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THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE RHETORICIAN:
A STUDY OF PERSUASION
IN PLATO'S *GORGIAS* AND ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

A MASTERS THESIS SUBMITTED TO
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BY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
INTRODUCTION: The Art of Friends and Fathers	1
Harmony According to Persuasion in the Ethics	2
Persuasion in the <i>Gorgias</i>	10
The Argument on Artful Persuasion and the Just Rhetorician	13
CHAPTER ONE	20
Chapter Three of the <i>Rhetoric</i> : Aristotle's Three Species	28
Justice, Expediency, and the Rhetoric's Nobly Ordered Plurality	36
Arranging Artful Proofs: Character and Argument in the Species.	52
The Role of Epideictic Rhetoric: How is Praise Political?	59
CHAPTER TWO	66
The Setting of the <i>Gorgias</i> : A Feast for a War	64
Chaerephon's Injustice and the Three Species of Rhetoric	70
Experience before Knowledge: The Weakness of the Proxy Dialogue	73
Socrates and Gorgias: Building a Dialogue from Pleasantries	83
Rhetoric and the Medical Art	91
CHAPTER THREE	97
Rhetoric's Subject and Practitioner: The Greatest Good and the Persuasion Producer	103
Gorgias's Speech: the Risk of Rhetoric's Power	112

The Link Between Knowledge and Shame	117
The Refutation of Unjust Rhetoric	130
Political Responsibility – the Just Rhetoric	137
CONCLUSION	140
The Place of Rhetoric in the <i>Politics</i>	142
Democracy and the Art of Character	144
ENDNOTES	148
BIBLIOGRAPHY	189

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ABSTRACT

In his treatise, *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues that there are three species within an art of rhetoric, judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Aristotle's threefold rhetorical art, which is based on the functioning of the soul toward justice, reveals the possibilities for persuasive speech found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle suggests that the soul and political life can be ordered according to reason through speeches pursuing justice, efficiency, and noble action. The relation between rhetoric and the soul also demonstrates how Socrates' rhetoric in Plato's *Gorgias* is based on an well-ordered soul, which is a just soul. In contrast to his own persuasion, Socrates demonstrates that the persuasive speech employed and taught by Gorgias, the rhetorician, is based on disorder and injustice. These two texts reveal that the intent of rhetoric is not separate from its practice. A study of the art of rhetoric, based on a study of the just soul and the good life, leads to the higher inquiries into politics and philosophy. Thus, political life and philosophy may benefit when citizens examine the nature of rhetoric, and subsequently, justice, within a community and within a soul.

Introduction: *The Art of Friends and Fathers*

“... *In the same way too we call listening to one's fathers and friends 'being rational'...*”

Nicomachean Ethics (1102b33)

Traditionally, educators thought students must understand rhetoric in order to function in the political community where citizens rule and are ruled in turn. The study of rhetoric has not been popular or popularly accepted since rhetoric was part of the medieval trivium with logic and grammar, and contemporary educators might wonder why rhetoric ever enjoyed such an established place in traditional education. A teacher or professor today might not consider what is missing from a public education that does not formally teach students about rhetoric. Are we now able to function as citizens without understanding the nature and purpose of persuasive speech?

How would political life, the life of ruling and being ruled, function without rhetoric? It seems that rulership can be established either by physical force or by persuasive speech. In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle suggests that it would be strange to argue that physical force is the superior method of ruling, since speech is more characteristic of human beings. That is not to say that the practical, physical reality is not characteristic of humans. Political life, the arena of human action, is filled with particular, practical acts. Yet, it is reasoned speech about justice which rules that arena. Thus, knowledge of justice, particularly, the just soul, enables one to rule; conversely, being ignorant of justice is impractical for someone who desires to win arguments and be persuasive. Furthermore, if the purpose of politics is justice, then one who ignores politics misses the ways in which humans attempt to be just and promote acting justly.

Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, is the bridge between reasoned speech about justice and political action; it connects the thinking community and the practical world. Rhetoric is distinct

from politics and philosophy, but how someone reasons about persuasion, the link between speech and action, affects how that person reasons about justice or truth. A return to ancient thinkers is helpful in a study of rhetoric because they describe most clearly the human manifestations of reason and persuasion – the philosopher and the rhetorician. The relationship between the philosopher and the rhetorician may define the relation between reason and persuasive speech. The shared and conflicting purposes between the two characters show the possibilities and limitations of rhetoric.

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that the just life is central to rhetoric. Other ancient texts may confront the questions concerning the just life directly.¹ Yet, Aristotle's treatise on persuasive speech, the *Rhetoric*, and Plato's *Gorgias*, examine the study of rhetoric, the art of persuasive speaking, and offer an indirect but, perhaps necessary, route to serious discussions about justice. Rhetoric addresses the limitations on political discourse and philosophic inquiry. The possibilities of goodness and justice in human lives may be revealed in a study of persuasion, whether persuasion be practised in the political community, in relations with one's friends and family, or within one's soul. The difficult questions surrounding those possibilities cannot be solved in this relatively short and incomplete study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and commentary on Plato's *Gorgias*. However, it is possible to clarify rhetoric and show what is at stake politically when rhetoric is misunderstood.

Harmony According to Persuasion in the Ethics

Aristotle subtly raises the problem of persuasion in his *Ethics* and what he suggests about persuasion and rhetoric in this treatise can provide a context for a study of the *Rhetoric*.² The purpose of the *Ethics* is not to explain persuasion or rhetoric but to pursue a definition of the

good man, and, for Aristotle, this pursuit must take place in a political community. Within this study of the good man in the political community, one finds rhetoric described as a power and, arguably, as an art, subordinate to politics or political science.³ Rhetoric, the art or power of persuasion, occurs in practical relationships as a speaker attempts to convince a listener that his argument is true and just, and at the most fundamental level, persuasion occurs in the relation between the two elements of the soul described near the end of the first book of the *Ethics*.

Aristotle divides the soul into rational and irrational elements (1102a28). Yet, he soon modifies this division when he explains that the irrational element contains a part which may participate in reason. This potentially rational part of the irrational element is significant for a study of rhetoric because it must be this part of the soul which is persuaded. According to Aristotle, in an “unrestrained” person, the irrational element acts against reason, but in the “self-restrained” person, this same element obeys or is persuaded by reason (1102b32). When the irrational element is persuaded by the rational, something occurs which is not mathematically rational but is in accordance with reason. This is the place for persuasion – where one obeys probable conclusions and is as rational as possible.⁴

From Aristotle’s initial ordering of the soul, it seems then one can recognise something as reasonable although it may be reasonable according to another person or by convention. One believes someone is reasonable and accepts his authority, or, one believes something said to be reasonable. Instead of only using reason for an argument or inquiry, one reasons about the character and ability of others and about their traditions. Thus, one is not irrational, but one also does not necessarily have knowledge on the matter of which one has been persuaded. One is irrational concerning that subject because he has not yet reasoned through the argument. He first

reasons by judging and trusting the character of a speaker, and secondly reasons through another's argument to become rational about the subject.

The relationship between the rational and irrational elements opens the possibility to move from irrational to rational. There are also dangers in this dichotomy. One may abandon reason as a useful end because it seems limited by the irrational, or, one may fail to recognise that one's reason is not reason in its entirety. To some extent one's reason is limited and can be informed by others; one holds opinions on matters about which one considers and for which one gathers probabilities. In cases of persuasion, one opines and one's reasoned opinion is based on what is probable. When those whom one believes provide advice, or when conventions give guidance to one's life, one holds these as authoritative and one's opinion is reasonably based on these individuals or institutions. While opinion is not as solid as knowledge, it still provides a basis for action within the limits of the practical world.

Although it is often necessary to act from opinion, perhaps this is not the most natural way of acting for a human being. The life of merely being persuaded seems second-rate or even unnatural for a reasoning human being; the conflict which may occur when the irrational element struggles to obey the rational seems to make for an inferior life. The active life of reasoning and holding oneself in a position to reason is superior and one would hope to become someone in possession of, and ruled by, reason. This desire to be reasonable seems distinct from reason itself, but is it not rational? The desire for the good, more specifically for the human good, happiness, is a desire to become reasonable if reason is found to be the means to happiness. In this passage of the *Ethics* concerning how the irrational is persuaded by reason, Aristotle notes that the "brave and temperate person" is in harmony with reason; it seems for him there is no need for a second-

rate life involving persuasion (1102b27).

Both the self-restrained and the persuaded perform actions without knowing why those actions are good. The former must have some suspicion that it is better to act a certain way and the latter must trust. Both the virtuous and the one following reason know why their actions are good. Self-restraint suggests conflict; one part of the soul seems to be moving in a direction other than reason. The reasoning element is one side of this conflict in the soul and the rhetorician is one side of a debate in a political decision. This conflict demonstrates that the soul cannot be reduced to reason alone and a debate suggests that the political community cannot be reduced to one persuasive argument. Virtue and following one's own reason do not require homogeneity but an ordered soul, a soul in harmony with reason. Because one's reason is not the whole of reason and it is situated in a soul, one's self-sufficiency is defined by being both part of a whole as well as a self-sufficient whole. Always reasoning in this manner is superior to being persuaded.

Most people, however, will require persuasion, and perhaps it is not exactly the case that the man of practical virtue (courage and moderation) is never persuaded. He too has a human soul with both the rational and irrational elements. Yet, he may have found his own source of persuasion. Harmony does require at least two parts; the brave, moderate man's ability to live in harmony with reason is a result of being self-persuaded. As one aligns one's actions to an order and develops habits of virtue of character, one learns that this ordering is beneficial to one's happiness. In ruling himself, the virtuous man works to harmonise his reason with reason simply. His self-persuasion is distinct from self-restraint because he is directly ruling his irrational element without conflict, and he is not ruled by, or acting according to, another's reason which he has accepted as his own opinion. The moderate and courageous person living in harmony

possesses what appears to be a keen sense of shame.⁵

Aristotle uses the example of how fathers and friends provide guidance to explain how the rule of reasoning can give external reasons before one actually reasons through matters oneself.⁶ Accepting advice is still a reasonable action; according to Aristotle, the proof that this part of the soul can be persuaded by reason – even when said soul is not reasoning itself – is evident in the practice of “admonition and by every sort of chastisement and encouragement” (1103a1). The practical world demonstrates that children and friends can become more reasonable through praise (“encouragement”) and blame (“admonition”).

The father’s relation to his child and the friend’s to his friend require the opinion that another shares a common good. This opinion does not necessarily mean one has the same knowledge as the friend or father, but one knows the kind of person they are and thus, knows that they would not persuade if it they did not have knowledge. Aristotle’s rational persuaders in this passage have goodwill toward those whom they persuade (1103a1). He does not discuss the possibility of those who do not have goodwill toward those whom they persuade. Nor does he amplify the conflict that can arise between friends or fathers and their children when describing the relations between the elements of the soul.

Aristotle argues that since he allowed the irrational element to be divided and to have one of its parts participating in harmony with reason rather than in conflict, he must also allow the rational element to be divided into two parts. The first part of the rational element holds reason “contained within itself” and the second part holds reason as it listens to reason, just as “one would listen to a father” (1103a2-4). Therefore, it could be said that one part of the rational element reasons and the other believes in reason when it does not have the capacity to reason

itself. Persuasion connects the rational and the irrational elements, and also connects the rational element that reasons and the rational element which follows reason.

According to Aristotle's description of the soul in this first section of the *Ethics*, the area of the soul, which is potentially rational or irrational, is the arena of persuasion. The soul's potential reasonableness positions persuasion between a metaphorical father's rule and a self-rule. Aristotle's description of persuasion leads to practical virtues or virtues of character. He states that when we speak about virtues of character we do not speak about the intellectual virtues "wisdom, astuteness, and practical judgement," but we do praise these; and "the active conditions of the soul" that we praise are called virtues (1103a6).

The intellectual virtues are separated because we do not speak about them with the virtues of character (courage and moderation) but they are reasoned to be virtues because they are the "active conditions of the soul" which are praiseworthy (1103a9). The excellence of the intellectual virtues seems to depend upon our praise, while practical virtues are inherently active conditions of the soul. In order to know what is praiseworthy one must understand virtue and vice. Thus, the intellectual virtues are dependent on the virtues of character. One understands justice and wisdom are praiseworthy when one understands courage and moderation.

From Aristotle's account of the virtues in this passage one gathers that praise is the result of a judgment of virtue and vice. Praise is a function of rhetoric and must follow an evaluation of character, that is to say, an account of one's virtuous and vicious acts. The intellectual virtues can be praised as virtues only after one evaluates the whole of virtue in one's character. It seems that one's soul must be in order before one can be wise. As persuasion causes what is irrational in the soul to obey the rational and the rational element that listens to authority to hear the rational

contained within itself, persuasion navigates between the virtues of character and the intellectual virtues. The authority of the intellectual virtues cannot mute the role of the virtues of character or the rational element of the soul would never be free to reason – to partake of its nature. Instead, the rational element would be compelled into the areas of human life which require practical virtue.

Thus, one finds persuasion in the *Ethics* between the two kinds of virtue, the two elements of the soul, the father and child, and two friends. The praise and blame which guide children and friends also function within the soul and the political community. Persuasive argument can improve judgement and action by guiding listeners to a more complete understanding of the good. Yet, persuasion does not occur through mere logical syllogisms; the possibilities of human reason are only made clear when one understands the soul. The soul, although reasonable, is contained within a human life limited to, and liberated by, time, place, and practical circumstances. Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, clarifies the relationship between the intellectual and practical virtues for the sake of virtuous action.

Politics is the realm of action and rhetoric; speech persuading toward action, may be used to guide the potentially reasonable part of the soul and, indirectly, the *polis* towards being reasonable or towards obeying reason. Yet, one must keep in mind that the possibility of a rhetorical art does not change the fact that there will always be an irrational element with the potential to be ruled by reason. The art of rhetoric does not provide an equation which solves the struggles of the human condition or the diversities between and within political communities for all time. Because the education from irrational to rational must continue (and it cannot be assumed that there has been a progression beyond requiring such education) the political regime

must demand certain actions of its citizens, according to its justice. A political community requires that citizens know and obey the law. Since rhetoric's purpose must be found within the greater study of political science (which governs all other arts and sciences and embraces their purposes within the greater purpose of politics [1094a28]), a study of a true art of rhetoric must fit within a true account of politics. Rhetoric's purpose is intertwined with the master art and its good.

While persuasion's role is largely in the political sphere, Aristotle emphasises persuasion as it occurs between fathers and their children and between friends, not in the political assembly (1094b3). Also, in the *Ethics*, rhetoric is called a "most honoured" power, but it does not seem that Aristotle assumes rhetoric is all-powerful. Aristotle does not claim that rhetoric has more precision than is in its nature (it is not mathematics but is based on what is probable). Because Aristotle admits rhetoric's imprecision and speaks of it in terms of friendship and rearing children, his rhetoric could be disregarded by those seeking a more mathematical or popular, public-centred persuasion.⁷ They demand that persuasive speech overcome the role of encouraging and chastising for the sake of good character, an end which a speaker would take up in speeches with friends and family. Instead, rhetoric must become better suited for the political persuasion of the many.

An art of speaking can provide power for its practitioners by dispensing techniques and manipulative approaches for an unqualified variety of ends. If one argues that rhetoric is instrumentality simply, one must admit that rhetoric does not include an evaluation of ends, or an obedience to reason outside of rhetoric's own set of techniques. By depending on the lowest common tendencies of humankind, this rhetoric manipulates pleasures and passions. If rhetoric is

neutral, instrumental, and most honoured by those who wish to persuade the many, rhetoric for justice's sake is then thought to be merely a stage in the development of rhetoric.

The first stage of this rhetoric would consist of arguments on behalf of the conventional aims of justice throughout childhood, but, justice would soon become the victim of a more clever and inventive persuasive speech. As the character Callicles argues in his first speech in Plato's *Gorgias*, the superior men are merely subdued toward the noble and just ends while they are young (484a2). They are taught to overcome base appetites (be moderate), share, and behave civilly; afterwards they come to learn that those habits are superfluous to, and perhaps even a hindrance for, the pursuit of political rule and honour. What argument can then be made for the rhetoric of justice?

Persuasion in the Gorgias

"...surely it is on purpose that we acquire companions and sons, so that when we ourselves, having become older are tripped up, you younger ones who are present might set our life upright again."

Gorgias (461c5-7)

An education in rhetoric can lead in two directions: either the ends of justice, goodness, and nobility become a stage in one's rhetorical education to be left behind after one learns the baser nature of politics, or, the just, good, and noble ends are true ends, and life is filled with misunderstandings about these ends which rhetoric should clarify. In the *Gorgias*, learning how one is persuaded and persuades centres around learning the distinctions between false opinions, true opinions, knowledge, and the practical knowledge that leads to action. Socrates tests Gorgias's ability to consistently defend his knowledge and Socrates demonstrates that Gorgias's "knowledge of rhetoric" is actually an opinion. Gorgias's opinion that justice is relatively

unimportant, directs his pedagogical approach to rhetoric.

If a rhetorician is unconcerned with justice and practical action he would specialise in techniques of speech that bring about any desired result. In a highly specialised society of individuals, persuasive speech becomes less the practice of friends and fathers and more akin to a professionalised skill. As skilled speech, rhetoric becomes the practice of the young with quick minds and ambitious spirits. The rhetoric of specialised professionals does not resemble informed practical judgement for the sake of the political community or a guiding instrument for the rational element of a moderate and courageous soul that one finds in the *Ethics*. An expert can be persuasive without considering what is practical or good for the *polis*.

Both Aristotle and Socrates reject speech that attempts to separate reason from the practical demands of human life. They centre their studies of rhetoric around the nature of education and illuminate an education by contrast, by demonstrating the insufficiencies of other educations. Plato addresses rhetoric by sending Socrates to a professor of rhetoric who is visiting Athens. Aristotle is motivated to give lectures on rhetoric by the teachings of the sophists or those he will name technologists.⁸

Aristotle argues against the technologists' appeal to passion in their persuasive speeches. Socrates argues against the way Gorgias bases his art of speech on his own understanding of human nature (from which he compiled a set of rules for persuasion). The technologists and Gorgias align their experience to the system of how passions arise in an audience without addressing the other parts of the soul. Problems arise for such systems when actions appear which do not fit into the system one established and follows. These problems are akin to what occurs when one acts against what one "knows" to be reasonable. Actions occur without our reasoning

because the entire soul – the practical situation of humanity – has not been taken into account.

Gorgias and the technologists think they possess the master art because they can manipulate passions and navigate speech. Yet, by dismissing the purpose and limits of practical life their speech is removed from reasoned action, the very end with which persuasive speech should be most concerned. Gorgias claims to provide his students with the power of speech that persuades audiences to perform whatever action his students desire. This “power” does not enable his students to provide a defensible argument for their desired action and indefensible arguments are powerless upon examination. Gorgias appears to teach the “master art” but instead distracts young men away from learning the nature of persuasive speech.

Gorgias’s purpose seems to differ from the purpose of his students. On the one hand, his students are young men eager for action; for them, arguments are of little interest outside of their usefulness.⁹ On the other hand, Gorgias is not interested in the practical use of speech in the political realm, aside from his initial efforts to persuade students to come to his school. Thus, there is a gap between the goals of Gorgias and those of his students. Gorgias aims toward mastery through speech for the sake of knowing how to be a master, while his students aim for victory– to be masters of men through political rule. Gorgias does not teach about political rule.

