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Intra-Party Federalism and the Progressive Conservative Parties of Alberta and
Ontario, 1943 to 2008

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This thesis examines intra-party federalism. Broadly defined, intra-party federalism is the relationship between the provincial wing and the federal wing of a political party of the same name and partisan affiliation. While past work on this topic has tended to identify what the internal structure of a political party looks like, the present work places considerable emphasis on how provincial parties interact with their federal cousins and why these parties act in the manner they do. Using the Conservative Party of Canada and its various predecessors as an example, it relies on four case studies to focus on two primary relationships: the relationship between the federal party and the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, and the relationship between the federal party and the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party.

This thesis illustrates that intra-party relations within the Conservative Party of Canada and its various predecessors have, at times, been considerably divisive. In most situations, provincial parties have illustrated that they have only limited loyalty toward their federal counterparts. That loyalty generally exists inasmuch as the federal party is able to provide some direct benefit to the provincial party. Quite simply, there is no guarantee that the provincial party will be an active supporter of the federal party. Despite sharing the same name and often a similar ideology, the two parties exist in different worlds. The federal party is forced to balance competing interests from coast-to-coast, while the provincial party is only required to look out for its own territorial-based interests. Consequently the intra-party relationship tends to be based on pragmatic concerns more so than it is on partisan concerns.

Introduction

This thesis examines intra-party federalism in Canada's conservative parties from 1943 to the present day.¹ In doing so, it seeks to improve our understanding of how Canadian federalism and Canadian political parties interact with one another. Broadly defined, intra-party federalism is the relationship between the provincial wing and the federal wing of a political party of the same name and partisan affiliation.

One area of Canadian politics that has been understudied is the way in which these two sub-fields, federalism and political parties, interact with one another. As a result, answers to a number of important questions have been underdeveloped. These questions include: What role do Canadian political parties play in the country's federal system? How does the presence of a federal system affect Canadian political parties? What is the general relationship between federalism and Canadian political parties? How do federal and provincial parties interact with one another? With some exceptions, scholars within both subfields have by and large overlooked the study of 'intra-party federalism.' However, it is a seemingly logical conclusion that Canada's federal system would have a great deal of impact on the parties which operate within its confines and thus merits considerable attention.

With ten provincial governments, three territorial governments, the federal government, and the existence of three major political parties in English Canada (not to mention many more now defunct parties), the potential scope of the study of intra-party federalism is rather broad. However, this study will focus on the relationship between the Conservative Party of Canada and its predecessors, and provincial governments headed by Progressive Conservative administrations in Alberta and Ontario over four distinct time periods. An examination of intra-

¹ This includes the federal Progressive Conservative Party, the Reform/Canadian Alliance, the Conservative Party of Canada, and the Alberta and Ontario Progressive Conservative Parties.

party relationships in Alberta and Ontario is useful because both provinces have seen long periods of dominance by the Progressive Conservative Party. In Ontario, the party governed uninterrupted from 1943 to 1985 and again from 1995 to 2003. In Alberta, the party has governed continuously from 1971 to the present day. At the same time, however, the Progressive Conservative Party governed at the federal level only sparingly, forming the government from 1957 to 1963, from 1984 to 1993, and for ten months in 1979 and 1980.

This study focuses on four chronologically ordered time periods in a further attempt to narrow the large scope offered by the study of intra-party federalism. Specifically, this study examines: (1) the Ontario government and its relation with the federal party from its own rise to power in 1943 to the rise of Trudeaumania in the late 1960s, (2) the federal party under Joe Clark from 1976 to 1980 and its relationship with the Ontario and Alberta governments, especially during the oil pricing dispute of 1979, (3) the relationship between the Progressive Conservative federal government and the Alberta provincial government from 1984 to 1993, and (4) the rise of the Reform party in 1993, its relationship with the provincial Conservative governments in Ontario and Alberta, and its effects on intra-party federalism. The conclusions attempt to generalize the findings from all of these eras, and also briefly examine the state of intra-party federalism since the merger of the Canadian Alliance and the federal Progressive Conservative Party in 2003.

An examination of these four time periods allows for the detailed examination of at least three sets of relationships. The two primary relationships that this thesis will focus on are: (1) the relationship between the federal party and the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, and (2) the relationship between the federal party and the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party. The third relationship- which is best classified as a secondary relationship- examines the intra-

party relationship between the Alberta and Ontario provincial wings of the Progressive Conservative Party. The time period for each of the relationships varies however. For example, the first relationship- that between the federal and Ontario party is examined from 1943 to 2003. For the vast majority of this period (1943 to 1985, 1995 to 2003), the Progressive Conservative Party formed the Ontario government. The second relationship- the federal and Alberta party- is examined from 1971 to 2003. The Alberta Tories were elected in 1971 and, at the time of writing in 2008, still form the provincial government. While the study of the third relationship- that between the Alberta and Ontario provincial parties- can begin in 1971, the primary focus is on the oil pricing dispute of the late 1970s. As each provincial wing operates in relative isolation of one another and rarely has need for direct contact with another wing, this relationship is appropriately classified as a secondary relationship for the purposes of this study. The primary focus, therefore, is on the relationship between the federal and provincial parties.

A review of the academic literature on intra-party federalism necessarily draws on two broad themes in Canadian politics: the study of political parties and the study of federalism. The study of political parties in Canada is often divided into a series of party systems at both the provincial and federal level.² At the provincial level, party systems have been classified based upon their competitiveness and the role played by major and minor parties, while at the federal level the party system takes into account partisan competition, the institutional and legal framework of parties, and the discursive framework in which politics are practiced. There has also been considerable emphasis placed on brokerage politics and political parties. The

² Peter McCormick, "Provincial Political Party Systems, 1945-1986," in *Canadian Parties in Transition: Discourse, Organization, Representation*, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1989), pp. 152-85, Steve Patten, "The Evolution of the Canadian Party System," in *Canadian Parties in Transition* 3rd edition, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2007), pp. 55-82 and R. Kenneth Carty, "A New Canadian Party System," in *Political Parties and Electoral Democracy in Canada*, ed. William Cross, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 15-36.

brokerage model posits that parties develop policies that will attract the most support and which would appeal to the various regions and regional interests across the country. Brokerage parties are pragmatic and non-ideological in nature. Battles about ideas matter little to the outcomes of elections, and styles and leaders matter more. According to this view, brokerage politics was needed to bridge the country's linguistic, religious and regional cleavages.³ This model received renewed attention following the historic 1993 federal election.⁴ However, since the 1993 election, which saw the rise of parties that did not conform to the brokerage model (the BQ and Reform), as well as the regionalization of the party system, the conventional view of brokerage parties has come under increased scrutiny.⁵

Brokerage parties have been further classified, with one 'market-based' theory suggesting that parties operate as competing firms, selling products to consumers (voters), while the competing sociological theory suggests that brokerage parties seek to promote social stability in an otherwise divided society.⁶ With the increasing popularity of the public funding of political parties, it has been suggested that a new type of party- the cartel party- has emerged with the goal of erecting barriers to new political parties, thus protecting the place of more established

³ F.C. Engelmann and Mildred Schwartz, *Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact* (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1975) and Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon Pammett, *Absent Mandate: The Politics of Discontent in Canada* (Toronto: Gage, 1984) and

⁴ Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen: Stability and Change in Brokerage Politics," in *Canadian Parties in Transition* 3rd edition, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2007), pp. 33-54.

⁵ R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross, and Lisa Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000 and André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte, *Anatomy of a Liberal Victory: Making Sense of the Vote in the 2000 Canadian Election* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002)

⁶ For an overview of the market analogy, see J.R. Mallory, *The Structure of Canadian Government* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971) and for an overview of the sociological view, see F.C. Engelmann and Mildred Schwartz, *Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure* (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

parties.⁷ It has also been suggested that political parties find themselves in an era of decline especially vis-à-vis the growing role of interest groups and non-governmental actors.⁸

The study of federalism is also one of the key subfields in the discipline of Canadian politics. As a result, a number of concentrations within the study of federalism have appeared over the years. These subfields have tended to focus on the relationship between the central government and sub-national units and can often be divided into two specific fields: 'interstate federalism,' which deals with relationships between states, a type of 'who does what' analysis; and 'intrastate federalism,' which tends to focus on aspects within a given state, such as political representation and incorporation. The Canadian constitution, its patriation, and subsequent attempts at further reform have received both considerable academic and popular attention. Undeniably the federal aspect of Canada has played- and will continue to play- an important role in the evolution of Canada's constitution. Some worry about the prospects of this, wondering aloud "can Canadians become a sovereign people?"⁹ The study of federalism has also received considerable attention for the role it plays in regards to Québec and that nation's future as a part of the Canadian state.¹⁰ The recent literature has been expanded to include debates about federalism, multinationalism and the Canadian state. The study of federalism in Canada has also evolved to include non-traditional actors who have previously been overlooked into the federal arena. Specifically, the inclusion of First Nations Peoples into the discussion of federalism has

⁷ Richard Katz and Peter Mair, "Party Organization, Party Democracy, and the Emergence of the Cartel Parties," in *Party Politics* 1 (1995), 1.

⁸ John Meisel, "The Decline of Party in Canada," in *Party Politics in Canada* 5th edition, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985) pp. 98-114 and Grant Aymot, "The Waning of Political Parties," in *Canadian Parties in Transition* 3rd edition, eds. Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2007), pp. 491-512.

⁹ Peter H. Russell, *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?* 3rd edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

¹⁰ Kenneth McRoberts, *Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Alain G. Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, *Federalism, Citizenship and Québec* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007)

forced a discussion on the creation of a third pillar of federalism in the form of Aboriginal self government.¹¹ Additionally, the important role played by municipalities in service delivery has also warranted their inclusion into the larger debate on federalism.¹²

The literatures on Canadian political parties and Canadian federalism, on their own, are indeed quite expansive. This should not come as a surprise, as both federalism and the presence of political parties are central tenets in Canadian politics. In fact, political parties have been forced to both respond and adapt themselves to the presence of a federal system. As Carl Friedrich has observed "...parties tend toward paralleling the government setup...therefore, if the government is federally structured, parties must adapt themselves to such a structure."¹³ Indeed, Friederich is correct, at least in the case of Canada, where the three main English-Canadian parties (the Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic parties) have incorporated elements of a federal structure whereby they operate as separate units at both the federal and provincial levels, though they share the same name, often adhere to a similar ideology and tend to have some sort of relationship with the cousins at the other level of government.¹⁴ However, the academic literature has tended to overlook the intersection of federalism and political parties. To be sure, the subject of intra-party federalism is substantially underdeveloped at the present time. This comes as a surprise, considering the central place that both federalism and political parties hold in the study of political science in Canada. The effects of such an arrangement on the parties themselves have been an area of study that has routinely been ignored, or at best, downplayed. Aside from a select few scholars- most notably Donald

¹¹ Alan Cairns, *Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).

¹² Andrew Sancton, "Municipalities, Cities and Globalization: Implications for Canadian Federalism," in *Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy*, eds. Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 261-77.

¹³ Carl Friedrich, *Limited Government: A Comparison* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 55.

¹⁴ There is, however, a greater level of association between the provincial and federal wings of the New Democratic Party than there is between the provincial and federal wings of the other parties.

Smiley, Reg Whitaker, and Rand Dyck- who have focused on this topic, it is a relatively unexamined sub-field of both Canadian federalism and studies of political parties.

Relying on a qualitative approach, this study employs a historical institutionalist methodology in an attempt to fill a gap that exists in the current literature.¹⁵ As such, it predominantly makes empirical claims regarding the nature of intra-party relations, though it does offer a theoretical model for the study of intra-party federalism. This thesis posits that the institution of federalism has had a considerable effect on the operation and evolution of intra-party relations. While the relevant actors- Prime Minister, Premiers, and Cabinet Ministers- are all rational actors, the presence of an overarching institution such as federalism greatly limits the policy choices of these leaders, specifically the provincial leadership. As federalism and the corresponding division of powers places considerable emphasis on territorial interests, political parties- especially at the sub-national level- are also forced to place considerable emphasis on territorial concerns. The utility of the historical institutionalist approach is that it facilitates a combination of calculus and cultural approaches.

The cultural approach in the study of intra-party federalism is sensitive to the diverse political cultures of both Ontario and Alberta. For example, Sid Noel, a leading expert on Ontario history and politics, has identified what he refers to as five operative norms that are reflective of Ontario's well-established political culture.¹⁶ These operative norms are "...unarticulated assumptions, expectations, and understandings of people- the norms they quietly hold- about the way their politics ought ordinarily to be conducted..."¹⁷ It is naturally important that these norms are taken into account by Ontario's politicians and are certainly a

¹⁵ See Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," in *Political Studies* XLIV, (1996), pp. 936-57 for a detailed explanation of historical institutionalism.

¹⁶ Sid Noel, "The Ontario Political Culture," in *The Government and Politics of Ontario*, Fifth Edition, ed. Graham White (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 49-68.

¹⁷ Noel, "The Ontario Political Culture," 50.

factor in identifying the provincial party's course in intra-party relations. However, the calculus approach involves a broader assessment of policy initiatives related to intra-party politics. In addition to political culture, provincial politicians are forced to weigh diverse, competing interests in determining their approach to intra-party relations. For example, issues such as personal gain, party solidarity, political alliances, and economics are all relevant in the decision making process. Historical institutionalism is sensitive to both cultural and calculus approaches, but nevertheless is guided by the presence and effect of institutions, in this case federalism. This thesis places greater emphasis on the calculus approach as political culture is one of a number of criteria that relevant actors must take into account when determining their course of action. However, it does not fully ignore the cultural approach in the process.

This theoretical approach also takes into account both the conflict over scarce resources (such as political loyalty) and emphasizes political economy and power asymmetries in analyzing the behaviour of political actors. With regard to the study of intra-party federalism, all of these factors are considerably important. In determining a strategy of intra-party relations, political loyalty was a factor of considerable importance for the provincial premiers. In Ontario during the post-war era, at the individual level, many voters who supported the Liberals federally supported the provincial Conservatives, forcing the Ontario party's leadership to remain relatively neutral in federal elections in order to refrain from offending these federal Liberal voters.¹⁸ Additionally, in Alberta during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, Reform was supported by many provincial Progressive Conservatives, which forced the provincial leadership increasingly to align itself with the upstart party and move away from its traditional alliance with

¹⁸ Conversely, Reg Whitaker suggests that at the federal Liberal Party tended to remain neutral in Ontario's provincial elections in order to avoid offending the governing Progressive Conservative, whose rule was nearly hegemonic and with whom they maintained a working relationship with at the inter-state level. See Whitaker, *The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), ch. 8.

the federal Tories. Quite simply, conflicts over scarce resources were a driving force behind intra-party relations.

Lastly, the historical institutionalist approach takes into consideration both political economy and power asymmetries, which are important factors in the study of intra-party relations. By taking into account the dynamics of political economy- particularly its operation in a federal system of government- one can obtain a more complete picture of intra-party relations. For example, the conflict behind the oil pricing debate of late 1979, which was directly related to the provinces' economic interests, pitted the Ontario Conservatives against the Alberta Conservatives and left the federal Conservatives in the middle. This divisive period of intra-party relations was influenced by political economy.

The existence of asymmetrical power is also an important factor to consider in the study of intra-party relations. Although the federal government and each provincial government are, in theory, constitutional equals with powers divided between the two, the reality suggests something different. The federal government has often been referred to as *primus inter pares*, or first among equals, in relation to the provincial governments. This suggests that there exists a power asymmetry in the normal operation of federalism. However, while there are definite power asymmetries in intra-party federalism, they do not parallel those found in interstate or intrastate federalism. It cannot be said that the federal party is *primus inter pares* in relation to the provincial parties. In fact, throughout most of the post-war era, the Ontario Tories were considerably more influential than their federal counterparts. Since 1971, the Alberta Tories have also been more powerful than the federal party. As a result, the relative power and influence of each party must be taken into account in any study of intra-party federalism. The party with more power and influence will often be unwilling- or at least less willing- to give full

aid to a less popular counterpart, while the party with less power and influence will often rely on their more influential counterparts for assistance, especially during election campaigns. Thus, the historical institutionalist approach is broad enough to account for and explain what one scholar has identified as the three predominant reasons for divisive intra-party relations: personality differences, pure political opportunism, and ideological differences.¹⁹ However, this approach should also be able to account for any competing reasons that might explain intra-party divisiveness.

Of the literature that does exist on intra-party federalism, the vast majority is empirical in nature. As a result, models explaining the theoretical workings of intra-party federalism are lacking. The relative obscurity of the study of intra-party federalism is perhaps most evident in that the first comprehensive writing on this topic in the Canadian context was published in 1972. Donald Smiley's chapter "The Politics of Canadian Federalism" in his text *Canada in Question* serves as the starting point for research on intra-party relations.²⁰ Smiley proposes a model which employs six variables- electoral dependence, party organization, party careers, party finance, ideology, and party symmetry- and dictates whether a party's intra-party relations are 'integrated' or 'confederal.' Through the study of these variables, Smiley notes the presence of a pragmatic approach to intra-party relations, stating "provinces have thus persisting interests and provincial politicians in power have of course a persisting concern to press these interests in such a way as to be re-elected."²¹ He notes that partisan politics play little to no role in federal-provincial relations, and that they play virtually no role in intra-party federalism. Quite simply, party lines are unimportant in federalism. He concludes that "within the context of federal-

¹⁹ Rand Dyck, "Federalism and Political Parties," in *Challenges to Canadian Federalism*, eds. Martin Westmacott and Hugh Mellon (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1998), 55-62.

²⁰ Donald Smiley, *Canada In Question: Federalism in the Seventies* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), ch 4.

An updated version of this chapter also appeared in subsequent editions of the book.

²¹ Smiley, *Canada in Question*, 101.

provincial relations as such the partisan complexion of the governments involved is not crucial and it would indeed be unusual to see a Conference of Prime Ministers and Premiers divide on party lines.”²²

Although focusing on the Liberal Party of Canada, Part II of Reg Whitaker’s doctoral dissertation analyzes that party’s system of intra-party relations, with chapters 7-10 focusing on federal-provincial relations within the Liberal Party in each of Québec, Ontario, The West and the Atlantic Provinces.²³ Unlike past scholarly works which largely overlooked the topic, Whitaker explicitly noted the importance of intra-party federalism, suggesting that “it would be a great distortion to simply treat the Liberal party as a national entity, without an attempt to inquire into its regional and provincial roots and into the difficult and complex question of federal-provincial intra-party relations.”²⁴ The Liberal Party, he correctly noted, has longed prided itself on its largely decentralized structure and the autonomy possessed by each of its sub-national units. Despite the partisan differences between the Liberals and Conservatives, this book was of considerable importance to the study of intra-party relations as it provided considerable insight into four case studies, as well as furthered the theoretical approach to studying intra-party politics. He concluded that study further illustrated the prevalence of executive federalism over political federalism, and that overall, it “in effect, constitutes a documentation of the growing ‘confederalization’ of the Liberal party...”²⁵

²² Smiley, *Canada in Questions*, 102.

²³ Whitaker’s dissertation was subsequently published as *The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58*. Donald Smiley served as the primary supervisor of Whitaker’s dissertation. A subsequent, though less developed analysis of intra-party relations within the Liberal Party can be found in Joseph Wearing, *The L Shaped Party: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1958-1980* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), ch. 4.

²⁴ Whitaker, *The Government Party*, 267.

²⁵ Whitaker, *The Government Party*, 416.

The most recent detailed work chronicling intra-party federalism in Canada is Rand Dyck's 1996 study, "Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties."²⁶ Dyck expanded upon Smiley's work and identified seven variables- organization, finance, elections, leadership, policy and ideology, personnel, and relations with a party of another name at the other level of government- to determine the relationship between the federal and provincial wings of English Canada's three main parties. Borrowing from Smiley's definition, the study maintained there were three possibilities for the scope of the relationship: an integrated party, a confederal party, and a truncated party. Dyck elaborated that:

Where a political party functions more or less successfully at both levels of government and where the relations between the two branches are generally close, it can be called an "integrated" party. Where the intraparty relations are not so intimate, it has been termed a "confederal" party. In some cases, the party may be completely absent at one level or the other, in what might be labeled a truncated state.²⁷

However, he noted that the three categories were not exhaustive, and that in fact a continuum existed whereby the relationship could in fact be somewhere between two of levels. The study was divided into three main parts- one for each party- and each of the seven variables were examined for each of the Liberal, Progressive Conservative, and New Democratic Parties.

Through the seven variables of intra-party federalism, Dyck concluded that an increasing level of separation between the provincial and federal branches of all three parties was apparent. Specifically, in the case of the Progressive Conservative Party, Dyck concluded that it can best be described as a confederal party; intra-party relations were not overly intimate, though they certainly were existent. The confederal relationship was seemingly desirable for both the party's federal and provincial wings, with both entities content to retain their independence from the

²⁶ Rand Dyck, "Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties," in *Canadian Parties in Transition: Discourse, Organization, and Representation*, Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds., (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1996), 186-219. An earlier version of "Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties" was published in *Canadian Parties in Transition: Discourse, Organization, and Representation*, Alain G. Gagnon and A. Brian Tanguay, eds., (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1996), 160-89. Note that references to page numbers in this thesis to "Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties" are referring to the 1989 text.

²⁷ Dyck, "Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties," (1989), 186.

other. Dyck concluded that “each goes its own way in terms of organization, membership, constituency associations, offices and finance. On the other hand, there is much crossover in terms of personnel, some mutual assistance in elections and an ongoing relationship among senior staff, executives and caucus members.”²⁸ Although Dyck’s studies are useful in identifying *what* the general relationship between federal and provincial parties is, it does little in the way of explaining *how* these relationships came to be, *why* they operate in such a manner, and *what* accounts for their continued operation. Furthermore, the fact that Dyck analyzed seven variables over three parties in all ten provinces did not allow him to pay specific attention to one party in one or two provinces. As a result, the study also fails to account for the specifics and nuances related to intra-party federalism within each party or each province. Nevertheless, the conceptualized framework of intra-party relations that Dyck identified is of considerable importance. This study acknowledges that fact that the intra-party relations within the Progressive Conservative Party are largely confederal in nature, but seeks to expand on this and explain why this is the case and how such a relationship occurred.

Intra-party relations became increasingly distant over the course of the 20th century- at least compared to what they were in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. At one point, the two levels were closely integrated with one another. For example, Garth Stevenson has noted that this level of intimacy existed until the controversies over the conscription issue of 1917 and the resulting formation of a coalition government.²⁹ In the first fifty years after confederation, however, intra-party relations were significantly different than they were throughout the 20th century and based largely on the partisan outlook of the provincial government. “Perhaps more than any other factor,” Stevenson suggests, “partisanship determined the character of a

²⁸ Rand Dyck, “Links Between Federal and Provincial Parties and Party Systems,” in *Representation, Integration, and Political Parties*, Herman Bakvis, ed., (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 164.

²⁹ Garth Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union*, Revised Edition, (Toronto: Gage, 1982), 180.

province's dealings with the federal government." He went on to add that "from a prime minister's standpoint, most of the provincial governments with which he had to deal could be classified as either friendly or hostile, depending on their partisan label."³⁰

Although intra-party politics in the immediate post-Confederation era were often dictated by partisan outlook, provincial parties were routinely placed in awkward situations by their counterparts at the federal level. This awkwardness between the federal and provincial wings of the party prompted one future prime minister, Charles Tupper, to suggest that it was "...inevitable that in a diverse federation the provincial wings of any party would differ among themselves on many questions, and he believed that the ties between federal and provincial parties were a source of inconvenience and embarrassment to both."³¹ Stevenson notes that Tupper's advice was 'premature,' though Tupper had considerable foresight as such a viewpoint became increasingly popular throughout the 20th century. Indeed, this thesis speaks directly to the perceived inconvenience of close-knit intra-party relations.

Stevenson also shed light on why intra-party relations became increasingly distant over the course of the 20th century. Much of the disagreement is a result of the federal system itself. He noted that "this peculiar separation of the party system into federal and provincial layers is perhaps in part a consequence of the intensity of federal-provincial conflict, which makes it difficult for a party affiliated with the federal government to appear as a credible defender of provincial interests."³² The fact that provincial parties must appear to be defenders of provincial interests is of considerable importance. This suggests that provincial parties will need to distance themselves from- and potentially even oppose- their federal cousins should they each

³⁰ Garth Stevenson, *Exo Uno Plures: Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, 1867-1896* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 183.

³¹ Garth Stevenson, *Exo Uno Plures*, 185.

³² Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union* 182.

form a government concurrently. As such, it can be assumed that a provincial government will need to place territorial concerns ahead of partisan concerns should it wish to remain legitimate in the eyes of voters. Furthermore, this also suggests that provincial parties will need to employ a considerable amount of strategy in their dealings with their federal cousins.

The notion of intense intergovernmental conflict has often translated itself into intense intra-party conflict. In an attempt to place territorial interests ahead of partisan interests, provincial parties began to place emphasis on their individual identity and employ a provincial centric outlook. As George Perlin has remarked in his analysis of the internal leadership politics of the Progressive Conservative Party, their provincial units became increasingly independent from the federal party. He stated that "Associated with the establishment of strong independent-minded provincial [Conservative] governments was the development of strong independent-minded provincial parties."³³ Such a statement is consistent with Dyck's study and may be deemed as further evidence of confederal relations between the two party wings.

Studies by R.K. Carty and David Stewart, and William M. Chandler have examined the theoretical background of political parties in the Canadian system.³⁴ Carty and Stewart did not focus on one party or one jurisdiction in particular, but instead examined the Canadian federal system as a whole. Their analysis built upon Smiley and Dyck's studies and examined party organizations, party constitutions, local organizational practices, and party memberships in relation to all three of English Canada's main political parties. While their analysis turned up nothing specific to either the Ontario or Alberta provincial systems, they were able to make some

³³ George Perlin, *The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party*, (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), 18.

³⁴ R.K. Carty and David Stewart, "Parties and Party Systems," in *Provinces: Canadian Provincial Parties*, ed. Christopher Dunn, (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1996), 63-92 and William M. Chandler, "Federalism and Political Parties," in *Federalism and the Role of the State*, eds. Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 149-70.

conclusions that were applicable to the Progressive Conservatives more generally. They stated that the Tories were "...often organizationally little more than election machines to vacuum up votes..."³⁵

The conceptualization of a political party as merely an apparatus for gaining votes saw the party act in terms of self preservation, which may account for the divergence between the two wings and the emphasis of a provincial centric outlook. If either wing found a wedge issue or saw their federal counterparts as unpopular, their policies would naturally differ from the federal wing in order to maximize their appeal to voters. This was seemingly affirmed by the authors, who noted that instead of integrating the federal and provincial wings, "...the Conservatives seek to keep them quite separate."³⁶ This may explain how the Ontario and Alberta wings were so popular, while at the same time the federal wing was often relegated to standing as an opposition party. At the very least, it is illustrative of a distinct level of autonomy that provincial party wings held from the federal organization. While this does not rule out partisanship and close relations, it certainly does not make them mandatory. Thus, the intimacy of the relationship between the two levels, if existent at all, depends almost solely on the will of the provincial wing.

William Chandler's analysis examines the federal impact on party politics, including patterns of competition, styles of governing, and the corresponding effects on the federal system itself. Chandler identified two types of federal systems, jurisdictional federalism and functional federalism, and stated that Canada fell into the jurisdictional system of federalism. This, he argued, had an effect on intra-party federalism, as "...jurisdictional federalism has generated centrifugal effects that have accentuated strains within national parties. Politicians at either level

³⁵ Carty and Stewart, "Parties and Party Systems," 65.

³⁶ Carty and Stewart, "Parties and Party Systems," 67.

have found it costly to be too closely associated with the policies or stances of their counterparts at the other level.”³⁷ Two models seek to explain this dichotomy: models of public choice, which argue that voters seek to maximize their preference, and countervailing powers, in which voters seek to limit the power of a national government by electing its opponent at the provincial level.³⁸ While Chandler’s analysis focused more on voter preference vis-à-vis countervailing political options at both the provincial and federal levels, it nevertheless acknowledged that territorial interests often put pressure on provincial parties as voters seek to maximize their own interest at the sub-national level. As a consequence, this prompts provincial parties to oppose their federal cousins on issues of considerable importance to the provincial electorate.

While not speaking directly about either the Ontario or Alberta Tories, though he easily could have been, Chandler remarked, “...regionally one may observe counter-effects such as one-party dominance within certain provinces or states...Federalism may also stimulate divergent pressures on national parties, undermining internal cohesion and inhibiting the establishment of coherent national organizations.”³⁹ Indeed, for much of the period in question, this is a seemingly clear picture of the realities of the intra-party relationship between the federal, Alberta and Ontario Tories.

Like Chandler, preeminent political scientist Alan Cairns has also examined the effects of federalism on intra-party relations. Of the federal system, Cairns has remarked that it “...stimulates ideological differentiation between federal and provincial parties bearing the same name,” adding that “the circumstances in which provincial parties in power will support their

³⁷ Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties,” 160.

³⁸ Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties,” 160-61.

³⁹ Chandler, “Federalism and Political Parties,” 152.

federal counterparts almost entirely reflect strategic considerations.”⁴⁰ Thus, a review of the literature seems to suggest that (1) the federal system of government has important- and potentially disunifying- effects on intra-party relations, and (2) that provincial parties’ interactions with their federal wing are routinely based on pragmatic and strategic considerations.

While Dyck, Carty, Stewart, Chandler and others have all focused on intra-party relations more generally, none of them have placed a considerable amount of analysis on one party in one or more jurisdictions. Quite simply these have been theoretical works to explain and contextualize the general workings of intra-party relations. The use of case studies, however, may provide insight into the questions of how and why specific parties in specific jurisdictions construct an intra-party relationship in the manner they do. Edwin Black, for example, examined intra-party federalism within the Progressive Conservative Party, focusing specifically on the dispute between the federal party and the British Columbia party in the early 1950s. This dispute was facilitated by the provincial party passing a motion of non-confidence against then federal leader George Drew. Consistent with other authors, he noted that federalism itself was often the root cause of federal-provincial squabbles, stating that “...in Canada, [parties] are always likely to be complicated by the federal system which, with its plurality of independent centres of political power, makes country-wide party discipline more difficult to maintain than it is in comparable unitary countries.”⁴¹

⁴⁰ Alan Cairns, “The Government and Societies of Canadian Federalism,” in *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, X: 4, December, 1977, 715.

⁴¹ Edwin Black, “Federal Strains Within A Canadian Party,” in *Party Politics in Canada*, 3rd edition, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1972), 120. Black established the Progressive Conservative Party’s research office and was the Research Director for the Federal Progressive Conservative Party from 1969-1970 while on a one year leave from Queen’s University.

The usefulness of Black's work is that it emphasizes a single case study in great detail and tests more general theories of intra-party relations of a specific case. Of the dispute between the federal Conservatives and their seatless counterparts in British Columbia, he notes that both personality conflicts *and* brokerage politics play an important role in intra-party relations. However, he gives more credibility to the latter, concluding that "the Canadian outlook favours, and, indeed, sometimes requires, politics of pragmatism rather than of policies or ideology" as a result of "...one group seeking federal victory and the other seeking victory at the provincial capital."⁴² Black's analysis provided a variety of causes to explain the dichotomy of intra-party federalism and identified the practical applications of these causes in relation to one specific case study. This is, however, the only detailed case study of intra-party relations within the Progressive Conservative Party. Additional focused studies are needed to shed more light on the practical workings of intra-party federalism.

David Rayside, for example, is one of the few scholars who has "undertaken a systematic study of intraparty, interprovincial, intergovernmental ideological cleavages."⁴³ His 1978 study of the federal and provincial Québec Liberal Parties discovered clear differences between Québec's MNAs and its MPs, though it found little to no difference between rank-and-file activists for each of the parties.⁴⁴ Critical of the fact that too many scholars had compared the same party in different jurisdictions, but had failed to examine the same party in different arenas within the same province, Stewart and Stewart built on Rayside's analysis of rank-and-file activists within the same party in the same provinces at different levels.⁴⁵ Using the Nova Scotia

⁴² Black, 129.

⁴³ David K. Stewart and Ian Stewart, "Fission and Federalism: The Disaggregation of Canadian Party Activists," in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 27:3 (Summer 1997), 102.

⁴⁴ David M. Rayside, "Federalism and the Party System: Provincial and Federal Liberals in the Province of Québec," in *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 11 (September 1978), 499-528.

⁴⁵ Stewart and Stewart, "Fission and Federalism," 97-112.

and Alberta Progressive Conservative Parties as case studies, they find that "...while there are clear provincial differences of opinion within the Tories, there exists an even greater attitudinal fault-line across orders of government."⁴⁶ The present study addresses the lack of literature in the area of same party, different jurisdictional analysis and provides evidence of such a relationship over a large temporal period in the provincial Progressive Conservative Parties in Alberta and Ontario and their counterparts at the federal level.

More recently, Christopher Kam has employed rational choice and game theory in an analysis of intra-party politics.⁴⁷ However the focal point of Kam's research, like the research of many others, is centered on intra-party relations within one wing of the party. As a result, he focuses solely on an individual MP's relationship to his or her party. Consequently, this viewpoint fails to take into account the dynamics of intra-party *federalism*. Nevertheless, Kam's analysis is useful in identifying and accounting for internal dissent within a party and explaining the motivations of those who break ranks with their party and fail to toe the party line. Although recognizing that political parties- especially in Canada- are highly cohesive units, he challenges the popularly held view that political parties are monolithic entities and instead highlights the fact that considerable division exists with every party.⁴⁸ Kam begins by suggesting that "MPs can and do vote against their parties, sometimes to great effect. The more nuanced view of reality is that an MP's loyalty is not automatic, but must be constantly elicited."⁴⁹ A similar approach is also useful to the study of intra-party federalism. Quite simply, federal and provincial parties, while sharing the same name and partisan affiliation, are not unitary actors as

⁴⁶ Stewart and Stewart, "Fission and Federalism," 99.

⁴⁷ Christopher Kam, "Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government," Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, available on-line at <http://www.politics.ubc.ca/index.php?id=9410>

⁴⁸ Kam, "Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government," 2 and Joseph Wearing, 'Party Discipline and the Westminster Model.' Panel Report from the Canadian Political Science Association Conference, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, June 2-4, 1996.

⁴⁹ Kam, "Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government," 2.

is often believed to be the case. In the same way that a political party must constantly seek the loyalty of its individual MPs on a constant basis, federal political parties must also routinely solicit the support of their respective provincial wings.

Utilizing what he calls a synthetic model- a combination of preference-driven, institutional, and sociological models- Kam identifies his central argument as follows: "...Ideological disagreement and electoral pressures (eg., differences in electoral environments and incentives across constituencies) set the stage for dissent to occur."⁵⁰ In many respects, this model of intra-party dissent as motivated at the local level is parallel to intra-party dissent between federal and provincial levels. Despite sharing the party name, ideological differences often occur between federal and provincial wings. This difference consequently strains the loyalty of party actors and challenges the intimacy of the intra-party relationship.

One case that this thesis analyzes in great detail, the rise of Reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s, provides a telling example of the strain that ideological differences place on intra-party cohesion. The decidedly right-wing Progressive Conservative provincial governments of Alberta and Ontario increasingly aligned themselves to varying degrees with the upstart Reform, consequently challenging the relationship they once had with the federal- and more centralist- Progressive Conservative Party. Electoral pressures have also contributed to intra-party dissent between the federal and provincial wings of the same party. For example, the oil-pricing debate of 1979 pitted the Alberta and Ontario Progressive Conservative parties against one another, leaving the federal Progressive Conservative Party as the arbiter of the intra-party dispute. Not surprisingly, this event considerably strained the relationship between the Alberta, Ontario and federal governments. In this case, electoral pressure at the territorial level- as opposed to the constituency level- challenged pre-existing intra-party relationships. In the same way that

⁵⁰ Kam, "Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government," 12.

individual MPs respond to ideological differences and electoral pressures, so to do provincial wings of political parties.

The second chapter of Kam's analysis, "A Model of Intra-Party Politics" conceived some of the theoretical approaches to the study of intra-party politics (and, in the case of this thesis, intra-party federalism). He suggested that, collectively, MPs may benefit from maintaining a united front, but individually they face incentives to act independently. In much the same way, the federal and provincial wings of a political party may also benefit from maintaining a united front, but they too are often faced with the prospects of acting independently from one another during situations in which each wing is faced with competing interests. The study of intra-party federalism is more complicated in that the supporters of the provincial party are often also supporters of the federal party. This fact adds an additional dynamic and further complicates intra-party relations.

Building on Anthony Downs' suggestion of targeting the median voter, Kam posited that "party leaders [have] strong incentives to move their party's policies toward the position of the median voter *in the national electorate*..."⁵¹ In contrast, the individual MP is "...elected to represent a constituency that may be socially and economically quite unlike any other," and "the overriding incentive for the individual MP is to cater to the median voter *in her constituency*."⁵² Kam effectively identified the crux of intra-party federalism without making specific reference to it. The federal party, responsible to the electorate from coast-to-coast, is faced with a different set of challenges than a provincial party elected to represent a single province, often with a distinctive political culture. As such, despite sharing a common name and ideological outlook, there is no guarantee that the policy preferences of provincial and federal parties will be

⁵¹ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) and Kam, "Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government," 21

⁵² Kam, "Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government," 21.

consistent. In some instances, what is desirable for one wing is undesirable for the other. In this situation, the provincial leadership is placed in a loyalty dilemma. They are effectively pulled between territorial interests (which may be ideological, economic, or social in nature) on one hand and largely partisan interests and party solidarity on the other. As the provincial wing is accountable only to the provincial electorate, it is more than likely that they respond to territorial interests first, at the possible expense of ignoring party solidarity. In such a situation, intra-party relations between the two wings are ultimately strained.

In order to explain adequately how and why provincial leaders have placed an emphasis on territorial interests at the expense of larger partisan interests, a concrete theoretical approach to understanding and contextualizing these responses is required. While previous research has identified that the intra-party relations between the federal and provincial wings are best described as confederal and that provincial leaders place considerable importance on defending territorial interests, it has largely failed to explain specifically the full range of responses available to the provincial leadership- both generally on a theoretical level and more specifically on a case-by-case basis- when the loyalty of provincial leaders is pulled between territorial and partisan interests. It has also failed to illustrate what accounts for these responses. A detailed theory to analyze the possible effects and courses of action for those caught between competing loyalties can be found in Katrina Burgess' *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy*.⁵³ Briefly, she uses a comparative method to examine the responses of trade union leaders in Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela after their traditional social democratic allies began to enact laws that were harmful to workers, thereby straining the traditional union-party alliance. Burgess recognizes that the party's adoption of an agenda of neo-liberal reforms saw the union leaders

⁵³ Katrina Burgess, *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004).

being pulled in strategically contradictory directions, known as a “loyalty dilemmas,” between the party and workers.⁵⁴ Although this work has nothing to do with intra-party federalism, its theoretical approach is considerably strong and applicable to the study of intra-party relations.

Burgess employs two variables to explain the behaviour of the union leaders. She theorizes that the divergent responses are the result of: “(1) the relative power of the party and workers to punish labor leaders for disloyal behavior; and (2) the party’s capacity to act autonomously from its own government.”⁵⁵ The first variable is reflective of this loyalty dilemma. It also lends itself well to a historical institutionalist approach as it emphasizes power asymmetries. Burgess contends that the labour leaders’ loyalty is likely to lie with the group that has the greatest amount of punishing power over them. The second variable determines whether or not the labour leader can be rescued from the loyalty dilemma by the political party. In the event that the actors in the party have sufficient autonomy to oppose the party hierarchy and join the union leader in resistance, the labour leader will be rescued from the dilemma and can remain loyal to both the party and workers while simultaneously opposing the reforms.

The two variables that Burgess has identified can also be applied to the study of intra-party relations. The variables remain virtually unchanged, with the exception of the actors involved. In fact, Québec Premier Jean Lesage referred to the ‘dilemma’ faced by provincial premiers when dealing with the federal party as early as 1964- the same year the Québec Liberal Party moved to disaffiliate from the federal Liberal Party. Of the intra-party divide, he noted that:

⁵⁴ A ‘loyalty dilemma’ is a concept borrowed from Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970)

⁵⁵ Burgess, *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy*, 6.

