicit dichotomy between the realm of thought and the sphere of action. Generally this distinction is not even consciously recognized. But nevertheless there exists a disparity in one's attitude towards principles and events which do not directly impinge upon one's existence and those which do and thereby demand a decisive response. In matters which do not immediately concern one thought is given a free rein and it unfolds according to its innate necessity. Its conclusions are accepted and applied objectively, if at all. Not only scientific truths but the principles of moral law seem usually to be regarded in this fashion. Consistency and dispassionateness are seen as the virtues of moral judgement and the moral code of a society is built upon such dispassionate

1 C.H.P., c. 179.
reflection. Since the moral code has its justifica-
tion in principles of universal applicability it
leaves the particular individual secure and unmoved
in his anonymity. This is so for generally no
individual can see his immediate concerns as
coinciding with a generality. They are varied and
unique, in short, particular. The universal appeals
to abstract thought and thought can reveal diverse
possibilities but cannot differentiate between them.
The possibilities presented are alike in their
indifference because difference belongs to the realm
of actuality or particulars. Thus, when one has
inhabited the realm of thought sufficiently long to
be aware of theemptiness of its disjunctions one
learns to respond as Kierkegaard's aesthetic young
man does: "My revered contemporary, you misunderstand
me. I am not in the game at all. I am outside like
a tiny Spanish 's'."

The individual, then, comports himself towards
the universal in conformity with its abstract nature.
But he does so only until he comes into conflict with
it. When the universal moral law contradicts the
particular, morality acquires a new perspective for
it has thrust itself into a subjectivity. A
matter which till then was of little more personal

2  E/C II, p. 175 - 176.
significance than a law of nature is under most circumstances, suddenly stands forth with a fullness of import because from the domain of abstract thought it has transposed itself into an individual existence. It becomes an either/or.

It is thus in an individual consciousness that the ethical acquires concretion. The ethical demands a choice, a decisive commitment to distinguish the good from the evil. And there can be no good and evil in abstraction for good and evil are values. Values presuppose interest, a purpose, and purpose can reside only in a subjectivity. Viewed abstractly, transposed into the realm of the collective or the universal, good and evil are transformed into the "greater" and the "lesser". They cease to be qualities and become quantitative determinants, because outside the ambit of subjectivity only effects are perceived. Therefore good comes to be regarded not as an ultimate quality but only as that which is conducive to this or that objective end and a relativism is introduced which converts evil into that which is no more than something not productive of that end. Evil is the absence of good and good the absence of evil. Good and evil thus cease to be absolute and positive.
"It is for this reason that Ethics looks upon all world-historical knowledge with a degree of suspicion, because it may so easily become a snare, a demoralizing aesthetic diversion for the knowing subject, insofar as the distinction between what does or does not have historical significance obeys a quantitative dialectic. As a consequence of this fact, the absolute distinction between good and evil tends for the historical survey to be neutralized in the aesthetic-metaphysical determination of the great and the significant, to which category the bad has equal admittance with the good." 3

Thus in the ethical choice the individual accepts and acknowledges his inwardness. In other words, he chooses himself, posits himself absolutely. The ethical, therefore, individualizes. Further, through the decisiveness derived from the ethical choice of inwardness, the individual affirms God; 
"...God comes into being for him," 4 and the ethical becomes an expression of God-relationship. Thus "the ethical is...a correlative to individuality and that to such a degree that each individual apprehends the ethical essentially only in himself because the ethical is his complicity with God." 5 In short, the ethical is the positing of inwardness which is faith. For "faith is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in God." 6

3 C.U.E., p. 120.
But what is faith posited? Faith is posited by reason by virtue of its innate uncertainty whereby it must always deal with the possible. Thought is necessarily thought about the unknown. This is so because even when reflection occupies itself with what which is actual, it approaches it as an entity endowed with unknown possibilities, that is, it deals with it as the unknown. In its passion to reveal, it infects with uncertainty everything it touches. Further, it is the nature of thought to reach beyond itself to posit something it cannot conceive. This is the paradoxical passion of reason.