Yet, Gorgias and his students do hold one thing in common, a desire for superiority. It seems Gorgias has become fixed on a desire for superiority in argument and his students, for superiority in political rule. By promoting their desire isolated from knowledge of political things, Gorgias hinders the growth of character in Athenian citizens. A common end of achieving superiority, whether in intellectual prowess or political rule, amounts to no common end at all, but in the constant, endless struggle for rulership (457d).¹⁰ This battle can be a distraction from what

is truly desirable for a human being and from discovering and discussing what is just and expedient in the *polis*, from engaging in the speech which distinguishes man as political (*Politics*, 1235a15). It may cause men to abandon the search for the common good and the good character.

Nevertheless, persuasive speech continues to display the character of the speaker; it shows what men hold to be praiseworthy. (If the desire for superiority is fixed on pursuing the common good and good character, the battle for superiority can be fought for praiseworthy ends. Struggle and conflict are not intrinsically shameful.) The harmony of the soul that Aristotle described in the first book of the *Ethics* provides the praiseworthy end – reason ruling as practical judgement. Rhetoric can be used to guide from the childhood of no-restraint to the adolescence of self-restraint and finally to the harmony of adulthood. The companions and sons, such as Polus, who Socrates addresses in the *Gorgias*, are reminders that self-restraint is a necessary, instrumental end. Yet, as Aristotle argues in the *Ethics*, the role of fathers and friends is to persuade that harmony according to reason is ultimately more desirable than both unrestrained irrationality and mere self-restraint.

The Argument on Artful Persuasion and the Just Rhetorician

Fathers and friends are worthy of trust because they pursue a just life. Although Aristotle may not take an interest in rhetoric for its own sake, persuasion and rhetoric are parts of the search for the good life in the *Ethics*. To understand the link between the persuasion and the good life, I provide a commentary on the opening of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Instead of rejecting rhetoric, Aristotle establishes a new direction for rhetoric and departs from other writings on rhetoric which focus on styles and techniques for manipulating passions. Aristotle questions what exactly occurs in persuasion and whether there is an order to, or purpose for, rhetoric.

The first chapter of this thesis introduces Aristotle's three species of rhetoric, which define the use of rhetoric for Aristotle. Before naming the three species, Aristotle presents three proofs – character, the audience's disposition, and argument – as the substance of artful rhetoric. Looking to the second proof, the audience, as the purpose of rhetorical speech, Aristotle divides rhetoric according to his listeners who, by necessity, are influenced by the time and place where the persuasive speech is given. On account of these practical considerations, rhetoric must be organised in a way which allows for a number of purposes and actions. Thus, Aristotle demonstrates that there are three species according to time, place, and purpose.

Eugene Garver's study of the *Rhetoric* and H.W.B. Joseph's study of the soul in Plato's *Republic*, are used as guides for an inquiry into how rhetoric is the art of character, the power of practical judgement, and why it exists in three species. The division of rhetoric organises these practical considerations and orders the relation between the unity of virtue and the changing, physical, time-ruled world. As particular, practical circumstances continue to shift, the excellence with which men speak and act ever remains the same, and rhetoric, ordered into three species, continues to be practised by fathers and friends for the sake of good action. For the protection of these relations, the species realign rhetoric to politics and away from the empty struggle for superiority which characterises the rhetoric of Aristotle's opponents and Gorgias.

The commentary on the *Gorgias* in the second and third chapters provides an account of the friendship that Socrates and Gorgias form in their pursuit of a definition of rhetoric, which becomes a pursuit of justice. Socrates teaches Gorgias that he must aim to improve his students' ability to judge practical circumstances. He must *be* just. Socrates presents his argument through both dialectic, as he questions the consistency of Gorgias's argument, and rhetoric, as he guides

by examples and suggestions, and by translating from one species of rhetoric to another. Socrates recognises Gorgias's capacity for thought and takes up this conversation as an opportunity for a friendship, a friendship defined by a shared end of justice. Gorgias begins to participate in a dialectic inquiry as Socrates displays what is noble and shameful about an education in rhetoric.

In the second chapter, Socrates draws Gorgias toward more practical concerns and away from his impractical, pleasing speeches. Gorgias has neglected rhetoric's practical concern to persuade toward justice. Practical judgement and the virtues of character introduce the theme of justice in the *Gorgias*. The initial metaphors for war and feasting point to virtues missing from the soul that has isolated its reasoning element from its order as a whole, and has consequently become a disordered, unjust soul. The first interactions among characters of the dialogue are evaluated on how well they shift between the species of rhetoric as they approach the highly-reputed educator. Yet, before speaking with Gorgias, an experience-based definition of rhetoric is put forward in this setting of practical action and education.

The definition of rhetoric offered by Polus becomes problematic because establishing rhetoric on (his) experience alone leads to the evaluation of pleasure. By contrasting immediate pleasure and justice, Socrates makes it clear that short-sighted appeals to what is pleasant may keep humans from their true ends. The argument then turns to the remedy Aristotle and Socrates provide for opposing short-sighted rhetoric, but is not a simple one. Persuasion's tendency to satisfy immediate pleasure is only subdued when rhetoric's ends are justice, expediency, nobility, and goodness. In Aristotle's terms, if the ends of the species of rhetoric are severed from each other persuasion degenerates into the speech of technologists. If judicial rhetoric and deliberative rhetoric are separated from each other or epideictic rhetoric is removed from political concerns,

there is a disconnect between thought and action, between speech and practise.

A description of the how the medical art is the bodily metaphor of the rhetorical art concludes chapter two. Just as the doctor, the practical artist par excellence, knows more about the medical art than the one who merely persuades patients to follow the doctor's advice, the true rhetorician knows more about the rhetorical art than one who merely persuades audiences to follow any advice. The practical nature of the art of medicine reveals how rhetoric is primarily a practical art. Furthermore, the responsibility to the patient and to the pursuit of health entailed in the art of medicine corresponds to the responsibility to the listener and the pursuit of justice entailed in the art of rhetoric. Thus, in chapter three, Socrates demonstrates why Gorgias must be just.

My commentary in chapter three shows that Gorgias lacks a political as well as practical direction for his art. Socrates does not dismiss an art of rhetoric; each example of an art (other than rhetoric) he chooses reveals the possible understandings of rhetoric. Yet, Gorgias, the rhetorician, has difficulty defining the specific knowledge of rhetoric; what *are* rhetoric's speeches about? Gorgias believes that rhetoric's speeches are about the greatest good, but during his speech displaying rhetoric's great power, Gorgias falters. Recognising the limitations of his persuasive speech, Gorgias is shown the reasons why he has misunderstood rhetoric. Although Gorgias is unable to avoid politics when convincing his students of the benefits of rhetoric (he turns to the political assembly and the courtroom as arenas for persuasive speech), he does not recognise the significance of political things for a rhetorical art.

To explain the authority of the political, I consider Socrates' introduction of shame into the dialogue; this epideictic end connects the political concerns to Gorgias's own reasoning.

Arguing that Gorgias must care for justice, Socrates links the severed bond between thought and action and makes practical judgement possible. At the end of their conversation, Socrates recommends that Gorgias know three sets of opposites. These opposites resemble the ends of Aristotle's species of rhetoric. Although this particular study of rhetoric concludes at the close of Gorgias's conversation with Socrates, the dialogue goes on to reveal that Gorgias does become dialectically engaged and perhaps takes up a friendship with Socrates. Yet, the remaining sections also reveal that Polus and Callicles do not grasp the interrelation of the three species of rhetoric, understand practical judgement, connect thought and action, or recognise the significance of just life in persuasive speech.

Disregarding the role of the just life (and disconnecting thought and action or lacking practical judgement) is as detrimental in contemporary times as it was for Aristotle and Plato. For politics, this disconnection results in the radical legalism of society twinned with the necessity of the power enforcing that legal system. For political science, serious thought is marginalised by theses of relativism which assume a strict division between reason and passion. For philosophy, the severing of thought and action destroys its contemplative role. If persuasion is not concerned with practical life, philosophy will have to compensate for the lack of practical judgement by taking up a concern with the practical itself and, against its nature, become instrumental, not an end in itself.

The philosopher may secure his purpose as contemplating and pursuing truth, if he establishes an understanding with those who are directed toward practical, political life. That is not to say that justice is not the aim of the philosopher or that Socrates is simply delegating the pursuit of justice to rhetoricians. It is as a friend seeking shared ends that Socrates, the

philosopher, displays for Gorgias, the rhetorician, the education his students need. The *Gorgias* is a fitting place to observe how the philosopher demonstrates the art of practical judgement in action. Within the action of the dialogue, Socrates attempts to reestablish the virtues of character by battling through the obstacles of immediate pleasure of the soul (flattery), and an insufficient, individualistic notion of political life.¹¹

Returning to the first chapter of the *Ethics*, one finds that of Aristotle's three highly honoured powers – generalship, economics, and rhetoric – rhetoric seems to have the smallest role in contemporary studies of politics or Aristotle's thought and perhaps few would say they honour rhetoric highly.¹² The rejection of rhetoric may occur on account of a democratic aim to enlighten all people (and eventually assume all people are equally enlightened), and a suspicion that those with wealth or nobility (the elites) will persuade the unsuspecting public away from equality. Yet, one might wonder, if rhetoric is rejected and neither addressed nor understood, is it not more probable that it will appear in its deviant (unjust) form? It is the rhetoric of Gorgias and the technologists which necessitates the education in rhetoric that Aristotle and Plato demand of citizens.

This education should also be demanded by those who study political science today. The arguments of Gorgias and technologists are still present in contemporary political discourse. When politics is considered subject to persuasion, rhetoric, against its possible noble role, is considered the foundation of human relations. Rhetoric does not take up its noble role as it does when it is subject to politics but argues according to what is probable. If one does not aim toward the good of the political community when evaluating what is probable then the purpose of politics is lowered and individual citizens are fundamentally separated from their political community.

This understanding of politics hinders trust and relations as friends and fellow citizens. The assumed antagonism between the individual and the political community does not have to define politics. When one recognises that such an assumption arises from a misunderstanding of rhetoric and its role, one is free to think of politics in a new light. The first book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* defines rhetoric as practical judgement related to both the study of politics and the study of character. A similar definition of rhetoric appears in the *Gorgias*. Socrates does not dismiss rhetoric as readily as one might think, but takes up this art as a potential entry way into a new understanding of politics and its relation to philosophy.

CHAPTER ONE

The division Aristotle makes in his art of rhetoric is a practical way to clarify the virtuous acts belonging to the just life. Because the purpose of persuasive speech is action, Aristotle's three species align rhetoric toward active political life. His division directs persuasion away from the struggle for individual success to the detriment of others, a struggle which often seems to characterise rhetoric and does not clarify virtuous action. Aristotle's realignment culminates in his division of rhetoric into three species. Prior to this division, in the opening words of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle states that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic.¹³ He elevates rhetoric from a mere knack of persuasion or a collection of manipulative techniques closer to the activity of philosophic discourse. Just as all people participate in dialectic, according to Aristotle, all people attempt to defend and accuse, and go about their defences or accusations either by chance or method. Yet, neither chance nor method leads to the art of rhetoric; instead, Aristotle suggests that one should approach rhetoric artfully by observing the causes of successful persuasion.

In contrast to common notions of rhetoric, Aristotle denounces the practice of appealing to passions as a basis for persuasion.¹⁴ For Aristotle, a speaker must search for causes for persuasion, he must understand the proofs (*pisteis*), which are the material for an art of rhetoric ignored by many speech makers. Aristotle criticises those who have previously constructed arts of speeches for choosing to misuse passions for persuasion. Aristotle accuses these men, whom he labels "the technologists" and later the sophists, of neglecting the proofs and enthymemes which are essential for a rhetorical art.¹⁵ These offending speech makers are especially prone to misuse passions within the courts where laws should rule.

According to Aristotle, the technologists' misuse of passions in court would leave them

speechless in the good state (1354a20). Thus, he indirectly suggests the possibility that rhetoric can belong in the good state. The technologists' speech-making parts from the whole of rhetoric and it is disallowed because this partial form of rhetoric ruins judges' ability to reason. Thus, rhetoric which improves judges' ability to reason may be permitted, but the technologists proceed as someone who was "making the rule crooked which one intended to use" (1354a25). A constant effort to provoke passions as one's means to persuasion will result in both the speaker and the judge becoming dependent on passions rather than argument. In a courtroom, if the speaker does not concentrate primarily on the argument, his speech becomes removed from the particular matter at hand and the law of the state. Such speech would not belong in a good state.¹⁶ In a good state rhetoric improves judgement.

Instead of manipulating passions, Aristotle requires proofs and rhetorical syllogisms (enthymemes) in his art of persuasion. These requirements are more likely met by legislators in the political assembly than by jurymen in the courtroom. In the assembly, the purpose of the speech is the advantage of the whole political community, whereas in the courtroom, the jurymen are distracted by the pains and pleasures of their own affairs and are not focussed on the argument (1354b10). Dedication to the argument arises when a speaker recognises how important it is, for his own sake, that he give a truthful account of the subject at hand and not be distracted by short-term benefits of telling partial truths. In his account of rhetoric, Aristotle attempts to align rhetoricians to arguments based on the truth about the human soul, upon which the legislators must base their decisions, and the practical human purposes, according to which the jurymen must judge (1354b10). According to Aristotle, these arguments must include the proofs and enthymemes – the only artful material of rhetoric.¹⁷

Persuasion was introduced in the *Ethics* as the ruling of the rational part of the soul over the irrational. Yet, this does not mean that any logical syllogism is appropriate for persuasion. Aristotle's rhetorical syllogism, the enthymeme, is defined as a demonstrative proof concerned with what is probable, which is related to truth as a whole (1355a5). Aristotle writes that the capacity to see what seems to be true, is the same as the capacity to see the truth. Thus, one who is capable of understanding truth will also understand opinion (1355a15). Holding opinions and understanding what is true about opinion is crucial to understanding the persuasion in Aristotle's art of rhetoric. In his first chapter, Aristotle seems extremely positive about the potential for rhetoric. He asserts that humans are sufficiently drawn to the truth and that they usually do strike upon truth (1355a16).

Therefore, Aristotle affirms that rhetoric is useful because by nature truth and justice are stronger than their opposites (1355a20).¹⁸ If rhetoric is useful in promoting what is by nature stronger, then it should divert away from what is unnaturally stronger; it comes to the aid of truth and justice (1355a24). Yet, to be useful, it is also necessary for Aristotle's rhetor to speak according to commonly held opinions and to know the opposite sides of the argument. Speaking about common opinions does not make rhetoric ignoble and Aristotle suggests there is something noble in the practice of rhetoric, for it is strange that one who lacks a defensive skill in body is regarded as more shameful than one who lacks a defensive skill in speech (1355b2). Aristotle would think, since speaking is more characteristic of humans than physical force, that not being capable of speaking defensively is shameful. Thus, Aristotle shames the reader, who wishes to be more characteristically human, toward learning rhetoric, and rhetoric becomes a noble capacity.

In this argument, Aristotle depends on the common opinion that it is noble to physically

defend oneself. Often it is harmful or ignoble for a human to simply defend themselves before questioning what it is they are defending. Aristotle admits that there is an argument for the skill of speaking being potentially more harmful than physical skill, but he denies that this argument can be made concerning virtue. If one is defending the external advantages of “strength, health, wealth, and generalship,” one may cause harm if the skill of speaking is badly used (1355b6). Yet, those who would argue that these external advantages are worth seeking before virtue do not have the same intentions for their rhetoric as Aristotle does for his. The skill of speaking defensively when done for the sake of virtue is never harmful.

How can Aristotle make these claims about rhetoric’s nobility or ensure that rhetoric will be used for the sake of virtue? To respond to this inquiry, Aristotle turns to the men who practise public speaking; his first chapter concludes with a discussion of the relations between dialectic, rhetoric, and sophistry. Dialectic, rhetoric’s counterpart, looks for logical syllogisms and apparent syllogisms. Rhetoric, in turn, looks for the means of persuasion and the apparent means of persuasion (1355b15-17). Distinguishing between the real and apparent means of persuasion is a different task than distinguishing between the syllogism and the apparent syllogism, but both require knowledge (that is to say, knowledge of what is apparent and not apparent). Those who practise dialectic and rhetoric consider what exists in the audience to improve judgement; they observe the means of persuasion.

When Aristotle contrasts sophists and rhetors, he finds that sophists are sophists according to choice.¹⁹ Rhetors are rhetors according to both how much they know about the available means of persuasion and also according to choice.²⁰ Rhetors choose the available means of persuasion, but not *any* means of persuasion; there are standards inherent in the purpose of one’s rhetorical

argument, but these standards are not required for a sophistical argument. By introducing the apparent means of persuasion, Aristotle demonstrates that there is a risk one practising rhetoric will take up sophistic fallacies instead of the available means of persuasion.

What does it mean to argue according to the apparent means of persuasion? If we look to Aristotle's metaphor of medicine as rhetoric, arguing according to apparent means of persuasion would be like treating illness according to an apparent cure. The sophist-doctor might have an idea what health is, but he only feels compelled to treat the patient in a way that allows the patient to believe himself to be healthy. The only explanation for a sophist employing the apparent means of persuasion, rather than true means of persuasion, is that his decision results from a certain ignorance or lack of goodwill. Rhetors are joined to their audience in the argument they give and the purpose that they aim toward, just as a doctor is joined to his patient in his remedy and aims towards health.

A dialectician, on the other hand, is a dialectician according to power or ability (1355b13-20).²¹ He does not see alternative choices to be used within an argument because he aims his ability at truth or what is probably true. Like a dialectician searching for truth, a rhetor should not see two choices for persuasion after fulfilling his primary objective – seeing the available means of persuasion. There would be no alternative for the rhetor because a judgment would have been made based on some knowledge about the means of persuasion (1355b16).

According to Aristotle, both the rhetor and the dialectician have the power to see what is apparent, which in a certain respect is false, and they have the power to conclude opposites (1355a31). The dialectician's purpose is to show what is true or probably true.²² Yet, if a dialectician did choose to speak according to what is only apparently true, because he decided his

purpose was something other than to show what is true, he is then a sophist. Rhetoric is concerned with persuasion and opinion rather than directly showing what is true, and a rhetor primarily looks to the probabilities and possibilities for reasoned argument in his audience. Arguing according to apparent reasoning may seem necessary in the realm of opinion and persuasion, but, it does not encourage or even allow for reasoned argument in the audience.

Reasoning to the best of one's ability for the good of the audience leads to different arguments than reasoning according to whatever easily convinces the audience of something that is only partially true (which the speaker does not think is truly reasonable). This easier approach to argument will not make the audience more reasonable; neither the audience's opinion nor its ability to judge improves. Sophistic fallacies such as, collapsing the good simply into one's own good, may seem to function in the realm of opinion. This arena of discourse appears to be open to the influence of passions, which can act as obstacles for reasoned argument. Arguments made according to apparent reasoning separate the speaker from his audience and use the passions, without a rhetorical standard, for the sake of mere persuasive victory. The suspicions surrounding rhetoric are largely due to the activities of technologists and sophists. Rhetoricians are indeed closely related to these two kinds of men, so Aristotle addresses the apparent syllogisms and appeals to passions within his account to reveal the distinction.

In the second chapter of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes a new case for rhetoric on the basis that it is not only an art of speech but an art more closely akin to dialectic and politics. Rhetoric is a power like dialectic, as well as a practical activity found in law courts and political assemblies. Aristotle defines rhetoric again, this time as a power to find the available means of persuasion.²³ Thus, like dialectic, rhetoric seems to be about any subject. Lacking a subject of its own, rhetoric

does not seem suitable for being taught, however, Aristotle introduces material for persuasion – the proofs.