It has become evident that the Canadian reality demands more and more that the political parties which work on the federal level be distinct from provincial parties and vice versa. In effect, the interests are too divergent between federal and provincial governments at the high political level, so that members of the (party) executive and those on the committees are constantly in a dilemma which I describe as almost insoluble for them.⁵⁶

As such, the concept of loyalty dilemma is fitting for the study of intra-party federalism. However, in the study of intra-party relations, the first variable becomes 'the relative power of territorial interests and partisan interests to punish provincial leaders for disloyal behaviour' and the second variable becomes 'the provincial party's capacity to act autonomously from its own federal party.' In a federal system such as Canada's the provincial party is always constitutionally free to act independently of its federal party. However, depending upon the nature of the intra-party relationship, the result can be different. For example, a provincial party operating within an integrated relationship may be less likely to oppose its federal counterparts than a provincial party operating within a confederal relationship. As the Conservative Party of Canada and its predecessors have always operated within a confederal structure, we can assume that there is great likelihood of the provincial parties opposing the federal party. At the same time, one must also take into account power asymmetries in determining which wing has more control and influence over the relationship.

Although this thesis does not focus on union-party relations as such, Burgess' methodological approach and theoretical model are nevertheless beneficial to this study. Building upon Albert Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, she contends that there are three possible strategies for the labour leaders to follow when placed in a loyalty dilemma: a norm-based voice, a norm-breaking voice, and exit.⁵⁷ The chosen response is contingent upon the relative strength of the two aforementioned variables. A norm-based voice consists of "demand-

⁵⁶ Quoted in Richard Simeon, *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 133.

⁵⁷ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* and Burgess, *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy*, 9.

making that conforms to the norms governing their interaction with the party”, a norm-breaking voice consists of “demand-making that violates the norms governing their interaction with the party,” while exit “consists of defection from the alliance.”⁵⁸ In the event that a labour union decides to exit and defect from the alliance, they continue to engage in “voice after exit” as they are still forced to interact with their former political allies. These strategies are not static however, and labour leaders move back and forth from one strategy to another.

Provincial premiers, much like the labour leaders Burgess speaks of, have three potential options when faced with a loyalty dilemma: a norm-based voice, a norm-breaking voice, and exit. However, in the case of a loyalty dilemma on behalf of a provincial party in intra-party relations, a norm-based voice consists of active and overt public support for the federal party, the sharing of resources between the two wings and withholding public criticisms of the federal party and privately negotiating any disagreements with the federal party; a norm-breaking voice consists of withholding financial or organization support for the federal party, refusing to co-operate in joint initiatives, refraining from publicly campaigning on behalf of the federal party and a public critique of the federal party; while exit retains the actions of norm-breaking voice but is expanded to consist of formally disaffiliating from the party (should affiliation have previously existed), vocal and overt opposition to federal party, and possibly public support of another federal party. In the event of exit, the provincial parties employ “voice after exit” as they are still forced to negotiate with the government, even though they have cut all partisan ties that they previously had. Although the nature of those situations in which provincial party leaders give lukewarm or unenthusiastic public support (and in some cases covert opposition) to the federal party leaders is perhaps more subjective and debatable, it will be posited that such action constitutes evidence of a norm-breaking voice based upon the lack of overt and willing

⁵⁸ Burgess, *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy*, 9.

support, as a norm-based voice would tend to dictate. It should also be noted that these classifications apply primarily to provincial party expressions of policy support, electoral support or offers of campaign assistance for their federal cousins. The analysis does not examine in any sort of detail other indicators of integration such as organizational structures and financial support, as it has been examined in considerable detail elsewhere.⁵⁹

To identify how and why the Ontario and Alberta Progressive Conservative parties have interacted with their federal counterparts in the manner they have, this study relies on historical process-tracing. As previously mentioned, process tracing is employed systemically to study four cases: (1) the Ontario government and its relation with the federal party from its own rise to power in 1943 to the rise of Trudeaumania in the late 1960s, (2) the federal party under Joe Clark from 1976 to 1980 and its relationship with the Ontario and Alberta governments, specifically during the oil pricing dispute of 1979, (3) the relationship between the Progressive Conservative federal government and the Alberta provincial government from 1984 to 1993, and (4) the rise of Reform in 1993, its relationship with the provincial Conservative governments in Ontario and Alberta, and its effects on intra-party federalism. Process tracing pays considerable attention to “identifying steps in a causal process that leads to the outcome of a dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical period.”⁶⁰ In this case, the dependent variable is one of the three ‘voices’ identified by Burgess: a norm-based voice, a norm-breaking voice, and exit. In contrast to other works on intra-party relationships, this thesis involves the systematic comparative study of four cases and pays considerable attention to the specifics and nuances of each case. The use of process tracing seeks to employ a number of cases to make theoretically

⁵⁹ Smiley, *Canada in Question* and Dyck, “Relations Between Federal and Provincial Parties”

⁶⁰ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 176.

relevant observations. Quite simply, this approach enables the analyst to draw relevant conclusions to explain *why* each party has acted in the manner it did.

In addition to employing process tracing, the final chapter, which focuses on the rise of Reform /Canadian Alliance and its effects on intra-party relations, can be considered a 'before and after' study as it seeks to compare intra-party relations in Canada's fourth party system to intra-party relations in the third party system. Throughout Canada's third party system, the natural partisan and ideological ally of the provincial Progressive Conservative Parties was the federal Progressive Conservative Party. However, with the rise of Reform in the late 1990s- culminating in the 1993 federal election- the Progressive Conservative Party was no longer the natural partisan or ideological ally of the increasingly right-wing provincial parties. Furthermore, the federal Progressive Conservative Party lost its 'official' party status in the 1993 election and was reduced to only two seats in the House of Commons, neither of which was from Alberta or Ontario. The usefulness of the 'before and after' method is that it allows a longitudinal study of intra-party relations on Canada's right wing to be divided into two- the cases 'before' the advent of Reform and those falling 'after' the advent of Reform. The existence of a new political party on the federal scene is an important variable relating to the nature of intra-party relations.

Despite federal and provincial wings sharing the same name and adhering to a similar ideology, this work illustrates that intra-party relations within the Conservative Party of Canada and its various predecessors have, at times, been considerably divisive. Quite simply, the provincial Conservative governments in Alberta and Ontario have routinely found themselves in loyalty dilemmas as they are pulled in strategically contradictory directions. More often than not, they find their loyalty divided between partisan solidarity and territorial-based interests. Of the

three possible 'voices' that a provincial party can employ when it finds itself in a loyalty dilemma, the Alberta and Ontario governments have relied on all three at various times. However, the use of a norm-based voice- backroom negotiations and some public support of the federal party- and a norm-breaking voice- public condemnation of the federal party and the provincial party failing to campaign on behalf of the federal party- have been the two most frequent courses of action. However, despite maintaining a norm-based voice in public and *appearing* to campaign on behalf of their federal cousins, in reality, the provincial parties almost always *preferred* to employ a norm-breaking voice. It was only with the rise of Reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the Alberta Conservatives began to employ an exit voice to various degrees, primarily as a result of individual cabinet ministers and Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) quitting the federal Progressive Conservative Party. Many members in Ontario followed a similar course of action in the late 1990s.

The provincial parties have routinely favored a norm-breaking voice in order to appeal to the voters to whom they are accountable and to protect and further territorial-based interests. They have illustrated that they have only limited loyalty toward their federal counterparts. That loyalty generally exists inasmuch as the federal party is able to provide some direct benefit to the provincial party. Quite simply, there is no guarantee that the provincial party will be an active supporter of the federal party. Despite sharing the same name and often a similar ideology, the two parties exist in different worlds. The federal party is forced to balance competing interests from coast-to-coast, while the provincial party is only required to look out for its own territorial-based interests. Consequently the intra-party relationship tends to be based on pragmatic concerns more so than it is on partisan concerns.

The Ontario Progressive Conservative Party and Post-War Politics

George Drew: "The Old Guard"

In 1939, frustrated with Liberal governance, both federally and provincially, as well as the inability of the federal Conservative Party to defeat the governing Liberals, George Drew, then leader of the Ontario Tories, remarked "that the [federal] Conservative Party was at the lowest ebb it had ever been in its history and that unless new life blood was infused [sic.] it would die of anemia."¹ He then added that what the party needed was courageous, instructive leadership. Bob Manion, a key Tory strategist, was not taken aback by Drew's comments on the state of the federal Conservative Party, but was, however, worried about his inclination for making forceful comments on matters of federal concern.² He thought that it would be pertinent to sit down with the fiercely partisan Ontario Premier to discuss the "proper spheres" of federal-provincial relations to ensure that Drew would not make any comments that would be detrimental to the federal party and its chances of forming government at the federal level.

Although the Liberals formed government at both the provincial and federal level- led by Mitchell Hepburn in Ontario and McKenzie King in Ottawa- the federal Tories did not want Drew and the Ontario Progressive Conservatives to be overtly critical of King and the federal Liberals for fear of "putting King on his guard and permitting him thereby to get better prepared for the session."³ The plan was to keep King complacent, rather than forcing him into action and attempting to appease dissenting provinces in the process. Any criticism of federal Liberal inaction or action would have to come from the federal Tories, who would be expected to take over the federal government in the event of a Liberal defeat. The meeting between Manion and

¹ George Drew, as recalled by J. Earl Lawson, in J.L. Granatstein, *The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967, 37.

² Granatstein, 37.

³ Bob Manion, quoted in Granatstein., *The Politics of Survival*, 37.

Drew took place on 8 January 1940 and Drew agreed on some level to abide by the ‘proper spheres.’ Yet within a week, the outspoken leader, ever cognizant of guarding provincial rights from federal influence, reneged on the agreement. Of this, he went on to state “I think it is clear that I cannot possibly avoid extensive reference to the situation [federal-provincial relations] as it exists, particularly so far as it affects the province of Ontario.”⁴

The Ontario Progressive Conservative government in the post-war era became something of a dynasty, forming the government under Drew in 1943 and governing continuously until its defeat in 1985. This forty-two year period of continuous governance represents one of the longest time periods of uninterrupted governance by a single party in a single Canadian jurisdiction. In many respects, the formula for success for consecutive Tory governments was laid down, in part, by George Drew. This ‘formula for success’ is obviously detailed and included a number of functions, among them a pragmatic approach to governance. One area in particular, federal-provincial relations in the post-war era, has been examined in close detail by historian P.E. Bryden. She has indicated that “Ontario had traditionally played the role of chief advocate of provincial rights within the young federation, but...under the premiership of George Drew, Ontario began to deal with Ottawa not by rejecting the central government’s proposals for centralization outright, but rather by offering alternative proposals of its own.”⁵ By playing such an active role in federal-provincial policy making, Ontario forced the federal government to respond to the often innovative suggestions that it put forward. Meanwhile, the citizens in Ontario saw their government at the forefront of intergovernmental negotiations, defending provincial interests while simultaneously playing a leading role in creating post-war social and economic policy.

⁴ Drew to Manion, quoted in Granatstein, *The Politics of Survival*, 37-38.

⁵ P.E. Bryden, “Ontario’s Agenda in Post-Imperial Constitutional Negotiations, 1949-68,” in *Canada and the End of Empire*, ed. Phillip Buckner (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 217.

Although this pragmatic and occasionally co-operative relationship between the Ontario government and the federal government did not come into full swing until the premiership of Leslie Frost, it was first initiated by Drew. For example, Bryden noted that "...the Conservative government under George Drew had, in fact, been experimenting with a new approach to federal-provincial relations which would both end the acrimony that had characterized Ontario's relations with Ottawa and simultaneously achieve a more agreeable place for Ontario within the federation."⁶ While Drew gave some thought to a more co-operative relationship between the two levels of government, his fiercely partisan nature and federal leadership aspirations largely prevented its successful implementation. He had, at times, the desire to co-operate with the federal government, but was ever mindful of provincial rights and provincial autonomy. Nevertheless, although such a harmonious relationship was given some thought by Drew, it is most readily and perhaps most appropriately identified with his successor.

This relationship, which was intended to improve intergovernmental relations, also had effects on intra-party federalism. As a result of creating an environment guided by co-operation and innovative policy making that would ideally lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, the Ontario government was unable to show favoritism to, or even worry about, the partisan nature of the federal government or opposition. Whether the federal government was Liberal or Progressive Conservative, the Ontario government was faced with the prospects of negotiating with them and working toward policy that was acceptable to both. As a result, the Ontario Conservatives were required to maintain a positive, working relationship with whoever was in power. What was originally intended to foster positive intergovernmental relations had unforeseen, negative consequences on intraparty relations. As a result, it was increasingly

⁶ P.E. Bryden, "Beyond the Green Book: The Ontario Approach to Intergovernmental Relations, 1945-1955," in *Culture and Citizenship in Post-War Canada, 1940-1955*, eds. Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003), 133.

difficult for Ontario's premiers to operate with a norm-based voice. This was especially true under the premierships of Leslie Frost and John Robarts, but less so under George Drew, who was considerably more of a partisan than either of his successors and whose provincial party was not as dominant as it was in later years. It should be noted that Frost's use of a norm-based voice in 1957 and 1958 was used at a time when the federal party was considerably strong and after he had previously tried, unsuccessfully, to first seek compromise with the governing Liberal Party.

Such a relationship dictated, on some level, that the premier and provincial party would be required to employ a norm-breaking voice as they needed to develop a positive rapport with a federal government of different partisan stripes, actively pursue and implement joint policy initiatives with said federal government, and by extension could not give overwhelming support to their federal cousins. The use of norm-breaking voice was necessitated by the fact that for much of the post-war era, and indeed continuing until the 1980s, the federal government was dominated by the Liberal Party, even earning it the title of 'the government party.' Conversely the federal Progressive Conservative Party was usually shut out of the government, relegated to the opposition benches, and was considerably less popular than the Liberals. As this chapter will illustrate, a combination of the desire to forge positive intergovernmental relationships and the relative (un)popularity of the federal party led the Ontario Conservatives to limit the support they gave to their federal cousins. Aside from routine rhetoric and occasional meaningful support, the Ontario Tories were largely aloof in their support of the federal Tories. Quite simply, their loyalty remained with territorial concerns and pragmatic politics as opposed to partisan concerns and party solidarity.

The next election that either the provincial or federal Conservatives faced was the 1943 Ontario provincial election, in which the Conservatives were elected to a minority government.

The assistance of John Bracken, federal Tory leader, may have helped to provide the Ontario Tories with their victory. Prior to the election, Bracken was urged to “speak firmly and bluntly” on the issue of power as it related to federalism and provincial rights. At the urging of his provincial lieutenant, Bracken conducted a two-week tour in rural Ontario in mid July, where the Tories ended up winning twelve seats in the August election. Howard Ferguson, former Conservative premier from 1923-1930, attributed the dozen seats won in rural Ontario to the presence of Bracken, himself a rural Manitoban.⁷ While this may be an overstatement, it is important to note that the very appearance of effectiveness and assistance certainly helped the party’s cause, as the impression among Ontario Tories was that the help from the federal leader was imperative to their own electoral success. The election saw a great deal of co-ordination and co-operation between the federal and provincial camps, suggesting the use of a norm-based voice by the federal party. The Ontario campaign was “well-run, well-directed, and well-financed,” and received a great deal of financial support from the party’s federal wing. Additionally, there was no attempt to build up the federal organization in Ontario until after the election. All Tory MPs from Ontario could thus devote their attention to getting their provincial cousins elected and “behoove[d] all of us who can make any contribution to do what we can to throw the greatest possible weight behind George”.⁸ The Drew victory was also of “immense importance [to the federal party] both from the practical and psychological point of view.” At this time, the relationship between the two wings was intimate and guided largely by party solidarity.

After forming the provincial government and having access to its machinery, most notably the ability to dispense patronage, the provincial Tories became less reliant on their

⁷ Granatstein, *The Politics of Survival*, 160. Granatstein noted, however, that according to the itinerary, Bracken spoke in at least five rural constituencies, and of these, Drew won only three- all from the Liberals. He concluded that while the effects of Bracken’s tour are hard to assess, that at the very least, it is significant that Bracken appeared to be of help to many Ontario Tories.

⁸ P.C. Party files, quoted in Granatstein, *The Politics of Survival*, 160.

federal cousins. In fact, throughout the post-war era of Conservative dominance in Ontario, the 1943 election was the time in which the federal wing was most involved in the provincial wing. Furthermore, it was the only election in which the relative power and influence of the federal wing was equal to or greater than that of the Ontario wing. The honeymoon feeling between Drew and the federal wing did not last for long as fears about Drew's desire to have the Ontario wing control the federal party began to emanate in the minds of the federal organizers. It was rumored that Drew was looking to become the leader of the federal party- a triumph that he would achieve upon his retirement from provincial politics in 1948- and his provincial organization would be willing to criticize the party's federal leadership in his bid for the top spot. It seemed to many in the federal camp that Drew's loyalty was increasingly with his own personal and pragmatic concerns, rather than larger partisan concerns.

The federal wing was forced to respond to these growing concerns. Not too long after the 1943 Ontario provincial election, an internal federal Conservative Party memo suggested that:

Some of the Drew people are in too much of a hurry to advance the cause of their own leader in federal affairs and have not hesitated to say so at the same time either directly or inferentially damning the present leadership. In the opinion of a considerable number of the federal members, the basic trouble is the desire of the Ontario Party to have control of the representation in the House of Commons from Ontario after the next election as a means of controlling a future convention of the Party and determining the future leadership of the party.⁹

Not surprisingly, there were harsh feelings toward Drew from some of Ontario's Tory MPs as a result of the perceived internal power struggle. Over the course of Drew's tenure as Ontario premier- ending shortly before he was elected federal leader- the federal wing of the party consistently had to worry about a power struggle with the well-organized and very popular Ontario wing. Although Drew's fiercely partisan nature and dislike for the 'Grits' is most consistent with a norm-based voice, the internal power struggle that his quest for power within party caused was less than beneficial to the federal party. It was not until Joe Clark would be

⁹ Bell, Federal P.C. memo, quoted in Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 148.

elected as federal leader nearly thirty years later that a serious attempt to block the control from Toronto occurred.

Known in Drew's era as the 'Old Guard,' this influential group supported the move for increased provincial control at the expense of the federal party and its leader. The 'Old Guard' consisted of former Prime Minister Arthur Meighen, *Globe & Mail* owner and mining magnate George McCullagh, Ontario organizer Alexander MacKenzie, Robert Borden's nephew Henry Borden, the Premier, and a host of Bay Street business elites. The group began to criticize Bracken for what they saw as a lack of decisiveness on his part in leading the federal caucus. Reports even circulated that there was a consolidated move among Bracken's opponents, Drew included, ensuring that he would not have a safe seat come the next federal election. In fact, the rumours became so persistent and destructive that Bracken, in a CBC radio interview on 26 July 1944, addressed them, though he denied any knowledge of a coup and suggested that there was no domination from internal factions. The federal leader remarked:

Speaking of leadership reminds me that a rumour is abroad concerning the leadership of this party. The rumour is to the effect that efforts are being made to dominate me by a certain business group or groups—perhaps to oust me for another leader. May I say emphatically there has been no domination; there has been no attempted domination; and domination, if attempted by any one section anywhere, will not be allowed. As for ousting me, no one has tried that; and they wouldn't succeed if they did; and, in any event, there are no aspirations that I know of...¹⁰

While Bracken could deny the rumours in public, in reality, he knew that they were much more than simple rumours. The very fact that he felt the need to address them in a public forum is illustrative of the strength and persistence of the rumours. However, the Ontario organization was strong enough that it commanded immediate attention and had significant influence over the federal wing.

Of the prominence placed on the Ontario organization, Dalton Camp remarked "the [federal] organization was obsessed with Ontario; it was the dead center of its universe, with the

¹⁰ Quoted in Kendle, *John Bracken*, 214.

Maritimes and the West flapping hinges.”¹¹ By late 1944, Bracken had lost control of his party. However, his biographer John Kendle has remarked that “he never had been, and never would be” in control of his party.¹² Such was the strength of the Ontario wing. This move on the part of the Ontario team to gain an increased amount of control and influence in the federal wing of the party is itself a reflection of Ontario’s political culture and its desire for pre-eminence within the federal party. It is also representative of Drew’s loyalty, which was clearly aligned with the provincial party, territorial issues, and personal leadership aspirations. Nevertheless, he was forced publicly to support the federal party.

However, neither Drew, nor any of the Old Guard, would publicly admit to a consolidated move against the federal leader, despite its obvious existence. With the desire to one day lead the federal wing, Drew was forced publicly to play the partisan role- campaigning against the centralization proposed by ‘the Grits’ (he rarely called them Liberals)- while at the same time working within the party to build his own base of support, thus undermining Bracken in private. In this sense, Drew willingly employed a norm-based voice in public, though privately his behaviour is more closely identified with a norm-breaking voice. As evidence of his norm-based voice, prior to the 1945 election, the only one which occurred while Drew and Bracken simultaneously led their respective wings, Drew stated “My one ambition in the political field outside of Ontario is to see an end as soon as possible of the weak and incompetent government in power at Ottawa to-day, and to assist in every way I can to assure that John Bracken is the next Prime Minister of Canada.”¹³ This statement, however, prompted Prime Minister King to decide against holding a federal-provincial conference on taxation powers prior to the election, as he felt that Drew’s overt partisanship would prejudice the conference and

¹¹ Camp, *Gentlemen, Players and Politicians*, 104.

¹² Kendle, *John Bracken*, 215.

¹³ Quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 105.

prevent any successes. This was much to the chagrin of Drew's finance minister, Leslie Frost, who had spent the previous seven months urging the Prime Minister to hold such a conference.

The 1945 federal election was not friendly to the newly re-named Progressive Conservative Party. The election did, however, highlight the strength and influence of the Ontario wing, the only province in which the party had some semblance of a grassroots organization. Of the 66 seats won by Bracken's party in 1945, 48 came from Ontario. It was also the only province in which the Tories eclipsed the Liberals, who managed to win only 34 seats in Ontario. The Tories also fared better in the popular vote in Ontario, narrowly defeating the Liberals 41.4% to 40.8%. In addition to the Tories' electoral success coming largely from Ontario- which over 70% of their MPs now represented- the campaign itself was largely Ontario dominated. Following Drew's own victory in Ontario a week earlier, as a result of which he turned his minority government into a majority, he proceeded to fly out west to campaign on behalf of Bracken and the federal party.

Despite the fact that this action seemed to support the federal wing, it was actually done in defiance of the wishes of Bracken and his advisors. "The federal issue is exactly the same as was decided in Ontario," Drew stated on a campaign stop in western Canada, adding that "Mr. Bracken should be supported by every right-thinking Canadian," Premier Drew declared. "Because of my sincere belief in everything that John Bracken has been preaching throughout Canada I came here to offer every support I can to candidates who have joined him to [sic] give Canada honest, unprejudiced, decent government."¹⁴ In the minds of many western Canadians, Drew's overt support for Bracken, as well as his central role in the campaign in Western Canada, reinforced the Liberal claim that the Progressive Conservative Party was controlled out of

¹⁴ "George Drew Enters Federal Field In Support of John Bracken," in *Ontario Progressive Conservative News*, Vol. II, no. 2, 9 June 1945, p. 1-2. Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-21 227-G "Progressive Conservative Assn.- Ontario Newsletter"

Toronto. This claim was strengthened when the party's closing radio address was delivered not by Bracken, himself a westerner, but by George McCullagh, part of the so-called 'Old Guard' and a well-known member of the Toronto economic elite and close friend of Drew's.

As widely expected, the Progressive Conservatives did not fare well on the Prairies, winning only a combined five seats in the three provinces, and not polling higher than 25% of the vote in any of the western provinces.¹⁵ It is not known if Drew and McCullagh were attempting to highlight their dissent with Bracken by going against his wishes and making a strong visible appearance in the campaign- a norm-breaking voice- or whether they were simply doing all they could to support their party and defeat their opponents- a norm-based voice. What is clear is that their actions highlighted dissent within the party, and illustrated the strength and control of Ontario within the party.

Originally, the Ontario provincial election and the federal election were to be on the same day. After the Tory minority government was defeated in Ontario and the legislature was dissolved, an election was slated for 11 June 1945. Mackenzie King quickly called a federal election for the same day. Worried that "casting ballots in two elections on the same day would be too confusing, while waiting until after the national poll might be damaging to the provincial Tories," Drew moved the date of the Ontario election up by one week.¹⁶ This also allowed him to campaign for Bracken and the federal party after the provincial election, and provided the federal party with some momentum, at least in Ontario where they fared quite well provincially. However, some federal MPs, including future Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, claimed that the change in dates actually hurt the federal effort. At this time, there was a genuine fear that socialism would take hold of the electorate. That was true in Ontario, where the CCF won 34

¹⁵ The party won two seats in Alberta, one in Saskatchewan, and two in Manitoba. Their best result was 24.9% in Bracken's home province of Manitoba.

¹⁶ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 107.

seats in 1943, having won none in the previous election. Their share of the vote also increased 26.1% points to 31.7%, only 4% points shy of the Tories. Not surprisingly, great efforts were made to hold off the rising CCF in the 1945 election, and, for some, perhaps too great. “Drew, in beating back the CCF threat in Ontario, had exhausted the party’s resources at a time when they were needed most federally,” Diefenbaker commented in retrospect.¹⁷ Regardless of the cost to the federal party, those efforts worked well for the Ontario Tories, who saw their seat count increase from a minority government of 38 to a dominant majority of 66. Their share of the vote also increased from 35.7% to 44.3%. This increase came largely at the expense of the CCF, who dropped to only 8 seats and 22.4% of the vote.

Bracken stayed on as federal opposition leader until 1948. However, those three years were tumultuous for the besieged leader. Drew butted heads with many members of the federal party for his opposition to baby bonuses, claiming they were “iniquitous” and the “penalty of Appeasement.”¹⁸ While many Tory MPs opposed the bonuses in principle, they were cautious to speak out against them in public, fearing a backlash from voters, especially in Québec. Despite Drew’s intentions to move from the provincial wing to the federal wing, he was unafraid to speak out against something he opposed, even when urged not to by the federal party. In this sense, Drew and his provincial party were willing to employ a norm-breaking voice over a policy issue that had no direct effect on Ontario.

H.A. Bruce, a Toronto area MP, shared Drew’s opinion, and claimed the bonuses were “a bribe of the most brazen character, made chiefly to one province [Québec] and paid for by the taxes of the rest.”¹⁹ The opposition to an issue such as baby bonuses is illustrative of the response to the loyalty dilemma faced by Drew and the Ontario group. While opposed to the

¹⁷ Quoted in Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 155.

¹⁸ Quoted in D.C. Thompson, *Louis St. Laurent*, 137.

¹⁹ Quoted in D.C. Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent*, 137.

bonuses in principle, the group could have remained quiet, recognizing that the federal party's support was designed in large part to gain support in Québec. However by publicly opposing them, the Ontario members were undermining the cause of their federal counterparts, while at the same time looking to make gains amongst Ontario's Anglophone population. The Ontario group could be unrelenting at times, and eventually became in their support for a leadership change. Denis Smith noted that "Drew's Ontario supporters were now aggressively pursuing the succession on his behalf, and, without any broader constituency, Bracken lacked authority to put them down. His resistance was gradually worn away."²⁰

Following Bracken's retirement, a leadership convention was called, and Drew, who had recently been defeated in his own Toronto area riding in the 1948 provincial election, handily defeated John Diefenbaker on the first ballot at the leadership convention. The Drew era in Ontario, "marked by a clash of economic principles, political philosophies, and personal relations," was very different from the era that was about to begin. Whereas Drew's loyalty lay largely with his personal interests at the expense of partisan interests, Frost's loyalty would lie with pragmatic concerns at the expense of partisan interests. In both cases, overly intimate intraparty relations were minimized in favour of another priority.

The George Drew years- 1939 to 1948- laid the grounds for intra-party relations between the Ontario wing and the federal wing for decades to come. The Ontario machine was able to assert its pre-eminence, not only provincially, but within the federal wing as well. While only one federal election occurred while Drew was Premier, the Ontario wing asserted its partisanship, though it is clear that Drew may have had some alternative motives as a result of his quest for the federal leadership position. Throughout Drew's tenure as Premier, the relationship between the provincial and federal wings was intimate at the public level, but behind

²⁰ Smith, *Rogue Tory*, 155.

the scenes had considerable division. While this had some benefit for the federal party in Ontario, many perceived it as detrimental elsewhere.

Leslie Frost: The Path of True Statesmanship

After outgoing Premier George Drew's defeat and decision to pursue the leadership of the federal wing, Frost won a decisive majority on the first ballot, winning more than two hundred more votes than his three opponents' combined totals.²¹ With the former premier leading the federal wing of the party and his former finance minister leading the Ontario wing, one might be tempted to think that the two would have worked well together, allowing for the routine use of a norm-based voice, an intimate relationship and increased electoral success for both wings of the party. Unfortunately for the federal wing of the party, such would not be the case.

While Drew and Frost did not have the openly hostile relationship that the media routinely reported they had, their relationship was anything but warm.²² As finance minister, Frost knew all too well of Drew's propensity to attack the 'Grits' for their centralizing tendencies and supposed communist leanings. Yet, Frost was never quite the fierce partisan that Drew was. In fact, during his tenure as finance minister, he worked at great length to restore the relationship between Toronto and Ottawa that Mitchell Hepburn had all but destroyed some years earlier and that Drew did little to rebuild.²³ Indeed, Frost's ability and willingness to remove himself from narrow partisan bickering and step back and examine the situation as a whole from a more pragmatic and, in many instances, non-partisan and provincially driven perspective, was one quality that Drew lacked, or at least one he was unwilling to make use of. Unlike Drew, Frost

²¹ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 150.

²² See Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 156-59, 224-25, and 321.

²³ For an in-depth analysis of intra-party federalism within the Liberal Party during the Mitch Hepburn era, see Whitaker, *The Government Party*, ch. 8.

was “determined to co-operate with the federal government when it was in Ontario’s interest to do so,” regardless of which party formed the federal government.²⁴ In this sense, Frost employed a norm-breaking voice, though in a considerably different manner than Drew. As long as the province could have economic success and operate as a powerhouse within Confederation, it did not matter much to Frost who governed federally. If the relationship was beneficial for Ontario’s interests and its people- and by extension its government- Frost was all too happy to compromise. This outlook caused many to assert that Frost had found the “path of true statesmanship.”²⁵ Thus, they assumed that partisan bickering would be muted and provincial entanglements would be ended. As a result, the relationship between the provincial and federal Conservatives became much more neutral than what it was under Drew’s premiership.

The first election for the two new leaders occurred in 1949 when voters were to elect a new House of Commons. Although Frost urged Ontario Conservatives to “stand behind our former leader and our great chief, George Drew, in the big battle that lies ahead,” he was hesitant to translate his words into practice during the campaign itself.²⁶ Although he made some appearances for the federal party, occasionally appearing with Drew, it was clear that Frost did not offer the same level of support to Drew that Drew had offered to Bracken in the previous campaign. Drew, ever the partisan, had been a strong supporter of Bracken and the federal Tories throughout his premiership, at least publicly, despite the fact that the federal wing was considerably weaker than the governing Liberals and that there was internal dissention within the party ranks. However, Frost did not entirely snub his former provincial colleague as he appeared in a few small towns during the campaign and at a large rally at Massey Hall near the end of the

²⁴ Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett, “Class Structure and Political Alliances in an Industrialized Society,” in *The Provincial State: Politics in Canada’s Provinces and Territories*, Toronto: Copp-Clark Pitamn Ltd., 1992, 156.

²⁵ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 192.

²⁶ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 156.

campaign. However, it is likely that Frost appeared more on behalf of the local candidates than he did on behalf of Drew or the federal party. Furthermore, he neither introduced Drew nor spoke for him at the Massey Hall campaign rally; although it was unlikely he was invited to speak on Drew's behalf.²⁷ Nonetheless, this support was seen as encouraging to the federal party, which was in need of garnering as much support as possible. In response to Frost's appearance at the Massey Hall rally, "the national headquarters...celebrat[ed] the renewal of the *bonne entente* between Ontario provincial Tories and the new federal leader."²⁸ The celebration of the supposed renewal of the *bonne entente* illustrated that the federal party saw benefit in maintaining a close relationship with the Ontario wing and believed that such a relationship was beneficial to the federal wing. The actions of the provincial party, however, suggested that the desire to maintain this intimate relationship was not mutual and that the use of norm-based voice, as suggested by federal officials, was greatly over exaggerated.

The very next day, campaign manager Allister Grossart dispatched a memorandum to all Tory candidates, reading, in part, that "We think you will be interested in knowing that the campaign got off to such a fine start and that Premier Leslie Frost left no doubt in anybody's mind as to his-all out support of our federal campaign."²⁹ However, such enthusiasm seemed to be premature and misplaced. While Frost did appear at the Massey Hall rally, it was hardly cause for celebration and certainly not reason enough to suggest the renewal of the *bonne entente* between the Ontario and federal Tories. Yet for a party searching for reasons to be optimistic about the campaign and its chances in the upcoming election, the visible support of the strong Ontario machine was positive, for whatever it would be worth. Such a response is also illustrative of the potential benefit the federal Tories could possibly receive if they were aligned

²⁷ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 156.

²⁸ Camp, *Gentlemen, Players and Politicians*, 314.

²⁹ Camp, *Gentlemen, Players and Politicians* 314.

with their popular provincial counterparts. However, Roger Graham, Frost's biographer, remarked of the 1949 campaign and Frost's efforts vis-à-vis those of Drew in earlier campaigns that "Frost...was more restrained, less noticeable, as though going through the motions without his heart being in it."³⁰

Far less important than the lack of warm friendship between the two was Frost's strong suspicion that the federal Tories were bound to lose the 1949 election. Aware of the likelihood of another Liberal victory, Frost was unwilling to fully throw his cap in the ring for someone that he did not think would be able to defeat the Liberal government. Sid Noel has remarked of the governing party in Ontario that "if they support an unpopular federal Prime Minister they suffer damage by association."³¹ This would also extend to an unpopular federal opposition leader. The presence of such a situation places the provincial leadership in a sizeable loyalty dilemma. While remaining loyal to an unpopular federal party may strengthen partisan relations between the two wings, it can also considerably damage the future electoral success of the provincial wing. As Noel has suggested- and as countless premiers have proven- it is unlikely for the loyalty of a provincial wing to remain with their federal counterparts during stints of unpopularity. Quite simply, the loyalty of the provincial leadership tends to remain with territorial concerns, or, at the very least, away from larger partisan concerns.

As Frost had worked hard to improve Ontario's relationship with Ottawa throughout his tenure as finance minister, giving unwavering support to Drew only to have him defeated would have likely done little to improve that relationship. An intimate relationship might also have had negative repercussions on the Ontario party itself. Throughout the 1949 campaign, provincial-federal relations could be described as distant, or at best, neutral. As had been anticipated, the

³⁰ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 156.

³¹ Noel, "The Ontario Political Culture," 59.

federal Progressive Conservatives dropped significantly in the polls, especially in Ontario. Having won 66 seats overall in 1945 with 27.6% of the vote and 48 seats in Ontario (41.4% of the vote), the Tories won only 41 seats in 1949 with 29.7% of the vote, and only 25 of Ontario's 83 seats (37.4% of the vote), a loss of 23 Ontario seats and 4.0% of the Ontario vote. Indeed, even the ridings that Frost visited during the campaign remained "more solidly Liberal than before."³² Frost's neutral relationship during the election certainly did not do anything to help the federal Conservatives in Ontario. Although things seemed bad for Drew following the election, they would only get worse, as Frost quickly warmed up to the new Prime Minister.

In many respects, Frost was a "natural complement to St. Laurent."³³ Unlike his predecessor, Frost had no ambitions of partisan bickering for the simple sake of partisan bickering, and was unwilling to allow Ontario's grievances with the federal government to spiral into a bigger issue than what they were. A better solution, it seemed to Frost, was to pursue a policy of cooperation with the federal government over a policy of confrontation. As long as Ontario's needs were taken care of, it seemed that Frost was open to compromise. In her studies of Ontario's post-war relations with the federal government, P.E. Bryden has suggested that Frost was "disposed to develop a more harmonious relationship with Louis St. Laurent than had been experienced between George Drew and Prime Minister Mackenzie King."³⁴ Under such a model of intergovernmental relations, it is clear that when the provincial government was placed in a loyalty dilemma, its loyalty would rarely lie with partisan interests. Indeed, a pragmatic response to a loyalty dilemma was commonplace throughout under this model of intergovernmental relations.

³² Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 157.

³³ Bothwell, Drummond, and English, *Canada Since 1945*, 192. For an early account of the relationship between Frost and St. Laurent, see Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 156-58.

³⁴ P.E. Bryden, "Ontario's Agenda in Post-Imperial Constitutional Negotiations, 1949-68," 219.

At the same time, St. Laurent was also willing to work across party lines and forge good relations with whomever and whatever party was governing provincially.³⁵ As Reg Whitaker has noted of the post-war federal Liberal government, "...federalism overrode federal-provincial solidarity. The Government party at Ottawa preferred to deal with other governments."³⁶ At the same time, Frost was "willing to live and let live politically," and would abandon Drew and the federal Tories if that meant improving his province's relationship with the federal government in the process.³⁷ He, for one, realized the need to be on good terms with Ottawa to make improvements for Ontario and its citizens, thus placing loyalty with territorial interests- and by extension pragmatic interests- ahead of larger partisan interests. In a 1963 memorandum, Frost made this point very clear, remarking,

...I was of the opinion that a new approach had to be made to the Dominion Government based upon as much understanding and co-operation as could be achieved...the people were completely tired of the bickering and dickering between the Provincial and Federal Governments. This thinking was borne out in the federal election of 1949 when the people of Ontario decisively rejected the Drew point of view.³⁸

This spirit of understanding and co-operation to better Ontario would manifest itself in a number of joint federal-provincial initiatives during the Frost-St. Laurent era or shortly thereafter. Among these joint projects included means tested pensions at age sixty-five and universal pensions at age seventy, the development of transportation routes including the Trans-Canada Highway and the St. Lawrence Seaway, hospital insurance, a natural gas pipeline from Alberta, and many others. The Frost government also signed a tax rental agreement with the federal government, which took effect in 1952. In signing this agreement with the federal government, he abandoned Drew's previous alliance with Québec Premier Maurice Duplessis in opposition to the tax rental system. This relationship between the two levels, or at least between

³⁵ Whitaker, *The Government Party*, chs. 7-10.

³⁶ Whitaker, *The Government Party*, 415.

³⁷ Bothwell, Drummond and English, *Canada Since 1945*, 150.

³⁸ Quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 157.

Frost and St. Laurent, alarmed many members of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives, who not only witnessed a level of co-operation never seen between the two entities, but also saw their former provincial leader, good friend and current federal party leader being excluded in the process. This perceived intimacy between the federal Liberals and provincial Conservatives is illustrative of cross-party co-operation and a generally close relationship between the two wings of the opposing parties. Of course, the intimacy stopped well short of campaigning on behalf of the other, but nevertheless prevented an intimate intraparty relationship and the use of a norm-based voice.

George McCullagh remarked to Frost that he had the “suspicion that you share the feeling of many others that your predecessor was constantly warring with Ottawa too much. My own viewpoint is that, due to that feeling, you are over-compensating and not standing up to them enough.” Unfazed, Frost thanked McCullagh for his input, but responded, “...I have never attempted to be anything but myself. For better or for worse, my methods are my own. George [Drew] no doubt in given situations would do much better than I. On the other hand, in some cases the converse will apply. Time alone will tell.”³⁹ Indeed, time alone would be telling and it would further illustrate Frost’s pragmatic approach to federal-provincial relations. Throughout Frost and St. Laurent’s first terms in office, a friendly rapport between the two had developed, the strained relationship between Toronto and Ottawa was greatly improved, constructive joint projects were undertaken with more awaiting in the planning stage, and no issues arose that were overly divisive. Additionally, Ontario entered into the tax-rental system in 1952. Going into the 1953 campaign, Frost had little reason to campaign against the federal Liberals and little reason to use a norm-based voice and campaign on behalf of the federal Tories and George Drew, who again had little chance of winning. Thus, intra-party relations amongst the

³⁹ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 158-59.