"...the highest pitch of every passion is to will its own downfall; and so it is also the supreme passion of the Reason to seek a collision, though this collision must in one way or another prove its undoing. The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think. This passion is at bottom present in all thinking, even in the thinking of the individual, in so far as in thinking he participates in something transcending himself." 7

By the inherent compulsion of its own nature, then, reason points to the unknown at every step. By the same paradoxical passion, it posits God, the Unknown. This unknown must of necessity remain the unknown for it is the unknowable. In its paradoxical passion reason has posited something which transcends 7  

mentioned, p. 47.
reason by virtue of its unlikeness to it. Reason has in fact posited its own limit. But having posited the unknown reason cannot let go and withdraw. It must perpetually contend with its unknowability.

"The paradoxical passion of the Reason thus comes repeatedly into collision with this Unknown, which does indeed exist, but is unknown, and in so far does not exist. The Reason cannot advance beyond this point, and yet it cannot refrain in its paradoxical-ness from arriving at this limit and occupying itself therewith. It will not serve to dismiss its relation to it simply by asserting that the Unknown does not exist since this itself involves a relationship. But what then is the Unknown, since the designation of it as the God merely signifies for us that it is unknown? To say that it is the Unknown because it cannot be known, and even if it were capable of being known, it could not be expressed, does not satisfy the demands of passion, though it correctly interprets the Unknown as a limit; but a limit is precisely a torment for passion, though it also serves as an incitement. And yet the Reason can come no further, whether it risks as an issue via negationis or vic erimetia." 8

Further, the positing of the Unknown by Reason establishes a relationship which dissipates man’s certitude regarding himself. In God-relationship self-knowledge gives place to an unresolvable uncertainty. Kierkegaard writes:

"...the paradoxical passion of the Reason, while as yet a mere presentiment, retroactively affects man and his self-knowledge, so that he, he thought to know himself is

8 *Fregioen*, p. 55.
no longer certain whether he is a more
strangely composite animal than Typhon
or if perchance his nature contains a
gentler and diviner part." 9

Thus by its own impulsion reason displaces itself
by creating a possibility which can only be grasped
by an act of the will; either an affirmation of the
self before God in faith, or its denial before God
in sin. Reason abdicates by giving place to this
disjunction. 10 But in doing so it does not negate
itself. It is present in the existential choice as
the element of objective uncertainty. This uncertainty
is an essential aspect of faith for faith is "not a
form of knowledge but a free act, an expression of
will." 11 Nor is faith a blind affirmation, an impulse
or inspiration. Were it such, faith would not be an
act of the will, nor would it carry with it the
eternal responsibility which attaches to deliberate
decision. On the contrary, subjectivity, in which
decisiveness inheres, must have present before it "the
memento of the fork in the road", the objective

9  Fragments, p. 49.
10 To say this, however, is not to imply that reason
directly leads to sin or faith, or necessitates
either. Reason, on the contrary, merely leads to
uncertainty which by the existing individual is
resolved by a free act of the will, by a leap either
of sin or of faith. It is possible, as in the sphere
of the aesthetical, to remain in the uncertainty,
but we are here concerned with the decisive, the
ethical or the existential.

11  Fragments, p. 103.
expression for truth. Without this confidence of the risk of error, Kierkegaard's notion of faith will lose its unique character of a "dil\-tant certainty". 12 It will lose its etiological import, cease to be an objection, and assume the neutrality of knowledge. The objective uncertainty presented by reason invests faith with its essential tension and "strenuousness". Thus,

"I conceive the order of nature in the hope of finding God, and I see omniscience and wisdom, but I also see much else that disturbs my mind and excites anxiety. The sum of all this is an objective uncertainty. But it is on this reason that inwardness becomes as intense as it is, for it embraces this objective uncertainty with the entire passion of the infinite." 13

Further, the risk entailed in faith also manifests itself as "temptation", an urge to revolve itself, for reason is not satisfied once the decision of faith is made but continues to deliberate upon possibilities.