There are three proofs within Aristotle's art of rhetoric: *ēthos* (character), *logos* (speech or argument), and *pathos* (passions of the audience).²⁴ Aristotle's first artful proof is *ēthos*.²⁵ In the *Ethics*, *ēthos* is not merely a set of good habits; it also entails a certain natural capacity and deliberate effort. As a proof, *ēthos* demonstrates a speaker's purposes in the judgements within his argument. The technologists ignore this proof altogether and focus their attention on the *pathos* of the audience. The passionate condition of the audience is more conducive to a systematic approach toward persuasive victories, a system is a matter one could "teach" (1356a12). *Ēthos*, the most important proof, does not fit into such systems and it is difficult, arguably impossible, to teach.²⁶ Yet, the technologists' systematic appeals to the passions are not conducive to improving judgement or fostering virtue; thus, if an education in *ēthos* were possible their approach would oppose it.

After suggesting that *ēthos* and *pathos* can have such persuasive strength, Aristotle calls rhetoric the "offshoot" of dialectic. These proofs cause rhetoric to depart from dialectic, which pursues truth in logical questioning. (Although rhetoric is still connected as dialectic's counterpart; its roots are in dialectic.) Dialectic seems to occur after the practicalities have been addressed, in a realm of speech not primarily concerned with political action. Rhetoric, on the other hand, becomes part of "ethical studies which it is just to call politics" (1356a24).²⁷ In contrast to dialectic, rhetoric is primarily concerned with politics and is justly called politics (1356a26). Aristotle goes on to say that rhetoric "slips in under" the political art.²⁸ Yet, Aristotle does not approve of this deception; those who profess that rhetoric can be called politics are

mistaken.²⁹ Aristotle perceives the danger that instead of learning about politics – the complexities and difficulties in regimes and their legislation – students will choose to learn persuasive techniques to manipulate passions and acquire or enhance sophistic intentions.³⁰

A distinction must be made between politics and rhetoric. Rhetoric is about opinion; it is concerned with what is commonly held (1357a13), and what is possible and probable (1357a35-1357b1). Rhetoric and dialectic do not contain the enthymemes or syllogisms which are concerned with particular topics. The more enthymemes and syllogisms grasp a topic, the less those arguments are part of rhetoric or dialectic (1358a1). As one comes closer to knowledge and first principles, one moves farther from rhetoric or dialectic. This is not the case for politics. An art or ability, such as rhetoric, would be subordinate to knowledge. Rhetoric must be subordinate to politics which holds knowledge of the good and the common good; politics is “the one the most governing and most a master art.”³¹

At the closing of his second chapter, Aristotle states that enthymemes come less from common matters – the just, the natural, and politics – and more from particular matters or one’s own private concerns and probabilities. From the particular concerns one may arrive at common matters and Aristotle himself begins from his own concern about the different speakers: sophists, dialecticians, and rhetoricians. Aristotle opposes what is taught as rhetoric and provides an account of what makes rhetoricians a distinct group – they argue according to three species of rhetoric. The species (*eidē*) arise out of propositions from particular kinds (*gene*) and from commonplaces (*topos*) (1358a30). He states that before discussing the topics, the kinds of rhetoric should be apprehended.³² Aristotle formally introduces the three kinds of rhetoric in his third chapter of Book I and goes on to discuss the topics of each kind in chapters four to twelve.

Aristotle's intention becomes clear in the first book of the *Rhetoric*. Rhetoric's purpose is to improve judgement. Aristotle denounces the manipulation of passions and opens the possibility for rhetoric in the good state. He considers the limits of, and possibilities for, persuasion in the human soul and in human relations through an understanding of the proofs. He restores the role of speech in guiding action by shaming those who cannot provide a defence in speech and denying that the art of speech would cause harm when used for virtue.

Finally, Aristotle looks at the practice of the groups of men who employ speech without a specific subject matter. Rhetoric is not dialectic but helps to make dialectic possible by ensuring conditions for responsible philosophical inquiry. In order to understand the proofs of rhetoric, one must be capable of arguing and studying character, virtue, and passions (1356a22-26). Dialectic can occur when one understands the limitations of reason, as they are manifested in the passions, and the possibilities of reason guiding human action.

For practical concerns, being reasonable means ordering a life so that one can reason as often and as clearly as possible toward virtue. Rhetoric is not politics but it is the capacity to find the available means of persuasion, to become political, and to seriously consider what is just. Aristotle's practical advice for moving toward what is common from particulars is provided in the third chapter. Aristotle's rhetorical art must be found in the three kinds or species; the interrelations between his divisions of the art perpetuate and order discussions about justice.

Chapter Three of the Rhetoric: Aristotle's Three Species

Why do the three species perpetuate and order discussions about justice? Are they not simply the clearest categories in which to place persuasive speeches? Aristotle does introduce the three kinds of rhetoric as if they are unproblematic. He uses the terms *eidē* and *gene*, species and

kinds, to describe the divisions of rhetoric.³³ Aristotle's third chapter begins by stating that there are three species (*eidē*) of rhetoric because there are three types of hearers, an observer (*theōron*),³⁴ a judge of the past, and a judge of the future (1358b2-3). These three types of hearers are also divided according to their occupation:

.... a member of the general assembly is a judge of the things to come; the dicast of things past; the mere spectator, of the ability of the speaker. Therefore there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic, and epideictic (1358b2-9).³⁵

Rhetoric is first divided into three species.³⁶ The number arises from the hearers of the speeches. One might then ask why there are three hearers, but Aristotle simply says that they come into being (*uparchousin*) (1358a37). The distinction of species seems to already exist among hearers. Since the hearers are also the "end" or goal of the speech, the species in the listeners are the beginning and end of rhetoric for Aristotle (1358a35 - 1358b2). Aristotle also writes that the speech is composed of three parts, "the speaker, the subject which he treats, and the person to whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer to whom the end or object of the speech refers" (1358a36-1358b1).³⁷ The species could have been divided according to the content of the speech or the speaker, but Aristotle first considers his audience.³⁸

When turning to these groups within the audience, Aristotle divides rhetoric according to necessity (*anankē*) rather than reason (1358b3). It is necessary that the hearer be either an observer or judge, and the kinds (*gene*) are divided according to these three hearers. So, it is also out of necessity that there are three kinds (*gene*) of speeches.³⁹ The kinds of speeches seem to be arranged according to the necessary constraints of time and place, where and when a judge is judging. Kinds are divided according to acts of the listeners, who either judge or contemplate (1358b5).

Because Aristotle argues that the purpose of rhetoric is the hearers, he sees the necessity of the three kinds. Knowing necessary limits (the restraints of time and place) is part of understanding what one is free to do and say. Thus, the three parts of rhetoric exist in kinds (*gene*) according to necessity, as well as species (*eidē*), according to reason. In the divisions of the rhetorical art necessity and reason coincide. This concurrence occurs because the rhetorical art concerns particular actions and requires judgement. Those listening to a speech may judge the speaker and the speech. Aristotle divides those judging the speech according to the purpose for which they listen to the speech.

The judges' purpose is either to judge the past or the future. Aristotle provides an example of each judge in a political role; the assemblyman judges the future and the juryman the past. The third listener, who is contemplating (*theōros*), judges the power or ability, presumably of the speaker. Yet, the contemplator is not considered a judge, although he seems to act as one, that is, he judges the power of the speaker (1358b1-5). The first hearers, those that judge past and future, appear more esteemed; courts of law and legislatures are significant political institutions. Simply giving an accurate account of the speaker's capabilities does not seem as significant as political judgement. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not describe the three types of audience as a hierarchy.

The three kinds of rhetorical speeches – deliberative, judicial, and epideictic – are also defined according to two opposing activities. Deliberative rhetoric includes either “exhortation” or “aversion.” Judicial rhetoric includes accusing or speaking in defence, whereas, epideictic or display rhetoric includes praise or blame (1358b9-11). The deliberative is for speaking about future time, the judicial is for speaking of past time, and the epideictic is for the present; however, epideictic rhetoric often includes reminding the audience of the past and presuming the future

(1358b14-17).⁴⁰ Epideictic rhetoric's ability to appeal to all times calls the divisions of rhetoric into question and suggests that epideictic is the most significant kind. Aristotle quickly reestablishes the divisions according to three distinct sets of purposes: the noble and shameful, the expedient and inexpedient, and the just and unjust. Yet, there is still a sense that epideictic's role within rhetoric is problematic.

Eugene Garver, the author of a recent study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, argues that the three species of rhetoric are not altogether distinct but are parts of the whole of rhetoric. His argument explains how each species argues according to the means of persuasion in a specific manner. Some speeches do not appear to argue according to the means of persuasion but only for the sake of success; however, Aristotle recognised other ends beyond mere success.⁴¹ How those ends entail rhetorical standards can be seen in a comparison with the medical art. When the doctor suggests a remedy he sees both the specific ailment in the patient and his purpose, health. When the rhetorician sees the available/possible means of persuasion he must also see both the particular obstructions to persuasion and the purpose, rhetoric's end – to be just and produce as just a result as possible by improving the judgment of one's listeners.

Although the species of rhetoric may interrelate as parts of a whole, for Garver, there are three distinct sets of ends for the rhetorical species. Deliberative speech either exhorts toward the expedient or dissuades from the inexpedient. While it is possible that the deliberative speech may touch upon other ends of rhetoric, the just or unjust, they are not the primary goals of those deliberating. For judicial speakers, the just and the unjust are the ends and all other ends are subordinate. Finally, the epideictic speaker holds the noble and the shameful as his ends (to which the other rhetorical ends are subordinate) (1358b25-30).

When arguing for their own ends, speakers can sometimes ignore the other ends because these ends conflict. To illustrate the truth of this claim, Aristotle points first to how this occurs for judicial rhetoric. The judicial speaker is neither arguing whether or not the act in question happened, nor arguing that it was in some way expedient. For example, a murder was committed. The defendant is neither arguing whether it did or did not occur, nor whether the victim's death was advantageous to the community. He is arguing that his client is unjustly accused of the murder. Being entirely focussed on justice, he would never argue against the justness of his case nor agree that what he speaks is unjust. When considering the punishment of the accused, a judicial rhetor would not consider deterrence. A judicial rhetor can concede something is inexpedient in an effort to maintain his argument concerning the just. It may be inexpedient for the community to cope with an extended trial or to ensure just treatment for the accused.

Aristotle shows the same is true for those deliberating. Although neglecting the other ends of justice and nobility, a deliberative speaker would never agree that he was advising inexpedient things or turning the listeners away from something expedient (1358b25-30). The deliberative rhetor would allow that something may be just or unjust, to the extent it did not interfere with his argument toward what is most expedient.⁴² If it is expedient for a state to invade her neighbour, then the deliberative speaker focusses on the expediency of this act. Just as the courtroom is the practical arena for judicial rhetoric, the assembly is where one would find the speeches of deliberative rhetoric.

Aristotle writes that a deliberative speaker, concentrating only on the expedient, is not concerned with injustice.⁴³ It seems to be the case for deliberative rhetoric that if a decision is expedient then its results become just or concerns for justice are suspended. A speaker could see

that a state or a person deserves a certain punishment, but Aristotle allows his deliberative rhetorician to set the legal notion of justice aside and provide counsel that is beyond revenge or even distributing what is deserved. Deliberative rhetoricians may allow justice to aid their main purpose, but never at the expense of expediency (1358b35). If an expedient act happens to benefit a group which was treated unfairly in the past, the speaker might make mention of this group, but he would give up a good punishment for the sake of an expedient act.

The kinds of rhetoric appear to come from the arrangements of our political systems: the courtroom and the assembly. Judicial rhetoric and deliberative rhetoric both have a space of practice and a time according to which they judge what is good. These two areas of public discourse focus the use of persuasion into species. Both the courtroom and the assembly demand practical judgements concerning particular actions. To understand practical judgement, one must understand its purpose and limitations. Practical judgement comes from the distinction between the good simply (*haplos*) and particular goods (*tini*).⁴⁴ In his study of the three species, Eugene Garver argues that this distinction is crucial to understanding rhetoric. Particular goods arise in particular times and places, which are irrelevant for the good simply. Yet, particular goods are not separate from the good simply. They are linked to good simply through the rhetorical proof, character (*ethos*). Since ends are held by character (not the other proofs), practical judgements of the good are made from the functioning relation between reason and character.

On account of the character's attachment to ends, it may seem that one should aim toward the good simply, the absolute end, all the time. The good simply is not a human's end. One may wish for the good simply, but there are also times when one should choose a particular good.⁴⁵ For example, it may be good (simply) to contemplate but one should also choose to exercise, eat, and

help a blind man cross a street. This distinction guides one to an understanding of practical activities and the species of rhetoric follow practical activities. If there is no distinction between the good and particular goods there would be a single “practical reason.”⁴⁶ This practical reason could then dictate from what is good simply, all particular goods.⁴⁷

The diversity of goods are offered as possibilities for what is the particular good to choose to do; these possibilities are ordered according to their place in the practical world, not according to “theory,” or the good simply.⁴⁸ If one attempts to order particular goods according to one general practical reason, diversity becomes unreasonable. In addition, the one practical reason takes the place of, and thus, eliminates, the good simply. The distinctions between the good simply and particular goods cannot be collapsed. Garver points out that, for Aristotle, it is actually unjust to choose the good simply as if it were one’s own particular good. This choice also seems to be untrue, for it denies the reality that one person is only a part of the whole (of a community or of humanity).

If contemplating at all times means one does not exercise or eat and disregards the needs of others, is it a good judgement for a human being to contemplate alone and neglect these actions? When one recognises something as good simply, is there a tendency to automatically think it is one’s own particular good?⁴⁹ If there is a proper relationship between the good simply and particular goods, why is there a tendency to think the good simply is one’s own and to be unjust?⁵⁰ One may mistake the unjust as something good, but why is this mistake made?

If one does not take into account his own particular situation he is not acting justly. When one does the right thing for the time and place in which one finds oneself, one is still participating in the good. A particular good can be good in one place but not another without taking away from

its goodness in the first place. The good simply, which is abstract and unchanging, is separate from particular goods in the decisions to do certain acts.⁵¹ One must always deliberate matters afresh and never cease to judge whether the good simply is good for the actual individual situation.⁵²

Deciding between the good simply and the particular goods is an act of practical judgement and the different kinds of rhetoric emerge from this decision.⁵³ Once it is evident that the good simply is not appropriate in particular circumstances, the decision among particular goods is based on one's character (*ēthos*). If the good simply is not the particular good for the circumstances one faces, then one must judge what is particularly good for the circumstances according to desire defined by one's character, which is subject to judgement according to the good. Desire can be a source of good because there is an initial decision concerning whether the good simply is practical; character is subject to the good and, thus, includes a desire to act well.⁵⁴ The acknowledgement of the good simply demonstrates a more fundamental desire to be ordered according to it.

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that one considers good that towards which one's character (*ēthos*) is naturally drawn (1363b1). Is the attraction toward the good simply natural or is the concern for particular goods natural? Decisions made according to character concern action because the particular, practical world of individual souls is one of action. If one judging practically has decided that the good simply is not practical for the circumstances, it is good to choose according to character. How can one ensure that desire is guided toward the good and is not defining what is good? One must see his own good as one part of the whole common good. While one can gain a clearer understanding of the common good, defining it according to one's

own good disregards the ignorance characteristic of humans.

After one acknowledges the good simply and particular goods, the relation between these two goods becomes a question of which good belongs to which individual, it becomes a question of justice. Speakers with good characters desire the good simply but know that it is not theirs; the good is not defined by them but they pursue it through pursuing justice. The understanding of practical judgement, which exists between the good simply and particular goods, is required for deliberations of the political assemblies and judgements of the courtroom. Aristotle's three species of rhetoric are ordered according to this relation between the good simply and the particular goods.

Justice, Expediency, and Rhetoric's Nobly Ordered Plurality

In Aristotle's *Ethics*, there is a distinction between the good simply and particular goods for practical judgement. This distinction is also made between the different ends of rhetorical species because persuasive speech aims toward action which is particular. Just as there is a particular good and the good simply, there are two justices: justice of a particular *polis* and justice simply. (The latter is not directly applied.) There is also expedience for a person and general expedience.⁵⁵ Despite the variety of the particular kinds of justice and expediency they do adhere to an order. Rhetoric, practised in the courtroom and assembly, is a product of this distance between the particular goods and good simply.⁵⁶

The many particular goods cannot be directly ordered according to good simply, such order requires human reason; particular circumstances demand judgement. This need for judgement entails an obligation to deliberate and points to the fact that it does make a difference to the political community whether or not one take up that obligation.⁵⁷ There is a responsibility

for one to translate between the good simply and particular judgements – to use reason to inform particular judgements and actions. The separation from the good simply could lead one to think that there is neither good order nor any reasonable method for the practical decisions about action. Yet, there is a teaching in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* of an order despite the apparent chaos of possible decisions and actions.

Practical judgement comes from a distinction between the good simply and particular goods, and a distinction between the goodness of something and one's desire for that thing. Again turning to Garver, he argues that character (*ethos*) provides a connection between the good simply and particular goods and a link to the judgements of others. One can see that "my" desiring good is also how "one" desires good.⁵⁸ Humans are connected through their desire for the good when one sees that others' desires are not fundamentally different from their own. (This connection does not necessarily exist for passions and appetites because they are characterised by limited physical resources that can lead to competition rather than connections and shared ends.)

The good simply does not exist because there is a common bond among humans, desiring the good. Rather, the existence of the good simply is demonstrated by the desire for the good evident in humans. Regardless of the differing intermediate manifestations of that desire in individual lives (the good simply exists with or without recognising one's desire for it), the desire for it is held in common. In order to grasp that common desire which appears in plurality one requires a rational level of organisation.

Aristotle provides species of rhetoric. Species are an intermediate level of organization between the whole and its particular parts.⁵⁹ As one learns in Aristotle's *Categories*, if something is a member of a species, in biology or rhetoric, it must have a function, which depends on

purpose (*telos*).⁶⁰ In rhetoric, the purpose is threefold: the just, the expedient, and the noble; the speech itself is the function. If a speech aims toward the rhetorical ends, the speaker, while arguing, simultaneously persuades his own soul, and potentially his audience, toward good action. Outside of these three species, a persuasive speaker's performance is divorced from what actually takes place in the audience. Since the species are based on an order, on justice, a speech which argues for unjust, inexpedient, or shameful ends will not function as a rhetorical species.

Even within the three species, the purpose of rhetoric can be unclear because rhetoric has two purposes: to argue according to the means of persuasion, and an external goal, to persuade.⁶¹ A speaker wants to nurture certain opinions as well encourage his audience to perform certain actions. It is difficult to determine whether thoughts or actions are the ends of rhetoric. A speaker who desires to argue just ends to an unjust audience is going to be unpersuasive, or, concede to an appeal to injustice, or persuade the audience that just advice is expedient while appearing to be disinterested in justice. In these circumstances the ends of rhetoric seem unclear.

Yet, ends are not deliberated about; they are deliberated toward. If one deliberates whether he will only persuade (external end) or argues according to the available means of persuasion (internal end), then his end is neither of these two (1355b15-17).⁶² If one can deliberate whether or not he will argue on behalf of justice, his purpose is not justice; he is not dedicated to justice. One whose end is justice, asks, "how can I be just in this argument?" Intermediate choices (such as, "Will I argue by comparing my position with weaker alternatives or by drawing out my position in detail?") also have ends, but they are not the ultimate end by which we are guided. Just as its roots are in politics or ethics, rhetoric's ultimate ends are held by politics or ethics. Rhetoric's own end is deliberation toward action.

There are two reasons why one performs an action that demonstrate how one deliberates toward his ends. First, one acts in a particular case for ends concerning that particular matter. One may eat a healthy meal because one is hungry and that is what was served to him by a family member. Secondly, if one also eats healthily because he is a moderate person and that is how a moderate person acts, then one's end is not restricted to the one meal and its set of benefits, but includes one's end as a "certain kind of person." This duality of deliberation occurs in rhetoric as well. In a particular case there is an end of persuasion, that is to say, winning over an audience. There is also the end of arguing according to the means of persuasion.

