THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PLURAL SOCIETIES:

A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN (1947-71)

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Pakistan had a plural society per excellence. Its people were divided geographically between two separate regions, spoke different languages, had different cultures and economic structures. Like other plural societies elsewhere, Pakistan also faced the problem of national integration. Cleavages along the lines of traditional attachments are fundamental to any plural society, as they were in Pakistan. But their political manifestation could have been kept within manageable limits if the Central Government, overwhelmingly composed of the West Pakistanis, was seriously committed to the task. All that Pakistan needed to maintain her integrated existence was deliberate, calculated and conscious efforts on the part of the Central Government to give the Bengalis, the majority linguistic and geographic group in the country, a partnership in the state of Pakistan, an effective power in the decision-making process of the country, a reasonable share from the economic resources of the country, and to show respect to their hopes and aspirations. In addition, Pakistan needed a national platform to bring her divergent linguistic and geographic groups together for some common, national purposes. Political parties were the only institutions which could have served this purpose. Pakistan miserably failed to sustain national political parties and failed to satisfy Bengalis' demands. This failure eventually resulted in the falling apart of the political system of Pakistan in 1971.
PREFACE

As the title of the thesis suggests, this is a study on the problem of national integration in Pakistan, or, to put it more specifically, why Pakistan failed to maintain her integrated existence. Despite the fact that the Muslim majority areas of the North-West and Eastern part of undivided India were separated from each other by about 1,000 miles and their peoples were different in language and culture, the Islamic ideology had produced such a great deal of enthusiasm that the people had forgotten all differences and unitedly fought for the establishment of a separate homeland for them where there would be no domination, exploitation, or hatred of one by the other. This Islamic idealism did not last long, however. Following the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, the Bengalis, who were the single largest linguistic and geographic group in the country, and whose contribution toward the independence movement was enormous, found themselves in a helpless situation—they had very little share in the decision-making process; they were not getting a fair share in the economic resources of the country; and they felt that they were being looked down upon by the West Pakistanis. Realization of these facts generated great discontent among the Bengalis and this led to very strained relations between East Pakistan and the Central Government, which was predominantly manned by the West Pakistanis. Whereas the Bengalis had been clamoring for the redress of their grievances, the Central Government did not pay proper attention to them.

When the Bengalis found that a change in their socio-economic-political status in relation to the state of Pakistan was not possible under the existing
structure of the system, they played extreme provincialism as a strategy to consolidate and unify themselves for a peaceful fight with the Central Government to wrest power so that they could change the very structure and thus assert their rights. But the Central Government was not ready to allow the Bengalis to do so. The former persistently tried to thwart any move of the latter toward this end. The crackdown of the West Pakistani armed forces on the unarmed Bengalis on the night of March 25, 1971, washed away any hope of an integrated existence of the two wings of Pakistan.

Thus, Pakistan provided an excellent ground for studies on the problem of national integration in a plural society. Although there has been a growing body of literature on the government and politics of Pakistan, and on the emergence of Bangladesh, there has been no extensive and analytical survey of the politics of Pakistan from the perspective of national integration in a plural society. This study purports to fill this vacuum.

The principal focus of this study is on the interaction between the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis; in other words, the politics between East Pakistan on the one side, and West Pakistan and the Central Government, on the other. The study is conducted under the framework of analysis developed in the first chapter. This has obviously limited the scope of the study since attention has been directed only to the four categories of conditions for national integration in a plural society.

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INTRODUCTION

National integration is a very difficult task in any plural society. Since traditional ties always carry very high emotional elements, all decisions and policies in a plural society must be calculated not to hurt any politically powerful, traditional group's interests or sentiments to the extent of making it feel alienated from the political system. National integration in the last analysis is a matter of what we may call the psychological dimension of political beings, that is, the political beliefs and attitudes of the people toward the political system. For its survival, the political system requires support from the people, and in a plural society, from all politically relevant groups. If any powerful group or groups withdraw support from the political system, the latter would suffer from a legitimacy crisis and would ultimately collapse.

In the plural background of Pakistan, politics at the national level consisted to a large extent of the interaction between East Pakistan, represented by the Bengalis, and the Central Government, overwhelmingly represented by the West Pakistanis.

This study shows that the Central Government in Pakistan had failed to discharge its responsibility of redressing the grievances of the Bengalis which had centered around demands for (a) effective participation in the decision-making process of the country; (b) reasonably equitable distribution of the economic resources of the country; and (c) representation of their hopes and aspirations

1 Since the mother tongue of the 98 percent of the population in East Pakistan is Bengali, the term "Bengalis" and "East Pakistanis" will be used synonymously, unless otherwise mentioned.
in the national life of the country. There was no serious effort on the part of the Central Government to promote and guarantee the conditions which could have maintained the country's integrated existence. The Central Government had persistently tried to impose uniformity where diversity was the dictate of the plural composition of the society of Pakistan. Whereas the Bengalis had been putting enormous demands on the political system of Pakistan for the redress of their grievances, the Central Government had rather followed a strategy of either suppressing them or paying no need to them. Whatever output was provided by the system, it fell far short of the expectation of the Bengalis. The serious imbalance between the input of demands by the Bengalis and the output of decisions by the system put serious stress on the system and culminated in its breakdown in March 1971.

**Methodology and Approach**

The materials for this dissertation have been collected from both primary and secondary sources. Due to the limitations of the availability of primary sources on Pakistan in and around Brock University, we have relied quite considerably on secondary sources. Every effort has been made, however, to use them as 'raw information' or 'raw data' for purpose of analysis. This study is conducted within a framework of four conditions for national integration in a plural society. Our approach is analytical, drawing materials from the historical events in Pakistan and arranging them under the selected categories of conditions.

**Organization of the Chapters**

This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter contains an analysis of the problem of national integration in a plural society and the strategies to overcome the problem. It outlines four minimum conditions for the maintenance of integration in a plural society. It also contains an analysis
of the problem of national integration in Pakistan posed by the socio-cultural differences between East and West Pakistan.

The second chapter analyses the nature and working of the party system in Pakistan and identifies the factors that stood in the way of the development of national political parties in Pakistan.

The third chapter shows how the central power elite failed to treat East Pakistan as an equal partner in the federation of Pakistan. Failure to maintain impartiality is discussed as the main theme.

The fourth chapter discusses how the Bengalis were deprived of effective decision-making roles in Pakistan.

The fifth chapter deals with the nature and extent of economic exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan and its effects on the national political life of the entire country.

Chapter six contains an overall analysis of the findings of the research and a conclusion.

The Problem of National Integration: A Framework of Analysis

The expectation of the West about political viability of the newly-emerged states of Asia and Africa has not, unfortunately, come true. The political systems of these areas have been plagued with instability and disunity which are largely a result of the plural composition of their societies. Nation-building efforts in these systems have been obstructed by racial, religious, regional, linguistic, tribal, and caste cleavages, which have sometimes posed as the ultimate focus of

1 By "central power elite" we mean those people at the center who are in effective exercise of decision-making powers.

2 By plural society we mean a society characterized by cleavages along the traditional lines of racial, religious, regional, linguistic, tribal, and caste cleavages and their relevance on the political system. This is similar to Alvin A. Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle's paradigm of the plural society presented in Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 62.

3 For convenience, we will refer to the term "ethnic" to encompass all these cleavages. Specific mention will be made, however, to particular kind of cleavage wherever necessary.
political loyalties, as against national, central authority. The more intensely peoples have identified with these parochial communities, the more acutely political systems have been threatened by disintegration.

Since national integration is a many-headed concept, we may proceed to give to it an operational meaning to serve our purpose of studying the problem of national integration in Pakistan. By national integration we will mean a process of bringing together the diverse socio-cultural groups of a state aimed at blunting the edge of their parochial loyalties and fostering of an outlook towards national, central authority. The process of national integration, then, involves the accomplishment of two complicated objectives -- the first is to reduce the sharpness of parochial attachments and the other is, in the language of Haas, "to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre."

Historically, it is evident that national integration is a very common problem which had to be faced by most states at different stages of their history. Whereas the Western democratic states solved the problem with much ease, having been more or less homogeneous societies, the plural compositions of the societies of the new states have resulted in pictures different from that of the West.


2 Ibid. Our conceptualization of national integration approximates what Coleman and Roseberg, op.cit., pp. 8-9, refer to as "territorial integration"; what Weiner, op.cit., pp. 197, calls "national integration"; and what Haas, op.cit., p. 16, calls "political integration".

3 Thus Windell Bell and Walter Freeman (eds.), Ethnicity and Nation-building (Beverly-Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 11, observe that the more than 60 states that emerged after the Second World War confronted the problem of national integration posed by "internal and cumulating conflicts based on religious education, social class, and region that were more or less interlocked with the ethnic and racial divisions."
It appears that a spirit of accommodation and co-operation existed among the disparate social groups of the new states on the horizontal level during the pre-independence period which largely resulted from their common dislike for injustices allegedly inflicted by the colonial rulers, and as a drive to provide the colonialists with a rationale for proposed independence. It is equally evident that the post-independence period in the new states witnessed a marked tendency for the assertion of centrifugal forces based on ethnic differences. Geertz terms the ethnic differences "primordial attachments". He also examines the causes of the emergence of these fissiparous forces in the post-independence period. To Geertz, the salience of primordial attachments stems from the fact that the achievement of independence by a state does not merely mean transfer of power from colonial to native rulers; rather it involves "a transformation of the whole pattern of political life ... [and] introduces into society a valuable new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force over which to contend". Rabushka and Shepsle similarly observe that the

1. See, for example, Rabushka and Shepsle, *op.cit.*, pp. 74-75, ff.
3. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution", in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 109, defines a primordial attachment as "one that stems from the "givens" -- or, more precisely, as culture is evidently involved in such matters, the assured "givens" -- of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connections mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, and following particular social practices".
competition for status, power and distribution of material goods conditions the politics of plural societies to a great extent. The Center for International Studies (USA) examines the problem and reports that traditional loyalties "reassert themselves with renewed strength ... particularly where the new national leadership has been recruited largely from a single region or ethnic group, or where it is a conspicuously westernized elite trying to impose alien values on their society".

Since nation-building efforts in the new states have been handicapped by the eminence of primordial attachments, the obvious solution would appear to be the complete elimination or suppression of these attachments. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be possible for the simple reason that the primordial attachments are "rooted in the non-rational foundations of personality". Democratic politics calls for their "domestication", not complete elimination; that is, to keep them within manageable limit, or, in Weiner's words, to achieve "unity in diversity". Verba argues in the same tone that complete elimination of traditional attachments "is not a meaningful possibility in a modern democratic state". He rather suggests that the strains of a plural society

1 Rabushka and Shepsle, op.cit., passim.
3 Geertz, op.cit., p. 128.
4 Ibid.
5 Weiner, op.cit., p. 200, examines two policy-strategies to achieve national integration in plural societies: (a) elimination of distinctive cultural traits of various ethnic groups; and (b) establishment of national loyalty without completely eliminating the primordial attachments through a policy of "unity through diversity" characterized by "ethnic arithmetic".
should be managed by reducing the "intensity of competition among political opponents." Enloe as well suggests democratic prescription to the disease inherent in plural societies. She observes that though ethnicity has been prominent in the politics of many countries, its "political salience is fading rapidly in any country that fosters ...[political] participation together with a wide distribution of the fruits of modern development". She is confident that given proper use and direction of human potentialities, individuals can be made to "redefine their roles, aspirations, and associations". Clark writes that in spite of the short-run destabilizing effect that the process of political development may have, the problems emerging from ethnic cleavages can be overcome "given proper guidance and coherent setting". A group of scholars known as the "consociationalists" have engaged since the last decade

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3. Ibid. p. 261.


in examining the segmented societies of the small states of Europe. This consociational theory is a challenge to the widely held beliefs that social fragmentation is essentially destabilizing and that "mutual compatibility of main values" is a prerequisite for a well-integrated society. The principal theme of the arguments of this theory is that the acute political manifestation of social cleavages in a plural society can be counteracted by conscious and deliberate efforts of sub-cultural elites who can check "the immobilizing and instabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation." This argument of the consociationalists approximates Ake's observation that "it is possible for a country to achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity".

It thus appears that though national integration is a challenging issue for all plural societies, the problem is not altogether unmanageable. The formidable difficulties that stem from the emotional aspects of traditional attachments can be counteracted by certain conscious devices. Efforts are to be directed towards the reduction of the political salience of traditional attachments, rather than towards their complete elimination.

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3 The consociationalists, however, use the term "fragmented society", which is basically the same as Pluralists' "plural society". Unlike pluralists, the consociationalists emphasize co-operation and consensus among elites of various groups.


5 Ake, op. cit., p. 113.
In the light of the above discussions we may now proceed to enumerate certain conditions which are conducive to attaining national integration in a plural society. This list is by no means exhaustive.

(1) Development of Broad-based National Political Parties;
(2) Impartiality of Central Power Elite;
(3) Accommodation of Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups in Decision-making Roles;
(4) Reasonably Equitable Distribution of Material Goods and Opportunities among various Ethnic Groups.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Political parties have been found to be an extremely functional mechanism for reducing the sharpness of traditional cleavages in a plural society and for fostering an outlook consistent with national integration. Thus Wriggins is convinced of the effectiveness of "mass" party systems in promoting national integration in a plural society. He defines the mass party as one which absorbs into it a wide variety of interests drawn from various traditional, linguistic, regional, caste and other social groups. Coleman's and Roseberg's study on Tropical Africa reveals that primordial attachments can neither be extinguished nor completely ignored. They find that in most instances the organization of a national political party (single, or dominant one party) is the "only structure" to keep traditional attachments within manageable limits. Emerson states that in a number of African plural states "political parties have played a central

1 Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 118-19. According to Wriggins, mass parties may be authoritarian as the CPP of Ghana and the PDG of Guinea, or democratic as the Congress party of India and the PRI of Mexico.

and invaluable role in spreading and consolidating the process of integration.

He notes that the party and leadership of the Partie Democratique of Guines (PDG) and the Convention People's Party (CPP) of Ghana have successfully achieved the principle of unity through diversity, that is, unity, not through complete elimination of the primordial attachments but through their recognition. Emerson concludes that "no one can dispute that the role of parties in national integration is, and presumably will remain, very great...." Similarly Weiner and LaPalombara conclude that "strong national parties, whether in an authoritarian or democratic context, appear to be playing an important role today in providing stable and legitimate government and often in laying the foundations for national integration". After examining the effectiveness of national political parties in inculcating a national outlook in plural societies, Halpern writes:

In so far as they [parties] are not novel disguises for restricted traditional cliques ... they cease being organically related to the old social structure and so can move themselves and others beyond the established order.

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2 Ibid., pp. 274-85
3 Ibid., p. 300.
National political parties can perform an integrative role in a variety of other ways. As a common platform for all important ethnic groups of a state, inter-ethnic conflicts may very well be resolved at the local level of the party or even at its top level. This would lessen the burden on national government in conflict resolution and would also reduce the severity of inter-ethnic conflicts. Further, national political parties can be an important institutional mechanism for cross-cutting ethnic group membership and for accommodating rising counter-elites of any ethnic group.

In many countries the bureaucracies in their nation-building efforts tend to combine the functions of parties, legislatures, and executives, and may appear to represent an alternative to political parties. But in the long run their attempts at nation-building "at the expense of Politics" (at the exclusion of party system) turns out to be a failure. It is evident that in spite of bureaucracies' initial, chronic dislike for political parties, the realization of their importance eventually compels them to take shelter in political parties, although these parties have very little or no influence in the actual decision-making processes of the system.


2. In Canada, for example, accommodation of Joseph Howe, a secessionist leader of Nova Scotia, and Donald Jamieson, an anti-confederalist leader of Newfoundland, into the Liberal Party, and their eventual elevation to elite positions made them modify their roles; Noel, *op.cit.*, p. 17.


Although development of political parties drawing support from a wide variety of ethnic groups is a step towards lessening the edge of traditional cleavages, their ultimate success is dependent upon the quality and characteristics of each party and its leadership and upon their performance in aggregating interests of diverse groups and the promotion of these interests through state machineries without seriously hurting one group in order to benefit another. If a party is closely tied to the interest of any single ethnic group, the integrative potential of that party will obviously be lost. Huntington rightly observes that the legitimacy of a party itself is dependent upon its contribution of the political system.

In considering the integrative role of the party system in a plural society we should, however, note that the possibility of the emergence of national parties depends on the intensity and the degree of cleavages in a given society. In a society where ethnic cleavages are, or have been rendered, very acute, there may be very little hope of creating national parties. In other words, the only possibility for the creation of a national party is in an environment where ethnic cleavages are not very extreme, where disparate groups are still in some kind of working proximity.

For political parties to be successful and dynamic in their integrative role, Pye observes,

[They must be capable of serving as a two-way channel, processing the demands and interests of the population upward to the centers of power, and simultaneously passing downward to the people as a whole a better understanding of the absolute2restraints and the ultimate requirements of the polity as a whole.]

Impartiality of Central Power Elite

By impartiality of central power elite we mean the adoption of very

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1 Huntington, op.cit., p. 91.
conscious efforts by them so that the state and its apparatus do not operate for the exclusive benefit of any particular ethnic group; that is, to make sure that national power elites do not represent interests of any ethnic group or groups in particular. The power elites for our purpose refers to those who exercise effective decision-making power, not simply those in decision-making positions. National elites in any state are expected to represent the interests of the nation as a whole, although they may be drawn from various ethnic groups. The viability of a plural society depends to a large extent on the capability of national elites to comprehend the needs and aspirations of divergent groups and the boldness to make well-measured policy responses, without favoring one group at the expense of another.

We admit the difficulty of applying this principle in concrete situations; we admit that no single policy or policies can satisfy each and every ethnic group in the same manner. But since national integration is in essence a matter of psychological orientation of the people towards the political system, prolonged feeling of deprivation by any ethnic group, believed to have resulted from bias of the national elites in favor of another group, will cause the frustrated group to hold central authority as illegitimate and thus create a situation of governmental immobilism. In such instances of psychological strains, it is possible that the aggrieved ethnic group will then look for any kind of outlet, including extra-constitutional, to ameliorate its situation.

**Accommodation of Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups in Decision-making Roles**

Pareto's famous dictum, "History is the graveyard of aristocracies", in essence maintained that constant circulation of elites is essential to maintaining

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social equilibrium in a heterogeneous society. Decision-making roles in a system, however, depend on the socio-political settings of the system itself. Growing social consciousness of any ethnic group about its inadequate representation in the decision-making roles will generate grievances and will quite naturally put demands on the system for their accommodation. In such an instance, Huntington believes, the existing national elites of any system are left with two alternatives: (a) either the system accommodates them "in ways harmonious with the continued existence of the system"; (b) or "it alienates the group from the system and produces overt or covert civil strife and secession." The second alternative will have dangerous impact on the system. Alienation of any important group by the system may have two tremendous impacts: (a) severing of relationship with the system; (b) rejection of the existing system, with an alternative course of action. The former will be extremely detrimental to the system in the sense that system maintenance is impossible without commitment (support) of the political actors to the system. Rejection of a system by any group of sizeable strength may not only create governmental immobilism but it may also generate political actions of violent nature, disturbing the whole set-up of the system.

According to the consociational theorists, responsibilities of the elites in a plural society are enormous. If the leaders of various sub-cultures engage in competitive behavior, the chances are that this will aggravate the situation. Prudence requires that divergent groups are to be accommodated at the national level of decision-making. Recognizing the destabilizing potentialities of a

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1 Ibid., pp. 1419-20.
2 Huntington, op.cit., p. 140.
4 Lijphart, "Cultural Diversities and Theories of Political Integration", pp. 1-14 passim.
plural society, Ake calls for "the modification of the political behavior of its elites" and suggests that consensus required for integration may be achieved at elite level "by enlisting the support of leading personalities from all major social groups... The leaders mediate between the government and society." Lewis suggests that in a plural society "all major parties ought to form a coalition".

Since decision-making roles may center around political posts, civil-military bureaucracies, and business circles, it is quite possible that an ethnic group would not be contented with entry into one or two of these sectors; rather, it will strive for entry more or less into all the sectors, depending on the relative importance of those sectors in a given system.

Tension may still prevail, even after securing entry into every sector, about relative strength or number of persons accommodated or to be accommodated. Resolution of this kind of tension calls for political expertise, skill, and understanding of the existing regime. On the system's side, the question of accommodation of new social forces requires adaptable, regularized institutions; otherwise it may lead to political instability.

Reasonably Equitable Distribution of Material Goods and Opportunities among various Ethnic Groups

It is generally acknowledged that one of the main objectives of most people is the pursuit of material happiness. Conflicts arise due to the hard fact of the scarcity of material goods and opportunities to be distributed, and also because of divergent views on what constitutes their equitable distribution.

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1 Ake, op.cit., p. 79.
2 Ibid., p. 112.
4 For an elaboration of this point, see Huntington, op.cit., pp. 32-59
Bushsch's study of Singapore, and Franck's and others' study on the failure of various federations show that gross inequality in the distribution of material goods and opportunities has been a major source of conflict among various contending groups in plural societies.

Wriggins examines the strategy of developing the economy of the country to counteract centrifugal tendencies. Similarly, Bell and Freeman show that unequal distribution of material resources activates ethnic tensions. They suggest that an equitable distribution of material resources will reduce such conflicts. Huntington also observes that effective handling of the tensions generated by the process of modernization requires that the system should distribute material benefits equitably among various social groups.

If governmental policies create wide economic gaps among various ethnic groups, a sense of oppression and deprivation is quite likely to develop and to produce a destabilizing effect on that political system.

Planned, calculated economic policies are required to ensure fair distribution of the available goods and opportunities in a way that it does not cause serious discontent. If any system fails to achieve this objective, there may be little hope of bridging the gaps among divergent ethnic groups of a given society.

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1 Peter A. Busch, Legitimacy and Ethnicity: A Case Study of Singapore (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1974), Ch. IV.
3 Wriggins, op. cit., pp. 193-95; this is Wriggins' 6th of the 8 strategies suggested to aggregate powers by ruling elites.
4 Bell and Freeman (eds.), op. cit., p. 15.
5 Huntington, op. cit., p. 140.
The Problem of National Integration in Pakistan

A new state of Pakistan emerged in the Indian sub-continent in 1947 on the basis of the Two Nation Theory and the Lahore Resolution. The society that Pakistan inherited was plural per excellence and, as is usually the case with other plural societies of Afro-Asian states, its major problem was that of integration.

Geographically Pakistan remained divided into two parts -- East Pakistan

1 The name "Pakistan" in this study refers to 'united Pakistan', as of December 1971.
2 This theory maintains that the Hindus and Muslims of India are basically two distinct nations. Although Mohammad Ali Jinnah is popularly given the credit of formulating this theory, actually his ideas were based on Sir Syed Ahmad's, who as early as 1888 said: "Is it possible that under these [hostile] circumstances two nations -- the Mohamedan and Hindu -- could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable." Quoted in Keith B. Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 11. Jinnah elaborated upon Syed Ahmad's ideas and said it more politely: "It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality.... They neither intermarry, nor interdine together and, indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different." Quoted in Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Ashraf, 1960) pp. 160-61.
3 The Lahore Resolution resolved "that geographically contiguous units [of British-India] are [to be] demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". Quoted in G. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historic Documents (Karachi: Pakistan Subscription Agency, n.d.) p. 172.
4 Until 1955 the eastern part of Pakistan was called "East Bengal". By an amendment of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan the name was changed to East Pakistan. For convenience, we will use "East Pakistan" although this study to refer to the eastern part (or wing) of Pakistan.
and West Pakistan -- one separated from the other by over one thousand miles of hostile Indian territory. Such unusual separation of the two parts of the country led political geographers like Spate to comment:

The greater the weight we attach to geographical factors, the more difficult does it become to accept the racial and ideological aspects of the Two Nation Theory.\footnote{O. H. K. Spate, "Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme", Geographical Journal (September 1943), p. 129.}

Another geographer similarly commented:

[The present separation of India and Pakistan is so illogical from a geographical point of view, especially because of the two widely separated parts of Pakistan, that one wonders how long these conditions will continue.\footnote{Van Valkenburg, Elements of Political Geography; quoted in A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 3-4.}]

Although the forerunners and the sympathizers of the scheme of Pakistan ruled out any possibility that geographical separation could stand in the way of Pakistan's integration, its effects, however, soon began to come to the surface, pushing back the Islamic fervor of Pakistani nationalism. Practically, there was no land route available for a journey from one wing to the other because of Pakistan's unfriendly relation with India; by sea it was a journey of about seven days; Pakistan's own air lines did not connect Dacca (capital of East Pakistan) with West Pakistan until 1955 and even after that the air route remained beyond the reach of the average man, despite Central Government's heavy subsidy. There was mobility only for the top strata of the society of the two wings. But they did not have much social contact with the rural masses, who constituted overwhelming majority in both the wings. In the absence of social intercourse between the great majority of the masses who were poor and

\footnote{For their views, see Ibid., p. 4; G. H. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1974), p. XI.}
illiterate, people of one wing could easily be aroused and mobilized against the other by interested politicians since people lacked first hand information about each other.

Some scholars have, however, argued that geographical discontiguity of a state may not necessarily be detrimental to its integration. Thus, Etzioni believes that "geographical discontiguity" means very little social interaction, and "reduces the need for integration". Lijphart argues that "if the subcultures are geographically concentrated, a federal pattern of government ... can be an eminently suitable consociational device".

In Pakistan this geographical factor put great strain on her politics. The physical separation of Pakistan contributed enormously towards the economic imbalances between the two wings. Economic development in one wing could not benefit the other due to the immobility of labor and of economic benefits. The establishment of the federal capital, services head quarters, foreign missions, industrial complexes, etc., in West Pakistan led to heavy expenditure and many other benefits in that wing, while the eastern wing was deprived of similar benefits and advantages.

The geographical situation of the two wings of Pakistan on two ends of the sub-continent had effects on their affinities and orientations towards the outside world. Thus Marshall observes: "West Pakistan looks out upon the Middle East, whereas East Pakistan looks to Southeast Asia". Similarly, Tayyeb writes that the influence of Arabia and Iran on the people of West Pakistan is quite

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2 Lijphart, "Cultural Diversities and Theories of Political Integration", p. 10.
apparent in her history and literature, in customs, manners, and even in
prejudices. East Pakistan's location on the eastern coast of the Indian Ocean
and her closeness to Southeast Asia in climate, natural vegetation, crops,
agricultural methods, density of population, etc., made her people more South-
east oriented.

The two wings of Pakistan had other ecological and demographic differences
as well. Whereas West Pakistan is montaneous and dry, with extreme climatic
conditions, East Pakistan is almost plain, except for a few hilly areas in
Cittagong, Sylhet and Comilla Districts, and full of rivers and canals, with
a very mild climate. Of the total area 365,529 square miles of Pakistan,
West Pakistan constituted 310,403 square miles, and East Pakistan 55,126 square
miles. Though 6 times smaller in size than West Pakistan, East Pakistan's
population was larger, which resulted in a higher density than in West Pakistan.
The rate of urbanization was much higher in West Pakistan than in the East.
(See Table 1 below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total population (In Millions)</th>
<th>Density of population (persons per sq. miles)</th>
<th>Urbanization (percentage)</th>
<th>Literacy (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 A. Tayyeb, op.cit., p. 18.
2 Ibid.
A large population in a small area in East Pakistan led to very close and sometime overcrowded habitation. Of course, this was a favorable factor for mass mobilization by the politicians without much time and effort as compared to West Pakistan, with vast area and scattered population. The rate of literacy in East Pakistan was higher than that of West Pakistan.

Linguistically, Pakistan was multilingual (See Table 2). Although East Pakistan came very close to "a linguistic unit" (more than 98% being Bengali speaking), West Pakistan had five different linguistic groups with Urdu serving as the lingua franca. Pakistan Government's efforts to develop a common language for both wings was an utter failure as demonstrated by Table 3. The languages of the two wings remained a great dividing factor due to differences in their vocabulary and scripts.

Table 2

Mother tongues of the people of Pakistan (percentage of the population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>East Pakistan 1951</th>
<th>East Pakistan 1961</th>
<th>West Pakistan 1951</th>
<th>West Pakistan 1961</th>
<th>Pakistan 1951</th>
<th>Pakistan 1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>98.16</td>
<td>98.42</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>56.40</td>
<td>55.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>67.08</td>
<td>66.39</td>
<td>28.55</td>
<td>29.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushtu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>8.16</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>12.85</td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jahan, op.cit., p. 12.

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1 See Table I, supra.
2 Wilber, op.cit., p. 71.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>East Pakistan 1951</th>
<th>East Pakistan 1961</th>
<th>West Pakistan 1951</th>
<th>West Pakistan 1961</th>
<th>Pakistan 1951</th>
<th>Pakistan 1961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushtu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although Pakistan was to be a homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent, a considerable number of non-Muslims, especially the Hindus, decided to stay in Pakistan. Regional distribution remained quite disproportionate. Quite opposite to the trend of linguistic distribution, East Pakistan remained bi-religious with about 20 percent Hindu population (See Table 4). West Pakistan remained almost homogeneous with only about 3 percent non-Muslims. Thus East Pakistani Muslims had to live with those people, the Hindus, who once dominated them in social, economic and political fields. But after the migration of the majority of the

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jahan, op.cit., p. 23.

1 In the then eastern part of Bengal 80% of the urban property was owned by the Hindus; they provided most of the traders, lawyers, doctors, professors, and other members of higher society. See, for example, Richard D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 28 (April 1959),p. 52.
Hindu 'oppressors' and the practice of co-residence for long years with those Hindus who stayed, Bengali Muslims' attitudes towards the Hindus had changed considerably. Feelings of cooperation and friendship between the Hindus and Muslims became particularly strong among the younger generation who did not witness the nature and extent of Hindu oppression. Another impact of co-residence of the Hindus and Muslims of East Pakistan was probably the waning of the fear of Hindu domination which had been the driving force behind the creation of Pakistan.

The economic structure of the two wings of Pakistan was different. Whereas West Pakistan inherited relatively better infrastructure for industrial growth, East Pakistan had very good potentiality for agricultural development.

Interestingly enough, the professional backgrounds of politicians of East and West Pakistan were also different. Whereas politics in West Pakistan was dominated mainly by feudal interests, politics in East Pakistan used to be dominated by lawyers. (See Table 5 and Table 6.)

Table 5
Occupation of Members of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1955. (In number)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialists &amp; businessmen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 Infra., Chapter V.
Table 6

Occupation of Members of the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1962 and 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen &amp; Industrialists</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ever since the inception of Pakistan till its last days (December 1971), both civil and military bureaucracies were overwhelmingly drawn from West Pakistan. In the first decade, about 96 percent of military elites and 93 percent of civil bureaucratic elites were drawn from West Pakistan. This East-West imbalance, however, dated back to historical past. Thus, during the transfer of power in 1947, of the total 133 Muslim members of the Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service who opted for Pakistan only 1 was a Bengali Muslim. In the military services of undivided India, likewise, Bengali Muslims' representation was insignificant.

The civil-military bureaucracies of Pakistan represented the landed aristocracy of West Pakistan to a great extent. This fact made a triangular relationship between the civil bureaucracy, military bureaucracy, and the politicians of West Pakistan much easier. As a result of this easy-going relationship, these three groups formed almost a monolithic power elite in Pakistan in

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1 Tables 17 & 18, infra.
which East Pakistan had very little representation. The exploitation and manipulation of this advantageous position by West Pakistanis created a sense of deprivation and alienation in the minds of East Pakistanis.

Given the above differences between the two wings of Pakistan, apparently there remained only one bond of unity—the force of Islam. Since overwhelmingly the population of Pakistan was Muslim (about 87%), the Central-Power Elite tried to manipulate religious sentiment to compensate for wide diversities in other spheres. But it was probably a mistake to emphasize the religious aspect alone at the exclusion of other more tangible ones. As a matter of fact, there existed a difference in perception about religion by the people of the two wings.

Although Bengali Muslims may be said to be more religious than their West Pakistani counterparts, the former regarded religion as a matter of personal life. The West Pakistanis, on the other hand, regarded the scope of religion to be more extensive. Thus Abul Monsur Ahmad, a noted Bengali writer and one-time Central Minister from East Pakistan, writes:

Let him then, in proper time and proper mood, come to religion as a blissful retirement from the humdrums of active social life. Let religion succeed where politics fails. Let religion begin where politics ends. The two must not meet.