Progressive Conservatives remained neutral and Frost's loyalty remained with territorial and pragmatic concerns.

Although Drew and the federal Tories wanted Frost and the Ontario wing to play an active role in the campaign and many 'true-blue' Ontario Tories concurred with the desirability of supporting the federal Tories, Frost was forced to balance the benefits of the warm and mutually beneficial relation he had worked hard to develop with St. Laurent against the benefits of supporting his own federal party with forlorn electoral prospects.⁴⁰ The potential drawbacks of damaging such a relationship led Frost to opt out of the idea of supporting Drew and the federal Tories in favour of remaining as neutral as possible throughout most of the campaign. Additionally, by downplaying partisanship, Frost had attracted a number of federal Liberals to his provincial organization, and therefore did not see the benefit of increased partisan wrangling and potentially losing those voters at the provincial level for what he saw as a fruitless cause at the federal level. However, the federal Tories fared marginally better in 1953 than they did in 1949, winning 51 seats in total with 31.0% of the vote, and 33 of Ontario's 85 seats (40.3% of the vote), up only marginally from 1949, and still below their 1945 levels.

Frost's absence from the campaign trail and unwillingness to openly and actively support the federal wing of his party drew a great deal of criticism. An article in the popular magazine *Saturday Night* stated the federal Tories were "aggrieved by what they regarded as the passivity of Mr. Frost and his colleagues" and believed that had the Ontario Tories been more active in the campaign "there would have been much a different story to tell about the result in Ontario."⁴¹ This aloofness from the federal wing also drew criticism from within the party. The federal wing was left with "...the uneasy knowledge that the powerful provincial organization of Leslie Frost,

⁴⁰ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 224-25.

⁴¹ John A. Stevenson, "Ottawa Letter: Behind the Election's Statistics," *Saturday Night* (5 September 1953), p. 10.

managed by his lieutenant Alex McKenzie, remained studiously aloof from the national party. The Ontario Tory *bonne entente* all had hoped for under Drew's leadership had become, instead, a deep, unfathomable estrangement."⁴² Despite these criticisms, Frost remained confident with his decision and realized that even had he done more to support the federal Tories, it would have been unlikely that they would have defeated the Liberals. At the same time, Frost would have risked souring his relationship with St. Laurent, C.D. Howe, Robert Winters and the rest of the federal Liberals whom he had become close with over the previous four years.

Frost responded to these criticisms confidently, stating "I think the course we took...was the right one...Our job is to do our work in this Province and to strengthen the Progressive Conservative Party by meeting our obligations here."⁴³ Frost thought that supporting the federal Tories would have been a greater hindrance than it would have been a benefit, at least for his party's success provincially. Faced with a loyalty dilemma, it is clear that Frost chose territorial interests over partisan ones and refrained from the active use of a norm-based voice. He also recognized an Ontario electoral phenomenon- the switch voters- that saw him guide his interactions with the federal party and Drew accordingly. Of the phenomenon, Clare Hoy remarked that:

Voting pattern studies show that about one-third of the people who vote Liberal federally in Ontario vote Conservative provincially, and another 10 per cent of federal Liberal voters don't even vote in provincial elections. So, to a large extent, the two parties represent the same constituency, which is why Frost refused to involve the provincial party in campaigning federally for Drew.⁴⁴

While Frost would go on to campaign actively for John Diefenbaker in 1957 and 1958, the voter switch phenomenon was less of a reality in those years, perhaps partly because of Frost's vocal support of the federal party. Additionally, Diefenbaker was riding a wave of populist support

⁴² Camp, *Gentlemen, Players and Politicians*, 146-47.

⁴³ Leslie Frost, quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 225.

⁴⁴ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 41.

that seemingly transcended partisan loyalties, allowing him to win, in 1958, the first majority Conservative government of the post-war era.⁴⁵

Prior to that, St. Laurent's second term from 1953 to 1957 had been scrutinized more in the eyes of the Ontario Tories, as an issue finally arose where Frost and St. Laurent did not see eye-to-eye on- the tax-rental agreement. Frost claimed that the formula for tax sharing was inequitable and that the formula for adjustments and grants was unfair to Ontario. With a \$500 million federal surplus, Frost and his Ontario cabinet were able to make a strong case, asking for only half of that amount to be split between the provinces, adding that such a proposal "is merely giving us a portion of what is our own."⁴⁶ Yet the federal government was steadfast in its opposition to altering the formula to provide any additional benefit to Ontario, prompting Frost to hold a news conference on 18 July 1956 and, without losing his temper or even raising his voice, deliver a scathing report of the federal government, and making many speculate that he would actively intervene in the next federal election.⁴⁷ It seemed that an issue had arisen that would unite the federal and Ontario wings of the Progressive Conservative Party and forced the Ontario Tories to reconsider their amicable relationship with the federal Liberal government.

The once amicable relationship between Frost and St. Laurent quickly dissolved, led by the tax rental disagreements. When it became apparent that St. Laurent was unwilling to budge, Frost concluded that if the party in government at the federal level was unable to compromise with Ontario, he would have to work to change the government in Ottawa to one that was more willing to co-operate with Ontario, regardless of its chances of winning. After all, shortly after St. Laurent's election in 1949, Frost made it clear that he was willing to work with any federal government- regardless of its political stripes- as long as it was willing to work with Ontario. By

⁴⁵ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 333.

⁴⁶ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 320-21.

⁴⁷ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 320-21.

no means, he concluded, should the relationship between the two governments be “at arm’s length.”⁴⁸ Yet by 1957, Frost realized that the relationship had in fact become one operating at arm’s length. He had also made up his mind to “join the battle against the government before there was even a bandwagon, when almost everyone would have wagered on another Liberal victory.”⁴⁹ Frost was being neither anti-government nor a narrow partisan. One only needs to look at Frost’s record to see that this was not, or ever, the case. For example, he co-operated with the federal Liberals in establishing the hospital insurance program, the last major achievement of the St. Laurent government. However, by the late 1950s, he no longer saw Ontario’s best interests being furthered by the federal Liberals. Much as he always had, Frost was following a pragmatic path and simply looking to ensure that the federal government would be friendly to Ontario. However, a close personal friendship with soon-to-be federal leader John Diefenbaker may also explain, in part, Frost’s active support of the federal party in the late 1950s. In this sense, the use of a norm-based voice in 1957 and 1958 was guided not only by personal friendship, but also, and perhaps more importantly, pragmatic and territorial based concern.

At the same time as the Ontario government was growing increasingly unhappy with the tax rental agreement it was apparent that George Drew, after being unable to lead the Conservatives to victory over the last two federal elections, would be replaced as federal leader. By this time, Leslie Frost already had his choice for replacement in mind. “Hugh,” he said, speaking to party organizer Hugh Latimer, “John Diefenbaker is the man that I think should take Drew’s place.” As Latimer began to object, referring to Diefenbaker’s ‘impossible temperament,’ Frost cut him off, reiterating “Listen, Diefenbaker is the man that can win the next election and I want you to go and see [party organizer] Alex [McKenzie] in hospital and tell him

⁴⁸ Quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 157.

⁴⁹ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 329.

what I think..."⁵⁰ For the first time since becoming Premier, it was apparent after Diefenbaker won the leadership that Frost was throwing his full support behind the federal wing of the party and employing a norm-based voice. However, many began to question Frost's motivations, with some stating that he was simply jumping on the anti-government bandwagon, and others adding that he was reasserting his partisanship, and thus abandoning 'the path of true statesmanship.'⁵¹ Yet in reality, neither was the case. Frost remained consistent in looking out for his own provincial interests. As Donald Smiley has noted, "in the 1957 federal election Mr. Diefenbaker and the Conservatives were perceived by several of the provincial administrations as being more sensitive to provincial interests than were the incumbent Liberals. This perception seems to have been important in winning for the new Conservative leader the support of the governing part[y]...in Ontario."⁵² Indeed, in regards to the tax rental formula, Frost suggested that "Mr. St. Laurent has completely missed the point of the argument advanced by Ontario."⁵³

Although Frost would play a major role in the 1957 election for new Tory leader John Diefenbaker, he first relied upon his previous amicable relationship with the federal government in order to find some sort of compromise over tax-sharing. Additionally, the increasingly distant relationship between the Ontario Tories and their federal counterparts over the course of Frost's premiership made it harder for both sides to work together. It was said that even had Frost originally attempted to work with Drew and the federal Tories, many in the federal party would have been hesitant to join with Frost in a battle against the federal government over

⁵⁰ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 330.

⁵¹ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 329.

⁵² Smiley, *Canada in Question*, 101. The Diefenbaker Tories also won the support of the governing parties in Nova Scotia (Robert Stanfield, P.C.), New Brunswick (Hugh Flemming, P.C.) and Québec (Maurice Duplessis, Union Nationale).

⁵³ "Remarks of the Honourable Leslie M. Frost, Q.C., at a Reception for the Honourable Percy Vivian, Port Hope, 5:00 p.m. May 22nd, 1957," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-24 (b292249) "Elections Port Hope 1957"

the tax rental issue.⁵⁴ However, despite any disagreements, the strong Ontario electoral machine and grassroots associations, something the federal party generally lacked, became a welcome addition to the 1957 campaign. Indeed, when Frost announced he would make the Ontario team available to the federal Tory campaign, he hoped that a strong message would be sent to the federal Liberals to make them aware of what he believed to be their pigheadedness over the tax rental formula.

Frost and the Ontario team were left to run Diefenbaker's campaign in Canada's most populous province in the 1957 election. Realizing the organizational strength of the Ontario wing that had helped put Conservatives in power provincially since 1943- and would do so continually until 1985- Frost concluded that Diefenbaker's victory was all but assured.⁵⁵ Diefenbaker met with Frost and McKenzie shortly after his election as party leader and indicated a willingness to let the Ontario machine take control. From the start of the campaign to the very end, Frost made it abundantly clear that he hoped for a change in government. Referring to the tax-sharing problem, he added that "there is only one man who can find that just solution for the little men and little women of Canada."⁵⁶ That man, of course, he assumed to be John Diefenbaker. However, Frost also publicly sought to make it clear that pragmatism was guiding his support more than partisanship, stating that he was interested in the benefit to Ontario as a whole more than simple partisan gain.

At a campaign stop on behalf of Diefenbaker in Barrie, Frost told the crowd that he was not campaigning for political benefit, but because Ontario's people and municipalities were facing staggering problems, and that the federal Tories were the party best able to help Ontario. This was echoed at a major campaign rally at Massey Hall, where Frost spoke on the issue on

⁵⁴ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 321.

⁵⁵ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 331.

⁵⁶ Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 332.

creating a 'realistic' division of tax sources in the field of direct taxation, claiming that Ontario was simply asking for what is "our own." He went on to say that the major difference between the Liberals and Conservatives was the idea of centralization as opposed to the idea of balanced government, which he claimed was represented by the Progressive Conservative Party.⁵⁷ While Frost's true intentions are likely debatable, this quote is illustrative of his pragmatic outlook. Regardless, the relationship between the Ontario and federal Tories was becoming increasingly intimate, and the federal party would soon reap the benefits of Frost's norm-based voice and the resulting intimacy between the two wings.

However, this increasingly intimate relationship was not lost on the federal Liberal Party and the media in Western Canada, particularly the pro-Liberal *Winnipeg Free Press*. Both the Liberals their allies in the press raised suspicions about a possible 'sweetheart deal' between Frost and Diefenbaker and questioned the federal party's commitment to the interests of the rest of Canada.⁵⁸ Frost appeared with Diefenbaker on a number of campaign stops in Ontario where the premier told the audience that a new tax rental agreement was needed and that only the federal Conservative Party could provide it. Diefenbaker in turn told the audience that he supported such a new deal and that he would be willing to provide it.⁵⁹ While this went over well in Ontario, the same cannot be said about the rest of Canada. Although both Frost and Diefenbaker indicated that the new tax agreement would favour all provinces, there was certainly an Ontario focus when speaking of the new agreement.

Upon arriving in Western Canada, Diefenbaker was immediately put on the defensive, stating that he had not "bought" Frost's support. Meanwhile Prime Minister St. Laurent asked

⁵⁷ "Notes on Remarks by the Honourable Leslie M. Frost, Q.C., at Massey Hall, Thursday, April 25th, 1957, at 8:30 p.m.," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-24 no. 32 (b292249) "Elections Massey Hall Speech 1957"

⁵⁸ See, for example, "Frost in His Hair, *Winnipeg Free Press* (15 May 1957)," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-23 89-G (b292325) "Federal Election (June 10/1957)"

⁵⁹ Mark Harrison, "Won't Sell Out West for Frost's Support Diefenbaker Says," *Toronto Star* (15 May 1957), 35/61.

“just what are Mr. Frost and Mr. Diefenbaker up to?” and accused Frost of getting from Diefenbaker “...what he couldn’t get from a Liberal government- a much better deal than the other provinces.”⁶⁰ As this instance illustrates, an intimate intra-party relationship between a provincial party and the federal party can serve as ammunition for the opposing federal party in other parts of the country. As the *Winnipeg Free Press* put it, “It is in Ontario that [Diefenbaker’s] chief hope of gaining seats lies. And that hope depends absolutely on Premier Frost and his organization. They will not be Mr. Diefenbaker’s seats. They will be Mr. Frost’s seats.”⁶¹ Thus, a close intra-party relationship in one province may lead to a distance intra-party relationship in another if that province feels as though the federal party’s allegiance lies elsewhere and cannot properly stand up for regional interests. Despite feelings of regional alienation in some parts of Canada, the Conservatives went on to win a minority government in 1957 and a sweeping majority government a year later.

While there were other factors that led to the Conservative victories in 1957 and 1958 aside from the close relationship between the federal and Ontario wing of the party, one cannot understate the value of the closeness, especially for the federal party.⁶² When analyzing these results in comparison with the results from the previous two elections in 1949 and 1953, it is no anomaly that federal support rose greatly when Frost was on good terms with his federal counterpart. In 1957, the Conservative Party won a minority government with 111 seats and 38.8% of the vote, an increase of 60 seats from the previous election. The Ontario results are particularly illustrative of Frost’s influence. The Tories won 61 seats in Ontario in 1957 with

⁶⁰ Robert Taylor, “St. Laurent Scores Diefenbaker-Frost Deal to Split Tax,” *Toronto Star* (18 May 1957), 1/2

⁶¹ “Frost in His Hair, *Winnipeg Free Press* (15 May 1957),” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-23 89-G (b292325) “Federal Election (June 10/1957)”

⁶² Other factors leading to the party’s success included their populist leader who dispelled the ‘Bay Street’ image of the party; the pipeline scandal; perceived Liberal arrogance; the perception that, at 75, St. Laurent was too old to lead the party; and their ability to finally gain a major foothold in Québec.

48.8% of the vote, up from 33 seats in 1953 and 25 in 1949. Tory gains in Ontario came at the expense of the Liberal Party which, despite doing extremely well in Ontario in the past, winning 55 seats in 1949, dropped to 20 seats in 1957 and only 14 in 1958. Of the 111 Tory seats in 1957, 55.0% were won in Ontario.

Following the 1957 Diefenbaker victory, the *Toronto Telegram* published an editorial entitled 'Ontario the Key to Victory,' and declared that "John Diefenbaker rightly proclaimed a date with destiny. In this Province, Hon. Leslie Frost made it good. The Ontario Premier emerges from this latest triumph an extraordinary political figure in the national scene."⁶³ A number of telegrams received by Frost from rank-and-file party supporters highlight the importance of the contributions made by the premier and his provincial organization. In fact, the text of the telegrams made it seem as though it was Frost's victory as much as it was Diefenbaker's. Messages received by Frost included: "Well Done, Great Credit, Your recent activities for Canada, Congratulations;" "Please accept my warmest congratulations in the splendid victory for which you are so largely responsible;" "Congratulations this lovely day;" and "I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the wonderful job you have done."⁶⁴ Not only was Frost responsible for publicly endorsing Diefenbaker and his party, he and his Ontario team were also responsible for candidate selection, party promotion, and getting their large support base to the polls. As the federal grassroots organization was virtually non-existent in 1957, the Ontario campaign relied on the efforts of the provincial party and its association.

The gratitude owed to the Ontario organization for its assistance and supporting during the 1957 campaign was certainly not lost on the federal Conservative Party. For example, a

⁶³ Quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 334.

⁶⁴ "Canadian National Telegraphs," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-23 89-G (b292325) "Federal Election (June 10/1957)"

message from the new Prime Minister in the program for the Ontario party's 1957 Annual General Meeting read, "I am grateful for the support accorded to me and my colleagues on June 10th...With grateful thanks I acknowledge the efforts of this and the other Progressive Conservative Associations as contributing in the fullest measure to our success at the polls."⁶⁵ Diefenbaker, reflecting on Frost's work, also stated "No man in public life did more than [he] for the Conservative Party in that election...from the very beginning of the campaign, it was Frost who said, 'We're going to win.'"⁶⁶

In addition to the personal thanks and pandering to rank-and-file provincial Conservative supporters, the federal party actively sought to substantially improve the links between the two wings. It was clear to many in the federal party that the actions of Frost and the Ontario Party in 1957 had built the capacity to strengthen the intra-party relationship by informal institutional arrangements. In a letter to Frost from federal party president Allister Grossart, he reminded the premier that "...my services would at all times be available to...yourself in any matter which I can be of help, and particularly in any by-election or general election. Apart from my own continuing personal interest, I consider it part of my job here to place the facilities of this office at the disposal of each of our Provincial organizations."⁶⁷ Of course, this offer was made despite the fact that the Ontario organization and support network was considerably stronger than that of the federal party. Nevertheless, it speaks to the growing level of intimacy between the federal and Ontario wings under the leadership of Frost and Diefenbaker. Although Diefenbaker only had a minority government until 1958, Frost was able to make some progress on the tax-sharing

⁶⁵ "The Ontario Progressive Conservative Association Annual Meeting, 1957 (Program)," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-23 227 (b292121) "Progressive Conservative Assoc. Ont. Nov 4th, Nov. 5th 1957 (Annual Meeting)"

⁶⁶ Diefenbaker, *The Years of Achievement*, 29.

⁶⁷ "Letter to Frost from Allister Grossart, July 19th 1957," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-23 227 (b292122) "Progressive Conservative Party Dominion Headquarters- General Correspondence"

scheme, as he was promised a first installment of the larger tax share. Thus, he had no excuse to stay out of the 1958 campaign and revert away from a norm-based voice.

The 1958 election represented the largest victory in Canadian history, with the Diefenbaker Tories winning a majority government with 208 seats and 53.7% of the vote. In Ontario, with Frost's help, the Tories won 67 seats and 56.4% of the vote, an increase of 6 seats and 7.6% of the vote. However, the federal party was less reliant on its provincial counterpart in 1958, as its one year in power allowed for the growth of some grassroots support and saw the federal party set up its own electoral and organizational machinery in Ontario. Furthermore, the major gains in Ontario for the Tories came in the 1957 election.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, Frost still remained an important part of the federal party's electoral success in 1958.

Frost transformed his distant relationship with the federal party and George Drew in 1949 and 1953 to an intimate relationship with Diefenbaker in 1957 and 1958, and that relationship continued after Frost's retirement in 1961. While Frost was Premier, he led the Ontario Tories to three electoral victories- 1951, 1955 and 1959. The federal party, with its aforementioned non-existent support network, was of little help to the Ontario Tories in provincial elections. The success of the provincial party occurred for a variety of reasons, few of which had anything to do with receiving help from the federal party.⁶⁹ As previously mentioned, many federal Tories were hesitant to help much during Drew's tenure, as relations were generally distant. The Ontario wing did, however, receive some support in 1959.

⁶⁸ Diefenbaker's major gains in 1958 were made in Québec and the West. Québec Premier Maurice Duplessis contributed significantly to that victory.

⁶⁹ The success of the Ontario Tories can be attributed to both internal factors- a regular rejuvenating leadership process, an effective grassroots network, pragmatic policy, adherence to operative norms- and external factors, the first-past-the-post electoral system and a stable and prosperous economy. See Bradley Walchuk, "The Government Party: Ontario Progressive Conservatives, 1943 to 1985," unpublished essay, 2005.

On the eve of Frost's retirement in 1961, he said to Diefenbaker, "I just want to say that my interest in the grand old Party will remain as active as ever...To the Party I have devoted most of the active years of my life. This I propose to do in the future... I am interested in your success and the Party's success. It will be a pleasure always to give my aid and support."⁷⁰ Frost and Diefenbaker remained close in the early 1960s, with Frost declining numerous Senate appointments by Diefenbaker, as well as an appointment as Canadian Ambassador to Washington. In 1961, Frost suggested that the federal Conservatives would be wise to call an election, as the provincial Tories were planning on implementing a provincial sales tax, but were willing to postpone the announcement until after a federal election, providing one was held quickly. The sales tax was bound to be unpopular, especially for a government that had consistently kept taxes low, and Frost feared that resentment against the Conservatives at the provincial level would transfer to the federal level. This situation represented an interesting approach to a loyalty dilemma. Realizing that a tax increase was necessary in Ontario, although perhaps not desirable, Frost was forced to implement legislation to this effect. This was purely a provincial issue. However, he recognized that a tax increase in Ontario could have adverse effects on the federal Tories. His loyalty, while ultimately remaining with the province, was nevertheless extended to the federal party through the use of a norm-based voice in the form of advance warning of the increase and the suggestion to call an early election. Meanwhile, Diefenbaker chose not to call an election, waiting instead until 1962 and seeing Frost's prophecy come true as the federal Tories were met with a considerable setback at the polls.

Though Frost and St. Laurent had got along amicably and made significant progress, the relationship eventually soured, and Frost began to support the federal party of John Diefenbaker. Whether he was reasserting his partisanship or continuing his pragmatic outlook on federal-

⁷⁰ Leslie Frost, quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 403.

provincial relationships, the federal election results vastly improved for the federal party when they had the strong organization of the provincial wing behind them. The 1957 and 1958 elections suggest that an intimate relationship can be of significant benefit to the federal party, although it was not the sole reason for their impressive electoral fortunes. Irrespective of whether the relationship was distant or close in nature, the Ontario government routinely put its own interests first ahead of larger partisan interests. However, as the federal results illustrate, the existence of an intimate relationship and the use of norm-based voice offered a significant benefit to the federal wing.

John Robarts: Full-Throttle Support?

Following Leslie Frost's retirement, John P. Robarts, a former minister in the Frost government, was elected as the party's new leader and became the new premier of Canada's largest province. Shortly thereafter, the Ontario government went ahead with a plan to implement a provincial sales tax. A month after Robarts prorogued the provincial legislature in the spring of 1962, Diefenbaker announced his decision to return to the polls and seek another mandate from voters. The federal party once again sought help from the provincial organizations- specifically Ontario- in trying to seek yet another mandate to govern. Allister Grossart contacted Robarts and remarked that "...it would be a nice touch at the official opening of the campaign...for our Provincial Leaders in each province to send a wire wishing the Prime Minister and the campaign success and giving assurance of continued support from each province."⁷¹ The new Ontario Premier obliged Grossart's request and, in fact, introduced

⁷¹ "Letter to Robarts from Allister Grossart, April 27th 1962," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-26 (b395409) "Federal Government, Hon. J.G. Diefenbaker, 1961-1962"

Diefenbaker at the opening event of the campaign, and, along with many of his ministers, was active on the campaign trail in 1962.⁷²

Yet in stark contrast to the 1958 election, the results were dismal for the federal party and the party lost 92 seats overall and 32 in Ontario alone. Support dropped from 53.7% nationally to 37.2% and decreased from 56.4% in Ontario to 39.2%. There may be some temptation to suggest that Frost's earlier advice to Diefenbaker to call an election before Ontario implemented its sales tax was prophetic, and voters had, to some degree, retaliated against the federal Tories for an action committed by the provincial government.⁷³ Regardless of the exact impact of the increased sales tax, Diefenbaker seemed to agree with Frost's sentiment, and acknowledged that the former premier's advice had merit and was aware of the likelihood of such resentment. Diefenbaker stated in his memoirs that "...an action unpopular [sic] by a Progressive Conservative government at Queen's Park would rebound unfavorably against the electoral fortunes of a Progressive Conservative government in Ottawa; and this is exactly what happened" because "...there is normally...some measure of popular confusion over the various levels of constitutional responsibility."⁷⁴ Regardless of any confusion, the federal Tories had been dealt a significant blow, and Robarts would have to respond accordingly. In fact, Diefenbaker had, to some degree, blamed Robarts and his colleagues for the federal Tory defeat. Despite Robarts' early statement of support for Diefenbaker and the federal Tories, Diefenbaker later claimed that "...Ontario's 'big blue machine' was never put in gear. Those with past election experience stayed away from our provincial office and constituency committee rooms in

⁷² McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 88.

⁷³ It should be noted, however, that a similar decline in Diefenbaker's support occurred outside Ontario, where the sales tax issue was irrelevant. Additionally, the Ontario Tories were given yet another mandate by the voters in 1963.

⁷⁴ Diefenbaker, *The Tumultuous Years*, 112.

droves.”⁷⁵ This he blamed, in part, on Robarts and the Ontario Tories perceived use of a norm-breaking voice.

With a troubled government in Ottawa, Robarts and the Ontario Tories decided to avoid an intimate partisan relationship and refrained from supporting the federal Tories. The loyalty of the provincial Tories was moving away from the federal wing and back to territorial and pragmatic concerns, thus decreasing the frequency of a norm-based voice. As such, the relationship became increasingly neutral. To survive in power, Robarts decided he would need to differentiate his party from both the preceding provincial government, as well as the “crippled regime in Ottawa.”⁷⁶ Facing a loyalty dilemma between partisan and provincial interests and party, Robarts decided to choose the latter. By early 1962, it became clear that on the policy level, Robarts was beginning to distance his government from the federal Tories. Provincial Minister of Economics and Development Robert Macaulay led a ‘trade crusade’ program in an attempt to boost the province’s trade and economic well being, an area of jurisdiction normally held by the federal government. In this regard, Robarts and the Ontario government were seeking to ensure that Ontario would be able to continue its imperative pursuit of economic success. Robarts had no problem charting a different course for Ontario than what the federal government was proposing, providing it put Ontario first. Noel has noted that “like other successful governments before it, the PC’s dynasty’s clear and overriding purpose was the pursuit of economic success.”⁷⁷ Of the trade program, Robarts commented that:

The question must be running through your minds is why should Ontario embark on an ambitious program of trade expansion- surely this is the responsibility of the federal government. Let me make clear, here and now, that the Government of Ontario does not intend to hide behind the skirts of the Federal Government in matters of trade and economic expansion.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Diefenbaker, *The Tumultuous Years*, 178.

⁷⁶ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 88.

⁷⁷ Noel, “The Ontario Political Culture,” 56.

⁷⁸ Quoted in McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 94.

By this time it had become clear that internal tensions within the federal party were having a crippling effect on its operations and many were questioning the abilities of Diefenbaker as a leader. In an attempt to remain as politically neutral as possible throughout the period of internal strife, Robarts remarked publicly that he was determined to “stay clear” of the internal politics of his federal counterparts, and when pushed for further comment, he simply declared that “we’re not responsible for events at Ottawa.”⁷⁹ When the 1963 federal election came along, Diefenbaker was still leader of the party, and while Robarts appeared on various campaign stops in support of his federal leader, Ontario PC organizers tended to avoid the election campaign as much as possible. With a neutral relationship between the Ontario and federal Tories, Diefenbaker was unable to tap into the organizational strength of the provincial wing, and won only 27 of Ontario’s 85 seats, with 35.0% of the vote.

It is here that Robarts falls into the pragmatic footsteps of his predecessor rather well, despite the fact that Frost and Diefenbaker had a more intimate intra-party relationship. Realizing that Diefenbaker had little chance of winning, Robarts was determined to carry on Frost’s practice of having an amicable working relationship with whomever wielded power in Ottawa.⁸⁰ He also knew that Bay Street both hated and feared Diefenbaker’s anti-Americanism and wanted him out of power. Working under the assumption that federal Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson would win the federal election, the Ontario Tories could not appear overtly partisan throughout the campaign and go on the offensive against the federal Liberals without risking a compromise to the relationship that Robarts hoped he could achieve with the potentially new Prime Minister. Party insider and loyal Diefenbakerite James Johnston remarked that “John Robarts was not anxious to tie himself to a much-criticized Ottawa Administration- not in 1962,

⁷⁹ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 94-95.

⁸⁰ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 95.

and even less in 1963. The federal party was left to its own devices.”⁸¹ Thus, Robarts’ actions may be appropriately classified as a norm-breaking voice.

The differing views of Canadian nationalism and federalism held by both Robarts and Diefenbaker, who stayed on as opposition leader, would be yet another source of tension between the federal and Ontario Tories. A particularly divisive issue surrounded the Fulton-Favreau formula proposed by the federal Liberals, which was vehemently opposed by Diefenbaker and many federal Tories. However, these were fully supported by Robarts, who was playing an increasingly large role on the national scene regarding Canada’s constitutional future. At the annual meeting of the Ontario P.C. Association in late 1964, Diefenbaker delivered a fiercely partisan speech in which he attacked the proposed amendment formula, stating that it was a mechanism designed to balkanize Canada.

The formula, however, as Davie Fulton attempted to point out to the federal leader, had actually originated in his own federal party.⁸² Robarts was on the stage throughout the speech, and remarked the next night that “the problems of Confederation must be faced from a non-partisan point of view.”⁸³ Diefenbaker, who had returned to the convention unannounced, could only listen to the Ontario Premier’s rebuttal. Again, the loyalty of Robarts and the Ontario wing remained solidly with territorial and pragmatic concerns, largely at the expense of an expansion of partisan concerns. The media, which had picked up the divergence in the two leaders’ speeches on constitutional reform, pounced on the contradicting scripts as evidence of a growing rift between the two leaders. Their approaches to the Constitution, confederation, and federalism itself, were different to the point of being irreconcilable. The rift reported by the press did indeed exist. While some federal Tories blamed Robarts for creating the rift, the *Toronto*

⁸¹ Johnston, *The Party’s Over*, 34-35.

⁸² McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 165.

⁸³ Quoted in McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 165.

Telegram remarked, far more accurately according to Robarts' biographer A.K. McDougall, that Robarts was "deeply troubled by the crisis which the facing the country...and he insists on putting Ontario's views and opinions on national unity as forcibly as possible. And this he will do- even when it conflicts with the views of the party's national leader."⁸⁴

The feud between the two leaders on constitutional matters continued following the tabling of a White Paper on the amending formula in the House of Commons in February 1965. Prime Minister Pearson asked each one of the provinces to approve it, promising to submit it for debate, providing it had provincial approval. In less than a month's time, a motion was introduced in the Ontario legislature, and was passed following a single day's debate. The motion read, in part, "...this House approves and supports the Addresses of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada to Her Majesty the Queen praying that Her Majesty may graciously be pleased to cause a Bill to be laid before the Parliament of the United Kingdom in the following terms."⁸⁵ Obviously opposed to the proposed amending formula and offended at a procedural slip on the part of the Ontario legislature- they had passed support for an address that had not yet been read or passed at the federal level- Diefenbaker went on the offensive in the House of Commons. He stated that:

What has taken place...offsets the rights and privileges of this House of Commons...This resolution does not represent the facts nor the state of affairs. There has been no address...We now find ourselves in a position in the Parliament of Canada where one of the legislatures has passed a resolution approving that which has not been put before parliament...It places parliament in a position secondary to that of any of the legislative assemblies which may approve of a similar form.⁸⁶

While the media enjoyed the situation, reporting that Diefenbaker had accused the Ontario Tories of attempting to usurp the power of the federal government, Robarts stated that he did not want to get into a dispute with the federal party leader and that they were still friends. Yet, according

⁸⁴ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 165.

⁸⁵ Ontario Legislative Assembly Journals, 1965, pgs. 66-70, quoted in McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 166.

⁸⁶ House of Commons, Debates, 18 Mar. 1965, pg. 12505-6, quoted in McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 166.

to McDougall, “the last remark was not true. Diefenbaker’s attempt to make political mileage out of what was at worst a procedural slip by the Ontario government was the kind of offensive manoeuvre that sharply divided him from the far less partisan Robarts.”⁸⁷

This should not, however, suggest that Pearson and Robarts had an intimate relationship- or were even in agreement on most issues- to the same degree that Frost and St. Laurent were. The issue of medicare proved to be particularly divisive, with Robarts and the Ontario Tories resisting the programs’ implementation. Joining Robarts in his opposition to Pearson’s medicare plan was Manitoba Premier Duff Roblin, a fellow Tory, who felt that the program already in place in Manitoba that covered all of its citizens was sufficient.⁸⁸ The program was also similar to Ontario’s, and the Roblin-Robarts entente was likely more pragmatic than anything else. Regardless, it did not last long, since the provinces did not receive any money without signing on to the program and the money proposed by the federal government was simply too much to say no to.

The 1965 election was Diefenbaker’s last as leader of the federal Tories, and once again, the provincial party in Ontario remained neutral on the surface throughout the campaign, though the backroom relations illustrate a distant relationship. With a strong desire to return as Prime Minister, Diefenbaker desperately wanted Robarts to campaign on his behalf, but “Robarts could see a sinking ship a mile away and wanted little to do with the increasingly paranoid Tory leader.”⁸⁹ Illustrative of Robarts’ lack of enthusiasm with the federal campaign were his responses to sitting or MPs or those seeking federal office, as well as his own MPPs, when he was asked for assistance with the federal campaign. Many responses were cool, brief and halfhearted. In one of the more lengthy responses written to an MPP seeking Robarts’ help at a

⁸⁷ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 166.

⁸⁸ Paikin, *Public Triumph, Private Tragedy*, 84.

⁸⁹ Paikin, *Public Triumph, Private Tragedy*, 88.

campaign stop for a perspective Tory MP in Southern Ontario, the premier remarked “over the past few weeks I have had many requests to enter into individual campaigns which I have found impossible to do. There are, of course, limitations because of what is proper in all the circumstances, and I am sure you will understand the difficulties which present themselves.”⁹⁰ Of course, what is proper was not defined, nor were the limitations or difficulties. While a busy schedule combined with many requests was likely a factor, the evidence suggests that apathy, as well as pragmatism, explain Robarts’ aloofness from the federal party and use of a norm-breaking voice in the federal campaign of 1965.

Throughout his tenure as Prime Minister and as opposition leader, Diefenbaker had repeatedly spoken out against the ‘deux-nations’ model that was becoming increasingly popular at the time, as well as the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, or any form of a hyphenated-Canadian. Thus, many saw Diefenbaker as a leader who was stuck in the past and unwilling to accept the new realities of Canada, or old realities that were finally being realized. This prompted Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson to say that Canada needed a “strong Conservative party,” a comment that Diefenbaker has interpreted to mean a Conservative party without Diefenbaker.⁹¹ With an increased sense of nationalism present in Quebec, Premier Jean Lesage was opposed to a Diefenbaker victory, which would have likely prevented any form of asymmetrical federalism or national identity for Quebec. This is a point that Diefenbaker has recognized, though he also claims, rightly or wrongly, that “Ontario’s Robarts, apparently, was of a similar mind” when reflecting on what would be his last campaign as party leader.⁹² The close relationship that existed only eight years earlier when Frost was Premier eroded

⁹⁰ “Letter from Robarts to Ontario MPP,” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-41 (b396972) Binder #42 (October 1965)

⁹¹ Diefenbaker, *The Tumultuous Years*, 243.

⁹² Diefenbaker, *The Tumultuous Years*, 243.

considerably through Robarts' tenure, to the point where the media and political pundits were well aware of the strained relationship between the two Conservative leaders.

Yet, going into the 1965 election, Robarts and his Ontario party were publicly appearing to use a norm-based voice and play the partisan role, kick starting the campaign with the Premier's promise of 'full-throttle support,' and appearing at a Progressive Conservative 'Unity Rally' at Varsity Arena in Toronto. The event featured over 7 000 spectators inside with 20 000 more waiting outside, and three Tory premiers, including Robarts, appeared on stage with Diefenbaker and the federal party. Robarts also promised Diefenbaker an increase of eight new Tory seats from Ontario. However, the spectacle, or at least the Ontario party's involvement in it, seemed to be merely face-saving from a partisan point of view, as little else was done by the Ontario wing in the way of support through the remainder of the campaign.⁹³

While the 'Unity Rally' appeared to illustrate Robarts' willingness to support the federal leader, the exact opposite was the behind the scenes reality. It was Eddie Goodman's responsibility to convince Robarts and his Ontario team to support the fledgling federal leader, and Robarts wanted nothing to do with Goodman, Diefenbaker, or the federal party. Goodman recalled that Robarts called him with a response, and used a few expletives to describe just how mad the premier was at him for attempting to garner his support in the federal election.⁹⁴ In the end, Ernie Jackson, a party insider and Robarts' best friend and closest advisor, even refused to give the federal party his list of Tory campaign contributors, a clear example of a norm-breaking voice. In this instance, the relationship between the two wings was distant. Facing yet another loyalty dilemma, the Ontario wing chose their provincial interests over larger partisan interests. The Ontario party did not want to be seen supporting a federal party that they felt was destined

⁹³ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 169-70.

⁹⁴ Paikin, *Public Triumph, Private Tragedy* 88.

for defeat. All of this was well known to the former Prime Minister and federal Tory leader, who reflected in his memoirs that:

Three weeks before the election, I had a meeting with Premier Robarts...When it came to Ontario, he predicted forty-five seats. This number of actual victories would have put us in. From that point on, Robarts did nothing to assist us, except for the final day of the campaign in Ontario, when he came along on the train. I later discovered that he had been less than co-operative from the beginning, refusing to make any sponsorship-type statements for television and radio broadcast and even refusing to allow the use of a photograph of the two of us in campaign literature. Of the twenty-three ridings considered possible turnovers in Ontario, we won only three...Nine thousand more votes nationally would have brought the Conservative Party to power.⁹⁵

Diefenbaker's bitterness towards Robarts is obvious and without saying so directly, he seems to have blamed the party's failure at the federal level on Robarts' unwillingness to become involved at the federal level. The lack of enthusiasm from Robarts, along with the lack of seats won, also prompted Diefenbaker to draw parallels between Robarts and his predecessor, Leslie Frost, who was still campaigning on behalf of his old friend in 1965. Frost was focusing much of his attention on Victoria-Haliburton, the federal riding which incorporated his hometown of Lindsay, and ensuring that the local Tory candidate had a sufficient amount of radio advertisement. This prompted James Johnston to "...wish we had had 265 Leslie Frosts across the country."⁹⁶ Diefenbaker also recognized the former Premier's hard work, though he could not say the same about the current Ontario Premier. He later remarked that "As far as Frost was concerned, he stood. As for Mr. Robarts, he did nothing to help in the 1965 election; indeed he directed various Cabinet Ministers to take no part in the campaign...Had he entered into the campaign with even a small percentage of the enthusiasm of Mr. Frost, the Conservative Party would have formed the new Government of Canada."⁹⁷ Regardless, this election saw the federal Tories win only 97 seats with 32.4% of the vote, and only 25 seats in Ontario with 34.0% of that

⁹⁵ Diefenbaker, *The Tumultuous Years*, 263. James Johnston has remarked that using the photograph of Robarts and Diefenbaker was Eddie Goodman's idea. When Robarts found out that the photograph was to be used without his permission, Johnston reports that called Goodman and "took several strips of [him]." (p. 65-66)

⁹⁶ Johnston, *The Party's Over*, 49.

⁹⁷ Quoted in McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 170.

province's vote, a relatively similar result, both federally and in Ontario, to that won in 1963. This transformation of a once intimate intra-party relationship to an increasingly distant relationship and the continued use of a norm-breaking voice did nothing to help the federal Tories' electoral chances. The Diefenbaker era had come to a crashing end.