"When I am deliberating it is my task to think every possibility; but when I have decided, and consequently acted inwardly, a chance turns to a place so that it is now my task to turn against further deliberation, except in so far something requires to be undone." And then, "the way to a new resolutely goes through repentance." 14

Faith thus contends with an inscrutable risk and this constitutes its dialectical tension. It is

12 O.W.P., p. 205.
13 Ibid, p. 182.
14 Ibid, p. 304n.
in the light of this tension that Abraham's decision achieves full significance. Abraham was compelled to acknowledge a contradiction between the ethical and the religious. Both have an imperative claim of obedience upon the individual and in the uneventfulness of day to day life one assumes that the forms of morality and obedience to God are mutually complementary and so obey the one is to acknowledge the other. Abraham, however, was compelled to choose between the two. And his response, as Kierkegaard represents it, was a decision in full awareness of the implications of the choice and not mere blind obedience.

"The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he would murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he would sacrifice Isaac; but precisely in this contradiction consists the dread which can well make a man sleepless, and yet Abraham is not what he is without this dread." 16

The reasonability of "Thou shalt not kill" is manifest; but also, once the idea of God is posited, it is reasonable that "...with God all things are possible". 17 Reason cannot lead to the affirmation or denial of the one of the other and therefore Abraham brings reflection to conclusion in the only way it is possible to do so, that is, in faith. Thus the seeming irrationality

15 In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard uses the term ethical to signify universal morality and in the Postscript to indicate the decisive, the existential.


17 Fear and Trembling, p. 57.
of Abraham's conduct does not indicate the absence of deliberation but lies in the choice of the particular alternative. He chose what the majority of mankind would not choose. But that precisely is the nature of the ethical. In decision man is individualized; 
"... the individual stands alone". 18

Thus, once reason posits God, it is constrained to countenance "the absurd", that through faith one regains the finite. It lies within man's power to give up the finite in infinite resignation but he cannot re-possess the finite by his own power. Therefore, he must regain it through the omnipotence of God. In other words, the object of faith is not absurd, only the act of faith is. Faith is absurd because it places the individual in an absolute relationship with the absolute in supersession of the universal. The absurdity lies in the relationship; it is a leap. Reason postulates God but it does not necessitate the relationship; it is something the individual contributes. Having posited the relationship the individual makes "the double movement" of resignation and return to the finite. And herein lies the difference between Socratic faith and faith as it is described in Fear and Trembling. Socratic 18 C.U.P., p. 287.
faith affirms God by a leap but it does not explicitly acknowledge the consequence such affirmation entails, which is that it lacks the individual in a direct relationship to God. Kierkegaard writes:

"The connoisseur in self-knowledge was relaxed over his self to the point of boulder art when he came to grapple in thought with the unlike; he scarcely knew any longer whether he was a stranger master than Typhon or if his nature partook of something divine. What God did he lack? The consciousness of sin..." 19

Faith concludes the relationship by positing itself and thereby also sin. Nevertheless, Socratic faith underlies faith and it presupposes reason inasmuch as reason posits God. 20

Reason thus renders possible the absurdity of the "double move". And what is reason's role in regard to the Absurd itself? In *Philosophical Fragments* Kierkegaard alludes to the God-man as the Absolute Paradox. Inasmuch as Christ is God he is unlike man and the unlikeness consists in man's sinfulness. Man himself cannot become conscious of his sinfulness. The consciousness of sin must be preceded by the condition of faith which man can receive only from Christ the teacher. In order to be man's teacher, therefore, God annuls the difference between man and himself so as to understand him better.

19 *Fragments*, p. 58.