On the contrary, Dr. Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal, a very famous philosopher and poet from West Pakistan, was not convinced of a separation between religion and politics. Politics, he said, divorced from religion had led to imperialism and exploitation. Sayeed's survey in the mid-60s revealed a difference in

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1 According to the population census of Pakistan 1961, the number of people who could read and write Arabic, the language of the holy Quran, was five times higher in East than in West Pakistan; Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 167. Sayeed further writes in "Federalism and Pakistan", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 23 (1954), p. 143: "East Bengalis are profoundly religious people".


perception about religion among the students of the two wings. Whereas 87 percent of the West Pakistani students regarded Islam as an effective bond of unity between East and West Pakistan, only 66.7 percent of the East Pakistani students did so.

Although East Pakistan was backward and underdeveloped in many respects, culturally she was far ahead of West Pakistan. Braibanti, the noted authority on the politics and administration of Pakistan, writes about the Bengali culture as follows:

So pervasive is the quality of Bengali culture that it has developed a very strong corporate sense. Bengalis, more aware of their Bengali culture than are Punjabis of their own heritage... Moreover, Bengalis in East Pakistan living as they do with 20 percent of their population Hindu, have greater understanding of Hinduism and Buddhism than do West Pakistanis. In this respect, they are at once more tolerant of diversity of religious beliefs and more cosmopolitan in their cultural outlook.

East Pakistan was more advanced politically as well. Political consciousness of the people of East Pakistan was higher than the people of West Pakistan. Writing on this point, Marshall observes: "East Pakistan is political; West Pakistan is governmental".

Another important aspect of East Pakistan which the national power elites often did not recognize was the contribution of the former towards the independence movement of Pakistan. Thus, Ikram, a West Pakistani senior civil service officer writes:

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1 Ibid., pp. 183-84.
2 Braibanti, op.cit., p. 47.
3 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 238.
Muslim Bengal was slow to start, but its contribution on two crucial occasions -- at the time of foundation of All-India Muslim League ... and again at the time of partition -- was important, almost decisive.1

Another scholar, G. W. Choudhury, a Bengali but a firm believer in the ideology of Pakistan, writes:

Of all the provinces which constituted Pakistan, it was Bengal which gave the most solid support to Mohammed Ali Jinnah in his struggle for the establishment of a separate Muslim state in the sub-continent.

It is against these dissimilar social landscapes, cultural settings and economic configurations of the two wings that the problem of national integration in Pakistan is to be studies.

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2 He lost citizenship of Bangladesh because of his alleged anti-Bengali and pro-Pakistani views.
POLITICAL PARTIES

This chapter contains a discussion about the development of party system in Pakistan and an analysis of the character, programs, base of support, and nature of demand aggregation by various parties and government response to these demands. The emphasis is on the integrative role of the party system as discussed in the framework of analysis. The discussion and analysis are divided into two parts -- pre-martial law period (1947-58) and the period following the passage of the Political Parties Act, 1962 (1962-71).

Pre-Martial Law Period

1 The most important objectives of the party in the initial period were to: (a) foster the loyalty of the Muslims towards the British Government; (b) look after the political interests of the Indian Muslims; and (c) bring about better understanding between the Muslims and other communities. See S. M. Ikram, op. cit., pp. 107-8; Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 30.


3 By 1954 the Muslim League was eradicated from all three levels of government--the Center, East Pakistan, and West Pakistan; Callard, op. cit. pp. 32-33.
municipal and district board elections, protection of Urdu, and a thorough investigation of Muslim Waqfs, etc." After 1940, the achievement of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent was added to its program. Its leaders were afraid that any discussion of program would generate cleavages among the diverse social groups of which the Muslim League was composed.

Thus Jinnah, who was later acclaimed as Father of the Nation, said:

> We shall have time to quarrel ourselves and we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, when wrongs and injuries will have to be remedied. We shall have time for domestic programme and policies, first get the government.

In the absence of any socio-economic program, the League relied heavily for mass support on the idealism [of Islamic brotherhood], interest [of promoting the well-being of the Muslims] and fear [of Hindu domination], and it was no surprise that the passionate zeal for Pakistan was so strong that the League succeeded by the mid-40's in building up a strong organization and recruiting support of a great majority of the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent.

After the setting up of the organization of the Muslim League in the then

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1 Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, p. 36

2 The Muslim League was composed of such groups as feudal landlords (mainly West Pakistani), industrialists, the Ulema, lawyers, industrial workers, the lower middle classes, peasants, socialists, and extreme leftists, *ibid.*, p. 181


5 Maniruzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
Bengal (a province of undivided India) for the first time in 1936, its leadership was largely in the hands of "upper-class landowning, Urdu speaking families of Dacca", who had very little cultural affinity with the mass of the people and thus lacked mass contact or mass following. Abul Hashim's ascendency to the Secretary Generalship of the Bengal Muslim League in 1943 brought about a phenomenal change in the provincial branch of the party both in its organizational strength and in its social character. Province-wide tours and personal contact of the dynamic, young General Secretary, Hashim, together with the help of young student leaders, brought Bengali Muslims under the organizational banner of the Muslim League in the 1940s, its strength being demonstrated in the provincial elections of 1945-46. The party, however, became divided into two factions -- the progressive faction, led by Hashim and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, and the conservative faction, led by Maolana Akram Khan and Khawja Nazimuddin. In the mid-40s the progressive faction was very successfully able to liberate the provincial branch of the party from the domination of the aristocratic elements and largely to recruit young, progressive forces from the middle class. Hashim's "unendorsed" manifesto generated strong appeal and support among the latter.

After independence, the younger section of the League belonging to the progressive Hashim-Suhrawardy camp were contemplating reorganizing the party to fit with the changing situation, but this was very strongly resisted by the provincial President of the League, Akram Khan, backed by Nazimuddin of the Central Parliamentary Party of the League. Hashim and Suhrawardy were severe threats to the

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4 *Ibid.*, pp. 221-26
leadership of Akram Khan and Nazimuddin, respectively. In an effort to consolidate their position vis-à-vis Hashim and Suhrawardy, both Akram Khan and Nazimuddin tried their best to keep the young, progressive forces outside the organization of the party.

Thus, the League leadership in the then Bengal and later in East Pakistan, in order to promote and serve their personal interests, played factional politics and alienated the emerging, young and progressive forces of the party. The latter, because of their socio-cultural background (middle-class, non-feudal) were more acceptable to the mass of the people and were gaining more and more support. The Tangail (a sub-division in East Pakistan) by-election was demonstrative of the mass support of the progressive faction of the League and at the same time of the lack of confidence in the official League leadership.

As argued earlier, the endurance of a national party depends on its performance in satisfying the hopes and aspirations of the people. Although the Islamic idealism could hold the diverse ethnic groups together for sometime, the bond faded away rapidly after independence was attained. Naturally, concrete, practical issues became more important to the people than Islamic idealism. Thus, the

1 Ibid., pp. 99, 229-30.
2 In the Tangail by-election held in 1949 the Government supported Muslim League candidate, Khurram Khan Panni, a very renowned zamindar of Karatia. He was defeated by a young, relatively less known, dissident Leaguer, Shamsul Huq. It may be noted in this connection that about half a dozen Ministers, Central and provincial, took active part in the election campaign of Panni and that the mouthpiece of the provincial League, The Daily Azad, directed all its efforts to malign Shamsul Huq as an anti-League, anti-Pakistani element. Shamsul Huq was, however, arrested immediately after the result of the election was known. The Government-influenced Tribunal later set aside Shamsul Huq's election over a trivial issue. Ibid., pp. 231-42.
Muslim League Government failed to solve the most pressing problems the country had been facing immediately after independence. There were the problems of refugee rehabilitation, flood control, law and order and others. Whereas the refugee problem put the new state of Pakistan into a precarious situation, the League leadership was not bold enough to introduce land reform for the reason that a considerable section of its leaders themselves were landlords. ¹

Whereas the Bengalis were clamoring for provincial autonomy as a device to promote the federal unity of the country, the League Government was adopting more and more centralized policies and techniques and thus equipped the Central Government with sufficient instruments to control the affairs of the provinces. ² The Bengalis reacted unfavorably to such policies of the Government.

That the Bengalis were very much resentful of the League-led Central Government became apparent as early as February 1948. Thus a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan observed:

> A feeling is growing among the East Pakistanis that Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as a 'colony' of Western Pakistan. ³

Even the Muslim League Chief Minister of East Pakistan expressed his Government's dissatisfaction over the over-centralization and interference of the Central Government in the affairs of East Pakistan:

> I should mention another point, that is, the anxiety on the part of the Central Government to encroach on every field of provincial activities. ... After the achievement of freedom there has been race for centralisation of power.... I consider this to be the most unsound and short-sighted policy. The province must be allowed to enjoy the full autonomous

¹ See, Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p.55; Table-5, supra.
² For example, there were section 92A of the Indian Independence Act,1947; Article 193 of the Constitution of 1956; offices of Governor; emergency powers; Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA), and others.
³ Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol.2, No.1, February 24, 1948, p.7,
position, must be as free from the Central Government as it is thought practical. But particularly this province of East Bengal which is far flung from the capital of the Central Government must enjoy fullest autonomy.

The response of the central Muslim League leaders to such demands for autonomy was one of complete rejection:

Today in Pakistan there is no difference between the Central Government and Provincial Government. The Central Government is composed of the Provinces... We must kill this provincialism for all times.  

Such negative response by the League leadership caused much resentment among the Bengalis against the party and West Pakistan.

The League's unconstitutional practices aggravated the situation further. Thus the dismissal of the Bengali Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, in 1953, although his Government had the annual budget passed by the House only a few days earlier, by the Punjabi Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad, was clearly in contravention of constitutional practices of parliamentary system. The Muslim League leaders' failure to protest against such an action of the Governor-General tarnished the image of the former in the minds of the Bengalis.

More severe shock to the Bengalis were to come a few months later. East Pakistan's first chance after independence to aggregate and communicate their demands through organized means came through the provincial elections held in 1954. In this election the United Front (UF) wiped out the Muslim League from East Pakistan. The results of the election were a great surprise to everybody, including the Muslim League leadership. The League Government at the Center

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3. It was a coalition of the Awami League (Autonomist), Krishak Sramik Party (Autonomist), the Ganatantri Dal (Leftist), and the Nizam-i-Islami Party (Islamic).
4. The Muslim League secured only 10 of 237 Muslim seats; Callard, op.cit., p.57.
reacted quite sharply to this situation and dismissed the United Front Government within two months on the alleged ground that its leader, Fazlul Huq, was a "self confessed traitor", and because of the Government's "inefficiency" to maintain law and order in some Jute Mill areas in East Pakistan. It may be mentioned at this point that it was this Fazlul Huq who moved the Lahore Resolution in 1940, which was in fact the cornerstone of the state of Pakistan. This action of the League government more than anything else provided a ground for a belief by the Bengalis that they would never be allowed self-government or autonomy except to the extent and in the ways the West Pakistani-controlled League would want.

The Muslim League in the early years of Pakistan was not ready to allow the emergence of other parties. Any opposition to the League was regarded as an act of treason. Thus, Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan and the most trusted lieutenant of Jinnah, publicly stated in 1950:

Pakistan has been achieved by the Muslim League. As long as I am alive no other political party would be allowed to work here.

Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daulatana, another staunch Muslim Leaguer from West Pakistan, joined the chorus saying in part:

In national politics there can be no greater crime and violation of democratic traditions that the act of defection from parent body [and the formation of other parties by the former Muslim-Leaguers] are attempts to stab it [the Muslim League] in the back.

Of the Bengali popular leaders, Abul Hashim, Fazlul Huq and Shahid Suhrawardy were matured politicians and personalities of a recognized high calibre. But the wrath of the Muslim League officials had fallen upon them and this had at

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1 Dawn (Karachi), May 31, 1954.
3 Dawn (Karachi), January 9, 1951.
least two significant effects on the politics of Pakistan. In the first place
the League alienated these eminent personalities who could have been an
asset to it. The League could have benefitted from their counsel of high
quality and gained a grass-root support in East Pakistan through them. In
view of the communication and mobility gap between the general masses of the
two wings, the Huq-Hashim-Suhrawardy base could have served as an effective
bridge or bond of unity between the two wings. The persons from East Pakistan
whom the Central League took into confidence could not serve this purpose for
the very reason that they were not the 'people of the masses'. The second
consequence of alienating Huq, Hashim and Suhrawardy was more serious to the
League. Suhrawardy, being disgusted with the League, joined the Awami Muslim
League and engaged himself in its organization. The party even in its initial
years gained a considerable support of the Bengalis and by 1954 it emerged
as the dominant party in East Pakistan, as a partner of the United Front.
Fazlul Huq also reactivated his old party, the Krishak Proja Party, under a new
name the Krishak Sramic Party (KSP), and the party became quite popular among
his many personal followers. This party joined hands with three other parties
of the United Front and defeated the Muslim League in the 1954 provincial
elections. The main planks of both the Awami Muslim League and the Krishak
Sramic Party were autonomy for East Pakistan and both denounced the Muslim
League and West Pakistani leadership of the Central Government. Hashim, however,
did not join any other party; he practically retired from politics. Thus, the
Muslim League not only lost important and leading personalities of East Pakistan,
it lost the voters of East Pakistan as well.

The Muslim League practically turned into an employment bureau, especially

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This term refers to leaders whom rural masses perceive as belonging to their own social class.
for its West Pakistani members. The 1954 East Pakistan elections was an eye-opener to the conscious section of the Muslim League. It became commonly felt after this election, even in West Pakistan, that the Muslim League was an organization of "job hunters and opportunists" and people also demanded their expulsion to clean it up. But there was a lack of leaders to take the lead. Understandably, where the interests of the top functionaries of the state were intertwined with the leadership positions in the League, nobody would come to clean up the mess. There were even demands upon and suggestions to the Muslim League by sections of the people of West Pakistan that the party officials should try to bring Huq and Suhrawardy into the fold of the party "in the bigger interest of the country and the Millat."

The Awami (Muslim) League. The Awami Muslim League (AML) was formed in Dacca in 1949 by the discontented, progressive section of the East Pakistan branch of the Muslim League. Its leaders included Maolana Bhashani, Suhrawardy, Abul Monsur Ahmad, Abdus Salam Khan, Mohammad Toaha, Tajuddin Ahmad, Shamsul Huq, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Mohammad Nayemuddin, and others. All these founding leaders, excepting Suhrawardy, had rural backgrounds and were educated at home, not abroad. The party, ever since its inception, was pragmatic and regional autonomist. Thus, the first 42-point Manifesto of the party included, among other things, the right of self-determination of the units of Pakistan, recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan, abolition of the zamindary system, nationalization of Banks, Insurance companies, Jute and Tea Industries, etc., introduction of cooperative farming, guarantee of economic and social rights.

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1 Callard, *op.cit.*, p. 39, regards this factor as one of the causes of the decline of the Muslim League.
2 *Dawn* (Karachi), March 27, 1954.
of industrial laborers in accordance with the provisions of the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions, establishment of Islamic way of life, and introduction of free primary education. By and large, autonomy of the regional units of Pakistan remained its main plank. The Awami Muslim League remained a regional party until 1951, when it merged with the Jinnah Muslim League, a West Pakistan based party. The merger was initiated by Suhrawardy from East Pakistan and Khan of Mamdot from West Pakistan. The merger of the two parties was followed by a convention in 1952 in which Suhrawardy seriously wanted the new party to be the representative of the whole nation. The convention adopted a Manifesto which demanded that the future constitution of Pakistan and its laws should be based on Islamic injunctions; the head of the state was to be elected by direct vote of the people; independence of judiciary was to be maintained; taxes should be reduced; state interference in trade and business was to be minimum; landlordism was to be abolished and the surplus land was to be taken over by the state; and the autonomy to regional units was to be guaranteed. A remarkable difference is evident from a comparison of the two Manifestos -- the inclusion of the Islamic provision. The reason was to accommodate influential religious interests of West Pakistan such as the Pir of Zakori Sharif and the Pir of Manki Sharif of the former Jinnah Muslim League. Suhrawardy made vigorous attempts to explain the importance of the party system for the effective functioning of democracy and called upon the people to assemble under the banner of the new party. The leaders of the party, especially in East Pakistan, undertook an extended program for mass mobilization and by 1953 the party acquired

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2 Callard, op.cit., p. 69.
3 Ibid. pp. 69-70.
a good organization and a support base. Its popularity in East Pakistan was demonstrated in the 1954 elections in which the party, as a partner of the United Front, emerged as strongest of all parties in East Pakistan.

The secular section of the Awami Muslim League represented by Bhashani and Suhrawardy desired to drop the word "Muslim" from its name in order to open it to non-Muslims who constituted about 12 percent of the population of Pakistan and about 20 percent of East Pakistan. The party went through a schism over this issue when its East Pakistan Council passed a resolution dropping the word "Muslim". Although the Awami Muslim League managed to get the resolution endorsed by the National Committee, this move alienated its rigid Muslim members including the Pir of Zakori Sharif, one member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, one member of the Legislative Assembly, and a Joint Secretary of the Central party organization, who disavowed this change and pledged their support to the 1952 Manifesto. Of course, this secular move of the party attracted the non-Muslims, living predominantly in East Pakistan, although at the cost of considerable support from West Pakistan.

The Awami League thus again moved towards the tendency of being essentially an East Pakistani based party with little support from West Pakistan. With the

1 Callard, op.cit., p. 70.
2 Dawn (Karachi), October 20, 1954, published the breakup of the relative strength of the 4 partners of the United Front as follows: Awami League-142; Krishak Sramik Party-48; Nizami-i-Islam Party-19; and Ganatantri Dal-13; the total falls short by one.
3 Table 4, supra.
4 Dawn (Karachi), December 2, 1955.
5 Ibid.
6 Callard, op.cit., p. 71.
passing of time the party became more and more vocal on the issue of the autonomy of East Pakistan. It consistently emphasized that the bond of unity and co-operation between the two wings could be strengthened not through the emphasis on Islam but by giving East Pakistan an equal share in power, resources and services.

The Awami League underwent another schism in 1957, giving birth to the National Awami Party led by Bhashani.

The Jamaat-i-Islam Party (Jamaat). Of all political parties in Pakistan, the Jamaat was the most well organized party, having an authoritarian structure. Although the party did have a national ideology, basically it remained a West Pakistani based party with very limited success in East Pakistan. In the first place, the party was not interested in mass contact. Its strategy was to build up a very dedicated cadre and only then launch a mass movement to sell its Islamic ideology. Thus, the Amir (president) of the Jamaat, Maolana Syed Abul Ala Moududi, was primarily interested in a mere four to five percent of the total Muslims in the country, who according to the Amir, were not contaminated by the influence of Western education. Ninety percent of the poor, uneducated Muslims were believed by the party to be deeply devoted to Islam, and they were to be later mobilized by those four to five percent loyal, practicing Muslims.

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1 Infra.
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3 Thus, Binder writes about the organization of the party: "On meeting officers of the Jama'at one is struck by their devotion, their pride in themselves and their work....Their offices seem to be well organized and their accounts well kept. Jama'at publications are enormous and well printed for the most part. For an organization of such small size a surprising number of persons have no other occupation than Jama'at administration...." Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) p. 76.
5 Ibid., p. 64.
Secondly, the Jamaat's rigorous and selective process of recruitment into the membership hindered its success to a large extent. Had its membership been as open as other parties, it could probably have attracted many more people in both wings of the country, especially the rural masses who were profoundly religious.

Thirdly, the Jamaat's policy of rigid interpretation of Islamic doctrine antagonized a considerable section of modernist clients, who were no doubt 1 Muslims by conviction.

Lastly, being a theological party, the Jamaat alienated the sizeable number of non-Muslims living in East Pakistan (about 20%). Also the party adhered to the principle of discrimination between the Muslim and non-Muslim; the non-Muslims were not eligible for key government posts. Not only this; the party regulations required that non-Muslims were to pay a special tax for being exempted from responsibility of running the administration of the state.

Thus, the rigid interpretation of Islamic laws, inflexible views on the affairs of state, alienation of non-Muslims, and a closed-door policy on membership stood in the way of the Jamaat gaining mass support in the country. Regionally, the Jamaat had gained considerable support in the cities of West Pakistan, especially Karachi, Lahore and some small towns of Punjab. One reason for its popularity in West Pakistan was the fact that the party workers worked reasonably hard to ease the sufferings of the refugees, who fled from India to West Pakistan. They distributed relief goods among the refugees and championed their demands for more help from government. Compared to West Pakistan, the number of refugees

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1 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 163.
2 Sayeed, "The Jama'at-i-Islami Movement" p. 66.
3 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 218
to East Pakistan was smaller. Moreover, at the time of the refugees' influx into East Pakistan, that is, during the initial years of Pakistan, the Jamaat did not have a support base in East Pakistan, and so it could not recruit the refugees upon whose support the party relied so heavily in West Pakistan. Thus, of the 13 administrative divisions of the party in 1957, only one was allocated 1 to East Pakistan. This indicated how weak the Jamaat was in East Pakistan. Most of its leadership also came from West Pakistan. Of the top party leaders, 2 only one was from East Pakistan. Its student front in East Pakistan was Islami Chhatra Sangha (Islamic Students Organization), which also could not recruit much support because of its religious fanaticism and exclusiveness.

The National Awami Party (NAP). The decision to form a new, national, secular party of leftist orientation was arrived at during the Democratic Workers' Convention in Dacca in September 1957 under the initiative of Maolana Bhashani of East Pakistan. Bhashani and his leftist followers of the former 3 East Pakistan Communist Party severed their relations with the Awami League apparently because of the Awami-League-led Central Government's pro-Western foreign policies and military pacts with the Western "capitalist" countries.

The September Convention was attended by over 500 "leftists" from all over

1 Jahan, _op.cit._, p. 133.
2 Ibid.
3 The Communist Party in Pakistan, which initially operated through the Secretariat of the Communist Party of India, and then established a separate organization in 1948, was banned in Pakistan in 1954, and since then it had been working under the organizational banner of the Awami League. Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh", pp. 226-29.
4 This issue became a matter of hot debate in the Kagmari Council meeting of the Awami League, held in February 1957, to decide whether the Prime Minister Suhrawardy or the party, the Awami League, was the ultimate authority to decide the issue in question. The Council, however, had passed Suhrawardy's pro-Western foreign policies and military pacts Pakistan had entered into, by a vote of 800 to 60; _Times_ (London), June 15, 1957.
the country, including more than 60 delegates from West Pakistan. The West Pakistani delegates included leaders like a Pakhtoon nationalist Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Sindhi nationalist G. M. Sayeed, and a Punjabi landlord Mian Iftikharuddin. The leading personalities from East Pakistan included Bhashani, Yar Mohammad Khan, Mohiuddin Ahmad, Mohammad Toaha, and Hajee Mohammad Danesh, who was formerly a President of the Ganatantri Dal formed in January 1953. The Convention after long deliberations formed a new "national party" named the National Awami Party, in the face of violent attempts by the Awami League workers and the Awami League-led Government to stop the Convention and the formation of the party.

The aims and objectives of the party included a strong demand for independent foreign policy; abrogation of the military pacts; full provincial autonomy, with all powers vested in the governments of the provinces, except defence, foreign relations and currency, which should remain with the Central Government; dismantling of One Unit in West Pakistan (breaking up of the province of West Pakistan and the creation of several provinces) "on the basis of cultural and linguistc homogeniety and geographical contiguity"; and immediate abolition of the Zamindary system in West Pakistan. The Manifesto of the party also demanded equality of all persons before the law without any sort of discrimination, equal opportunity to all regarding employment, shelter, education, civil

2 Jyoti Sen Gupta, History of Freedom Movement in Bangladesh, 1947-73 (Calcutta: Naya Prokash, 1974), p. 120.
5 Ibid., p. 125; Rashiduzzaman, The National Awami Party", p. 395;
The programs of the National Awami Party differed from that of the Awami League in two important respects -- foreign relations, and dismantling of the One Unit in West Pakistan. With regard to the rest, the National Awami Party remained an autonomist party like the Awami League.

The National Awami Party became the front organization of the disbanded East Pakistan Communist Party. The support base of the party consisted of those leftist elements who deserted the Awami League, the leftists of the East Pakistan Communist Party, urban intellectuals and some professionals of East Pakistan, and some landed aristocrats and their followers from West Pakistan. While the party's West Pakistani leaders, such as Iftikharuddin, G. M. Sayeed, and Mahudul Huq Usmani, were rich landlords, most of its East Pakistani leaders came from teaching, business, law and trade unions.

Ideologically, the East and West Pakistani leading personalities of the Awami Party were different. Whereas the East Pakistan branch of the party recruited support primarily from the leftist elements of the province, its West Pakistani counterpart was mainly composed of the regional autonomists from Sind, North West Frontier Province, and Punjab.

The East Pakistan National Awami Party soon attracted the leftist students' organization, the East Pakistan Students' Union (EPSU), as its front organization.

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2 Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh", p. 233.
5 The East Pakistan Students' Union was formed in April 1952 by a group of East Pakistani students who broke away from the East Pakistan Students' League, a branch organization of the East Pakistan Awami League. The East Pakistan Students' Union's objectives were similar to those of the Awami Party -- secularism, anti-imperialism, and non-communalism. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
The promulgation of martial law in Pakistan in 1958, which outlawed all political parties and political activities in the country, brought an end to the National Awami Party's effort to organize the party at rural levels of East and West Pakistan.

**The Politics of No-Party**

As is usually the case with all military regimes, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Chief Marshal Law Administrator since the promulgation of martial law in October 1958 by President Iskander Mirza, had a deep aversion for political parties and a contempt for politicians. Ayub publicly expressed his low estimate of politicians in the very first broadcast to the nation as Chief Marshal Law Administrator of Pakistan on October 8, 1958:

Ever since the death of Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, politicians started a farce-for-all of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged a ceaseless and bitter war against each other regardless of the ill effects on the country, just to whet their appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit, and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious, racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. They could see no good in anybody else. In this mad rush for power and acquisition, the country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned.

He treated politicians as a "big joke" and "dirty linen". Ayub was firmly convinced that the affairs of the state of Pakistan could be very well managed without political parties and politicians. Although he recognized that Pakistan was facing the problem of national integration and he stressed the

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1 See Huntington, *op.cit.*, pp. 244-45.
need for it, this was to be achieved by paternalistic leadership through his novel creation of the system of Basic Democracies (BD) and through Islamic ideology. It was his sincere hope, however, that the Basic Democrats (BDs) would not get mixed up with politics: "There was [indeed] little bit of glamour in politics, but one was apt to be misled". Although the Martial Law Regulation number 79 was amended permitting the holding of meetings in

1 Ibid., p. 584.

2 The system of Basic Democracies was introduced by Ayub in 1959 with a view to replacing the Western type of democracy which was considered unworkable in Pakistan since Western democracies required certain 'infrastructures' such as high degree of social and political awareness and mass literacy, which Pakistan had lacked. To Ayub there were only two alternatives for Pakistan: either to wait for ideal conditions to obtain in Pakistan, or to lay the foundation of a democratic system to suit the genius of the people. He chose the second because the first would take a long time to attain. He had a high hope that the system would in due course generate fresh enthusiasm among the people and liberate moral and intellectual forces which were regarded as so essential for a dynamic leadership. See his broadcast to the nation on Sept. 2, 1959, in Asian Recorder (New Delhi), September 19-25, 1959, pp. 2907-8. Under this system the two wings the country were each divided into 40,000 constituencies with an average population of about 1,000. Every constituency elected one representative on the basis of universal adult franchise. Ten such constituencies formed an Union Council. Above this was the Thana Council consisting of members elected (indirectly) and nominated (by the Government). The two constituted of elected and nominated members. Upon all these tiers of the system, there was direct government control and influence. For an elaborate discussion of this system, see, for example, Inayatullah, Basic Democracies, District Administration and Development (Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1964).

3 See Ayub's views in Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective", p. 584.

4 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), March 12-18, 1962, p. 4471.

5 The Regulation was amended on January 20, 1962; Dawn (Karachi), January 21, 1962.
connection with ensuing elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies, it was made sufficiently clear that "no persons shall organise, convene or attend any meeting or procession of a political nature, nor shall any person make a speech of political nature at any meeting or gathering".

Ayub rather envisioned several other institutions and mechanisms to substitute for political parties. These were: (a) the institution of Basic Democracies; (b) civil bureaucracy; (c) national assembly; and (d) provincial governors.

(a) Basic Democracies. The Basic Democracies system was claimed by Ayub to be a unique institution most suitable to the genius of the people of Pakistan, under which the "voters will be less liable to be exploited and misled ... than in direct elections where they were driven as cattle to polling booths". Through this system, he believed, "every village and every inhabitant in every village in our country would become an equal partner with the administration in conducting the affairs of the state".

It is understood that he devised this "unique" mechanism in order to gain legitimacy for his "Constitutional Autocracy". Unfortunately, the system did not work as Ayub believed it would, and the Basic Democrats gradually became alienated from the people, which resulted in large-scale harassment and manhandling.

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1 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), February 26 - March 4, 1962, p. 4450. The amendment did not spell out, however, what was meant by "political nature".
2 Ibid., September 19-25, 1959, p. 2907.
4 Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Vol. 2, p. 35.
5 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Ch. 5, terms the Ayub regime a "Constitutional Autocracy".
even sometimes brutal killing, of them by the general public during the 1969 mass upsurge against Ayub's system. Bhutto probably rightly called the Basic Democrats as "Brahmins of Pakistan". The Basic Democrats, much contrary to the expectation of its architect, really earned the system a bad name as being essentially corrupt, and as such they became a liability to the Ayub regime rather than an asset. That the Basic Democrats could not earn for the Ayub regime the required support and legitimacy was realized by Ayub himself. He admitted in May 1963 that he had failed to make the people of Pakistan accept his philosophy of working out a political set-up through the system of Basic Democracies and that he had failed to play the game according to his own rules.

(b) Civil bureaucracy. The civil bureaucracy was an important institution for the government control of Basic Democrats at different tiers, and for the consolidation of Ayub's powers both at the Center and the Provinces. All members of the civil service had tenured positions with constitutional entrenchment. Especially the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) functioned as the chief agents of the Central Government in the provinces and occupied all the key positions within both governments, the Central and the Provincial. Although the bureaucracy was given the charge of directing and manipulating the Basic Democrats, the former's success in mass mobilization, by virtue of its very character, was very limited. It may be that the bureaucrats were successful in

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intimidating and taming the Basic Democrats through various types of lures for supporting the Ayub regime, but they could never reach the people whose support actually mattered in the long run for the workability and durability of the political system.

(c) National Assembly. In the face of strong resentment and demonstration from East Pakistan against the Constitution which he had imposed on the nation in March 1962, Ayub turned to the members of the National Assembly (elected by the Basic Democrats) and its Parliamentary Secretaries to sell it to the people. Thus, he said in the inaugural session of the National Assembly that its foremost duty was "to work and defend the constitution". At the same time he invested the Parliamentary Secretaries with the "first task" of going "to the people at all levels and to explain to them the spirit and salient features of the constitution and in doing so to educate them about the bona fides of the Government policies". The members of the National Assembly and the Parliamentary Secretaries were pleased to 'obey' Ayub's directives since that would bring political prizes awarded by the latter.

(d) Provincial Governors. The office of the Provincial Governor was another institutional mechanism devised by the Ayub regime to perpetuate


2 There was one Parliamentary Secretary for each ministry selected from amongst the members of the National Assembly. They were the liaison between the Minister and the Secretary of the Ministry concerned, and the National Assembly. They used to answer questions in the absence of the Minister concerned. They enjoyed more fringe benefits than the members of the National Assembly.


4 Ibid., pp. 254-55.
the hegemony of the Central Government over the provinces. The Governors were real executive heads of provinces without being responsible to them. They were selected by the President and were subject to his directions.\(^1\) They had either to do as the President desired or to be ready for his wrath to fall upon them.

Neither the members of National Assembly or Parliamentary Secretaries nor the Governor of East Pakistan could earn support for the political system of the Ayub Government. The reason was that they were not the persons whom the people had authorized to represent them in the government.