Yet, with Diefenbaker on the way out, the federal Tories still faced the daunting and divisive process of selecting a replacement, a part of the haunting 'Tory Syndrome' that George Perlin has identified.⁹⁸ This was a process that Robarts wanted little part of. Others, however, were keen on becoming involved in the process, including Senator Grattan O'Leary, a long serving Tory who was dissatisfied with all of the declared candidates in the race, and the first to approach Nova Scotia premier Robert Stanfield to run. Before Stanfield had even agreed to run, O'Leary telephoned Robarts to discuss his strategy. Robarts agreed to support Stanfield's candidacy, though he played little to no role in his campaign.⁹⁹ Meanwhile, Dalton Camp had just led the forces to terminate Diefenbaker's leadership. However, there was, at this point, no clear front runner in line for the party's federal leadership. At an annual meeting of the Ontario P.C. Association during the heart of the federal leadership campaign, Robarts, in his closing speech, made no mention of the event, preferring instead to focus on Ontario's fiscal challenges.¹⁰⁰ In one instance when the national executive met for a pivotal meeting to plan for the leadership convention, Robarts was on the highway and unable to be reached. Ernie Jackson, after being unable to get hold of him, appointed an alternate to attend. Years later, Robarts remarked that had he been reached, he would have ordered no alternate be appointed. Quite

⁹⁸ See George Perlin, *The Tory Syndrome*. The Tory Syndrome explores the divisive internal politics of the federal Tories that saw routine in-fighting over leadership selection and party outlook. The results of the syndrome are one of the reasons why the federal Tories rarely formed government in the post-war era. Perlin also noted that provincial Conservative parties were often strong-minded and largely independent of the federal wing, which further exacerbated internal divisions.

⁹⁹ Stevens, *Stanfield*, 173-74.

¹⁰⁰ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 174.

simply, Robarts responded to the turmoil and uncertainty at the federal level by withdrawing the Ontario Tories from the situation as much as possible. "All I wanted to do was to be in Toronto," he remarked of his time at the national convention in which the new leader was selected.¹⁰¹

The convention would go on to select Robert Stanfield as the party's new leader, but not without the Ontario wing inadvertently offending the outgoing Diefenbaker in the process. Although Robarts personally attempted to stay out of the fray as much as possible, when he was at the convention he first appeared on stage just as Dalton Camp was finishing his speech, shook Camp's hand and sat down on the podium beside him. Diefenbaker then appeared on stage, and was given an unwelcoming reception by the crowd. This was seen as evidence of a well-planned manoeuvre in support of Camp's 'insurrection' against Diefenbaker, causing "many ardent Diefenbakerites [to write Robarts'] name near the top of their enemies list."¹⁰² Diefenbaker himself later wrote "I expected no more from Premier Robarts, although I was somewhat mystified by the statement of the President of the Ontario Conservative Association, Mr. Elmer Bell, Q.C., that the Ontario organization would adopt complete neutrality on the question of national leadership."¹⁰³

With the federal leadership convention out of the way, the Ontario government could also move forward with its plans to call a provincial election. Although it had wanted to do so well before the convention, reliable Ontario-friendly sources from Ottawa secretly reported that an angry and bitter Diefenbaker was contemplating intervening in the Ontario election to try and defeat Robarts prior to his own dismissal.¹⁰⁴ While the federal wing was normally a non-factor

¹⁰¹ Quoted in McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 175.

¹⁰² McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 175.

¹⁰³ Diefenbaker, *The Tumultuous Years*, 273.

¹⁰⁴ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 183.

in Ontario elections, the federal party or its leader had never tried to openly campaign against its provincial counterparts. The relationship was never that distant. The decision was made to postpone the call for an election until after the federal leadership was decided, partly to wait until the internal strife within the party was quelled and Diefenbaker was gone, and partly to draw positive attention to Robarts, as Ontario was the host of the convention. That move seems to have paid off, as the Ontario Tories won 69 of Ontario's 117 seats and 42.3% of the popular vote. However, that was down 8 seats and 6.6% from the 1963 campaign. An openly hostile Diefenbaker would certainly not have attracted any more votes to the provincial Tories.

Following the election of Stanfield as federal leader, the Ontario government remained critical of the federal Liberal government's cost-sharing social program priorities, including its reluctance to co-ordinate priorities between the two levels of government, as well as its high priority on intruding on provincial responsibilities in the field of medicare.¹⁰⁵ In these grievances, they had a formidable ally in Stanfield, who routinely supported the Ontario position in the House of Commons. While under normal circumstances the relationship would have become increasingly intimate, unfortunately for the federal Tories any momentum they had coming out of the leadership convention or in their new leader was quickly extinguished following the rise of Trudeaumania after the Québec intellectual was elected as the new leader of the Liberal Party in 1968. The momentum that Trudeaumania brought to an invigorated Liberal Party carried into the 1968 election, and although Robarts made a few campaign appearances on behalf of Stanfield that year, he was careful not to get in too deep to the point that his or Ontario's relationship with Trudeau would be compromised if he were to be elected.¹⁰⁶ While a memo was sent out from the provincial government's caucus office to all Tory MPPs containing

¹⁰⁵ McDougall, *John P. Robarts*, 196.

¹⁰⁶ Manthorpe, *The Power and the Tories*, 72.

material which was to "...be of assistance in the campaigning which you will be doing on behalf of our federal candidates," it was sent from a staff member explaining why Robarts supported Stanfield, as opposed to being from Robarts and explaining why he personally supported Stanfield.¹⁰⁷ Although this may seem like a meaningless difference, such nuances are illustrative of Robarts' uninspiring feelings towards the 1968 campaign.

This lackluster support for the federal party was not lost on observers. Telling of the Premier's feelings toward the federal campaign, an article in the *Toronto Star* described Robarts at the 1968 campaign kickoff as behaving "...like a fat, rich cousin at a family reunion, a little patronizing, a trifle remote from the family's problems, but trying to hard to be a good chap all the same."¹⁰⁸ However, in addition to appearing at the campaign kickoff, Robarts did his part for the party and also appeared at the campaign's last major rally in Ontario in Hamilton on 21 June 1968, where he introduced Stanfield. Throughout this election campaign, Robarts was faced with yet another loyalty dilemma. Despite having a federal leader whom he considered a friend and ally, Robarts was faced with the stark reality of Trudeau's growing popularity. Thus, for the most part, he resorted to pragmatism and pursued provincial interests over greater party interests. And by all accounts, Robarts expected Trudeau to win.

Indeed, the 1968 election was not kind to the Progressive Conservative Party or its new leader. The Tories won only 72 seats, down 25 from 1965, with 31.4% of the vote, which was a drop of 1% from the previous election. Of the 25 lost by the Tories, 8 came from Ontario, where they also dropped from 34.0% of the vote to 32.0%. Around the same time, Robarts was also contemplating a move to get out of provincial politics. With the federal Tories well aware of

¹⁰⁷ "Why Bob Stanfield on June 25th?- Memorandum May 28, 1968," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-26 (b397355) "Hon. Robert Stanfield Jan. 68- Dec. 68 Federal Government"

¹⁰⁸ Peter C. Newman, "Winnipeg wanted hoopla for campaign opener- but it got dour Stanfield," *Toronto Star* (22 May 1968), p. 7.

Trudeau's high profile and image around the country, many within the upper echelon of the party sought to replace Stanfield with the popular Ontario Premier. Peter Hunter, Robart's advertising man, recalls that "Robarts was high profile and very respectable..." adding that "We don't make 'em like that any more. People thought he was the guy to knock off Trudeau."¹⁰⁹ Robarts, who was open to making the jump to the federal level, did not want to seem to be usurping the federal leader. He agreed to the plan on the condition that he not approach Stanfield, who twice called him to offer him the job. Neither time was Robarts available to take the call. Eventually, Trudeau's popularity declined, and the plan to replace Stanfield was aborted.¹¹⁰

Growing increasingly tired and bored with Ontario politics, Robarts retired in 1971 and turned the reins over to his education minister, William Davis, a former backbencher first elected in the Frost era. Yet, Robarts' days of playing politics were not over, and he wanted to do something to help his friend Robert Stanfield. Outside of the realm of elections, Robarts could see to it that the intra-party relationship would become more intimate. He called Don Matthews, a London area Tory and personal friend, and told him to run for the presidency of the federal Progressive Conservative Party. "Somebody's gotta give Bob Stanfield the loyalty he deserves," Robarts said to Matthews over the phone.¹¹¹ "When a guy says that to you, what the hell are you going to do?" Matthews says of his decision to run. He eventually served as party president from 1971 to 1974. With a strong replacement as provincial Premier, and a good friend as the national president, Robarts retired from the limelight. His tenure as premier and the relations he held with the federal party were slightly different from his predecessor, and would also be different from his successor.

¹⁰⁹ Peter Hunter, quoted in Paikin, *Public Triumph, Private Tragedy*, 130.

¹¹⁰ Paikin, *Public Triumph, Private Tragedy*, 130.

¹¹¹ Don Matthews, recollecting a telephone conversation with John Robarts, quoted in Paikin, *Public Triumph, Private Tragedy*, 155.

The intimate relationship between the Ontario wing led by Leslie Frost and the federal wing quickly turned to a distant relationship following Frost's retirement and replacement by John Robarts. While the Ontario wing offered some support to the federal wing in each of the 1962, 1963, and 1965 elections, the organization under Robarts did much less than what Frost had done in 1957 and 1958. Though the growing divergence was not simply the result of a dislike between the two leaders, it is true that Robarts and Diefenbaker did not connect in the same way that Frost and Diefenbaker did. Not surprisingly, without the support of the popular and organizationally strong Ontario wing, the federal Tories did not fare well at the polls. At the same time, the Ontario party sought to ensure that their relationship with the federal Tories would not jeopardize their own electoral success at the provincial level. While Robarts got along amicably with Diefenbaker's replacement Bob Stanfield, he was cautious in his support amidst the rise of Trudeaumania. As a result, the relationship became much more neutral. Much like his predecessor, Robarts' relationship with the federal wing was seemingly guided by a sense of pragmatism and acting in both Ontario's best interest and in the best interest of the provincial Conservative Party. Confronting loyalty dilemmas during both Diefenbaker's decline and Trudeau's rise, Robarts consistently chose provincial interests over larger party interests.

“There’s no doubt that the division between Mr. Lougheed and Mr. Davis cost the federal Conservative party a great deal in 1980.” Joe Clark¹

The Oil War: Clark, Davis, and Lougheed

Introduction

The federal election of 1979 saw the Progressive Conservative Party win 136 seats in the House of Commons and in the process made leader Joe Clark the new Canadian Prime Minister. This election served as a potential turning point for intra-party relations within the Progressive Conservative Party. With the country in the midst of an oil crisis and combating both inflation and unemployment, the federal party was presented with an opportunity to illustrate that they were capable of putting forward a different face of federalism from their Liberal predecessors who had governed since 1963. With a Progressive Conservative Prime Minister in office at the federal level and corresponding Progressive Conservative governments at the provincial level in both Alberta and Ontario, it was hoped that party solidarity could improve working relations between the federal and provincial governments, particularly the country’s leading oil producing province and the leading consuming province. The federal government and the provincial governments had not been governed by the same party in the three jurisdictions since 1871 when Frederick Haultain was Premier of the North West Territories (which included present day Alberta), John Sandfield Macdonald was Premier of Ontario, and John A. Macdonald was the Prime Minister. In the end, party solidarity was not maintained and harmonious relations between the three jurisdictions were not experienced because of competing loyalty dilemmas in which territorial interests were more pressing than party solidarity.

Throughout this period, Prime Minister Clark, Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed, and Ontario premier Bill Davis all found themselves in loyalty dilemmas as they were pulled in

¹ Douglas Sweet, “Lougheed and Davis blew it in ’80- Clark,” *Edmonton Journal* (24 August 1984), A6.

strategically contradictory directions between remaining loyal to the party and to another cause. In this case of Lougheed, the loyalty dilemma consisted of remaining loyal to the party or loyal to Alberta's financial interests of achieving an oil price that yielded maximum profits. In order to protect and secure Alberta's territorial based interests, Lougheed indicated that "We are going to be forced to take certain action we do not want to take and would not otherwise take...We have to try and protect the Alberta public interest...from central and eastern Canadian domination of the West."² In Davis' case, the loyalty dilemma consisted of remaining loyal to the party or loyal to Ontario's financial interests of the lowest possible oil price. Davis' suggestion that "Ontario is not a 'have not' province, but it is not about to be bled white either," though perhaps exaggerated, resonated with a population that was growing increasingly concerned with the ever-rising price of fuel and its effects on both the pocket book and local industry.³ That each Premier would stake a territorial claim was not surprising. As Hugh Segal has indicated of the conflict: "The trouble...was that both Ontario and Alberta were operating from principled positions."⁴ Meanwhile Clark, an Albertan elected largely on support received from Ontario voters, was forced to consider Alberta and Ontario's competing financial interests, interests of the country as a whole, and the interest of party solidarity within the Progressive Conservative Party. Clark's loyalty dilemma was complicated thanks in no small part to the assistance provided by Davis' campaign machinery in the 1979 election which finally led to the party's Ontario breakthrough. However, it is first necessary to understand both intra-party relations in the late 1970s and the rising oil prices to fully appreciate this situation.

² David Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 147.

³ Murphy et. al., *Brian Mulroney*, 146.

⁴ Segal, *No Surrender*, 86.

The Rise of Joe Clark

Unable to win an election in three attempts, Robert Stanfield's tenure as federal Progressive Conservative leader was coming to a halt in the mid 1970s as the party was looking for a new leader who would be capable of defeating Trudeau. Despite their relative power throughout post-war Ontario, at this point in time the Ontario Tories were working with a minority government- having lost 27 seats in 1975 and garnering only 36.1% of the vote. As a result, Davis decided that it would be best for his caucus and cabinet to stay out of the federal leadership contest. While it had been suggested that both Davis and Lougheed were potential candidates (as it had been for some time), neither Premier chose to run. Instead, Davis suggested that involvement in the federal campaign and endorsing candidates had the potential to create unneeded strife within the Ontario party, especially at a time when they could be facing an election. Here, Davis was confronted with a small loyalty dilemma. He could very well have sided with the leader of his choice and campaigned actively on his or her behalf. However, he recognized that this might be divisive within the Ontario wing, and indeed the party as a whole. Instead Davis chose to remain neutral to further both his personal interests and the larger interests of the Ontario wing. Despite the reasoning and warning from the Premier, many key ministers publicly came out in favour of one candidate or another. Even Davis' wife, Kathleen, publicly supported Flora MacDonald's leadership bid.⁵ Joe Clark, who was not widely expected to fare well, won the leadership contest at the party's convention, and though Davis was initially supportive of Clark, he never had much respect for him. At any level, Davis certainly was not on the same terms with Clark as he was with Stanfield.⁶ That being said, Davis still held the view that a Tory was a Tory, and would therefore remain supportive of Clark and the federal party,

⁵ Clare Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 317.

⁶ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 317.

suggesting the likely use of a norm-based voice. However, the relationship between the federal and provincial wings under Davis and Clark can be best described as neutral, and was occasionally distant.

The following year saw the Ontario government face another election, their second in less than two years. They went on to win another minority government, albeit with slightly more seats and an increased level of popular support. It was at this time that the relationship between Davis and Clark began to sour, as Clark did not make any public appearances on Davis' behalf during the provincial campaign while Stanfield had been at the Premier's side on various occasions.⁷ Additionally, the Ontario Tories, who were used to influencing the federal party to the point of controlling it, were not afforded the same level of influence under Clark, who wanted little to do with Davis and his organizational team. Ultimately the relationship between the Ontario and federal wing became even more distant, and nearly ruptured, over the issue of oil pricing. Even relatively minor issues began to affect Davis' outlook toward Clark. For example Davis was offended by Clark's decision not to attend the Albany Club- a location frequented by the Ontario Tories and the Bay Street crowd- because at the time it did not admit female members.⁸

By the end of 1978, a federal election was imminent, and early in 1979, Davis announced that he would be willing to do whatever Clark asked him of in the coming election.⁹ This was, however, a less enthusiastic endorsement than his earlier attitude of full and unwavering support to the federal party under its former leader Robert Stanfield. Yet despite these less than enthusiastic endorsements from Davis, many members from the provincial team began working on the federal campaign, including six full-time organizers. While Davis' attitude was still

⁷ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 317.

⁸ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 318.

⁹ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 319.

greatly influenced by his partisan outlook, there was a certain sense of pragmatism to the efforts of the Ontario wing in 1979. It tended to concentrate its efforts in areas where Davis already held seats or had a good chance of winning the seat provincially, rather than simply following the plan that was set out by the federal organizers.¹⁰ Further into the campaign, Davis promised his “absolute, total, and overwhelming support” for Clark, and cautioned voters that re-electing the Trudeau Liberals would lead to “four more years of indecision, inflation, devaluation.”¹¹ Davis also made the mistake of comparing Clark to his beloved Toronto Argonauts, claiming that while he may have looked like a loser, he was betting on him anyways.¹² While Davis was simply asserting his partisan nature- claiming that a Tory is a Tory and he would always support the Tory whether successful or not- many interpreted the comment to be a slight against Clark. It did not help matters much that the Argonauts had not won a Grey Cup title in nearly thirty years.

Meanwhile in Alberta, Lougheed was working hard to ensure that oil price increases scheduled to take effect on 1 January 1979 would not harm Joe Clark and the federal party, or at the very least harm them as little as possible. In this sense, Lougheed was proceeding with a norm-based voice. A federal-provincial energy conference was held in late November 1978 to determine price increases for the upcoming year, and Lougheed and the Alberta delegation felt that Trudeau was attempting to turn the conference into an energy pricing altercation “...so that the next election could be run in part against Alberta and, by association, Joe Clark, the Albertan.”¹³ The pricing agreement between Alberta and Ottawa provided for an increase of \$1.00 per barrel to the price of crude oil. Determined to prevent arming Trudeau with considerable political clout in central Canada, and particularly in Ontario, the Alberta

¹⁰ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 319.

¹¹ quoted in Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 319.

¹² Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 319.

¹³ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 158.

government decided to forego the scheduled price increase and withhold any future increase for a period of at least six months. While this decision did not provide any direct assistance to Clark and the federal Conservatives in central Canada, it denied Trudeau ammunition to use against his opponents. As David Wood noted, “Lougheed’s move was a sizeable contribution to the federal Conservatives and Joe Clark...A moment’s speculation might indicate that in the March 1979 federal election campaign, an increase in the price of crude oil from Joe Clark’s home province might have made a depressing difference to an election that Clark narrowly won.”¹⁴

When the results from the 1979 election were tallied, the underdog Tories had pulled off somewhat of an upset thanks in part to Canada’s first-past-the-post electoral system, winning 136 seats- 22 more than the Liberals- despite garnering 35.9% of the vote compared to the 40.1% won by the Liberals. However, the results in Ontario were particularly telling, as the Tories won 57 seats with 41.8% of the vote, up 32 seats and 6.7% points from 1974.¹⁵ Those increases in Ontario came largely at the expense of the Liberals, who lost 23 seats and saw their popular support drop by nearly 10 percentage points. In Alberta, the Tories won all 21 of the province’s seats with over 65% of the vote. This was not particularly surprising though, as the Conservatives had been the dominant party in Alberta since 1958, winning on average over 52% of the popular vote. As such, Lougheed’s willingness to forego crude oil price increases in January 1979 meant more to Clark and the federal party in Ontario than it did in Alberta. An increase in oil prices from Clark’s home province would not have been well-received in Ontario, and Clark would have likely suffered as a result. In all likelihood, the oil price hike would likely not have made much of a difference in Alberta.

¹⁴ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 158.

¹⁵ Seven additional seats were created in Ontario for the 1979 election as a result of redistribution.

The new federal government- albeit a minority government- became the first Progressive Conservative government since the fall of Diefenbaker sixteen years prior. Notwithstanding Lougheed's decision to withhold the proposed oil price increase, the Davis camp "felt that even if they had had to hold their collective noses to do it, they had given Clark his victory."¹⁶ However, despite having a supposedly allied party in federal office, things did not go well for the Ontario Tories. Of the Clark government, Sally Barnes, Davis' former press secretary, stated "They had power; they didn't need Ontario...It was a lousy way to treat their friends."¹⁷ Once again, oil prices had come to be sore point between the two wings of the Progressive Conservative Party.

The Oil War

In July 1979, Prime Minister Clark agreed to an increase in oil prices because they had previously been "depressed." Soon after Imperial Oil announced its profit increased from \$146 million to \$197 million in the first six months of the year, while Shell Canada announced its profit had risen from \$69 million to \$98.7 million in the same time period.¹⁸ With many consumers enraged at the staggering profits collected by the oil giants, Davis quickly announced that part of such huge increases in profit should be used to benefit all Canadians, not just those Canadians living in oil rich provinces. In Ontario, the \$2 per barrel increase proposed by Clark meant that Ontarians would see their home heating costs increase \$48 annually and their gasoline costs increase \$40 annually. In addition to increasing the Consumer Price Index by almost a full point, it impeded the province's economic growth to only 0.4 per cent. However, the situation

¹⁶ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 320.

¹⁷ Sally Barnes, quoted in Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 321. Of the Tories loss in 1980, Barnes remarked "They got what they deserved."

¹⁸ Figures quoted in Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 339.

soon worsened, as Clark and Lougheed eventually reached agreement on a \$4 per barrel increase.¹⁹

Faced with yet another loyalty dilemma, Davis was forced to put the interests of the Ontario citizens and by extension his party's electoral interests over partisan interests. With an increased number of Ontarians worrying about 'freezing in the dark,' Davis was forced to break party solidarity and look out for the interests of Ontario and its citizens, even if it meant butting heads with the federal Tory leader and the Tory premier of Alberta. In fact, Ontario Finance Minister Frank Miller called Peter Lougheed more of a threat to Confederation than Parti Québécois leader René Lévesque.²⁰ Jeffrey Simpson has identified the bind that Davis and the Ontario Tories were in, one in which they were forced to decide between consumer interests in Ontario and larger party interests. He concluded that "Davis was protecting his own political position in Ontario by staying on the popular side of the PetroCanada issue [public ownership] and keeping a safe distance from the Clark government's energy policies...[but that] Davis' message came too late to change Ottawa's course but it helped to undermine further the federal Conservatives' political position in Ontario."²¹ Clark, however, was in a loyalty dilemma of his own. He owed a great deal of his electoral success to Ontario, but he was also an Albertan, and fared rather well in his home province, winning all 21 of its seats and over 65% of the vote in 1979.

Oil prices rose steadily throughout the late 1970s, and by the summer of 1979, a divisive battle between Ontario Premier Bill Davis, Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed, and newly elected Prime Minister Joe Clark was full-blown. A proposed increase of \$1.00 per barrel of oil was

¹⁹ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 339.

²⁰ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 323.

²¹ Simpson, *Discipline of Power*, 171-72.

slated for January 1980, adding further expense to the then current price of \$13.75.²² The Ontario government was opposed to any additional increases beyond the proposed \$1.00 and argued that the price of domestic crude oil should be kept below the world average price. Further increases, they argued, would have disastrous effects on Ontario's oil dependant manufacturing industry and increase consumer prices for home heating and driving. The Alberta government, on the other hand, naturally wanted to ensure that their natural resources were being sold at the world market price. Both governments staked out territorial-based arguments. The loyalty of both the Ontario and Alberta governments was to the interests of their provincial industry and citizens, which in turn had the potential to propel their own electoral success at the provincial level. Of course, the interests of industry and consumers varied from province to province, and neither government had any direct loyalty to the other or interest in appeasing it. In this instance, the voters within their own province took precedent over both partisan and national issues. Meanwhile, the newly elected federal government found itself in an unfortunate position trapped between these competing loyalties. As *Edmonton Journal* reporter Paul Jackson remarked, "Two specters haunted Clark- those of Davis and Lougheed...Lougheed wanted to get oil prices as high as possible. Davis, on the other hand, wanted to keep them as low as he could. Clark was the hemmed-in-man-in-the-middle."²³

Not only was the price of oil a contentious issue, but what Alberta did with the profits it made from oil was also subject to scrutiny from the Ontario government. The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, developed in 1976, increased by 30% of annual energy revenues. The Fund had already amassed \$4.7 billion and was expected to exceed \$6 billion by April 1980. During

²² Of that \$13.75, \$1.20 represented the cost of production, \$4.29 went to the oil industry, \$5.83 went to the Alberta treasury, and \$2.09 went to the federal government. Gordon Jaremko and Jim Travers, "Lougheed says NO!," *Edmonton Journal*, 15 August 1979, A1, A3.

²³ Paul Jackson, "Premier's a threat to PM's re-election," *Edmonton Journal*, 15 December 1979, A2.

the March 1979 election, Lougheed predicted that the Fund would come under attack and promised to protect it. The Premier appealed directly to Albertans' financial interests and in return vowed to protect those interests. It was clear where Lougheed's loyalty lay. While significant oil revenues were put toward the Fund to ensure the long-term financial viability of the resource producing province, Davis and the Ontario government suggested instead that oil revenues should be used for a "national energy and employment program" which would help offset the costs of rising oil faced by consumers and industry.²⁴ Released as a part of Davis' *Oil Pricing and Security: A Policy Framework for Canada* document, such a program would include tax credits, grants, and subsidies. If the Alberta government were unwilling to unilaterally put oil profits toward such a program, the Ontario government argued that the federal government would need to intervene to create the reinvestment program. Davis' proposal stated that, "If necessary, the federal government must use its influence and constitutional authority to direct oil and natural gas revenue flows in accordance with agreed national objectives."²⁵

In response to Davis' call for an oil profit sharing program, an angry Peter Lougheed denounced the plan as "extremely objectionable" and "completely unacceptable."²⁶ Profits from Alberta's oil, Lougheed maintained, must benefit Alberta and its people and consequently would not go back to Ontario or other provinces. Furthermore, he argued that Ontario had in fact been benefiting at the expense of Alberta for a number of years by receiving crude oil at less than world price and being spared from buying its oil from the often volatile and more expensive middle-Eastern market. In essence, oil profits had already been shared with Ontario as a result of its ability to buy oil well below the world-market price. The oil bought by Ontario was

²⁴ Gordon Jaremko and Jim Travers, "Lougheed says NO!"

²⁵ Gordon Jaremko and Jim Travers, "Lougheed says NO!"

²⁶ Robert Mackenzie and Pat Crowe, "Lougheed heaps scorn on Davis proposals for sharing oil wealth," *Toronto Star*, 16 August 1979, A4.

purchased at the lowest price in the western world according to Lougheed, who argued “this is an unprecedented subsidy by one province to the rest of Canada and the foregone revenue involved can never be recouped by Alberta because it is based on the sale of depleting resources.”²⁷ The depleting resources were in large part the reason behind the creation of the aforementioned Heritage Fund. The thought that even more of Alberta’s oil profits would go back to the rest of Canada was anathema for Lougheed and many Albertans. At the same time, the *Edmonton Journal* was claiming that the Alberta government received \$5.87 for every barrel of oil sold in Alberta through royalty and corporate taxes, while the Ontario government received \$7.49 per barrel sold in its province from sales tax.²⁸

The Ontario government realized that it had little to no direct bargaining power in determining domestic oil prices or what would be done with oil profits. As a result, alluding to a potential backlash from Ontario voters against the federal government was the only bargaining chip of the Ontario government. Nevertheless, Ontario Finance Minister Frank Miller conceded that “it’s going to be hard for Mr. Clark to be tougher on Mr. Lougheed than Mr. Trudeau was.”²⁹ Despite the support Clark received from the Ontario PC Party in 1979 and the relatively high number of seats won in that province, Miller hypothesized that Clark’s loyalty would lie with Lougheed and his home province of Alberta. At the same time, many Alberta opposition politicians felt the opposite would be true. The support given to Clark by the Ontario PC Party and the large number of PC seats in Ontario could dictate that he would be forced to bow to pressure from the Ontario government. Grant Notley, leader of the Alberta New Democratic

²⁷ Robert Mackenzie and Pat Crowe, “Lougheed heaps scorn on Davis proposals for sharing oil wealth”

²⁸ Bill Fox, “‘Alberta gave Canada \$15 billion shelter,’” *Edmonton Journal*, 16 August 1979, A1.

²⁹ Gordon Jaremko and Jim Travers, “Lougheed says NO!”

Party, felt that “Alberta may pay the price of its fanatical loyalty to the Tory cause. Mr. Clark doesn’t have to worry here- all 21 seats are already Tory.”³⁰

While Notley’s comments were rooted largely in partisan terms, his point cannot be ignored. All of Alberta’s 21 federal seats were held by Tories and there was little chance that voters would elect either a Liberal or a New Democrat federally. At the same time, there was absolutely nothing that could be gained since all of Alberta’s federal seats, and a majority of the popular support, was already held by the Progressive Conservatives. Conversely in Ontario, the federal PCs had finally established a foothold in 1979, winning 57 seats, an increase of 32 from the previous election. The federal party faced a potential backlash from Ontario voters if oil prices were set too high, especially if such an increase led to increased costs for consumers and job losses in the manufacturing sector. Quite simply, the federal PCs could have made a potential gain in Ontario if Ontarians perceived oil prices to be set at a fair (low) rate. However, the party also had a lot to lose in Ontario, as those who voted for Clark in 1979 could quickly revert back to voting for another party if they perceived the federal Tories to be favoring Alberta. This fact was not lost on Clark. Lougheed’s personal notes from a private meeting between him and Clark are particularly revealing. Lougheed noted that:

We...got into a very tense discussion when he said he had to find a way to solve the political problem in Ontario. I told him I found that unacceptable, particularly his suggestion that he had IOUs to the Ontario Conservative party that were somehow different to his obligations to western Canada and the Alberta Conservative party.³¹

Clark’s suggestion that he owed more allegiance to the voters and government of Ontario than to the voters and government of Alberta was particularly offensive to Lougheed. After all, Lougheed’s decision to forego the price increase set for 1 Jan 1979 aided Clark in Ontario, though Lougheed seemed to be getting little back in return. The suggestion that Clark owed

³⁰ Bill Fox, “‘Alberta gave Canada \$15 billion shelter’”

³¹ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 162.

'IOUs' to the Ontario government for its help in the 1979 election seemed to confirm Grant Notley's earlier suspicions that Alberta would pay for its loyalty to the federal Conservative party. When placed in a loyalty dilemma between the Ontario and Alberta governments, it seemed as if Clark's loyalty was leaning toward the former, likely a pragmatic response to his electoral fortunes in Ontario.

Despite the fact that the federal, Ontario, and Alberta governments all represented the same party, any common interests they may have had were downplayed and their often similar ideologies were muted by territorial concerns. The interests of the people living within a marked territory, and not larger partisan or national interests, defined the parameters of this battle. As University of Alberta law professor Gerald Gall remarked, "...this is a testing of the water- the political water. Here we have Ontario, Alberta, and the federal government all of the same political party, but because of their different individual interests, the common political ideology doesn't bind."³² In this situation, the common partisan alignment mattered little. Both the Alberta and Ontario governments put their own citizens- and their own electoral interests- ahead of all else. For the federal government, this involved more of a balancing act since they simultaneously represented both Albertans and Ontarians. The loyalty dilemma for Joe Clark and the federal government was particularly divisive. The issue was not whether Clark's loyalty would lie with one party or the other, but whether his loyalty would lie with one province or the other. While it remains possible, even likely, that Clark's subsequent actions were done in a larger national interest, the way in which the oil pricing standoff was constructed by the provincial governments and media alike placed Clark in a compromising situation. He was effectively forced to take sides with one province's argument at the expense of the other.

³² Lasha Morningstar, "Alberta's argument: does the constitution agree?" *Edmonton Journal*, 3 November 1979, B3.

A federal-provincial energy summit was called for mid-November 1979 in the hope that a price increase for 1980 would be established and agreed to by all provinces and the federal government. Although all ten provinces had a stake in oil pricing, Alberta- the largest producer- and Ontario- the largest consumer- played a leading role and took polar opposite positions. While convincing the other eight provinces to a mutually acceptable solution remained a distinct possibility, it was unlikely that both Alberta and Ontario would agree on the same proposal. Quite simply, what was good for one was not good for the other. Earlier proposals indicated that the proposed increase for 1980 was to be \$1 per barrel and the Ontario government asserted that “[it was] opposed to any immediate price increase beyond the \$1-a-barrel hike planed for Jan. 1.”³³ However, by the time the conference was underway, reports indicated that the federal government was proposing increases of either \$4 per barrel or \$6 per barrel. Although the federal government’s preliminary proposal of \$6 per barrel was modified and lowered, Clark still wanted to raise prices “quickly” toward the world level.³⁴ Although a \$6 per barrel increase would still have kept the price of domestic oil well below the world average, which fluctuated from between \$20 to \$27, the federal government had backed down from its promise and instead proposed an increase of \$4 per barrel. However, Clark also proposed incremental increases of \$2 every six months until 1982.

A \$4 per barrel increase would have placed domestic oil just under \$18 per barrel, but would have also significantly increased consumer (individual and corporate) costs. Davis, who posited himself as the champion of consumer interests throughout the oil pricing talks, was steadfastly opposed to such an increase. In addition to a flat increase on the price of a barrel of oil, the federal government was also proposing an excise tax on gasoline of \$0.30 per gallon.

³³ Ken MacGray, “Recession risked if oil hiked; Davis,” *Toronto Star*, 10 November 1979, A1.

³⁴ Terrance Wills, “PM sought \$6 increase in oil price,” *Toronto Star*, 12 November 1979, A6. The world price in late 1979 was roughly \$24 per barrel.

The combination of the increase of the well price and the excise tax represented, according to Davis, "an excessive and imprudent response to the claims of the oil industry and producing provinces."³⁵ An increase of the magnitude proposed by Clark represented a significant increase to consumer costs in Ontario and across Canada for that matter. There was, however, some confusion as to the exact increased cost that Ontarians faced as a result.

An early report released in August suggested that a \$2-a-barrel increase would only lead to an \$88 increase per year, though Davis indicated to reporters after Clark's proposed \$4-a-barrel increase, subsequent \$2 increases, and 30 cent-a-gallon excise tax that the increases would cost "over \$700 from every household in Canada."³⁶ The proposed increase, in Davis' estimation, would "...constitute an unprecedented raid on the consumer."³⁷ It is worthwhile noting that Davis appealed not only to consumers in Ontario, but consumers from coast-to-coast, including Alberta. In this sense, Davis sought to be seen not simply as protecting Ontario's financial position and its consumers, but all consumers, regardless of what province they lived in. Nevertheless, Davis' primary concern was for consumers in Ontario. After all, they were the only Canadians with the power to remove him from office. However, what was good for the Ontario Tories was not necessarily good for the federal Tories. In fact:

Telling Ontarians that oil and natural gas were national commodities belonging to all Canadians, and telling eastern manufacturers they should always be able to enjoy cheaper energy...were popularly acceptable statements. They may have done Davis and the Ontario Tories some good, but political hindsight reveals that they were certainly harmful to Clark.³⁸

Davis was required, in his position as Ontario's premier, to oppose Clark's proposal and employ a norm-breaking voice. Had Davis failed to show opposition to the proposed increase, there was considerable likelihood that Ontario voters would have turned their backs on the Progressive

³⁵ Ken MacGray, "Big hikes imperil nation: Davis," *Toronto Star*, 12 November 1979, A6.

³⁶ The former estimate was reported in Pat Crowe, "Share oil wealth Davis urges," *Toronto Star*, 15 August 1979, A15, while the latter estimate was reported in Ken MacGray, "Big hikes imperil nation: Davis"

³⁷ Ken MacGray, "Big hikes imperil nation: Davis"

³⁸ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 160.

Conservative government, which was already operating in a minority position. The minority PC government, the second in two elections, would presumably not have been transformed into a majority government had Davis been weak on opposing the price increase. At the very least, any perceived weakness from Davis would have represented an opportunity for the Ontario Liberals and New Democrats.

Despite Davis' appeal to consumers coast-to-coast, his pleas had little resonance in Alberta or elsewhere for that matter. The profits of such an increase would fuel Alberta's confers and provide even more funds to the burgeoning Heritage Fund. In addition to a profit-motivated argument, Albertans were also protective of their depleting resources and constitutional rights. In fact, Lougheed responded to Clark's suggestion of introducing a federal royalty tax on Alberta oil by indicating that if such a tax were introduced, that the provincial government would "...not [be] prepared to stage in wellhead price increases."³⁹ Lougheed added that he would only accept federal tax measures on the profits of oil producers. In his mind, profits on the resource, not the resource itself, would be subject to tax. By failing to increase the price at the wellhead by \$4 per barrel and \$2 every six months thereafter, Alberta would no longer be able to ship oil to other parts of Canada. Lougheed illustrated that he was willing to play hardball.

In the rest of Canada, Davis' pleas to the consumer were not having the desired effect, at least not on those at the negotiating table. Québec's Energy Minister Yves Bérubé suggested that "Ontario's problem is that nobody likes you," while Newfoundland Premier Brian Peckford, a fellow Conservative, suggested that it was "about time [Davis] should accept the inevitable."⁴⁰ In fact, all but Ontario agreed in principle to Clark's oil pricing proposal. Perhaps the *Toronto*

³⁹ Richard Gwyn, "Does Clark understand Lougheed's game plan?" *Toronto Star*, 15 November 1979, A10.

⁴⁰ Richard Gwyn, "Disliked and alone, Ontario humiliated at talks," *Toronto Star*, 13 November 1979, A12.

Star was most blunt about Ontario's struggle in convincing Clark and the other premiers to his own proposal of a \$1-a-barrel increase and introduction of a federal reinvestment program. An article entitled "Disliked and alone, Ontario humiliated at talks," sums up the proceedings of the federal-provincial energy conference rather well. Quite simply, Davis was unable to translate his territorial-based, Ontario-centered concerns into broad based support elsewhere in Canada.

The federal-provincial energy conference was unable to decide upon a unanimously acceptable oil price increase, which left the federal government with the sole responsibility of setting the price, although it would continue to negotiate predominantly with Alberta and listen to the concerns of other interested provinces. In the meantime, federal-provincial relations between Ottawa and Ontario, and more specifically between Clark and Davis, took an interesting turn during a \$150-a-plate fundraising dinner in honour of Clark in Toronto. Speaking in front of 2,500 Conservative faithful, Davis commented that "there is no question that 1 ½ million Albertans must have their fair share...but you [Clark] have the tough task of speaking for 22 million Canadians who also have their rights and expectations."⁴¹ To this challenge, Clark, in what seemed to be a prepared statement, responded that "I give you the commitment as we face the complex decisions ahead, that we will bear in mind the interests of this province and this city [Toronto]- and we will bear in mind their historic role as an engine of growth for Canada." Clark also recognized Ontario's role in helping him to form the government and attempted to regain the regard of Davis and many senior Ontario Tories whom Clark had alienated and who felt they were owed a favour by the federal party. He acknowledged that "...without the support of Bill Davis, we would not be a government and I would not be here as prime minister."⁴² At the very least, this seemed to indicate that Clark recognized that Ontario had been loyal to his

⁴¹ Stephen Handelman, "Tory menu: Oil rehash," *Toronto Star*, 22 November 1979, A2.

⁴² Stephen Handelman, "Tory menu: Oil rehash"

party during the 1979 election campaign and that he was willing to take into consideration Ontario's interests in establishing oil price increases.

A day after the Toronto fundraiser, Clark took, for the first time, a hard-line approach to Canada's oil pricing situation. Perhaps heeding Davis' advice to some degree that the Prime Minister was responsible for 22 million Canadians, Clark offered Lougheed a 10-day ultimatum, after which point he would consider using various courses of action available to the federal government. It is important to note that after 10-days expired Clark would only begin to "...contemplate very seriously the use of other instruments that are open to the national government."⁴³ One of these instruments, the *Petroleum Administration Act*, provided the federal government with extraordinary powers related to the province's natural resources that were normally reserved for the provincial government. However, Clark claimed that the *Act* would not go into effect after the 10-day period, but only that he would begin contemplating its potential use after such a point. "There is a point where the federal government has to act," claimed Clark, who added that no significant progress had been made with Alberta or other oil producing provinces since the failed conference.⁴⁴

While there was no guarantee that the usage of the *Petroleum Administration Act* would benefit Ontario and adversely affect Alberta, Clark indicated a willingness to determine unilaterally a price if it was unwilling to negotiate one. However the price increase that Clark was considering, \$4.50 per barrel, was much higher than what the Ontario government would have otherwise preferred. While such a price may have been acceptable for the Alberta government, the sticking point was Clark's proposed tax which would see the federal government retain half of the revenues over \$2 per barrel for use in national energy projects,

⁴³ George Oake, "Lougheed gets 10-day ultimatum," *Edmonton Journal*, 23 November 1979, A1.