Just as the goal of politics is not mere life but the good life, rhetoric's goal is not merely winning over an audience, but arguing according to the available means of persuasion. When there is a conflict between mere life and good life or merely winning the audience and arguing according to the means of persuasion, it seems the citizen speaker should choose the good life and should choose to be artful, sacrificing his own safety and success. Yet, is there a responsibility to the political community to support the conditions (mere life) for the good life, or, is there a responsibility to speak according to the rhetorical conditions (winning over an audience) that provide for future arguments according to the means of persuasion?

Refusing to lead a mere life as opposed to the good life may be different than choosing the persuasion of necessity over using the means of persuasion. One may sacrifice one's life, as Socrates does, yet sacrificing one's life or the success of one's argument seems irresponsible. When would winning over an audience be more important than arguing according to means of persuasion? It is tempting to assume any victory which produces an action that prevents great harm or injustice justifies persuasion by an appeal to necessity. In the same way that mere life is

an intermediate end toward the good life, mere persuasion may be useful in seeking the means of persuasion.

Yet, a speaker should not simply strive to accomplish an action but must always look to inform the decision that leads to an action. When one wishes that people would simply act well and, consequently, labels the reasoning that leads to a good act as secondary to having listeners perform an act, one makes judgement subordinate to action. This may be an acceptable avenue for those speaking to children lacking judgement. Having children perform good actions regardless of their own judgement can help to form good habits – the proper conditions for good judgement – that they will see reason for as they grow. Mere persuasion may be necessary for children. It is not that the speaker ceases to have just ends when speaking to them, but, the lack of capacity for reason in the child requires a different approach.

When a speaker can argue artfully, not as one would with a child but according to the means of persuasion, the three species in the *Rhetoric* bear similarities to the virtuous actions in the *Ethics*. Like the acts of persuasion, virtuous actions cause one to become a certain kind of person.⁶³ In addition to having its own internal end, that is, the artful argument, rhetoric exists in three species. These species of rhetoric set out what is required of a speech and depend on rhetoric's practical political end – to persuade toward an action according to the three ends of rhetoric: the noble, the useful, and the just.⁶⁴

The rhetorical art, like other arts, imitates nature. Yet, speakers cannot guarantee the order of cause and effect that exists in the natural physical world.⁶⁵ Therefore, that which is made by art or human action is less likely to be organised into species. Although rhetorical speeches that exist as species are rare, they do allow persuasion to be political.⁶⁶ The three species interrelate in a

manner unlike natural species (which interrelate as predator and prey, or, in human terms, master and slave) and more akin to the interrelations of the virtues. Like the virtues they are interdependent. While arguing on behalf of the end of one species of rhetoric, another species can significantly modify the argument.⁶⁷

The correct use of deliberative, epideictic, and judicial rhetoric correlate in a *polis*.⁶⁸ As we turn to how the three kinds are related, the species appear more akin to the virtues than biological categories. When studying the way in which the species of rhetoric are interdependent, there is a struggle to define where one species of rhetoric should end and the other begin.⁶⁹ Aristotle discusses how the ends of the species of rhetoric associate in arguments (1358b23-1359a6). The ends of the species of rhetoric could be the end of the argument or used as an accessory to help support the argument toward that primary end.

This arrangement makes sense practically. A deliberative speech directed toward the expedient could be assisted by arguing that the expedient is also just. In the same way, a particular punishment advocated in a judicial speech could also be a source of deterrence, which is an expedient concern for the future. Yet, the different ends are not always complementary. An expedient end could be “cancelled out” by consideration about what is just, but that consideration is still necessary for good deliberation. For example, consider the expedient end of deliberative rhetoric in terms of allocating punishment. Policy makers cannot formulate punishments thinking *only* of deterrence.⁷⁰

Yet, one wonders what exactly is occurring between these three different ends if each one may move from priority to nonpriority and back.⁷¹ There are two possible ways that the species are arranged within a speech. First of all, the three ends of rhetoric test each other with the aim of

amending or supporting a judgement. Deliberative and judicial rhetoric are both concerned with what is useful in the *polis*. Deliberative and epideictic rhetoric are also very closely related; a deliberative proposal can become epideictic rhetoric by changing how a statement is expressed (1367b36).⁷² A deliberative speech advising one toward an action and an epideictic speech praising that action are very similar.⁷³

Aristotle also encounters speeches where the accessory end may not assist the primary end. Conflict is the second possible relation between ends. Any plurality introduces a possibility for conflict and a plurality of rhetorical ends is not an exception. The ends must be somewhat distinct to maintain their independence; these ends are, at times, subordinate to each other. When observing speakers who have conflicting ends in their speeches, Aristotle sees that they argue primarily toward one end and take a subordinate end “as an accessory with reference to this [end]” (1358b29). When the ends of deliberative and judicial speech (the expedient and the just) are not in conflict, one end may be used to strengthen the argument for the other end.⁷⁴

There is a difference between how the ends of deliberative and judicial rhetoric relate and how the ends between deliberative and epideictic relate. The judicial speaker “on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed or damage inflicted by him” (1358b30); he may have done something and it may have been inexpedient but the court is only to decide if it is just. Likewise, the deliberative speaker always promotes what is expedient (1358b30-37). In a judicial speech, a speaker could admit that an end is not expedient, and the deliberative speaker may neglect justice while aiming at what is useful. Yet, the speakers “who praise and blame do not consider whether a man does what is expedient or harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise that, disregarding his own interest, he performs some deed of honour” (1359a1-3).⁷⁵

In epideictic rhetoric, praiseworthiness is attributed to the one who does not consider what is expedient for himself. The man being praised seems to neglect his own ends. Epideictic rhetoric negates the pursuit of expedience for the one being praised. It is not merely the case that epideictic rhetoric denies that expediency is lacking, an act is noble and praiseworthy precisely *because* it is not expedient for the actor.⁷⁶ Garver argues that there is thus a conflict between the deliberative rhetor's purpose to encourage listeners toward an action on account of its expedience and the epideictic rhetor's purpose to praise noble acts. Aside from this conflict, according to Garver, each one of the three kinds of rhetoric can be placed as a priority while the other is an accessory.⁷⁷

Yet, is the epideictic end, the noble, in conflict with deliberative rhetoric's end, the expedient? Or, might the noble be as translatable as the two other rhetorical ends when one pursues what is expedient for a purpose other than one's own interests or life? If the noble is translatable, then deliberative rhetoric must attach its end, the expedient, to an end beyond the individual. If something is expedient for the preservation of the political community but not the individual, it is noble for the individual to perform an act where he sets aside his own preservation. Thus, if one acts for the political community, each end can serve as an authoritative end that orders the argument and can be shown supporting or as less significant than the authoritative end. As the other ends appear in a speech, there is a way in which each end of the three species of rhetoric may be carried over into the other. The subordinate end may become more significant in an argument toward particular circumstances over time.

The interrelation of the species appears irrational; how can something noble become expedient? Yet, Aristotle's presentation suggests that rhetorical speeches are not strictly confined to one species. If one disallows movement among rhetorical ends, he does not deliberate about

practical circumstances. Thus, he claims instead that a rhetorical end is an end in itself; it is not an end for the sake of practical judgement but for the sake of rhetorical success. The justness of an end may be a sufficient reason to arrive at a particular decision or perform an act, but as deliberation is occurring, a claim that a proposal is just can also be the beginning of further deliberation. For an art of persuasive speaking practical reasoning cannot be rendered unnecessary because one recognises that there is the good simply; practical circumstances require continuous deliberation.⁷⁸

If one comes to some conclusion about what is just, expedient, and noble, and refuses to accept challenges from the arguments on behalf of other ends, one no longer has a practical argument but an attempt to force abstract reasoning onto circumstances that have not been considered. This kind of argument opposes Aristotle's rhetorical art. A theory that ignores reality will not contribute to good practical decision-making; it will be unsuccessful or even harmful as it operates to preserve the theory itself and makes (often unfounded) assumptions about an action or decision. For example, when defending human rights one's end is justice regardless of how inexpedient this justice might be. Yet, if the defence would undermine the provider of human rights, then it is necessary to deliberate one's ends more carefully.

The possibility one end may move from being primary to being subordinate is reasonable when *speaking* about the relation between the three ends (the just, the expedient, and the noble). When *acting* in specific times and places the three ends conflict. A similar question concerning the relation of ends occurs in Aristotle's treatise on character. In the *Ethics*, one finds a discussion of how expediency, pleasure, and nobility seem to be, but are not, the good simply. These ends are part of the search for the good simply and their interrelation demonstrates the nature of a good act.

In Book II, chapter three, Aristotle presents a threefold definition of the good as the noble, expedient, and pleasant. The ends he lists in this passage are good because they are the possible ends toward which all human inquiry, action, and choice aim (*Ethics* 1094a). One can see the art of rhetoric within this search for the good life: the noble and the expedient are also the ends of epideictic and deliberative rhetoric respectively. Furthermore, what is pleasant and what is painful are the instruments of reward and punishment used to guide toward what is just – the end of judicial rhetoric (*Ethics* 1104b17).

Why is pleasure not the good and how is it related to judicial rhetoric? Pain and pleasure follow from certain feelings and actions, but pain and pleasure are intermediate; both can be good if their end is good. The pursuit of pleasure alone (and the consequent avoidance of all pain) is inherently unjust. Humans need to strive to be just because pleasure is not good in itself and will not lead to happiness. Excessive pleasure leads to disorder, yet, pleasure continues to *seem* to be good and to provide happiness. In addition, the lowest pleasures, the animal, bodily pleasures give clear evidence of being good to most human beings; they provide immediate pleasure. Yet, pleasure also follows noble and expedient actions and decisions. Thus, it is not pleasure itself that is the cause of excess and unhappiness but an unjust relationship to pleasure.

When one begins to find nobility and expediency more pleasant than immediate bodily pleasures, one's soul is becoming just. What does it mean for the soul to become more just? To explain the just soul it is best to refer to the tripartite soul described in Plato's *Republic*. In this dialogue, three elements: reason, spiritedness, and appetite constitute a soul. H.W.B. Joseph, in his study of these elements, explains that each has an active state which is a form of pleasure. The pleasure of reason is to know, of spiritedness, to do, and of appetites, to have.⁷⁹ The pleasures in

knowing what one ought to have and ought to do, and doing things successfully, surpass the pleasure of simply having bodily pleasures met. Yet, the pleasures of honour and bodily pleasures are still part of human life, and a just relationship between these three active parts of the soul would result in knowing what is just, doing what is just, and having what is just.

Being just requires all three actions and it is these three actions that Aristotle chooses as the ends of his three species of rhetoric. The judicial rhetoric's end concerns what one deserves, what one ought to have. The deliberative rhetoric's end concerns what is useful, what one ought to do. Finally, epideictic rhetoric's end, the noble, concerns knowing what to praise and blame, which is what one ought to know. The knowledge one ought to have, or seek to have, is the knowledge of what is just. Praising what one discovers to be just and blaming what is not encourages this search. Being just consists in knowing and having what is just, and acting justly. To act justly one must continue to judge which actions are useful because actions occur in particular times and places; these particularities affect what is available for just distribution and just rule.

Thus, the species of rhetoric are derived from the nature of the human soul. The species describe times when a speaker makes practical judgements, judgements that include the entire soul. A speaker must recognise both the good simply, the practical situation, and each aspect of the good that the three species aim toward – knowing what is just (nobility), acting justly (expediency), and having what is just (justice). Gathering together all of these requirements, a speaker brings his judgment about good acts into the *polis* by persuading fellow citizens toward particular good acts. This persuasion toward a particular action is a deliberative speech toward what is expedient for the good.

In the *Ethics*, expediency is eventually abandoned as a definition for the good (1142b31-33). Since what is expedient is always the means for an end beyond itself, it cannot be the end toward which all activities aim. Expediency is instead categorised as the end for artful deliberation because deliberation itself requires an end. Although the pleasant and the noble remain as definitions of the good (and thus, possible ends for expediency), in Book VII chapter nine, Aristotle states that pleasures must be qualified as noble in order to be good ends (1151b19). Thus, the pleasant is subordinate to the noble.⁸⁰ Yet, the good in the *Ethics* is not nobility as an idea or notion; the good is the noble *act*.

Because the definition of the good is concerned with action, the particular circumstances surrounding a practical judgment are as important as knowing what is noble (the end of the virtues of character and epideictic rhetoric). Thus, both reason and the desire to act well are required for a pursuit of the good. In contrast to the *Ethics*, the expedient, the just, and the noble remain as ends in the *Rhetoric*. They are separate for the sake of continuing and guiding discourse about the good. If one were to conclude that the just, which orders pleasures, the expedient, which deliberates well toward happiness, or the noble idea (beauty), which is good for the sake of itself, was the final definition of the good action, public discourse about these ends would be unable to guide citizens toward better actions.

The interrelations between the three species of rhetoric may lead to conflict which can foster further discourse. There are times when the just and the expedient conflict. In a similar way, the appetitive and spirited elements conflict in the soul. The *Rhetoric* demonstrates that good actions can be achieved from the conflict that occurs when one deliberates. Yet, shifting from judicial to deliberative rhetoric does not mean that justice simply becomes expediency. On the

whole, the three ends are interrelated, but, there are also times one rhetorical species rules the others. What occurs when one rhetorical species must rule the others? Why does this happen? When deliberative rhetoric must dominate as an end, the argument is made according to necessity. When something is necessary, practical circumstances make demands that are not open to deliberation. If citizens need to live on rations to support a war effort, it is irrelevant whether these measures are just or noble. The points of entry into further discussion are closed.

Limits to deliberation are set by the other species of rhetoric as well. A judicial rhetor can argue that his end is the just law and thus dismiss appeals to expediency or nobility. Again turning to the question of rights, one sees that rights are defended regardless of what is expedient and noble for a political community, law, or tradition. When arguments are made according to law what is legally defined as justice rules over the other species. When what is noble rules over the other species arguments are made according to tradition.⁸¹ For example, a traditional definition of beauty exists for the poets and this tradition of aiming toward an aesthetic purity is not changed for the sake of being useful or fair. Thus, each species has its ruling force and a decision made according to necessity, law, or tradition cannot be further discussed.

These ends limit the movement between species and can be used unjustly. Arguments from necessity may be unthoughtfully made for the sake of mere utility. Arguments defending the law may become base appeals to the passions. Arguments defending tradition may disregard what is practical. Since these uncompromising arguments close the possibility of referring to other ends, they are not actually cases of the rhetorical art. These arguments can cause listeners to hold opinions or perform acts they do not genuinely choose because they do not deliberate further and they do not have control over necessity, law, or tradition.⁸² When choice is not a possibility

rhetoric is unartful.

A deliberative argument from necessity pursues its end without thought to how its ends will come about.⁸³ When a deliberative argument is open to concerns for justice, expediency is limited; the way in which one reaches one's ends are evaluated. Necessity may be individualistic if one seeks what is expedient for oneself. Arguments from the law which do not address what is expedient or noble can become arguments that appeal to the law without thought of the purpose behind the law, often rendering the law to individual use. Laws are put in place for practical reasons and when judicial arguments are open to expediency, one can recognise that justice is practical and examine how it is practical.⁸⁴

Understood in the narrow sense of law, justice applies rules. Thus, this rule-applying justice does not seem to encourage deliberation beyond those rules. An account of character (*ēthos*) may promote deliberation and provide guidance for the good life but its suggestions are not re-enforced as law.⁸⁵ Is that account of character part of justice? Justice can be understood in the wider sense of a proper order for human action, which results from the proper order of the soul. Laws are made to promote this order and are, therefore, practical. If laws were regarded as an impractical (and thus, irrational in terms of practical judgement) set of rules, one's practice and defence of the law would consist of appeals to passion.

The danger of these passionate appeals shades the optimism of Aristotle's first chapter of the *Rhetoric*. In practice, the law cannot keep appeals to passion out of the courtroom (1354a1). Character (*ēthos*) allows one to recognise the reasonableness of the law and argue according to the laws because they are reasonable and practical. In addition, character is required to rule these passions which may interfere in the courtroom; the justice of rules calls for the justice of other

virtues of character, thus, judicial rhetoric cannot eliminate the possibility for deliberative rhetoric.⁸⁶ The pursuit of justice and expediency continue to coincide.

For example, in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*, the Athenian statesman, Diodotus, states that there is an "impossible combination" of justice and expediency; he intends to speak for the sake of the latter. Yet, Diodotus's speech describes the situation in such a way that listeners could not avoid concluding that Diodotus's proposal is more just than the proposal of his vengeful opponent Kleon. Diodotus's appeal to expedience allows him to reformulate the question of justice, thus, his justice more accurately accords with an order of human action than the "justice" provided by appeals to revenge and deterrence. Because the expedient is not a true end but the end of deliberation, a speaker must introduce an end beyond deliberation. Diodotus's choice entails future good – a just result. The purpose of his deliberation is justice.

While it may seem problematic for a speaker to argue that his end is expediency rather than justice, he does not deceive his audience when he says that his purpose is not the just. Justice was defined in Kleon's argument and Diodotus needs to redefine it. He initially accepts Kleon's notion of justice, but then offers up his own justice under a different name. That which is just for Athens in Diodotus's opinion appears more clearly as the expedient.⁸⁷ When the members of the audience recognise that Diodotus's practical advice provides a more just result, he is persuasive. Kleon has not employed a compelling argument according to necessity or the law; thus, Diodotus is at liberty to shift the focus from past wrongdoings to future possibilities.

An argument depending solely on tradition, which is the authoritative end of epideictic rhetoric, has a different relation with necessity and the law. What is traditional or conventional does not seem necessary and does not bear the force of the law. As discussed above, the noble

may actually define itself by not being expedient. Pursuing what is noble allows humans to rise above what is necessary. While expediency and necessity are concerned with what is appropriate for one's position in life and relation to others, nobility draws one to see one's place to be just according to the just ordering of the whole and recognises others as being part of that whole.⁸⁸

Epideictic rhetoric can broaden deliberation to include a recognition of good results beyond our own achievements and possibilities. Deliberation only concerns actions that we ourselves can do, but, praise can be given to matters which are outside of our control. We are free to look beyond expedient ends toward that which is praiseworthy when we are not concerned with expediency.⁸⁹ There are many matters to encounter beyond one's own deliberation. Praising the good without always choosing it allows one to act toward the good without being unjust and claiming the good as one's own. Thus, our ability to praise those who have chosen what is good for them, links us to others' decisions through our understanding of the good (*haplos*). This allows us to reason about matters outside of what is possible for us.

Each of the species of rhetoric has the potential to take over as a persuasive end and each remains a separate form of speech because it reflects an element of the human soul and the environment of the human soul – the practical realities of time and place. Epideictic rhetoric is preserved by holding traditions that may seem unnecessary and inexpedient, thus, the epideictic speaker appears separate from deliberation. Yet, those traditions were put in place to safeguard a practical purpose for later times and the epideictic speaker's praises may not be for his own deliberation, but he can affect others' deliberation through praise. Epideictic speech appears to have the most significant role in rhetoric because it connects one's understanding of one's own good to another's good (even another from a time past).

In fact, epideictic's end of nobility may lead to more deliberation because one must judge whether the noble end it praises is a possible action. Just as the noble act is the end in the *Ethics*, epideictic speech persuades toward an action that occurs for the political community not against or in denial of the political community. When arguing for the sake of what is noble, what is just and what is expedient are not defined according to what the individual deserves or individual expediency. They are defined according to what is just in the *polis* and what is expedient for the preservation of the *polis*. Nobility demands giving up one's self-preservation for the whole of which one is only a part.