Ayub continued without political parties till June 1962. Even in the third week of June he was against the idea of reintroducing the party system. He rather advised the people "to avoid reverting to the same old system of parliamentary, party politics which had done us no good".\(^2\)

Ayub, however, changed his mind. Von Vorys speculates that Ayub's new ministers, especially Mohammad Ali (Bogra) and Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto, advised him to introduce political parties for mass mobilization in favour of the Government.\(^3\) "Reluctantly", Von Vorys continues, "President Ayub Khan agreed and sacrificed his fond hope of leadership through personal excellence to leadership through organization."\(^4\)

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Whatever may be the weight of Von Vorys' speculation about Ayub's change of stand on political parties, it is evident that by June 1962 Ayub had already managed to gain considerable support from the members of the National Assembly, most of whom were old Muslim Leaguers. It may be remembered that in view of continued ban on political activities and political parties, the elections to the National Assembly in 1962 were held on a non-party basis. But soon after the Assembly met, informal political groupings began to take shape and those groupings operated as pressure groups. Rashiduzzaman thus writes about as many as four such groupings, of which 41 members of one of these groupings (led by Mohammad Ali Bogra) extended support to the Ayub Government. There were also "Independent" groups, one led by Ayub's brother, Sarder Bahadur Khan, which had 21 supporters. Ayub also had a good reason to be confident about the loyalty of a considerable section of the 80,000 Basic Democrats whom his system patronized economically, politically and socially. His award of political prizes in various forms to the old Muslim Leaguers, outside the Assemblies, encouraged them to rally under his umbrella. It was also possible that the revival of party activities was a strategy of Ayub to break up the unity of the opposition forces in the National Assembly.

1 The important reason for the Muslim Leaguers' victory in the National Assembly elections of 1962 was that most of the prominent members of the popular parties in East Pakistan, like the Awami League and the National Awami Party, were either imprisoned or disqualified under the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO). Some Muslim Leaguers were also EBDOed, but their number was small. The total figure of the old Muslim League members in the National Assembly of 1962 is not available, but according to Jahan, the Muslim Leaguers from East Pakistan totalled 40 out of East Pakistan's total membership of 75; Jahan, op. cit., pp. 127-28.


3 Economically the Basic Democrats were patronized through Rural Works Program. See, for example, Feldman, Crisis to Crisis, pp. 3-4, 177-78; as members of the Electoral College, they became a very important political group; their economic benefits and political role elevated correspondingly their social positions as well.
All these factors together finally culminated in the adoption of the Polit­i­cal Parties Act on July 14, 1962, with the following restrictions, however: (a) parties must not be "foreign aided"; (b) they must be based on Islamic ideology; (c) parties must not recruit persons who were convicted of moral turpitude -- dismissed government servants and public officials, or the politicians disqualified under the Elective Bodies Order. It should be added that Ayub expressed his desire that structurally the parties should follow the Basic Democracies' tier system. He called upon the leaders to form political parties on a national, pragmatic, and grass-root basis.

Political Parties Since 1962

The Pakistan Muslim League. With the adoption of the Political Parties Act (PPA), 1962, the leaders of most parties, including the Muslim League, engaged themselves in the revival of their former organizations. As mentioned above, Ayub already had a sizeable number of supporters inside the National Assembly. He urged upon his ministers and followers in the Assemblies "to get on with the job of building a party that would represent the government in the assemblies." It seems then that the purpose of forming a party was not, as was conventional, to bring the government policies to the people and recruit their support for them; Ayub was rather more concerned for those who would be needed to regularize and legitimize his pro-

mulgations and proclamations, not the mass of the people.¹

Ayub's followers in the Assemblies, some of whom were members of the pre-martial law Muslim League, together with other veteran Leaguers, attempted to organize a party with a national platform. The leaders, especially the veteran Leaguers like Moolana Akram Khan, Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, Nazimuddin, and others became divided over the issue of the procedure for reviving their party.² Ayub's supporters, however, formed a party through a Convention of the members of the pre-martial law Muslim League, and preferred to retain the name of the old nationalist party, the Muslim League, adding, however, the word "Parkistan" before "Muslim", which made the full name of the party the Pakistan Muslim League. Since the party was formed through a convention, it used to be called the Convention Muslim League, or Muslim League (Convention). This party was mainly composed of Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, and supporters of Ayub within and outside the Assemblies. Interesting, the party attracted mostly new blood whose political experiences fell far short of political skills of members of the other faction of the League, the Council Muslim League.³ The more veteran Leaguers of the pre-martial law Muslim League refused to join hands with Ayub. Instead, they revived the old party in a Requisitioned Council Meeting, permitted by the old constitution of the party, with Nazimuddin as President.

Ayub formally joined the Pakistan Muslim League in May 1963, because it "had supported ... [his] programmes within and outside the legislature."⁴ He

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¹ A sizeable number of laws during the Ayub regime consisted of promulgations and proclamations, later rubber-stamped by the National Assembly.

² Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, p. 19, explains the reason for the division as mysterious.

³ Ziring, op.cit., p. 33.

admitted his defeat in making the people play the game of politics "in accordance with my rules, and so I have to play in accordance with their rules -- and the rules demand that I belong to somebody; otherwise who is going to belong to me? So it is simple. It is an admission of defeat on my part".1

Immediately after joining the party, Ayub defined the objectives of the Pakistan Muslim League as follows:

(1) take steps to bring about unity among the people and foster a sense of pride in their homeland;
(2) build up a modern society;
(3) achieve scientific and technological development;
(4) develop industries and modernize agriculture, and remove disparities;
(5) ensure sharing of the benefits of development by as many people as possible;
(6) establish Islamic principles of social justice and economic order;
(7) pursue foreign relations conducive to the security and development of the country;
(8) assist the people of Jammu and Kashmir in attaining their freedom.2

These objectives of the Pakistan Muslim League defined by Ayub, promising though they were, could have hardly appealed to the masses who were scarcely acquainted with elusive terms like "modern technology", "developed societies", "independent foreign policies", and others. Although they contained goals like removal of disparities, and distribution of the fruits of development, they did not spell them out in detail. Moreover, with the passage of time,

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2 Dawn (Karachi), May 23, 1963.
the people of East Pakistan discovered that Islamic social justice of the Ayub regime meant something different than social justice as defined in the Quran and the Hadith.

Ayub accepted the presidency of the Pakistan Muslim League in December 1963, but he did little to ensure its penetration in every nook and corner of the country. The most frequent method of mass mobilization of the party was propaganda through mass media like newspapers, radio and the television, with very little emphasis on public meetings and personal contacts. But in a traditional society like Pakistan, personal contacts through informal discussions and mass rallies were more effective than mass media. Since the majority of leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League held government posts or other jobs, they had very little time for mass contact.

The support base of the party remained extremely limited. It primarily consisted of those who had a stake in Ayub's government and administration. Apart from some professional politicians, businessmen, industrialists, and contractors, the party could hardly recruit support from the middle and lower middle class groups. The principal reason that various economic groups came under the banner of the party was to be found in the regime's emphasis on economic development. As a matter of fact, Ayub's followers were more interested in mobilizing support among the members of the Basic Democracies than among the masses, for it was Basic Democrats' support which mattered in keeping Ayub in power. Whatever little effort might have been directed at recruiting mass support for the Muslim League, it could not succeed in East Pakistan since the regional autonomist parties like the Awami League and the Awami Party had already convinced the people that the Pakistan Muslim League was a party

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1 There were as many as 11 English and vernacular medium dailies managed by the Government controlled National Press Trust. Besides, the Radio and TV were solely under Government control.
serving primarily West Pakistani interests. Another reason for the Pakistan Muslim League's failure to gain popularity in East Pakistan was the fact that its leadership consisted of those persons whom the people had rejected in 1954 because of their repeated betrayal of the Bengalis' causes during the pre-martial law days. Thus, according to Maniruzzaman, of the eleven East Pakistani Muslim Leaguers who were in Ayub's Cabinet of Ministers, eight had run and lost in the Provincial Assembly elections in 1954. Moreover, since the Pakistan Muslim League stood for a strong central government of presidential form, it went against the aspirations of the Bengalis who were consistently demonstrating their strong demand for provincial autonomy with a weak centre and a parliamentary form of government.

The Council Muslim League. As mentioned above, the leaders of the pre-martial law Muslim League were divided over the procedure for reviving the party in 1962. This gave birth to two parties -- the Pakistan Muslim League, the official party of the government, and the Council Muslim League, which decided to remain in opposition to the government party. The Council Muslim League was led by Nazimuddin, an East Pakistani, and, after his death in 1964, by Mian Momtaz Mohammad Khan Daulatana of West Pakistan. The party under the Presidentship of Daulatana claimed to be the true heir to the old Muslim League. The party stood for a parliamentary, federal form

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of government with fully autonomous provinces,¹ and a greater share of resources to East Pakistan for her economic development.²

The base of support of the Council Muslim League was predominantly in West Pakistan, especially Punjab, wherefrom Daulatana, the president of the party and Shaukat Hayat Khan, the provincial president, hailed, and Sind after Ayub Khuro joined the party.³ Its success in East Pakistan was very limited. Organizationally the party was weak in both wings of the country, and there was no serious effort made to take the party to the masses.⁴ The reason for the weak support for the party in East Pakistan was that it was the same leadership and the same party which had been denounced by the people in the province in the 1954 elections.

The Awami League. After the restoration of party activities in Pakistan, Suhrawardy, leader of the pre-martial law Awami League, attempted to set up a non-party organization consisting of democratic forces of the country under the name of the National Democratic Front.⁵ Although Suhrawardy's move received support from major opposition parties such as the Awami League, the National Awami Party, the Council Muslim League, and the Jammat-i-Islami,

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² "Seven Point Programme of the Council Muslim League", ibid., Appendix-II.


⁴ Jahan, op.cit., p. 135.

⁵ The participants of the Front agreed not to revive individual parties until there would exist healthy atmosphere conducive to the development of a party system in Pakistan.
it did not turn out successfully, partly because of the Ayub Government's repressive measures against it,¹ and partly because of its short life.²

With the death of Suhrawardy in 1963, the National Democratic Front lost most of its dynamism. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, General Secretary of the pre-martial law Awami League, together with Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, a senior leader of the party from West Pakistan, revived the Awami League. Since the party always stood for maximum autonomy for the provinces, the West Pakistanis were suspicious and had reservations about it. As a result, the Awami League continued to be an East Pakistani based party with very limited success in West Pakistan.

In East Pakistan, the Awami League was steadily gaining support from people from all walks of life, mainly due to its lofty promises for a better future for the Bengalis. The Theory of Two Economies,³ propounded in the middle of the 1950's, and widely publicized in the 1960's, provided the Awami League with a theoretical base for its demand for maximum provincial autonomy. The theory, in short, suggested that in view of the spatial separation of the two wings of the country, and because of the different nature of the economies of the two wings, the country should be divided into two economic zones with two separate economic policies, which alone could remove mounting disparities and lay the foundation for the unity of the country.

¹ For an account of the repressive measures, see Von Vorys, op.cit., pp. 259-66.
² All political parties were revived by 1964.
³ Infra., ch.v.
The Awami League picked up this theory and gave it a political shape incorporating it into the famous Six-Point Program, formulated in 1966. The Program provided for the following:

(1) federal parliamentary form of government with legislative supremacy, and provincial autonomy as envisaged by the Lahore Resolution in 1940;

(2) federal government would have powers only in foreign affairs and defence, the rest being vested with the "Federating States";

(3) there were two alternatives with regard to currency: (a) two separate, but freely convertible currencies for the two wings, or (b) one currency for the whole country, with checks on the flight of capital from one wing to the other;

(4) power of taxation would lie with the provincial governments, and the latter would regularly pay an amount to the Central Government to enable it to discharge its functions;

(5) there would be two separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings by the two wings, and the two wings would be given constitutional powers to establish trade and commercial relations with foreign countries;

(6) East Pakistan was to be made self-sufficient in defence, allowing her to set up and recruit militia or para-military forces.\(^1\)

The Six-Point Program generated mass enthusiasm in East Pakistan. It was duly approved by the Council meeting of the East Pakistani Awami League. But, as one would expect, the Program created adverse reaction in West Pakistan. In the first place, the Program was formulated without consulting the West Pakistani leaders of the party; and secondly, the latter sensed an

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element of secession or disintegration of the country in the Program. Thus, Nasrullah Khan, national President of the party (a West Pakistani), and his followers from West Pakistan, declined to endorse the Program. President Ayub called the program a demand for "greater sovereign Bengal" which would put the Bengali Muslims under the domination of the caste Hindus of West Bengal,¹ and he threatened the autonomists with dire consequences if they failed to abandon the idea.² He even went to the extent of saying that "language of weapon" would be used to stop these "disruptionist elements" and he would not be surprised to see the country going through a civil war similar to the one in the United States.³ Prominent Bengali leaders of the Awami League, including its chief spokesman, Mujibur Rahman, were imprisoned; the mouthpiece of the party, the Daily Ittefaq was closed down, with its editor put behind bars.⁴ While the non-Muslim League leaders of East Pakistan condemned such repressive actions of the Government,⁵ the East Pakistan Provincial Muslim League Working Committee supported it.⁶

Mujib was intelligent enough to realize that the Program would be condemned by the West Pakistani unit of the party. It seems that his strategy was to capitalize on the numerical majority of East Pakistan, even at the cost of support from West Pakistan. Another possibility was to pressurize

¹ *Dawn* (Karachi), March 17, 1966.
² *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), September 3-9, 1966, p. 7270.
³ *Dawn* (Karachi), March 21, 1966.
⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 210-211.
the Central Government into changing its attitude towards East Pakistan. Sensing the fact that the West Pakistan Awami League would be reluctant to support the program, Mujib, perhaps purposely but most naively, tried to convince the West Pakistanis that the Program was a crusade against the exploiters of West Pakistan, not against the exploited masses who were in no better condition than the East Pakistanis. Mujib repeatedly said that the Program contained a demand for "justice, equality and fairplay amongst brothers". He also tried to propagate the idea that there was inherent in the Program "a corresponding benefit to my West Pakistani brethren". All this, however, did not produce much positive result in West Pakistan, except for some sympathy in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province.

The Six-Point Program was gaining support very steadily in East Pakistan. Mujib and other members of the Awami League, with the very active co-operation of the East Pakistan Students' League, undertook strenuous and hectic tours all over East Pakistan to mobilize support for the Program. The national Government at Islamabad became extremely concerned with the huge gatherings of people which the Awami League was attracting. The Government reacted to this situation quite sharply by arresting Mujib and other members of the Awami League with a view to bringing an end to the movement.

Mass mobilization in favour of the Program went on. Although no other party, except for the National Awami Party (Moscow), supported this Program, the East Pakistan Students' League took up the task of carrying it to the

1 Ministry of External Affairs, op. cit., p. 31.
2 Ibid., p. 30.
3 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), May 7-14, 1968, p. 4729.
4 This student organization was formed in 1948. After the formulation of the Awami League, the EPSL worked as its front organization.
remote corners of the province. Witnessing that the arrest of the Awami League members could not stop the movement against the regime and in favour of the Program, the government risked another extreme measure by launching an alleged conspiracy case, the Agartala Conspiracy Case, involving Mujib, three Bengali senior Civil Service Officers, one Bengali senior military officer, and thirty-one other Bengalis.1 Although the Government, having almost an exclusive control over the mass media, laboured hard to publicize that the arrested persons were engaged in acts of high treason which, if successful, would have put the Bengali Muslims in the servitude of the Hindus of India, the Bengali Muslims paid little heed to the government propaganda for the reason that they had heard of such fake conspiracies on many occasions in the past. Past experiences of the people of East Pakistan had shown that whenever Bengali leaders had tried to do something good for their province, they had been branded as "treacherous" and "anti-state elements", and with other 'titles'.2

In January 1969, all student organizations of East Pakistan, except the Pakistan Muslim League's student front, the National Students' Federation (NSF), formed an alliance under the name of the Students' Action Committee (SAC) and launched an united movement against the Ayub regime and for the

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1 The case charged the arrested persons with an attempt to separate East Pakistan from the federation of Pakistan with the help of India. *Dawn* (Karachi), January 7, 1968.

2 Thus, people had heard that Fazlul Huq had conspired to merge East Pakistan with West Bengal. He was dismissed from the Chief Ministership of East Pakistan in 1954 on this account. *Dawn* (Karachi), May 31, 1954; Suhrawardy was discredited for having conspired with Netajee Subhash Bose, the famous Indian nationalist leader, to form an united Bengal, separated both from India and Pakistan. Suhrawardy was also charged in 1962 with anti-state activities. *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), February 26-March 4, 1962, p. 4449.
realization of the demands formulated as the Eleven-point Program. This program of the Students' Action Committee articulated the interests of diverse social, economic, political and professional groups of East Pakistan and recruited their enthusiastic support. The Awami League very promptly picked up the Eleven-Point Program and incorporated it into the objectives of the party.

The base of support of the Awami League became greatly expanded. The amalgamation of the Six-Point with the Eleven-Point Program gave the Awami League an extra vitality, making room for the leftist elements of the province who felt comfort within the Awami League because the party, after incorporating the Eleven-Point Program, became the spokesman of the leftists as well. Peasants, urban workers, petty officials, Bengali bureaucrats, petty businessmen, intellectuals, students, and others started assembling under the banner of the Awami League. An alliance between the Awami League and the Students' Action Committee was very easy in view of the fact that top officials of the latter were members of the East Pakistan Students' League, the auxiliary student organization of the Awami League.

In the face of the nationwide anti-Ayub demonstration started in the latter half of 1968, and the unprecedented mass-upsurge in East Pakistan in the spring of 1969 which called upon the Government to accept the Eleven-Point Program, the Government decided to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy.

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1 The Eleven-Point Program included the following: (a) de-provincialization of all provincialized colleges, lowering the tuition and other fees, subsidization of hostel charges by the government; (b) all the Six points of the Awami League's Program; (c) good working conditions and fair wages for industrial labourers and the repeal of all black laws; (d) Pakistan's withdrawal from all military pacts; (e) nationalization of heavy industries, banks and insurance companies; (f) reduction of taxes on the farmers; (g) repeal of all repressive laws; (h) release of all political prisoners from jails and the withdrawal of the fake Agartala Conspiracy Case. Reproduced in Gaziul Hug, Bangladesh Unchained (Calcutta: Indian Associated Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 100-102.
Case and released all persons arrested in connection with the case.\footnote{Asian Recorder (New Delhi), March 26-April 1, 1969, p. 8846.} Ayub also invited "responsible" leaders to a Round Table Conference designed to spell out solutions to the crises the country was going through.

Mujib, after his release from jail in February 1969, became a more outspoken champion of the causes of the Bengalis. The influence of the students on the Awami League was getting more decisive than ever. Mujib realized that it was the students, the East Pakistan Students' League in particular, who had mobilized the masses during 1968-69 against his implication in the Conspiracy Case, and got him released from jail; and again it was the students' protests and demonstrations which caused governmental immobilism, which was an important reason why Ayub decided to abdicate in March 1969.

\textit{The National Awami Party (NAP).} The National Awami Party, as noted above, was a front organization of the East Pakistan Communist Party. Following the promulgation of martial law in Pakistan in 1958, a 'red scare' resulted in the arrest of some of the Awami Party leaders and others went underground.\footnote{Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh", p. 234.} The split in the International Communist movement and differences in the attitude of the National Awami Party members towards the Ayub regime resulted in a split in the party giving birth to two main factions -- pro-Moscow and pro-Peking.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 234-35.} The split was officially complete in 1967 when the pro-Peking faction led by Bhashani and the pro-Moscow faction led by Professor Mozaffor Ahmad held separate Council meetings; the former in Rangpur and the latter in Dacca.
The impact of the split in the East Pakistan branch of the National Awami Party reached West Pakistan as well. Among West Pakistani leaders of the party, Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Mahmudul Huq Usmani supported the pro-Moscow faction, while C. R. Aslam and Mian Iftikharuddin supported the pro-Peking faction.

Regionally, the pro-Moscow National Awami Party drew its strength from West Pakistan. Its leadership was mainly composed of regional autonomists. The pro-Peking National Awami Party, on the other hand, consisted mainly of leftists of East Pakistan. The base of support of the pro-Peking National Awami Party remained quite limited. In the first place the repressive measures of the Ayub regime did not permit the veteran communist leaders, who went underground following the promulgation of martial law, to engage in mass mobilization. Secondly, the religious-minded rural masses of East Pakistan were always suspicious of the National Awami Party's views on religion. The Awami League, especially its students' front, the East Pakistan Students' League, consistently propagated the idea that the National Awami Party and its student front, the East Pakistan Students' Union, were communists and, therefore, did not believe in God.

The rift in the National Awami Party was reflected in the attitude of the two factions towards the Ayub regime's foreign policies. The regime, after the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962, had adopted an "anti-imperialist, pro-Chinese" foreign policy, in which the pro-Peking National Awami Party discovered a manifestation of its own ideology, which regarded imperialism

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1 Jahan, op.cit., p. 138.
2 Ibid.
3 This is author's personal knowledge as an active member of a student organization.
as "the number one enemy". To the pro-Moscow National Awami Party, the Ayub regime was nothing short of a bourgeoisie dictatorship supported by imperialist powers and run through an alliance of big business and landed interests of West Pakistan. This faction, therefore, adopted a strategy of denouncing the Ayub regime and forging co-operation with other progressive forces of the country like the Awami League.

Although the pro-Moscow National Awami Party generally agreed with this strategy of peaceful transition to socialism, the supporters of the party became polarized around leading personalities of the party in the two wings of the country. While Ghaffar Khan of North-West Frontier Province and Achakzai of Baluchistan were central figures in West Pakistan, Mozaffar Ahmad remained the key figure in East Pakistan. There was no serious effort to bridge the gap between the pro-Moscow National Awami Party in East and West Pakistan, except for occasional meetings of the top leaders of the party. Followers of the party in each wing remained aware of their immediate leaders alone. The pro-Peking National Awami Party, however, underwent several other schisms on the issue of the strategy and tactics of revolution.

The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The Pakistan People's Party was relatively a new party a Pakistan. It was formed in 1967 by one of the

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1 Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh", p. 236.
4 Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh", pp. 241-52.
close associates of the Ayub regime, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, with Islamic social democracy as its main plank. The party declared that: "Islam is our faith; Democracy is our policy; Socialism is our economy". The party pledged itself to the "transformation of Pakistan into a socialist economy". With regard to foreign policy, the party emphasized friendship with socialist countries, especially China and the Soviet Union, and strong stand against India.

Although the party did not put forward any regional demand, and, therefore, in this sense it may be said to have aspired to be a national party, its success in East Pakistan was practically nil. Its leader, Bhutto, undertook tours in East Pakistan to explore the possibilities of setting up branch offices there, but with no significant result. The reason was somewhat obvious. The political culture of East Pakistan was dominated by her peoples' desire for provincial autonomy, which the People's Party failed to accommodate. Its rejection of the Six-Point Program of the Awami League and its support for a strong center was very much against the East Pakistanis' long felt desire -- a desire for a weak center and strong provinces. The party thus remained totally West Pakistani both in its leadership and base of support. In West Pakistan, its main base of support was the enthusiastic students and youths who were very much attracted by its militant

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2 Ibid., p. 34.
3 Ibid., pp. 68-80.
4 Although the party managed to set up a show organization in East Pakistan with Maulana Nuruzzaman as provincial President and Joynul Abedin as the General Secretary, both of them severed relationship with the People's Party on the eve of general elections of 1970. Bhattacharjee, op.cit., pp. 287-88.
5 Pakistan People's Party, Foundation and Policy, pp. 81-88.
nationalism. The party also recruited support from urban intellectuals and small zamindars. The People's Party's slogan of Islamic Socialism was magnetic. The leaders of the party, without creating any misgivings or confusion, most successfully convinced the leftists as well as the religious minded people that it stood for both Islam and Socialism at the same time, and this tactic worked marvelously.

The Jamaat-i-Islami (Jamaat). The Jamaat was subjected to political repressions by the Ayub regime. The party was banned in early 1964 throughout Pakistan under the Criminal Law Act of 1908 on charges of overt and covert attempts to subvert the loyalty of the people and government officials. The ban was, however, lifted in September 1964 after the Supreme Court rejected the allegations against the party.

During the period following its revival, the Jamaat seemed to have changed its previous policies about mass mobilization. In the 1960's the party leaders engaged themselves in setting up offices at district, subdivision, and thana or tehsil levels. But because of its preference for a strong central government, its opposition to the demand for provincial autonomy, and its fanatic views on Islam, its success in East Pakistan continued to be limited.

1 Jahan, op.cit., p. 140-41.
5 Ibid., November 4-10, 1964, p. 6129.
The Jamaat was a partner of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) and participated in the national elections of 1965 and 1970 with limited success.¹

The Pakistan Muslim League (Quyyum). The Pakistan Muslim League (Quyyum) was the third faction of the Muslim League. It was formed under the leadership of Khan Abdul Quyyum Khan of West Pakistan. The party attracted a large section of defectors from the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention). The leaders of the party in East Pakistan were former lieutenants of Ayub Khan, Khan Abdus Sabur Khan and Wahiduzzaman, and in West Pakistan it had recruited some support from Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province.² The party advocated an Islamic republic with strong central government, and this prevented it gaining support in East Pakistan.

The Nizam-i-Islam Party. The Nizam-i-Islam was a religious party formed by Maolana Athar Ali of East Pakistan. The party was a small partner of the United Front in the 1954 East Pakistan elections. The base of support of the party was entirely in East Pakistan until 1963, when it was extended to West Pakistan after Chaudhury Mohammad Ali of West Pakistan joined it. Its base of support continued to be limited and the organization of the party was very weak in both parts of the country.³

¹ Infra.
² Baxter, op.cit., p. 204.
³ Jahan, op.cit., p. 141.
The Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). The Pakistan Democratic Party was formed in 1969 as a result of a merger of former parties like the National Democratic Front\(^1\) led by Nurul Amin of East Pakistan, Nizam-i-Islam Party led by Choudhury Mohammad Ali of West Pakistan and Maulana Farid Ahmad of East Pakistan, West Pakistani anti-Six-Point Awami Leaguers led by Nasrullah Khan, and the Justice party headed by Air Marshal (retd.) Ashgar Khan of West Pakistan. The Eight-Point Manifesto of the party included the advocacy of an Islamic republic, regional autonomy with sufficient powers to the Central government, and Islamic principles of social justice.\(^2\)

Organizationally the party was too weak in both the wings of the country. The strength of the party remained in the personal follower of the leaders of the party who were in most cases veteran politicians of the country. Punjab was a relatively strong base of support for the party.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The NDF was actually a coalition of several parties forged in 1962. In 1964, when all political parties in it were revived, Nurul Amin, one of the leaders of the Front, decided to stick to the Front.


\(^3\) Infra.
fresh vigor from within and from outside the party. Elections at regular intervals provide the parties with opportunities to sell their ideologies and recruit support, which is most essential for the viability of any democratic political system.

In Pakistan, unfortunately, no national level elections were held in the 15 years following her birth. In East Pakistan, the Muslim League leaders, after a defeat of their candidate in the Tangail by-election, were too reluctant to hold elections despite the fact that as many as 34 of 171 seats of the Provincial Assembly fell vacant by August 1953.

Elections to the East Pakistan Assembly were, however, held in 1954, in which 16 parties participated and 1,285 candidates stood for 309 seats. The Muslim League was quite hopeful of a victory. The opposition forces in East Pakistan fought the election through an alliance of 5 parties known as the United Front, with provincial autonomy as its main plank. The results of the elections were quite surprising -- surprisingly bad for the Muslim League and surprisingly good for the United Front. East Pakistan's massive support of the United Front's 21-Point Program was in fact a vote of no confidence in the policies pursued by the Muslim League Government, and demonstrated an overwhelming support for provincial autonomy with a weak center. The Muslim League Government at the Center, sensing a great challenge to its authority dismissed the United Front Government in only

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1 Supra.
2 Callard, op.cit., p. 56.
3 Ibid., p. 58.
4 Dawn (Karachi), January 27, 1954, predicted that the Muslim League would secure 75 to 80 per cent of the Muslim seats. The results showed that the League secured only 10 while the Front won 223 of 237 Muslim seats and 10 non-Muslim seats. Infra., Table-14.
5 See, Ibid.
6 See Appendix A.
two months time, and alienated the people of East Pakistan from the Center as well as from the Muslim League.

The first national level elections in Pakistan were held in 1962 in which the 80,000 Basic Democrats elected 75 members to the National Assembly of Pakistan from each wing.¹ Since the elections were held in the midst of a continuing ban on political parties and political activities, candidates fought the elections on their own merit, although most of them had previous party affiliations. Von Vorys, thus, estimated that in East Pakistan no less than 43 of 75 National Assembly members had been actively associated with the Muslim League which the people of East Pakistan so overwhelmingly defeated in 1954.² Since the elections were indirect and without the participation of political parties, they produced very little enthusiasm. Most of the popular leaders of the two wings were disqualified under the Elective Bodies Ordinance (EBDO) at the time elections were held, and the elections were contested by "second-echelon of political leaders" only.³

A series of elections were held in 1965, which produced a great deal of politicization of the people. The first in the series were the presidential elections in which all major parties, except the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, were united under the name of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP). It was an alliance of the Council Muslim League led by Nazimuddin in the East and Daulatana in the West; the National Awami Party led by Bhashani in the East and Wali Khan in the West; the Awami League led by Mujibur Rahman in

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¹ The total number of members of the National Assembly was 156, of which 6 were reserved for women, 3 each from the two wings, to be elected by the sitting members of the National Assembly.

² Von Vorys, op.cit., p. 238.

³ Jahan, op.cit., p. 145.
the East and Nasrullah Khan in the West; the Nizam-i-Islam party led by Choudhury Mohammad Ali in the West and Farid Ahmad in the East; the Jammat-i-Islami led by Maolana Maudoodi in the West and Ghulam Azam in East Pakistan.

The Combined Opposition Parties aggregated the popular interests of the two wings of the country. It issued a Nine-Point Manifesto which included the following: democratic constitution in Pakistan; direct elections to national and provincial assemblies which had full legislative and budgetary powers; federal parliamentary system of government with provincial autonomy consistent with the integrity of Pakistan; curtailment of powers of the President; separation of judiciary from the executive; powers of judicial review to the Supreme Court; release of all political detainees; repeal of all repressive laws; removal of inter-wing disparities, and pursuance of an independent foreign policy.¹

This unity among the various parties was no doubt a great achievement. But the alliance as a whole was less organized and less united than expected.²

The Combined Opposition Parties failed in many instances to exhibit a spirit of co-operation, compromise and accommodation with regard to the issue of setting candidates for various elections.³

After a "long search" for a presidential candidate, the Combined Opposition Parties nominated Miss Fatima Jinnah, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's sister, who had a reputation for integrity, honesty, and a long, active association with

¹ *Dawn* (Karachi), October 31, 1964.

² Thus, the National Awami Party was unhappy because the Program of the alliance did not mention the need for the dismantling of One Unit in West Pakistan and the quitting of SEATO and CENTO by Pakistan. The Awami Party also did not like the inclusion of a demand for the amendment of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance. K.P. Misra and others, *Pakistan's Search for Constitutional Consensus* (New Delhi: Impex India, 1967), pp. 52-53.

³ Ibid., pp. 57-58.

the Pakistan movement. Above all this, she had also the symbolic value of being the sister of Father of the Nation. Her acceptance of this offer infused the Combined Opposition Parties with a new life and a high hope. The Government party, the Pakistan Muslim League, anticipated a great challenge and danger to itself from Miss Jinnah's candidacy as well as from the unity of the opposition parties, however loose it might have been. Ayub, the nominee of the Pakistan Muslim League and the incumbent President, appeared to have been quite alarmed after sensing the popular support for the Combined Opposition Parties, and public opinion against him and his system. The ruling Pakistan Muslim League branded the Combined Opposition Parties' leaders as "frustrated", "tired and discredited" politicians who were alleged to have been responsible for much of the mess the country had experienced prior to the promulgation of martial law. These leaders, the Pakistan Muslim League alleged, were again active "to seize power" and "elevate the disgrace to the national level". To Ayub, the Manifesto of the Opposition Parties was nothing more than "catchy slogans based on sentiments of parochialism, regionalism and petty issues". He even threatened the country with a "second revolution if the opposition parties came to power". He cautioned the Basic Democrats against the ulterior motives of the Combined Opposition Parties, reminding them that they were the custodians of the system of Basic Democracies and, therefore, it was their responsibility to guard it against those "whose purpose was to do away with them". The

1 *Dawn* (Karachi), October 7, 1964.

2 *Ibid*.