⁴⁴ George Oake, "Lougheed gets 10-day ultimatum"

conservation measures, and providing assistance to regions and individuals adversely affected by the price increases. In many respects, this latter proposal mirrored the program proposed by Davis.

Such a program, however, was opposed by Lougheed. The Alberta Premier instead suggested that the federal government tax only profits from oil companies, rather than the revenue from the sale of a barrel of oil. Lougheed's proposal would have left the federal government with significantly less money than taxing oil revenue. At issue here was the constitutional division of powers. The government of Alberta claimed that taxing revenue from the sale of oil implied that the federal government shared the ownership of the oil as well. This implication was forcefully rejected by the Alberta government who firmly asserted and protected their constitutional right to resource ownership as spelled out by the Canadian constitution. While the taxation of corporate profits fell within the jurisdiction of the federal government, the taxation of revenue, the Alberta government claimed, was *ultra vires* of federal jurisdiction.

In response to Clark's perceived abrasive action, the *Edmonton Journal* proceeded to run a scathing editorial of Clark's boldness and what they claimed to be his incompetence the day after his ultimatum announcement.⁴⁵ Authored by the newspaper's publisher Patrick O'Callaghan, it suggested that Clark's approach to the oil pricing impasse risked the destruction of not only Canada's energy policy, but the federal Progressive Conservative Party as well. Specific reference was made to intra-party relations and the impending loyalty dilemma faced by Alberta's federal politicians. O'Callaghan questioned if the loyalty of Alberta's Progressive Conservative MPs would lie with Lougheed and Alberta's territorial interests or with the PC party's proposal and partisan interests. "Joe Clark's foolish and unnecessary ultimatum will cause a crisis within Tory party ranks," the editorial asserted, and continued "Where will the

⁴⁵ Patrick O'Callaghan, "Clark's ultimatum: an editorial," *Edmonton Journal*, 24 November 1979, A1.

Alberta Members of Parliament stand when their party leader asks them to vote in Parliament against the fundamental interest of their province? The West will not support any political party that betrays it.”⁴⁶ In this sense, the paper was alluding to the likely use of a norm-breaking voice if Alberta’s need were not met.

This was not the first time that the loyalty of Alberta’s 21 Progressive Conservative MPs had been questioned. Lougheed held a private meeting for the province’s MPs in mid-September at which he stated that he did not think they were doing their jobs properly in fighting for Alberta’s interests in Ottawa. For Lougheed, the loyalty of Alberta’s MPs needed to lie with the province and its territorial interests, not the overall interests of the federal party. An MP, Tory or not, was of no use to Lougheed if they chose not to put Alberta first. As a result of the meeting and of his norm-breaking attitude, “Lougheed lost a fair number of friends...and lost a lot of respect, too.”⁴⁷ The loyalty of many of Alberta’s MPs remained with the federal party and its leader, despite the fact that Lougheed insisted that they toe the Alberta provincial government’s line. Lougheed’s approach was in stark contrast with the approach taken by Bill Davis who “...would never dare call his federal members together and talk to them the way Lougheed speaks to Alberta’s federal representatives.”⁴⁸

Shortly after Clark’s announcement of a 10-day ultimatum, the federal government and the Alberta government reached agreement on a schedule of oil price increases. Early reports suggested that annual increases would range between \$4.00 and \$4.50 per barrel, which would add 15 cents to the price of a gallon of gasoline. The \$4.00 increase, according to the *Toronto Star*, would cost Metro Toronto homeowners an additional \$400 in heating and gasoline costs in 1980, and \$600 more within two years. However, the two sides failed to reach agreement on

⁴⁶ Patrick O’Callaghan, “Clark’s ultimatum: an editorial”

⁴⁷ Paul Jackson, “Lougheed stance could split Tories,” *Edmonton Journal*, 3 November 1979, B3.

⁴⁸ Paul Jackson, “Lougheed stance could split Tories”

how Ottawa would tax the additional revenues that the price increase would generate.⁴⁹ Clark had proposed a tax on oil revenue from increases beyond \$2.00 per barrel, while Lougheed proposed a federal tax only on a 'higher amount.' Lougheed's preferred per-barrel price increase was also higher than what was agreed upon. For his part, Davis continued to remain opposed to any increase over \$2.00 per barrel. Despite the fact that a major element of the oil pricing agreement had yet to be agreed upon, the federal government was finally able to move ahead with its budget process having an idea of what prices would rise to in 1980.

Finance Minister John Crosbie's energy dominated budget was released on 11 December 1979 and contained regularly scheduled annual oil-price increases of \$4.45 per barrel. The 1980 price increase would be followed by similar increases in each of 1983 and 1984, bringing domestic oil prices to 75% and 85% of the U.S. oil price respectively.⁵⁰ Among the budget's more contentious points was an eighteen-cent-a-gallon excise tax increase on gasoline. Reactions to the budget were polarized between Alberta and Ontario. Lougheed pragmatically employed a norm-based voice, praised the budget as "realistic" and suggested it "[would] help strengthen the Canadian dollar."⁵¹ While he acknowledged that oil price increases were a bitter pill to swallow, he also suggested they were necessary to ensure oil self-sufficiency and to give a fair return to resource producing provinces. Despite its earlier criticism of Clark's hard-line on oil pricing as "foolish and unnecessary" and "caus[ing] a crisis within Tory party ranks," the *Edmonton Journal* went one step further than Lougheed in its praise of the budget, claiming "[It] is in no way a bitter pill; it is a courageous and optimistic investment in the 1980s."⁵²

⁴⁹ Terrence Wills, "Oil price to jump by \$4 but tax split not settled," *Toronto Star*, 28 November 1979, A11.

⁵⁰ Andy Imlach, "'Look out, more increases to gush in oil-price struggle,'" *Edmonton Journal*, 12 December 1979, A19.

⁵¹ Anon., "Lougheed praises 'realistic' budget," *Toronto Star*, 13 December 1979, A6.

⁵² Anon., "A wealthier Canada," *Edmonton Journal*, 12 December 1979, A4.

The reaction of Lougheed and the *Edmonton Journal* could not have been further from the reaction of Bill Davis and the Ontario Progressive Conservatives. Davis, in a norm-breaking voice, claimed that the budget would “cause serious financial hardship” among the disadvantaged, while Finance Minister Frank Miller indicated that the budget would cost the province 20 000 jobs and “take about \$600 out of the pockets of each Ontario citizen and only put about \$200 back in.”⁵³ Despite their overt support for Clark and the federal party only a few months prior, the 1979 budget illustrated that the federal government did not feel they owed anything to Davis or the Ontario party. The budget, with its adverse effects on Ontario, was quickly and forcefully rebutted by Davis. Davis and the Ontario party, with a minority government and impending election, made sure their loyalty was visibly with their provincial constituents and not the federal party. Nevertheless, the perceived cozy relationship between the federal and provincial wings was the subject of much criticism following the budget.

The criticism of the federal budget was not confined to the Ontario government, as the opposition parties in Ontario were also predictably critical of the budget. They attempted to gain partisan advantage by drawing the connection between the unpopular budget and Davis’ support of Clark a year earlier. Opposition Liberal Party Leader Stuart Smith made reference to the 57 seats ‘delivered’ to the federal Progressive Conservatives by Davis and the Ontario party and accused the federal Tories of “...turn[ing] around and hammer[ing] Ontario...in a way that the people of Ontario should never forget.”⁵⁴ Ontario New Democratic Party Leader Michael Cassidy maintained that “Bill Davis and his Ontario Tories created this mess by helping to elect Joe Clark. All their brave words and chest-beating about how Clark and Crosbie have sold the people of this province down the river should not be allowed to absolve them of

⁵³ Ken MacGray and Joe O'Donnell, “Budget will cost Ontario jobs: Davis,” *Toronto Star*, 12 December 1979, A23.

⁵⁴ Ken MacGray and Joe O'Donnell, “Budget will cost Ontario jobs: Davis”

responsibility.”⁵⁵ The people of Ontario, according to the provincial opposition, could no longer trust a provincial party that supported a federal party whose budget was “pay-now *and* pay-later.”⁵⁶ Ontario’s support for the Clark and the federal Conservative Party provided the province with little to no advantage in the 1979 budget.

With the combination of an unpopular budget, a divided Conservative Party, opportunistic opposition parties, and Clark’s ignoring of the Cr ditiste members who had previously supported his government, the federal government was defeated on a non-confidence vote on the budget on 13 December 1979. Earlier that same day, Frank Miller argued that “the fiscal balance within Confederation will be materially affected by this budget” during a speech in the Ontario legislature.⁵⁷ Clark’s experience with putting a ‘fresh face on federalism’ was unsuccessful. Although he hoped to show the provinces that the federal government could be co-operative and reach mutually acceptable decisions, he instead illustrated not only the fractured nature of the federal relation in Canada, but the fractured nature of his party as well. As the *Toronto Star* remarked of Clark’s demise, “by showing Alberta how co-operative the federal government could be, [he] hoped to bring Premier Peter Lougheed into line. Instead, he nearly lost an angry Ontario Premier William Davis.”⁵⁸ Canadians were headed back to the polls.

Clark’s fall from grace

In addition to the disputes between the Ontario wing and Clark over oil prices, Davis and his provincial allies were also frustrated with the way in which Clark was running the federal party. In the past, the Ontario wing of the party had all but controlled the federal wing, but under Clark they were increasingly shut out of the decision making process. Unable to have a

⁵⁵ Ken MacGray and Joe O’Donnell, “Budget will cost Ontario jobs: Davis”

⁵⁶ Ken MacGray and Joe O’Donnell, “Budget will cost Ontario jobs: Davis” Emphasis Added.

⁵⁷ Ken MacGray, “Budget disgusts Ontario Miller tells legislature,” *Toronto Star*, 14 December 1979, A17.

⁵⁸ Stephen Handelman, “Bitterness blighted 31st Parliament: Clark’s legacy a sluggish record,” *Toronto Star*, 14 December 1979, A17.

dominant position within the federal wing and in some cases without a position at all, the Ontario Tories became increasingly frustrated with the state of affairs under Clark. Policy creation and implementation, financing, and marketing were all areas that the Big Blue Machine was used to controlling, and under Clark's leadership it lacked any meaningful say. Of the dispute, a senior party official remarked:

Like everything else, the attitude of the Big Blue Machine guys reflected Davis's attitude. He wasn't out to get Clark or anything, but he didn't have much respect for him. These guys say they got Clark elected. Fine. Does that mean they have to accept the blame for all the election the Tories lost? Much of the animosity was personal jealousy. Under Stanfield those guys- Atkins, Segal, Goodman- ran the federal party as well. Clark shut them out. They were furious. Not only did they want Clark to consult with them before he made a move; they wanted him to consult only with them.⁵⁹

Clark, however, had a different agenda from the Ontario Tories, and this obviously upset them.

Despite these disagreements, Davis' partisanship reasserted itself, at least on the surface. However, it was less reasserted less forcefully than it was a year earlier and certainly much less so than it was when Stanfield was federal leader. Davis' earlier belief that a Tory was a Tory still existed, although it was much less apparent than it had ever been in the past. While Davis believed the election to be unnecessary, he publicly supported Clark, stating "I am a Conservative. Mr. Clark is a Conservative. Mr. Stanfield was a Conservative when he led our federal party. I have supported each and every Conservative leader who sought my support."⁶⁰ Clark not surprisingly welcomed any support he could get from the Ontario wing. However, such a statement was rather lackluster compared with Davis' earlier statements in support of Stanfield. Quite simply, his norm-based voice was considerably weaker than what it had previously been. The election was scheduled for February 18, yet illustrative of Davis' true feelings about Clark and the federal Tories, he headed off in the middle of an election campaign for his annual holiday in Florida, and announced that he would not be back until January 21.

⁵⁹ Unidentified source, quoted in Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 322.

⁶⁰ Anon., "Davis says he'll back Clark in 'unnecessary' election," *Toronto Star*, 14 December 1979, A16.

What accounted for Davis' seemingly contradictory feelings toward Clark? On one hand, the Premier was overly critical of Clark and the federal party for its failed 1979 budget, but on the other hand he remained supportive of Clark, at least publicly, and the federal party. In fact, he attempted to justify his dual outlook to hooting opposition members by stating that "Ontario's policy position remains strong. My personal loyalty remains the same."⁶¹ Davis attempted to separate politics and policy from parties. If these entities were separated, the contradiction disappeared. In this situation Davis, or any other premier for that matter, could be critical of their partisan cousins in another jurisdiction on policy matters, but at the end of the day could support their partisan goals. While the loyalty dilemma was still present for Davis, he attempted to mitigate its all or nothing effect. A typical response to a loyalty dilemma is to remain either loyal to the party or to the territorial or ideological interest. Davis attempted to do both. However, this duality is not possible. Once a political leader actively supports one interest, they cannot simultaneously support the other with any sense of legitimacy. The 1980 election campaign is illustrative of this point.

While Davis and his team may have half-heartedly supported the federal Tories during the election campaign, they had criticized the Clark government enough during its short stint to come back and haunt the Conservatives during the election campaign. The Liberals capitalized on both Davis and Miller's public condemnations of the Clark Tories, most notably their handling of oil prices, and various quotes were used in Liberal Party commercials that ran in Ontario.⁶² It seemed that the Ontario Tories had dug the federal party a rather deep hole, and one that they could not begin to dig themselves out of. Try as they might to save face and appear partisan during the election campaign, the practical realities of the Clark government and the

⁶¹ Jim Travers, "Clark may bend to oil blue machine" *Edmonton Journal*, 15 December 1979, H9.

⁶² Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 326.

provincial Tories 'Ontario-first' attitude and routine norm-breaking voice had come back to haunt the federal party.

One Liberal commercial featured a shot of Joe Clark in the Commons, and stated that it was the Tory budget that caused the election. A male voice then stated what one prominent Ontarian thought of the budget: "This will exact a toll of higher inflation and fewer new jobs...One cannot justify the large increase in excise tax on transportation fuels...This will place a severe hardship on many people."⁶³ The prominent Ontarian was Bill Davis, and the commercial then featured a picture of Davis standing at his desk in the Ontario legislature wearing a blue suit. "If Joe Clark's Conservatives let [Davis] down, think of what they'll do to you," the commercial concluded.

A second commercial began the same way, featuring Clark in the Commons. Another male voice over began: "Ontario will bear the brunt of these increases...In 1980 it will cost \$575 more for every Ontario household...It will cost twenty thousand jobs."⁶⁴ This time the picture on the screen switched to Frank Miller, sitting in a chair, wearing a Tory-blue suit. The voice concluded that, "If the embarrassing Joe Clark budget worries him, what should it do for you? This is the time to vote Liberal." While the exact effects of these commercials cannot be precisely quantified, Miller once stated "...I don't think I'm ever going to have a seat in a Conservative Senate, let's put it that way."⁶⁵

Unlike the Ontario party's contradictory position throughout the election, the Alberta government's position remained relatively consistent. Despite a relatively favourable budget for Alberta's interests, especially vis-à-vis Ontario, Peter Lougheed's endorsement of Clark in the 1980 election was non-existent. He simply responded "no comment" to reporters when asked of

⁶³ Simpson, *Discipline of Power*, 280.

⁶⁴ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 326.

⁶⁵ Frank Miller, quoted in *Bill Davis*, 326.

his thoughts on the upcoming election, and added “after the election, I’ll have a comment.”⁶⁶ Despite the benefits of the failed budget to the Alberta government, Lougheed still refrained from employing a norm-based voice. However, on Clark’s last rally of the campaign, he was joined by Lougheed who disingenuously praised the federal leader as a “tough negotiator, who now, more than ever, has my respect and admiration.”⁶⁷ By this point, the Conservatives had already lost.

Meanwhile Davis’ partisanship, though bent, was not broken. He was still willing to support a Prime Minister and party whose budget provided considerable expense to the Ontario economy. Lougheed, on the other hand, was concerned only with Alberta’s interests and would fiercely protect them, regardless of which party formed government at the federal level. When faced with a loyalty dilemma, Davis was loath to go against partisan interests, unless absolutely necessary. However, like all of Ontario’s Premiers, he recognized that he was ultimately accountable to Ontario’s voters in provincial elections, and thus acted accordingly. He nevertheless retained his strong attachment as much as pragmatically possible to his federal party. Lougheed recognized a similar phenomenon with defending territorial interests in Alberta, but also identified that there was little or no pragmatic reason to endorse Clark.

Clark knew that the tide was against him going into the election and became desperate well before Davis’ scheduled return from holidays. Publicly, he stated that he did not need to rely as much on Davis as he had a year earlier because he now had his own Ontario team of federal cabinet ministers, but privately, he realized that Davis was a much-needed commodity. Diefenbaker made a similar argument regarding his Ontario cabinet ministers prior to the 1958 election, but privately sought Frost’s aid. The Premier agreed to return from his vacation three

⁶⁶ Anon., “Davis says he’ll back Clark in ‘unnecessary’ election,”

⁶⁷ Quoted in Simpson, *Discipline of Power*, 336.

days early and his aides sent out three-thousand letters to key Ontario Tories asking for their support in Clark's re-election bid at Davis' request. The Premier also made some campaign stops for Clark, adding that the Prime Minister "has all my support and the total support of my government and my party."⁶⁸ Not many people believed it, but Davis said it nevertheless.

When the votes were finally counted following the 1980 election, the federal Tories had lost 19 seats in Ontario, dropping from 57 to 38, and saw their share of the vote slip from 41.8% to 35.5%. This result in Canada's largest province, coupled with decreases in all other provinces except Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador, saw Joe Clark lose his job as Prime Minister and the Conservative government came to a crashing defeat. The 1980 election was Davis' least partisan campaign, though he had still agreed to help the federal Tories in return for the promise of a voice for Ontario in the redistribution of federal-provincial revenues if Clark were elected. He also made numerous campaign stops with Clark in the final weeks of the campaign. While he did not give the same level of support to Clark in 1980 as he had a year earlier or to Stanfield in 1972 and 1974, his team did at least attempt to see Clark re-elected. Therefore, the intra-party relationship is best described as neutral. Yet, many federal Tories did not see it that way, and frequently blamed Davis and his dispute with Lougheed for allowing Trudeau to be re-elected, referring to Davis as a Judas or a poisonous snake.⁶⁹

For example, John Crosbie expressed bitterness over Davis and Lougheed's public dispute over oil pricing and suggested that the federal Tories might have won had the two Premiers, especially Lougheed, backed them more forcefully in 1980. Crosbie indicated that he "...secretly got a kick out of observing the sidelines as Trudeau savaged the Alberta government over the next four years." He continued that "[The Alberta government] deserved it. They

⁶⁸ Quoted in Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 328.

⁶⁹ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 313.

deserved the National Energy Program that [Trudeau] shoved down their throats. They brought it on themselves because they wouldn't give Clark any help, not one jot or tittle of assistance. I never saw such selfish characters. Between Davis and Lougheed, our chance for re-election was wrecked."⁷⁰

In addition to following divergent and, as the election results of 1980 illustrate, divisive paths in regards to oil revenues in 1979, the Ontario and federal Progressive Conservative Parties also disagreed over the process of the patriation of Canada's constitution between Trudeau's re-election in 1980 and the final patriation in 1982. Throughout Trudeau's first tenure as prime minister, he and Davis were always closer together than they were apart in regards to constitutional reform, though this did not lead to any significant splits within the Progressive Conservative Party. However, as the likelihood of patriation became increasingly likely following the defeat of Clark in 1980 and the re-election of the Trudeau and the Liberal Party, divisions between Davis and the Ontario wing and Clark and the federal wing were thrust to the forefront.

When the federal government first submitted its constitutional package- unilaterally- statements made by Davis and Clark illustrate a clear divergence within the ranks of the Progressive Conservative Party. In a speech delivered to Canadians on 2 October 1980, Clark maintained that "what Mr. Trudeau appears to be proposing contains...alarming elements...That is why tonight I appeal to Canadians, regardless of party allegiance...to join with us in the weeks and months ahead- to fight this arbitrary measure..." while Davis, the very next day, employing a norm-breaking voice, stated that "the substance of the resolution put forward by the Prime Minister...substantially adheres to the priorities which were outlined by us at [the First Ministers Meeting in September]...In overall terms we support the resolution put forward by the

⁷⁰ John Crosbie, *No Hold Barred*, 183

Government of Canada...”⁷¹ Much like they were only one year earlier during the oil pricing war between Alberta, Ontario and the federal government, Joe Clark and Bill Davis were in dispute over a major governmental policy in the public eye for all to see.

Not surprisingly, the media were quick to pick up on this divergence. The front-page headline on the *Globe and Mail* on 4 October 1980 read “Davis asks Ontario Tories to support PM over Clark,” while the article noted that “less than 24 hours after Mr. Clark made an uncompromising attack on the [constitutional] package, calling on all Canadians to fight against it ‘for the larger interests of Canada,’ Mr. Davis made it equally clear that the powerful Ontario Conservative Party won’t be with the national leader on this issue...”⁷² While it was true that Davis was not in agreement with his federal party leader on the specifics of constitutional reform package proposed by the government, the headline was slightly exaggerated in that Davis did not suggest that the loyalty and support of Ontario Tories lie with Trudeau definitely, when in fact he merely indicated that Trudeau’s specific proposal would receive their support. This raises the larger issue of loyalty and how Davis conceived loyalty to the federal leader and party.

Davis quickly composed a response to the *Globe and Mail* which indicated “deep frustration and resentment,” but also illustrates Davis’ view of loyalty. Davis responded that “I reserve the right...to differ with my national leader in what I consider to be in the interest of the people of Ontario, just as it is Mr. Clark’s right to differ with me, as he has in the past, in what he considers to be the national interest, in the context of his role as the Leader of Her Majesty’s

⁷¹ “Statement by the Rt. Honourable Joe Clark on the Proposed Resolution Respecting the Constitution of Canada, Thursday, October 2, 1980” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 FP 4-1-1(b401651) “Amend. to the Constitution of Can. PM, Premiers, & Min ’80” and “Statement by the Honourable William G. Davis, Premier of Ontario, on the Constitution, Friday, October 3, 1980” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 FP 4-1-1(b401651) “Amend. to the Constitution of Can. PM, Premiers, & Min ’80”

⁷² Stan Oziewicz, John Fraser, and Rosemary Spiers, “Davis asks Ontario Tories to support PM over Clark,” *Globe and Mail* (4 October 1980), 1/2.

Loyal Opposition.”⁷³ While Davis denied that he was being disloyal to the federal party, his actions clearly indicated that he was pursuing a norm-breaking voice. Davis was refusing to cooperate in joint initiatives to oppose the Constitutional reform package and, in some sense, was presenting a public critique of the federal party. However, illustrative of his own sense of loyalty to the party, publicly he maintained that, despite this disagreement, he would continue to campaign on behalf of Clark. However, as this chapter has previously illustrated, Davis’ campaigning on behalf of Clark was a considerably less enthusiastic than it was on behalf on Stanfield and should not be taken as evidence of a warm relationship between the two and the operation of a norm-based voice.

The agreement between Davis and Trudeau over the specifics of the proposed constitutional package was based in furthering the interests of Ontario, ideology, policy, and the fact that the Trudeau’s proposal included virtually all the elements that Davis had been pushing for since first becoming premier.⁷⁴ As a letter sent out to many rank-and-file party members who questioned Davis ‘being in bed with Trudeau’ throughout the patriation process, the premier reminded them that “...In the end, therefore, when the Federal resolution, now being debated, was introduced, my government found itself considering a ‘constitutional package’ made up largely of proposals which we had advocated over the years and without any of those provisions to which we had previously taken exception...”⁷⁵ From Davis’ perspective, it would have been backward thinking to oppose a constitutional package that contained everything his government was looking for based solely on the fact that it was proposed by a different party at the federal

⁷³ “Letter to the Globe and Mail” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 FP 6-2 (b110062) “Federal/Provincial Members of Parliament, Leader of Opposition ’80”

⁷⁴ These constitutional demands included: 1) entrenchment of the monarchy, 2) the protection of individuals rights and liberties through a guaranteed charter, 3) the ability for English and French parents to educate their children in their native tongue where numbers warranted, and 4) mobility rights for all Canadians.

⁷⁵ “Letter from Bill Davis to....” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 (b317132) “Politics of Canada (National) Progressive Conservative Assoc ’81”

level. In fact, the letter also spoke to the growing public disagreement between him and Clark over the constitutional proposals:

Now let me turn to the difference between our National Leader and myself...He has the duty to oppose Federal government proposals and to provide alternatives and suggestions which he and his colleagues, in their wisdom, believe to be preferable alternatives. I believe that Mr. Clark is doing his job extremely well and is a credit to our National Party...however...Mr. Clark's views and my views as to what is in the best interest of the country differ sharply...As much as I dislike being on different sides with our National Leader, I am not prepared to change a position that I believe is right.⁷⁶

Davis drew clear divisions between the job of the federal opposition leader and a provincial premier- even when members of the same party- which speak directly to the existence of a loyalty dilemma. The job and required duties of each person may force them on a collision course, even if it is one they would rather avoid. Generally speaking, as Davis rightly states, the job of the opposition leader in a Westminster parliamentary system is to oppose the government and provide alternative policy measures while looking out for what is best for the country. The job of a premier, as Davis also rightly states, is to promote sub-national interests, and, in some instances, put forward a position that is best for the sub-national units which make up the country. Thus, what is advocated by the opposition leader may differ from what is advocated by sub-national leaders. In such a case, a conflict arises. As each leader represents different electoral interests and has different roles to play, they are forced to put partisan labels aside in lieu of their policy position. From Davis' perspective, this wasn't being disloyal to the national leader, but rather, loyal to the jurisdiction and interests that one was obliged to represent.

The premier also elaborated on what seemed to be the irony of cross-party cooperation between a federal Liberal and a provincial Progressive Conservative. As Davis stated on many occasions throughout the process of constitutional negotiations, "The Prime Minister of Canada

⁷⁶ "Letter to Calgary Fish Creek Constituency Assoc.," Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 (b317132) "Politics of Canada (National) PO8 Progressive Conservative Assoc '81." This passage was part of a template that was used for many letters regarding Davis' support of Trudeau's constitutional package.

is a Liberal and I am a Progressive Conservative...Nothing would be easier for me during the course of these constitutional discussions than to retreat behind my partisan affiliation and oppose what has been put forward from Ottawa because it has been put forward by a Liberal.”⁷⁷ Despite the partisan differences between Davis and Trudeau, the premier put those aside and maintained his support for the constitutional package because it was, in his opinion, not only in the best interest of Ontario, but in the best interest of Canada as a whole.

Six provinces, later joined by two others, commenced a constitutional challenge to Trudeau’s unilateral patriation, putting questions to three separate provincial Courts of Appeal. The case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, who ruled that while unilateral patriation was legal, it broke constitutional conventions. In a memo entitled ‘Upholding the Canadian Way: The Supreme Court Decision that the PC Party Made Possible,’ the federal party maintained that “the Supreme Court’s ruling...is a clear vindication of our determined stand over the last year...”⁷⁸ However, this was not a stand shared by Davis or the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party.⁷⁹ In fact, when Clark and most other Tory premiers were appealing the federal government’s unilateral decision to patriate the constitution, the Ontario government—represented by Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs Tom Wells and Attorney General Roy McMurtry—appeared as interveners alongside the federal Liberal government.

The combination of the oil pricing dispute and the debate over the patriation of the constitution has made many federal Tories cast Davis as disloyal to the federal party. Eddie Goodman, a former Frost organizer and National Chair under Robarts, rebuts these charges of

⁷⁷ “Statement by the Honourable William G. Davis, Premier of Ontario, on the Constitution, Friday, October 3, 1980” Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 FP 4-1-1(b401651) “Amend. to the Constitution of Can. PM, Premiers, & Min ’80”

⁷⁸ “Letter from Joe Clark, and memo ‘Upholding the Canadian Way: The Supreme Court Decision that the PC Party Made Possible’ Ontario Archives- R.G. 3-49 FP 4-1-1(b203969) “Amend. to the Constitution of Can. Vol. 1 Jan-Apr, PM, Premiers & Min ’81”

⁷⁹ Davis’ position was also shared by New Brunswick Premier Richard Hatfield, himself a Progressive Conservative.

disloyalty on Davis' part. Reflecting on the former Ontario Premier's relationship with the federal party, Goodman stated:

I can tell you- Davis worked far harder than either Frost or Robarts, except Frost worked hard in 1957, but by and large Davis never turned down any strong request from Clark...Anybody who knows that facts knows how hard he worked. I know what the perception is, but it isn't fair. I don't deny that his position on oil prices hurt the feds a bit, but his first obligation was to his province...You know, Billy doesn't like that stuff. He doesn't like being cast as disloyal when he really is such a great loyalist. That really bothered him. No one was saying that any of the other Tory premiers were disloyal, premiers who hadn't worked or move a finger for Joe.⁸⁰

Goodman not only highlighted the popular opinion among federal Tories of Davis as a Judas whose efforts sabotaged the Clark campaign in 1980, he also highlighted that, ever the partisan, Davis was working on behalf of Clark when many other Tories were staying away from the faltering Prime Minister. Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed, whose province saw huge benefits under Clark that often became the focal point of Davis' criticism against the Prime Minister, refused to comment on the 1980 federal election or campaign outside of his home province, maintaining that his allegiance was only to Alberta. This is the same 'provincial first' story that Frost and Robarts often played without being so direct, but certainly not one that Davis preferred to play. Nevertheless, in the end many maintain that "Davis hammered [a] nail in Clark's political coffin."⁸¹

However, the bad blood between Lougheed and Davis continued well after Clark's defeat. In May 1984, a few months prior to Davis' retirement from politics, the Progressive Conservative Party held a party for Davis to commemorate his twenty-five years in politics. The event was attended by a number of Conservative Party dignitaries, including Brian Mulroney. Many other Conservative provincial leaders and Premiers sent congratulatory telegrams to Davis. After Davis was handed the pile of telegrams from the other Premiers and had looked through

⁸⁰ Quoted in Hoy., *Bill Davis*, 328.

⁸¹ Simpson, *Discipline of Power*, 191.

them, he turned to Rob Webb, the evening dinner's chairman and said "there's one missing."⁸² The missing telegram was Lougheed's. Of Lougheed, Davis has remarked that there "may be more strains" from Lougheed's point-of-view than from his own, though he acknowledged that the two Premier's difference of opinion on oil pricing was the one of the sources of their dispute. They also had divergent opinions regarding Trudeau's patriation of the Constitution. The Alberta Premier refused to be interviewed by *Toronto Star* journalist Clare Hoy for his biography of Davis. Lougheed's press secretary, Ron Leipert, called Hoy and informed him that "The Premier has nothing to say about Bill Davis." When asked if that illustrated what Lougheed thought of the Ontario Premier, Leipert remaked "Yes, I think it does."⁸³

⁸² Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 389.

⁸³ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 388.

The Mulroney Era

The Decline of Joe Clark and the Rise of Brian Mulroney

Following his defeat in the 1980 federal election, Joe Clark remained the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party and became the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons. The party re-affirmed Clark's leadership at the 1981 biennial convention, though 33.5% of the delegates at the 1981 convention supported a leadership review. The party's next biennial convention, held in Winnipeg, Manitoba, occurred in January 1983. Clark's leadership would either be re-affirmed once again or the party would undergo a formal leadership review. Despite the disagreements between Davis and Clark in 1979 and 1980 over oil pricing, in late November, 1982 Davis indicated his feelings on the upcoming convention, unenthusiastically remarking to over 1,400 Tories at a party fundraiser that "I'm a loyal supporter of Clark."¹ Quite simply, this was a less-than-stellar endorsement, especially from a loyal partisan such as Davis. However, a considerable number of the convention's delegates disagreed with Davis' pronouncement. Perhaps they saw through his façade, or perhaps they were simply frustrated with Joe Clark. Regardless, 33.1% of the convention's delegates supported a formal leadership review, arguing that the party would be unable to win another election with Clark as leader. This support- or lack thereof- prompted Clark to resign as leader and seek a renewed mandate from the party's membership through a leadership convention held later that year. The fact that Clark had been able to increase his support by only 0.4% over the two-year period between conventions likely played a role in his decision to seek a new mandate.

The lack of support that Clark received would have been much different had he received the support of the party's provincial wings. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) checked the registration records of the convention and found a disturbing lack of intra-party

¹ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 377.

solidarity. Of the 341 provincial legislators who were eligible to vote, only eighty-five had even bothered to attend.² Their absence is indicative of a norm-breaking voice. Peter Lougheed was in Hawaii, and most of his caucus was also on vacation. Only seven of Ontario's seventy MPPs attended, despite Davis' public pronouncements of loyalty. As Peter Mansbridge observed following the convention, "For Joe Clark, the irony is biting...If the votes had been delivered for him, there would have been no leadership convention because those votes would have given him a 70 per cent approval, the acknowledged figure he needed to stay on the job."³ Of Lougheed and Davis, Ian MacDonald has stated more bluntly that "these were the people who could have saved Joe Clark's hide, and they didn't."⁴ While placing the blame solely on Lougheed, Davis and their provinces' provincial legislators is overstated, it cannot be denied that these provincial governments of Ontario and Alberta failed to provide any meaningful support to the federal leader. Regardless of who is to blame, Clark determined that he did not have the requisite support to lead the party and proceeded to resign his leadership position. Following Clark's resignation, Davis gave the vague indication that he supported "the federal leader," though he made no specific reference to Clark.⁵ With a party leadership contest approaching, many Tories began to announce their candidacy, including Brian Mulroney, the high-spending candidate in the party's 1976 leadership race.

There were some indications that the 1983 federal Progressive Conservative leadership race was to feature one of, and potentially both of, Bill Davis and Peter Lougheed. Both Premiers had long been rumored to be potential candidates and both had numerous supporters in their own province and some support elsewhere. With some suspicion regarding Mulroney's

² MacDonald, *Mulroney: The Making of the Prime Minister*, 140.

³ Quoted in MacDonald, *Mulroney: The Making of the Prime Minister*, 140.

⁴ MacDonald, *Mulroney: The Making of the Prime Minister*, 140.

⁵ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 378.

potential entrance into the leadership contest, there were many Conservatives worried about a potential “right-wing thrust in the party.”⁶ A consensus existed amongst many moderate Tories, especially in Toronto, that Davis’ candidacy would be the only way to prevent a Mulroney victory and a corresponding ideological re-alignment within the party. The Ontario Premier gave some thought to the idea of entering the leadership race, but eventually decided not to. This may have been, in part, the result of numerous telephone calls from the Mulroney camp to Queen’s Park indicating that their polling data suggested that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for Davis to win the party’s leadership.⁷ While Mulroney’s camp remained diplomatic in the pressure they exerted on Davis, Clark, in an uncharacteristically intemperate remark dismissed the Ontario Premier as “a regional candidate.”⁸ By this point Clark and Mulroney had emerged as the two front-runners in the leadership race.

Meanwhile in Alberta, there was also discussion of a regional candidacy to ensure Alberta’s interests were heard within the federal party. There was considerable support for Clark in Alberta more generally, and a number of MLAs in the provincial caucus were also supportive of Clark’s candidacy. There was considerable pressure on Lougheed to endorse Clark, particularly if he were the only Albertan contesting the party’s leadership.⁹ Again, provincial concerns played a dominant role and transplanted themselves into the federal party. The full caucus did not have time to meet with all of the leadership candidates and Lougheed himself was not overly supportive of Clark’s candidacy. As a result, the Premier came up with the idea to select a few members from his caucus- himself, party whip Ian Reid, David King, Jim Horsman, and Nigel Pengelly- to interview each of the prospective candidates. Dubbed by some as ‘the

⁶ Murphy et. al, *Brian Mulroney*, 168

⁷ MacDonald, *Mulroney*, 158.

⁸ Sawatsky, *Mulroney*, 469.

⁹ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 202.

inquisition,' the committee asked three basic questions to the potential leaders: "What are your plans in regards to the National Energy Program?"; "Are you going to make changes in the bureaucratic structure now running in Ottawa?" and "What is your attitude toward the centralization of power?"¹⁰ Not surprisingly, all the questions were closely related to Alberta's territorial and ideological interests.

The committee met in mid-May 1983, though Lougheed was still under considerable pressure to support Clark. Lougheed told Clark "...candidly and directly, that [he] wouldn't support any candidate, that [he]'d do as [he] had done at the 1976 leadership convention as provincial leader, and...would be neutral." However, the Premier also "...concede[d] that [he] went further this time...[and] went to the extent of encouraging Albertans to take a good look at Brian Mulroney."¹¹ Lougheed became fond of the Québec politician during the 'inquisition' when the meeting between the two politicians lasted for over two hours. Mulroney recalled that the Alberta Premier told him to "keep it up, you're doing great," though Lougheed still maintained a public face of neutrality.¹² Of course with two Albertans- Clark and Peter Pocklington- in the leadership contest, Lougheed and his inner circle were prudent in their actions, ever careful not to offend the numerous Alberta-based Clark and Pocklington supporters.

Mulroney was eventually elected leader of the federal Progressive Conservative party on 11 June 1983, beating Joe Clark on the fourth ballot. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to say with any certainty the exact effects of Lougheed's implicit support for Mulroney and his lack of support for Clark, Lougheed's biographer has suggested that "most observers of the leadership convention agree that Clark would probably have carried the convention if Lougheed had taken a

¹⁰ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 202.

¹¹ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 203.

¹² MacDonald, *Mulroney*, 168.

strong public stand for him.”¹³ The actions of some federal MPs and Clark supporters seem to support this contention. Seven provincial Tory premiers- including Lougheed- attended a meeting of the federal caucus held the day after the leadership convention. Lougheed recalls seeking the “daggers in the eyes of three or four key people” in attendance after he was formally introduced. Don Braid remarked that “in the end, the Albertans showed no special loyalty to the native son. They were more interested in finding a winner than keeping an Albertan in the leadership.”¹⁴ Irrespective of any ill-will that might have arisen from the leadership convention, the convention had selected a new party leader that all relevant players were forced to live with for some time.

Davis, meanwhile, kept his vote secret, though some reports suggested that he voted for Michael Wilson on the first ballot.¹⁵ In any event, he, his wife Kathleen, and their aides left the Ottawa Civic Centre prior to the announcement of the convention’s winner. While his cabinet members supported a wide range of candidates- Crombie, Wilson, Crosbie and Mulroney- they were by and large members of the ‘ABC’ (Anybody but Clark) movement. One source indicated that “they agreed they wanted to get (Clark) for the way he’s treated Ontario Tories since 1979.”¹⁶ Only Social Services Minister Frank Drea and Culture Minister Bruce McCaffery openly supported Clark, though they only went to his camp on the third ballot after supporting David Crombie on the first two.

Although the politics of leadership conventions are often divisive, they are a routine and necessary part of intra-party relations. As a result, it is problematic to suggest the use of either a norm-based voice or a norm-breaking voice. While party members, and specifically leaders of

¹³ Wood, *The Lougheed Legacy*, 203.

¹⁴ Don Braid, “Most Alberta Tories look forward to life with Brian,” *Edmonton Journal* (11 June 1983), A7.

¹⁵ Alan Christie, “Davis keeps his vote secret—but his minister’s don’t,” *Toronto Star* (12 June 1983), A12.