In addition, if the noble is a speaker's authoritative end, he does not argue for the sake of mere tradition because he understands the kind of human being that tradition promotes. If tradition is not thought to contain any truth then humans are less likely to strive to be the kind of human beings that tradition upholds. Even these three species of rhetoric and the order they reveal are an Aristotelean tradition. They may not be the most expedient approach to persuasion at first because it is more difficult to consider these intermediate ends. Yet, by exploring the reasons why Aristotle introduces three species one can understand rhetoric's relationship with politics and with the study of character that his tradition promotes. In order for Aristotle's species of rhetoric to occur the rhetorical proof of character must link the argument (*logos*) from the individual soul to the good of the political community.

Arranging Artful Proofs: Character and Argument in the Species

Conflicts between the rhetorical ends not only affect discourse within epideictic, deliberative, and judicial rhetoric, they also reveal relations between the proofs comprising rhetorical speech. Aristotle's rhetorical speech must include the proofs in order to be artful

(1356a1-5). Eugene Garver suggests that the rhetorical species are unable to interrelate because of problems in the relations among artistic proofs, specifically, between character (*ēthos*) and argument (*logos*) in the speech. Aristotle addresses this tension between the roles of character and argument in the three species of the *Rhetoric*'s Book I, before he goes on to give an account of the third proof (*pathos*) in Book II.⁹⁰

Before turning to the passion-ruled interlocutors, Plato also introduces the tension between character and argument in the *Gorgias*. Socrates' first interlocutor, Gorgias, does not bring an individual concern for justice into his argument. The success of Gorgias's argument is one matter and his approach to, or concern for, virtue, is another matter.⁹¹ Because Socrates argues for the sake of virtuous action he can successfully move from one species of rhetoric to another. The arrangements of character and argument in the three species shift but this movement is reasonable insofar as one's end is virtue. For example, in deliberative rhetoric character maintains the end toward which one deliberates because one does not deliberate ends.

A deliberative argument assumes the end of the audience is good or valid and reasons rigorously toward it. If one argues that an end is expedient to the extent that it is necessary, the argument is drawn away from character of the speaker, which provides the purpose of the argument.⁹² Necessity allows what is instrumental to become an end; in deliberative rhetoric one uses argument and one's end is argument. Because the purpose of argument is only provided by character or found in the political community, argument alone is not sufficient.⁹³ Returning to the work of Garver, it is evident that in the practical world deliberative rhetoric cannot be reduced to argument because different political communities deliberate toward different notions of happiness.⁹⁴ With only one practical reasoning, or one acceptable argument, it is difficult to see

how a political community which does not follow this argument would be explained.

Without a reasonable account of why differing arguments might occur, it would seem better to simply overcome such diversity. Deliberative rhetoric must take into account the variety of ways people with different constitutions will define happiness.⁹⁵ Citizens of diverse political communities do not agree about which goods are choice-worthy and praiseworthy. The ability to reason that guides citizens to their respective goods is the same ability used to contemplate the good simply. Yet, reason is first directed toward what is good practically and, thus, must be based in practice.⁹⁶ An argument without an end beyond itself denies the plurality of practical ends and leads only to more argument when an action might be required. In deliberative rhetoric, character links argument to what is practical and particular.

In contrast to deliberative rhetoric which is aimed toward the best action for the political community, judicial rhetoric is concerned with practical judgments about the guiltiness, debts, and penalty of an individual who is part of the political community. Thus, it is concerned with the just for the individual and the political at the same time, and the judgements which are made should include both character and argument. Yet, judicial rhetoric has the tendency to exclude character when arguments are only concerned with the lawful.⁹⁷ Narrow legalism neglects the actions and decisions the individual made throughout his life, and relies on the word of the law without considering its practical purpose.

When used in this impractical sense law appears purposeless; however, experience shows that, in practice, those judging do not neglect their own purposes in the midst of formulating judgments. For this reason the technologists can use passionate appeals in their speech and neglect character; this virtue-avoiding approach often leads to success. If the judges' purposes are often

passion-based then the speaker must consider the role of passions in the courtroom. This problem (which Aristotle regards as significant or prevalent enough to address at the beginning of the *Rhetoric*) reveals that reason and passion are connected when making practical judgements; it is through character that reason rules passion.⁹⁸

While justice may be the following of rules without passion, if the practice of justice is reduced to following the rules without character, laws cease to order passions and instead become subservient to them. Justice in the individual soul provides order over the passions. While it is not possible for laws to rule over passions with the same kind of precision that is possible in the soul, legislators introduce laws for that purpose. When character is maintained within the judicial speech there is an ordering of passions; this order is related to the other ends of rhetoric, the expedient and noble, and the larger sense of justice that is possible in the individual soul.

Like the goods of deliberative rhetoric, the variety of injustices differ from place to place and the laws are set up to correspond to these differences. If the judicial rhetoric is simply regarded in terms of the lawful there is no room for rational comprehension of the laws of other states or a notion of justice beyond any particular set of laws. Although laws are supposed to be rational rules to guide citizens (instead of the unpredictability of rulers or the passions of the many) there is a proportionality of justice beyond the laws.⁹⁹ The pleasures that are considered tempting and their particular forms of injustice vary from one state to another and the laws to preserve justice are set up accordingly. The notion of lawful as justice does not take the diversity of constitutional justice into account.

Epideictic rhetoric lacks the political purposes found in the other species. Traditional notions of nobility are subject to being impractical. The practical guidance that the assembly

demands of deliberative rhetoric, and the judgements that the court demands of judicial rhetoric, do not exist for epideictic rhetoric.¹⁰⁰ Epideictic rhetoric raises the question: why should character be connected to argument? Is this arrangement itself not merely traditional? Is it according to tradition that the character of the speaker is dedicated to his argument? If the argument is not linked to character or, more specifically the end of virtuous action that character provides, then any intelligent and valid argument may be produced. The virtues of character may be replaced by intellectual capacity; a clever, persuasive speaker can rationalise intemperance, cowardliness, and other injustices.¹⁰¹ Character binds epideictic argument to justice and expediency; otherwise the practical virtues and political life seem unnatural.

The corrupted versions of the three species occur because the argument is not linked to the character of the speaker.¹⁰² Arguing according to character does not mean concluding that reason is powerless or that one should cease reasoning due to its apparent lack of precision in human affairs. Rather, one should seek what is probable and possible, dedicating oneself to bringing forth the argument. Thus, one finds that Aristotle's requirement that a speaker's argument be part of rhetorical art has little to do with one's former reputation for being a good man (1356a5-13). A rhetorical speaker must argue according to the good of each particular situation and distinguish properly between good simply and particular goods.¹⁰³

Aristotle's rhetorical art is linked to his own character. As a rhetorical speaker writing, Aristotle desires what is good and chooses what is practical. Aristotle's descriptions of the three kinds follow his understanding of the nature of the good and the nature of how it is brought about in speech and action through obstructions and limitations.¹⁰⁴ Thus, Aristotle's argument about the three species explains how relations of the good come about in practical arguments, but they do

not definitively explain what the good is. The limits of the species are appropriate for practical situations where claims about the good do not directly rule practical life.

The species of rhetoric occur because humans have three elements of the soul, which include spiritedness and appetites (as well as reason) and must be ordered. When the proper ordering of these elements occurs one is both courageous and moderate. This order frees the reasoning element from seeking excessive pleasures or honour and improves practical judgement. With a clearer view of practical, political circumstances, the three species of rhetoric are used to guide souls toward certain conclusions. Aristotle's end for persuasive speech is a clear conclusion that guides toward virtuous action; it is not mere persuasive victory toward any action.

The species also occur because humans must make judgements according to three relations to time where action occurs. Persuading toward action requires more than an agreement that a conclusion is valid; the entire soul must hold the conclusion as true and as a basis for action. Since persuasive speech guides entire souls, it requires more than logical argument. Persuasive speech must begin from what is practical and reason toward what is true. The limitation of practical circumstances teach preliminary definitions of the just, the expedient, and the noble. Judgements about these three ends may be refined according to arguments made for listeners, for citizens of the political community.

Rhetoric's refinement of judgement does not come in the form of a system. Studies of persuasion may attempt to systematise human interests and desires, but there are no systems in Aristotle's species of rhetoric.¹⁰⁵ Rhetoric is not systematic knowledge, its ends are limited, and it is dependent on knowledge. Rhetoric is dependent upon knowledge of political things and Aristotle coaxes his reader to explore politics in a number of passages. In the first chapter of the

Rhetoric, Aristotle makes the role of the lawmakers central (1354a32-b1). He calls the rhetoric of the political assembly the more noble rhetoric (1354b23). Aristotle also suggests that rhetoric might be “justly” called politics; if justice is one’s end (and not expediency, nobility, or the good) one might look to the past and say that politics is a matter of persuasion and power. Yet, Aristotle argues that one would only say this if one lacks education (1356a26-29).

By arguing that those who understand the distinction between rhetoric and politics are more educated, Aristotle encourages those who are interested in persuasive speech, but who also wish to be more educated, to study politics and understand the distinction between the two. The rhetorical species reflect different parts of the political community; the species appear to include knowledge of political things but they create arguments based on the character, speech, and the perception of the listeners.¹⁰⁶ By providing accounts of the probable and possible in speech and navigating the intermediate arena between the good simply and particular goods, the rhetorical species may seem to rule the whole of human affairs. Rhetoric assumes the appearance of politics and its imitation may cause one to forget the nature of politics.

Beyond the power or art of persuasive speech there are real political acts, institutions, laws, principles, and exclusive citizenship. Political communities must exist before the rhetorical art because rhetoric depends upon political ends. Rhetoric does not substitute the particular actions within, or the laws and principles of, a regime; rhetoric is subordinate to them. Organised according to practical political life, rhetoric links the good particular to the common good or the good simply; this occurs when reason rules passion through character for the sake of justice of the political community or justice simply. Good practical judgment occurs after one understands the distinction between the good simply and the particular good; recognising the good simply should

not cause one to reject the practical, political world but rather to approach it artfully, through character.

Yet, the third species of rhetoric does not clearly guide one toward political life. Why should character be dedicated to the political good and justice? The most politically problematic of the three species seems to be epideictic rhetoric. Are noble acts, which epideictic rhetoric praises, praised for the sake of the *polis* or for the sake of some other end? How do praise and blame connect reason to practical political life? What does a dedication to justice demand of the epideictic speaker? Does the dedication of a speaker's character to the end of justice cause the trust evident in the *Ethics*?

The Role of Epideictic Rhetoric: How is Praise Political?

Aristotle does not elevate epideictic rhetoric over the other species of rhetoric.¹⁰⁷ Yet, its position in his rhetorical art is significant. It seems that epideictic rhetoric does not have a specific political institution of its own as deliberative rhetoric functions in the assembly and judicial rhetoric, in the courtroom.¹⁰⁸ In terms of its relation to the soul, it is not concerned with what the appetitive element should have or what the spirited element should do, thus, its purpose does not seem to be an act or a judgement. Since epideictic rhetoric is still a species of rhetoric, the requirement of a political institution and purpose appears to become unnecessary in defining rhetorical art. In addition, Aristotle's account of the political man mentions only expediency and justice, not nobility.¹⁰⁹ Is epideictic rhetoric removed from political concerns?

Epideictic rhetoric does traditionally have an important political function in praising those lost in war. These speeches were part of an Athenian tradition demonstrated by "Pericles' Funeral Oration" in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian Wars*, and Aspasia's speech in Plato's *Menexenus*.¹¹⁰ This

political speech is significant; it praises the noble sacrifice an individual can make for the political community – his life. Thus, epideictic speech should praise the *polis* worthy of such a sacrifice.

While the other two rhetorical species allow the argument to overcome a concern for the character of the speaker, and become a corrupted rhetorical argument, the character of the epideictic speaker is not overcome by the argument. Yet, his argument may lack an obligation to political realities or to truth. Epideictic rhetoric does not seem to direct an audience toward any particular action. One praises those who have fallen in war to persuade toward the noble character.

The activity of epideictic rhetoric is praise and blame. Praise and blame follow an evaluation of virtue and vice. Epideictic rhetoric should persuade an audience that a character is praiseworthy or blameworthy, virtuous or vicious. Although it is not directly connected to action, epideictic rhetoric is connected through speech to deliberation which is connected to action. Epideictic rhetoric can link the pursuit of good choice and the pursuit of good praise; thus, it does make the art of speaking praiseworthy.¹¹¹ The matters within the speech which, when used, are used for deliberation, are still held as praiseworthy until the time comes when such opinions may be employed in decision-making. The epideictic speaker's character must be committed to responsible participation in the *polis*. Praising and blaming are part of our role as citizens. Public discourse provides opportunities for the good man to become the good citizen.¹¹²

Epideictic rhetoric also appears to encompass the other species. First of all, epideictic rhetoric's relation to time is not as clear as that of the other species. Deliberative rhetoric looks to the future and judicial rhetoric judges the past, while epideictic rhetoric judges the present in the sense that it judges the power of one who is speaking (1358b5). According to Aristotle, "it is not uncommon, however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by

way of recalling it, or the future by way of anticipating it” (1358b17-20). Not only does epideictic rhetoric resemble the rhetorical art as a whole because it concerns all times, it is also concerned with “greatness and smallness and the greater and the less, both universally and in particular,” as is the whole of the rhetorical art (1359a16-24). Epideictic rhetoric presents goods which are held by all human beings; it introduces a notion of human nature.

Despite this timeless and universal role, the epideictic species of rhetoric does not immediately demonstrate itself in practice. It is made evident after considering the purpose and approach of arguing according to the just or the expedient. In the same way, considering what one should have (justice for the appetitive element of the soul) and what one should do (justice for the spirited element) informs, and is informed by, the reasoning element (which is seeking what one should know). Nobility appears in the speaker’s reasoned opinions on expedience and justice.¹¹³ These opinions raise the standards of rhetoric because epideictic rhetoric is not as limited as deliberative and judicial rhetoric are in their political roles.¹¹⁴ Rhetoric in general has persuasion alone as its goal. Epideictic rhetoric narrows this goal and raises the standards of persuasion to the purpose of praising and blaming and, thus, evaluating virtue and vice.

Aristotle chooses epideictic rhetoric as a practical addition to his rhetorical art because of where it occurs – in an area unburdened with direct demands for action and judgment. Epideictic rhetoric provides space for contemplation and perplexity concerning practical questions. That which is good simply can inform the persuasion concerning particular goods. Thus, judging the past, deliberating toward future actions, and thinking in the present, and, justly having things, acting justly, and knowing justice are all components of this practical political art. The art of rhetoric is based on required political functions which guarantee its stability. When citizens

recognise their roles within politics, and, as good men who praise and blame, rhetoric is both practical and noble.

The first two chapters of the *Rhetoric* introduce an art related to dialectic, politics, and ethics. The purpose of rhetoric is to promote practical judgement which is also noble, and this requires a dedication to the just life. For Aristotle, rhetoric must be subordinate to politics; since rhetoric is a capacity and not a science or knowledge, it naturally subordinates itself to knowledge of political things. Although rhetoric lacks a subject matter like politics, one can study the proofs: *ēthos*, *logos*, and *pathos*, to grasp the rhetorical art. The possible disconnect among these proofs reveals the risk rhetoric poses. Aristotle addresses this risk in his polemic against the deviant forms of rhetoric employed by the technologists and the sophists, who consider *ēthos* superfluous.

Aristotle's three species provide a practical way to examine persuasive speech and to demonstrate the findings of his own inquiry into rhetoric. The art of rhetoric has its own set of standards – justice, expediency, and nobility – beyond mere victory, as well as a function in reality – a persuasive argument. Artful rhetoric falls into species that provide order for the plurality of practical, particular circumstances from which one could draw a speech. This plurality arises from the inability of what is good simply to directly guide practical action. Despite rhetoric's abilities one must remember that rhetoric is not knowledge; it is a power under politics which proves opposites. The role of political institutions must not be forgotten although the practical reasoning involved in rhetoric may appear to be more important than the political regime in which one finds the practical reasoning. Rhetoric does not account for the regime principles and practical, political demands; it is instrumental and subordinate.

What lies at the root of an understanding of rhetoric is the distinction between the good

simply and the particular goods, and also the nature of the human soul. Both are essential for any considerations of practical judgement. Examining the distinction between goods, one finds that most of our decisions appear to be made according to particular goods. On the one hand, the plurality of choices appears unmanageable and therefore not conducive to discourse or open to guidance. On the other hand, there is still a possibility we will mistake the good simply as our own, pursue it, and neglect our practical circumstances. Rhetoric hinders this possibility as well as offering an order to the plurality. Neither mere experience (from particular to general) nor direct inference from general to particular is sufficient to demonstrate the intermediate area and role of practical judgement.

The intermediate space between the good simply and particular goods is necessary because, otherwise, there would be one method of practical reasoning for all; plurality would not appear to have a reasonable basis. If a plurality exists in reality, there are reasons for it, and persuasive speech should be organised according to reality – according to how it is practised. If the plurality of goods clearly exists, how might one be prevented from reasoning through to see this distinction between the goods? Why would someone feel compelled to organise practical life according to theory? How does Aristotle call this unjust?

One could be prevented from seeing the distinctions between the good simply and the practical good because one has given no thought to the good. One has not made the inquiry from what is known to oneself to what is known simply. One has not thought about what is good about the actions he decides are good. Neglecting to think about the good life prevents one from thinking about the good, finding its distinctions, and understanding practical reason. Instead, a person may hold that there is either one practical reason (for example, all humans make decisions

according to comfortable self-preservation), or that there is no connection between the practical good and the good simply. The latter alternative would lead to the conclusion that a good life may exist, but we cannot know it; therefore, it does not affect our practical decision making. Both of these options would require one to negate the role of practical judgement.

Without practical judgement, it appears reasonable to organise practical life according to one argument or theory, perhaps, even when it forces one to deny reality. If practical considerations are collapsed into theories of impractical speech, then a decision would not be reasonable anytime it did not align itself to a posited theory. Instead of exploring the reasoning behind a so-called theoretically unsound decision, it could be concluded that such a decision arises from a nonrational, emotive cause, or from series of causes and effects resulting from one's environment and social conditioning for which one is not responsible. Aristotle's rhetorical arguments are different from logical arguments in that they are responsible arguments.¹¹⁵ Logic cannot ignore concerns of character if the argument as a whole is about particular actions. In practical judgement, argument and knowing practical circumstances are joined in one character.

By not facing the difficulty of practical discourse and judgement and simply labelling questions concerning the good life and good action as irrational, one achieves an undeserved peace of mind, one is unjust, and one lacks character. Aristotle and Plato face the difficult task of promoting character in political life. In Plato's dialogue, *Gorgias*, Socrates initiates an encounter with the famous professor of rhetoric. Good character enters political discourse by pursuing justice. This professor, Gorgias, tries to maintain a neutral stance toward justice while imparting the technique of persuasive speech.

The three species of rhetoric, rhetoric's precarious position as an art, and the risks posed

by the deviant forms of rhetoric are evident throughout this dialogue. Thus, it appears that Aristotle drew his presentation of rhetoric from the exchanges of Socrates and his interlocutors.¹¹⁶ A comparison of Socrates' approach to rhetoric with Aristotle's three species of rhetoric and his reasoned account of a possible art provided in the *Rhetoric*'s introductory section helps reveal the weaknesses of Gorgias's rhetoric.

In his translation of the *Gorgias*, James H. Nichols notes that the kind of rhetoric spoken in the beginning of the dialogue is not what Socrates would prefer Gorgias teach. Nichols states, "Socrates steers Gorgias away from epideictic toward political (or deliberative) and above all toward forensic rhetoric."¹¹⁷ Epideictic rhetoric may lack a direct connection with the political realm. It is possible to understand how Gorgias mistakes this impractical species of rhetoric for the whole of rhetoric. Gorgias does not experience the pressing concerns of the courts of law or the political assembly. As a visiting educator in persuasive speech, he is removed from these problematic realities. By isolating epideictic rhetoric, Gorgias distorts the other species and impoverishes the practical role of epideictic speech.