3 *Dawn* (Karachi), August 16, 1964.


5 *Dawn* (Karachi), December 31, 1964.
Opposition Parties, however, tried its best to assure the Basic Democrats that although they would not be acting as an electoral college, if the Opposition Parties would come to power they would be given more power of local self-government. ¹

As noted above, the Pakistan Muslim League was concerned with the alliance of the popular opposition forces of the country and with the nomination of a nationally reputed figure like Miss Jinnah. The party's first task was, therefore, to consolidate its power within the organization. Although the party was about two years old by then, little effort was directed to build its organization and expand its base of support. It was surprising that the party did not have its branch even in a strategic place like the city of Karachi. ² The leaders of the Muslim League, however, took up the task of mobilizing the Basic Democrats through personal contacts and public meetings. Ayub himself undertook strenuous election campaigns throughout the country. He issued the election Manifesto in his own name, pledging, among other things: maintenance of the sovereignty and unity of the country which, he believed, could be "guaranteed only by a strong centre capable of providing full provincial autonomy without allowing centrifugal forces to reassert themselves"; maximum utilization of national resources and "widest possible...equitable distribution of wealth"; promotion of Islamic nationalism; removal of disparities; promotion of facilities for cultural integration; and safeguards for minorities. ³

The style and theme of the campaign by the two principal presidential candidates⁴ -- Miss Jinnah and President Ayub -- were different. According

² Misra, et.al., op.cit., p. 60.
³ Dawn (Karachi), October 26, 1964.
⁴ There were two other independent candidates from West Pakistan -- Kamal Ahmad and Mian Bashi.
to Von Vorys' tabulation, whereas Miss Jinnah relied heavily on mass rallies,\(^1\) probably to pressurize the Basic Democrats by the people to vote for the Opposition Parties, Ayub mainly approached selected audiences.\(^2\) Ayub's appeal to the Basic Democrats was about three times higher than Miss Jinnah's.\(^3\) The main themes of the election campaign were dominated by two conflicting issues; whereas the Pakistan Muslim League advocated the retention of the existing system of government, the Combined Opposition Parties denounced it and wanted to replace it by a parliamentary system with universal adult franchise.

The country went to the polls in January 1965 and 80,000 Basic Democrats were given the sole responsibility for selecting the executive head of the country. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Basic Democrats had been elected in the fall of 1964 by direct vote of the people. The Pakistan Muslim League did not nominate candidates for this election. The strategy of the party was to try to recruit the support of the 'finished products'\(^4\) (the Basic Democrats) without entering into the difficult job of managing elections of a huge number of candidates. It seems that the Pakistan Muslim League was confident that the Basic Democrats could not but accept the lures of power, benefits and positions provided by Ayub's system.

The Combined Opposition Parties had attempted to field its candidates in the Basic Democrats' elections but it failed to overcome petty party considerations which sometimes took the shape of rivalry and enmity among themselves.\(^4\)

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1 Von Vorys, *op.cit.*, Table-16, p. 285; Miss Jinnah addressed 27 mass rallies, while Ayub addressed 8.


3 *Ibid.*, Miss Jinnah addressed 4 Basic Democrats' meetings, while Ayub addressed 11.

The results of the presidential elections were a thunderous shock to the Combined Opposition Parties and the mass of the people. They were, no doubt, jubilant news for the Pakistan Muslim League. Of the 79,700 votes cast, Ayub polled 49,951 (62.7%), while Miss Jinnah polled 28,691 (36%) votes. Regionally Miss Jinnah received more support from East Pakistan (46.5%) than from West Pakistan (26.7%). Ayub got 73.3% of West Pakistan's and 52.9% of East Pakistan's votes. Although the election results did not necessarily reflect public opinion in the truest sense, still it was evident that, generally speaking, East Pakistan was much in favor of a change in the existing system whereas West Pakistan overwhelmingly voted for its retention.

Ayub's victory in this election and Miss Jinnah's defeat, though somewhat surprising in view of popular support Miss Jinnah had received, was not, however, unexpected. Given a small number of electors (80,000), the good prospects for them provided by Ayub's system in terms of power, influence, prestige, economic benefits, etc. and the superior economic resources of the ruling party to intimidate the Basic Democrats who did not have a strong party commitment, it was no wonder that Ayub won the elections. The Combined Opposition Parties' vehement criticism against the system of Basic Democracies and a plan, by implication, to do away with it and, therefore, to put the Basic Democrats to impotence definitely produced an adverse reaction.

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1 All figures of the presidential elections are from al-Mujahid, "Pakistan's First Presidential Elections", p. 292.
among the Basic Democrats. Further, the Opposition Parties' disorganization, rivalry, and sometimes betrayal of some of the component parties put the alliance in a weak situation. Noteworthy was the fact, however, that the Opposition Parties secured no less than 36 per cent of the votes of Pakistan and 46 per cent of East Pakistan. Ayub's victory, in spite of so many favourable factors, cannot be termed a landslide. Though the 'votes went with Ayub' the people, however, 'went with the Mother'.

The defeat in the presidential elections demoralized the Opposition Parties and also minimized its energy and vitality to a great extent, especially in view of its strong belief that the elections had been rigged and would continue to be so in future. Sensing the future trend, the parties in the Combined Opposition Parties became divided between pro-participation and pro-boycott groups over the forthcoming National and Provincial assemblies elections. Finally, however, "chiefly at the insistence of the AL [Awami League] and the NAP [National Awami Party]" the Opposition Parties decided to participate in the elections.

1 There is an indication that the Bhashani faction of the National Awami Party betrayed the Opposition Parties and voted for Ayub. See Maniruzzaman, "Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh", p. 237. There is further indication that there was a secret deal between Bhutto and Mashiur Rahman, a close associate of Bhashani, in which the Pakistan Muslim League paid half a million Rupees to the Awami Party to vote for Ayub and ensure the defeat of Miss Jinnah. Daily News, November 27, 1969, quoted in Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, p. 72.

2 Misra, et.al., op. cit., p. 194.


4 The East Pakistan Awami League and the East Pakistan National Awami Party were in the first group; the Council Muslim League and the West Pakistan National Awami Party were in the latter group; the Nizam-i-Islami and the Jamaat-i-Islami were flexible, but the latter supported the boycott. Sharif al-Mujahid, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. II, (1965), pp. 540-41.

5 Ibid., p. 542.
Having achieved victory in the presidential elections, the Pakistan Muslim League and its president Ayub showed very little interest in the Assemblies elections, knowing probably very well that the previous trend was going to be repeated. The Opposition Parties, as well, having lost its momentum after its defeat in the last elections, was not enthusiastic about the forth-coming exercise. Nevertheless, restrictive and repressive measures of the Government continued during the election campaigns by the Opposition Parties.¹

The results of the Assemblies elections showed declining support for the Pakistan Muslim League. Although it bagged 80 percent of the seats of the National Assembly, it received only 54.8 percent of the total votes cast (49.64% in East Pakistan and 61.31% in West Pakistan). The opposition won a little over 25 percent of the votes cast; the rest were won by independent candidates.² Of the 16 seats won by the opposition, 15 were from East Pakistan.³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Pakistan Muslim League</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Combined Opposition Parties</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Democratic Front</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from al-Mujahid, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan", p. 547.

¹ Ibid., p. 544.
³ Ibid.
The provincial elections in Pakistan produced much less enthusiasm. The outcome of the elections was predictable by almost anybody. Electoral campaigns were for the most part conducted by the candidates themselves on their own merit, the main themes being provincial or regional. Results showed a poorer performance by the Pakistan Muslim League and a victory of more independent candidates. (Table-8 below)

Table 8

The Results of the Provincial Assemblies Elections - 1965.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PML</th>
<th>Ind.</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>AL</th>
<th>NAP</th>
<th>NDF</th>
<th>CML</th>
<th>NIP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In West Pakistan Assembly elections the Pakistan Muslim League secured 96 seats and 48.78 percent of votes cast; the independent and opposition candidates won 50 seats and 51.22 percent of votes. In East Pakistan, the Pakistan Muslim League secured only 66 seats and 38 percent of votes cast; opposition candidates won 23 seats and 16.33 percent of votes; the independents, of which about half were backed by the opposition, won 58 seats and 45.35 percent of votes cast.

1 Ibid., p. 548.
2 Ibid., and Table 8 above.
The 1965 elections, although disheartening for the opposition forces of the country, provided the masses of the people with political training, introducing them to a new technique of selecting the representatives by whom they were to be administered. To the opposition forces it became crystal clear that Ayub's system could hardly be replaced by another under the existing set-up, since the way the Basic Democracies system had been devised made it a most difficult, if not impossible, task to convince the Basic Democrats to sacrifice the powers, status, and benefits they were entitled to under Ayub's system. The defeat in the elections made the Combined Opposition Parties more resentful of the system of Basic Democracies. It denounced them as "a privileged class of men with no superior qualities of education, intelligence or character", and regretted that the Pakistan Muslim League made "every appeal...to their greed for status and money". ¹

The Opposition Parties disparaged the Basic Democrats as persons who were easily purchaseable and who looked "upon election as a source of income and influence". ²

The 1965 elections, however, showed that the parties like the Pakistan Muslim League, the Council Muslim League, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Nizam-i-Islam, the Awami League, and the National Awami Party had their organizations, however weak, in both wings of the country. Although most parties were faction ridden, they had at least united themselves for some common causes, not purely regional.

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The 1970 General Elections. The 1970 general elections were an important landmark in the political history of Pakistan for several reasons. This was the first ever direct general elections in Pakistan on the basis of adult franchise. The elections were held under a military regime\(^1\) which promised an early transfer of power to the elected representatives of the country,\(^2\) and contrary to the usual practice elsewhere in the world, the regime was partially honest to its pledge. The elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies were held in December 1970\(^3\) in an impartial and healthy atmosphere. These elections, however, completed the polarization of political issues and forces in Pakistan and gradually led the country towards disintegration.

Shrewdness of the military regime, however, resolved quite a number of constitutional issues before the elections. The issues clearly resolved were the dissolution of One Unit in West Pakistan, and the principle of proportional representation in the national parliament, which was to consist of one house only. The former was the most popular demand of West Pakistani peoples, except for the Punjabis who stood to gain not to lose by the One Unit.\(^4\) The latter constituted a fervent desire of the people of East Pakistan.

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1 President Ayub abdicated on March 25, 1969, and handed over power to General A.M. Yahya Khan, who immediately declared Martial Law throughout the country.

2 Yahya's broadcast to the nation on March 26, 1969; Dawn (Karachi), March 27, 1969.

3 Elections were originally scheduled to be held in October 1970 but were postponed due to severe floods in East Pakistan. Ibid., August 16, 1970.

4 It may be remembered that the West Pakistan Legislature voted against the One Unit arrangement in 1957, urging for the restoration of pre-1956 status, but it could not be effected primarily because of Punjab's opposition to it.
Pakistan. By virtue of their numerical majority, the Bengalis, if united, could now very successfully challenge the western wing of Pakistan in matters of holding legal political power. As to the most crucial issue -- the issue of regional autonomy -- the regime took a vague stand. Yahya recalled "that the people of East Pakistan did not have their share in the decision making process on vital national issues". He recognized that the Bengalis "were fully justified in being dissatisfied with this state of affair" and pledged to "put an end to this position" through "maximum autonomy to the two wings of Pakistan as long as it does not impair national integrity and the solidarity of the country".\(^1\) Other constitutional issues such as the form of government (federal parliamentary), direct adult franchise, fundamental rights, independence of judiciary, and the principle of judicial review were considered to have been settled, since the regime believed there was no disagreement over these issues among various political parties and their leaders.\(^2\)

Twenty-five parties participated in the national elections, but only 11 parties put up candidates in both the wings for the National Assembly, a house of 313 members of which 300 were general seats to be elected equally from each wing and 13 were reserved seats for women to be elected by sitting members of the National Assembly from respective provinces.\(^3\)

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1 Yahya's broadcast to the nation on November 28, 1969; *Dawn* (Karachi), November 29, 1969.

2 Of these issues, the first two were also accepted by Ayub in the Round Table Conference held in February 1969.

3 By an order of President Yahya Khan, the system of One Unit in West Pakistan was dissolved in July 1969, creating 4 provinces -- Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. For nominations to the National Assembly election, 1970, by various parties and regions, see Appendix B.
Important common aspects of the election issues of various parties were the recognition of the need to end inter-wing disparities, and a pledge to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy for Pakistan. On the most controversial issue of center-province relationship, parties were divided into two broad categories; one supporting a strong center, and the other supporting strong provinces. The Pakistan People's Party, the Muslim League (all factions), the Pakistan Democratic Party, and all Islamic parties were in favor of the former, while the Awami League, and the National Awami Party (both factions) stood for the latter.

The issue of autonomy being unsettled, the Awami League made use of it as its main campaign issue. Had it been solved before the elections, emotional appeals relating to provincial autonomy would have lost sharpness and the extent of the AL's victory might have been in doubt. Although the Awami League Election Manifesto pledged support to its own Six-Point Program and the Eleven-Point Program of the Students' Action Committee, the party's main emphasis was on the issue of autonomy. The party summarized its ideologies as being Democracy, Socialism, Nationalism and Secularism. Its principal slogan was "Joi Bangla" (victory to Bengal). The Bengalis were promised that "if we achieve autonomy on the basis of the Six and Eleven-Point Programme, you will get everything and everything will be yours". Its most usual term of reference to West Pakistani ruling coterie was

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2 There were strong demands by other parties to solve this issue before the elections. Bhattacharjee, op.cit., pp. 254-55.
3 These were subsequently incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Bangladesh Gazette (Extraordinary) (Dacca: Bangladesh Government Press, December 1972), pp. 3489-93.
"exploiters" and "colonizers". The Awami League repeatedly told the people that its struggle was to create a society free from exploitation, to eliminate the exploiters and to free the toiling masses -- peasants and workers -- from exploitation. The Awami League recognized that East Pakistan's numerical majority was its "greatest resources", and the party cautioned the people that the ensuing elections were the 'now or never' opportunity for them in determining their fate.

The Awami League's extensive program of nationalization aggregated the demand of the leftist elements of East Pakistan who did not find any future in the leftist organizations of the country because of their extreme disorganization and enormous factionalism coupled with continued government repression of the leftist organizations. The Awami League also recognized the existence of a wide gap between the rural poor and urban rich as an obstacle on the way of national integration and pledged to reduce such a gap.

The Pakistan People's Party's elections strategy was marvelous. Summarizing its strategy, al-Mujahid writes:

Bhutto [Chairman of the party] displayed a Bismarkian sense of "the art of the possible" by aggregating diverse interests and promising something or another to everyone. He promised an economic nirvana to peasants, workers and unprivileged

1 See Mujib's speeches in Dawn (Karachi), June 15, 1970; March 1, 1971.
2 Dawn (Karachi), June 8, 1970.
3 See Mujib's speeches in ibid.; in Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 117.
4 Its program of nationalization included Banking, Insurance, Heavy Industries, Foreign Trade, Jute Trade, Cotton Trade, Arterial, inter-wing and international transport, including shipping, and "other key industries as would be determined by the planning agency". Ibid., p. 71.
5 Ibid., p. 74.
through socialism while adopting landlords, moneyed people and Ayub's "priviledged" followers as candidates for most part. He exploited the lack of leadership among leftists in the West after NAP's [the National Awami Party's] fragmentation to win their support by calling for a socialist revolution; but at the same time he dissipated the Islamists' misgivings by interpreting his "Islamic socialism" in terms of Islamic masawat ("egalitarianism") and Masawat-i-Mohammadi....

It was no surprise that Bhutto's strategy of taking good care of every political section of the region of West Pakistan worked out very well. Thus he was able to bring religious leader like Maolana Kaosar Niazi and Makhdoom Shahib of Hala; leftist like Mahmood Ali Kasuri; landlord like Mustafa Jatoi, Mustafa Kher, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, and others under the banner of the People's Party. In order to dispel leftists' and poor masses' fear about landlords of his party, Bhutto assured that the "capitalists and feudals" of the party were not conventional sucker of the "blood of the poor people...[They] have already taken an oath before me to abide by all the conditions laid down in the manifesto".

The results of the 1970 National and Provincial Assemblies elections gave the Awami League an unbelievable victory. It secured 160 of 300 general seats of the National Assembly. Of the 162 general seats of the National Assembly allotted to East Pakistan, the Awami League lost only two. In West Pakistan the People's Party secured an absolute majority in the province of Punjab (64 of 82 seats) and in Sind (18 of 27 seats), winning a total of 83 of the 138 general seats of the National Assembly allotted to the provinces of West Pakistan. While in Baluchistan the National Awami Party (Moscow)

3 Baxter, op.cit., p. 212, thus comments on the elections victory of the Awami League as being "possibly the greatest victory of any party in a free and contested election anywhere".
won 3 of the 4 general seats, the situation in the North-West Frontier Province presented a mixed picture; here no party won an absolute majority, the Pakistan Muslim League (Quyyum) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulemai Islam (Hazarvi) captured 7 and 6 seats respectively. (See Table 10, next page). Of the total votes cast in the National Assembly elections, the Awami League secured 38.3 percent in all Pakistan and 74.9 percent in East Pakistan, while the People's Party won 19.5 percent in all Pakistan, 41.6 percent in Punjab, 44.9 percent in Sind, 14.2 percent in NWFP and 2.3 percent in Baluchistan. (See Appendix C).

The results of the Provincial Assemblies elections in both wings of the country almost corresponded with the results of the National Assembly elections, with the exception of the North-West Frontier Province. In East Pakistan the Awami League lost one seat to the National Awami Party (Moscow), two to the Pakistan Democratic Party, one to the Jamaat, one to the Nizam-i-Islami, and seven to the Independents, while it won 288 of the 300 general seats. The Pakistan People's Party won a majority in Punjab (113 of 180) and Sind (28 of 60), while in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, the National Awami Party (Moscow) won 13 of 40 seats and 8 of 20 seats, respectively. In the Frontier Province the Pakistan Muslim League (Quyyum) emerged as the second largest party, winning 10 seats. (see Table 11.)
Table 10

Results of Pakistan National Assembly Elections - 1970 (General seats)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>Tribal Areas</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People's Party</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Quyyum)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Muslim League</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markazi-Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Thanvi)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Moscow)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Convention)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Seats</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *Legal Framework Order - 1970, Schedule 1, Article 4(2) in Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 56; Ibid., p. 130.*

* In addition to these general seats there were 13 seats reserved for women, who were elected indirectly by the members of the general seats. The break up of the reserved seats were as follows: East Pakistan 7; Punjab 3, Sind 1; Baluchistan 1; the North-West Frontier Province 1. Ministry of External Affairs, *op.cit.*, p. 56.
Table 11

Results of the Provincial Assemblies Elections, 1970. (General seats)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People's Party</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Quyyum)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Moscow)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Muslim League</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markazi-Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Thanvi)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Convention)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others **</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dawn (Karachi), December 21, 1970.

Notes: * In addition to general seats there were 21 seats reserved for women, who were elected by members of general seats of respective provinces. The Province wise break up was as follows: East Pakistan 10; Punjab 6; Sind 2; Baluchistan 1; the North-West Frontier Province 2. Ministry of External Affairs, op. cit., p. 57.

** Others included one member each from the Jamiat-i-Ahl-i-Hadees (Punjab), Sind Karachi Punjabi Pathan Muttahida Mahaz (Sind), National Awami Party (Achakhzai, Baluchistan), Baluchistan United Front (Baluchistan), and Nizam-i-Islam (East Pakistan).
Thus in the 1970 elections the Awami League emerged as a majority parliamentary party not only in East Pakistan but in the whole of Pakistan with no representation, however, in West Pakistan; while the Pakistan People's Party emerged as the largest party in West Pakistan and second largest parliamentary party in Pakistan, but with no representation in East Pakistan. Whereas the Awami League stood for a weak center, the People's Party stood for a strong center; whereas the Awami League stood for friendly relations with India, the People's Party regarded India as the sworn enemy of Pakistan. Thus Pakistan for the first time in her history suffered a complete polarization of political forces and political issues, coupled with an equally polarized society.

Conclusion.

It appears from the discussions in this chapter that an important problem in Pakistan has been to establish a national party system broadly inclusive of major geographic and linguistic groups. Although the Muslim League during independence received overwhelming support from a section of people of both the wings, its minimum display of interest in mass mobilization and failure to accommodate the rising progressive forces of East Pakistan, during the period following independence, gave birth to regional parties like the Awami League. After the Awami League attained an apparent "national status" in 1952, the party continued to put emphasis on the autonomy of East Pakistan and this made the people and the leaders of the party from West Pakistan quite suspicious about the party's motives. The militant provincialism of the East
Pakistan Awami League, as exemplified by the Six-Point Program, alienated the West Pakistani supporters of the party. The Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islami could not have a strong foothold in East Pakistan, partially because of their weak organizational display and partially because of the secular attitude of the Bengalis. Enormous factionalism coupled with government repression hindered the emergence of leftist parties as national parties. The Pakistan People's Party failed to grow any roots in East Pakistan because of its rejection of the demand for provincial autonomy, and its insistence on a strong central government. The Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) became alienated from East Pakistan because of its government's failure to respond satisfactorily to the popular demands of the people. The Council Muslim League put little effort into mass mobilization and mass contact. Ayub's experiment of substituting other institutions for political parties did not work out well. These other institutions themselves lost legitimacy in East Pakistan because they were thought to be unrepresentative of the popular will.

Pakistan also did not have a congenial atmosphere for the development of a healthy party system. The absence of any national level direct election until 1970, coupled with the government's restrictive and repressive measures, were not in any way favourable for the development of a national party system.
Chapter III

IMPARTIALITY OF THE CENTRAL POWER ELITE

The success of a federal system depends on a spirit of accommodation and moderation by each federating unit as well as the Central Government. It is essential that the Central Government treat the federating units equally so that it is not subjected to a charge of serving the interests of one unit at the expense of another. Unfortunate though it was, the Central Power Elite of Pakistan, which was predominantly manned by the West Pakistanis, failed to ensure impartiality in its dealings with the two federating units--East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Events are supportive of the fact that the Central Power Elite was determined to protect and promote the interests and causes of West Pakistan either at the neglect or to the detriment of the Bengalis living in East Pakistan. The Central Power Elite's bias toward West Pakistan was so consistent that the Bengalis were led to accuse it of constantly conspiring to subjugate the Bengalis.

In this chapter we show that the Central Power Elite over and over again treated East Pakistan and its people, the Bengalis, not as an equal partner in the state of Pakistan, but as a subordinate unit. The West Pakistanis, represented by the Central Power Elite, consistently tried to impose their will upon the unwilling Bengalis, and this led the Bengalis to feel that they were no better than "second class citizens" in their own country. As a result, the Central

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1 Mujib's speech on March 1, 1971, following the announcement by President Yahya of the postponement of the National Assembly session which was due to be held on March 3, 1971. Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 190.

2 Mujib's speech on October 25, 1970; ibid., p. 102.
Power Elite lost its legitimacy in East Pakistan.

The Scheme for Pakistan. Two earlier architects of the future homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent excluded the eastern part of undivided India, which later formed East Pakistan, from their plans for "Pakistan". Thus Sir Muhammad Iqbal's scheme did not at all mention the Muslim majority province of Bengal. In his presidential address at the Allahabad session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1930 Iqbal said:

I would like to see the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.1

Choudhury Rahmat Ali's plan for "Pakistan" was to include only the "land of the Paks--the spiritually pure and clean" people of the North-West. His scheme, however, provided for the creation of two other Muslim states in India--Bang-i-Islam in the North-East, and Usmanistan in the South, consisting of the state of Hyderabad. In spite of differences in these two schemes, one common element was that neither wanted the Muslim majority areas of North-East undivided India to be a part of "Pakistan". It seems that Iqbal either did not want to see this area constituting a part of his projected Muslim state or he did not care to think about the future of the Muslims of this area. From Rahmat Ali's scheme it appears that he considered only the Muslims of North-West undivided India to be the "spiritually pure and clean." The Muslims of other parts of undivided India were, by implication, 'impure and unclean'.

The first positive step towards the creation of the Pakistan of 1947 was,

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1 Quoted in Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, pp. 103-104.
2 He is said to have coined the term "Pakistan" in 1933; ibid. pp. 105-106.
3 Ibid., p. 106.
however, taken with the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 moved by a
popular Bengali leader, A.K. Fazlul Huq. The Resolution resolved that the
Muslim majority areas of undivided India were to be demarcated into regions to
form "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous
and sovereign." It is evident that the Muslim League envisioned the creation
of more than one independent Muslim state with autonomy to the constituent units.
Sayeed observes that there was evidence that the League leaders considered the
creation of two federations, one in the North-West and the other in the North-East.
He further notes that Jinnah, soon after the passing of the Resolution, interpre­
ted it as implying the creation of only one federation of Muslim states consisting
of the North-Western and the Eastern provinces of undivided India. While writing
on the issue, Aziz Ahmad notes:

"Despite the reference ... to the possibility of the creation of
a plurality of Muslim States, the unanimous comments of the Muslim
League leaders made it quite clear that the resolution actually
envisaged the creation of a single Muslim State, embracing both
zones, north-eastern as well as eastern."  

The Muslim League, however, in order to avoid further confusion over the issue
passed another resolution in 1946 changing "States" to "state", and there is
indication that the Bengali leaders unsuccessfully challenged such an amendment.

The change in the original resolution in spite of the Bengalis' opposition to
it was perhaps the first blow to the hopes and aspirations of the Bengalis for
a separate state in which they would be their own masters. They still hoped,
however, that the Central Power Elite would at least honor the last portion of
the Resolution, that the constituent units of the state of Pakistan would be
autonomous. Contrary to their expectations, they rather witnessed a steady

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1 Quoted in Allana, op.cit., p. 172. The Resolution in detail has been produced on p. 26, supra.
2 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 41.
3 Ibid.
5 Jahan, op.cit., p. 22.
increase in the powers of the Central Government which was in the hands of the West Pakistanis. The centralized control over East Pakistan was later interpreted by Bengali politicians as the Central Government's failure to consider East Pakistan as an equal partner of West Pakistan, and these leaders very successfully mobilized the people of East Pakistan by imbuing them with strong provincialism.

The Language and Culture. The language and culture are very dear to every country and to every people. This is especially true of the Bengalis who take a special pride in their language and culture. As noted earlier, Bengali was the mother tongue of 54 percent of the people of all-Pakistan and 98 percent of East Pakistan. No other language of Pakistan came even close to this. The majoritarian principle of democracy would imply that Bengali should have been the first choice as the state language of Pakistan. But the Central Power Elite in Pakistan made an all-out effort to thrust Urdu, the mother tongue and a spoken language of only 1 percent of the people of Pakistan, as the only state language. Naturally, the Bengalis reacted very sharply and vehemently opposed such a move.

The suggestion to make Urdu the lingua franca of the Muslim India was first made at the Lucknow Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1937. The resolution of this session "recommended to the All-India Muslim League to make all efforts possible to make Urdu the lingua franca of the Muslim League." Jinnah was reported to have expressed no sympathy for the "resolution in its present form."

After independence, the Bengalis demanded the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan. This was first articulated through

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1 See Tables 2 & 3, supra.
the Tamaddun Majlis, formed in September 1947 by some leading students and 1
teachers of Dacca University.

The Central Power Elite summarily rejected such a demand by the Bengalis.

Very soon the official position of the Central Government was manifested. Liaquot, while replying to a move by a Bengali member of the Constituent Assembly to make Bengali a state language of Pakistan, said:

Pakistan is a Muslim State and must have as its lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation.... [The Constituent Assembly member] should realise that Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this sub-continent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu.... It is necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and no other language.2

Several deductions may be drawn from this speech of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It may be true that Pakistan was a demand of a hundred million Muslims of the whole of undivided India, of which non-Bengali speakers constituted the majority. But when Pakistan came into being, 56.40 percent of its population spoke Bengali as their first language (Tables 2 & 4 above); that is, Bengali became the majority language of Pakistan. Even if one subtracted the Bengali Hindu population of East Pakistan which was about 20 percent, Bengali stood as the dominant language of the Muslims of Pakistan (36 percent). Secondly, if the language of the Muslim nation was to be the state language of Pakistan, then not Urdu but Arabic should have been the language, since it was the mother tongue of the majority of the Muslim nations of the world. Liaquot's statement also tended to undermine the contribution of the Bengali Muslims, who did not speak Urdu but 3 Bengali alone, towards the creation of Pakistan. It may be mentioned in this connection

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3 Some city people, however, spoke broken Urdu.
that Liaqot's mother tongue was Urdu.

Jinnah's first visit to East Pakistan in March 1948 as Governor-General of Pakistan sowed the seeds of misgivings between the Central Power Elite and the people of East Pakistan. In the face of the Bengalis' demand for the recognition of Bengali as one of the state language of Pakistan, Jinnah declared in Dacca:

Let me tell you in the clearest language there is no truth that your normal life is going to be touched or disturbed so far as your Bengali language is concerned. But ultimately it is for you, the people of this province, to decide what shall be the language of your province. But let me make it very clear to you that State Language of Pakistan is going to be URDU and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan.¹

Liaqot's and Jinnah's statements created tremendous political stirings among the East Pakistani students, intellectuals and urban inhabitants. Bengalis believed that the move to impose Urdu as the only state language would cripple them by throwing them out of Government and other employment. There were serious protests and demonstrations in East Pakistan against this move of the Central Power Elite.²

The Reports of the Basic Principles Committee, a Committee in the Constituent Assembly which was to recommend the broad outlines of the future constitution of Pakistan, in pursuance of the declarations of the Governor-General and the Prime Minister, recommended in 1950 Urdu as the only state language. The East Pakistan Muslim League Council protested against it in vain, while some of its members very strongly urged that if the language of Pakistan was to be chosen "on a purely democratic basis then Bengali which is used by over 60 percent of the population of Pakistan must have a prior claim for consideration. Urdu

¹ Quoted in Jamilud Din Ahmad, (ed.), Vol.1, op.cit., p.490.
which is used by far smaller section can have no more consideration that Sindhi, Punjabi or Poshtu which must be equally dear to those using them."

The unreasonable and adament attitude of the Central Power Elite towards the language issue accentuated the situation in East Pakistan which became much worse on February 21, 1952, when police opened fire on a procession demanding the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages. Several students and other people were killed.

Bengali was recognized as one of the state languages of Pakistan, together with Urdu, in the Constitution of 1956. But the Bengalis could never forget the price they had to pay for it. Every year since 1953 the Bengalis have been observing February 21, the day students and others were killed by police fire, as the Shahid Day (Martyr's Day). The observance of this day acquired much political significance and was much more than simply a ceremonial function. The circumstances leading to this event are usually recalled with a sense of deep grief and hatred towards the Central Power Elite's prejudice for Bengali and the Bengalis, with a renewed pledge to rise up against all the injustices inflicted upon the Bengalis by the Central Power Elite.

West Pakistanis always considered themselves superior to the Bengali Muslims, whom they considered to be converts from low caste Hindus. Sayeed observes:

In social gatherings, one could hear West Pakistani and other Muslims from Urdu-speaking provinces of India referring with scorn to the Bengali's devotion to his language and to their inability to pronounce correctly Muslim names.  

The suspicion of the Central Power Elite about the Bengali language stemmed from:  

1 Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", P. 384.
from the fact that its scripts originated from the Sancrit alphabet used by the Hindus. The Central Power Elite believed that the Hindu influence on the Bengali Muslims came through the Bengali language and literature and this would vitiate the political life of Pakistan. This is why the Elite made an all-out effort to replace Bengali by Urdu. The Bengali Muslims, on the other hand, contended that although the language of the Bengali Muslims and Bengali Hindus was the same, nevertheless, the Bengali Muslims had a separate culture and a separate style in the usage of the language and literature which was predominantly influenced by the Islamic values, penetrated through the port city of Chittagong, and, therefore, there should be no reason to believe that the Bengali Muslims needed to be insulated by taking away their very dear language.

This argument of the Bengalis, however, did not convince the Central Power Elite. Having failed to replace Bengali by Urdu, it engaged in another sinister move engineered by the Ayub regime. This time it was a move to transliterate the Bengali script into roman letters. Such a move probably stemmed from the low view Ayub used to maintain about the Bengalis:

East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population, probably belong to the very original Indian races. It would be no exaggeration to say that up to the creation of Pakistan, they have not known any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in turn ruled either by the caste Hindus, Mughulas, Pathans or the British. In addition, they have been and still are under considerable cultural linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions a downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible psychologically to adjust to the requirements of their new born freedom. Their peculiar complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of defensiveness probably emerge from this historical background. Prudence, therefore, demands that these factors should be recognized and catered for and they be helped so as to feel equal partners.

and proven an asset.  