¹⁶ Alan Christie, “Davis keeps his vote secret—but his minister’s don’t”

provincial wings, are under no obligation to publicly endorse a candidate- and many decide to remain neutral- there are many Premiers or provincial leaders who make their views known. After all, they are members of the party and have a keen interest in charting that party's future. However, this form of intra-party politics is ideally short-lived, with the party coalescing, at least publicly, around the newly elected leader and proceeding from the convention with a norm-based voice. The divisive nature of intra-party conflict during a leadership contest is not limited to a dispute between those seeking the leadership position and those not supporting them. The discordant politics of leadership selection can also permeate into pre-existing conflicts between party members. Reflecting on Davis' non-candidacy in 1983, veteran organizer and Davis loyalist Hugh Segal recalled that, "Everybody else had a purpose, which was to elect the candidate of their choice. There's nothing wrong with that. But Lougheed was the one person whose sole purpose in life was to destroy Bill Davis"¹⁷ Clearly the divisive effects of intra-party relations were long-lived. While Segal's comments may be exaggerated and reflect his own bias toward Davis, they nevertheless indicate that federalism can be troublesome for intra-party cohesion.

Despite not being overly supportive of Mulroney during the leadership selection and even seriously contemplating challenging his candidacy, Davis quickly came around to the new federal leader. The new federal leader worked hard to win over the Ontario Premier and his fabled Big Blue Machine, as he had failed to win Davis' praise during the 1976 leadership campaign or at any point since. While Davis and Queen's Park felt increasingly isolated under Clark's leadership- a serious point of contention between the two wings- Mulroney "put all his considerable charm" into ensuring that Davis would not feel as slighted by the new

¹⁷ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 378.

administration.¹⁸ Mulroney's efforts did not go unnoticed by the Ontario Premier who was increasingly receiving calls from the federal leader on issues of substantive policy or simply to have a friendly discussion. These efforts went a long way into bringing Davis back into the fold of the federal party and paid considerable dividends during Mulroney's first election campaign as federal leader.

The 1984 Federal Election

A federal election was called for September 1984, about one year after Mulroney's election as federal party leader. Davis, ever the partisan, wanted to ensure that his provincial organization was square behind the new Conservative leader. To that end, he employed a norm-based voice and sent out thousands of letters to Ontario Tories urging them to "put their strength and experience solidly behind Brian Mulroney."¹⁹ Mulroney, for his part, indicated that "Bill has told his people that if he has to move the city of Toronto five feet to the right to get me elected then that's what they should do."²⁰ While the assistance that Davis and the Ontario Tories provided to the federal Conservative Party should not be overstated- the election was fought largely on the previous Liberal government's record in office- the Ontario wing did help to mobilize the party's grassroots to support Mulroney. Furthermore, unlike the previous federal election in which oil pricing was the main issue- and in large part the cause issue that caused Clark's defeat- the premiers were virtually silent on oil pricing in 1984, despite it being an outstanding issue. Davis, Lougheed and the other Tory premiers were forced to deny that any deals had been made not to discuss oil pricing during the election the campaign. In an interview in Charlottetown, the Ontario Premier simply stated "Why provoke an issue?"²¹

¹⁸ MacDonald, *Mulroney*, 260.

¹⁹ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 330.

²⁰ MacDonald, *Mulroney*, 260.

²¹ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 330.

Prior to the election, Conservative strategist Norm Atkins remarked that “Billy Davis is going to work his ass off [for Mulroney].”²² Indeed, in what was by far his most partisan campaign and clearest use of norm-based voice since 1974, Davis made nearly two dozen appearances on his behalf.²³ In addition to the Premier making appearances on behalf of Mulroney on the campaign trail, a whip was put on the party’s Ontario caucus by Davis. The Tory MPPs were instructed that they should be available to campaign when needed, even when up in the cottage country areas of Lake Huron and Georgian Bay. This support and enthusiasm for the federal party was in contrast with the election campaign of 1980 “when it was all Joe Clark could do to get a cup of coffee at Queen’s Park when he went hat in hand to the Premier.”²⁴ Additionally, nearly all of the Mulroney campaign team was made up of Ontario’s ‘Big Blue Machine’ and Norm Atkins assigned Bill McCleer, a Davis supporter, to run the Ontario section of the campaign. In what turned out to be the most lopsided electoral victory since the Diefenbaker victory in 1958, the federal Tories won 211 of Canada’s 291 seats with 50.0% of the vote. In Ontario, they won 67 seats with 47.6% of the vote. Four years earlier, the Tories had managed to win only 38 seats in Ontario while garnering 35.5% of the vote. These impressive gains were due in part to the loan of Bill Davis’ organizational structure and Davis’ own popularity and support. However, by this point the Premier was already contemplating his retirement.

The Fall of Ontario’s Big Blue Machine

Davis, after over 13 years in office, resigned his position as premier in 1985 and was succeeded by Frank Miller. Later that year the party went on to win a minority government with 52 of Ontario’s 125 seats, and only 37.0% of the vote. This was less than the Liberals total of

²² MacDonald, *Mulroney*, 287.

²³ Hoy, *Bill Davis*, 329.

²⁴ MacDonald, *Mulroney*, 287.

37.9%, though the Liberals managed to win only 48 seats. However, Miller's minority government quickly fell after the 1985 election. One of the reasons for the defeat, though certainly not the only one, was that of checks and balances. For much of the post-war era of Tory dominance in Ontario, the federal government was nearly always a Liberal one. Frank Underhill argued that "Her Majesty's Canadian Opposition is emerging in the provincial capitals. The federal government treats the little opposition parties in Ottawa with contempt, but it negotiates warily with the provincial governments. It well knows where the countervailing power is located..."²⁵ Perhaps then voters felt that a strong Tory government in Ottawa would be more rigidly balanced by a Liberal government in Ontario.

When Frank Miller and the Conservative Party were elected as a minority government in 1985, it marked the first time since 1959 that Ontario voters had elected a provincial Conservative government in Ontario when the Conservatives were in power in Ottawa. Having the federal party in power was not always a good thing for the Ontario Tories. In 1959, the year after Diefenbaker's Conservatives won a sweeping majority federally, Frost's Tories lost a dozen seats and their popular support dropped 2.2% points, though they managed to rebound four years later. Ontario voters have traditionally elected one party to govern at the federal level, and another party to govern at the provincial level. There are two explanations for this: the checks and balances argument and the vote-switch argument.

Writing in 1946, Frank Underhill noted that "thousands of Ontario voters last summer, after putting Mr. Drew into office, turned around within a week and helped the rest of Canada to make sure that Ontario Tories should not dominate the dominion," adding that "as long as the Drew-McCullagh combination dominates Ontario, Mr. King is assured of office at Ottawa."²⁶

²⁵ Frank Underhill, "Political Stagnation in Canada, 1956," 254.

²⁶ Frank Underhill, "W.L. MacKenzie King: Twenty-five Years as Prime Minister," 121.

When Drew took over as the federal leader, he was handily defeated in two elections- 1949 and 1953- and did not fare particularly better in his own province than he did across the Dominion. It was not, however, the result of an anti-Tory sentiment in Ontario, as Drew's successor, Leslie Frost, improved in both the 1951 and 1955 provincial elections. Underhill concluded that "by some instinctive, subconscious mental process the Canadian people have apparently decided that, since freedom depends on a balance of power, they will balance the monopolistic power of the Liberal government at Ottawa by setting up the effective countervailing power, not in Ottawa but in the provincial capitals."²⁷ While Underhill's reasoning may have been too simplistic and more was likely at work explaining the phenomenon, his observations were indeed correct, and consistently have been ever since.

Perhaps the phenomenon is better explained by Leslie Frost, who correctly identified a vote-switch pattern between federal and provincial voters. As opposed to Underhill's rationale of a subconscious counter-balance of power, Frost states that voters were rational and conscious in their decision to elect different parties to govern federally and provincially. Frost stated that, "some are Grits and some are Tories. A few more Grits makes little difference to me because I have dozens of them in my retinue anyway...The Provincial Party is very largely different than the Federal Party. Our supporters in many cases are not the same. One draws support where the other does not and vice versa."²⁸ In addition to differing from Underhill's analysis, Frost also greatly differed from Davis' belief that a Tory was a Tory. In either case, the election of the Tory minority in Ontario in 1985 was unusual considering a Tory majority governed Ottawa.²⁹

²⁷ Frank Underhill, "Canadian Liberal Democracy in 1955," 237.

²⁸ Leslie Frost, quoted in Graham, *Old Man Ontario*, 390.

²⁹ Interestingly, the same happened in reverse in the late 19th century, when Ontario voters supported both Oliver Mowat (a Liberal) and John A. Macdonald (a Conservative).

The pattern would not be broken, however, as Miller's minority government was quickly defeated by a Liberal-New Democrat coalition.

Although Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had, prior to the beginning of the campaign, decided to support Miller and the Ontario Tories, he sensed that the popularity for the provincial party was wavering, and began to withdraw from campaigning on behalf of his provincial cousins. On the first day of the campaign, the Ontario Tories suffered a setback at the hands of the Mulroney government. A story was published in the *Toronto Star* that stated an increase in gasoline taxes would be in the next federal budget and prices would rise from anywhere between 3 to 5 cents per litre. As Miller got off his bus for a campaign stop in Kitchener-Waterloo, he was surrounded by reporters demanding to know what the Ontario government would do to protect consumer interests. The news leak came as a surprise to Miller, who was completely unaware of the situation.³⁰ The Mulroney government had failed to warn the provincial campaign team of changes to the upcoming federal budget. With no time to respond to a story that completely caught him off-guard, Miller was reduced to stating 'no comment,' and by the end of the day could only promise to bring the issue up at an upcoming federal-provincial conference.

Things did not get much better for Miller, as the federal Tories were not particularly helpful to Miller for much of the campaign, and certainly were treating the Ontario dynasty much differently than they had in the past. What would account for the seemingly non-partisan attitude taken by the federal Tories? Underhill's earlier explanation may ring true, as Rosemary Speirs suggested that "[Mulroney] may have been influenced by his own political needs: Ontarians

³⁰ Speirs, *Out of the Blue*, 108.

were more likely to vote Conservative federally if they didn't also have a Conservative provincial government.”³¹

To give the Tories a boost in support, an “All-Ontario Night,” was planned in Toronto. The rally would feature Miller, Mulroney, and Davis, along with other prominent Tories and would be transmitted across the province on television via a satellite link. However, what was designed to be a cornerstone of the provincial campaign would become the laughing stock of it, as the media quickly reported that securing the Prime Minister's presence was more difficult than expected. Norman Atkins encouraged Mulroney to stay out of provincial politics in principle, but also to avoid attracting attention to the Conservative majority in Ottawa.³² Mulroney finally agreed to attend, though he was forced to cancel another event that night. Having a Conservative government in Ottawa during the campaign was not a blessing for the Ontario Tories, as they did not have the luxury of blaming the province's problems on the Grits in Ottawa. The Liberal campaign exploited this throughout the election, warning voters that if they re-elected the Tories, the province would be run by Mulroney, Atkins and Miller out of the Albany Club.

Although Miller did not serve as Ontario's premier for long, he did serve long enough to attend a federal-provincial conference in Regina. Not surprisingly, money was a major issue between the two levels of government. The federal Conservative government had touted improvements to social programs prior to the conference and during their campaign, but it quickly became apparent that in reality, that money simply was not going to be made available. “Nothing slows a provincial politician down faster than money,” Miller stated, adding that “[Mulroney] discovered the inevitable fact that whether there's a Liberal or Conservative government in Ottawa, a provincial premier of any stripe is not going to agree with him too long.

³¹ Speirs, *Out of the Blue*, 109.

³² Speirs, *Out of the Blue*, 118.

A premier needs one or two ingredients to win an election in Canada, either a fight with the feds or a fight with the Americans. If you have both, you've really got it going for you."³³ Though the stripes of the governing party in Ontario would quickly change colour, true to Miller's words, the fight with Ottawa did not. After all, the fight with Ottawa was often necessary to maintain the support of voters and uphold Ontario's operative norms.

Though Mulroney had briefly campaigned for the provincial Conservatives in 1985, he began to retreat after polls showed that Tory popularity in the province was quickly declining. After the defeat of the Miller government, the prime minister quickly shed any shades of his partisanship and announced that he had "always tried, irrespective of the political stripe of the government, the duly elected government of a given province, to co-operate fully and openly with that government..."³⁴ He also boasted that he would have no problem working with Ontario's new premier, David Peterson, as the two used to "whore around" together in Montreal in their younger days, though Peterson denied they were as close as Mulroney had made them out to be.³⁵ Regardless of any past relationship the two may have had, Peterson began attacking Mulroney over fiscal issues. He had also been quite critical of the close relationship between Miller and Mulroney in the early part of the campaign. With a two party coalition denying the Tories the ability to run the government as they had since 1943, the Conservative dynasty in Ontario had come to a crashing defeat.

Frank Miller did not serve as Ontario's premier for long enough to lead the Ontario Tories through a federal election campaign. For the first time in over forty years, the next federal election would take place at a time when Ontario was not governed by a Progressive Conservative government. Much as Leslie Frost and John Robarts were guided by pragmatism

³³ Hoy, *Friends in High Places*, 84.

³⁴ Hoy, *Friends in High Places*, 87.

³⁵ Hoy, *Friends in High Places*, 87.

in their relationship with the federal wing, Brian Mulroney's relationship with the provincial wing was governed in a similar fashion. As soon as he saw signs of weakness, his support for the struggling Ontario Tories receded. Much as the Ontario premiers boasted that they would be willing to work with whoever was in Ottawa, regardless of their political stripes, Mulroney made it known that he was willing to work with whoever was at Queen's Park. For the Ontario Tories, what went around eventually came around.

However, prior to Miller's defeat in 1985, a potentially divisive intra-party issue came to the forefront. In the first year of Mulroney's first term, the Prime Minister announced a desire to enter into talks with the United States government over the issue of a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries. The issue of Free Trade was one that had long been advocated by Alberta politicians, and Lougheed had long pushed for a commitment to that effect. However Miller cautioned Mulroney against such a plan, at least until it had been examined in greater detail. Southern Ontario's heavy industrial base had long benefited from the existence of a tariff barrier and fears of a potentially significant job loss and lack of branch plant investment forced Miller to proceed with caution. However, Miller's government fell before discussions surrounding the Free Trade Agreement were put in full force. Consequently Ontario's new Liberal government, in conjunction with the New Democratic Party and a coalition of trade unions, led the anti-Free Trade forces. The federal Liberal and New Democratic Parties were also involved in fighting free trade, and Larry Grossman, the new Conservative leader, also opposed free trade in the 1987 Ontario election. Miller and Grossman's hesitation to endorse Free Trade is illustrative of their concern with territorial issues. Conversely Lougheed's embrace of Free Trade, though consisted with his support of limited government intervention in the free market, was nevertheless also related to territorial concerns. Alberta's resource-based economy

was based largely on export to the United States. Free Trade between Canada and the U.S. meant that Alberta's raw material exports would no longer be the subject of a tariff when crossing into the United States; it also meant that finished goods could be purchased cheaper from the United States than from central Canada.

The Rise of Reform and the Fall of Brian Mulroney in Alberta

Meanwhile in Alberta, the provincial government was enthralled with Mulroney's decision to scrap the National Energy Program, a promise he had made to Lougheed during the "inquisition." April 1985's *Western Accord* officially announced the end of the much maligned program, prompting Lougheed to indicate that "the mood is very positive toward the new Government. There's a belief that the Prime Minister will treat the West equitably." However, Lougheed made sure that it was known that his support was tenuous, adding that there remained "some very strong feelings below the surface in Alberta that could flare up" if their expectations were not fulfilled.³⁶ Quite simply, Alberta's interests would need to be paramount in federal policy making for it to receive the provincial government's continued support. Although Lougheed was supportive of Mulroney, his loyalty ultimately laid with his own province's electorate. However, the scene of federal-provincial relations was quickly changing. Shortly after Davis' retirement, Lougheed followed suit and retired himself. The leadership of the Alberta Progressive Conservative party was won by former Edmonton Eskimo quarterback Donald Getty. Getty had previously served in the Alberta cabinet as Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs from 1971 to 1975 and as Minister of Energy from 1975 to 1979. He left politics that year, but returned to seek the party leadership after Lougheed stepped down.

The politics of both intra-party federalism and western discontent were significantly different from Lougheed's era to Getty's. Lougheed's strategy had consisted of typical Ottawa

³⁶ Quoted in Wardhaugh, "Brian Mulroney and the West," 230.

bashing and rhetoric opposing the federal government, since Ottawa and the federal government were viewed as synonymous with the Liberal Party. Lougheed and the Alberta Tories were free to take all the shots against Pierre Trudeau and the federal government as they saw fit. Quite simply, there was no intra-party relationship to constrain the rhetoric of the Alberta Tories. The previous chapter has illustrated how Joe Clark's short tenure in government influenced intra-party relations and demonstrated how adversely one wing's electoral successes could be affected as a result of the constraints and visible signs of discontent. However, following Trudeau's resignation and the Liberal defeat in 1984, the politics of western discontent were tamed once again as a result of the Conservatives' victory. Furthermore, Alberta- even under Lougheed- was less rambunctious in the 1980s because energy prices had fallen.

As a result of Mulroney's victory in 1984, intra-party politics once again had the potential to play an important role in political dialogue. Roger Gibbins has noted the presence of these intra-party constraints on Getty, arguing that "at the very least, it was difficult for a Conservative premier to fight hammer and tongs with a Conservative prime minister."³⁷ The fact that both the Alberta government and the federal government were governed by majority Progressive Conservative governments meant limiting the anti-government, and by extension anti-federal Conservative, rhetoric. Quite simply, the Alberta government faced a considerable loyalty dilemma throughout Mulroney's reign as Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, the first months of the Mulroney administration proved to be beneficial for the West, and specifically Alberta, especially in terms of gaining representation in key positions in the federal government. Joe Clark was named Minister of External Affairs and Don Mazankowski was chosen as Deputy Prime Minister. With the heavily criticized National Energy Program officially over and discussions on Free Trade in the works, the federal

³⁷ Gibbins, "Alberta and the National Community," 80.

government continued to make concessions toward the West, while at the same time removing itself from the market. However, Getty remained critical of the federal government in instances in which he perceived they failed to give proper weight to western-Canadian territorial concerns. For example, he criticized the federal government for being “too faint-hearted and timid” to back a feasibility study of Husky Oil’s Lloydminster, Saskatchewan oil refinery upgrades.³⁸ However, despite some limited signs of promise in the early years of Mulroney’s Prime Ministership, western attitudes towards the new Conservative government began to “shift uncomfortably” by late 1986, though western Canadians, and Albertans in particular, still voted predominantly for the Conservatives in 1988.³⁹ In many respects, Western resentment coalesced in October 1986 around the CF-18 incident, in which the Mulroney government awarded a billion-dollar maintenance contract to a Montréal firm in lieu of a Winnipeg firm. The company based in the latter city, however, had placed a technically superior bid at a significantly lower price.⁴⁰

The much hated Petroleum Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) was also eliminated, although some viewed this “...as an obvious move rather than an indication of a west-friendly government.”⁴¹ However, the removal of the PGRT involved a significantly battle between the provincial and federal Tories and did not come without Getty first denouncing the federal Tories in August 1986 for their failure to remove the tax up until that point and alluding to renewed Western separatism and alienation from the federal Conservative government. The Premier stated “I feel in Alberta a frustration that we don’t have the kind of policies coming out of

³⁸ Don Getty, quoted in Donald C. Wallace, “Ottawa and the Provinces,” in *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Administration- 1986*, ed. R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 63. (pp. 49-93)

³⁹ Quoted in Wardhaugh, “Brian Mulroney and the West,” 231.

⁴⁰ Peter M. Leslie and Ronald L. Watts (ed.) *Canada: The State of the Federation 1987-88* (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 1988), 213.

⁴¹ Wardhaugh, “Brian Mulroney and the West,” 231.

Ottawa we hoped we would have. Once we thought, well, it's because we're not supporting the Liberal government. But now we've supported the Conservative government and there's still this sense of frustration."⁴² Ultimately, Getty threatened the use of norm-breaking voice and alluded to the fact that many Albertans were willing "to look elsewhere" as a result of the perceived failures of the federal government.⁴³ Not only did Getty champion provincial-based interests and illustrate a clear sense of frustration with the federal party, he also openly questioned the possibility of many Albertans abandoning the federal party. In such an instance, it would have also been difficult, if not impossible, for the provincial government to have any association with the federal party.

The Prime Minister's response to Getty's threats and talk of separatism illustrated a clear dichotomy between the role of the premier as a champion of territorial-based interests and the prime minister as someone who requires the support of the given province, but who is also responsible for, and accountable to, a national electorate. Mulroney responded to Getty by stating "...I don't know that you will find a government that has responded to so quickly and so completely to the needs to Western Canada," and added that "leadership requires a sense of national commitment and a determination to set aside regional difficulties, a determination to resist the easy temptation to blame the neighbour."⁴⁴ Mulroney attempted to highlight to Western Canada- an important base of support for the Conservative Party- the fact that his government was responsive to their needs, but at the same time was forced to highlight to the rest of the country that his government was receptive to the needs of all provinces and could look past the narrow and sometimes parochial interests of individual provinces.

⁴² Lynda Shorten, "Separatism rising again, says Getty," *Edmonton Journal* (21 August 1986), A1.

⁴³ It should be noted, however, that in Alberta, as in Québec, provincial politicians tend to oppose any federal government, regardless of its policies.

⁴⁴ Anon., "PM slaps Getty's wrist," *Edmonton Journal* (22 August 1986), A1.

In response to the delay in the tax being withdrawn, the premier noted that, “sometimes, it takes more hammering on the head before people start to actually understand. If that’s what it takes, that’s what we’ll do.”⁴⁵ In an August 1986 speech in Calgary, federal Energy Minister Marcel Masse stunned the oil industry, the provincial government, and many Albertans by stating that his government was “nowhere near” ending the PGRT. This came not only as a surprise to the Alberta government, but also as an embarrassment. Provincial Energy Minister Neil Webber had hinted heavily to Albertans that the reversal of the PGRT was a mere formality.⁴⁶ Furthermore, when the federal government discussed the possible repeal of the PGRT, it was suggested as a *quid pro quo* to the western provinces promising to reduce their oil royalties, something that was vehemently opposed by the Alberta government. However, the actual reversal of the PGRT came only in September, amidst fears about the federal Progressive Conservative Party’s electoral fortunes in an Alberta by-election.

The by-election in the Edmonton area riding of Pembina, scheduled for 29 September 1986, was necessitated when MP Peter Elzinga resigned his seat to run provincially for the Tories. Rogue MP Alex Kindy echoed Getty’s sentiments regarding increased western separatism and suggested that the premier was “practically inviting voters...to vote against the government in the Sept. 29 byelection.”⁴⁷ The federal government, realizing there was considerable likelihood of losing a seat that the Tories had won consecutively since its inception in 1968, eventually responded to the criticisms of Albertans and their government and agreed to dismantle the PGRT and not forcing the Alberta government to reduce its resource royalties.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Donald C. Wallace, “Ottawa and the Provinces,” 64.

⁴⁶ Peter McCormick, “Alberta,” in *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Administration- 1986*, ed. R.B. Byers (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 334-35. (pp. 326-337)

⁴⁷ Anon., “PM must wake up to West’s frustrations- MP,” *Edmonton Journal* (22 August 1986), A14.

Nevertheless, the federal Tories only managed to win the by-election by a mere 274 votes, after winning the riding two years earlier by over 34 000 votes.

The loyalty dilemma faced by the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party was accelerated considerably in 1987 following the formation of the populist and conservative Reform party. The new party was largely a western Canadian phenomenon, which alleged that the Progressive Conservative government showed favoritism towards Québec and lacked fiscal responsibility. Reform also opposed the Tories for their failure to support a program of Senate reform. The 1987 round of constitutional negotiations, known as the Meech Lake Accord, served as a catalyst for Reform's creation, as a considerable number of Western Canadians were opposed to the deal. The new federal party was, in many respects, a natural complement to the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party. In terms of populist outlook, pro-western viewpoint, and, to some degree, economic policy, the two parties operated in virtual lockstep. The loyalty of the Progressive Conservatives would increasingly become challenged by the presence of Reform. The upstart federal party fielded candidates in the 1988 federal election, though it failed to win any seats. It did, however, manage to obtain over 15% of the vote in Alberta, though at this point received little to no support from the Alberta PCs.

The issue of free trade dominated the election campaign of 1988- which was largely a single issue campaign-and provided the federal Progressive Conservatives with considerable support in western Canada, and particularly in Alberta. With considerable resentment over the CF-18 question, the *Official Languages Act* and a general perception that the federal Conservatives were "do[ing] too much for Québec," as well as the rise of the upstart, populist Reform, free trade proved to be a saving grace to the federal Tories in 1988.⁴⁸ According to

⁴⁸ Wardhaugh, "Brian Mulroney and the West," 238. An Angus Reid poll in autumn 1988 indicated that 71 per cent of those on the prairies felt that the Mulroney government had "done too much for Quebec."

Edmonton area Progressive Conservative MP David Kilgour, free trade saved the Conservatives because those tempted to vote Reform begrudgingly supported the Tories to ensure a Conservative victory and by extension the passage of the Free Trade Agreement. He noted, however, “next time...we won’t have the advantage of a mega-issue,” alluding to declining support of many Albertans for the federal party.⁴⁹ This declining support would also force the Alberta PCs into an intense loyalty dilemma.

Even prior to the Reform’s meteoric rise in the 1993 federal election, it presented a major obstacle for the Alberta Tories in the late 1980s. In addition to being a party of social and fiscal conservatism, the Progressive Conservatives, at least in Alberta, had been viewed as a regional party and the voice of western, or more specifically Albertan discontent. As Roger Gibbins noted, “by remaining grimly loyal to the Conservatives through a sustained period of Liberal dominance, Albertans were able to regionalize the Conservative party, and transform it into a vehicle for western discontent.”⁵⁰ However, Mulroney’s attempt to “bring Québec back in” by reforming Canada’s constitution saw him reach out to nationalist forces in Québec in an attempt to build a successful governing coalition. Of course, such action involved giving some perceived concessions to Québec. While this ultimately brought the Conservatives to power, elements of western discontent were increasingly muted and the party no longer championed a specific western perspective.

Events such as the Meech Lake Accord and the CF-18 dispute suggested to some Albertans that *their* party- and *their* federal government- were no longer in working in their best interests. Gibbins noted the irony of this situation, suggesting that “...Alberta MPs traded a

⁴⁹ Wardhaugh, “Brian Mulroney and the West,” 238.

⁵⁰ Gibbins, “Alberta and the National Community,” 78. Kilgour, along with fellow Alberta MP Alex Kindy, were later expelled from the PC caucus in October 1990 as a result of their protest over the government’s GST bill. Kindy would continue to sit as a Progressive Conservative MP, though outside of caucus, and later as an Independent, while Kilgour, whose sister was married to Liberal leader John Turner, would later sit as a Liberal.

regionalized national party for national office, but in so doing lost the capacity to express clearly a regional perspective on the national political stage. In effect, the Reform party today may have picked up the expressive torch of regional discontent that the Conservatives dropped in their successful bid for national power.”⁵¹ Although Reform was increasingly presenting a challenge to the hegemony of the Conservatives in Alberta, it still lacked both a voice in the House of Commons and adequate electoral machinery at the provincial level. The Progressive Conservatives, both federally and provincially, were put on the defensive and forced to respond to the growing challenge. With the provincial Tories worried about losing their hegemonic control over Albertan politics, intra-party relations became increasingly divisive.

For example, a significant point of departure between the provincial and federal Tories occurred in March 1989 during a federal by-election in the riding of Beaver River. The riding of Beaver River had a large Conservative base and was created prior to the election 1988. The new riding included a large part of Don Mazankowski’s former riding, and was won in the 1988 election by Conservative candidate John Dahmer. However, Dahmer died only five days after the election and was never sworn in. A by-election was held in March 1989 and was won by Reform candidate Deborah Grey, a local high school teacher. Grey won the election “with a broad alliance of anti-Tory voters” after finishing a distant fourth only five months earlier.⁵² Grey’s victory was due, in part, to the fact that free trade was now a *fait accompli* and no longer an issue. Quite simply, without free trade as a salient political issue, the Progressive Conservatives lost a considerable bargaining chip that they had previously held in Alberta. Intra-party conflict, as manifested in the by-election, occurred not because of what the provincial Tories did, but what they failed to do for the new Tory candidate in 1989. A local political

⁵¹ Gibbins, “Alberta and the National Community,” 78.

⁵² Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 30.

observer noted that “the provincial Tories could have done something to stop this...there was really no federal Tory because it was a new riding. But the provincials basically sat back and said ‘It’s Reform time.’”⁵³ Grey became the first Reform Member of Parliament in the House of Commons, and more importantly her victory represented only the second federal Conservative defeat in Alberta since 1968.⁵⁴

A second point of departure between the Alberta and federal Conservative parties occurred over the issue of Senate reform. Getty, upon taking over for Lougheed in late 1985, quickly became a firm believer in reforming Canada’s upper chamber. However, it was not until Mulroney’s second term that the Alberta government took the first step in a proposed scheme for Senate reformation. A bill was introduced in the Alberta legislature in February 1989 that, if passed, would allow the province’s voters to elect a Senate nominee to fill the province’s next open Senate appointment. The appointment of the ‘elected Senator’ would then need to be confirmed by the Prime Minister, who it was hoped would then rubber stamp the election and formally appoint the people’s choice. The bill, however, conflicted with the Meech Lake Accord proposal, which only allowed the provincial government to submit a list of proposed names to the federal government to fill the Senate opening. The bill, if passed, compelled the Alberta government to send only one name- that of the people’s elected nominee.⁵⁵

The election, called for mid-October 1989, came shortly after a challenging election for the Alberta Conservatives. Although they won 59 of the 83 seats in the legislature, the Tories’ vote share dropped by over 7% and Getty lost his own Edmonton area riding, forcing him to run in a by-election in a safe seat in rural Alberta. The general anti-Tory mood in the province, and

⁵³ Quoted in Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 30.

⁵⁴ A single New Democrat, Ross Harvey, was elected in Edmonton East in 1988. Every Alberta MP elected in 1972, 1974, 1979, 1980 and 1984 was a Progressive Conservative.

⁵⁵ Wardhaugh, “Brian Mulroney and the West,” 239.

limited interest in the Senatorial election itself, had many observers predicting negative ramifications for Bert Brown, the Conservative candidate in the Senatorial election.⁵⁶ While the observers were correct in asserting that negative ramifications were in store for Brown, their belief of a lack of interest in the Senatorial election was unfounded. A total of 641, 519 votes were cast in the election, approximately 200 000 less than the number cast in the previous provincial election.⁵⁷ The election was won by a Reform candidate, Stan Waters, a former Lieutenant-General and Commander of the Canadian Forces Mobile Command and “a true right-winger.”⁵⁸ Waters won the election by a significant margin, gaining 41.7% of the total ballots cast, a significant number more than Liberal Bill Code (22.5%) and Conservative Brown (20.5%). Illustrative of the anti-Tory mode, the Progressive Conservative candidate was even out-pollled by the Liberal candidate, a rarity in Alberta. As Braid and Sharpe have noted, “the election proved that Albertans were disgusted with Tories, both federal and provincial.”⁵⁹ Much like the Beaver River by-election, Getty was barely visible throughout the election campaign. When he did speak publicly regarding the election, his comments were directed toward the symbolic and important nature of electing a Senator rather than toward garnering support for the Conservative candidate, suggesting the use of a norm-breaking voice. While Getty and his cabinet stopped well-short of formally endorsing the Reform candidate, they nevertheless remained more aloof throughout the campaign than many Tories would have preferred.

By all accounts, the Senatorial election was an embarrassing event for both provincial and federal Tories. However, the event also highlighted the divisions and uneasiness within the broader conservative movement and is illustrative of intra-party conflict. The Reform victory

⁵⁶ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 171.

⁵⁷ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 171. The Senatorial election was also held on the same day as Alberta's municipal elections.

⁵⁸ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 31.

⁵⁹ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 172.

placed Premier Getty in an awkward position in that he was forced to demand that the Prime Minister appoint Waters to the Senate, despite the fact that he had recently defeated the Progressive Conservative's own candidate. The *Edmonton Journal's* provincial affairs columnist rhetorically asked "...who has more egg on his face- Brian Mulroney or Don Getty?" and continued that "[the election] ended with a sharp repudiation of the Conservative governments in both Ottawa and Edmonton."⁶⁰ Waters' victory also caused uneasy feelings between the two wings of the Progressive Conservative Party, with many federal Tories believing that Getty was trying to embarrass them and many provincial Tories believing that Mulroney was "rubbing their noses in the defeat by delaying the appointment."⁶¹ The Senatorial election, despite illustrating a sense of Alberta's populism and entrenching their demands for a reformed Senate, proved to be a divisive point between the Alberta and federal Progressive Conservative Parties. Getty was reduced to suggesting that "the prime minister ought to be guided by the Senate election," knowing full well that Mulroney was under no obligation to appoint Waters.⁶²

A third point of departure between the federal and provincial wings occurred over the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), designed to replace the outdated 13.5% Manufacturers Sales Tax (MST)- an indirect tax paid by manufacturing sector. Following the adoption of Free Trade with the United States- an issue that Mulroney and Getty were in virtual lockstep on- the MST hindered the manufacturing sector's international competitiveness and discriminated against domestic manufacturers. Thus, the passage of the Free Trade Agreement necessitated the repeal of the MST. Although all ten provincial governments were opposed to

⁶⁰ Mark Lisac, "Senate election results leave Conservatives looking clumsy," *Edmonton Journal* (17 October 1989), B5.

⁶¹ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 31.

⁶² Anon., "Mulroney insists he's not bound by Alberta's vote," *Edmonton Journal* (17 October 1989), B5.

the tax, the very concept of a sales tax was anathema to Alberta, as it was the only province in the federation which had not already imposed a sales tax at the provincial level. After the provinces rejected the concept of introducing a joint sales tax, the federal government announced its plans to implement the GST unilaterally, drawing significant criticism from Getty and the other nine premiers.⁶³ The Alberta government essentially refused to be a part of the talks, stating that “you [Mulroney] do not have to leave the door open to Alberta. We are not coming in.”⁶⁴

The GST was dismissed by Getty as a “damaging and unacceptable” tax, while Alberta Treasurer Dick Johnston added “if they want to force [the GST] through, they’ll have to pay the consequences.”⁶⁵ The opposition to the GST was shared by all ten premiers representing all political stripes, but nevertheless illustrates that provincial Progressive Conservative parties such as Alberta’s were more than willing to employ a norm-breaking voice and oppose their federal counterparts on a major issue and align themselves with their provincial governments in other provinces representing opposing parties. The Alberta government and other provincial Conservative governments could have come to the aid of the Mulroney government and offered their support of the GST, but gained little benefit in doing so. Accountable only to their provincial constituents and faced with the likelihood of losing support in the event they backed the GST proposal, the Alberta Tories aligned themselves with territorial based interests and proceeded to employ a norm-breaking voice in their dispute over the GST. The *Edmonton*

⁶³ Michael Howlett, “Ottawa and the Provinces,” in *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Administration-1989*, ed. David Leyton-Brown (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 61. (pp. 54-67)

⁶⁴ Norm Ovenden, “Getty launches attack on GST,” *Edmonton Journal* (10 November 1989) A3.

⁶⁵ Norm Ovenden, “Getty launches attack on GST”

Journal correctly remarked that "...the provincial and federal Tory governments are heading for divorce court over Ottawa's unpopular goods and services tax."⁶⁶

The imposition of an unpopular consumption tax, the defeat of Conservative candidates in the March 1989 by-election and the October 1989 Senate election- as well as Getty's own defeat earlier that year- prevented the Progressive Conservative Party, federal or provincial, from gaining any real momentum in Alberta. Needless to say, 1989 was not a good year for the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party or intra-party relations more generally. As Peter McCormick remarked, "the label for 1989 is 'the Conservatives in decline,' highlighted by election disappointments in March and October, by disputes between the federal and provincial parties...and by growing dissatisfaction with the leadership of Premier Don Getty."⁶⁷ Conversely the victories by the Reform the by-election and the Senatorial election- as well as their overt opposition to the GST- began to shift the pendulum of power in Alberta and gave a significant boost to the upstart populist party. Of the Senate election, Reform leader Preston Manning remarked that "We...were sending messages to Ottawa and messages to Edmonton," while Senator-elect Waters added that "...this is sending a message to the premier but it's not a message that will kill him or be fatal to the PCs...It may be a message that will allow him to take some action that will improve his position in the province."⁶⁸ The message being sent to the provincial Tories was a reminder of the increasingly popularity of Reform and the subsequent standstill or decrease of Tory support. Quite simply, Reform was making their presence felt and attempted to use their newfound popularity to exert influence on Getty's struggling government.

⁶⁶ Norm Ovenden, "GST causes bitter family feud among federal, provincial Tories," *Edmonton Journal* (9 December 1989), A1.

⁶⁷ Peter McCormick, "Alberta," 217-18.

⁶⁸ Richard Helm, "Stan the man stands tall," *Edmonton Journal* (17 October 1989), B5.

The popularity of Reform increased so much so that the party began to ponder if it should begin to run candidates provincially and struck a task force to this effect. The task force became known tongue-in-cheek as “The Task Force to Scare the Hell Out of Don Getty” and included a number of former Tories. Reform did not hide the fact that they were attempting to influence the provincial Tories; Manning openly remarked “if you ask whether the creation of this task force is designed to exert pressure on the provincial Conservative party for constructive change, the frank answer is yes.”⁶⁹ In fact, Manning began to mail his party’s literature and resolutions to the provincial Tory MLAs to illustrate exactly what his party stood for (and by extension highlight what the federal Tories were not standing for). In the end Reform decided not to run candidates provincially, but their willingness to stay on the sidelines came at a price.⁷⁰ Reform demanded that the provincial Tories remove Getty as their leader and balance their provincial budget, and many provincial Tories listened. As Braid and Sharpe remarked, “they had no choice, since many of their own MLAs agreed with nearly everything the Reform Party said.”⁷¹ The Alberta Progressive Conservatives quickly agreed to one of Reform’s demands, adopting Reform’s balanced budget resolution in time for the 1991-1992 fiscal year.

The same year “the Alberta Conservatives eliminated from their constitution largely symbolic clauses committing the party to support both the candidates and the objectives of the federal wing.”⁷² Although the clause was, as Stewart and Stewart rightfully point out, symbolic, the very fact that the provincial Tories were willing to remove it from their constitution illustrates a movement away from a norm-breaking voice and coalescence around an exit

⁶⁹ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 32-33.

⁷⁰ Dyck notes that the likelihood of Reform running provincially decline significantly after the Alberta Tories began to adopt many of Reform’s policies. However, he also notes that the lack of financial resources and Manning’s unwillingness to share the power with provincial equals also decreased the likelihood of Reform entering the political arena. See Dyck, “Federalism and Political Parties,” 56.

⁷¹ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 32.

⁷² Stewart and Stewart, “Fission and Federalism,” 108.

strategy, as the provincial wing quickly began to disavow itself from the federal party and remove all ties- even symbolic ones- to the federal wing. In essence, all that was shared between the two wings was a common name. Removing these ties between federal and provincial wings had the dual effect of making federal Reformers feel more at home in the provincial P.C. Party and ensuring that Reform would be less likely to make inroads provincially.⁷³

The Alberta premier, furthermore, seemed to indicate openness to Reform. When his Municipal Affairs Minister Ray Speaker, a former Social Credit MLA, quit his seat in the legislative assembly to run federally for Reform in the 1993 election, Getty remarked that “I don’t consider it defecting to the enemy.” The *Toronto Star* rhetorically asked “So if Getty’s enemy on the federal scene isn’t Manning, who is? Tory Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.”⁷⁴ By the start of 1993, the Alberta Progressive Conservative had replaced Don Getty and elected a new leader in Ralph Klein. Furthermore the Alberta PCs responded to the rise of Reform by severing any remaining formal links to the federal Progressive Conservative Party.⁷⁵ Meanwhile at the federal level, the Progressive Conservatives’ second term in office was quickly coming to an end. The upcoming 1993 federal election would continue to alter intra-party relations within the Progressive Conservative Party.