The interrelations of three species are necessary for artful persuasion. Socrates demonstrates to Gorgias that using persuasive speech because it is *easier* than having to learn what is true is insufficient, and for thinking men, unpersuasive. Socrates "wins" the argument between himself and Gorgias, not because his "word-play" is better, but because he takes into account what is true and what is true in their particular situation. Socrates is concerned with character and practical judgement. In an examination of how Socrates, a just and wise man, practises rhetoric we shall find the three species of rhetoric being navigated properly.

CHAPTER TWO

"... if, putting our hand to public practice, we urged each other on as being adequate doctors, I suppose I should examine you and you me ..."

Gorgias (514d3-5)

The confrontation between Gorgias and Socrates, the rhetorician and the philosopher, reveals that the philosopher knows more about rhetoric than the rhetorician. Socrates advises Gorgias that he must pursue justice if he wants knowledge of rhetoric. The opinion that justice is unnecessary for persuasive speech threatens this pursuit of justice and knowledge of rhetoric. (This opinion seems to occur when one thinks that justice is merely invented and not discovered and that there is no order or reason in human life.) Persuasion toward this opinion poses a danger to both philosophy and politics because the act of clarifying through argument can guide toward truth and practical judgement.

On the one hand, if a rhetorician or educator proposes that disorder is the inevitable human condition rather than order, his students are given no reason to search for an order in persuasive speech. Instead, they accept the disordered end and may invent their own order drawing on the prevailing disorder. Because justice itself is an ordering of human actions, the assumption that disorder is inevitable is an assumption that injustice is inevitable. On the other hand, if a rhetorician restricts justice to a particular set of laws, rhetoric hinders further discourse about the nature of justice. As Aristotle's account of rhetoric shows, justice has an order, but adhering to its order does not require one to deny the variety of practical demands or political decisions.

The art of rhetoric clarifies justice and must begin from particular practical circumstances. In the previous chapter, rhetoric is found in the three species and resembles practical judgement. These species exist as a result of the divisions of the soul and the limits of human judgement.

Aristotle's rhetoric, as a threefold approach to argument, addresses the plurality of possible actions in politics, and addresses the artful, virtuous approach to speech and action. As the counterpart to dialectic, rhetoric's purpose is to build upon basic judgements that are made about the ends of the three kinds: the just, the expedient, and the noble. A better understanding of the relationship between these three ends removes the obstacles to justice.

Discourse about justice orders the space between intellectual life of speech and practical life of action. The *Gorgias* demonstrates how an education in persuasive speaking cannot be indifferent to its political role; it must be a civic education. Neglecting the political community's concern for justice, Gorgias's rhetoric operates for the sake of ending dialogue and replacing practical reasoning with a craft of speech-making. He does not grasp the interconnectedness of the three species of rhetoric or consider the order of the soul. On the other hand, Socrates' rhetoric functions for the sake of providing the foundations for meaningful discourse (dialectic) and exercising practical judgement in the political community.¹¹⁸ He shifts among the species of rhetoric, demonstrates how one argues according to an ordered soul, and promotes self-rule.

The Setting of the Gorgias: A Feast for a War

The setting of the *Gorgias* suggests that it is a dialogue written for educators, perhaps particularly for educators of students intending to be politically active. Plato's title character is a famous rhetorician who teaches ambitious young men, in this case young Athenian men, how to speak persuasively. Relatively early in the dialogue, Socrates refutes Gorgias's account of rhetoric but this does not bring the dialogue to a close. Instead, Socrates proceeds to demonstrate (to Gorgias) the possibilities and limitations of an education into rhetoric by speaking with Callicles and Polus. The opening refutation is only the beginning of Plato's teaching on rhetoric, but it

serves as an outline of Socrates' position concerning the art. Gorgias, the rhetorician, must first become aware of his insufficient understanding of rhetoric and desire to know a more sufficient definition of rhetoric.

Socrates' definition of rhetoric is stated in a relatively straightforward manner as he approaches the close of his discussion with Gorgias. Just as Aristotle establishes the purpose and order for his study of rhetoric in his introductory chapters, Plato provides a framework for his study of rhetoric by establishing guiding questions in the speech of his characters, predominately Socrates, at the opening of the dialogue. Both Aristotle and Socrates question rhetoric's status as an art, a power, or a kind of knowledge, and, at the close of the introductory sections, both resolve that it is best to discuss rhetoric according to three sets of opposites. I shall examine the first section of the dialogue to see how Socrates arrives at this conclusion.

The *Gorgias* is an acted dialogue without a narrator; Plato writes his discussion of rhetoric in a live dramatic conversation without a bridge between his reader and his characters. The reader must evaluate the characters without the insights of a guiding voice. Socrates voluntarily seeks this encounter with Gorgias; this visit is Socrates' own choice. Socrates engages three characters in conversation, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. The dialogue is set amidst the action of the Peloponnesian War.¹¹⁹ Gorgias is a foreigner from the city of Leontini on the island of Sicily, where Athens will later suffer a terrible defeat. At the outset of the dialogue, Chaerephon, Socrates' oracle-bearing companion, is with Socrates. Chaerephon's presence may remind the reader of Socrates' interpretation of the Delphic oracle and subsequent search for a man wiser than himself.¹²⁰

The first section of the dialogue echoes Socrates' account of how he tests the wisdom of

others, as he describes in the *Apology*.¹²¹ Plato uncovers the errors in Gorgias's understanding of rhetoric and his manner of teaching by means of Socrates' examination of Gorgias's wisdom and the action of the dialogue. Socrates' dialogue with Gorgias demonstrates the external demands required for an art of rhetoric.¹²² Plato placed his demonstration of a rhetorician's need for practicality in a dialogue which continually refers to practical deliberations. "War" is the first word of this dialogue. It is spoken by Callicles, an Athenian student of Gorgias as well as the rhetorician's host. The dialogue opens with Callicles welcoming Chaerephon and Socrates, but his greeting suggests that he thinks Socrates has avoided Gorgias's display in fear of losing a battle of words. Socrates is quick to say that which he missed was more like a feast than a battle.

Thus, the bodily pleasures of food and drink are immediately brought into the dialogue to replace the more noble pleasures of a soldier. These two activities may also anticipate Aristotle's concern for practical virtues, courage and moderation, in his discussion of persuasion. According to Socrates, Gorgias's audience has not experienced anything akin to the rigours of battle but their souls have instead been filled with delicacies of a feast. Socrates displays his own use of rhetoric in his swift digression from the initial metaphor of rhetoric as war to that of rhetoric as mere bodily pleasure. Socrates shifts Gorgias's rhetorical display from being viewed as the noble event of battle to a pleasant event of a feast (447a3).

Callicles is not altogether misguided in his comparison between speeches and battles because both rhetoric and war can be struggles over who decides what is just. Public arguments and formal political disagreements often result from differing opinions of justice. War occurs when there is an uncompromising conflict between opinions of justice. Similar to strategies of rhetoric, strategies concerning how to fight and win battles are necessary in the volatile condition

that a disagreement about justice can create. Strategy and the power that it grants are not pursued for their own sake in either war or rhetoric. Rhetoric and war are praiseworthy when used for the sake of justice.

This theme of war can also help to explain why Socrates would face Gorgias in the first place. Socrates may suspect through Gorgias's reputation as a teacher of rhetoric, or recognise from reading Gorgias's work that he has a capacity for strategy. Yet, it is likely due to their discordant opinions on justice that Socrates decides to speak with him. While Gorgias's technique is used to merely please other men with feasts, Socrates looks toward battles and toward encouraging other men who have been trained to endure battles. Socrates may hope to link Gorgias's ability to a new purpose and demonstrate to Gorgias battles worth fighting.

Chaerephon's Injustice and the Three Species of Rhetoric

Chaerephon seems guilty of the offense of lingering in the agora; this action causes Socrates to miss Gorgias's display and is portrayed in the opening scene as an unjust act that Chaerephon must answer for. This injustice leads to our first discussion of the three species of rhetoric in the dialogue. Socrates accuses Chaerephon of being the cause of their tardiness after Callicles reproaches them for their inappropriate arrival. Chaerephon takes responsibility for the accusation and promises he can resolve the injustice done to Socrates, which is of a questionable degree since Socrates himself often chats in the agora at length and is probably quite tolerant of Chaerephon's discussions. Nevertheless, because Gorgias is Chaerephon's friend, arrangements can be made for Gorgias to make a display for them upon Socrates' wish.¹²³ Socrates' interest in Gorgias becomes clear despite his having missed Gorgias's big show.

Callicles seconds Chaerephon's assertion that it should be possible for Gorgias to speak to

Socrates and he extends an invitation to come to his home where Gorgias is staying. Plato shows that the Athenian friendliness toward Gorgias is almost competitive. Callicles is sure to display that he is a closer friend of Gorgias than Chaerephon. It seems the Athenians, at least these two citizens, are attracted to Gorgias's teachings and are eager to make connections with him. The Athenians are delighted by Gorgias's skill, but whether he is able to train his students to be as skilful as himself remains to be seen. Thus far, the dialogue suggests that Gorgias excites his students with compelling rhetorical inventions.

In opposition to Gorgias's thrilling speeches, Plato uses written dialogues to educate and Socrates uses dialectic. There is a tension between Gorgias's approach to education and the philosophers' approach. Gorgias seems to hinder the efforts of Plato and Socrates. Gorgias's speeches may work when linked to judicial rhetoric, which is subject to the laws of the *polis*. A careful study of Plato's writings improves deliberation; it helps to decide what to do. Finally, Socrates demonstrates the praiseworthy life of seeking justice and truth through dialectic and the three species of rhetoric are ordered in Socrates' speech. He seeks just ends and makes practical, particular decisions with his interlocutors. Even before the principle exchange between Socrates and Gorgias occurs, the setting of the *Gorgias* includes interplay between judicial, deliberative, and epideictic rhetoric.

Socrates moves Callicles' initial comment from a question of nobility in war to a question of pleasure in feasting, and therefore potential injustice. Yet, by arriving too late for the speech, Socrates seems to be the one who acts unjustly toward his soon to be interlocutor but he declares it was actually Chaerephon's unjust act. Chaerephon agrees with Socrates' accusation and his injustice is "cured" by his promise to be of some use. The conversation moves to what they want

to do next.¹²⁴ After Callicles offers to remedy the injustice himself, Socrates praises him twice by telling him what he says is both “good” and “noble” (447b8) (447c9); Socrates’ praise guides them toward their chosen course of action, learning from Gorgias.

The ends of the species of rhetoric appear here in the action of the dialogue. Socrates accuses Chaerephon of injustice, that is to say, for choosing a disproportionate pleasure for the time and place. (He should have saved his discussions for a moment which would not make them late; he should have been in the place where Gorgias was giving his speeches.) Following the articulation of Chaerephon’s unjust act, Socrates shifts the discussion towards his intended future conversation with Gorgias; their speech would then be an instance of deliberative rhetoric. This progression includes a contribution by Callicles, who suggests the possibility of a dialogue between the rhetorician and philosopher. Thus, Socrates praises Callicles’ offer.

This opening conversation establishes an interplay between three ends: the just, the expedient, and the noble. Socrates’ praise arises from the judgements about what is just and what is the most expedient act for them. This opening example does not seem to be a very serious piece of deliberation, but, the three species can be seen functioning in this subtle manner. When an audience obviously holds the same end, deliberation is unnoticeable. In this case, Chaerephon, Socrates, and Callicles all wish to speak with Gorgias. When the desired judgement or action is not agreed upon, knowing how the divisions of rhetoric function is useful to a speaker wishing to make his argument persuasive.

The next section of the dialogue reveals that Socrates and Gorgias do not agree about the ends of rhetoric. Thus, the deliberation about what should be done, that is to say, how should rhetoric be taught, is more complicated. Socrates uses the three species to show that Gorgias lacks

knowledge of rhetoric and consequently teaches rhetoric unjustly. Gorgias's student, Polus, cannot argue according to the three species because he does not hold justice as a purpose of rhetoric. Polus bases the art of rhetoric on experience rather than reason, he has experienced how rhetoric is expedient or powerful and thus believes rhetoricians are praiseworthy. According to Aristotle's species, Polus has separated deliberative and epideictic rhetoric from judicial rhetoric. Socrates is able to disagree with Polus without directly attacking Gorgias's position.

Experience before Knowledge: The Weakness of the Proxy Dialogue

Socrates' initial encounter with Gorgias is non-confrontational as the dialogue in this scene is conducted between Chaerephon and Polus – a novice rhetorician from Gorgias's school. The conversation between Chaerephon and Polus reflects the respective positions of Socrates and Gorgias. Although one might assume a degree of animosity exists between the two men, Socrates does not immediately make a strike against Gorgias by claiming to disagree with his opinions of rhetoric or justice. Socrates looks to Gorgias because he is seeking an answer to the question, "what is the *power* of this man's art?" If we assume that Socrates is speaking of the power of rhetoric, he may claim to be ignorant about rhetoric's power because, although rhetoric's power seems to be great, it is not reason that makes it so.

Yet, there is evidence that rhetoric does have power.¹²⁵ Gorgias is a powerful speaker and impresses people in Athens with his rhetoric, convincing many to come to his school. The success of Gorgias's rhetoric seems to make a strong case for the accuracy of his rhetoric. Gorgias understands how men are persuaded insofar as he is able to effectively move them to agree that he is honourable. He grasps human nature in a particular manner which defines his approach to rhetoric. Yet, Socrates is not asking "what is rhetoric?" He asks about the *power* of Gorgias's art

and perhaps he is not making the assumption that Gorgias's art is rhetoric, or at least what Socrates understands rhetoric to be. Although it is likely Socrates already has his own ideas about rhetoric, he turns to his art of choice, dialectic, when beginning a discussion with Gorgias.

Socrates indicates that he would particularly like to have a conversation, "a dialogue," with Gorgias, rather than listen to a display. Socrates' timing is perfect because, as Callicles explains, Gorgias is having a question and answer period following his display of speeches. For Gorgias, the posing of questions is "one aspect of his display" (447c6). Callicles encourages Socrates to take advantage of this opportunity for Athenian citizens to experience Gorgias's wisdom. Callicles tells Socrates that "there's nothing like asking the man himself" (447c5); thus, the questioning begins. In order to discover the power of Gorgias, Socrates asks, who is Gorgias and what is his art?

Socrates instructs Chaerephon to ask these questions in his place, perhaps because Gorgias is, as was mentioned earlier, Chaerephon's friend. It is possible that Chaerephon and Socrates were discussing Gorgias, or the former's friendship with Gorgias, in the agora. Socrates could have explained to Chaerephon how he views and approaches friendship. Thus, Chaerephon may have some notion of Socrates' purpose and how he intends to approach Gorgias. Still, it is necessary for Socrates to give instructions to Chaerephon about what Socrates wishes to know (who Gorgias is). At first, Chaerephon does not grasp what Socrates is talking about and tells him so. Socrates slows down and explains to Chaerephon what he means and verifies that Chaerephon understands. Socrates' leadership with Chaerephon contrasts with Gorgias being brushed aside by Polus. Chaerephon proceeds into an argument with caution, whereas Polus is quick to speak out of turn and overconfident in his assumptions.¹²⁶

Chaerephon asks Gorgias whether it is true that he professes that which Callicles said he professes. The first word Gorgias speaks in this dialogue is “true,” as he answers Chaerephon’s question.¹²⁷ Gorgias confirms that Callicles indeed spoke the truth and introduces himself by professing two things: first, he will answer whatever anyone asks him, and secondly, he declares that no one has asked him a new question for many years. From this profession, Chaerephon gathers that Gorgias would find it easy to answer Socrates’ question. It is established that “ease” is a motivation for an action or decision. The opposites, difficult and easy, are thus introduced into the dialogue. Actions are difficult and easy depending on the different amounts of pain and pleasure involved. Chaerephon assumes that an act becomes less difficult when one does the same thing many times. Experience has demonstrated that by practising certain behaviours, pain and difficulty can be reduced. Since Gorgias has experienced many arguments, he offers Chaerephon the experience of how he can, without pain or difficulty, answer any inquiry (448a5).

Efforts to avoid pain and difficulty remind the reader of the opening of the *Gorgias*, which began with the allusion to feasting, an activity of (bodily) pleasure. Gorgias’s rhetoric is based on appealing to his audience’s desire for what is easy and pleasant. Yet, even basing one’s understanding of pleasure and pain on experience should lead to the conclusion that short-term pleasure may equal long-term pain and vice versa. For example, eating three pieces of chocolate cake everyday may grant short-term pleasure and result in long-term pain. Likewise, exercise may include short-term pain but leads to the long-term pleasure of health.

Plato uses the character of Gorgias to demonstrate how this pleasure and pain dynamic is also true for speeches; Gorgias’s easy answers do not make his argument capable of reaching the truth. Although gratifying pleasure seems to be the most stable base for a persuasive argument, it

does not withstand reasoned argument. Just as habituating oneself to healthy behaviours concerning one's body should not depend on pleasure and pain, habituating one's soul to justice should not depend on what one finds pleasant or easy. Subordinating what is good or just to what is pleasant, results in the avoidance of all things painful, including the painful things which are good or just. The speech makers who persuade according to the pleasant may have a certain confidence gained from experiencing the agreement of most crowds. This kind of speaker is not burdened with questions concerning how useful his definition is, whether his definition of persuasive speech could lead to injustice, or whether he delivered his definition in a way proportionate to an audience's understanding.

Before Chaerephon can question or "test" Gorgias "by experiment," Polus seizes their conversation. Polus demands that he be the one tested since he feels that Gorgias must be tired from his previous speeches. Chaerephon questions whether Polus believes his own answers are better than Gorgias's. (It is probable that Chaerephon cannot imagine himself taking up a conversation intended for Socrates in the manner in which Polus takes up the questions intended for Gorgias.) Polus merely retorts that his answers should be enough for Chaerephon. Polus seems to admit that he himself may not be the same calibre of rhetorician as Gorgias, but that he is enough of a rhetorical fighter to successfully spar with Chaerephon.

As the dialogue later indicates, Polus measures his success by how well he can gratify his opponent, not by his ability to find the truth about the subject of their discussion. For Polus, victory occurs when he satisfies and silences his audience, thus his rhetoric projects that purpose. If a speaker is only looking toward what will gratify the listener, he will find himself in a difficult situation if someone in the audience actually knows the truth about the subject at hand (that

subject here being the art of rhetoric). That member of the audience would not find a response like Polus's pleasant, it would not be adequate. Even if no one in the audience had enough knowledge to reject his speeches, Polus's rhetoric would still have an effect. The audience would believe they had learned the subject at hand.

Chaerephon does not seem impeded by Polus's interjection and continues questioning him. Thus, the first conversation between Socrates and Gorgias proceeds as a proxy conversation through Chaerephon and Polus. It is not successful: the two do not manage to define the art of rhetoric. Yet, their conversation does set out the difficulties of rhetoric. Polus's "rhetorical" display of rhetoric does not (at least not directly) teach us what rhetoric is. Polus demonstrates that one cannot define matters with rhetoric, one cannot even define rhetoric itself rhetorically. He is determined that rhetoric be regarded as a praiseworthy activity; even when used for doing injustice, which Polus later admits to be shameful (474c9). Because Polus does not believe that rhetoric is just he is reluctant to define rhetoric among potential students and citizens. Thus, he praises and defends the art that Gorgias practises but neither explains nor names it. Unlike dialectic, rhetoric is limited to praise and blame.