Ayub further recognized that the Bengalis could be made to feel equal "only if they are given a considerable measure of partnership." As a step towards their emancipation from the cultural and linguistic influences of the Bengali Hindus, he suggested a change in the Bengali script, as noted above, which, he believed, would give "tremendous psychological freedom to the people in East Pakistan from the forces of Hindu culture and influence."

Understandably, Ayub sent necessary directions to his Governor in East Pakistan, Abdul Monem Khan (1963-1969), who echoed the voice of his 'master', labelled Bengali as a non-Muslim language and attempted to Islamize it by converting it to the roman script. It should be noted in this connection that both Ayub's and Monem's moves were in contravention to Clause 18 of the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution of 1962 which read:

Any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to preserve the same.

The Monem Government's ban, for a short while though it was, on the Tagore songs--songs composed by the Nobel Prize winner, Bengali Hindu poet, Rabindra Nath Tagore--deepened the suspicion of the Bengalis that a conspiracy was again afoot to cripple them culturally as well as economically. They took this as another manifestation of cultural imperialism of the Western wing of the country. Although the move could not succeed due to a strong agitation in East Pakistan against it, it added fuel to the fire. The Bengalis realized that the

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2 Ibid.
3 Asian Recorder (New Delhi), May 7-13, 1962, p.4566.
4 Jahan, op.cit., n.53, p.163.
5 Ministry of Law, Government of Pakistan, op.cit.
Central Power Elite did not represent their interest because it was determined to protect and promote the culture of West Pakistan and to suppress that of the Bengalis.

Symbolic cultural equality is a very important device to provide psychological comfort to various ethnic groups in a society. In Pakistan, even following the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages, together with Urdu, Bengali was not used in Government documents, currency notes, coins, postal stamps, etc. It was Urdu and English which were used for the purpose. This made the rural masses psychologically isolated since they "found it difficult to fill out their money order forms or understand the value of the money written on stamps, etc., because Bengali was nowhere to be found on any of these documents." The Ayub Government, however, in the mid-60s, realizing the impact of this act of omission, ordered Bengali to be used in government documents. But by that time it was too late.

**Helplessness of Bengali Politicians.** The results of the 1954 East Pakistan elections presented a great test to the impartiality of the Central Power Elite. The Muslim League leaders considered the elections to be of crucial importance since these were the first elections in East Pakistan following independence, besides the Tangail by-election in 1949. The people of East Pakistan were told that the defeat of the League would mean the destruction of Pakistan. The Muslim League leadership also tried to discredit Fazlul Huq, leader of the opposition parties' alliance, the United Front, as a disloyal element.

In spite of malicious campaign by the Muslim League, the elections results

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3. *Ibid.*, when asked a question whether she thought that Fazlul Huq would destroy Pakistan, Miss Jinnah replied: "Yes, it is a historical fact. What did he do before partition? He tried to prevent the establishment of Pakistan and he is still pursuing that path."
turned out to be a big surprise for the Muslim League. It brought to power in East Pakistan a separate set of leaders—separate from the one in the Center. The United Front bagged 223 of the 237 Muslim seats, while the Muslim League won only 10 of these seats (see Table 12&13 below).

Table 12&13

Results of the Elections to the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly, 1954.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim seats</th>
<th>Non-Muslim seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khilafat-i-Rabbani</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>237</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule Caste Federation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Front</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganatantri Dal</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>309</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source; Callard, op.cit., P. 57.

The 1954 elections had both positive and negative aspects. Negatively the results were a protest denouncing the Muslim League and the Central Power Elite's unresponsive attitude towards East Pakistan. Considered from the positive point of view, the elections were a clear verdict and a demonstration of faith in the emerging Bengali autonomists. The conscious elements within the Muslim League were wise enough to read the spirit of East Pakistan political scene. Thus a section of the Muslim League admitted that the elections were clear verdict of an "oppressed", "persecuted", "neglected", and "economically discontented"
people against the League leadership.\(^1\) Chaudhury Nazir Ahmad, a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan said: We have failed because "we failed to deliver the goods and we failed to fulfil our promises to the people" of East Pakistan.\(^2\)

These elections in East Pakistan had ushered in a new hope in the minds and hearts of the Bengalis. But the implementation of the 21-point Program, the pledges of the United Front to the people, needed the fullest cooperation of the Central Government. Unfortunately, and much contrary to the expectations, hopes and aspiration of the Bengalis, the Prime Minister, a Bengali but a captive of West Pakistan\(^3\), declared that the outcome of the East Pakistan elections "would not in any way change the complexion of the central government."\(^4\) This statement generated a very adverse reaction in East Pakistan. Voicing the Bengali reaction, Suhrawardy said: "This shows the Prime Minister's utter want of "appreciation of constitutional decencies and democratic requirements."\(^5\) The Prime Minister reiterated his government's position,\(^6\) and also the Muslim League Working Committee endorsed his statement without paying any heed to the Bengali sentiments. The editorial commentary in the \textit{Dawn}, founded by Jinnah and the mouth-piece of the Muslim League, represented a very reasonable and logical view:

\textit{From the strictly legalistic point of view no one can find fault with the thesis unfolded by Mr. Mohammad Ali ... that in Federation the...}
election results in one or more units need not necessarily lead to a change in the complexion of the Central regime. The circumstances of certain other countries which he cited [Australia, Canada and the United States] were also technically apposite. But none of those analogies are fully applicable to the present situation vis-à-vis East Pakistan and the Centre, because in no other country does a single Unit contain a majority of the whole country's population, and secondly, in no other election anywhere else in the world has the ruling party --to which the centre owes allegiance--been so completely, decisively and sensationally routed. For this reason we had urged a readjustment of the Central set-up so that the phenomenal change which has taken place in the party allegiance of large masses of people in the country might be reflected in the Central regime, perhaps on the basis of a coalition.

But the Central Government was not at all prepared to accommodate the hopes and aspirations of the electorate of East Pakistan as expressed through the elections. Instead, a section of the West Pakistani leadership of the Muslim League engaged in malicious propaganda to malaign the image of the popularly elected Bengali leaders and tried to create an impression that the people whom the East Pakistanis had elected to power were "anti-Pakistan elements".

The saner section of the Muslim League, however, did not approve of such an attitude towards the new East Pakistan leaders. "Dawn" suggested editorially under the title "The Awful Majesty of the People's Will":

The Central leadership will make a suicidal mistake if it allows itself to be swayed by the false propaganda that the people who have been returned to power in East Pakistan are less patriotic than those who sit in power in Karachi, Lahore, Peshwar and elsewhere in the western wing.... The Prime Minister and the League President, Mr. Mohammad Ali, should give a correct lead on this point. If he regarded Mr. Fazlul Huq as an enemy of Pakistan he would not have met him secretly during the election campaign with a view to coming to an arrangement with him if he agreed to join the Muslim League. Merely by changing his political label Mr. Fazlul Huq could not have been metamorphosed into a Pakistani from an anti-Pakistani--if he were one. As regards Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, his contribution to the struggle for Pakistan was far greater than the combined contributions of all those who constitute the Central Government of today. Therefore, let there be an end to all such widespread and printed non-sense, and instead, let the hand of cooperation be gracefully extended to

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1 Dawn (Karachi), March 22, 1954.
2 Ibid.; editorial regret of such a tendency.
those whom the people of East Pakistan have by such overwhelm­ ming votes designated as their trusted leaders.1

The United Front Government was, however, installed in East Pakistan with Fazlul Huq as Chief Minister. Dawn, projecting the truth and upholding Huq's position, wrote:

[Fazlul Huq] is the only politician in power through the clearly and overwhelmingly expressed will of the people, and therefore in his own right. The same cannot be said of any body else in any other province, or even in the centre.... Thus the present Chief Minister belongs to an altogether different class, as he belongs to different political party. He can talk of democracy with his head held high; the others should not.2

But the Central Power Elite could not stand the fact that Huq and the United Front belonged to a different class and a different political party. A conspiracy against him and his Government was thus engineered in a few weeks. In May 1954 Huq visited Calcutta where he made a speech recalling the "common language, common heritage and age-long common traditions"3 of the people of the two Bengals. Since the Central Power Elite was searching for a pretext to undo the popular verdict expressed through the elections, this speech of Huq provided it with a good opportunity. In spite of Huq's refutation4, the Central Power Elite misconstrued his Calcutta speech as implying a desire for the separation of East Pakistan from Pakistan. In the meantime the Central Power Elite prepared other grounds as well for discrediting the United Front Government. Serious communal riots broke out in the biggest Jute Mills of the country, the Adamjee Jute Mills5, owned and controlled by a West Pakistani industrialist. Chief Minister Huq vainly expressed his grief over the way the Karachi news media

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1 Dawn (Karachi), March 18, 1954.
2 Ibid., April 24, 1954.
3 Ibid., May 5, 1954.
4 He refuted the allegations against him and declared: "What I actually said was that I did not believe that the political division of a country by itself necessarily remove the bases of contact, friendship and mutual dependence [between the people of East Pakistan and West Bengal of India]." Ibid., May 11, 1954.
5 Ibid., May 18, 1954.
exaggerated and misconstrued the Adamjee Jute Mills incident, and he invited 1
the Prime Minister to visit East Pakistan and see for himself what was going on.

The Central Power Elite moved quite fast. On May 30, 1954 the Prime Minister
in a very dramatic way denounced Huq as a "traitor and fundamentally disloyal"
to Pakistan, dismissed the United Front Ministry, and named Iskander Mirza,
a staunch bureaucrat and an upholder of the interests of West Pakistan, as the new 2
Governor of the province.

The announcement of the Prime Minister was followed by repressive measures 3
against the political activities of the leaders of the dismissed Government.
Although the Central Power Elite declared Huq a traitor, it did not dare to
arrest him; rather Governor Khaliquzzaman found it necessary, perhaps anticipating
possible recourse to violence by the people, to make it clear that Huq was not,
as the rumor went, put under house arrest. It should be mentioned, however,
that "traitor" Huq, on his arrival from Karachi after the dismissal, "was
accorded a rousing reception [at the Tejgoan airport] by large crowds who were
waiting there long before the arrival of the plane." This report demonstrates
that the people of East Pakistan hardly believed that their leader was, or
could be, a "traitor."

This action of the Central Power Elite "at a time when the ink on the ballot 6
papers would have hardly dried" was a tremendous shock to the people of East

1 Ibid., May 24, 1954.
2 Ibid., May 31, 1954. The allegations against the Huq Government by the Prime
Minister included: (a) inability to secure lives and properties of the people;
(b) the Ministry could not be depended upon to take effective measures against
the trouble makers; (c) the United Front leaders wanted independence for East
Pakistan.
3 Dawn (Karachi) on June 3, 1954 reported arrests of as many as 435 persons.
4 Ibid., June 1, 1954.
5 Ibid., May 31, 1954.
Pakistan. Although the Government at the Center and in the eastern province claimed that everything in East Pakistan, following the dismissal of the Huq Ministry, was normal, Governor Mirza's threat that "I shall have no hesitation in declaring martial law in any district where trouble occurs" indicated that deep grief had piled up in the minds of the Bengalis, which did not escape the notice of the Government. Eventually, however, Huq was not tried, and he later became the Governor of East Pakistan.

Khawja Nazimuddin was the first person from East Pakistan to hold the highest executive position in Pakistan, the office of the Governor-General. After the death of Liaqot in 1951, Nazimuddin stepped down to take over the position of the Prime Minister with Chulam Mohammad, a Punjabi bureaucrat, as the new Governor-General. After all, Nazimuddin came from East Pakistan and he was morally committed to do something for the upliftment of the unpreviledged Bengalis. The Punjabi Governor-General contented the Power Elite by dismissing the Nazimuddin Government in April 1953 on charges of maladministration, although the Government had restored law and order in Lahore and got the budget passed by the Assembly only a few days before.

When Suhrawardy became Prime Minister in 1956, his Government took a bold step towards the removal of existing disparities by way of allocating equal funds to the commerce and industrial sectors of the two wings of the country. While the Suhrawardy Government's move to allocate more resources to East Pakistan—more than before—received a very warm welcome by the industrialists and businessmen of that wing, it was resented by their West Pakistani counterparts who alleged that the Government policies "have been leaning towards provincialism and party politics." Governor-General Mirza took up this issue as a

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1 Ibid., June 7, 1954.
2 Callard, op.cit., pp. 135-36.
3 Dawn (Karachi), November 21, 1956.
pretext to move Suhrawardy from power. The Republican Party, Mirza's own party, withdrew support from the leadership of Suhrawardy.

Suhrawardy was subjected to political repression by the Ayub regime as well. He was arrested in early 1962 and was charged with acting "in a manner prejudicial to the security and defence of Pakistan and indulging in activities of a highly prejudicial nature ever since the inception of Pakistan." It may be remembered at this point that it was this Suhrawardy about whom the Muslim League mouth-piece, Dawn editorially commented: "As regards Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, his contribution to the struggle for Pakistan was far greater than the combined contribution of all those who constitute the Central Government of today[1954]."

While a habeas corpus petition on behalf of Suhrawardy was filed in the West Pakistan High Court (he was arrested and detained in West Pakistan), Ayub promulgated an ordinance expressly precluding the High Courts from issuing writs of habeas corpus in case of persons detained under the Security Act.

When student riots and hartals protesting against Suhrawardy's arrest broke out in Dacca and other parts of East Pakistan, the Government responded by launching large-scale arrests of top leaders and local members of the defunct Awami League.

By far the most politically significant example of the Central Power Elite's failure to maintain its impartiality was the denial to the Awami League of the political power to which it was legally and constitutionally entitled after the popular verdict given to the party in the elections of 1970. As mentioned

3 Dawn (Karachi), March 18, 1954.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 4481.
earlier, the Awami League emerged from the 1970 general elections with an absolute majority in the National Assembly of Pakistan, and the ruling military regime was taken aback by the results. Probably things did not happen as the regime had visualized. Commenting on this, Jahan writes:

The emergence of the Awami League and the People's Party as clear winners up set the Yahya regime's plan concerning post-election alignment. The regime had expected that the election would either bring parties to power, for example, the PDP or the Islam Pasand (the right wing parties with Islamic ideologies) parties, who would not fundamentally threaten the ruling elite's position, or that it would result in such a plurality of parties that no party would have absolute command, and the military would be able to consolidate its position by working as a mediator among parties. The general expectation of the regime was that the Awami League would at best win a bare majority in East Pakistan, which would make it possible for the ruling elite to keep the Awami League out of power, or that if it should come to power with West Pakistani alliances, it would be forced to water down its Six Points and would not the threat to the military.\(^1\)

The absolute majority of the Awami League produced a degree of concern for the military regime since it would lead to a dominant position of the East Pakistani provincial autonomists in the Center as well as in their own province, and this would become a threat to the position of the Central Power Elite. Following the Awami League's victory in the elections, Air Marshal (retd.) Asghar Khan, a West Pakistani politician, deplored the fact that some West Pakistani leaders were openly saying that "military regime was preferable to them than the power being transferred to East Pakistan leaders."\(^2\)

After the elections, President Yahya ordered that the session of the new National Assembly would be held in Dacca on March 3, 1971, to prepare a constitution for Pakistan. Bhutto, Chairman of the People's Party, supported by the

\(^1\) Jahan, op.cit., pp. 191-92.
\(^2\) Dawn (Karachi), March 5, 1971.
\(^3\) Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 151.
the civil-military bureaucracies of West Pakistan, first declared his party's unwillingness to sit in the opposition benches in the Assembly, thereby implying a demand to share power at the Center, and later said his party would not attend the Assembly session unless the Awami League conceded to his demand of revising the Six-point Program. In reply to Bhutto's "unshakable and unrevokable" position, Mujib declared that after the elections verdict the Program was the property of the people and, therefore, he and his party now had no right to revise it. Mujib made it clear, however, that the Program would not be imposed upon the people of West Pakistan, implying that the federating units of West Pakistan was free to decide if they wished to "cede certain additional powers to the centre or to establish certain regional institutions." Having failed to convince the Awami League to share power at the center and to revise the Six-point Program, Bhutto engaged in manipulating the Central Power Elite in his favor, and eventually he succeeded in this game. Much to the surprise of the people of Pakistan, Yahya suddenly declared on March 1 that the Assembly would not meet on March 3, 1971, since the "major party of West Pakistan, namely, the Pakistan People's Party, as well as certain other political parties, have declared their intention not to attend the National Assembly session." When Yahya urged the elected representatives of the two wings of Pakistan to sit together to work out solutions to the existing immobilism before the Assembly met, Mujib responded negatively, saying in part that "while the blood of the

1 Bhutto's statement on December 20, 1970, in Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 132.
3 Bhutto's statement on February 16, Ibid., February 17, 1971.
4 Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 171.
5 Ibid., pp. 174-75.
6 Ibid., p. 189.
7 Ibid.
martyrs on the streets is hardly dry, while some of the injured are fighting death in hospital, [the invitation to sit with the President in a conference] comes as a cruel joke."

The announcement concerning the postponement of the National Assembly session produced a very sharp and violent reaction in East Pakistan. Spontaneous processions demonstrating strong resentment were brought out all over East Pakistan. Confrontation between the processionists and the West Pakistani army became a regular affair. Some political parties such as the pro-Moscow and the pro-Peking National Awami Party of East Pakistan, the left wing of the Awami League and the Students' League were urging Mujib to declare the independence of East Pakistan immediately. Mujib, without conceding to these pressures, adopted a middle course and launched a non-violent, non-cooperation movement with a view to demonstrate his mass support and pressurize the military regime to come to a settlement with the Awami League in accordance with the verdict of the electorate. His strategy worked out well. Yahya declared a fresh date for the National Assembly session to be held on March 25, 1971. The non-violent, non-cooperative movement in East Pakistan, however, went on. The political situation took a new shape after Mujib's historic speech in a mammoth public meeting in Dacca on March 7, 1971, in which he demanded the fulfilment of four

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1 Immediately following Yahya's radio broadcast on March 1, 1971, concerning the postponement of the Assembly session, angry Bengalis came out on the streets, expressing their resentment, to which the police and military opened fire, killing many demonstrators. Mujib's press statement on March 2, 1971, in Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 191; Dawn (Karachi), March 6, 1971.
2 Ibid., March 4, 1971.
3 Ibid., March 6, 1971; Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 191.
4 Jahan, op.cit., p. 196.
5 Dawn (Karachi), March 7, 1971.
conditions before the Awami League would participate in the Assembly session. He also instructed the Bengali officials to follow his directions in matters of day to day administration in the province. The Awami League became the de facto Government of the province. This naturally concerned the military regime and as a result it started moving troops into East Pakistan from West Pakistan under the pretence of holding talks with Mujib by Yahya and other West Pakistani leaders, including Bhutto. Their talks began in Dacca on March 15, 1971. Yahya agreed to accept Mujib's four conditions laid down in his March 7 speech. While the people were expecting Yahya's formal declaration about his acceptance of the four conditions, and the installation of the Awami League Government at the Center, Yahya's army suddenly cracked down on the unarmed Bengalis, committing large-scale murder, loot, arson and rape. After this most unfortunate event, the Bengalis fully realized that the Central Power Elite dominated by West Pakistanis would never treat East Pakistan as an equal partner in the state of Pakistan and that the Bengalis would never be allowed to be the masters of their own destiny.

Conclusion

Our discussion in this chapter confirms the Bengali allegations that the West Pakistanis did not consider the Bengalis and East Pakistan to be an equal partner in the federation of Pakistan. The West Pakistan-controlled Central Power Elite persistently failed to respect the hopes and aspirations of the

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1 The four conditions were: (a) withdrawal of Martial Law; (b) sending of troops back to barracks; (c) inquiry into the killings; (d) transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Ibid., March 8, 1971.
2 See Dawn (Karachi), March 8, 10, 16, 1971.
4 See, for example, Mascarenhas, op.cit., pp. 80-128.
Bengalis. The Bengalis were forced to conclude that whenever they tried to get hold of the decision-making powers, deep conspiracies staged by the West Pakistanis frustrated them. As a final resort to put an end to this unfortunate attitude and behavior of the West Pakistanis, the Bengalis turned to militant provincialism which latter turned into Bengali nationalism, and they severed their identity with Pakistani nationalism.
Chapter IV

ACCOMMODATION OF POLITICALLY RELEVANT ETHNIC GROUPS INTO DECISION-MAKING POWERS

As noted earlier, the Bengalis as a linguistic and regional group constituted about 56 percent of the total population of Pakistan. Ever since the inception of Pakistan, the Bengalis were quite conscious that they had very little say in the actual decision-making in the country. The decision-making roles in Pakistan consisted of the Political Elite, the Civil Bureaucratic Elite and the Military Elite, in which the Bengalis' representation, except in the Political Elite, was extremely low. Even when some Bengalis had held top positions of decision-making in the Political Elite, they were rendered inactive by the force of circumstances. In this chapter we discuss the power structure in Pakistan, the role of various elites in the decision-making process of the country, Bengali representation in those elites, policy responses of the government to Bengalis' demands for a greater share of the decision-making powers, and finally the Bengali reaction to the policy responses of the government. Our focus is on the Central Government.

The Evolution of the Power Structure in Pakistan

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947 Jinnah became the Governor-General, holding simultaneously two other top positions -- the Presidentship of the Muslim League and the Presidentship of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.
Though Pakistan had adopted a federal parliamentary system of government in which the Governor-General was a figurehead, Jinnah's role in the Pakistan movement, his charisma and his towering personality overshadowed parliamentary practice. All decisions of major consequences were taken by Jinnah. Thus Callard writes:

> When Pakistan was formed the Quaid-i-Azam was recognized to be above the political battle, a figure to whom all might turn for authority and justice and protection... He was no longer a party leader or even the nation's spokesman, he was the personification of the state.... No constitutional ruler and few autocrats have possessed such a plentitude of power.... Cabinet ministers understood clearly that they had held office as agents of the Governor-General...  

After Jinnah's death in 1948, Nazimuddin, a Bengali, became Governor-General, with Liaqot, a native of Uttar Pradesh and the most trusted lieutenant of Jinnah, as Prime Minister. As a result of this change in personalities, Pakistan returned to real parliamentary practice. The Prime Minister became the central figure of the government, while the Governor-General was reduced to simply a titular head of the state.  

Following Liaqot's tragic death in October 1951, Governor-General Nazimuddin stepped down to become Prime Minister, and Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi and a senior member of the former Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IAAS), became Governor-General. The seat of effective power was changed again to suit those who were not happy with Nazimuddin as the source of authority because he represented Bengali interests. The power relationships reverted

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1 Callard, *op.cit.*, p. 20; also see Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 62, for similar view.


to coincide with the traditions during Jinnah's Governor-Generalship, and thus the Punjabi Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad acquired effective power, bypassing the Bengali Prime Minister Nazimuddin. It was Ghulam Mohammad's entrance into the politics of Pakistan which marked a new importance for the Civil Bureaucratic Elite within the Central Power Elite. Stephens observes:

> ... it seemed obvious where power now lay: with the bureaucracy; in particular with Ghulam Mohammad, backed by another former civil servant, Chaudhury Mohammad Ali, who had been Finance Minister since 1951.¹

Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Nazimuddin in April 1953 and another Bengali, Mohammad Ali (Bogra), then Ambassador of Pakistan to Washington, who was not at that time a member of the parliament, ² was selected as Prime Minister. The most probable reason for selecting Mohammad Ali was that he could very well be used to serve West Pakistani interests, while at the same time he appeared to give Bengalis' representation in a top executive position of the Central Government. It was such a strong choice it made one political observer comment that "the new Prime Minister... was perhaps as surprised as anyone by his own appointment..."³ Since Mohammad Ali had no base of support in either wing of the country, Ghulam Mohammad had reason to believe that Mohammad Ali would be no more than a puppet Prime Minister.

The installation of the "Cabinet of Talents"⁴ under Mohammad Ali's Prime Ministership in October 1954, with Iskander Mirza, a senior member of the

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² He was elected but had to resign when selected Ambassador.

³ Williams, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

⁴ The Governor-General dismissed the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in October 1954 on the ground that it had lost the confidence of the people, especially after the elections to the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly in early 1954, and he called upon the incumbent Prime Minister Mohammad Ali to form a new cabinet. Since the new cabinet included 'talent' like Suhrawardy, Mirza, Ayub, and others, it was called the "Cabinet of Talents".
Indian Political Service (IPS), as Minister of Interior and General Ayub Khan as Defence Minister, gave the power structure of Pakistan a new component, i.e. the Military Elite, had entered the Central Power Elite group.

Mirza's elevation in September 1955 to Governor-General and in 1956 to President of Pakistan put the civil-military bureaucracies into a well-entrenched position. Although Mirza was basically a civil bureaucrat, his position as Secretary of Defence in the early 1950's brought him into close contact with the Military Elite; he was even given the status and title of Major-General. As Minister of Interior in Mohammad Ali's cabinet, he had asserted the position of the Military Elite within the Central Power Elite.

Mirza castigated the politicians and laid the foundation for the "guided democracy" which would later be developed by Ayub Khan. Speaking on the occasion of the Declaration of Emergency in October 1954 Mirza said in part:

Some underdeveloped countries have to learn democracy, and until they do so they have to be controlled. With so many illiterate people, politicians would make a mess of things.¹

Mirza regarded politicians as "crooks and scalawags" who exploit the poor, illiterate people by promising them 'the moon' without delivering it.² Instead, he favored the rule of well-bred and educated gentlemen.³

When Suhrawardy, the vocal champion of the Bengali causes, became Prime Minister in 1956, it "did not bring him the real power which goes with the office [in a parliamentary system]."⁴ His was a coalition government which

¹ *Dawn* (Karachi), October 31, 1954.
³ Ibid.
depended for support on the Republican Party of President Mirza himself. Since no party had an absolute majority in the Assembly and the constitution of 1956 gave the President the discretionary power of choosing the Prime Minister, Mirza was using his party as the chief instrument of maintaining his control over the cabinet.¹ But Suhrawardy was an equally strong and very popular personality. He tried his best to demonstrate his public support through mass contact and thus to acquire effective power from Mirza.² Mirza was shrewd enough to realize Suhrawardy's tactics and in October 1957 the Republican Party, at the instruction of President Mirza, withdrew support for Suhrawardy's leadership. After Suhrawardy's departure all subsequent Prime Ministers were selected from West Pakistan.

Mirza had developed during this period a very close relationship with the armed forces through General Ayub. When Mirza declared martial law in Pakistan on October 7, 1958, it was obviously done with the concurrence of the army. Eventually, however, Ayub forced Mirza to abdicate on October 27, 1958 and the former took over the charge of the country as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Ayub became President in 1960.

It was as a junior officer in the British-Indian army that Ayub first pondered the possibility of the "nation building activities of the country under the leadership of the army".³ Now he had ample opportunities to realize the long-cherished dream. Despite the fact that he sent the troops

¹ Ibid.
² Ibid.
back to the barracks within a month of the promulgation of martial law
and appointed civil deputies to zonal Martial Law Administrators, the
military continued to be an effective force and the base of support of
the Ayub regime. ¹

The Civil Bureaucratic Elite suffered a setback in matters of effective
decision-making following the martial law. ² But it was rather temporary.
Ayub was distrustful of politicians and in the long run he needed to
turn to the civil bureaucrats for the civilian support to legitimize his
regime. The civil bureaucrats, who in the past had exercised immense
powers, were eager to help Ayub out. Thus a two way operation was in
process. Ayub was now ready to give the "major share of power" to civil ser-
vants.³ The latter had, however, to accept into its ranks some young
military officers.⁴ Once the Civil Bureaucratic Elite established itself
within the Central Power Elite, it steadily increased its powers, even sur-
passing the Military Elite.⁵ On the dominant position of the Civil Bureau-
cratic Elite during the Ayub regime, Khan Abdus Sabur Khan, a Central

¹ Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a

² The civil servants were even blamed for the mess in the country during the
pre-martial law period. Thus Lt. General K. M. Sheikh once stated: "We are
convinced that the CSP's must share the blame for some of the political
mischief which brought Pakistan to the edge of total disaster". Quoted in
Shahid J. Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: A Reevalu-

³ Von Vorys, op.cit., p. 148.

⁴ Between 1960 and 1963, 14 army and navy officers joined the Civil Service of
Pakistan (CSP). The CSP had always resisted such moves before. Burki, op.cit.,
p. 248.

⁵ Thus Braibanti observes: "Except for President Ayub Khan and two or three
military men in the cabinet for part of the period, there was no overt super-
cession of civil authority by the military. On the contrary, the civil bureau-
cracy, rid of political harassment, became stronger than ever." Ralph T.
Braibanti, "Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan", in Braibanti (ed), Asian Bureau-
cratic Systems Emergent From British Imperial Traditions (Durham, N.C.: Duke
Minister for 7 years and an Ayub supporter, observed:

Basically President Ayub was not a politician...Instead of relying on the advice of the politicians he relied upon instructions [emphasis added] of the bureaucrats. He always repeated his horrible mistake. The wishes and aspirations of the people were ignored. On these issues, recommendations of the ministers or Assembly members to President Ayub did not influence him. On the contrary, on these matters, recommendations of the bureaucrats were preferred. It is true that bureaucracy is essential for a nation and good government. But, a bureaucracy should reflect the aspirations and wishes of the people. This was a "lost link" that Ayub Khan and his administration failed to establish. The biggest tragedy which resulted in the total collapse of the Ayub regime was that in his administration even constitutionally elected representatives of the people were subordinated to the bureaucracy.¹

With Yahya's coming to power in March 1969, the power relationships were changed again. The Civil Bureaucratic Elite was pushed back and the Military Elite came to the forefront without, however, castigating or displacing the politicians. The position of the Civil Bureaucratic Elite was shaken terribly. Thus G. W. Choudhury, one of the very few close civilian associates of Yahya, and a noted scholar on Pakistan, writes:

General Pirzada, [who believed that Ayub's fall was due to his excessive dependence on senior civil servants] was the most powerful man in Yahya Government and wanted to avoid similar mistake and made sure that no senior bureaucrats were able to get near Yahya.²

He further elaborates upon this theme:

It was an amusing phenomenon to see the top bureaucrats waiting in the corridors of the brigadiers and then at the office of the all-powerful PSO [Principal Staff Officer]; very rarely did they have occasion to see the President [Yahya] himself.³

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The Yahya regime also removed top bureaucrats like Altaf Gaughar, N. A. Faruque and Fida Hasan who had wielded immense powers during the Ayub regime. Moreover, the regime of Yahya terminated the services of 303 civil servants, including some senior CSP officers, on various counts of misappropriation of money, maladministration, and others.¹

**Decision-Making and the Civil Bureaucratic Elite**

Although Ghulam Mohammad's rise to the Governor-Generalship marked the beginning of the ascendancy of the Civil and Military Elites within the Central Power Elite, the Civil Bureaucracy was not completely dormant even before Ghulam Mohammad. The Civil Bureaucratic Elite's political role dated back to the time of Jinnah and Liaquot. Both of them used to depend very heavily on the civil servants.² Since none of the ministers in the initial period of Pakistan had much governmental administrative experience,³ the Civil Bureaucracy had a chance to assert its influence. This was possible because it had a long tradition, as a descendent of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), of possessing superior intellectual qualities and moral integrity. On the whole, however, it could not overshadow personalities like Jinnah and Liaquot, who continued to be the source of ultimate power.

The civil bureaucrats, especially the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, held all key positions of decision-making at different levels of government, from the Central Secretariat down to the sub-division. Since Pakistan had a centralized government, the national level decisions were

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almost the monopoly of the central secretariat. Although the CSP officers in the Secretariat were theoretically the advisors to ministers in matters of policy formulations, in effect, they performed the combined roles of advisor, policy formulator and policy implementor. In general, however, policy-making roles were confined to the officers of the Secretary and Joint-secretary of the Central Secretariat.