This chapter has illustrated that intra-party politics play an increasingly important role during times in which both the federal and provincial governments are governed by the same political party. Such a situation forces each side to be cognizant of the other and their own electoral interests, which are occasionally the same. At the very least, both federal and provincial governments are often supported by the same people, and an overt attack by one wing of the party against another jeopardizes the success of both. It is thus undoubtedly easier to

⁷³ The first reason is borrowed from Stewart and Stewart, “Fission and Federalism,” 112.

⁷⁴ Anon., “Darts and Laurels,” *Toronto Star* (9 January 1992), A16.

⁷⁵ Archer, “Voting Behaviour and Political Dominance in Alberta, 1971-1991,” 133.

govern at the provincial level when the federal government is formed by a different party. Not only are provincial politicians free to say virtually whatever they will regarding the federal government, any decrease in support for the federal party will likely translate into an increase for the provincial party's federal cousins.

However, the same cannot be said when both party wings govern simultaneously. In the event that a divisive situation arises, provincial leaders are placed in a loyalty dilemma whereby they are pulled between territorial concerns and larger partisan concerns. This situation forces the provincial leader to tread with considerable caution. Some have suggested that this fact was lost on Getty. For example, Braid and Sharpe argued that "[The 1989 Alberta provincial election] campaign featured far more Ottawa-bashing, in fact, than any conducted by Lougheed during the height of the great western wars with Trudeau. Lougheed's immensely successful tactic was to set up a strong anti-Ottawa climate, and then rarely mention the federal government during his campaign...Getty never seemed to grasp this basic truth about successful Ottawa-bashing in Alberta, and, remarkably, he was opposing the federal leader of his own party."⁷⁶

This chapter has also indicated the challenges posed to intra-party relations when a new party is formed at one level, in this case federally, whose ideological leanings are more in-line with the provincial wings of a competing party. Such a situation greatly complicates the loyalty dilemma faced by the provincial leadership. The rise of Reform in the late 1980s is a telling example of this phenomenon as its growth posed a significant threat to the already tenuous relationship between the federal and Alberta Progressive Conservative Parties. While Reform's rise in the 1990s will be analyzed in greater detail in the next chapter, the Alberta Tories had already abandoned the federal wing of the Progressive Conservative party by the 1993 election, thereby severing any official ties with their federal cousins. In regards to the loyalty dilemma

⁷⁶ Braid and Sharpe, *Breakup*, 92.

faced by the Alberta Tories, they ultimately responded by exiting the alliance. This illustrates that ideological, territorial, and pragmatic concerns carried significantly more weight than partisan concerns.

"This dream of PCs and Reformers working together is going to become a reality, and a nightmare for the Liberals."¹ Stockwell Day

New Challenges: Reform, the Canadian Alliance, and 'Unite the Right'

Introduction

The federal election that took place on 25 October 1993 to establish the 35th Parliament of Canada represented a defining moment in Canadian political history. Indeed, this watershed election saw two of Canada's traditional political parties- the New Democratic Party and the Progressive Conservative Party- fail to win enough seats to maintain official party status. On the other hand, two relatively new parties- the Bloc Québécois and Reform- won the second and third most seats in the Commons respectively, trailing only the newly elected Liberal government. The results of this election led to the realignment of Canadian party politics and fundamentally altered the political landscape in Canada. Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson have noted that "The 1993 federal election marked an historic shake-up of traditional party politics in Canada,"² while R.K. Carty, William Cross, and Lisa Young have remarked that "One of the greatest democratic electoral earthquakes ever recorded hit Canada in 1993."³ Politicians, academics, journalists, pundits, and voters alike have generally come to a consensus that the 1993 election had significant effects on Canadian party politics, with some suggesting that the election ushered in the new creation of a new fourth-party system.⁴

Although a great deal of attention has been given to this election for its effects on federal party politics in Canada, there has been a significant lack of attention on the effects that this election has had on intra-party federalism in Canada, that being the relationship between federal and provincial political parties of the same partisan affiliation. Indeed, the collapse of two

¹ Clare Hoy, *Stockwell Day: His Life and Politics* (Toronto: Stoddart, 2000), 116.

² Brodie and Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen," 33.

³ Carty, William Cross, and Lisa Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*, 12.

⁴ Carty, Cross, and Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*, see especially ch. 10.

federal parties with longstanding provincial wings and the rise of two new parties without formal provincial wings complicated the sphere of intra-party relationships. With certain exceptions, previous party systems provided for somewhat straightforward intra-party relationships. Generally speaking, the New Democratic Party represented the moderate left of the political spectrum at both the federal level and the provincial level, while the Progressive Conservative Party represented the moderate right at both the federal and provincial level. This left the Liberal Party to operate at the centre of the political spectrum, though it leaned to the left or right depending on the mood of the electorate and relative strength of its competitors.

While it must be stressed that this set of intra-party relationships did not always lead to cordiality between the federal parties and their provincial counterparts,⁵ the relationship between parties of the same partisan affiliation prior to 1993 was more straightforward than it was following the 1993 election. The provincial NDP would often align itself with the federal NDP, the provincial P.C. Party would often align itself with the federal P.C. Party, and the provincial Liberal party would often align itself with the federal Liberal Party, though perhaps less often than the others. Although these relationships varied in their degree of cohesiveness and support, it was rare for one party to actively campaign against its partisan counterpart at the other level of government or to actively campaign for a different party altogether.⁶ While the newly elected opposition Bloc Québécois aligned itself with the separatist Parti Québécois following the 1993 election, especially leading up to the 1995 referendum on Québec sovereignty, the system of intra-party relationships on the right of the political spectrum was complicated by the rise of the populist, right-wing Reform party.

⁵ See, for example, Edwin R. Black, "Federal Strains Within A Canadian Party" 120-30.

⁶ One clear example of the federal-provincial divide existed within the Liberal Party between Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Ontario Premier Mitch Hepburn. Hepburn supported Mackenzie King's opponent Arthur Meighan in a by-election in 1942, and had an overtly hostile relationship with King and the federal party throughout his premiership.

This chapter will explore intra-party relations within Canada's right-wing political parties throughout the fourth party system and determine what prompted the provincial parties to act in the manner they did. The fourth party system is characterized by the entry of two new parties, a regionalization of party politics, fragmentation of the electorate, greater diversity among parties, and democratization.⁷ Specific attention will be paid to the provinces of Ontario and Alberta, which, by 1995, both had strong Progressive Conservative provincial governments. Despite the fact that these two provincial parties carried the name of Progressive Conservative, their ideological composition and policies were more in-line with the ideology and policies advocated by Reform (and later the Canadian Alliance) than they were with the ideology and policies advocated by the federal Progressive Conservative Party. The federal PCs, though still right-wing, were decidedly more centrist, especially following the 1993 election, especially vis-à-vis Reform and their provincial cousins in Ontario and Alberta. This divergence placed the leadership of the provincial Progressive Conservative parties in a loyalty dilemma.

As opposed to many past instances of intra-party conflict which have been a result of territorial or jurisdictional concerns, the dilemma faced by the provincial leadership in Ontario and Alberta was related to ideological outlook more so than provincial interests. Nevertheless, the provincial party needed to ensure that its provincial interest allowed for a norm-breaking voice before such a course of action could be taken. Quite simply, the natural ideological ally of the Ontario and Alberta Tories was Reform and later the Canadian Alliance, while their traditional partisan ally was the federal Progressive Conservative Party. When faced with this loyalty dilemma, the provincial parties placed ideology ahead of partisanship, aligning themselves, in varying degrees, with Reform and the Canadian Alliance. Furthermore, the provincial leadership was generally supportive of Preston Manning's 'United Alternative'

⁷ Carty, Cross, and Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*, 218-26.

initiative, which sought to unite Reform and the federal Progressive Conservatives into a unified party capable of challenging the governing Liberals. As Rand Dyck has pointed out "[Reform's] ideological appeal was so great that most provincial Conservative parties- especially in Alberta and Ontario- began to appropriate Reform party policies, so that Manning's party could influence policy without even contesting provincial elections."⁸ Support was given to Reform, the Alliance, and later a 'united right,' in varying degrees, by both Alberta and Ontario provincial wings, despite the fact that the federal Progressive Conservative leadership was opposed to such unification.

The analysis of intra-party relations in the fourth-party system does not begin until after the 1997 federal election that returned the Liberal Party to office for a second term, albeit with a significantly reduced majority. Although there were some relationships between Reform and the provincial parties between 1993 and 1997, the potentially divisive nature of intra-party federalism became apparent only after the Liberals were returned with another majority government and Canada's right-wing parties remained fragmented and powerless. This fragmentation forced many on the right of Canada's political spectrum, including the Progressive Conservative provincial governments of both Alberta and Ontario, to rethink their party structure.

In the 1997 election, Reform replaced the Bloc Québécois as the official opposition, though it had nowhere near the number of seats and percentage of support to challenge the Liberal Party and form the government. Additionally, the Progressive Conservative Party, after winning only two seats in the 1993 election, won 20 seats in 1997 and saw a marginal increase in its popular support. Of consequence to both Reform and the Progressive Conservatives was the fact that the Liberal Party won 101 of Ontario's 103 seats, despite failing to win even a majority

⁸ Dyck, "Federalism and Political Parties," 56.

of support in the province. It became apparent to many observers that a fractured right-wing could not garner the support necessary to unseat the Liberals. Many saw vote splitting as a major hurdle and perceived that the Liberals were benefiting from right-wing voters dividing their vote between the Reform and the Progressive Conservatives. In light of this, Reform leader Preston Manning launched the United Alternative or 'Unite the Right' initiative. It is at this time that intra-party federalism was pushed to the forefront and provincial leaders were placed in a loyalty dilemma.

The emergence of a loyalty dilemma

For Preston Manning, a divided right-wing at the federal level served only the interests of the governing Liberal Party and offered no real hope of providing a credible right-wing alternative to the public, one capable of unseating the Liberals and forming the government. To rectify this situation, Preston Manning and others within the ranks of Reform sought the creation of a new alternative based on the principles of fiscal responsibility, social responsibility, democratic accountability, and reforming federalism.⁹ With the federal Progressive Conservative in considerable debt, the desired course of action was not to take over the PC Party or even to merge with it, but "...to attract supporters and activists from other political groups, particularly at the provincial level, who are also committed to these principles."¹⁰ Among these desired provincial groups were supporters of the Mike Harris Tories in Ontario, the Ralph Klein Tories in Alberta, and the Gary Filmon Tories in Manitoba, as well as supporters of other various right-wing parties in the other provinces. As Reform had no formal provincial parties to rely on support from, it naturally sought to attract the support of Progressive Conservative voters in the

⁹ Carty, Cross, and Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics* 56.

¹⁰ Quoted in Carty, Cross, and Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics* 56.

provinces.¹¹ The active seeking of provincial support from various provincial wings of the Progressive Conservative Party on the part of the United Alternative placed the leadership of these provincial wings in a loyalty dilemma, forcing them to either remain loyal to the federal party or remain loyal to their neo-liberal ideology, thereby exiting their formal relationship and transferring their loyalty to a new party.

The most strategic direction for Manning to follow was to target the province in which a united right-wing party needed to expand the most. Such a strategy required the United Alternative to gain significant support from those who voted for the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, as well as required support for the party's leadership and its rank-and-file members. The pressing need to expand into Ontario is evidenced by the fact that voters in Alberta elected 24 of a possible 26 Reform candidates in 1997, whereas no Reform candidates were elected in any of Ontario's 103 seats in the same election. This fact was not lost on Manning, who believed that "It's important to get people who believe the same things, particularly on the fiscal conservative positions- Mr. Klein and Mr. Harris and others- to talk together to see if there is some alternative."¹²

Whereas Klein was supportive of right-wing unification from the beginning, suggesting that a loyalty dilemma placed few constraints on his course of action, he quickly clarified that he "[wouldn't] be down there to lead the Conservative party into that reunification of the right."¹³ Reform was the most popular choice at the federal level in Alberta (with the Progressive Conservatives significantly less popular), thus making it easier for Klein to openly support the United Alternative, employ an exit strategy, abandoning the federal Progressive Conservative

¹¹ The Reform Party of British Columbia was created in the early 1980s and registered in 1983. However, there was no formal association between the two parties, although there was some overlap in support. The Reform Party of B.C. ran candidates in provincial elections in 1991 (0.18% of vote), 1996 (9.27% of vote) and 2001 (0.22% of vote).

¹² Darcy Henton and Tim Harper, "Klein supports reunification of right," *Toronto Star* (11 March 1998), A6.

¹³ Darcy Henton and Tim Harper, "Klein supports reunification of right"

Party in the process. By this point Klein had already rescinded his membership in the federal Progressive Conservative Party, seeing an association with the federal party as providing few, if any, benefits to the provincial party. In this respect, Klein had already, to a large degree, proceeded on an exit strategy from the federal party. Harris, in contrast, never directly supported Manning's initiative, although he did not impose public neutrality on his cabinet and a number of high-profile Ontario ministers came out in support of the United Alternative. As such, Harris' original response to the loyalty dilemma was to proceed with a norm-based voice, though he was unwilling to force that strategy upon his cabinet.

Data collected from the 1997 Canadian Election Study indicated that the United Alternative faced a significant obstacle in gaining the support of the target voters who supported the Ontario Conservatives. While 59% of those who voted for the Alberta PC Party indicated Reform was their first choice at the federal level, only 27% of those who voted for the Ontario PC Party identified Reform as their first choice at the federal level. This number was in fact equal to the percentage of Ontario PC voters who indicated the Reform was "too extreme" for their liking (compared with only 9% of Alberta PC voters).¹⁴ Clearly, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of Ontario PC voters represented a definite obstacle for supporters of the United Alternative. At the same time, these data suggested that the Ontario Tories were placed in a more pressing loyalty dilemma as there were certain risks in appearing too closely aligned with the UA, whereas the Alberta Tories faced few risks in openly supporting the UA. As such, the analysis of intra-party federalism from the perspective of the Ontario Tories receives significantly more attention in this chapter than does intra-party federalism from the perspective of the Alberta Tories.

¹⁴ Data calculated from the 1997 Canadian Election Survey, quoted in Carty, Cross, and Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*, 58.

The emergence of the 'United Alternative'

To facilitate the creation of the United Alternative, Reform's leadership scheduled a party convention for the last weekend of May 1998, and selected London, Ontario as the location. A city in Ontario was selected largely based on its likelihood of garnering both media attention and public support in Canada's most populous province. The first resolution slated to be heard at the convention specifically called for the formal creation of a 'United Alternative' to the Liberal government. While Premier Harris remained neutral in the 1998 federal Progressive Conservative leadership race and refused to formally support Reform or the creation of a United Alternative, he noted that "As long as there is a divided centre-right, it allows people like (Finance Minister Paul) Martin to rip off Ontario's workers with almost immunity...We need a strong opposition to present an alternative to massive over-taxation."¹⁵

Harris' suggestion of the need for an 'alternative' all but indicated his feelings on a united right, although he offered no direct endorsement to Manning's initiative and chose not to attend the Reform convention in London. This is evidence of Harris proceeding with a norm-based voice, though a robust defense of the federal party was noticeably absent, which is suggestive of an openness toward moving ahead with an eventual norm-breaking voice or exit. While he supported the idea of a united right, he claimed that he was too busy to become actively involved in the creation of a united right-wing, though the real reason lay deeper than that. However, a number of Harris' senior staff members attended the convention, along with senior cabinet ministers including John Snobelen and Tony Clement, who by this time had emerged as a key figure in the United Alternative movement. Of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, Reform MP and United Alternative supporter Jason Kenney maintained that "We see no reason

¹⁵ Tim Harper, "Reformers taking up dream of united right wing," *Toronto Star* (28 May 1998) A6.

why the Conservative party of Ontario should be the provincial wing of the federal PC party.”¹⁶ In the end, 80.9% of the almost 1 000 convention delegates voted to affirm the leadership of Manning- which on their part signified a willingness to support the United Alternative agenda. Furthermore, 97% of the Ontario delegates voted in favour of uniting the right, indicating that the convention was largely successful in building inroads with the targeted card carrying rank-and-file membership from Ontario.

Despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of Ontario's rank-and-file Reform membership was supportive of the United Alternative initiative, that same level of support needed to carry over to the non-partisan electorate. Support for a United Alternative from Ontario's Reformers was perfectly logical because it represented the most likely way of seeing more right-wing MPs elected in the province and the defeat of the Liberal government. However, many federal PCs were active in Ontario and also supportive of the provincial Tories. For Mike Harris, there was little incentive to be identified with a relatively unpopular party in Ontario that was often seen as 'too extreme' for many voters. While he may have agreed with Reform in principle, there were no political reasons to offer his own support to a party that could offer him nothing in return. A public declaration of support would only serve to alienate the federal PC voters that also supported the provincial Tories. In this instance, a norm-based approach was the most logical for Harris, as a norm-breaking voice and formal endorsement of the UA would have caused unnecessary conflict within the party. As Ian Urquhart observed, "There is good reason for provincial Tories to stay neutral as the federal party and Reform slug it out: Most of them have both Reformers and federal Conservatives active in their riding associations and they don't want to alienate either side."¹⁷ Notwithstanding the hesitant

¹⁶ Rosemary Speirs, "Merger spirit may turn into a marathon," *Toronto Star* (31 May 1998), A4.

¹⁷ Ian Urquhart, "Unite the right makes Ontario waves," *Toronto Star* (3 November 1998) A10.

openness to the United Alternative by Mike Harris, the movement continued to gain support throughout 1998, and an increasing number of prominent Ontario PCs came out in support of the UA. While Harris continued to remain officially neutral while suggesting he would prefer a united right, his cabinet played an active role in the promotion of a new party.

By late 1998, two additional developments in the movement to unite the right occurred. Former Prime Minister Joe Clark was elected to replace Jean Charest as the leader of the federal Progressive Conservative Party and a United Alternative convention was planned for February 1999 in Ottawa. For his part, Clark remained steadfastly opposed to any unite the right initiative, arguing that the electorate- especially in Ontario- preferred a more moderate party. Reformers, he argued, could come back to the Progressive Conservative Party, rather than focusing their efforts on building a united right-wing party.¹⁸ Clark also decided not to attend the February conference and refused any dialogue on a merger.

With a clear refusal to consider the United Alternative, the loyalty dilemma of many senior Ontario Tories was brought to the forefront and divisions within the party began to show. For example, Ontario Solicitor-General Bob Runciman, who claimed to have no ties to either of the federal parties, publicly criticized Clark for failing to even consider a merger with Reform, stating "To close down that option (of a merger) and say I'm going to put blinkers on and just forge ahead on my own, I think you'd find people who support the federal Tories would move away from (Clark)."¹⁹

What were noticeably absent from the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party were any strong endorsements of Joe Clark and the federal Progressive Conservative Party. Certainly no senior cabinet ministers in the Ontario government publicly opposed the United Alternative,

¹⁸ William Walker, "Is the drive to unite the right out in left field," *Toronto Star* (14 November 1998) A1, A29.

¹⁹ William Walker, "Merger conference worth Clark's time; Runciman," *Toronto Star* (12 November 1998) A6.

leaving only Tories from the Bill Davis era to oppose the merger. However, their opposition to a merger were hardly startling endorsements for the federal PCs *per se*, but rather, opposition to the 'extreme' elements of Reform. For example Sally Barnes, herself a lifelong Tory, stated "I find it so difficult to see the marriage idea as credible. I don't feel at home with the suitors...The Conservatives they're bringing in aren't my Conservatives...right now I look at the players and they're not the guys I want to have on my team."²⁰ A similar sentiment was echoed by another lifelong loyal Conservative, former Bill Davis era minister John Tory. Tory noted "I don't see a groundswell among Tories, in no small part because of suspicion about a conference sponsored by, organized by and with rules set by a party that decided how it could add to nation-building in the last election...That baggage rests with Preston Manning right now. They'll trot out some names (of Tories), but in terms of a groundswell of grassroots Conservatives, I'd say there isn't one."²¹ Again, such a statement was hardly the use of norm-based voice and an overwhelming endorsement of the federal party or Joe Clark, but rather, illustrated suspicion of the more extreme elements of Reform.

One Tory who was firmly in support of the United Alternative and was not hesitant to let his feelings be known was Ontario Transportation Minister Tony Clement. In addition to Runciman, Transportation Minister Tony Clement was a major architect of the United Alternative and played a prominent role in keeping Reform out of provincial politics. In fact, Clement was rumored to be among the prospective leaders of any formation of a new party. His support of the UA made him unpopular amongst some fellow Ontario Tories, though he maintained that there was no reason not to trust, and even embrace, Manning and Reform. In

²⁰ William Walker, "Can the right make might?" *Toronto Star* (13 February 1999) B1.

²¹ William Walker, "Can the right make might?"

contrast to Harris, Clement's strategy involved employing a norm-breaking voice and flirtation with an exit strategy.

Leading up to the February 1999 UA convention, Clement was appointed as one of the convention's co-chairs and worked hard on the ground to mobilize the grassroots support that John Tory felt was lacking. "Ontario is the problem," exclaimed Clement, adding "We are the frontline for where the Conservatives and the Reform did not get their act together, did not dominate one over the other, split the vote and allowed Liberals to take 98 percent of the seats. So we're going to be integrally involved in how the solution is arrived at."²² While these were certainly harsh words coming from an Ontario cabinet minister, there was an element of truth to them.

However, it must be asked why senior cabinet ministers such as Clement and Runciman would be supportive of the merger, while their party leader stated that he was too busy to get 'mixed up' in uniting the right. As has already been suggested, there was nothing directly that Reform could offer to Harris and the Ontario Tories in return for a public endorsement. Furthermore there was considerable risk for Mike Harris in publicly supporting the United Alternative and risking alienation from partisan federal PC supporters and other more moderate Ontario voters. This pragmatic approach was supported by Professor Nelson Wiseman, who stated "If I were advising Mike Harris, I'd say: 'Hey, shut up. Let things unfold.' If a United Alternative takes off, it can only help him. If it doesn't, then he has associated himself with an idea that's fallen flat on its face."²³ What, then, explained Clement and Runicman's support for the UA?

²² Daniel Girard, "Ontario: Fertile ground for right-wing merger," *Toronto Star* (13 February 1999) B5.

²³ Daniel Girard, "Ontario: Fertile ground for right-wing merger"

Much as Wiseman theorized above, the emergence of a united right-wing party capable of challenging the federal Liberal Party represented a potential benefit to Harris and the Ontario Tories. A 'United Alternative' would operate to the right of the governing Liberal Party, and would be in ideological lockstep with the Ontario Tories. The assumption made by the Ontario Tories and other UA supporters was that such a party was needed to break the Liberals' hold on Ontario at the federal level. The pressing nature of the United Alternative was not so much that unified right-wing party at the federal level would be a direct benefit to the Ontario Tories, though few within the upper ranks of the party would have argued against it, but rather that a divided right-wing and the continued existence of Reform could present some difficulties for the Ontario Tories to overcome at the provincial level. These difficulties would manifest themselves in the potential establishment and growth of Reform at the provincial level, especially in Ontario, which could have led to a parallel right-wing divide at Queen's Park. In that case, it would be increasingly difficult for the Ontario Tories to form a government as they would be plagued by a similar splitting of the vote that was occurring at the federal level. As such, the Ontario Tories needed to build popular support for a United Alternative at the federal level to protect their privileged position as a united right-wing party in Ontario. The support of leading cabinet ministers such as Runciman and Clement was required to build this level of support, but at the same time the party took the calculated risk that if the UA initiative failed, there would be less blowback from the general populace if the premier himself stayed out of the situation. The popular cabinet ministers could presumably maintain the support of the constituencies in their own ridings. As such, the decision to offer some support to the UA was largely based on pragmatic reasons, and not simply ideological reasons.

The Ontario Progressive Conservative Party was well aware that its so-called 'Reformatory' coalition could easily form the government largely because of the absence of a credible right-wing alternative. Clement played an important role in uniting the 'Reformatories' leading up to the 1995 provincial election by ensuring that Ontario Reform members would throw their support behind the Ontario PCs, instead of nominating, running, and supporting provincial Reform candidates. Furthermore, Klein strategist Rod Love delivered the keynote address at the Ontario PCs 1995 candidate school, and the Ontario PCs borrowed a great deal from the 'Klein Revolution' in Alberta of lower taxes, decreased government spending, and aggressive debt reduction.²⁴ Of course, Reformers were also attracted to the Tories overtly right-wing 'Common Sense Revolution,' which was largely in-line with the ideology and policies of the federal Reform. As Wiseman remarked at the time, "The right is united provincially, right now...If there's a provincial Reform party it would be devastating (to the Ontario Tories)."²⁵ The Ontario Progressive Conservative Party did not operate in a bubble. They had a clear understanding of the dynamics of party politics and electoral competition and sought to protect their privileged position on Ontario's political spectrum.

Despite pragmatic support for the United Alternative by some members of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, the supporters of the new party faced a significant obstacle in convincing voters of the merits of a united right-wing. Specifically, the social conservatism that formulated a significant portion of Reform's appeal in Western Canada had limited support in Ontario, and even less support in many urban areas. Although the economic platform of the Ontario's PCs was relatively consistent with that of Reform, the provincial party had no interest in commenting on divisive social issues, and indeed, sought to avoid taking a stance at all costs

²⁴ Don Martin, *King Ralph: The Political Life and Successes of Ralph Klein* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2002), 160.

²⁵ Daniel Girard, "Ontario: Fertile ground for right-wing merger"

as they remained outside the jurisdiction of the provincial government. As the economic policies of privatizing, deregulating, and lowering taxes held by both the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party and the federal Reform operated in relative lockstep, it is fair to conclude that the divergence in support between the two was largely in relation to their stance on social issues, as well as populist Western issues such as Senate reform and decentralized federalism, which carried little weight in Ontario. In fact, as previously noted, only 27% of those who voted for the Progressive Conservative Party at the provincial level in Ontario identified Reform as their first choice at the federal level, a number equal to the percentage of Ontario PC voters who indicated the Reform was "too extreme" for their liking.²⁶

In order for a united right-wing party at the federal level to make significant gains in Ontario that were needed to form government, the party would have to be pragmatic in its approach to social issues as to not alienate Ontario's libertarian voters, who sought less government involvement in both economic and social spheres. As David Laycock has noted, "fiscal conservatives who are not religious fundamentalists are likely to behave as rational-choice theory would predict...To keep Ontario's fiscal conservatives happy, Mike Harris has prudently gone nowhere near the distance down this [socially conservative] road that many high-profile voices in Reform and Alliance have."²⁷

Ralph Klein, the Progressive Conservative premier of Alberta and an ardent supporter of the United Alternative, noted the dichotomy that existed between social and fiscal conservatism. Despite governing the relatively socially conservative province of Alberta, Klein championed a libertarian philosophy that sought to limit government involvement in all facets of life,

²⁶ Data calculated from the 1997 Canadian Election Survey, quoted in Carty, Cross, and Young, *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*, 58.

²⁷ David Laycock, *The New Right and Democracy in Canada: Understanding Reform and the Canadian Alliance* (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 2002), 170.

contrasting this approach with social conservatives who sought to regulate activity in the private sphere. Klein also recognized that a policy of social conservatism would have little appeal in Ontario, the area that a united right-wing sought to overtake. He explained to the UA convention that "we cannot, as those who adhere to a conservative philosophy, declare ourselves to be the party of minimum interference in the every day lives of everyday Canadians and then propose to interfere in the most personal of all decisions."²⁸ Klein suggested that it was hypocritical- and electorally dangerous- for a united right-wing to run on a socially-conservative platform and was seen by many as a credible supporter of Reform who could bring together both fiscal and social conservatives, as he did successfully did in Alberta. He continued that "I have found that, rather than dictate that these [socially conservative] issues become a matter of party of government policy, these questions are best left to the internal moral compass found within every Canadian."²⁹ Furthermore, the Alberta premier also suggested that the United Alternative recognize Québec's unique character. Clare Hoy has remarked that if the new party was to heed Klein's advice on Québec's distinct character, same-sex marriage, and reproductive rights, it "would pretty well make [the UA] another Liberal Party."³⁰ Of course, since the Liberal Party won 101 of Ontario's 103 seats with 49.5% of the vote in 1997, appealing to the centre and appearing more 'liberal' may have been a strategic advantage in attempting to gain support in Ontario.

Uniting the Right

At the United Alternative February 1999 convention- attended by three Ontario cabinet ministers, eight Ontario backbenchers, a number of Alberta MLAs- delegates voted in favour of creating a new party. 665 of the conventions 1,216 delegates indicated that such action was their

²⁸ "Klein warns conservatives of Reform-style excesses," *The Globe and Mail* (20 February 1999) A11.

²⁹ "Klein warns conservatives of Reform-style excesses"

³⁰ Clare Hoy, *Stockwell Day*, 113.

preferred choice, while another 296 delegates indicated it to be their second choice. The convention signaled, according to Preston Manning and other UA supporters, the creation of "a new party for a new century," though federal PC leader Joe Clark maintained that he had "...no interest in a proposal that would involve the winding down of the Conservative party."³¹ While the grassroots of Canada's right-wing party had indicated a willingness to create a new party, the 59% first-choice support for a new party was hardly an overwhelming majority. Indeed, a united right-wing capable of defeating the federal Liberals had a long way to go. Convention co-chair and Ontario cabinet minister Tony Clement suggested that Tories should take the convention results back to their constituencies and discussed them, adding that "perhaps resolution [can be] reached."³²

Although many within the Ontario Progressive Conservative party had no real affinity for their federal cousins, preferring instead to create a new right-wing party, the relationship between the Ontario PCs and Reform was certainly not integrated. As Rosemary Speirs suggested, "For many Ontario Tories anxious to end the vote-split, this whole exercise is about getting rid of Manning, whom they regard as unsaleable outside the West."³³ In addition to the social conservatism of Reform, their populist leader was also identified as problematic and potentially expendable. This sentiment was echoed by Bob Dechert, the leader of a group of right-wing Progressive Conservatives and a supporter of the United Alternative. Dechert suggested that Manning "has got some problems" and is "...going to have to work hard to sell himself [in Ontario]."³⁴ These critics wasted little time, making these statements on the same day as the United Alternative convention itself. Again, the federal-provincial intra-party

³¹ Edison Stewart and Tim Harper, "Unite the right votes for new party," *Toronto Star* (22 February 1999), A1.

³² Tim Harper, "New party not a done deal," *Toronto Star* (22 February 1999), A6.

³³ Rosemary Speirs, "Odd coalition seeks power and the glory," *Toronto Star* (22 February 1999), A6.

³⁴ Brian Laghi, "Manning seen as handicap to Ontario win" *The Globe and Mail* (22 February 1999), A10.

relationship was guided by pragmatism. However, the Ontario PCs faced no real loyalty dilemma when criticizing the federal Reform, which made the criticism easier.

The divisiveness with Canada's right-wing parties over the United Alternative was not limited to the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party. The Nova Scotia PC Youth Association voted to strip its president and two others of their membership for attending the UA convention. Clement called on the remaining Nova Scotia PC Youth executive to reverse its decision, suggesting that it was wrong to oust the three, arguing "Anyone who thinks the best way to advance political discussion...is to purge people is just plain silly. I mean, Lenin used to purge people." Manning added that the expulsions were "ill-advised."³⁵ While it is rare for a national leader and a senior provincial cabinet minister to publicly chastise another province's youth wing, the tension surrounding the UA is illustrative of the divisiveness of intra-party relations.

After the affirmation by the rank-and-file membership to create a new, united right-wing party, many within the party sought the help of the relatively popular Ontario Progressive Conservative organization. A mobilization on the part of the Ontario PCs to employ either a norm-breaking voice or exit strategy and aggressively support the United Alternative/Reform ultimately spelled the end of amicable relations with the federal Progressive Conservative Party, and potentially the end of federal Progressive Conservative Party as a whole. Party organizer and strategist Tom Long, often credited with orchestrating the Ontario PC victory in 1995, stated that "I just didn't feel comfortable any longer sitting on the sidelines," and announced that he would contribute his services to the United Alternative cause.³⁶ Clement felt that many of the Ontario Progressive Conservatives' rank-and-file membership would soon follow suite. Meanwhile, similar to the pressure put on Ralph Klein in 1998 to seek the leadership of the

³⁵ Edison Stewart and Tim Harper, "Clark adviser eyes right-wing cease fire," *Toronto Star* (2 March 1999), A6.

³⁶ William Walker and Caroline Mallan, "Harris strategist tries alternative," *Toronto Star* (23 July 1999), A6.

United Alternative, Mike Harris was facing an increasing number of calls to play a leading role in, or even to lead, the united right, increasing the severity of his loyalty dilemma. "Only Mike Harris can make the UA fly...The UA needs a leader who plausibly brings the two sides [social and fiscal conservatives] together," stated an anonymous Alberta strategist, while Alberta strategist Rod Love added "If Mike Harris wants to help us with his skill or his good offices on the central problem we face, his intervention would be welcome."³⁷

Harris, for his part, maintained that he had the best political job in Canada and had little desire to leave his position as Ontario's premier. However, he remained worried about the vote-splitting between the two right-wing parties, suggesting at the very least implicit support for the United Alternative and a move toward norm-breaking voice. Glen Wright, one of Harris' senior strategists, maintained that "...it would be fair to say that Mike Harris as a leader of a provincial Conservative party is concerned about (federal vote splitting by Reform and the Tories), but that's all."³⁸ What was, however, absent from Harris' public statements was a rousing defense of the federal Progressive Conservative Party. In fact, the Premier maintained that he was not officially tied to any federal party, indicating that he was no longer a card-carrying member of the federal Conservatives, and thus had personally exited from the federal party.³⁹ Such a statement had the potential to send a clear message to Ontario Tories, and at the same dealing a significant blow to the federal party.

The federal PCs fight back

Meanwhile at the federal level, Joe Clark publicly questioned the commitment, or lack thereof, of his leading provincial cousins in Alberta and Ontario. Leading up to the federal

³⁷ William Walker and Tim Harper, "Activists want Harris to do the 'right' thing," *Toronto Star* (24 September 1999), A6.

³⁸ William Walker and Tim Harper, "Activists want Harris to do the 'right' thing"

³⁹ Theresa Boyle, "Harris rejects calls to run federally," *Toronto Star* (5 October 1999), A6.

Progressive Conservative convention in October 1999, Clark, in a speech delivered at Toronto's Canada Club, made reference to his ambivalence toward both Klein and Harris and joked about their relationship to the United Alternative, stating that they were similar to "some kind of Moses who would come and led us all to salvation." Clark indicted that he saw little hope for the United Alternative and that his provincial cousins could not be the 'savior' that the party needed, adding "Sometimes it's Mike Moses. Sometime it's Ralph Moses. But most often, if I may say so, it's 'Moses Who?'"⁴⁰ Publicly at least, Clark put on a brave face and suggested that the new party did not offer a credible alternative to the Liberals and that calls for a right-wing merger were of little concern to him. The real split, he argued, was between moderate and extremist Reformers, and felt that the moderate Reformers would be much more at home with the Progressive Conservative Party. Nevertheless, the lack of support for the federal party coming from their strongest provincial wings should have indicated to Clark that their loyalty to him, his party, and the prevailing ideology within the party was in doubt.

Despite their general support for the United Alternative, some Ontario MPPs and cabinet ministers, including Tony Clement, attended the federal Progressive Conservative convention in Ontario. However, their support for the UA remained and "nothing ha[d] changed" according to UA committee member Peter White. Frustration among rank-and-file PCs was also high. Lynne Beyak, a grassroots member from Ontario and UA supporter, remarked of the PCs unwillingness to entertain a merger, "Isn't it a shame? The Liberals must be gleeful."⁴¹ For Beyak, and many other rank-and-file members, the real power rested with Harris, Klein, and the UA leadership. "I just hope the real power of the PC party isn't with Joe Clark anymore," she exclaimed, and continued that "The entire existing PC party was in that (convention centre) room. But many of

⁴⁰ William Walker, "Clark wants to lead Tories out of political wilderness," *Toronto Star* (30 September 1999), A6.

⁴¹ William Walker, "Clark can't claim victory, critics say," *Toronto Star* (4 October 1999), A6.

the real Conservatives, like (Premier Mike Harris' strategist) Tom Long and (Alberta Premier) Ralph Klein are with the UA."⁴² As such, a distinction was drawn between so-called *real* conservatives aligned with the UA camp and those conservatives who remained loyal to the Progressive Conservative Party.

For their part, the federal Progressive Conservatives elected Peter Van Loan, a former two-time president of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, as their new party president. Van Loan's strategy further emphasized the importance of the Ontario electorate, and specifically those who voted for the Harris Conservatives, to the federal party and to the right-wing as a whole. While there has always been some distinction between the will of the electorate at the federal and provincial level,⁴³ the federal Tories decided to increasingly cater their strategy to the Ontario electorate- and specifically Ontario's PC voters at the federal level- by replicating in some respects the fiscal conservatism of Mike Harris. As Van Loan suggested, "...Mr. Clark has made it clear that he'd like to see some tax relief, he'd like to see us focus on balancing the budgets...These are things that are very consistent with the Conservatives in Ontario and certainly with the policies that the Ontario government has had."⁴⁴ By emulating the Ontario Tories, the federal party was attempting to consolidate their support on the political right, while at the same time seeking to limit the growth of Reform or a new right-wing party in vote rich Ontario.

While the federal Tories were seeking to emulate the policies of the Ontario government, Preston Manning was boasting that his party had always maintained these same principles, adding that the federal government needed a good dose of common sense. Of Ontario's 'Common Sense Revolution,' Manning stated "It is a positive and constructive force that

⁴² William Walker, "Clark wants to lead Tories out of political wilderness"

⁴³ See, for example, K.L. Morrison, "The Businessman Voter in Thunder Day," 219-31.

⁴⁴ Caroline Mallan, "Federal PCs eye Harris-type alliance," *Toronto Star* (4 October 1999), A6.

deserves to be supported and expanded, expanded so that its principles of controlled spending, debt reduction and tax relief are practiced in Ottawa as well as Queen's Park..."⁴⁵ The key to this, Manning argued, was to end vote-splitting in Ontario. As they had throughout much of the post-war period, the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party proved to be much more powerful and influential than their federal cousins (and step-cousins in Reform/Alliance for that matter). As it routinely had, the power and influence within Canada's right-wing rested with the provincial Progressive Conservatives, which consequently forced the federal wing to align and attach itself to the provincial wing. For the provincial parties, and Ontario Conservatives specifically, this not only had the potential to increase their popularity, it also had the potential to legitimize the Common Sense Revolution. Needless to say, the Ontario Tories were able to command a certain amount of respect from their federal counterparts in both the Progressive Conservative Party and Reform.

Despite its potential advantages, the Ontario provincial wing of the Progressive Conservative Party was not shielded from attack. In fact, their perceived cozy relationship with Reform and the corresponding divide between the federal and provincial Tories led one prominent member, Bill King, a former executive assistant to Mike Harris, publicly to highlight and criticize the division. In fact, King was virtually the only Ontario Tory to employ norm-based voice and defend Clark and the provincial party from attacks from its provincial wing. King's criticisms were directed at Tory strategist and UA supporter Tom Long, who referred to Clark as "tiresome" and "not a real Conservative" during a keynote speech. In response, King stated he was saddened by the attack, adding "I thought Tom Long's personal attack on Joe

⁴⁵ Richard Brennan, "Manning dishes out praise for Harris Tories at dinner," *Toronto Star* (19 November 1999), A9.

Clark was an unwarranted cheap shot. I expected Tom to offer substantive reasons to join this movement rather than attacking his friends on the right.”⁴⁶

For Long, there was hardly a loyalty dilemma in deciding between the more centrist federal Tories and the overtly right-wing United Alternative. Long, loyal to a neo-liberal ideology, quickly and forcefully identified with Manning, Reform, and the United Alternative and proceeded to employ an exit strategy from the federal Tories. King, on the other hand, remained loyal to the Progressive Conservative Party in the midst of a badly divided right-wing. Furthermore, King's use of the word 'friends' to describe Clark and the rest of the federal Tories is telling of his outlook toward the competing parties. A similar rebuttal of Reform was put forward by Harris' long-time communications director Paul Rhodes, who simply stated "If I wanted to join a small-c conservative party led by Preston Manning, I had 13 years to do that. No thank you.”⁴⁷ Rhodes' specific characterization of Reform/United Alternative as a 'small-c conservative party' indicates that an acceptance of the Reform platform was not uniform amongst all senior Tory insiders. However, despite a defense of Clark and the federal Tories from two of Harris' senior staffers, the prevailing viewpoint was one of support for the UA.