If one desires a definition one must approach rhetoric from a different method than merely defending it as a praiseworthy thing. The nature of any phenomenon can be found through questioning and Socrates is famous for his dialectic inquiry, but he does not follow that approach when guiding Chaerephon in this preliminary battle. Socrates provides examples for Chaerephon instead of questions. First, he uses the example of the "cobbler" to explain to Chaerephon how he should approach his inquiry into Gorgias's art. Examples are rhetorical tools Aristotle designates for deliberative rhetoric and Socrates finds it more appropriate that Chaerephon think of his

question practically.

Socrates aims for what is expedient for this conversation, and his aim is evident in the example he chooses. Socrates' first comparison of a rhetorician is with a craftsman whose work is notably practical, who produces something fit for action, and whose art can be taught. A rhetorician may be similar to a cobbler in the sense that the practical speeches of a rhetorician should be made with the same purpose as the cobbler makes shoes – to be sturdy and fit properly.¹²⁸ This example begins to build the definition of rhetoric that Socrates indirectly reveals to Gorgias. The example is also useful for Chaerephon: he imitates Socrates' practice of using examples.

After being coached by Socrates, Chaerephon chooses the doctor and then the painter as examples of men, who, like rhetoricians, have arts. The doctor is a “knower” of his art and is “justly named” a doctor, while the painter is “experienced” in his art and is “rightly” called a painter (448b4-448c3). Chaerephon seems to draw a distinction between arts based on knowledge and those based on experience. The knowledge-based art is the practical art of the doctor and the experienced-based art is the imitative art of the painter. Both reveal the nature of the rhetorical art in a particular way.¹²⁹

In light of the doctor and painter examples, Chaerephon questions Polus concerning what Gorgias might be on account of the art that he knows and in which he has experience. Polus does not simply answer, “a rhetorician and rhetoric.” Instead, he describes how arts come about, tells Chaerephon that many arts exist, and praises Gorgias's art without describing the art itself in any way. According to Polus, arts come from experiments that are experienced by men. He says that men who go about matters without art do so because they do not have experience and live by

chance (448c4-5). For him, experience is the basis of art, and there are a number of different arts participated in by different men. Polus claims that the best men do the best arts, and since Gorgias is one of the best men, he takes part in the most noble art. Rather than giving it a definition or classifying it by name, Polus instead provides a defence of rhetoric by calling it the noble art of the best man.

According to Polus's definition, experience guides toward art and inexperience to chance. His definition seems partly true. The more time one takes to practise an activity the more one should grasp the order which rules that activity. In terms of rhetoric, one would be more confident in one's success after experiencing many successes. If one spends less time practising activities one is less likely to see an order from which to build an art. Since Gorgias often gives public speeches, he is guided toward art, while one who gives a speech for the first time might proceed haphazardly and only persuade by chance. Yet, Socrates seems perfectly capable of giving a public speech if given a good reason. Chaerephon's examples help to reveal insufficiencies in Polus's definition of rhetoric.

If the arts in the examples represent aspects of the rhetorical art, Polus only provides the experienced painter aspect of the rhetorical art and not the knowledgeable doctor aspect. It seems that experience alone cannot constitute an art of rhetoric, or any practical art, without knowledge. Learning an art requires that one's experience be directed by reason. If an event is merely experienced, its effects are seen and learned; however, if an event is reasoned through, its causes can also be seen. An art requires this type of conscious arranging of causes. In rhetoric, for example, in order to practise artful persuasion, one would have to know what occurs in the listener(s) when persuasion takes place. In order to understand this persuasion, one requires

knowledge of human nature, the human soul and its various manifestations.¹³⁰

Polus and his teacher Gorgias could have experienced many arguments without developing an art based on them. By reasoning through why an event occurred or why an argument is held and by testing what is experienced, one finds exceptions to what is originally gathered from that experience, as well as deeper insights about each event and argument. What is occurring in the souls of the listeners when they are persuaded by particular speeches should not be organised into a system based on when they “give in” to, are gratified by, or receive pleasure from, an argument. That would be a case of only providing an immediate experience of pleasure. If pleasure is pursued as an end then pleasure becomes excessive. What is occurring in the souls of the listeners should be based on the proper ordering of those souls according to moderation. The art of rhetoric would then depend on the speaker’s relation to the ordered soul and the plurality of souls in his audience. Therefore, Polus is not entirely off the mark with his notion of a connection between the nobility of the art of rhetoric and the individual rhetorician practising the art (448c7).

Despite these possible half-truths about rhetoric that can be found in his speech, Polus has yet to answer Chaerephon’s question – what is this art and what is Gorgias as a result of knowing this art? Despite that striking omission, when the question of who “won” this interchange is posed, the victor appears to be Polus. Chaerephon either does not desire the truth himself and he does not recognise that Polus has not answered his question, or he is simply confused by Polus’s response and does not have the capacity to articulate its faults. Nevertheless, Chaerephon falls silent and abandons his original question after Polus’s account of rhetoric as a praiseworthy activity.

Polus, like his teacher, seems fond of epideictic rhetoric, which is most concerned with praising noble things, but he has not explained why rhetoric is noble. Polus provides a general answer that may produce pleasure for the audience, but it does not teach Chaerephon anything about the art of rhetoric that he can judge; what has rhetoric done or what can rhetoric do? Polus's definition, in that sense, is impractical; there seems to be nothing in the art of rhetoric itself that is noble. According to Polus, Gorgias has compiled an art from experience that is the best art because he is noble. Such a definition may be pleasing to most of those present, however, Gorgias's past experience alone does not account for the causes or reasons behind that experience or the lessons about persuasion that can be drawn from it.

Experience can be evaluated according to pleasure and pain; but, if we come to find that some pleasures are better than others, then pleasure is by nature subordinate to other ends. Polus's type of pleasure may become lower and altogether insignificant for one who has higher aims in mind than just any pleasure. Since knowledge would be required in order to distinguish which pleasures are higher than others, Socrates prefers the search for knowledge over the pursuit of pleasure. This means evaluating one's experience according to something more than pleasure alone and Polus's instructor does not seem to know other standards (448d2 and 463d6).

Polus is indirect and unclear about his opinion of rhetoric because he wishes for rhetoric to be pleasing, which is his benchmark for success. The war metaphor appears again when Socrates supposes that Polus has armed himself with a number of these types of arguments. Yet, Polus has not kept his promise to Chaerephon to define rhetoric; the arguments Polus has experienced, as bad strategies in battle, have not helped him to fulfil this particular duty. Polus does not seem concerned with the truth or nature of rhetoric, and instead focusses entirely on whether rhetoric is

noble. Perhaps, he cannot keep his promise because he does not know how to define rhetoric in a way which imparts what he thinks is the truth about rhetoric and still maintain its praiseworthiness. He seems reluctant to even use the word “rhetoric.”

Polus is unjust to Chaerephon on two accounts. First, he says nothing clear about rhetoric or Gorgias that would help Chaerephon understand or be able to employ rhetoric; secondly, he does not keep his promise or commitment to name Gorgias’s art. The rhetorical ends of justice, efficiency, and nobility are not functioning well together in Polus’s speech. Unlike the opening scene where an accusation of injustice was addressed, Polus defends the art of rhetoric without its being accused of an offence. He seems to begin from the point of view that rhetoric is unjust but chooses to hide this possibility rather than explore it. Thus, there is a severing in his reasoning. He must think of a method for defending rhetoric while thinking it is not justly defensible. In moving from judicial to deliberative speech, he could question rhetoric’s use and reveal that it is useful for justice. Polus does not possess a reason to be just, or he would have the capacity to argue how rhetoric is useful for justice and would not simply praise rhetoric to hide its potential for injustice.

According to Polus, rhetoric is “fine” or “noble” because it is an art found through experience in which the best men participate. Polus does not define the characters of the best men and the experience of rhetoric is left unqualified and unclear. The torn nature of his own thought creates a disjunct in his speech. By thinking that rhetoric is unjust but arguing that it is praiseworthy, Polus praises injustice and seems to act against his own thought. Despite his inability to provide a precise definition of rhetoric, Polus was taught how to be a “powerful” speaker and it seems Chaerephon was not. Polus’s education, free from guidance concerning the purpose of the power of speech, makes Polus capable of being more unjust; he is seemingly more

knowledgeable than Chaerephon. The recognition resulting from this apparent success makes him less likely to examine his reasoning.

Polus's "victory" over Chaerephon may cause Gorgias's audience to think that Gorgias is a better teacher than Socrates. To Gorgias, Socrates may be another sophist attempting to learn from him how he teaches his pupils so effectively. On the other hand, Gorgias admits that he does not see why Socrates finds Polus's response to Chaerephon inadequate, for Chaerephon seemed satisfied or at least stifled. Gorgias teaches an impractical art that produces the ability to speak without knowledge of the speech's subject matter. As was demonstrated in Polus's response, this ability allows his students to make speeches about the kind of thing something is, whether it is of a noble or a shameful kind, without knowing what the thing is.¹³¹

Gorgias exhorts Socrates to speak with this student of his, if Socrates wishes. Socrates does not desire to speak with Polus; he would rather discuss this with Gorgias, if the rhetorician wishes to answer. Polus has demonstrated how one might be ignorant or false and still persuasive if one's audience surrenders in silent agreement without reasoning. Neither Polus nor Chaerephon recognise what is missing, but Socrates knows Polus's rhetoric is insufficient. Polus's persuasion does interrelate among the ends of rhetorical species. For him, injustice does not appear to be shameful, and expediency is not necessarily just. Through Polus's "successful" injustice, Gorgias appears to be the better educator and the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias begins in Gorgias's apparent advantage.

Socrates and Gorgias: Building a Dialogue from Pleasantries

The first conversation between Socrates and Gorgias emphasises Gorgias's skill as a rhetor and proceeds in a friendly, voluntary manner. In this discussion, doing only what they wish

to do and what is pleasant appears very significant for Socrates and Gorgias. No one is forced to speak or answer questions if they find it unpleasant or do not desire to do so. They are careful to engage in a pleasant, voluntary inquiry. The significance of this pursuit being pleasant and free may be that Socrates is initially adhering to Gorgias's ends of pleasure, and perhaps he (Gorgias) might say beauty, which are freed from the concerns for what is just or expedient, not to mention the harsher facts of political life, necessity and force.

In his first discussion with Gorgias, Socrates avoids mentioning these political realities with which a citizen would be concerned. These realities are unpleasant or difficult, attributes which run counter to Gorgias's rhetorical end. In this passage, Socrates emphasises the pleasant for the sake of revealing how pleasures, even pleasures which seem higher and unrelated to the body, can lead to injustice.

"Rhetoric," is Gorgias's reply when Socrates asks what art he knows (449a4). This is the second time the word rhetoric is used in this dialogue; the first time occurred when Socrates used it as an accusation against Polus. Yet, Gorgias does not appear ashamed to speak clearly about rhetoric. It must be remembered that Gorgias's students are present and he is making a "sales pitch" for his rhetoric classes. His audience would affect his speech by preventing him from portraying rhetoric as dishonourable even if he thought it was, at times, shameful. Gorgias genuinely wishes for the honour-seeking young men to desire to learn this art. He removes the "blameworthiness" that seemed to undermine Polus's reply about rhetoric by openly and shamelessly professing that his art is rhetoric and that he is a rhetor.

Socrates encourages Gorgias to elaborate on his rhetoric by asking him, if he knows this art, what it is that he should be called. Gorgias takes this opportunity to amplify his work, saying

that Socrates must call him a rhetor “if you wish to call me what I boast that I am, as Homer said” (449a6-7). Socrates does wish to call Gorgias a rhetor, and adds that Gorgias is a good rhetor. Since Gorgias’s capacity as a teacher would attract students, Socrates is able to use their practical surroundings and avoid the definition of a good rhetor as one with the capacity to give long speeches. Instead, being a good rhetor means being able to make rhetors out of other men (449b). By saying that he indeed can teach this art, Gorgias has turned rhetoric into a teachable craft.

Gorgias makes the further claim of being able to teach anywhere, which eliminates the requirements for political persuasion thought to belong only to citizens.¹³² The art Gorgias offers to teach is universal but its practice takes place in political communities. Thus, there is a gap between Gorgias’s universal teaching and its particular, political practice. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues that what makes a speaker persuasive is the practical judgement of the speaker. Through the three species, the speaker is able to moderate the demands of expediency and justice within a regime for the sake of what is good. Aristotle’s artistic proof of character (*ēthos*) is the link between what is good and what is good in particular situations, but character must be linked to one’s political community. Thus, through praise and blame, he also promotes virtue in his political realm.

According to Gorgias, it does not seem that one learns practical political persuasion from one’s political community. Thus, one could live in any political community and rhetoric would be the same and there need not be a link between one’s purpose and the purpose of the particular, political community. Yet, one wonders, practically speaking, can Gorgias be persuasive in any *polis*? Although, he is appreciated by many Athenians, it seem unlikely he would fair as well among the Lacedaemonians. If rhetoric does not offer universal persuasive speech, a speaker

would have to be an active citizen in order to be persuasive. The question can also be raised whether the political realm in which one finds oneself is largely a matter of chance; it does not seem to be of our choosing. One's commitment to the good of a political community may be chosen but being born into a political community is not chosen. Thus, there are limits to rhetoric's universality.

Aristotle's rhetorician may grasp the notion of trans-political persuasion (not merely by understanding the physical or passionate appeals to pain and pleasure but) by understanding how good practical judgement manifests itself in a variety of circumstances. Yet, Aristotle's rhetorician is dedicated to his political community; his persuasion moves from justice of his political community to justice in general and returns to justice of his political community. As Aristotle argued in the first chapter of the *Rhetoric*, a rhetorician is a rhetorician on account of both choice and power (1355b11).

Rhetoric also has the potential to become a threat to the activities of the city. Young men should be powerful citizens through their knowledge of, and dedication to, the city, not on account of power provided by persuasive techniques (especially imported ones). Gorgias is a foreigner in Athens, but he claims to be as effective an educator there as he is in his home city, Leontini. According to Gorgias, it seems that knowing and maintaining the principles of a regime are not the crucial elements in making men rhetoricians and rulers. It should be no surprise that a citizen who recognises that knowledge of a regime – its principles, laws, institutions and history – makes good citizens would be sceptical of Gorgias's ability to make good statesmen of young Athenians.

Often when people become specialists or more highly educated in a field, they, like

Gorgias, leave their home city and travel around teaching their speciality. Even if a young Athenian does not become a professional rhetorician himself, he will have this speciality learned from a non-citizen to use in the affairs of citizens. Thus, it is not difficult to see why Gorgias may receive a mixed welcome in Athens. He makes a craft out of the public speech citizens employ when speaking to the most important political affairs, those surrounding justice, expediency, and the common good of their city. This speech should not be a mere craft but a faculty which develops in citizens motivated by a responsibility to judge and advise with clarity.

Socrates is attempting to reveal the practical consequences of persuasive speech to Gorgias. Although his speech does include a question (“would you be willing ... to answer what is asked briefly?”), Socrates does not use dialectic with Gorgias but encourages him to make a display. Socrates’ exhortative approach includes the commands “don’t play false,” “be willing” and “make a display” (449b6-8 and 449c3). Socrates encourages Gorgias to make a promise to display brief speaking but they disagree on what is necessary. While Gorgias argues that “some answers, Socrates, must necessarily be made in speeches of great length,” Socrates argues that brief speaking “is just what is needed” (449b9). Socrates is persuading Gorgias that it is necessary to be dialectic. He appeals to the uncompromising version of Aristotle’s deliberative species of rhetoric – necessity.

Socrates does not need to say his end is just or noble. Yet, if he wishes to avoid speaking as if he knows when he does not know, and, if he wishes to approach with care the difficult questions about political persuasion and the responsibility it entails, then his end, necessity, appears just and noble. Socrates’ purpose seems more just and noble than many who speak directly to those ends. One might argue that Socrates’ approach attempts to inflate or reveal

Gorgias's high opinion of himself, by helping Gorgias amplify his ability for this crowd of potential students. One might also argue that Gorgias suspects Socrates is scheming, but Gorgias appears to trust Socrates. This trust could result from the careful manner with which they constructed their conversation, basing it only on their "wishes" and what they find pleasant. Perhaps Gorgias imagines that as soon as he does not "wish" to discuss something or finds the conversation "unpleasant," it will cease.

Although it is unlikely, Gorgias might be genuinely flattered and lack the reason or self-knowledge to make a tempered argument when showered with compliments. Flattery is often given without thought to the quality of the thing praised, but Gorgias would understand that Socrates' flattery is not distributed this way. Socrates distributes flattery in jest with Gorgias, by applauding him for the simplest of deeds such as providing brief answers. Socrates will eventually show that Gorgias's rhetoric is insufficient, but in this instance Socrates is jovial and friendly. Gorgias may be thinking of Socrates as a comrade on account of this pleasant experience of praise and recognition that Socrates provides while understanding the limits of praise and recognition. Since Socrates functions at what Gorgias would consider his intellectual level, and appears to wish goodwill toward him, Gorgias allows Socrates the freedom to be somewhat playful in speech and may even be curious and open to learning from him (449b4).

Despite Socrates' seeming acknowledgement of Gorgias as a great educator in rhetoric, Socrates does not want to hear his speeches. Gorgias must speak dialectically with him and avoid long speeches like those Polus seemed eager to make.¹³³ Socrates also stresses that if Gorgias is "willing" to promise to speak briefly, then Gorgias should not go back on his promise. Being an expert on speech, Gorgias declares that he is able to speak briefly as Socrates requests.¹³⁴ Gorgias

will leave behind the long speeches he deemed to be often necessary and “make a display... of... brief speaking” for Socrates (449c4).

Socrates uses Gorgias’s confidence in his ability, desire to display his art, dependence on the audience, and possible curiosity about the philosopher’s opinion to persuade him to speak dialectically. Socrates secures this dialogue between himself and Gorgias by taking into account his rhetorical situation and persuading toward an action. Gorgias and Socrates go on to discuss rhetoric in front of an audience of pupils and potential pupils who had gathered to hear Gorgias’s displays (449b4-c8).

This discussion reveals a fundamental disagreement between Gorgias and Socrates. Socrates believes that one must know the matters that one speaks about, while Gorgias remains uncommitted on this point. Gorgias’s reluctance to admit that knowledge of the speeches’ subject matter is necessary, prevents him from seeking such knowledge. If Gorgias is not pursuing subject matter in general, then he is not going to have knowledge of the art of persuasive speaking, knowledge of the very thing that allows him to avoid knowledge. Gorgias faces the rhetor’s obstacle to gaining knowledge of his art – the “success” persuasion without knowledge often brings.

Socrates returns to Gorgias’s claim of knowing and making others know the art of rhetoric. Socrates then asks what it is that rhetoric is about. Examples of how weaving produces clothing and music produces tunes are used by Socrates to question what rhetoric produces. These productive arts add another dimension to rhetoric’s previous comparisons with the arts of shoemaking, medicine, and painting. Although Socrates was quick to dismiss Polus’s comments regarding rhetoric being one of many arts, Socrates himself introduces many arts into the

discussion to bring the rhetorical art into view (448c5 and 449d2).¹³⁵ Again, Socrates is attempting to draw Gorgias's attention to the practical products of his art.

Referring to Gorgias's rhetoric, Socrates then asks "about what of the things that are, is it a science?" (449d10). Gorgias claims his science (knowledge) is about speeches. Socrates then questions whether these speeches are about making the sick man healthy, thus reintroducing the comparison of rhetoric with the practical art of medicine. Gorgias does not think speech-making for medical purposes is rhetoric. Medicine is not the kind of art in which his present audience would be interested. Thus, Gorgias agrees with Socrates' assessment that rhetoric is not about all speeches.