During the Ayub regime, economic development received priority over development in other fields because Ayub felt this was the best way to modernization and national integration of the country. In matters of economic policy formulation, the following agencies were in an important position: Pakistan Planning Commission; Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance, Industries, Commerce, Agriculture; Chairmen/Presidents/Managing Directors of such bodies as the Industrial Development Corporation, Water and Power Development Authorities of the two wings; Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation; East and West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporations; Tariff Commission; National Investment Trust; Export Promotion Bureau, etc. Apart from these bodies, other central public corporations, such as the Pakistan International Airlines, Atomic Energy Commission, Security Printing Corporation, Capital Development Authority, National Bank of Pakistan, Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, and the Road Transport Corporation, had almost complete control in decision-making over a wide range of subjects falling within their respective spheres.

1 Ibid., pp. 141-57.
2 Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 388.
4 Ibid., p. 98.
Thus, contrary to the expectation of some political observer that the CSP in the mid-60's would give way to "non-CSP technical and financial services", the CSP continued to control levers of power. Whereas in 1964 only 63 positions in various corporations were held by members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, the figure increased to 85 in 1967. This clearly indicates that the CSP expanded its role in the decision-making process of the country during the Ayub regime.

Decision-making and Military Elite

Specifically, the Military Elite in Pakistan was composed of Generals, Admirals and Air Marshalls in the Defence Services of Pakistan holding such positions as Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief of General Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Director of Inter-Services Intelligence, Military Governor of Provinces, and Commander of certain divisions. Although they were not always in positions of political decision-making, they had conventionally been at the helm of affairs of the state of Pakistan.

The selection of Mirza (Interior) and Ayub (Defence) for the "Cabinet of Talents" of Mohammad Ali in 1954, provided the Military Elite with ample opportunities to secure its position in the Central Power Elite. The imposition of martial law in Punjab in 1953, for the first time in Pakistan, at the initiative of Mirza, brought the armed forces of the country into the politics of the country. Subsequent impositions of martial law in 1958 and

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1 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 158.
2 Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan", p. 254.
4 Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, p. 70.
again in 1969 politicized the armed forces in general. The 1962 Constitution of Pakistan had specifically entrenched army officers in the politics of Pakistan. It was provided in Article 238 that unless the President himself had held a rank not lower than Lt. General, at least one of the ministers in the cabinet for the next 20 years was to be from the defence services of Pakistan. Although only 4 military officers served in the cabinet of Ayub from 1958 to 1969, the army maintained its influence and control through Ayub in the whole 11 years of his regime. In the crisis of 1968-69 these "specialists in violence...became the men of the hour". During the Yahya regime, the Military Elite, particularly the "inner cabinet" which consisted of a handful of top military officers, was the sole authority of decision making.

**Decision-making and the Political Elite**

Apart from a short period in Pakistan's history, during the Jinnah and Liaqot era (1947-51), the Political Elite in Pakistan never came to the forefront in wielding actual decision-making power; decisions, especially of 'major consequences', were always the function of other Elites. Unlike Western democracies, where authority is dispersed mainly among various constitutional functionaries, major decision-making authority in Pakistan has always centered around a few personalities. This led to the concentration of powers in a particular region -- West Pakistan, to the exclusion of East Pakistan. Even

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1 See Lawrence Ziring, *op.cit.*, Appendix A, pp. 199-201.


during the days of Jinnah and Liaquot, as we have noted above, average politicians were overshadowed by the Civil Bureaucratic Elite. After the death of Jinnah and Liaquot, politicians witnessed a further increase in the power of the Civil-Military Elites.

When martial law was imposed in 1958, the National and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved, political parties outlawed, and political activities banned. We have noted above that both Ayub and Mirza had an aversion to politics and politicians. But Ayub eventually gave up the hope of running the country without politicians; he mostly selected civilians for his cabinet from 1958 to 1969; he even legalized political parties and himself joined one, later becoming its President. But all these reforms did not significantly change the distribution of power; during his regime politicians remained secondary figures while the real power lay with the Civil and Military Elites.

Although Yahya's regime formed a civilian cabinet in August 1969, "nominating" five ministers from each province, the real decision-making power remained with the Military Elite alone. Specifically his "inner cabinet", which consisted of four or five Generals, Air Marshalls and Vice Admirals, was the repository of the ultimate power. "The civilian cabinet was a ceremonial body, its members often touring as VIPs in the four principal cities... inaugurating public functions, presiding over innocuous meetings, sitting at the head table at banquets in the President's House."

1 Dawn (Karachi), October 8, 1958.
3 G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, pp. 50,57. Choudhury was himself a minister in the Yahya cabinet.
The Alliance of the Three Elites

The members of the three Elites from West Pakistan had developed a sort of alliance among them which led to the concentration of decision-making power and its monopoly by one province of the country, i.e. West Pakistan. A close relationship between the members of the Civil and Military Elites stemmed from the fact that a majority of them came from the same social background and had the same schooling and socialization.¹ Both the Civil and Military Elites had a shared suspicion about the Bengali counter-elite. An alliance between the Civil, Military and Political Elites of West Pakistan was based upon both ideological and social grounds: they believed in the policy of centralization to counter the disintegrating potential of regional cleavages, and they shared a distrust of the parliamentary system.² The reason for such preference was that these implied the maintenance of their dominance over East Pakistan through the machinery of the Central Government, which they controlled. Family relationship through matrimony among top civil bureaucrats and military officers was an important factor in interlocking them socially. Thus, Sayeed's study reveals that in the years 1965-66, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan's Ambassador to Washington, the Secretaries of Home and Kashmir Affairs, and of the Economic Affairs Division were in fact related by matrimonial alliances.³ Some top civil bureaucrats had similar family ties

¹ Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 76.
² Jahan, op.cit., p. 139.
³ Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 392; also his The Political System of Pakistan, p. 157.
with some top military officers. Since the mid-60's this trend was on increase. As noted before, a considerable number of civil-military officials came from the landed aristocracy of West Pakistan, from which the majority of the Political Elite were drawn. Thus the Central Power Elite in Pakistan was a triangular alliance concentrated in the western wing of the country, which made it an exclusive group of power and influence.

Benglai Representation in the Three Elites

Political Elite. It is evident from Table 14 below that the Bengalis had an almost equal share in the Political Elite of Pakistan during the period 1947-58.

Table 14

East-West Representation in the Political Elite of Pakistan, 1947-58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heads of State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers, Deputy Ministers, State Ministers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the Constituent and National Assemblies</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of ministers, deputy ministers and state ministers includes those up to 1957 and omits those in the two short-lived ministries from 1957-58.

Source: Jahan, op.cit., Table II.8, p. 25, with some modification. Jahan

1 Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 392.
2 Supra.
3 Tables 5 and 6, supra., pp. 23-24.
gives the break up of the head of the state as 2 : 2, East Pakistan : West Pakistan; but of Jinnah, Nazimuddin, Ghulam Mohammad, and Mizra, who held the position of head of the state of Pakistan, only Nazimuddin was from East Pakistan.

The Bengali Governor-General and Prime Ministers of the pre-martial law period could never play effective decision-making powers. Thus Callard observes:

Whether through Bengali ineffectiveness or the Machiavellian wiles of their opponents (West Pakistanis) Bengali influence had never been decisive. Nazimuddin had been Governor-General, but real power lay with Liaquat Ali. Nazimuddin became Prime Minister, but he lacked force of will, and was ultimately dismissed by the (Punjabi) Governor-General. Mohammad Ali (Bogra) was brought in as Prime Minister but, although a Bengali, he remained the captive of the West Pakistani group that provided the main strength of his government. The Bengali members attempted to use their majority to diminish the powers of the Governor-General, but as a result they found themselves out of their own jobs. The electorate of East Bengal had repudiated the Muslim League, but the outcome was rule for more than a year by West Pakistan bureaucrats.1

We may add to Callard's observation that when Suhrawardy became Prime Minister, the controlling authority remained with Mirza since the survival of Suhrawardy's cabinet depended upon Mirza's Republican Party. Eventually, when Suhrawardy tried to assume constitutional powers, he found himself out of office. After Suhrawardy no other Bengali was either President or Prime Minister.

Both Ayub's and Yahya's cabinet ministers were almost equally drawn from East and West Pakistan.2 Similarly, members of the National Assemblies of 1962 and 1965 were elected equally, taking 75 from each wing. In the 1971 National Assembly, the Bengalis had, however, more members (162 East Pakistan and 138 West Pakistan), as a result of proportional representation. But as

1 Callard, op.cit., p. 173.

2 For a list of Ayub's cabinet ministers, see Ziring, op.cit., Appendix A, pp. 199-201; The Yahya cabinet consisted of five ministers from each province.
we have noted above, neither during Ayub's nor during Yahya's regime did the Political Elite have effective decision-making power.

Civil Bureaucratic Elite. Table 15 below clearly indicates that even in 1955, seven years after Independence, the Bengalis had extremely poor representation in the Civil Bureaucratic Elite of Pakistan. This generated much of the discontent in East Pakistan.

Table 15

Regional Representation in the Higher Ranks of the Central Secretariat, 1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>% of Total to East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Dawn (Karachi), January 18, 1956.
Military Elite. The situation for East Pakistan was even worse in the military establishment of Pakistan. Table 16 below shows that in 1955 East Pakistan had virtually no representation in the officer ranks of the army, navy and air force.

Table 16

East-West Representation in the Officer Ranks of the Military Establishment, 1955. (Number of Officers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>% of Total to East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from *Dawn* (Karachi), January 8, 1955.

In addition, the Bengali officers in the army, navy, and air force held junior ranks only. The data in Table 17, which shows the rank-wise break-up in the Army, is representative of the other services as well.

Table 17

East-West Representation in the Army, 1956. (Number of officers in different ranks)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>% of Total to East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. General</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from *Dawn* (Karachi), January 9, 1956.
On the whole, then, in the first decade of Pakistan, about 96 percent of the Military Elite and 93 percent of the Civil Bureaucratic Elite was drawn from West Pakistan.

Thus, it was not the dominant position of the Civil-Military Elites in decision-making powers that generated discontent; it was rather poor Bengali representation in those Elites, which created the rage among the Bengalis. As Muneer's survey reveals, about half of the CSP's were influenced by regional considerations in matters of policy formulation,¹ which obviously went against the interest of the Bengalis, and in favor of West Pakistanis.

The insignificant representation of the Bengalis in the civil and military services actually stemmed from the past. The Muslims of Bengal were down-trodden peasants, with very little education. It was the Hindus who controlled the trade, industries, and other professions. Although the Bengali Muslims made tremendous contributions towards independence, in education and wealth they lagged far behind the Bengali Hindus and the non-Bengali Muslims of the North-West of undivided India. As a result, at the time of partition in 1947 only one Bengali was among the total of 133 Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service officers who had opted for Pakistan.² As a result of this initial situation, most key positions of decision-making both at the center and in the provinces were filled by the civil servants who were natives of Punjab or the Urdu-speaking Indian provinces.

¹ Muneer Ahmad, The Civil Servant in Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1964), Table 23, p. 113. His study reveals that 49.1% were influenced by regional consideration; 14.4% were influenced to some extent, while 22.9% were not at all influenced by regional considerations.

² Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, p. 49; also "Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan", p. 264.
Similarly, during the British period the armed forces were mainly recruited from Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. After independence, naturally the West Pakistanis constituted the overwhelming majority in the defence services. In fact, about 60 percent of defence personnel came from the districts of Rawalpindi, Cambellpur, Jhelum and Gujrat of Punjab, and 30 percent from the districts of Peshwar and Kohat of the North-West Frontier Province.¹

**Bengali Consciousness and Bengali Demands on the System**

By the early 1950's the Bengalis were becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that it was not the politicians but the Civil and Military Elites who were playing the main roles in the decision-making process which adversely affected their economic and political life. This growing awareness was thus aired by Professor Mahmud Hossain, a Bengali Muslim League Minister, saying that "the situation became so bad that one could walk through the [East Pakistan Secretariat and not find a single Bengali among the secretaries in the ministries]."² The situation was further aggravated by a tendency of some West Pakistani civil servants serving in East Pakistan to defy the East Pakistan Ministers. Thus, in one instance the Chief Secretary of the East Pakistan Secretariat, a Punjabi civil servant, appointed the Commissioner of Sales Tax without even consulting the Finance Minister. In another instance, the Chief Secretary assumed the charge of the Accommodation Board when it was in fact under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Revenue. In addition, "several"

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¹ Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 390.
Secretaries in the Ministries of East Pakistan were appointed without consulting appropriate Bengali Ministers. Thus, one can easily see how the Bengali Ministers were rendered ineffective by West Pakistani civil bureaucrats even in matter within their own province. The central Muslim League was not willing, and the provincial Muslim League was not powerful enough, to save the Bengalis from such a manifest injustice.

The Bengalis had repeatedly demonstrated their discontent over the West Pakistanis' preponderant majority in the Central Power Elite and demanded an equal share in the decision-making powers. The results of the East Pakistan Assembly elections in 1954 was a clear verdict in favor of the Bengali demand to strip the Central Government of its power and to strengthen the Provincial Governments.

The Bengalis' awareness of their impotence in decision-making powers and the resultant severe discontent finally erupted toward the end of the 1960's as a volcano. The Six-Point Program was in effect no more an appeal to the Central Government or to the West Pakistanis; it was rather a final notice served on them to let the Bengalis take over the affairs of the state and end all injustices inflicted upon them. This "final notice" entailed repeated assurances, however, of no revenge on West Pakistan or its peoples.

The verdict of the 1970 general elections clearly pointed out that the Bengalis were determined to assume power of effective decision-making both in their own province and at the center. East Pakistan's demand for a parlia-

1 Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 64.
mentary system and direct election stemmed from the same desire to have self-
government in the province and an effective decision-making power at the
center. Although it was not realistic to think of stripping the Civil and
Military Elites of their powers overnight, the East Pakistanis, given a
chance to hold political power, could probably have changed the power struc-
ture over some extended period of time, presumably with the help of non-Punjabi
politicians and bureaucrats who were also discontented with the Punjabis for
their upper hand in the decision-making process in the country. ¹

The Bengali sentiment representative of the 1960's may be illustrated
by the following passage from Mujib's statement:

We have been denied our birth-right as the free citizens of an
independent State. All decisions of consequence are made in
Rawalpindi or Islamabad. All powers vest in the Central Govern-
ment and its bureaucrats. ²

Policy Response of the Central Government and Its Impact upon the Bangalis

Sensing the growing discontent of the Bengalis over their negligible repre-
sentation in the Central Power Elite, the government introduced a quota system
in 1949/1950 ³ to recruit 40 percent of the civil servants from East Pakistan
and 40 percent from West Pakistan, the remaining 20 percent being recruited
on the basis of merit. This quota system helped to change representation in

¹ Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 389.
² Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh, My Bangladesh, p. 17.
³ Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan", p. 253, mentions
that the quota system was introduced in 1949, but Braibanti, "Higher Bureau-
cracy in Pakistan", pp. 264-65 and n. 100, p. 265, writes that there was
confusion about the exact date. He finds the earliest reference to it in
a phamphlet published in 1950.
the CSP cadre. It is evident from Table 18 below that a considerable number of East Pakistanis\(^1\) were being recruited into the CSP cadre. Thus in 1956, 1959 and 1962 the East Pakistanis constituted nearly half of the entering batch of the CSP,\(^2\) and in 1957 their total share in the CSP cadre rose to 24.3 percent (65 of 267).\(^3\) But, as Table 15 shows, the representation of East Pakistan in the higher ranks of it remained very insignificant. In the military service, in the absence of a similar quota system, there was no change in composition.

Table 18
East-West Representation Among CPS Recruits, 1948-58

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total No. of New Officers</th>
<th>East Pakistan No.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>West Pakistan No.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jahan, op.cit., Table II.10, p. 26.

\(^1\) It does not include Bengalis as a linguistic group alone. Several non-Banglisi migrant domiciled in East Pakistan were recruited from the East Pakistan quota. See ibid., Table 9.

\(^2\) Ibid., and also Jahan, op.cit., Table V.2, p. 107.

\(^3\) Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan", p. 253.
The Bengalis were getting impatient with the slow pace of their recruitment into the elite services. Thus there was a demand in 1957 for ad hoc appointments to the CSP cadre by giving promotions to officers of the East Pakistan Civil Service. It was maintained that this would ensure "justice" and cement the bond of unity and integrity of the people of the two wings of Pakistan. But there was no visible government response to this sort of recommendation by the Bengalis.

The Bengalis, especially after the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, became more vocal in demanding an equal share in the administration of the country. East Pakistan, during this war, was left almost defenceless. The then Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was later reported to have stated that East Pakistan's defence was insured by China. This gave the Bengalis an opportunity to strengthen their demand for self-sufficiency in defence. The Six-Point Program and the amazing Bengali support for it exerted a great deal of pressure on the Ayub regime which found it necessary to take some concrete steps in order to prevent the Bengalis from resorting to extreme violence.

The constitution of 1962 stipulated that parity should be maintained between the two wings of the country in all spheres of the Central Government "as nearly as practicable." In order to give the Bengalis a sense of participation in the Central establishments, the Ayub regime made some "concessions" to East Pakistan. As a result, her representation in the Civil Service of Pakistan rose to 34.1 percent (139 to 467) in 1967, as compared to 24.3 percent

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1 See Maulavi Farid Ahmad's speech in the National Assembly of Pakistan on February 15, 1957, which, as Braibanti notes, represented the Bengali views of the time. Reproduced in Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, Appendix 4.


3 Ministry of Law, op.cit., Principles of Policy, Clause 15; Fundamental Rights, Clause 17; and Article 240. This quotation is from Article 240.
in 1957. The regime also adopted in 1961 a policy of posting as many Bengali civil servants as possible in East Pakistan in order to give East Pakistan a sense of self-government. But the system was reversed in 1967, by reviving the original practice of posting the CSP officers outside their own province. Surprisingly enough, this change was made at the initiative of the Government of East Pakistan, then headed by a very loyal lieutenant of Ayub, Monem Khan, who thought that the rotation of the CSP officers would be helpful in the process of national integration. During the Ayub regime Bengalis rose to the positions of the head of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and the State Bank of Pakistan. Moreover, since 1962 and 1963, the offices of the Chief Controller of Exports and Imports, and of the Deputy Secretaries in the Cabinet and Establishment Divisions were invariably given to Bengalis. Table 19 (next page) indicates the tendency of recruiting more Bengalis in the various divisions of the Central Secretariat, except for the Establishment (O&M wing), Home, and Information and Broadcasting Divisions.

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1 Burki, op. cit., p. 253.
4 Ibid., p. 100.
Table 19

Regional Representation of East Pakistan among Class I Officers in Divisions of the Central Secretariat. (In Percentage of the Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>January 1, 1963</th>
<th>January 1, 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O &amp; M Wing</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Affairs</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and Broadcasting</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Social Welfare</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Division (Military)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Wing</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Wing</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and Work</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Summarized from Jahan, op.cit., Table V.1, p. 66.
In the East Pakistan Secretariat by 1967-68, almost all the high positions except for the Chief Secretary, and the Secretary of Agriculture, were filled by Bengalis. But in view of the centralized decision-making process of Pakistan, the Provincial Secretariat had little significance in the over-all development of the province, except to give the people the psychological comfort of being 'administered' by their 'own' people.

Disparity continued to persist in the Central Secretariat. Thus during 1964-65 only two Bengalis held the position of "Acting Secretary". This number rose to four in 1966. Such slow progress was not satisfactory to the Bengalis. Moreover, the 'key ministries' such as the Ministries of Establishment, Finance, Economic Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Commerce and Industries, and Planning Commission were always headed by the West Pakistanis. The Bengalis had been demanding a fair share of the decision-making powers, not of empty positions. The West Pakistanis continued to far outnumber the Bengalis in decision-making power as well as in positions.

The Yahya regime identified the lag of the Bengalis in various central services as the main cause of their discontent and the regime directed all the ministries to give priority to Bengalis whenever there were vacancies in senior positions, even if it meant discarding the principle of seniority. As a result, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, all Secretaries in the East Pakistan Secretariat, including the Chief Secretary, were from that province. The regime also promoted six Bengali CSP Officers to Central Secretary positions.

1 Ibid., p. 101.
2 Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 195.
3 Jahan, op.cit., p. 100.
4 See Yahya's speech of July 28, 1969 in Dawn (Karachi), July 29, 1969, which stated: "The Bengalis] were not being allowed to play their full part in the decision-making process at the national level and in certain important spheres of national activity....[T]hey were fully justified in being dissatisfied with the state of affairs."
5 G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 54.
Since the Yahya regime pushed back the Civil Bureaucratic Elite and promoted the Military Elite in matters of effective decision-making powers, increased Bengali representation was of no significance. Moreover, since the West Pakistanis continued to hold the majority of the Central Secretary posts, the Bengali Secretaries used to feel cornered in matters of any significant decision formulation. Thus Sayeed observes, "it was difficult for them [the East Pakistani Secretaries] to be effective [in decision-making powers] because the West Pakistani civil servants dominated the policy-making structures to such an extent that East Pakistani civil servants could either be overruled or transferred." Table 20a (next page) illustrates that the Punjabis and Urdu-speaking migrants from Indian provinces monopolized the decision-making power even during the last days of united Pakistan.

To increase the Bengali recruitment into the armed forces of the country, the Ayub regime relaxed rules regulating physical measurements in view of the small stature of the Bengalis. But absence of a quota system, strict adherence to the principle of seniority, and the dominance of the West Pakistanis in the selection boards did not bring any significant change in the composition of officer ranks of the armed forces (Table 20 below).

Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Junior Commissioned Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Other ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Chief Petty Officers</th>
<th>Petty Officers</th>
<th>Leading Seamen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jahan, op.cit., p. 62.

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1 Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 390.
### Table 20a

**Background of Civil Service Officers in Influential Positions - 1865-1970.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Urdu-speaking Indian Provinces</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Influential positions held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9 Punjab</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs; Agriculture and Works; Cabinet; Establishment Division; Home and Kashmir Affairs; Communications; Industries and Natural Resources; Defence; Secretary to President; Finance; Investment Promotion Bureau; Water and Power Development Authority; Information and Broadcasting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>9 Punjab</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs; Agriculture and Works; Defence; Home and Kashmir Affairs; Economic Affairs; Communications; Secretary to President; Cabinet; Industries and Natural Resources; Finance; Investment Promotion; WAPDA; Information and Broadcasting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8 Punjab</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Secretary to President; Communications; Cabinet; Foreign Affairs; Industries and Natural Resources; Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission; Agriculture and Works; Economic Affairs; Investment Promotion; Planning Division; Finance; Information and Broadcasting;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7 Punjab</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs; Agriculture and Works; Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission; Cabinet; Economic Affairs; Industries and Natural Resources; Planning Division; Finance; Information and Broadcasting; Economic Affairs; Defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7 Punjab</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs; Agriculture and Works; Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission; Cabinet; Economic Affairs; Industries and Natural Resources; Planning Division; Finance; Communications; Information and Broadcasting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5 Punjab</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Chairman and Managing Director, Steel Mills Corp.; Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission; Defence; Cabinet; Planning Division; Industries and Natural Resources; Finance; Communications; Agriculture and Works.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sayeed, "Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", p. 391.
The Yahya regime also issued an order to "double" the recruitment of the Bengalis in the armed services. But the regime was short-lived (1969-71), and no significant improvement over the Ayub regime, in terms of the Bengalis' representation, could be expected.

We have noted the Bengalis' demand for more representation in the Civil Service of Pakistan. We have also noted that during the period preceding the Yahya regime the CSP's wielded immense powers in the decision-making process of the country. Had the Bengalis been given an accelerated promotion in the 1950s or even in the early half of the 1960s, the Bengali discontent would not have reached the proportion of the late 1960s.

Contrary to the argument of the Central Power Elite that the accelerated ad hoc appointments of Bengalis to the higher ranks of the civil service meant the abandonment of the merit and seniority principle, one can probably make a good case in favor of the demand of the Bengalis. It is revealed from studies by Braibanti that there was no evidence to believe that the quota system introduced in 1949-50 lowered the high quality of the CSPs:

Avoiding definition of the term "intellectual", it is difficult to find evidence in that data here arrayed that the recruits of the new period (1947-1965)[which obviously included the Bengalis as well] will be any less able than their ICS mentors. It can be said with certainty that CSP recruitment [even] within the limits of the quota system and personality qualifications, brings into the service a significant portion of the best qualified men the nation produces.

If this observation is valid, there was no reason to suggest that the Bengalis who were recruited during the period following independence and who had attained considerable experience and seniority in the 1960s would have been less efficient as Secretaries or Directors of public corporations. Seniority alone is not a definite criterion for judging efficiency.

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1 Braibanti, "Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan", p. 286.
In this connection, when we look back, we see that after independence, Pakistan experienced a considerable shortage of central civil service officers to fill important positions. To fill the 244 higher decision-making positions reserved for them, only 158 were available. This situation prevailed even in 1967. During the British period, the career of most of the native civil service officers usually terminated at the level of deputy commissioner of a district. After independence, if the same ICS officers who would otherwise go up only to the district level could fill higher positions in Pakistan and discharge duties quite efficiently, it is likely that the East Pakistani CSP officers, if they were given accelerated promotions, could have done the same job as did their ICS counterparts immediately after independence.

After Ayub gave up the hope of running the country without politics and politicians, he turned for support in East Pakistan to those politicians whom he could take into confidence. Most of these were people who were second level leaders of the pre-martial law Muslim League from which the people of East Pakistan had withdrawn support in the 1954 elections. Thus Maniruzzaman's study reveal that of the 16 ministers from East Pakistan who had served in Ayub's cabinet, 11 were Muslim League leaders of the second echelon and 8 had contested and lost the provincial elections of 1954. Of the four Governors of East Pakistan during his regime, two were from West Pakistan (one was a Lt. General and the other a civil servant) and two were Bengalis -- one was a police officer and the other a lawyer who was in office.

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1 Ziring, op.cit., p. 123.
2 Ibid., n. 28, p. 211.
3 Ibid., p. 124.
4 Maniruzzaman, "Crises in Political Development", p. 231.
for 7 long years. It was this lawyer who was defeated so badly in the 1954 elections that his election deposit was forfeited.

**Conclusion**

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that in the three Elites that constituted the Central Power Elite in Pakistan, the Bengalis had very little representation except in the case of the Political Elite. The Bengali politicians in the Central Government during the pre-martial law period could not play a decisive role because of the uncompromising and unaccommodating attitude of the West Pakistanis. During the Ayub regime, although regional autonomists had the most popular support in East Pakistan, Ayub purposely denied them access to central power positions. Instead, he picked up the second echelon leaders of the discredited Muslim League.

It is possible that had Ayub accommodated the growing political forces of East Pakistan in the Political Elite, it would have given his regime enormous support at the same time as it would have given the Bengalis the psychological satisfaction of participation in national politics through their esteemed leaders. A place in the Central Power Elite could have made the Bengali counter-elites more responsible, more aware of specific situational problems, and more restrained in their promises. It could have led them to redefine their roles.

In the Civil Bureaucratic and Military Elites, although it was not possible to achieve absolute parity over night, calculated, rational policies of the Central Government directowards the amelioration of Bengali grievances and sincere implementation of those policies by the West Pakistani members of the Elites could have checked the Bengali discontent to a considerable extent.

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2. By "counter-elite" we mean those elites who were different from the central elites in socio-cultural orientation and in political ideology.
Chapter V

REASONABLY EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL GOODS AND OPPORTUNITIES

A proper distribution of available economic and social benefits is a problem for all ages and for all societies. Economic inequality has been found to have some positive economic and political benefits. Economically, as Papanek notes, income inequalities contribute "to the growth of the economy, which makes possible a real improvement for the lower income groups." A concentration of income in a few hands is believed to generate higher savings which can finance industrialization and development of a country, leading to the economic gain of both poor and rich in the long run. From a political point of view, as Friedrich writes, economic disparities among various regions may form a part of the federal bargain, that is, they generate among less developed regions an interest in the federal union in the hope of future economic benefits from the federal system. Friedrich cautioned, however, that economic inequalities among regions are bearable and politically durable only to a limited extent. Federal authorities must strive sincerely to balance existing imbalances "by federal subsidies in one form or another."

In this chapter we discuss and analyse the initial levels of economic development in the two wings of Pakistan, the strategies and policies of the Central Government for economic development, the immediate causes and extent of economic disparities, Bengali consciousness and demands on the political system, the Government response to these demands and the Bengali reaction to the Government response. Our focus is on the distribution of economic goods between East and West Pakistan.

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3 Ibid.
As Vakil notes, British India as a whole was industrially very backward. After the partition of India in 1947, the areas that constituted Pakistan was industrially much less developed than India. Thus, according to an estimate made in 1945, the industrial establishments that Pakistan inherited from British India constituted only 9.6 percent (1,406 to 14,569) of the total; that is, with one-fourth of the total population of British India, Pakistan had only about one-tenth of the total number of industrial establishments.

In absence of sufficient date, Table 21 gives some idea about the relative strength of industrial establishments of the two wings of Pakistan in 1947.

**Table 21**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industries</th>
<th>Pakistan (Number)</th>
<th>E.P. (Number)</th>
<th>Share of East Pakistan in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jute Presses</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar Mills</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match Factories</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Factories</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Factories</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosiery</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice Mills</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>430</strong></td>
<td><strong>204</strong></td>
<td>(<strong>%</strong>) 47.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from Nafis Ahmad, *An Economic Geography of East Pakistan*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), Table 35, p. 223; C. N. Vakil, *Economic Consequences of Divided India* (Bombay: Vova and Co., 1950), Tables VII.7, VII.20, VII.23 and Appendix, pp. 286-7. The East Pakistan figures for Jute Presses, Tea Factories, Hosiery and Rice Mills are all from Ahmad. All other figures are from Vakil. Although Vakil's data are for 1945 and Ahmad's for 1947, we assume that there was not much industrial expansion during the intervening period.

It would then appear that as far as industrial establishments were concerned, East and West Pakistan did not differ much. In terms of other economic factors, however, West Pakistan had some superiority over East Pakistan. Thus, at independence, West Pakistan had a much better irrigation system, the proportion of irrigated areas sown being as large as 76 percent, as compared to only 1.0 percent in East Pakistan. Of the total installed plant capacity for the production of electricity in undivided India (75,000 kilowatts), East Pakistan inherited only 0.5 percent, while West Pakistan inherited as much as 4.8 percent. Of the total route mileage of railways in Pakistan in 1947 (6,957.88 miles), East Pakistan inherited only 23%. Of the total metalled and unmetalled roads in Pakistan in 1947 (55,913 miles), East Pakistan had only 32%. Moreover, West Pakistan had the sea port of Karachi which was the third largest sea-port in British India, with adequate modern facilities. East Pakistan had only the port of Chittagong with its much less adequate facilities. Whereas the annual handling capacity of Karachi port was 3 million tons,

1 Vakil, op.cit., Table IV.5, p. 158.
2 Ibid., Table VI.2, p. 225.
3 Ibid., Table X.1 and X.2, p. 402.
4 Ibid., Table X.10, p. 414
Chittagong's was only 0.75 million tons. West Pakistan was rich in mineral resources as well.

Now let us look at the situation of East Pakistan. Before partition, the area that constituted East Pakistan was the hinterland for supplying raw materials to the industrial city of Calcutta. But East Pakistan always had very good potential for agriculture, fisheries and forestry, a potential unmatched by any other province of British India. The lands of East Pakistan were among the best in fertility and they had many natural sources of water. East Pakistan was also a land of enormous Bils (marshy land), tanks and rivers, with ideal conditions for the development of fisheries. Proper exploitation of her resources could have been a major source of foreign earnings for Pakistan.

Such resources in East Pakistan led one noted West Pakistani economist to suggest in the mid-60's that "if proper steps are taken, the eastern wing is destined to become the granary for the whole of Pakistan."

It appears from the above evidence that both the wings started almost from the same industrial base, although West Pakistan had a slight edge over East Pakistan. West Pakistan also had a relatively better infrastructure for industrial growth. East Pakistan, on the other hand, had an excellent resource base for the development of agriculture, fisheries and forestry. This economic pattern was very much conducive to the development of a complementary and viable economy for Pakistan, with the East concentrating upon agriculture and the West upon industries. It should be mentioned at this

1 Ibid., pp. 423-4.
2 See ibid., Chapter V, pp. 185-223.
3 See Nafis Ahmad, op.cit., Chapter VI.
point that in terms of the share of the Gross National Product, both East and West Pakistan started from the same level, East Pakistan having slight edge over West Pakistan till 1953-54. (See Table 22). The per capita Gross Provincial Product (GPP) in East Pakistan was lower than in West Pakistan because the former had a larger population.