The emergence of the Canadian Alliance

By early 2000, the United Alternative was beginning to take shape as the Canadian Alliance, although it would not become an official party until late March when rank-and-file delegates had the chance to vote on its formal creation. Alberta Treasurer Stockwell Day, who had long been rumored to seek leadership of the new party, announced in early March 2000 that he would make up his mind in three weeks. Day, like Klein, had proceeded to exit from the federal Progressive Conservative Party and quickly aligned himself with the UA. His statement

⁴⁶ William Walker, "Ontario Tories split by attacks on federal party," *Toronto Star* (30 January 2000), A6.

⁴⁷ William Walker, "Ontario Tories split by attacks on federal party"

confirming his intention to seek leadership of the new party came one day after the website draftstockday.com received 10,000 hits. By the end of the first week on-line, the site had received 40,000 hits. Both the 'Draft Stock Day' campaign and Day's formal leadership campaign were led by Reform MP Jason Kenney and Rod Love, Klein's long-time senior advisor and a strategist for the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party. The Alberta PC Party was largely behind Day's leadership bid, and it is said that tears of joy flowed from Children's Services Minister Iris Evans when Day formally announced his leadership campaign. Day also received strong support from Klein, who "...always said that Stockwell Day...would make a tremendous leader." Klein "...believe[d] that in order for the new conservative party to rejuvenate itself, it needs a new leader with a new time and a new style."⁴⁸ While Klein stopped short of formally endorsing Day for the new party- after all, at that point Klein was not a card carrying member of any federal party- it was clear that the Alberta PC Party was largely in support of the new party and had no particular affinity for their federal cousins.

Just days prior to the convention to create the new party, Ontario cabinet minister Frank Klees announced his intention to seek the leadership of the soon-to-be Canadian Alliance. His campaign was backed by Long and by cabinet ministers Jim Flaherty, Chris Hodgson, and Bob Runciman. Klees was seen largely as Ontario's candidate, though it was suggested that he was in the race solely to aid Stockwell Day's campaign and consequently prevent Manning from gaining leadership of the new party.⁴⁹ While Manning was often seen as a candidate who could not be 'sold' in Ontario, neither Day nor Klees were as liberal on social issues as Ralph Klein's speeches suggested that the new party and its leader should have been. This can explain, at least in part, the Alliance's inability to make significant gains in Ontario in the fall 2000 election. As

⁴⁸ Clare Hoy, *Stockwell Day*, 131.

⁴⁹ Tim Harper, "Klees denies he's in Alliance race to help Day," *Toronto Star* (23 March 2000), A6.

far as the party's leadership went, to ensure that the leadership race was not seen as Alberta's candidate versus Ontario's candidate, Klein did not officially endorse Day nor did Harris endorse Klees, though Klein did formally join the Alliance to back Day's bid. However, only a few weeks after announcing his leadership campaign, Klees unexpectedly withdrew his name from the contest, and Tom Long quickly announced his candidacy and became Ontario's flag-bearer.

Long's entry into the leadership campaign as Ontario's preferred candidate presented problems for Joe Clark, as well as for Preston Manning. For Clark and the federal Tories, the withdrawal of Klees' leadership campaign signified a brief opportunity to make inroads with Ontario's small-c conservative voters, though that opportunity quickly passed when it was reported that Long had signed up between 120,000 and 140,000 Ontario Tories to the Alliance, and an additional 60,000 across the country.⁵⁰ With such a larger number of Ontario Tories and potential federal Tory voters switching to the Alliance, Joe Clark and the federal Tories faced a significant setback at the hands of Long and the Ontario PC organization.

In many respects, Long's entry into the Alliance leadership campaign was a nail in the coffin for Clark. As Jim Travers noted:

Clark's strategy, planned before speculation about Long surfaced this weekend, was to take advantage of the embarrassing withdrawal of Ontario cabinet minister Frank Klees from the Alliance leadership race. With no credible Ontario candidate seeking the post, Clark saw an opportunity to position his party as the obvious alternative to the federal Liberals for the 905-area conservatives. Long's decision to contest the leadership, something he said he wouldn't do as recently as week ago, transforms that opportunity into a potentially fatal threat. While long may not have the broad national support or public profile needed to beat Manning or Day, he does have the loyalty of the Ontario Tory party and the political IOU's that come with it. Long... can count in widespread support from the Ontario cabinet and caucus, as well as access to party membership and fundraising lists.⁵¹

Again, the loyalty dilemma faced by the Ontario Tories placed pragmatism and ideology in direct competition with cordial partisan relations. When faced with a loyalty dilemma between

⁵⁰ William Walker and Richard Brennan, "Long's entry into race seen as boost to Alberta's Day," *Toronto Star* (11 April 2000), A6.

⁵¹ Jim Travers, "Long tough days ahead for Clark," *Toronto Star* (11 April 2000), A17

the good of the federal party and the benefit of their own interests and the leadership quest of one of their own, the Ontario Tories were quick to employ a norm-breaking voice to support their own interests at the expense of the interests of the federal party. Long, committed to the politics espoused in the Common Sense Revolution, quickly placed his loyalty with ideology and the Alliance, largely at the expense of the federal Tories. With limited members, dwindling funds, and a lack of popularity, the federal Tories were placed in a precarious position. Combined with the lack of support from their strongest two provincial wings, the federal Tories were placed at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the upstart Alliance.

Furthermore, the entry of Long into the campaign also erected a barrier for Manning, as it became increasingly unlikely that he would be able to win 50% of the party's support on the first ballot. Calgary MP Jason Kenney, an ardent support of Day, urged western-based Reform supporters to consider Long as a second choice. "I think Tom would be a credible leader...I'm supporting Stockwell Day, but I would be enthusiastically behind Tom as a prospective leader should he be elected."⁵² Any additional support for Long in the west would have likely further eroded Manning's support, all but ensuring a second-ballot run off and presenting Long's campaign with the ability to be kingmaker.

Despite having the support of many within the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, and access to the party's fundraising and membership lists, Long was unlikely to win the Alliance leadership race. Despite his close friendship with Long, Harris attempted to be seen as employing a norm-based voice throughout the Alliance leadership campaign. However, he praised him publicly, which did little to hurt his leadership campaign within right-wing circles. Harris declared that "Tom Long is a very good friend of mine. He is a very, very committed Canadian, a very bright individual, somebody who I have a great deal of time and respect for,"

⁵² William Walker and Richard Brennan, "Long's entry into race seen as boost to Alberta's Day"

though he added, "I will maintain...neutrality in anything to do with federal politics, even with Tom Long."⁵³ Despite officially maintaining neutrality, Harris nevertheless let his feelings toward the Alliance and Long be known, suggesting that he desired to employ a norm-breaking voice. In fact, Harris seemed to do everything possible to help Long- and by extension the Alliance- without ever saying 'I support Tom Long and the Alliance.'

However, worse news was on the horizon for the federal Progressive Conservative Party. The party was faced a major setback when Ontario Finance Minister Ernie Eves, one of the last of Ontario's cabinet ministers to remain a card carrying federal Conservative and loyal to Joe Clark, quit the party in order to support Long's bid for the leadership of the Alliance. An exit strategy on the part of Eves dealt a significant blow to the federal PC Party. However, for what it was worth, Eves maintained that "At the end of the day, if Mr. Long doesn't win, I think that some of the people, perhaps myself included, who support Mr. Long will not be there for another candidate."⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the damage had already been done to the federal Tories. Of all the Ontario Tories, the loyalty dilemma faced by Eves was the most severe, as his loyalty remained with the federal party and its leader longer than almost everyone else in the Ontario cabinet. Furthermore, he was a long time friend of Clark and a life-long federal Progressive Conservative. Nevertheless, his pragmatic outlook eventually overtook his partisan allegiance when he determined that the only way to defeat the Liberals was by uniting Canada's fractured right-wing.

Furthermore, Eves' personal loyalty to campaign strategist Tom Long also had a great deal to do with his quitting of the federal party and endorsement for Long's Alliance leadership bid. He believed that the Alliance under Long's leadership would draw in many federal PC supporters, former Reform supporters, and right-wing Liberals. Such a feat, he hoped, would all

⁵³ Caroline Mallan, "Long will be 'formidable,' Harris says," *Toronto Star* (12 April 2000), A6.

⁵⁴ Richard Mackie, "Ontario's Eves quits federal Tories to back Long," *The Globe and Mail* (20 April 2000), A4.

but guarantee a right-wing federal government. Furthermore, Eves suggested that a party led by Preston Manning, "...was, and is perceived, here in Ontario and in other parts of Canada, as being a fairly right-wing party, too far right wing for the liking of a great many Ontarians."⁵⁵ As the economic policies between the Ontario Tories and the federal Reform were rather similar, Eves was likely referring to Reform's stance on divisive social issues. Indeed, while all the candidates sought to increase the use of direct democracy, Long was the only one, for pragmatic reasons, willing to restrain its use on moral issues.⁵⁶ Thus, Long became the champion of Ontario's Tories, who did not wish to alienate their socially liberal and libertarian voters from the Alliance.

The event was significant not only for the fact that Eves switched loyalties, but also sent a strong message to the federal party. As John Ibbitson explained, "Mr. Eves' endorsement, therefore, signals that even those Ontario Tories who had until now remained loyal to the federal party have moved four-square behind their friend and campaign strategist."⁵⁷ By this point, the list of prominent Ontario PC cabinet ministers who had pledged their allegiance to Long, and by extension employed an exit voice included Elizabeth Witmer, Chris Hodgson, Jim Flaherty, Chris Stockwell, Norm Sterling, Bob Runciman, John Snobelen, Al Palladini, and Janet Ecker. Of that list, only Ecker retained her membership in the federal Progressive Conservative Party.⁵⁸

The Canadian Alliance's leadership convention in July 2000 saw Long finish in third place on the first ballot, and then, in a somewhat surprising turn of events, back Manning on the second ballot. Manning ended up being defeated by Stockwell Day, who became the new party's first leader. While many Ontario Tories preferred a Day-led Alliance to the then current

⁵⁵ Richard Mackie, "Ontario's Eves quits federal Tories to back Long"

⁵⁶ David Laycock, *The New Right and Democracy in Canada*, 21.

⁵⁷ John Ibbitson, "Eves's support of Long is a kiss from Ontario," *The Globe and Mail* (20 April 2000), A4.

⁵⁸ John Ibbitson, "Eves's support of Long is a kiss from Ontario,"

Liberal government, they did not leave the leadership convention totally unscathed. It is useful to once again recall Professor Nelson Wiseman's advice to Mike Harris regarding the upstart United Alternative. Wiseman remarked, "If I were advising Mike Harris, I'd say: 'Hey, shut up. Let things unfold.' If a United Alternative takes off, it can only help him. If it doesn't, then he has associated himself with an idea that's fallen flat on its face."⁵⁹ Although the United Alternative had some success and morphed into the Canadian Alliance, Harris and many of his senior cabinet ministers hardly 'shut up and let things unfold.' While Harris never publicly endorsed Long and the Alliance, he certainly let his feelings be known. At the same time, many senior Ontario cabinet ministers exited the federal Progressive Conservative Party in order to back Long and the Alliance. In the end, their gamble and lack of loyalty to the federal party did not deliver the desired results. At the end of the day, Harris had gained absolutely nothing by supporting Long's failed leadership campaign. In the process, he not only alienated many federal PC supporters, but also put himself in a potentially compromising position with the Alliance's new leader by supporting the competition in Tom Long.

In analyzing the 'winners' and 'losers' of the Alliance leadership campaign, columnist Ian Urquhart believed that the Ontario Tories had lost far more than they won. His 'losers' column included Tom Long, who, "...had a reputation as a political genius...Today, after running a poor third in the first round of the Alliance race and then backing Manning in the second, Long's reputation is considerably tarnished," Mike Harris, who, "...signaled with winks and nods that Long was his man, thereby alienating the federal Tories in his ranks," and Ernie Eves, who became "a man without a federal party."⁶⁰ On the other hand, the 'winners' included low-profile Solicitor General David Tsubouchi, one of the few who remained loyal to the federal

⁵⁹ Daniel Girard, "Ontario: Fertile ground for right-wing merger"

⁶⁰ Ian Urquhart, "...but not everyone is cheering result," *Toronto Star* (12 July 2000), A25.

Tories; Bob Runciman, who jumped on Day's bandwagon after the first ballot; and Tony Clement, a key architect of the new party. Despite severing any ties that they may have had with the federal Progressive Conservative Party in order to create the United Alternative and the Canadian Alliance, Ontario Tories such as Harris, Eves, and other vocal Tom Long supporters could have learned a lesson from Clement's strategy leading up to the leadership convention. Clement stayed neutral throughout the leadership campaign, thereby ensuring that he could have a privileged position within the inner-circle of whoever won the leadership of the Alliance. Clement showed no loyalty to any individual campaign within the Alliance, but was loyal to the Alliance as a whole. Though employing an exit strategy from the federal Tories, by keeping his options open, Clement emerged from the leadership convention unscathed and well respected for his organizing efforts.

Following the Canadian Alliance leadership convention, the governing Liberal Party called a snap election only three years into their five year mandate, largely to capitalize on the unpreparedness of a party which had, just months earlier, selected Stockwell Day as their new leader. The Alliance went into the election with a great deal of hope and expecting to capture more seats than the one it had (via a floor crossing) in seat-rich and centrist Ontario. The 2000 election was a disappointment for all parties, with the exception of the Liberal Party. While the Alliance won 23.6% of the votes in Ontario, compared with 19.1% for Reform in 1997, the party won only two of Ontario's 103 seats, in the process losing their incumbent in Markham. Clearly this increase of 4.5% of the popular vote fell well-short of the high expectations that the party had going into the election. Once again, the Alliance, like its predecessor in Reform, was still perceived as too extreme by many in Ontario. "It's depressing," said Consumer Minister Bob Runciman of the results, while Attorney General Jim Flaherty noted they "were depressingly

predictable.”⁶¹ While many Ontario Tories were disappointed with the poor showing for the Alliance, Solicitor-General David Tsubouchi, one of the few cabinet ministers to remain loyal to the federal wing of the party, exclaimed that “reports of the death of the federal Tories [were] extremely exaggerated.” In reference to the success the federal P.C. garnered, he added “We have Joe Clark to thank for that.”⁶²

However, despite Tsubouchi’s belief and optimism, the Ontario PC’s support of the Alliance certainly hindered their federal cousins. While the results were admittedly disappointing for those hoping for an Alliance breakthrough in Ontario, the Alliance’s 4.5% increase in vote mirrors the Tories 4.4% drop. This may be explained, in part, by the fact that thirty percent of Conservative identifiers (people who thought of themselves as Conservatives) in Ontario ended up voting for the Canadian Alliance in 2000.⁶³ While the Alliance/Reform was not always the preferred second choice of federal Progressive Conservative voters, there were still more Tories willing to vote Alliance than there were Liberals or New Democrats. Indeed, had it not been for the involvement of the provincial Tories, the Alliance would have likely done much worse than it did. Without access to party lists and donation lists and the endorsement of a large portion of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, the Alliance would have lacked any real backing in Ontario. After all, they had no official and active provincial wing to provide them with support. For their part, the federal Tories, while having an official provincial wing, were unable to take advantage of its resources, volunteers, and overall organization. Indeed, a simple endorsement was hard to achieve. While the results in Ontario illustrate that simply having the support of a powerful provincial wing does not guarantee a federal party electoral success in that province, they do illustrate that the positive effects of such support generally

⁶¹ Richard Brennan, “Gloom grips provincial Tories,” *Toronto Star* (28 November 2000), B3.

⁶² Richard Brennan, “Gloom grips provincial Tories”

⁶³ André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte, *Anatomy of a Victory*, 120.

outweigh the negative effects. Conversely, a federal party can suffer greatly when it does not have the organizational support of its provincial cousins.

Conclusion

In Ontario, the Harris Tories were forced to be pragmatic in their outlook toward intra-party relations as a large number of their supporters at the provincial level were not Reform/Alliance supporters at the federal level. The 'Reformatory' coalition in Ontario was made up of Progressive Conservatives, Reformers, and right-wing liberals. As such, their support of a federal party represented a cautious balancing act and largely explains Harris' unwillingness to formally endorse Alliance candidates or the party as a whole. A loyalty dilemma was binding on Harris. However, in Alberta, the loyalty dilemma faced by the governing Progressive Conservatives led by Ralph Klein was not particularly strong as the majority of Klein's provincial network consisted of federal Reform supporters. This fact made his loyalty dilemma virtually non-existent and gave a green light to an exit voice and to endorse the Alliance. Reform won a remarkable 54.6% of the vote in Alberta in 1997, only to increase that to 58.9% under the Alliance in 2000, even though they managed to win only 23 of Alberta's 26 seats in 2000, compared to 24 three years earlier. In many respects, it made perfect sense for Klein to align his provincial party with the populist, right-wing Alliance.

In comparing the loyalty dilemmas faced by Harris and Klein, Clare Hoy accurately remarked that:

In Alberta essentially the same people voted Reform federally and Conservative provincially. Harris, however, had to deal with a reality in which Reform voters and Conservative voters were quite different animals. Historically, Ontario's Conservative voters have tended to split into two major camps, the blue, or more right-of-centre, contingent...and the pink Tories, or Clarkites...In winning two consecutive majorities

in Ontario, Harris had relied on support from the entire conservative spectrum. He wasn't about to openly endorse any of the groups...⁶⁴

As such, despite the economic similarities between the policies of Reform and the Ontario PCs, Harris was forced to look out for his own interests and ensure his party's own success at the provincial level before he could attempt to ensure another party's success at the federal level. This largely explains his choice to employ a norm-based voice, while only occasionally flirting with a norm-breaking voice. For Klein, that dilemma was not present as the parties (federal Alliance and Alberta PCs) were one and the same.

The emergence of Canada's fourth party system greatly altered intra-party relations. The rise of decidedly right-wing Reform, the successful United Alternative movement, and the re-birth of Reform as the Canadian Alliance altered not only federal party politics in Canada, but the field of intra-party relations as well. The corresponding decline of the federal Progressive Conservative Party had similar effects on both the federal party politics and intra-party relations. At the same time, overtly right-wing provincial governments in Alberta and Ontario had more in common with the upstart Canadian Alliance than they did with their federal PC cousins. This placed the leadership of both provincial wings in a loyalty dilemma. The response to this dilemma required a pragmatic approach that most often consisted of norm-breaking voice and exit. The loyalty dilemma was more binding on the provincial party in Ontario because it consisted of a coalition of both Alliance and Progressive Conservative supporters. As such, the typical response to the dilemma consisted of norm-breaking voice, and in some cases, exit. At the same time, norm-based voice was often employed by Premier Harris. The loyalty dilemma was less binding on the Alberta PC party because the majority of its supporters were firmly aligned with the Alliance. This led to a corresponding result of exit as the typical response to the

⁶⁴ Hoy, *Stockwell Day*, 111-12.

party's loyalty dilemma. While there are three distinct responses to a loyalty dilemma, the usage of either response is generally the result of pragmatic considerations on the part of the provincial party.

Conclusion

Despite a move by both the Ontario and Alberta Progressive Conservative Parties to rally support for the Canadian Alliance, it remained clear that Canada's political right wing remained divided following the 2000 federal election. As they had in both the 1993 and 1997 elections, Canada's right-wing voters had essentially split their votes between the Canadian Alliance (formerly the Reform party) and the Progressive Conservative Party. The Liberals, with just less than 41% of the vote, commanded 172 of the House of Commons' 301 seats. For their part, the Canadian Alliance won 66 seats with 25.49% of the vote, while the Progressive Conservative Party won 12 seats with just over 12% of the vote. The perception that a divided right would be unable to defeat the governing Liberal Party led to an increased number of calls to 'unite the right' into a single, unified party.

President of the National Citizens Coalition, Stephen Harper, along with University of Calgary political scientist Tom Flanagan, became vocal supporters of a united right-wing party capable of defeating the Liberals and forming a government. They noted three debates within conservative politics that served as barriers to the formation of a united party: economic versus social conservatism, populism versus traditionalism, and the "One Canada" versus "Two Nations" views of the country.¹ While these schisms in conservative thought have unarguably served to divide the conservative movement in Canada and inhibited the formation of a united party, they were not the only divisions on Canada's right. One important factor largely ignored by Harper, Flanagan and others was the federal-provincial divide on Canada's right wing. Although the calls for a unified right were referring solely to the federal level, this thesis has demonstrated that intra-party relations play an important role in Canadian politics. While Harper

¹ Tom Flanagan and Stephen Harper, "Conservative Politics in Canada: Past, Present, and Future," in *After Liberalism: Essays in Search of Freedom, Virtue and Order* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1998), pp. 168-92.

and Flanagan provided some commentary on provincial politics, noting that "...it [conservatism] is better off than ever, with conservatives in control of key provincial...governments..." their emphasis was centered on federal politics. They continued, "...but it [conservatism] is so divided politically that winning control of the federal government seems hopelessly out of reach."²

Although supportive of a united right wing, they warned that "...experience suggest that a monolithic conservative party is unworkable" and that "...what might make more sense is the gradual construction of an explicit alliance of opposition elements, or 'sister parties.'"³ The 'sister parties' that were referred to were Reformers, Tories, and Québec nationalists (often, though not exclusively, supporters of the Bloc Québécois). Ultimately, they suggested that for Canadian conservatism to work, "its three sisters must recognize that each represents an authentic aspect of a larger conservative philosophy."⁴ Although a collaboration of the 'three sisters' was necessary to unite the right, it is equally important to make sure that the ten cousins- referring to provincial conservative parties- were also on the same page. As this thesis has illustrated, when one of the provincial cousins publicly opposes the federal party, it can lead to potentially dangerous results. The lack of attention paid to intra-party federalism by Harper and Flanagan is also symptomatic of a larger void in literature pertaining to intra-party relations.

On 15 October 2003, a 'Conservative Party Agreement-in-Principle' was negotiated between Canadian Alliance leader Stephen Harper and Progressive Conservative Party leader Peter MacKay. The agreement-in-principle dictated that the two parties would create the new Conservative Party of Canada, thereby finally 'uniting the right.' However, the new party would not be created until after the rank-and-file membership of each party had formally endorsed the merger through a democratic vote. Members of the Canadian Alliance ratified the Agreement-

² Flanagan and Harper, "Conservative Politics in Canada: Past, Present, and Future," 168.

³ Flanagan and Harper, "Conservative Politics in Canada: Past, Present, and Future," 187.

⁴ Flanagan and Harper, "Conservative Politics in Canada: Past, Present, and Future," 190.

in-Principle on December 5 by a margin of 96% to 4%, while members of the Progressive Conservative Party ratified the Agreement-in-Principle a day later by a 90% to 10% margin. The new party- named the Conservative Party of Canada- was officially registered with elections Canada on 7 December 2003, and elected its first leader- Stephen Harper- three months later. Although the creation of a new party meant that, to some degree at least, the ‘three sisters’ had recognized their differences and successfully collaborated together, there was no guarantee that the ‘provincial cousins’ would rally behind the new party. In fact, the name ‘Conservative Party of Canada’ applied only to the federal party, as the provincial wings retained the use of ‘Progressive’ in the party’s name. Whether the continued use of the word ‘Progressive’ was simply for aesthetics or whether it represented a clear difference in ideological outlook remains to be seen, though the answer likely varies from province to province.

Perhaps the result of past conflicts with the provincial wings of the party, the new constitution of the Conservative Party of Canada states that “the Party shall not establish provincial parties,” but instead “...shall promote and maintain relationships with existing provincial conservative parties.”⁵ This section is telling about the new party’s view of intra-party federalism in a number of respects. For example, it has adopted the Reform and Canadian Alliance policy of refraining from entering provincial politics. As a result, the party is free to concentrate its attention on politics at the federal level. This necessarily leads to a confederal relationship and formally prevents federal party members from being placed in a loyalty dilemma (as no *formal* relationship exists with provincial parties). However, practically speaking, one must recognize that a loyalty dilemma may still occur if there is a dispute between the new party and one of its ideological allies at the provincial level. The fact that the party’s

⁵ Conservative Party of Canada. *Conservative Party of Canada Constitution, as amended on March 19, 2005*, article 15, available on-line at: <http://www.conservative.ca/media/20050319-CPCCConstitution.pdf>

constitution also mandates the promotion and maintenance of relationships with existing conservative parties (as opposed to existing Progressive Conservative parties) suggests that the party will support right-wing parties such as the British Columbia Liberal Party, the Saskatchewan Party, and possibly others. In this sense, partisan loyalty has been superseded by ideological loyalty, potentially broadening the spectrum of provincial parties who will view the federal Conservatives as a natural ally.

It would seem that the new party has recognized the often divisive conflicts that are inherent in intra-party federalism and has adopted this structure in order to side-step them. The federal party is now free to offer electoral support to a wide array of conservative parties at the provincial level. In this sense, the new federal party may target supporters of a number of partisan stripes at the provincial level, so long as they share a certain level of ideological coherence. At the same time, the federal party can more easily distance itself from an unpopular conservative regime at the provincial level. This also means that a conservative politician at the provincial level engaged in a dispute with the federal party is not necessarily engaged in a loyalty dilemma, as the federal party is not directly affiliated to the provincial party. Nevertheless, there is still validity in studying a conservative politician at the provincial level engaged in dispute with the federal Conservative Party and how he or she behaves. However, as a result of the structure adopted by the new party, one must recognize that intra-party federalism within Canada's right-wing parties after 2003 is necessarily different from intra-party federalism before 2003.

Despite achieving the long sought after goal of 'uniting the right' and being united under a single banner and adopting a new federal-provincial structure, Canada's federal Conservative Party is still forced to deal with the divisive effects of intra-party federalism. Quite simply, the

'cousins' at the provincial level, despite being a legally different entity, have continued to champion territorial goals at the expense of partisan or ideological solidarity. The first sign that all was not well, at least in relation to intra-party cohesiveness, occurred in March 2007 when Newfoundland and Labrador Premier Danny Williams "declared rhetorical warfare on the prime minister" regarding the exclusion of non-renewable resources in the federal equalization formula.⁶ Williams claims that the 2006 Conservative campaign platform promised their exclusion from the federal equalization formula. His current criticism of the federal government is the result of its decision to include them in the funding formula. In May 2007, Williams stated, in a speech to the Economic Club of Toronto, "'I am encouraging Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, and Canadians, in the next federal election to simply vote ABC — easy to remember...Vote ABC — anything but Conservative.'" ⁷ The Newfoundland and Labrador Premier also accused Prime Minister Harper and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty of pursuing a "deceptive agenda," culminating in their releasing misleading information about the equalization formula.

This represents an example of 'exit,' as Williams has clearly defected from any alliance with the federal Conservatives. Specifically, his active campaigning against the federal party and urging to voters to support other federal parties is symptomatic of an exit voice. Nevertheless, Williams is forced to employ a 'voice after exit' as the federal Conservative Party still forms the federal government, which he must continue to negotiate with. He continued his assault on the federal party into 2008, reaffirming his promise to campaign against the federal party, not just in Newfoundland. He concluded, "I think ultimately it comes down to the integrity of the man [Harper] and whether we [the provincial government] can trust him or

⁶ "Defeating Harper Easy as ABC, Williams tells Toronto audience," *CBC News*, available on-line: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2007/05/03/williams-harper.html> (accessed 12 March 2008)

⁷ "Defeating Harper Easy as ABC, Williams tells Toronto audience," *CBC News*

not...and whether in fact the Canadian public can trust him."⁸ Of course, Williams' opposition to the federal Conservatives is rooted in territorial concerns, as the inclusion of non-renewable resources in the federal equalization formula will have adverse financial implications on the province. Thus, his opposition to the federal party is not necessarily ideological or partisan, but rather, represents pragmatic opposition based on advocacy of territorial based issues.

At the same time, Nova Scotia's Progressive Conservative Premier Rodney Macdonald has also expressed vocal opposition to the Harper government for its treatment of Atlantic provinces and revenue for offshore oil. In fact, Macdonald used a norm-breaking voice and called on all of the MPs from Nova Scotia- and specifically the Tories- to vote against the party's proposed federal budget. Macdonald's opposition to the federal Tories stemmed from the fact that Flaherty stated he would not negotiate any side deals with provinces in order to get support for the budget. The Finance Minister also insisted Ottawa was still honouring the Atlantic Accord and that nothing had changed for Nova Scotia. Macdonald disagreed, however, and retorted that "the accords are not going to be honoured as signed...and that will mean the loss of \$800 million-plus for our province."⁹ Much like Williams, Macdonald's opposition to the federal Conservative government was centered on territorial based concerns, specifically financially motivated, and was generally void of ideological or partisan disagreement. His voice is best described as norm-breaking voice, despite encouraging Conservative MPs to oppose their own party's budget in a minority government situation. Macdonald's actions consisted primarily of public condemnation of the federal party and the provincial party will presumably be hesitant to campaign on behalf of the federal party. What separates Macdonald's actions from Williams',

⁸ "Not-so-dear-Danny: PM's letter angers Williams," *CBC News*, available on-line: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2008/01/17/williams-harper.html> (accessed 12 March 2008)

⁹ "N.S. Premier takes case against federal budget to Toronto," *CBC News*, available on-line: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/nova-scotia/story/2007/06/11/macdonald-budget-070611.html> (accessed 12 March 2008)

and prevents him from employing an exit voice, is that he refrained from campaigning or advocating against the federal party.

The examples of Danny Williams' and Rodney Macdonald's opposition to the new federal Conservative Party of Canada illustrate that the actions of provincial politicians will almost exclusively be informed by territorial interests above all else. Despite considerable rhetoric regarding a united right, the presence of jurisdictional federalism has often prevented this from becoming a reality. As William Chandler has indicated, the jurisdictional system of federalism has significant effects on intra-party federalism, as "...[it] has generated centrifugal effects that have accentuated strains within national parties. Politicians at either level have found it costly to be too closely associated with the policies or stances of their counterparts at the other level."¹⁰ Quite simply, as long as the federal dynamic exists in Canada- and there is no reason to believe that its importance will cease- political parties will never be fully united as the federal-provincial dynamic will routinely illustrate divisions within the larger party.

Relying on a historical institutionalist theoretical approach and building upon the methodological design of Katrina Burgess' *Parties and Unions in the New Global Economy*, this thesis has focused on four case studies to examine, in specific detail, the relationship between the federal and provincial conservative parties in Alberta and Ontario. All four case studies have illustrated that the provincial wings deal with the federal wing in a pragmatic fashion. Although they tend to employ a norm-based voice in the public sphere- consisting of backroom negotiations and some public support of the federal party- in reality they actually lean more toward a norm-breaking voice, by generally remaining silent and uninterested in the affairs of the federal wing. The norm-breaking voice is the most desirable course of action for the provincial parties to

¹⁰ Chandler, "Federalism and Political Parties," 160.

ensure that they can advocate territorial-based concerns with considerable force without being constrained by partisan politics.

The first study, which explored the relationship between the Ontario government and the federal Progressive Conservative Party from 1943 to 1967, established the status quo relationship between the Ontario and federal wings. The Ontario Progressive Conservative Party was generally more powerful than its federal counterpart, which ensured that the pendulum of power remained with the Ontario Tories. As the more influential and powerful of the two wings, the Ontario Tories had considerable control over the relationship. During the early part of Leslie Frost's premiership, he and the Ontario government had a considerably amicable relationship with the federal Liberal government. This relationship was built on pragmatism as it provided both parties with mutual benefits. However, by 1957, Frost became an avid supporter of John Diefenbaker and campaigned aggressively on his behalf. While some have falsely suggested that Frost's partisanship had reasserted itself, the reality is that he was once again being pragmatic in his support for Diefenbaker. Quite simply, he felt that Ontario was capable of getting a better deal in the tax-rental formula under Diefenbaker. The support given to the federal Tories in 1957 and 1958 is telling, as the federal party won 61 and 67 seats respectively in Ontario. However, after the rise of Trudeaumania, the Ontario government of John Robarts once again reasserted its amicable relationship with the federal Liberals and remained at arm's length from the federal party.

The relationship between the federal party under Joe Clark from 1976 to 1980 and the Ontario and Alberta governments- with specific emphasis on the oil pricing dispute of 1979- formed the second case study of this thesis. It was unique in that it was the first time in which the federal, Ontario, and Alberta governments were governed simultaneously by Progressive

Conservative governments. Not surprisingly, it highlighted the potentially divisive nature of intra-party federalism. Both the Ontario and Alberta provincial parties gave considerable support to Joe Clark and the federal Tories in 1979, Lougheed as a result of his genuine dislike for Trudeau and Davis as a result of his partisan nature. Much like 1957 and 1958, and in fact for the first time since, the federal Tories won a considerable number of seats in Ontario. They also won all of Alberta's federal seats. As a result, Clark and his government owed a great deal of thanks to both Lougheed and Davis. However, the rise in world oil prices and general economic stagflation in the late 1970s forced a considerable loyalty dilemma on Clark. The Alberta government sought to achieve a high oil price to obtain a maximum profit, the Ontario government sought a low oil price to protect Ontario's business and consumer interests, while the federal government was taxed with the task of negotiating an oil price. In the end, the price of oil increased considerably, causing the Ontario government to employ a norm-breaking voice and publicly condemn the federal party. In the end, Ontario voters turned their loyalties away from the federal Tories and back to the federal Liberals. However, despite the rise in oil prices, Davis appeared to champion the cause of the Ontario consumer and the province's business community. This chapter illustrated both the benefits of close intra-party co-operation and the drawbacks to an openly hostile intra-party relationship.

The third case study, which examined the relationship between the Progressive Conservative federal government and the Alberta provincial government from 1984 to 1993, gave further evidence to the fact that provincial parties' relations are dictated by their need to advocate for and protect territorial interests. The Alberta Progressive Conservatives placed considerable pressure on the newly elected federal government to repeal both the National Energy Program and the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax. In these instances, the Alberta

Progressive Conservatives tended to employ a norm-based voice. However, the Alberta wing began to use a norm-breaking voice and proceeded to an exit strategy in the late 1980s after it was announced that the federal government would implement a goods and services tax. This chapter reinforced the claim that provincial parties are pragmatic in dealing with their federal counterparts to maximize the promotion of territorial-based interests.

The final case study provided a useful before-and-after analysis and explained how the addition of a new independent variable- in this case the Reform party- affected the dependent variable, the nature of intra-party relations. With the rise of Reform's popularity in the late 1980s, the governing Alberta Tories- whose popularity was declining- were increasingly forced to distance themselves from their federal counterparts. Quite simply, there was genuine fear that if Reform were to run provincially, it would lead to a splitting of the vote on the right, and even potentially overtake the Progressive Conservatives as the dominant political force at the provincial level. As a result, at the same time that the provincial Tories were distancing themselves from their federal cousins, they were increasingly- albeit implicitly- aligning themselves with the federal Reform party. Ideologically, these two parties shared much in common. Additionally, Reform was led by an Albertan in Preston Manning. In response to the provincial leadership's loyalty dilemma, they employed a norm-breaking voice and even flirted with an exit voice. In one sense, this response is pragmatic, but at the same time Reform was seen as the 'natural' ally of the provincial party.

Following the 1993 federal election in which the Progressive Conservative Party was decimated, winning only two seats (and none in Alberta), the Alberta Tories became firmly entrenched in the Reform camp. In fact, by this point the party had already adhered to many of Preston Manning's demands, including balancing the province's books and replacing Don Getty

as leader. By this time, there were early rumblings of a movement to 'unite the right' in an attempt to end vote splitting between the Progressive Conservatives and Reform. However, this movement did not gain strength until after the 1997 election, which further disillusioned many of the right as once again the vote was split between the Tories and Reform. By this point, many members from both the Ontario and Alberta Progressive Conservative Parties were open to, if not supportive of, the creation of a united right. While many MLAs and MPPs employed both a norm-breaking voice and exit voice and were openly supportive of Reform/Canadian Alliance, others, including Ontario Premier Mike Harris, refused to endorse a united right. However, what was remarkably absent throughout the majority of this period was a strong defence of the federal Progressive Conservative Party. In effect, a norm-based voice had all but disappeared.

Although this thesis only examined one party over the post-war era, and therefore its findings should not be overly generalized, it has made some important conclusions. First, it has confirmed that the Progressive Conservative Party (and the present Conservative Party of Canada) maintained a confederal structure throughout the post-war era. Second, using a detailed process-tracing method, it has confirmed that the jurisdictional nature of Canadian federalism has accentuated strains within national parties and that provincial parties tend not to be too closely associated with the policies or stances of their federal counterparts and has provided reasons for this aloofness and opposition. It has also explored how provincial parties interact with their federal counterparts and what accounts for their course of action. Specifically, it has noted that provincial parties tend to place significant emphasis on advocating territorial-based concerns. These concerns are often not shared by the federal party, and therefore the provincial party must place its territorial concerns over partisan concerns. Lastly, it has explored the various options- norm-based voice, norm-breaking voice, and exit voice- that are available to

provincial parties when faced with a loyalty dilemma. Specifically, it has found that all three voices have been employed in various situations, but that the general trend is to, when possible, publicly advocate a norm-based voice while privately advocating a norm-breaking voice. However, provincial parties have been more than willing to employ a norm-breaking voice to demonstrate to their provincial voters that they are forcefully advocating territorial concerns.

This thesis has indicated that intra-party relations are more often than not dictated by pragmatism. As a consequence, partisan solidarity is generally not present, or at best plays a limited role. Accordingly, provincial parties frequently employ a norm-breaking voice in practice, though they tend publicly to advocate a norm-based voice. Quite simply, the four case studies presented have illustrated that provincial parties' primary loyalties remain with voters in their province- and not the federal party. As such, provincial parties have tended to advocate territorial concerns and look out for their own citizens and by extension their own electoral fortunes. This project has also suggested that provincial parties- despite sharing a name and similar ideology- are not strong allies for their federal counterparts.

Despite the fact that provincial parties are generally not dependable allies for their federal cousins, they do have the potential to play an important role in aiding the federal party. As Donald Smiley has remarked, "the support of provincial party organizations is undoubtedly of assistance to federal politicians but...it is by no means decisive."¹¹ The federal election of 1957- in which Ontario Premier Leslie Frost and the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party provided considerable support to the federal wing- serves as a telling example of the assistance that a motivated and active provincial wing can provide. The same can be said of the support given to the federal party by the Ontario wing in 1979. However, in virtually all cases, this thesis has confirmed that said assistance is likely to be based on the pragmatic considerations of the

¹¹ Smiley, *Canada in Question*, 86.

provincial government. While most federal parties will happily take the assistance of their provincial wings, the assistance is by no means guaranteed and there is no reason for the federal party to expect that it will be forthcoming. As such, federal parties cannot rely on their provincial cousins as committed partisan allies.

However, despite the insights provided by this thesis, there is significant room for expansion in the overall study of intra-party federalism. The scope of study can be greatly expanded. For example, this study did not take into account provincial Progressive Conservative parties in Atlantic Canada, in Manitoba, or in Saskatchewan. What was the intra-party relationship in these provinces? Did it follow the general trend established in this thesis? Why or why not? Furthermore, this thesis did not take into account the pre-war era. Further work could examine, in great detail, specific case studies prior to World War II. At the same time, further work on intra-party federalism could also examine the Liberal and New Democratic Parties. While these parties have received attention from some scholarly work regarding intra-party relations, the scope of this work could also be expanded and updated.¹² Additionally, the inter-party relationship between allied parties could be examined. Examples would include the relationship between the Bloc Québécois and the Parti Québécois, or the Union Nationale and the federal Progressive Conservatives. Although this thesis has contributed to filling a larger gap in the literature, the overall scope of potential work surrounding intra-party federalism is expansive.

¹² See, for example, Terry Morley, "Federalism and the New Democratic Party," 45-73 and Reg Whitaker, *The Government Party*, chs. 4-8.

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