20 In terms of the *spheres* of existence, this relationship is expressed as the inclusion of the aesthetical and the ethical in the religious.
This then is the dual aspect of the paradox; that it reveals the absolute unlikeness between and in coin so annul the difference. Now, reason by itself cannot conceive of an absolute unlikeness. It postulates the Unknown as the absolutely different but in reason with such a concept it converts the absolute distinction into a difference it can conceive. This must be so for reason cannot absolutely transcend its own limit. The knowledge of the Paradox must therefore be granted by the Paradox itself.

Reason, then, cannot conceive of the Paradox but must obtain such knowledge from the Paradox itself. But to be aware of the Paradox is not necessarily to accept it. Reason may rebel against the Paradox and react to it in offence as to the Absurd. But the absurdity is not reason's discovery but the nature of the Paradox itself. The Paradox reveals itself to reason as the paradoxical and the absurd as it vouchsafes to reason a glimpse of complete unlikeness. This of course is an "acoustical illusion".

Thus in offence reason acknowledges the absolute unlikeness of the Paradox. But then the absolutely unlike is necessarily that towards which reason strives in its "paradoxical passion". Therefore in the sense of passion reason "crasus the Paradox as the
Paradox; this "de nous passion" in which reason surrenders itself and the "paradox itself" is faith. In the encounter with the Absurd, therefore, reason yields but is not vanquished. It is present in the union as the factor of tension. The notion of the consumption of reason in Christian faith is summed up thus in the *Fragments*:

"But can such a paradox be conceived? ... The reason will doubtless find it impossible to conceive it, so did not itself have discovered it, and when it hears it announced will not be able to understand it, sensing merely that its downfall is threatened. In so far the reason will have much to urge against it; and we have on the other hand seen that the reason, in its paradoxical passion, precisely desires its own downfall. But this understanding is present only in the notion of passion. Consider the analogy of love, though it is not the perfect one. Self-love lies in the ground of love; but the paradoxical passion of self-love when at its highest pitch will reverse its own downfall. This is also what love desires, so that these two are united in mutual understanding in the action of the soul, and this passion is love. Why should not the lover find this conceivable? But we who in self-love shrink from the notion of love as we neither understand it nor can the courage to venture it, since it is its downfall. Such is then the passion of love; self-love is indeed subverted but not annihilated; it is to the contrary, and love's soul is united, but the soul is one to life, and this is love's temptation. So also with the Paradox in its relation to the reason, only that the reason in this case has another ...

21 *Fragments*, p. 59 - 60.
Thus, once again, faith supposes reason, for only in the presence of reason with its limitations does the Paradox present itself as a Paradox and thus become the object of faith. Further, in faith reason though "submerged is not annihilated" and is present as the constant indication of uncertainty against which faith must be perpetually engaged in a running battle.

"If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep, or r seventy thousand fathoms of water still preserving my faith." 22

In Christian faith, the danger is magnified beyond measure for the objective uncertainty gives place to an objective certainty that the Paradox is absurd.

"It is certain only that it is absurd, and precisely on that account it invites to an infinitely greater tension in the corresponding inwardness. The Socratic inwardness in existing is an analogue to faith; only that the inwardness of faith, corresponding as it does, not to the repulsion of Socratic ignorance, but to the repulsion exerted by the Absurd, is infinitely more profound." 23

Faith entails a risk but the risk only strengthens faith the more. "For without risk there is no faith and the greater the risk the greater the faith; ..." 24

22 C.U.P., p. 182.
23 Ibid, p. 184.
24 Ibid, p. 188.
II. Faith, thus, is not the abrogation of reason but the destiny reason chooses for itself. By virtue of its "paradoxical passion" reason converts itself into the "human common sense" which is Kierkegaard's touchstone of the existential. It is from the standpoint of the existential thinker that he exposes the inadequacy of the dominant philosophy of his day. He asks regarding the Hegelian:

"Does he in fact exist? And if he does, does he not face the future? And does he ever face the future by way of action? ...But if he ever acts sensu eminenti, does he in that case face the future with infinite passion? Is there not for him an either/or? Is it not the case that eternity is for an existing individual not eternity, but the future, and that eternity is eternity only for the Eternal who is not in process of becoming? ...Was he born sub specie aeterni, and has he lived sub specie aeterni since...never having had anything to do with the future, and never having experienced any decision?" 25

The existential is the decisive; to exist is to act; man is not sub specie aeterni. But to say this is not to imply that the existing individual does not think. To act is to function as an integral human being, as an "entire man". The self that decides is not merely the cogitative self but the entire self of which imagination and feeling are as much a part as thought. Therefore "the task is not to exalt the one at the expense of the other, but to give them 25 G.U.P., p. 271 - 272."
an equal status, to unify them in simultaneity; the
medium in which they are unified is existence." 26

The existing individual must think inasmuch as
existence itself combines thought with action. His
distinction lies not in the absence of thought but
in the realization that his own existence is the
sole object of thought. His task is to understand
himself. This must necessarily be so for every
reality other than his own is related to him only as
a possibility. In thinking, he abstracts existence
from the actual and reduces it to a possibility. But
in thinking his own existence, he cannot reduce him-
self to an abstraction for he is not totally an
object of thought for himself. Existence intervenes
to render thinking intermittent for existence is a
movement, a becoming, and thought has no category to
reflect it; indeed it cannot do so for thought deals
in categories. By virtue of this reason the existing
individual "...thinks before and after". 27 Thus for
the existing thinker his own reality is not effaced
in thinking. Therefore "the only reality in which an
existing individual may have a relation that is more
than cognitive is his own reality, the fact that he
exists; this reality constitutes his absolute interest." 28

26 C.U.E., p. 311.
27 Ibid, p. 293.
Existence is a process and therefore the existing individual cannot give it continuity merely in thought. What then holds together the individual existence? The element of continuity in existence is passion, wherein the entire personality asserts itself as a unity. And passion expresses itself as decisiveness. Therefore "the goal of movement for an existing individual is to arrive at a decision and renew it". The task proper to existential thinking is therefore the ethical and in this realization lies the greatness of Socrates; for "Socrates was... a man whose energies were devoted to thinking; but he reduced all other knowledge to indifference in that he infinitely accentuated ethical knowledge".

In decisiveness, then, the self is concretized and consolidated in as much as it affirms itself in its passion as an entity endowed not merely with thought, feeling, or imagination but with all three. Thus, "if only the choice is posited, all of the aesthetic returns again and you will see that only then does existence become beautiful, that only in this way can a man succeed in saving his soul and gaining the whole world without abusing it".

In contemplating this self as a reality thought invests it with a horizon, with possibilities the self must realize. Thus,

29 O.J.H., p. 277.
31 E/O. II, p. 182.
"This ethical reality is the only reality which does not become a mere possibility through being-know, and which can be known only through being-thought; for it is the individual's own reality. Before it became a reality it was known by him in the form of a conceived reality, and hence as a possibility."

The task of existential thinking, therefore, is to think the ethical for it is in decision that the self acquires being-concretion, and ceases the true in its own interiority. Truth is subjectivity and subjectivity is inwardness. Viewed from this standpoint the Incarnation emerges as the most crucial existential problem, for it rebels thought and stands out as an uncontroversial either/or. The entire individual must either accept it or reject it and 'either alternative we choose', 'e o e v a r o r e a l a t i v e e x s t r e n s i o n. The individual emerges as a free case in his God-relationship for in conjunction the disjunction 'e n p l a c e s h i m s e l f d e c i s i v e l y b e f o r e God either in faith or in sin. Nietzsche writes:

"To understand oneself in existence is also the Christian principle, except that this 'self' is received far richer and deeper determination, still more difficult to understand, in conjunction with existence. The belief is a subjective thinker...here again the 'self' is not humanity in general, or subjectivity in general, in which case everything becomes easy because the difficulty is removed, and the whole task transposed to
the realm of the abstract thought with its shadow-coining. The difficulty is greater than it is for the Greek, for still greater contradictions are contained, existence becoming accentuated paradoxically as sin, and eternity accentuated paradoxically as God in time. The difficulty resides in existence in such categories, not in abstractly thinking oneself out of them, abstractly becoming, for example, about an eternal God-becoming and such like, all of which ideas evolve as soon as the difficulty is taken away. As a consequence, the believer's existence is still more a sin than the existence of the Greek philosopher, who needed a high degree of passion even in relation to his atomism; for existence generates passion, but existence paradoxically accentuated enforces the maximum passion."

Through his God-relationship the believer reaffirms the ontic for "the true distinction between good and evil...exists only in the individual and in the last analysis only in each individual in his God-relationship". The individual thus knows himself in the only way possible, which is through grasping himself in decisiveness. But when he does so in faith sensu scripturismo wherein the object is not Christian recourse but Christ himself, he is taken "rather than his own self; he not only affirms himself but also affirms another and thereby knows him. For the object of faith here is Christ, the God-man. Through the Incarnation he has annulled the difference between on and God and has

33 C.U.P., p. 317.
34 Ibid, p. 139.
rendered himself knowable in faith, for the reality of a self other than one's own can only be known in faith. For,

"the object of faith is the reality of another, and the relationship is one of infinite interest. The object of faith is not a doctrine for then the relationship would be intellectual, and it would be of importance not to botch it, but to realize the maximum intellectual relationship. The object of faith is not a teacher with a doctrine; for when a teacher has a doctrine, the doctrine is so into more important than the teacher, and the relationship is again intellectual, and it again becomes important not to botch it, but to realize the maximum intellectual relationship. The object of faith is the reality of the teacher that the teacher really exists. The answer of faith is therefore unconditionally yes or no... it is the answer to a question concerning a fact: Do you or do you not suppose that he really existed? and the answer, it must be noted, is with infinite passion. In the case of a human being it is thoughtlessness to lay so great and infinite a stress on the question whether he has existed or not. If the object of faith is a human being, therefore, the whole proposal is the vagary of a stupid person who has not even understood the spirit of the intellectual and the aesthetic. The object of faith is hence the reality of the God-man in the sense of his existence. But existence involves first and foremost particularity, and this is why thought must abstract from existence, because the particular cannot be thought but only the universal. The object of faith is thus God's reality in existence as a particular individual, the fact that God has existed as an individual human being." 35

Thus, in the notion of Christian faith the discord between reason and faith is resolved. Reason

35 C.U.P., p. 290.
is transmuted and assumed its proper place as a
"co-ordinate" in the harmonious reality that is an
individual. An thereby is redeemed one of mankind's
most valuable instincts: that

"the true is not higher than the good and
the beautiful, but the true and the good
and the beautiful belong especially to
every human existence, and are unified for
an existing individual not in thought but
in existence." 36

36 C.N.F., p. 211.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) Primary Kierkegaard Sources used in Thesis

Either/Or, Doubleday 1959, Anchor paperback A 181 a-b, translated by David F. and Lillian Marvin Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Translations and notes revised together with a forward by Howard A. Johnson.


Philosophical Fragments, Princeton University Press 1963. Originally translated and introduced by David F. Swenson; new introduction and commentary by Niels Thulstrup; translation revised and commentary translated by Howard V. Hong.


Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, 1846, Princeton University Press 1941. Translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Published for the American Scandinavian Foundation.


Training in Christianity, 1850, Oxford University Press, (New York) 1941. Translated by Walter Lowrie. This volume also contains An Edifying Discourse, 1850.


(2) Secondary Kierkegaard Sources