Table 22

Regional Distribution of GNP in Pakistan. (at 1959-60 factor cost).
(In Crores of Rupees; One Crore = 10 million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>G.P.P.</th>
<th>G.P.P. per capita (Rs.)</th>
<th>G.P.P.</th>
<th>G.P.P. per capita (Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>1281</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>1256</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>1228</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>1363</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>1323</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1459</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1552</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>1497</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>1584</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1711</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>1795</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>2224</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>2024</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>2489</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>2186</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>2642</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>2891</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>2271</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>3156</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In view of the above facts and figures we may safely conclude that in aggregate terms there were very few differences in the levels of economic development between the two wings of Pakistan shortly after independence.

The Emergence and Extent of Economic Disparities in Pakistan

It was the strategies of economic development pursued by the planners of Pakistan which created, widened and continued serious imbalances in the level of economic development of the two wings of the country.

One of the important planks of the independence movement for Pakistan was to free the impoverished Indian Muslims from economic domination and to improve their economic lot. Although the Pakistan economy was overwhelmingly agricultural, the planners of Pakistan chose rapid industrialization as the shortest possible way to achieve the economic objective of the Pakistan movement. Pakistan also chose a system of mixed economy, a blend of private and public sectors, directed towards the achievement of her goal of economic development.

Pakistan as a whole, shortly after attaining independence, lacked industrial entrepreneurs. Muslims in British India were more interested in the short-term profits of trade and landownership than in risky industrial enterprises. In order to transform these traders into industrial investors, the government decided to provide lucrative incentives. This generated positive results. Thus, by the mid-50's Pakistan achieved such phenomenal industrial growth that it was considered by some economic observers to be unmatched by any other country in the world, except Japan, whose rate

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of growth was similar. But, unfortunately, this unprecedented growth was achieved at the cost of the principle of distributive justice. Growth resulted in serious imbalances among various economic groups and between religions, and this caused wide-spread unrest and resentment with severe political consequences.

The Strategies for Economic Development

The history of economic development in Pakistan reveals that her strategy was based upon the following principal ideas:

(a) treatment of the two regional economic units as an integrated whole, in spite of the existing structural differences and the consequences of spatial separation between the two wings;

(b) concentration of income to facilitate investment and lessen dependence on foreign finances;

(c) investment in that region and sector of the economy which would bring the maximum return and the most rapid economic development in absolute terms.

Policies Pursued by the Central Government to Achieve the Objectives

The most immediate policy of the government was to provide economic incentives and a 'strong government' to attract potential industrial investors and entrepreneurs. To provide capital and other assistance to those who already had some capital to invest and who had a latent desire to participate in the promotion of economic goals as set up by government, the government introduced a number of measures.

Firstly, the government established a number of specialized financial institutions, such as the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP)(1949), the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC)(1952), the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC)(1957), and the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP), with the purpose

Papanek, Pakistan's Development, p. 30
of advancing loans to potential industrial speculators. Loans advanced by these financial institutions increased steadily over years and became an important source of incentive for industrialists. The Tables below show that major benefits from these institutions were reaped by West Pakistan.

Table 23

Regional Distribution of Loans Sanctioned by Specialized Financial Institutions. PICI, IDBP And ADBP (Annual Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Disparity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rs. Million)</td>
<td>(Rs.)</td>
<td>(Rs. Million)</td>
<td>(Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1947-60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>274.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1960-65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plan</td>
<td>245.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>375.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1965-70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 24


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Akhlaqur Rahman, op. cit., Table 5.7, p.87.
Secondly, with the desire of removing industrial backwardness, the planners of Pakistan decided to divert resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. This policy adversely affected agriculture while it benefitted industries. Table 25 shows that agriculture contributed the lion's share of the value added to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Pakistan, as against a very thin contribution by large-scale manufacturing industries.

Table 25

Value added by Agriculture and Large-scale Manufacturing as Percentage of GDP; East and West Pakistan. In million Rupees at 1959-60 factor cost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Agriculture E.P.</th>
<th>Agriculture W.P.</th>
<th>Large-scale Manufacturing E.P.</th>
<th>Large-scale Manufacturing W.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1/1954-5</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-6/1959-60</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1/1964-5</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Thirdly, since industrialization needed imports of machinery, spare-parts and intermediary goods, which in turn required foreign currencies to buy them, the government very generously made foreign currencies available to the industrialists. As Table 26 shows, East Pakistan was the major earner of foreign exchange, her share oscillating between 42.5 percent in 1952-53 and 70.5 percent in 1961-62, with the cumulative average in the 22 years being

1 A large-scale manufacturing plant in Pakistan was defined as one which employs more than 20 labourers and uses electricity.
## Table 26

East Pakistan's Share of Exports and Imports. In millions of Rupees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Foreign Imports</th>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign Exports</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan E.P.</td>
<td>Share of</td>
<td>Pakistan E.P.</td>
<td>Share of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) (2) (3)</td>
<td>E.P. (%)</td>
<td>(4) (5) (6)</td>
<td>E.P. (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>1459</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>1194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>2554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>2237</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>1510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>1286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>1103</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>1223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>1325</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>1784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>2335</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>1608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>2050</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>1422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>1578</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>1325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>3188</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>1799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>3109</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>1843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>3819</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>2247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>4430</td>
<td>1489</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>2299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>5347</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>2408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>4208</td>
<td>1328</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>2718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>5192</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>2913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>4655</td>
<td>1327</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>3348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>4897</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>3305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>5098</td>
<td>1813</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>3337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more than 55 percent of the total foreign exchange earnings of Pakistan.

Fourthly, the government also ensured a very high return to the industrial investor. Low tariff duties on imports of capital goods, high tariffs on consumer goods, protected home market for domestic products with prices higher than on the international market, the Korean boom in the 1950's, tax concessions, possibility of tax evasions -- all these contributed to very attractive profits, estimated by some economists to be between 50 and 100 percent per annum.

These incentives attracted a number of traders from non-Bengali Muslim communities such as the Memon, Chinioti, Bohra, Khoja, etc., who had formed the nucleus of the Muslim trading class in the Indian territories prior to their migration to West Pakistan. These communities had much more in common with West Pakistanis than East Pakistanis in terms of culture, food, dress, etc., and this was an important reason for their decision to migrate to West instead of East Pakistan. Apart from cultural affinities, Karachi was a big attraction because it facilitated easy access to the government officials who were at the helm of the economic affairs of the country. Papanek observes:

> Letters, long-distance phone calls over poor connections, ... are poor substitutes to face-to-face contact, especially in a society that places a high value on personal relationship.

Karachi became the principal site of industrial establishments. Thus in 1958 of the total industrial capital in West Pakistan (Rupees 308.7 crores), Karachi alone accounted for more than 37 percent. Regionally, of the total industrial capital of Pakistan (Rs. 456.6 crores), regions

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1 See Power's estimate, infra.
2 Papanek, *Pakistan's Development*, p. 33
3 Ibid., pp. 41-2.
of West Pakistan accounted for about 68 percent and East Pakistan for about 32 percent. Although this account gives an impression that about one-third of the total industrial capital was located in East Pakistan, this does not mean, however, that the industrial capital in the eastern wing of the country was in the hands of Bengalis. According to an "approximate" estimate, the Bengalis owned only 11.0 percent (2.5% by Bengali Muslims and 8.5% by Bengali Hindus) of the total industrial assets of Pakistan in 1959, although they constituted about 56 percent of the total population of the country. The remaining assets were owned by the industrialists of West Pakistan.

Selective Government Policies and Widening of Disparities

Allocation of Revenue and Development Expenditure

Although after independence there was a phenomenal increase in government expenditures, both developmental and administrative, West Pakistan very heavily gained from these at the expense of East Pakistan. The location of federal establishments, such as the federal capital, the headquarters of the Armed Forces, defence industries, foreign missions in and around the federal capital, etc. resulted in heavy investment in West Pakistan, and generated income and employment for its people. Table 27 shows that of the total revenue expenditure in Pakistan, East Pakistan received only about 19 to 25 percent. Of the total development expenditure, East Pakistan's share varied from one-fifth in 1950-51/1954-55 to a little over one-third in 1965-66/1969-70. This heavy expenditure also created economic and social

1 Papanek, "Location of Industry", Table III, p. 300.
2 Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Table II, p. 42.
### Table 27

Revenue and Development Expenditure in East and West Pakistan. (In million Rs.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Revenue expenditure</th>
<th>Development Plan expenditure</th>
<th>Outside plan expenditure</th>
<th>Total development expenditure</th>
<th>Total expenditure</th>
<th>Dev. exp. as % of all Pak. dev. exp.</th>
<th>Rev. exp. as % of all Pak. rev. exp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Public Private</td>
<td>Indus Basin</td>
<td>Works Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51/54-55</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>2710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56/59-60</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>5240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61/64-65</td>
<td>4340</td>
<td>9250</td>
<td>6250</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9700</td>
<td>14040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66/69-70</td>
<td>6480</td>
<td>16560</td>
<td>11060</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>16560</td>
<td>21410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAST PAKISTAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51/54-55</td>
<td>7200</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>11290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56/59-60</td>
<td>8980</td>
<td>7570</td>
<td>4640</td>
<td>2930</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7570</td>
<td>16560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61/64-65</td>
<td>12840</td>
<td>18400</td>
<td>7700</td>
<td>10700</td>
<td>2110</td>
<td>20710</td>
<td>33550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66/69-70</td>
<td>22230</td>
<td>26100</td>
<td>10100</td>
<td>16000</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>29700</td>
<td>51950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST PAKISTAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:  
(a) Revenue expenditure in East Pakistan is the expenditure of East Pakistan Government excluding debt service plus 15% of Central Government expenditure on Civil Administration and 12% of the latter's defence expenditure. All transfer payments of the center i.e., debt services, grants-in-aid to provinces, and expenditure on foreign affairs have been excluded.

(b) Public sector development expenditure of the provincial Government plus that of the center on projects located in the province, mainly based on Planning Commission estimates. Private development expenditure as estimated by Planning Commission.
infrastructure such as the growth of transport and communication networks, water and power development, etc. This development in the economic and social overheads resulted in a reduction in the cost of investment which, in turn, lowered the prices of industrial goods in West Pakistan.

**Allocation of Foreign Exchange and Inter-wing Trade**

West Pakistan very heavily reaped the major benefits from the foreign earnings of East Pakistan. As Table 26 shows, although East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings varied between 50 percent in the pre-Plan period, 61 percent in the First Plan and about 50 percent in the Third Plan periods, her share in foreign imports varied between 28 percent, 32 percent, and about 33 percent in the same periods. The remaining portion of East Pakistan's earnings had been spent for imports of capital and intermediary goods by West Pakistan to set up and feed her industrial complexes. Moreover, as Table 28 shows, East Pakistan always maintained a positive balance of trade with foreign countries but always had a deficit balance with West Pakistan.

The West Pakistan's deficit in foreign trade used to be met by East Pakistan's surpluses. East Pakistan's deficit in domestic trade with West Pakistan resulted from the fact that the latter's industries used to supply the bulk of consumer industrial products for East Pakistan at higher prices than on the international market. On an average, about 80 percent of the finished products for consumption used to be imported by East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

**Import Licenses**

The mechanism of issuing import licenses to the private sector was adopted to ensure the inflow of capital goods, intermediary goods and some

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1 Akhaqr Rahman, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-71.
2 Mascarenhas, *op.cit.*, p. 23.
Table-28.

Commodity Imports and Exports for East Pakistan and West Pakistan for Domestic and Foreign Trade (Annual average). (Rupees in Million).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAST PAKISTAN:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c.i.f.) X</td>
<td>439.4</td>
<td>624.8</td>
<td>1219.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from West Pakistan X</td>
<td>287.8</td>
<td>564.3</td>
<td>881.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Imports</strong></td>
<td>727.2</td>
<td>1189.1</td>
<td>2100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f.o.b.) X(M)</td>
<td>863.4</td>
<td>979.8</td>
<td>1260.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export to West Pakistan X</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>280.6</td>
<td>457.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Exports</strong></td>
<td>989.1</td>
<td>1260.4</td>
<td>1717.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with West Pakistan</td>
<td>(-)162.1</td>
<td>(-)283.7</td>
<td>(-)424.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X-M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of trade with abroad (X-M)</td>
<td>424.0</td>
<td>355.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of trade combined</td>
<td>261.9</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>(-)383.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST PAKISTAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c.i.f.) X</td>
<td>1053.1</td>
<td>1525.0</td>
<td>2772.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from East Pakistan X</td>
<td>125.7</td>
<td>280.6</td>
<td>457.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Imports</strong></td>
<td>1178.8</td>
<td>1805.6</td>
<td>3229.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f.o.b.) X(M)</td>
<td>852.8</td>
<td>616.3</td>
<td>857.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to East Pakistan X</td>
<td>287.8</td>
<td>564.3</td>
<td>881.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total exports</strong></td>
<td>1140.6</td>
<td>1180.6</td>
<td>1738.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with East Pakistan</td>
<td>162.1</td>
<td>283.7</td>
<td>424.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of trade with abroad (X-M)</td>
<td>(-)200.3</td>
<td>(-)908.7</td>
<td>(-)1915.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of trade combined</td>
<td>(-)38.2</td>
<td>(-)625.0</td>
<td>(-)1491.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

consumer goods which were not produced in Pakistan. Since the distribution of import licenses, both commercial and industrial, was done through the Finance Ministry which was never headed by a Bengali and which overwhelmingly represented the West Pakistanis (Table 19 above), the lion's share of the licenses went to West Pakistan. During the period 1957-58 to 1962-63, West Pakistan got 62.4 percent of the commercial licenses and 69.5 percent of the industrial licenses. (Tables 29 and 30) Although East Pakistan received 37.5 percent of the total value of commercial licenses and 31.0 percent of the total value of industrial licenses issued, we should note that this share of East Pakistan also included some West Pakistani involvement in partnerships with East Pakistanis and some businesses owned by West Pakistanis but run by East Pakistanis. Thus East Pakistan's actual share would be much lower.

Table 29

Commercial Import Licenses Issued to East and West Pakistan.
(Percent of total commercial license value.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>W.P.</th>
<th>E.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative percentages 62.4 37.5

Source: Adapted from P. S. Thomas, "Import Licensing and Import Liberalisation in Pakistan", The Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1966, Table A-6, p. 533

Table 30

Industrial Import Licenses Issued to East and West Pakistan.
(Percent of total licenses.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>W.P.</th>
<th>E.P.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cumulative percentage: 69.5 31.0

Source: Adapted from P. S. Thomas, "Import Licensing and Import Liberalisation in Pakistan", The Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1966, Table A-6, p. 534.

West Pakistan further gained from her substantial share in the foreign exchange allocations and import licenses in view of Pakistan's over-valued exchange rate. West Pakistan being a major importer of foreign goods and East Pakistan being a major exporter to foreign countries, the exchange rate policies of the government tremendously benefitted the former to the detriment of the latter.

Export Bonus Scheme

When Pakistan's exports fell after the Korean boom, the government introduced in 1959 a device known as the Export Bonus Scheme with a view to boosting exports. According to this scheme, the exporters of manufactured goods were allowed to use between 20 and 40 percent of their export earnings for imports with much relaxed rules. In view of the protected market of Pakistan for consumer goods, the demand for superior quality

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imported goods was very high and this enabled the exporters to earn a very high profit. A close look will, however, reveal that the scheme allowed imports from the sale proceeds of exported manufactured goods and not from primary goods or raw-materials which were East Pakistan's principal exports; it was West Pakistan which was the principal exporter of manufactured goods. West Pakistan's industries, which benefitted by importing capital goods at a cheaper price from East Pakistan's foreign earning, also exported the bulk of manufactured goods and thus made high profits from the import of consumer goods allowed under the scheme. Thus it appears that West Pakistan benefitted from East Pakistan's foreign earnings in many different ways.

Transfer of Resources from the Agricultural to the Industrial Sector

In order to promote industrial development the planners of Pakistan were determined to increase savings in an economy which was overwhelmingly agricultural. To accomplish this goal they adopted a policy of transferring resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. Although most foreign earnings came from the export of East Pakistan's jute, tea and fish and West Pakistan's cotton, these earnings were made available to the industrial sector dominated by West Pakistanis. According to one estimate, there was a transfer of resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector amounting to Rs. 3,600 million per annum.

Table 31 reveals that agriculture continued to constitute the principal sector in the economy of the country as a whole, although its contribution to the G.N.P. declined steadily from 60 percent in 1949-50 to 48 percent in 1964-65, while the contribution of the manufacturing sector registered a

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1 Lewis, Pakistan, p. 29.


Table 31
Percentage of G.N.P. in Pakistan contributed by agriculture and manufacturing industries. (At 1959-60 constant factor cost)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sayeedul Huq, "Patterns of Industrialization in Pakistan", in Robinson and Kidron, eds., op.cit., Table 9.1, p. 153

a rise from 5.8 percent to 11.5 percent in the same periods. Although this decline in the agricultural sector and rise in the manufacturing sector might be explained as an indication of the country's journey towards industrialization, this trend had a definite detrimental effect on East Pakistan's economy which had, as noted earlier, very bright prospects for the development of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, etc. Since the majority of Pakistan's industries were situated in West Pakistan, the rise in the industrial sector and decline in the agricultural sector in effect meant an economic gain for West Pakistan and a loss for East Pakistan.

The agricultural sector in West Pakistan also developed at a faster rate than in East Pakistan. Thus during the 1960's the value added to agriculture and major crops in West Pakistan grew at 4.6 percent and 5.5 percent per annum, respectively, while the corresponding growth rates in East Pakistan were 2.1 and 2.2 percent.

We noted above that given the superior potential of East Pakistan in agriculture, all that she needed was a little investment in coastal embankments, flood control measures, irrigation, fertilizers, good seeds, and

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1 Swadesh Bose, "East-West Contrast in Pakistan's Agricultural Development", in Robinson and Kidron, eds., op.cit., Table 8.1, p. 128.
financial assistance to farmers. Economic inputs and better techniques in terms of these facilities were directed instead towards the development of the barren, low quality lands of West Pakistan at the neglect of East Pakistan's fertile and good quality lands. Thus West Pakistan marched forward both industrially and agriculturally.

Foreign Aid

Pakistan received considerable amounts of foreign aid to finance her various development and industrial projects. Although both the wings had equal claims on the foreign aid, East Pakistan received only 4 percent of the total foreign aid from sources other than the United States, and 34 percent of the U.S. aid; the remaining 96 percent and 66 percent was spent to finance gigantic projects in West Pakistan such as Karachi Port Development, Mangla and Targela Dams, Indus Basin Replacement Works, Heavy Machinery Complexes, etc.

One consistent argument by the Central Government and West Pakistani economists to rationalize the small investment in East Pakistan was that East Pakistan's 'absorption capacity' was very low. If absorption capacity was explained in terms of economic infrastructure, one wonders how East Pakistan herself could have developed it without deliberate and serious efforts by the Central Government which was in charge of undertaking the economic development of the whole country.

Impact of Economic Policies and Practices of the Central Government

It was an admitted fact that Pakistan had achieved tremendous economic

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1 West Pakistan's agricultural sector received the bulk of fertilizers, improved seeds, irrigation facilities, and other incentives such as the reduction of export duties on cotton, price stabilization and price control, etc. See, for example, Swadesh Bose, "East West Contrast", Tables 8.3; 8.4; and pp. 130-44; Griffin, op.cit., pp. 612-3.

2 Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 17; estimates are cited to be "by a group of Scholars in Vienna"—presumably foreign scholars (p. 15).

3 See, for example, Abdul Matin, "Problem of Inter-wing Development and Strategy of the Third Five-Year Plan", in Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, ed., The Third Five-Year Plan and Other Papers, (Rawalpindi: The Pakistan Economic Investigation, 1963), pp. 215-19.
advancements, especially during the Ayub regime - the regime which placed economic development far above development in other spheres as a means to promote the economic betterment of the people and the integration of the two regions. Thus the G.N.P. of the country increased 29% in the 1950's but 73% in the 1960s; per capita income rose 2% in the 1950s but 33% in the 1960s. Pakistan became a model of economic development for developing areas.

But these gross quantitative measurements of Pakistan's economic development concealed the distributive aspect of economic development. The strategies and policies as pursued by Pakistani planners not only widened regional disparities, they also created a very wide gap between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural people.

Concentration of Income

The policies of free private enterprise, coupled with heavy government incentives to industrial entrepreneurs, in fact helped to achieve one of the central objectives of the planners, i.e., the concentration of income which would lead to a high level of savings and investment and less dependence on foreign assistance. The Chief Economist of the Planning Commission of Pakistan disclosed in 1968 that about 20 families controlled 66 percent of the total industrial assets, 70 percent of all insurance funds and 80 percent of bank assets. It should be noted that none of these "20 families" was Bengali. Although the concentration of income in such a magnitude was unhealthy for

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1 Planning Commission, Report of the Panel of Economists, p. 132; Percentages have been calculated.
for the country as a whole, West Pakistanis reaped some benefits out of this in the form of getting employment which was far beyond the reach of East Pakistanis. Such concentration of income generated wide-spread resentment in both wings, a resentment which was expressed through the programs and policies of parties such as Awami League, Pakistan People's Party, National Awami Party (both factions) and the Pakistan Democratic Party. All these parties demanded nationalization of heavy industries, bank and insurance companies.

Transfer of Resources from East to West Pakistan. Imbalances in the economic life of the country was accentuated by the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan. According to Power's estimate:

Over 14 years, from 1948 to 1961, East Pakistan's total-of-trade surplus was about 1,500 million rupees, a capital outflow which, together with foreign capital of about 3,900 million rupees, financed West Pakistan's cumulative deficit of 5,400 million rupees. In addition, East Pakistan had a deficit of about 3,500 million rupees with West. If we assume that on the average Pakistani products are priced 40 percent above their equivalents in world markets, there is implied an additional transfer of about 2,500 million rupees for 14 years, or about 180 million rupees per year. This is more than 2 percent of East Pakistan's average annual income for the period as best we can estimate it. In addition, if we assume that East Pakistan's share of foreign capital inflow into West was in proportion to its population, the transfer would be almost doubled.1

According to another estimate made by the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission during the Ayub regime:

The extent of this transfer of real resources was about Rs. 210 million per annum in the pre-Plan period and Rs. 100 million in the Plan period. It meant that roughly 2 per cent. of East Pakistan's regional income in the pre-Plan period and 1 per cent. in the Plan period was being taken away by West Pakistan, besides all the foreign aid and loans.2

On top of this, the Chief Economist says, if the distribution of foreign aid and loans and foreign exchange reserves were taken into account, East Pakistan's trans-

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fer of resources to West Pakistan would stand at 4 to 5 percent per annum of the 
East's income.\(^1\)

The latest estimate shows that the transfer of resources from East Pakistan to 
West Pakistan was to the tune of Rs. 46,420 million during the period 1949-50 to 
1969-70,\(^2\) that is, an annual average of Rs. 2,321 million.

Some West Pakistani economists, however, have questioned the validity of such 
an estimate of the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan.\(^3\) One of 
these economists, Professor Mahmud Khan, challenged the above estimate of the 
"Bengali economists" but came out with the conclusion that "the so-called" net 
resource transfer" from East to West Pakistan was about half of the amounts claimed."\(^4\)

It is noticeable that Professor Khan challenged the estimate of the "Bengali econo­ 
mists", without any reference to earlier estimates by the 'non-Bengali' and 'non- 
Pakistani' economists, for example, the Power and Haq estimate. According to 
Professor Khan's quantification, the transfer of resources from East to West 
Pakistan stood at Rs. 1,160 million per year, while according to Power's estimate 
it was Rs. 180 million, and according to Huq's estimate it was Rs. 210 million 
per year in the pre-plan period and Rs. 100 million in the plan period.

The transfer of resources generated major differences in the levels of in­ 
vestment in the two wings. This enabled West Pakistan to keep her investment level 
far above the capital generated by domestic savings. Thus, in the first decade,

\(^1\) Mahbub ul Haq, op. cit., p. 102.  
\(^2\) Planning Commission, Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year 
\(^3\) See, for example, Abdul Matin, op. cit., pp. 213-5; Mahmud Hasan Khan, 
"An Interpretation of the "Net Resource Transfer" from Bangladesh to Pakistan from 
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 4.  
\(^5\) Ibid., p.3-4; Table I.
West Pakistan maintained a gross investment at about 12 percent of her G.D.P., although domestic saving was only 7 percent in the pre-Plan and 5 percent in the first Plan period. Investment in East Pakistan during the same periods fell. Her gross investment was 5 percent in the pre-Plan and 6 percent in the first Plan period, although gross domestic saving was about 7 percent during both the periods.

The continuation of this transfer of East Pakistan's resources to West Pakistan became a matter of widespread resentment in East Pakistan and was much capitalized upon by the Awami League.

The concentration of income in a few West Pakistani hands and the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan, coupled with heavy revenue and development expenditures in West Pakistan, led to a situation in which the economic base of East Pakistan became weaker and weaker. Thus, with regard to regional per capita gross domestic product, West Pakistan's G.D.P. was 32 percent higher than East Pakistan's in 1959-60 and this disparity increased steadily. There was a break in 1963-64 when the disparity fell to 36 percent from the previous year's 42 percent, but the highest disparity, 62 percent, occurred in 1969-70. (Table 32 below.) The rate of growth in West Pakistan during the period 1959-60 to 1969-70 was more than double than in East Pakistan.

In terms of per capita income, whereas East Pakistan registered a decline of -0.3 percent in 1959-60 from 1949-50 base period, West Pakistan registered a growth of 0.8 percent during the same period. (Table 33 below.)

1 Mahbub ul Haq, op.cit., p. 131.
2 See Mujibur Rahman's speech at the Round Table Conference, Dawn (Karachi), March 14, 1969; Ministry of External Affairs, op.cit., p. 36
Table 32

Per capita Gross Domestic Product in East and West Pakistan. (At 1959-60 constant prices). In Rupees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>E.P.</th>
<th>W.P.</th>
<th>W.P. GDP higher than E.P. in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Growth over the decade: 17% 42%

Growth in the Third Plan Period: 7% 18%


Table 33

Regional Levels of per capita income and rates of per capita growth. (At 1959-60 prices). In rupees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>E.P.</th>
<th>W.P.</th>
<th>W.P.'s per capita income higher than E.P. in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual compound rate of per capita growth. (In percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periods</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>(-)0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Government of Pakistan, Report of the Panel of Economists, p. 133.
During the third Plan period, the disparity in per capita income widened further. Whereas West Pakistan's per capita income was only Rs. 51 higher (18%) than that of East Pakistan in 1949-50, the gap widened steadily until it reached Rs. 206 (62%) in 1969-70 (Table 33). The gap grew despite the fact that the rate of population growth in East Pakistan had always been lower than in West Pakistan: 1.9 percent during 1951-61 in East Pakistan, as against 2.4 percent in West Pakistan.

The differences in per capita income do not, however, tell the whole story of the economic plight of the people of East Pakistan since the purchasing capacity of money also differed in the two wings due to the differential price levels of essential commodities. According to an authoritative estimate, if purchasing power of money in the two wings was taken into account, the "true" extent of disparity in West-East income in 1959-60 would be 60 percent rather than the 30 percent calculated by the government.

More important to note is the fact that the East Pakistan price of rice, Table 34

Regional Prices of Certain Products in Constant Prices (average of 1949-50 to 1952-53) per ton.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>E.P. Price Rs.</th>
<th>W.P. Price Rs.</th>
<th>E.P.'s price higher than W.P. in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gram</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar-cane</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Mahbub ul Haq, op.cit., p. 93.

1 N. Shamsi, "Growth of Population and Economic Development in Pakistan", in A. I. Qureshi, ed., op.cit., Table 1, p. 267; D. M. Qureshi, "National Income Per Capita and the Rate of Growth of Population in Pakistan", in ibid., Table 1, p. 259; Albert Waterson, Planning in Pakistan: Organization and Implementation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. IX.

2 Mahbub ul Haq, op.cit., Tables 13(a), 13(b), pp. 92-4.
the principal food of the Bengalis, was 55 percent higher than the price in West Pakistan, while the West Pakistan price of wheat, the staple food of the people of West Pakistan, was almost half of the price in East Pakistan. (Table 34) All this indicates that the purchasing power of money in West Pakistan was much higher than in East Pakistan.

The stagnant agricultural sector, the low rate of industrialization, less government expenditure, the transfer of resources, etc., resulted in severe unemployment in East Pakistan (Table 35 below). In 1949-50, 25 percent of the labor force in East Pakistan was unemployed, as against 3 percent in West Pakistan. Thus, the rate of unemployment was 733 percent higher in East Pakistan than West Pakistan.

Table 35
Unemployment in East and West Pakistan. (In percentage of total labor force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>E.P.</th>
<th>W.P.</th>
<th>E.P.'s unemployment higher than W.P. in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Mahbub ul Haq, op.cit., Table 22, p. 108.

As Table 35 shows, the East-West unemployment gap was reduced quite considerably over the years; from 733 percent in 1949-50 to 313 percent in 1959-60. But on the whole, more of labor force became unemployed in both wings. Though unemployment figures for the later years could not be gathered, it may be assumed that the situation in the 1960's did not show any improvement over that in the 1950's. The considerable number of unemployed men in East Pakistan, having nothing to do, preferred to engage in 'full time politics',
directed against 'colonial exploitation' by West Pakistan.

Rural-Urban Income Disparity.

The "unprecedented" industrial growth in Pakistan had to be heavily paid for by rural agricultural people who constituted about 85 percent of the population. The architects of the Third Five Year Plan admitted that:

there was a considerable transfer of savings from the agricultural to the industrial sector ... as terms of trade were deliberately turned against agriculture through such policies as licensing of scarce foreign exchange earned primarily by agriculture to the industrial sector, compulsory government procurement of foodgrains at low prices to subsidize the cost of living of the urban, industrial workers, generous tax concessions to industry and lack of similar incentives for commercial agricultural investment. 1

Table 36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per capita Rural-Urban Income Distribution in Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954-55 (Rs.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Griffin, op. cit., Table IV, p. 608.

Table 36 shows that the average urban income in Pakistan was 5.6 times higher than the average rural income in 1954-55 and 6.1 times higher in 1964-65. This urban-rural disparity in income demonstrates that the fruits of economic achievements in Pakistan were reaped by a small section of urban people, i.e., about 27 percent (Table 36), while the rural majority though it had overwhelmingly

1 Quoted in Griffin, op. cit., pp. 605-6.
contributed to the economic growth of the country, remained as poor as before. In East Pakistan, the gap between rural poor and urban rich widened quite steadily. Table 37 below reveals that there had been a decline in the per capita rural income between 1949-50 and 1963-64, while the per capita urban income increased almost steadily, though not considerably. While the rural-urban gap in per capita income in 1949-50 was Rs. 338, it rose to Rs. 476 in 1963-64.

Table 37

Per capita Factor Incomes of Total Agricultural, Rural and Urban Population in East Pakistan. (In rupees at 1959-60 constant prices).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Rural Income</th>
<th>Urban Income</th>
<th>Urban income higher than rural income in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Swadesh Bose, "Trend of Real Income of the Rural Poor in East Pakistan - 1949-66", The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 8, (1968), Table-1, p. 455. Bose's note: Figures for the period following 1963-64 were not available.
Apart from regional and rural-urban inequalities in income, there were also wide gaps among different income groups of the country. According to Bergan's survey for 1963-64, 50 percent of the households received only about one-fourth of the total personal income while the top 5 percent of the households received 20 percent. The concentration of income was even higher among the urban population. According to the same survey, only one-fifth of the total urban income went to the lower 50 percent of urban households, while one-fourth went to the top 5 percent of the urbanites.

It then would appear from the above evidence that there were wide gaps in per capita income between urban and rural people and among different income groups of both regions. On the whole, however, the rural masses had very low income, although their rate of savings was double that of the urban households.

Both the Awami League and the People's Party, the victorious parties of the two regions in the 1970 general elections, projected this issue of income inequalities as the manifestation of neo-exploitation by the ruling class, although they differed in their approach and emphasis: the Awami League putting emphasis on regional income and the People's Party on personal income. It was no surprise that both these parties were successful in carrying the poor masses with them -- both urban and rural -- in their respective provinces.

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East Pakistan's Grievances and Demands on the System

From the very beginning of Pakistan's independence, the Bengalis were quite aware of being economically exploited by West Pakistan, although this sense of exploitation did not reach the rural people en masse until the middle of the 1960's. The eventual penetration of the rural areas was to a large extent due to the impact of the extended system of mass-communication and the mobilization effort of East Pakistani political parties.

In 1949 the then Muslim League Chief Minister, Nurul Amin, had complained that East Pakistan was being deprived of her due share of the jute tax and income tax. He expressed his determination to "fight on and on till our province's claim is accepted" and urged the Central Government to ensure the "fullest autonomy" to East Pakistan in view of her long distance from the center.¹

Abul Monsur Ahmad's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan also carried the same sense of deprivation -- when it alleged that the Central Government was not allocating funds in proportion to contributions to federal revenue.² The Manifesto of the East Pakistan Muslim League, released by its President, Maulavi Tamizuddin Khan, went a little further:

According to our manifesto the appalling poverty of the people of East Pakistan and the disparity between the standard of living in the two wings of the country are calculated to create disequilibrium and instability. This fact that the people of East Pakistan have hitherto been deprived of their legitimate share in the defence of the country, in the administrative appointments of the federal government and in the industrial and commercial activities of the country is a contributory cause of this disparity. Therefore, the present government in the Centre should guarantee just and equal share of East Pakistan in all these spheres as well as in the utilization of available foreign exchange of the country on the basis of parity so that present disequilibrium which is a menace to stability of Pakistan may be removed. The Central grants and aids for industrial,

¹ Hindustan Standard, March 20, 1949, cited in Maron, op.cit., p. 132.
commercial, educational and agricultural developments in East Pakistan must necessarily be also on the basis of parity.\footnote{Morning News (Dacca), November 13, 1957, cited in Richard D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan", Far Eastern Survey, (April 1959), p. 53.}

In addition to these, the 1949 Manifesto of the Awami League,\footnote{Cited in Umar, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 22-25.} the 21-point Program of the United Front,\footnote{See Appendix A, infra.} the 9-point Election Manifesto of the Combined Opposition Parties,\footnote{Supra.} the 6-point Program of the Awami League,\footnote{Supra.} the 8-Point Program of the Pakistan Democratic Movement,\footnote{Feldman, \textit{From Crisis to Crisis}, Appendix G, pp. 320-22.} the 11-point Program of the Students' Action Committee,\footnote{Supra.} and others, demanded the removal of economic disparities between the two wings of the country by the adoption of various devices such as provincial autonomy, decentralization of power, nationalization of certain industries, dispersal of Central Government offices, and so on.

Whereas the East Pakistani politicians mainly placed stress on structural changes as remedies to the problem of disparities between the two wings, a group of East Pakistani economists had been, since the mid-1950's, putting forward some policy recommendations and suggestions for structural changes designed to remove disparities and attain parity.

\textbf{The Theory of Two Economies} The theory was first expounded by A. Sadeque at the Chittagong Conference of the Pakistan Economic Association in 1956. Other
East Pakistani economists later joined him and developed the theory which recommended in view of the structural differences in the economies of the two regions, spatial separation and the resultant immobility of labour and the fruits of economic growth, economic disparities and price differentials that economic development in Pakistan should be so planned as to treat each region's economy as a separate entity, not as part of an integrated whole. It was suggested that each region should be allowed to have control over its own revenues and foreign exchange earnings and should be permitted to enter into trade pacts with other countries and to adopt monetary and fiscal policies consistent with the growth of its own economy.\(^1\) To quickly remove the existing disparities, this group of economists suggested policies of accelerated growth for East Pakistan, "consciously and deliberately discriminatory in favour of East Pakistan vis-a-vis West Pakistan, and whatever is needed for this purpose must become an integral part of such policies.\(^2\)" Specifically, the East Pakistani economists insisted that to remove disparities, resources should be allocated not only on the basis of population "but of population weighted by the inverse ratio of per capita income". Their mathematical formula was:

\[ \frac{\text{East Pakistan}}{\text{West Pakistan}} = \frac{54}{46} \times \frac{1.25}{1} = 67 \frac{1}{2}\]


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 199, at the time the article was written the author was a Member of the Planning Commission of Pakistan and became Finance Minister of East Pakistan the following month, during Ayub regime.

As to the structure of the Planning Commission, some East Pakistani economists suggested that

though for the preservation of national unity and solidarity an overall planning authority is essential ... yet for maximum economic development greater emphasis should be laid on regional planning with their respective autonomous planning units than an overall planning for the whole country .... These are not sentiments, but hard facts of national economy.¹

The Daily Ittefaq, most popular vernacular daily in East Pakistan and the mouthpiece of the Awami League, recommended editorially that since different regions of Pakistan had different problems and were at different stages of development, central planning could not do justice to all regions; the remedy was to dissolve the Planning Commission of Pakistan and to form a co-ordinating committee with representatives from regional planning commissions.²

These recommendations of East Pakistani economists obviously strengthened the hands of East Pakistani autonomists, who found in these theories a 'theoretical justification' for their demand for "full autonomy."


The Central Government's economic policies prior to the formulation of the First Five-Year Plan were not at all concerned with the problem of mounting disparities, and they may be said to have lacked coherence, consistency and any relevance to the complicated issues of regional development. The First Five-Year Plan, however, committed itself to increase rapidly the rate of development of East Pakistan to reduce regional disparities.³ But this policy statement did not match with the physical nature of the Plan and its implementation. The Plan set an investment target of Rs. 125 per capita in East Pakistan as against Rs. 225 in West

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² Daily Ittefaq (Dacca), February 7, 1970.
³ Mahbub ul Haq, op. cit., p. 135.
Pakistan, and the actual investment turned out to be Rs. 80 in East Pakistan and Rs. 205 in West Pakistan.¹

When Ayub came to power in 1958, the Two Economies Theory was getting more publicity and public support.² Although the regime and some West Pakistani politicians branded the theory as dangerous and said it would lead to the end of Pakistan,³ they found it necessary at least to appear to make efforts to reduce the disparities.

The removal of disparities was made obligatory on the part of the Central Government by provisions of the 1962 Constitution. Thus Article 145 of the Constitution provided for the establishment of the National Economic Council (NEC) whose primary objective was to ensure that inter-regional and intra-regional disparities, in terms of per capita income, were removed and that the resources of the country, including foreign exchange, were allocated to provinces in a manner conducive to the removal of such disparities.⁴ The preceding article, Article 144, provided for another institution, the National Finance Commissions,⁵ which were entrusted with the duties of making recommendations about the distribution of certain taxes between the Central and Provincial Governments, reporting on the progress made with regard to the objective of Article 145, and making further commendations as to how the objective

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² See *Jahan, op. cit.*, pp. 87-9.
³ For the regime's views see *ibid.*, p. 87; for a politician's views see the comment of A.K. Sumar, Chairman of the National Press Trust and a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, in *Dawn* (Karachi), June 16, 1966.
⁴ Ministry of Law, *op. cit.*
⁵ These Commissions were actually established in 1961.
of removing disparities could be achieved.\footnote{Ministry of Law, \textit{op.cit.}, Article 144.} We should note that these were purely advisory bodies and that the Government was under no obligation to implement their recommendations.\footnote{Consider clauses 4, 5 and 8 of Article 144 and clauses 7, 8 of Article 145.} Moreover, there were allegations against the National Economic Council that it was not at all serious about its constitutional obligations:

Now Sir, 1962 is gone, 1963 is gone, and 1964 is going. Although it is constitutional obligation that the National Economic Council must submit a report to the National Assembly every year,\footnote{Article 144, clause 8.} it has not been done even once, and this is the way we are working our Constitution.\footnote{National Assembly of Pakistan, \textit{Debates}, Quoted in Jayanta K. Ray, \textit{Democracy and Nationalism on Trial: A Case Study of East Pakistan} (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1968), p. 317.}

In 1963 the Ayub regime created another institution, the National Income Commission, which was to make recommendations on the preparation of national income statistics. This would help the National Economic Council in fulfilling the obligation placed on it by Article 45 of the Constitution.\footnote{\textit{Asian Recorder}, May 28-June 3, 1963, p. 5225.}

The first Finance Commission failed to arrive at any compromise formula about the central-provincial allocation of resources.\footnote{The East and West Pakistani members of the Commission, having failed to agree on the terms of recommendation, submitted two separate reports which were not published. See Edgar A. and Kathryn Schuler, \textit{Public Opinion and Constitution-Making in Pakistan 1958-1962} (East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 1967) pp. 144-5.} The government, however, managed to come out with principles to allocate the income tax, the sales tax, excise duties, and export duties on jute and cotton, between the Centre and Provinces and also between East and West Pakistan.\footnote{Schular and Schular, \textit{op.cit.}, Tables I and II, pp. 146-7.} These principles of
allocation failed to match the expectations of the Bengalis.¹

The constitutional objectives of the Ayub regime were incorporated into
the Five-Year Plan as well. The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) provided for
the accelerated growth of relatively less developed areas in the country.² The
total development expenditure in East Pakistan during this plan period rose
to 32 percent as against 26 percent of the previous period of 1955-60.³

Since regionalism in East Pakistan during the period preceding the Third
Five-Year Plan (1965-70) already had taken an alarming shape, the government
in the Third Plan came out with more concrete commitments on reducing regional
disparities and aimed at reducing disparities by one-fifth by the end of 1970.
The Ayub regime also took up a 20 year Perspective Plan (1965-85) of which the
Third Five-Year Plan was the integral first step. The Perspective Plan aimed,
among other things, at the complete elimination of inter-wing disparities by the
end of 1985 in per capita income terms.⁴ The Third Plan allocated more funds
to East Pakistan: Rs. 27 thousand million as against West Pakistan's Rs. 25
thousand million. Of course, the Plan's allocation of funds does not project
the whole picture. While it became a fashion for the regime and some West
Pakistani economists to point to the Plan's more allocation of money to East
Pakistan as a gesture of good will of the regime and the West Pakistani people,
the East Pakistanis were too conscious to be fooled. They consistently pointed
out the funds earmarked outside the plan for big projects in West Pakistan, such
as the Indus Basin Replacement Works which amounted to Rs. 2,110 million during

¹ Ibid., pp. 147-8.
² Cited in Waterson, op.cit., p. 102.
³ See Table 27, supra.,
⁴ Cited in Ole David Koht Norbye, Development Prospects of Pakistan (Oslo:
Universities for Laget, 1968), p. 239.
⁵ Supra., Table 27.
The Central Government's argument that the Indus Basin project was kept outside the Plan because it was covered by a special treaty became a subject of rage for the Bengalis, and they regarded such an argument as "preposterous" and "the joke of the day".1 Taken as a whole then, with Rs. 25 thousand million within the Plan and Rs. 3,600 million outside the Plan, West Pakistan received more than East Pakistan. We should note, however, that the Third Plan brought East Pakistan's share of the development expenditures to 36 percent, against 32 percent of the 2nd Plan period.2

In terms of per capita revenue and development expenditures, West Pakistan remained far ahead: Rs. 521.05 in per capita development expenditure and Rs. 390.53 in per capita revenue expenditure as against East Pakistan's Rs. 240 and Rs. 70.29.3

Both foreign and East Pakistani experts were pessimistic about the Perspective Plan's objective of completely eliminating inter-wing disparities; the former about the feasibility and the latter about the "adequacy and boldness" of the Central Government to meet the problem.4

The Yahya regime was very much "sympathetic" to the plight of the Bengalis. Yahya expressed his belief that:

In our circumstances, there is no alternative to planned economic development. But planned development cannot be isolated from the demands of social justice. The wide gap which separates the different sections of society must be narrowed, and the imbalance which led to social strife and discontent must be removed.5

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1 Mohammad Anisur Rahman, "Regional (East-West) Per Capita Income Disparity and the Perspective Plan", in A.I. Qureshi, ed., op. cit., p. 239.
2 Supra., Table 27.
3 Calculated from Table 27, supra.
4 One such foreign expert, Norbye, op. cit., p. 282, extensively examined the Perspective Plan and came out with a 'doubtful' conclusion. An East Pakistani expert's reaction presented by M.N. Huda, op. cit., p. 197.
5 Dawn (Karachi), April 11, 1969.
With the above ends in view, the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75) allocated a larger share (52.5 percent) for the development of East Pakistan. The planners also projected a transfer of resources worth Rs. 750 to 1000 crores from West to East Pakistan in order to narrow down the economic disparities between the two wings.

Although the Yahya regime regarded this 'big push' as "positive steps to reduce regional disparities and provide a greater measure of social justice", the Bengali members of the regime were not happy with such allocations. The East Pakistani politicians, however, showed little concern over the Plan because they were contemplating to overhaul the system itself and as such the Plan mattered very little to them.

Apart from the Five-Year Plan and the establishment of institutions to remove disparities, there were other policy measures of the Central Government directed towards the end of promoting economic development of East Pakistan at a faster rate:

(a) The system of a tax holiday, introduced in 1959, granted a tax exemption to recognized industries in East Pakistan for 2 years. The period was extended to 6 years in 1960-61 and to 8 years in 1961-62 for East Pakistan and the underdeveloped regions of West Pakistan, as against 4 years for developed regions of West Pakistan.

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2 Per M. M. Ahmad, Vice-Chairman, Planning Commission of Pakistan, Dawn, July 2, 1970.
4 G. W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, p. 63. Choudhury was a member of the regime from East Pakistan.
(b) In 1961-62, customs duties on the import of machinery and spare parts were reduced from 12-1/2 percent to 7-1/2 percent for East Pakistan.¹

(c) In 1962, the Railway was provincialized, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation was bifurcated and made a provincial corporation, and the headquarters of the House Building Finance Corporation was shifted to East Pakistan. Dacca was also made the second capital of Pakistan and the principal seat of National Assembly.

These economic measures of the Central Government definitely attained some positive results. Though there is no data available, it may be said that these measures gave rise to a small industrial class in East Pakistan whose members were not contented with these selective measures. They found it very tough to compete with West Pakistani industrialists and, as an alternative course of action, they joined the East Pakistani autonomists who, they believed, would be sympathetic to their interests.

Although there was some progress made during the '60's in terms of economic and social infrastructures, East Pakistan lagged far behind West Pakistan and this became a matter of resentment for the Bengalis. Thus whereas 2,824 miles of new roads were constructed in West Pakistan during the period 1959-60 to 1966-67, corresponding construction in East Pakistan was 1,548 miles; whereas the number of motor vehicles in West Pakistan increased by 150,167, in East Pakistan it increased by 31,875 during the same period.² Hospitals in East Pakistan during the period 1959-1966 increased by 5, as against West Pakistan's 55. Increase in hospital beds in East Pakistan during the same period was 2,512 against 4,642 in West Pakistan. The increase in doctors was 1,929 in East Pakistan and 4,873 in West Pakistan.³

¹ Ibid.
² Jahan, op.cit., Statistical Appendix, Table 18, p. 215.
³ Ibid., Statistical Appendix, Table 16, p. 214.
West Pakistan registered a phenomenal growth in education which is demonstrated in the graph below:

**GRAPH 1**

Enrollment in Schools and Universities in East and West Pakistan, 1947-66.

The above graph shows that in 1947-48 East Pakistan was above West Pakistan in the level of enrollment of students at various levels of educational institutions. In 1965-66 West Pakistan's enrollments outstripped East Pakistan's except at the primary level. It may be argued that East Pakistan's decline at the secondary and post-secondary levels resulted from her poverty. It is a valid argument to some extent; but this poverty, the East Pakistanis believed or were made to believe by party propagandas, was the creation of deliberate policies of the Central Government.

Source: Jahan, op. cit., p. 82.
Bengali Reactions to Policy Responses of the Central Governments

It appears from the foregoing discussions that compared to the pre-Plan period of 1947-1955/56, economic development in East Pakistan, especially during the 1960's, was enhanced to some extent, in terms of development expenditure, industrial growth, and growth in the economic and social infrastructure. But the Bengalis politicians did not calculate in terms of the amount of money allocated to East Pakistan but rather in terms of the per capita income which declined over years. The mass of the people, on the other hand, were more concerned with the price-level and flood control than with the physical size of various Plans and other policy measures to enhance East Pakistan's rate of economic growth. The East Pakistan parties, such as the Awami League and the National Awami Party (both factions), vigorously mobilized the masses of the people of East Pakistan, projecting West Pakistan and the Central Government as a colonial power and calling upon the people to support them in an effort to bring an end to exploitation. East Pakistani intellectuals in general, and economists in particular, joined the autonomists and thus strengthened their hand.

The report of the panel of economists on the draft Fourth Five-Year Plan of Pakistan was characteristic of the anguish of the Bengalis as a whole. The economists commented:

Our analysis indicates that despite the formal commitment of the Government of Pakistan to reduce disparity, the extent of disparity in per capita income between East and West Pakistan has widened at an increasing rate over the past decade and the commitment was only honoured only in the breach. Disproportionately higher rate levels of development and non-development expenditure in West Pakistan, supported by fiscal and commercial policy throughout the past two decades, led to the creation of a thriving private enterprise in West Pakistan while that in the East was deliberately left to lag behind.  

We have seen in the above paragraphs that these allegations of the East Pakistanis against the Central Government of Pakistan were not without foundation.

Despite Bengalis' consistent demands for flood control measures for East Pakistan, the Central Government did not seriously attend to the matter. Each year's damage by flood to property, crops, cattle, etc., was estimated to be an average of Rs. 1,000 million. The Awami League government at the Center headed by Suhrawardy appointed Crug Commission to make recommendations regarding flood control in East Pakistan, but the ministry could not survive to implement the recommendations of the commission:

TheGovernment could not manage Rs. 400 crores [Rs. 4,000 million] for East Pakistan's flood control [estimated expenditure by the Crug Commission], whereas it completed the Indus Basin project involving Rs. 600 crores [Rs. 6,000 million].

Ayub assured the East Pakistanis in 1969 of preparing a "feasible master plan" to provide protection against flood ravages and also indicated the World Bank's "sympathetic consideration" and his government's efforts to get financial assistance from other countries for this purpose. His hope, however, did not materialize.

In 1970 coastal areas of East Pakistan were hit by the century's worst cyclone in which about 1 million lives were estimated to have been lost. The Central Government's failure to make a quick response to this calamity provided a chance to the East Pakistani autonomists to exploit this issue politically. The Awami League accused the Central Government of "criminal neglect and discrimination against Bangladesh." The party resented that

Rs.20 crores could not be found in ten years for building these cyclone-proof shelters, yet over Rs. 200 crores could be found for building those monuments of luxury and waste in Islamabad.

1 Abul Monsur Ahmad, Sheree-Bangla Hoite Bongobongdu, p. 173.
2 Ibid., pp. 173-4. The figure for flood damage seems to be exaggerated.
4 Mujib's statement to foreign journalists on November 26, 1970, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh, p. 17.
To the Awami League the injustices in the economic life of the country were the product of management of the economy by the Central Government, and the party did not believe that the Central Government was capable of redressing such injustices. According to the Awami League, the 6-Points Program provided for a comprehensive strategy and rational solution to this "fundamental" problem.\(^1\)

The fact that East Pakistan was turned into a colony of West Pakistan was admitted by a section of West Pakistani politicians as well.\(^2\) The Bengalis' feeling of being exploited was not, as an East Pakistani economist put it, mere "sentiments, but the hard facts of national economy."\(^3\)

One should not be completely indifferent to the measures and policies of the Central Government during the period 1958-70, however. But there remained a big gap between the policies and their implementation. The fact that the West Pakistani bureaucrats occupied all important policy formulations as well as implementation positions, and since they were not free from regional bias,\(^4\) an implementation of novel policies could hardly be expected. It appears that the West Pakistani bureaucrats created immense difficulties in sanctioning development schemes and projects in East Pakistan. Thus Mujib once characteristically complained:

The bottleneck is everywhere. Do you know how many darwaza (door) we have to knock before we can start a scheme? Take any industry; it goes to Finance Department, Ministry of Economic Affairs, then the Planning Board and this Department and that Department and ultimately the scheme is not approved. If it is approved, the time passes {there was time limit for the

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 2-3, 5.
\(^3\) Shafiqur Rehman, op. cit., p. 44.
\(^4\) Muneer Ahmad, op. cit., Table 23. P. 113.
submission and completion of a project, set by central government) and money lapses.1

Similar complaints were noted by the East Pakistani economists in 1970:

The administrative efforts for plan implementation was basically limited by the absence of East Pakistanis at the top executive positions both in central and provincial Governments. The former was responsible for the lack of the right kind of motivation of the central administration toward the development of East Pakistan. The latter was responsible for the lack of requisite leadership in the Provincial administration for the initiation of economic development in East Pakistan. And it is well-known that in Pakistan the initiation, formulation, and the implementation of development projects and policies were primarily undertaken by the bureaucrats in the top executive positions where Bengali representation was almost absent.2

In the light of the above discussions, it may be concluded firstly that the Government policies, as Bhutto said, was "smacked of colonialism" and secondly that the implementation of the Plans and policies designed to accelerate the development of East Pakistan economy was seriously handicapped by the indifferent administrative behavior of the West Pakistani bureaucrats. It was because of this prevailing gap between the formulation and the implementation of the policies of the Central Government, dominated by the West Pakistanis, that East Pakistan wanted to strip Rawalpindi of planning and other powers and to make the provinces much stronger.

Conclusion

It appears from the above discussion that initially both East and West Pakistan started from almost the same level of economic development. It was the strategies and policies adopted by the Central Government to accomplish its objective of economic development which created and increased the disparities between the two wings of the country. Although the Central Government, in response to the Bengalis' demand for an equal share in the economic

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resources of the country, had taken some positive steps with some concrete results, these had fallen far short of the expectations and legitimate claims of the Bengalis. It is evident that the Pakistan Government's goal of attaining economic development completely neglected the aspect of distributive justice. This led the Bengalis to believe they were merely a "colony" of West Pakistan, and in the late 1960's they were determined to put an end to such a situation.
Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

From our discussions and analyses presented in the foregoing chapters it appears that Pakistan had failed to fulfil any of the conditions for national integration which were suggested by our framework of analysis: there was no truly national political party; absence of impartiality of the Central Power Elite; little accommodation of the Bengalis in the effective decision-making powers; and little attempt to distribute fairly economic resources of the country.

Although the Muslim League was a party broadly inclusive of the major linguistic and geographic groups of the country, its integrative potential was lost because of its unresponsiveness to the input of demands from the Bengalis. The party's failure to accommodate the rising, representative forces and interests of East Pakistan resulted in the alienation of the latter from the former. It is evident that although all the major parties in Pakistan, except the People's Party, had organization in both the wings of the country, each party was strong in a particular wing, that is, each party was more legitimate in one wing than the other, depending on which wing the leaders came from. In other words, the support bases of the parties coincided with the regional identities of the leaders. The organization of parties along such lines produced immobilism in national life and resulted in dissension for the regimes.

The argument of the Central Power Elite, that political parties and politics was dysfunctional in a plural society like Pakistan, had caused much damage to
the politics of the country. Ayub's introduction of the system of Basic Democracies, with a promise that the new order would usher in a new era in Pakistan and forge national unity, relied upon his own personal ability, institutions such as the Civil-Military Bureaucracies, and the promotion of Islamic ideology, and it did not produce the desired results. His charisma and ideology had appeal only to a segment of population of East Pakistan who were the beneficiaries of his system. Eventually when he allowed party politics in the country and himself joined a party, he recruited into the elite position those people who were "decadent" elements of East Pakistan, who lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the great majority of the people.

Whereas a national party or parties could have lightened the burden of the national government in conflict resolution and in reducing the inter-ethnic conflict, its absence gave rise to what Verva terms as "two closed camps", that is, the camps of East and West Pakistan. As a result, the political negotiations in the country following the 1970 general elections resembled Verva's "rival states" in which "war or breakdown of negotiations" was always possible. This breakdown is exactly what happened in Pakistan.

The Central Power Elite's persistent failure to treat the Bengalis and East Pakistan as an equal partner in the federation of Pakistan and its failure to respect the Bengalis' hopes and aspirations generated a sense of alienation from the Central Power Elite and its power base, West Pakistan. Having found that the Central Power Elite was prejudiced against them, the Bengalis naturally turned to support the regional autonomists.

The Political system of Pakistan had failed to give the Bengalis a sense of participation in the decision-making process of the country. In every society

1 Verva, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus", p. 470.
2 Ibid.
new groups and ideas are in continuous circulation. It was the responsibility of the Central Government in Pakistan to see that the dominant social forces and new ideas found a proper place within the political system. It utterly failed to perform this job. The Central Power Elite in Pakistan had purposely and persistently tried to keep the Bengalis out of the circle of effective decision-making powers. When a counter-elite emerged with new ideas and programs on the political scene of East Pakistan in the mid-50s, the Central Power Elite was either unwilling or unable to accommodate it into national politics. The Ayub regime, more so than the previous regimes, systematically tried to discredit the new dominant social forces of East Pakistan by branding them as anti-Pakistani elements. The social forces are like the current of a river; its course may be diverted but the natural flow cannot be stopped; it will find its own way. Having found it extremely difficult to get into power positions, the regional autonomists directed all their energies to destroying the structure of the political system which had stood in their way.

Our discussion in the fifth chapter supports the Bengali allegations that one imperialist power had replaced another; that is, the West Pakistanis had replaced the British and that the Central Government had turned East Pakistan into a "colony" of West Pakistan. The fair distribution of the country's economic resources was completely ignored and this led to the miseries, sufferings and impoverishment of the Bengalis, despite the fact that their contribution to the building up of the national economy was greater than that of the West Pakistanis. The sense of being deprived from the economic benefits of the "unprecedented" economic development of Pakistan was probably the single most important issue which caused the general rural masses to withdraw their support from the Ayub regime and turn toward the regional autonomists in the hope of
a promising economic future.

It was the hope of economic advantage that provided part of the rationale for the formation of a federation of the two Muslim majority areas of undivided India. However, the Bengalis witnessed a steady increase in the extent of economic exploitation by the West Pakistanis. The economic hardships of the people of East Pakistan as against West Pakistan's relative affluence made the former feel very uncomfortable and antagonistic toward the latter. Economic hardships had eroded the idealism of Islam.

The Bengalis' sense of exploitation and deprivation was hastened and exacerbated by the process of social modernization, especially in the field of communication. The development of quite extensive communication media in the 1960s brought so far quiescent individuals and groups of East Pakistan the knowledge of what had been happening in the other wing of the country and also elsewhere in the world. The availability of a large number of low-priced radios exposed the rural people to a new world. Together with listening to the popular folk songs they also used to listen to news broadcasts in Bengali from Radio Pakistan, the Akash Bani (the Bengali programs of the All-India Radio), the BBC and the Voice of America. The people were particularly interested in the Akash Bani and the BBC news since these broadcasts attested to what they used to perceive around their small surroundings, and what they heard from their autonomist political leaders and students attached with regional autonomist parties. The students usually came home during school vacations and told their parents, relations and neighbors about what had been going on in the political arena of the country. Since the majority of these students came from illiterate rural

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1 Thus from 1959 to 1966, the number of radio licenses issued in East Pakistan increased by 9.8 times, while the increase over the same period in the English medium newspapers was 1.6 times and in the Bengali medium newspapers was 1.7 times. Calculated from Jahan, op.cit., Statistical appendix, Table 20, p. 216.
families, their parents, relations, and neighbors could very easily be moved by accounts of disparity, neglect and oppression inflicted by West Pakistan—the accounts which the students were imbued with in the students' party meetings, receptions and informal discussions with leading student organizers. For the rural masses, the accounts of the students were attested to by the news broadcasts and news commentaries from the Akash Bani and the BBC.

As is characteristic of any political system, the political system of Pakistan received enormous inputs in the form of demands and supports. But the demands on the system by the Bengalis far outweighed the support and the conversion of these demands into output by the system. This lack of support and prevalence of more demands put extreme stress on the political system of Pakistan. The volume of stress accumulated over years because demands had remained unprocessed or unfulfilled by the system and this led to less support for the regime and more input of support for the demands put by the Bengalis.

The failure of the Central Government to satisfy the Bengalis' demands produced a feeling of discontent and grievances. But the persistent failure to take the Bengali demands into consideration and to convert them into satisfactory output led to a demand for changing the structure of the system. Following the 1970 general elections, in March 1971 the Central Power Elite resorted to the extreme measure of military action to thwart the verdict of the great majority of the population of Pakistan. This washed away any possibility for the integrated existence of the two wings of Pakistan. This military action led the Bengalis to take recourse to the alternative of liquidating the political system itself (the state of Pakistan), and the creation of a new system which would be suitable for the fulfilment of the desires, hopes and aspirations.
The generation of stress from the input of demands is prevalent in any political system at some point or the other. But the system is to be adapted to meet stresses in order to be saved from complete destruction. It appears that while a counter-elite had emerged in the political scene of East Pakistan with a great amount of support, the Central Power Elite was reluctant to adapt itself to this changing trend. Both in the pre- and post-martial law period the Central Power Elite rather had decided to rely upon the tactics of repressing and suppressing the Bengali counter-elites as a means of reducing their political importance. These tactics did not work out because of the quantity of support for the counter-elite and because of political consciousness of the Bengalis.

In the absence of any solid base of support in East Pakistan, the Central Power Elite, in order to counter balance the input of demands, had adopted a strategy of gaining support by rewards and punishments, that is, rewards to those who supported it and punishments to those who declined to support. But, as Easton observes, "the most seductive rewards and severest punishments will never succeed in preventing some of the members of the system from pursuing what they consider to be their inextinguishable interests and from seeking, with varying degrees of success, to change the goals and norms of the system." The repressive measures of the government had simply accentuated the Bengalis' demands without being able to reduce their intensity, let alone stop them. The Ayub regime's policy of building a strong reserve of support in East Pakistan firstly through the Basic Democrats and then through the politicians was a classic example of buying support and legitimacy for the regime, which did not work as Ayub had

2 Ibid., p. 399.
thought it would. His selection of the "decadent" elements of East Pakistan as representatives could not earn the regime the support required for its maintenance. On the other hand, the input of demands and supports by and for the regional autonomists increased steadily, producing an excessive volume of stress on a system which was not adequately equipped to cope with it.

Eventually, the quantitative volume and qualitative intensity of stress on the system reached a point in March 1971 where the system's adaptive capacity was lost and, as a result, the entire system disintegrated.
Appendix A.

The 21-point Program of the United Front

Recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan;
Abolition of the Zamindary system without compensation;
Nationalization of the Jute trade;
Introduction of cooperative farming and the improvement of cottage industries;
Self-sufficiency in salt;
Refugee rehabilitation;
Improvement of irrigation system and construction of dams to save the country from floods;
Industrialization of East Pakistan;
Introduction of free, compulsory primary education;
Reorganization of the educational system and the introduction of Bengali as medium of instruction;
Repeal of all black laws of the Universities and make them autonomous;
Reorganization of pay scale to reduce the gap between low and high paid jobs;
Eradication of corruption and bribery;
Release of all political prisoners detained under the Public Safety Act, and freedom of press, speech and association;
Separation of executive from judiciary;
Introduction of Research Institute for Bengali;
Creation of monuments for the 1952 language martyrs;
Declare February 21 as Shahid Day;
Full autonomy to the provinces in accordance with the Lahore Resolution, leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency to the center.

Source: Summarized from Dawn (Karachi), December 20, 1953.
### NOMINATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1970) BY PARTY AND REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIES:</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>EP</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim League (Quyum)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>PML (Convention)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>119</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamiatul Ulema-i-Pakistan (Hzarvi)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Moscow)</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan National League (PNL)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jatio Gana Mukti Dal</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>1570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average No. of Candidates</strong></td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan: The First General Election", Asian Survey, Vol.11, No.2, 1971, p.163; Kabiruddin Ahmad, Breakup of Pakistan: Background and prospects of Bangladesh, (London; Social Science Publishers, 1972) Table II, p.86; (The figures here exclude women seats which were filled by indirect elections by the sitting members of the National Assembly.)
Appendix C.
Results of Elections to the National Assembly of Pakistan, 1970.
Percentage of total valid votes polled by various parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Province</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan People's Party</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League(Quyyum)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League(Convention)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League(Council)</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markazi Jamiat-i-Ulemai Pakistan</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party (Moscow)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Democratic Party</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Pakistan Awami League</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above figures do not include the number of contesting candidates in constituencies where proceedings due to the cyclones and the death of three of the contesting candidates in East Pakistan.

Source: Summarized from G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan, Table 5.4, p.129.
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