Yet, Gorgias argues that rhetoric does provide men with the power to speak. It should logically follow that if rhetoric produces a power to speak in general, then it should take into account all speeches. Socrates ignores this conclusion. An ability or power should be indifferent to subject matter, but Gorgias wishes for his rhetorical speech to be more powerful than speeches that have set subject matter and boundaries or speeches that address private or trivial matters.

Socrates encourages Gorgias to focus on the subject matter because he knows it will probably lead to a political subject matter. He goes on to say that if men are made able to speak, they must also know what it is they are speaking about. It seems that one should not learn a capacity of speech without learning, in tandem, the content and meaning behind the speech one is learning. Socrates asks the question, is one's power (*dunamis*) dependent on one's knowledge (*episteme*)? Gorgias does not answer Socrates' question directly with a "yes;" instead he poses an ambiguous question. Gorgias asks, "how could they not?" meaning how could men not understand what they are speaking about (449e10). Gorgias may be telling Socrates two things in

his elusive response. First, we have all heard those who speak about something they do not understand and Gorgias may be referring to this common occurrence. Second, he may also think, “how could *I* not know the things about which *I* speak and still be so successful?” Either way, it appears that Gorgias is not entirely confident that persuading without knowledge does not occur (449e11).

Throughout this chapter I have shown Socrates’ attempts to bring Gorgias’s notion of rhetoric closer to practical ends and the interrelations of the three species. First, Socrates and Callicles debate the practical acts of wars and feasts. Second, Socrates engages in a preliminary example of practical judgement and the three species which bring them to Gorgias. Third, Polus’s notion that persuasive speech is dependent on experience without reason is found to be impractical, as judicial rhetoric is missing from his definition. The disconnect between reality and Gorgias’s speeches is emphasised by this final understanding that he does not need to know what he speaks about in order to be a persuasive speaker.

The end of justice needs to be understood in order to reconnect Gorgias’s art to the particular, practical ends of rhetoric. The metaphor of the art of medicine as the art of rhetoric continues to be employed by both Aristotle and Plato. It clarifies the practical nature of the art of rhetoric and as a conclusion to this chapter it shows rhetoric’s role promoting justice in the human soul as the doctor promotes health in the human body.

Rhetoric and the Medical Art

As the epithet to this second chapter suggests, medicine provides a clear, physical comparison to the practise of rhetoric, a practice where friends critique each other and share advice. Socrates’ comparison of rhetoric with the medical art demonstrates the necessity of

knowing one's subject matter. At this point in the conversation Gorgias should be considering what Socrates' examples of various arts have to do with his own art. If it is not about medicine, what *does* Gorgias think the business of rhetoric is? Socrates returns to the example of the doctor, explaining his belief that man must first understand diseases and the sick before speaking about them. The reader may wonder what speech without knowledge would be like in the medical art. The thought of an ignorant doctor causes one to be concerned for his patients.

Gorgias agrees that it is the business of the medical art to teach about disease and that it is the business of gymnastics to make speeches about the good and bad condition of the body. Yet, Gorgias states that it is only "apparent" that each of these arts has its own business which should be learned along with using speeches. He may actually hold that speeches can be learned separately and in a way which does not require particular knowledge of the subject; the speaker need only appear to know. Through the medical comparison, Socrates argues that Gorgias is wrong. Since Socrates will refer to the doctor again in the dialogue and similarities between the two arts are emphasised throughout, this comparison should be explored further. The two related sets of practitioners within the comparison of rhetoric and medicine should be distinguished. First of all, there are those who are learning medicine and learning rhetoric, and there are those who are using medicine on patients and using rhetoric on audiences. It is assumed that the latter group knows its art through previously being part of the first group, the learning group.

The variety of diseases, which must be learned by the doctor, is perhaps surpassed by the varieties of injustices in the world.¹³⁶ Since knowledge should be as connected to speech for the rhetorician as it is for the doctor, there is much for the rhetorician to learn. As one is taught the art of medicine not by studying good healthy bodies but by studying diseases, one must also be taught

the art of rhetoric not by studying just souls but by studying various unjust souls. It is assumed we know what health is and hold that standard in our mind as we study disease. Similarly, it is assumed that we know what justice is and hold it in our mind as we study injustices.

Secondly, there is the analogy between the doctor in practice, and the rhetorician in practice. We find that the medical doctor treats disease as the rhetorician treats injustice, with the doctor aiming at health and the rhetorician aiming at justice. The doctor finds and diagnoses the illness and then treats it. Furthermore, our bodies are naturally drawn to health – our wounds heal and we function best when in good shape. Doctors often view their jobs as facilitating health or removing obstructions to the body's own recovery. But can the same be said for rhetoric? Are our souls naturally drawn to justice and can the rhetorician view his function as facilitating this return?

Gorgias might argue that there is no comparison between health and justice because justice cannot be defined, or because it may not exist, and if it does exist, it does so in speech which is not real in the same way health is real. As the dialogue progresses, it would be difficult to deny that Socrates demonstrates how justice might appear in thought. His own soul may be “seen” in contrast to the undisciplined, overfed but poorly nourished, and perhaps even diseased souls of Gorgias's pupils.

Before leaving the discussion of this metaphor, it is important to recognise that both aspects of the medical example are related to each other. The example of the medical art in practice reminds us how absurd it would be for a doctor not to aim at health; he would have to be utterly malicious. Do we expect rhetorical educators to pursue justice in the soul in the same way that medical educators pursue health in the body? We expect medical students to be taught in a

way that guarantees they pursue our health as patients, and their art depends upon the idea of health. Being removed from that goal perverts the art of medicine. It might be difficult to test pupils to see if they do indeed hold health as their purpose; only in looking to their work as doctors would we begin to see their purposes. Yet, if a student chose to make a Frankenstein kind of project rather than working towards developing cures or treating patients, there might be little the medical school could do to prevent it. This risk is inherent, but the absence of a proper end can be discerned by those who know health.

It would also be strange if medical students were only taught how to use sophisticated medical terminology and taught nothing about the actual diseases in the body or what to do in order to cure them.¹³⁷ When these students complete their “education,” they may still have an idea of what health is in the back of their minds, but they would not have practical knowledge or the ability to bring about health in a patient. Their education would be more of a distraction than an aid to helping them work for health. In their busy practices they might soon forget the standards of health and treat patients with anything that takes away the pain quickly (although perhaps only temporarily) in order to keep their own ignorance safely hidden. Testing to ensure that pupils understand the diseases is less difficult than ensuring their purpose is sound. Examining students’ work in labs should reveal whether they have practical knowledge of the art but one would have to ask students the purpose behind their work.

These risks do not mean that an education in medicine or rhetoric is inherently harmful. In the final sections of this dialogue, Socrates takes up the role of the educator in the rhetorical art and Gorgias becomes his pupil. Just as a medical professor sees a promising student or a new professor, Socrates is aware of Gorgias’s abilities and perhaps hopes that Gorgias might dedicate

himself to learning the true art of rhetoric. Similar to a senior doctor demonstrating his art on the operating table, Socrates also takes up the role of practitioner of rhetoric for the sake of the well-being of Polus and Callicles and to serve as a demonstration for Gorgias. Socrates must examine the opinions that have formed in the souls, using cautery or surgery to change false opinions. Socrates will tell Gorgias the three ends of rhetoric, and show Gorgias how these function in correcting injustices and allowing justice to establish itself in the soul.

Rhetoric, like medicine, is a practical art (as opposed to simply a productive or imitative art). Both medicine and rhetoric are not ends in themselves but are instruments of their ends, health and justice. Health, once achieved, is pleasant, but the means by which one achieves health are often not pleasant. It is sometimes necessary to suffer pain in order to achieve our goal of health. Likewise, in order to achieve justice in our soul, the pleasant life cannot be our goal. Having little friction and frustration in one's soul – not thinking, not reasoning, and not being mindful of desires and pleasures – makes one unjust.

The unjust person may think he is unencumbered. This subtle injustice at times seems more pleasant, just as living with disease for awhile seems more pleasant than its cure. Such neglect does not lead to a pleasant end. An unjust person may suffer as Socrates reveals injustices through both questioning in dialectical exchanges and comparing the various opinions one holds to be true.¹³⁸ Socrates practises his art in order to remove false, passion-ruled opinions which obstruct justice in the soul just as the doctor removes obstructions to health in the body.

Gorgias's opinion that the rhetorician does not have to be just in order to be a successful speaker is revealed to be unpersuasive. Socrates' ability to defend justice consistently demonstrates that he has knowledge of politics and his persuasive speech is ruled by this

knowledge. In this chapter, it was emphasised that rhetoric must be a practical art. Gorgias has only thought about the epideictic speech and has neglected the other two species of rhetoric. He has isolated himself from practical life and the concerns of the political community. The following chapter shall demonstrate that Gorgias must know justice and be just. In order to seek justice and argue justly, the rhetorician must look to politics, to the whole of which one human being is only a part. Rhetoric functions in three species when it is subordinate to politics because the species reflect the soul's effort to bring the good into action in the political community.

CHAPTER THREE

“Thus, too, rhetoric dresses itself up in the form of politics, as do those who pretend knowledge of it, sometimes through lack of education, sometimes through boastfulness and other human causes.”

The Rhetoric (1356a27-30)¹³⁹

Gorgias thinks rhetoric is more powerful than politics, or that rhetoric *is* politics. For him, rhetoric contains the greatest good which is the acquisition and preservation of human freedom and mastery. This is a most serious claim. In the commentary of this chapter, Socrates reveals the opinion of the greatest good Gorgias offers his students. Socrates begins by contrasting Gorgias’s opinion of the greatest good with the others’ opinions of the greatest good. It becomes evident in the dialogue that Gorgias is arguing that the greatest good involves ruling others and securing one’s ability to do as one pleases. The question of who should rule raises a political problem. While the second chapter focussed on Gorgias’s neglect of practical judgement and the just soul, this chapter moves from his impracticality to his subordination of politics and thus, justice, to his persuasive speech.

Gorgias has agreed that rhetoric is not a productive art like other arts because his rhetoric is unconcerned with manual skill. He then rejects the arts that Socrates introduces as holding speech as their authority, because the subject matter involved in this education is not compelling for those interested in political affairs. Gorgias rejects five arts as not being part of his rhetoric, and Socrates uses these same five arts to clarify his understanding of rhetoric. Socrates provides lessons about rhetoric through the arts of manual skill, such as the metaphoric relation between the art of rhetoric and the art of medicine explained in chapter two. Socrates also clarifies rhetoric through the arts that hold speech as their authority (450b4).

Before investigating the arts holding speech as their authority, Gorgias first dismisses painting and sculpting, the two examples of art that Socrates presented. Socrates' examples are concerned with manual skill, and Gorgias argues that they are not part of his art because the action of rhetoric only occurs through speech. Gorgias's rhetoric concerns speech alone and not action; thus, Socrates explores speech unconcerned with action, and shows its impractical, unpolitical nature. Socrates demonstrates the arts for which speech is authoritative and shows that they do not include the guarantee of political power that Gorgias would want to attribute to his art. When Gorgias rejects the silent arts of manual skill (painting or sculpting) for the sake of arts of speech Socrates wonders if he is starting to understand what it is that Gorgias wants to call rhetoric (450c3).

Socrates seems suspicious of the reason Gorgias's speech is unconcerned with action. Thus, Socrates introduces four impractical arts involving speech: "arithmetic, calculation, and geometry" as well as "draught playing" (450d6). Some of these, according to Socrates, equally include action and speech but often speech is greater and the authoritative part. Although Gorgias does think that speech is the authoritative part of rhetoric, this kind of speech would not be what Gorgias is seeking for his rhetoric. Draught-playing, calculation, arithmetic, and geometry do not guarantee political power, however, if given political ends, this selection of arts resembles Aristotle's divisions of the rhetorical art. This resemblance suggests that Socrates is not dismissing rhetoric but ordering rhetoric as Aristotle does.

Socrates argues that calculation, arithmetic, and geometry are similar to rhetoric because they do not require manual skill and are predominately practised through speech. Yet, Socrates verifies that Gorgias would not call arithmetic or geometry rhetoric, although they are the same

kind of art (450e9). Notice that Socrates does not list calculation among the arts that Gorgias would not call rhetoric. By not mentioning calculation, Socrates leaves the possibility open for Gorgias to call rhetoric the calculative art. If one sees the connection between Aristotle's species of rhetoric and these arts, Socrates takes up the same purpose as Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* – to realign rhetoric toward the practical judgement of deliberative speech, which, without political ends, looks like calculation.

Yet, Socrates keeps arithmetic, calculation, and geometry together in his discussion and explains their practice. Socrates dramatises how arts would be defined in a mock dialogue. He produces this imaginary conversation in his own speech, thus making a “display of ... brief speaking” (449c4). In answering his hypothetical interlocutor, Socrates completes his definition of arithmetic, by explaining that arithmetic speeches are “about the even and the odd, however large each happens to be” (451b4-5). (Unlike the subject matter of Gorgias's rhetorical speech, the subject matter of arithmetic speech can be clearly stated and Socrates uses dialectic to clarify it.)

After defining arithmetic's speech Socrates turns to calculation. Socrates claims his explanation of speech in the calculative art will be given in a similar manner to how proposals are written in the people's assembly. Why does Socrates point out that he is speaking politically?¹⁴⁰ Calculation is an image of decision-making, which occurs in the political assembly, and thus, deliberative rhetoric. Socrates argues that calculation is about even and odd, as is arithmetic; however, calculation examines “how great odd and even are in relation to themselves and one another” (451c4-5).

On the one hand, calculation seems less stable than arithmetic because it is relational. On the other hand, calculation figures out how greatness will be evaluated, which means how the

inequalities of the odd and even will be evaluated. Calculation is concerned with the basis of equality, greatness, and inferiority, while arithmetic is speech about even and odd regardless of greatness. Yet, calculation must first provide the standard of equality in the arithmetic relations of even and odd. For example, a calculation might conclude that an X is greater than a Y, then arithmetic would assume this conclusion in its equations and base its outcomes on what was calculated.

Why does Socrates decide to present these arts as examples of those which hold speech as their authority? Nichols makes note that draught-playing often seems “to be an image of dialectic” in Plato’s work.¹⁴¹ The other arts offer similar images for kinds of speaking and consider the three speech-centred arts as pursuits of justice and the common good. First, the arithmetic art is an impractical, unpolitical image of judicial rhetoric, which defends and accuses according to law and established rules of justice. Judicial rhetoric arranges benefits of the city according to the accepted standards of justice, whether they be based on wealth, beauty, free birth, merit, etc.

Judicial rhetoric is primarily concerned with following the laws’ account of justice. This rhetoric persuades about evenly distributing goods, such as honour and wealth, which belong to the political community, to those in the political community (*Ethics*, 1130b30). Likewise, arithmetic is an art which follows a set of rules, which are laid down somewhat similarly to those in the justice system. Numbers are inserted into equations just as particular cases are inserted into the justice system.

Calculation, as an impractical or apolitical activity, evaluates the relations between these equals and unequals just as one deliberating in politics must weigh alternatives when making decisions according to the good of the community. As a practical political activity, deliberative

rhetoric is the instrument for deciding whose advice is followed or for deciding who should rule on account of what (wealth, beauty, free birth, merit, knowledge, etc.). Deliberative rhetoric questions the basis of the equality that judicial rhetoric assumes. Aristotle's focus on the legislators in the first part of the *Rhetoric* also emphasises this function of deliberative rhetoric (*Rhetoric* 1354a32-b5). It decides which is the best basis for ruling or ordering.

Both calculation and deliberative rhetoric are not as restricted to the laws themselves but are more concerned with legislators (*Ethics*, 1129a36). The laws are in place as they are because of the legislators' practical judgement. Legislators have an understanding of justice they are attempting to promote in the practical lives of citizens. Yet, there is a distance between injustice according to what is publically agreed, (which legislators judge as impractical to their goal of public virtue) and injustice according to the actual injustice the legislatures intended to avoid. Thus, Aristotle wishes to return to legislators' original judgements that aim to avoid actual injustices, rather than merely following the law for personal or unthoughtful ends.

Deliberative rhetoric is connected to epideictic rhetoric by looking to the same purpose for which the laws were put in place, but praising and blaming rather than using physical coercion of the law. In epideictic rhetoric, there is more freedom to explore justice beyond the law, however, justice becomes more refined and therefore complicated. Perhaps the most difficult connection to make between the arts Socrates lists in this section of the *Gorgias*, and the practical pursuits of rhetoric, is the connection between geometry and epideictic rhetoric. Geometry, unlike arithmetic or calculation, studies the space or relations between points; these spaces define the physical world. Epideictic rhetoric praises and blames the actions and decisions of individuals in their political community; it praises and blames how an individual understands himself as a part of a

whole community and the space between himself and others within that community.

The connection between epideictic rhetoric and geometry is further complicated; Socrates ignores geometry when describing the subject of a third art that holds speech as an authority, and instead turns to astronomy.¹⁴² Astronomy, which is speech about “what speed the motions of stars, sun, and moon have in relation to one another”(451c8-9), looks to what seems beyond the practical affairs of this world. Yet, once recognised and understood, astronomy provides a trustworthy guide to those practical affairs such as guiding a ship. One can find the link between these arts and epideictic rhetoric when one considers the opposing ends of epideictic rhetoric. Shame and nobility are experienced both through one’s relationship to standards of human behaviour that one has reasoned for himself and aims toward (astronomy), as well as the standards that exist among citizens inhabiting the same space (geometry).¹⁴³

It appears that just as draught-playing is an image of dialectic, calculation, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy are images of the species of rhetoric, deliberative, judicial and epideictic. When one removes character and political ends from arguments, one is left with these four unpolitical or abstract “arts” that are not concerned with human affairs or justice. The playful art of draught-playing is similar to dialectic, calculation to deliberative rhetoric, arithmetic to judicial rhetoric, and finally, geography and astronomy, to epideictic rhetoric. While they lack a political role, these arts are images of the kinds of practical, political speech. As images, calculation and arithmetic demonstrate how our speech organises practical life into pursuing future justice, and defining justice according to what justice has been in the past.

Thus, there are a few possible reasons why Socrates lists four arts that seem to have little to do with what Gorgias would be teaching his students. Socrates may simply be suggesting that

Gorgias's students should continue studying these arts, which hold speech (*logos*) as their most authoritative part, rather than prematurely attempting to go on to political things. Secondly, Socrates' list presents an image of the arts of dialectic and rhetoric. Each of the arts that has been introduced into the dialogue requires certain knowledge of its subject matter, knowledge of what its speech is about. For example, geometry is about the space and relation between points. Both Socrates and Gorgias share the opinion that rhetoric requires more than attaining this specific kind of knowledge.

Rhetoric's Subject and Practitioner: The Greatest Good and the Persuasion Producer

Socrates returns to the question of Gorgias's art and what it is that his speeches are about. In contrast to Socrates' efforts to deter men from active political life, Gorgias replies that his speeches are concerned with "the greatest of human affairs, Socrates, and the best" (451d6). Socrates does not fully accept this reply. Again, Gorgias is only describing what kind of thing his speeches are about. Thus, Socrates questions what Gorgias believes man's greatest and best affairs to be. Their search for rhetoric's subject matter leads to this important question; are the greatest and best affairs not political affairs? Yet, the significance and seriousness of this inquiry are initially avoided by Socrates.

To demonstrate possible answers to the question of the greatest good, Socrates turns from Gorgias's reply to playfully share a drinking song which describes three different opinions about the greatest affairs of men. Each man in the song thinks his affairs, whether health, beauty, or "wealth without fraud," to be the best (451e5). Socrates questions which one leads the most praiseworthy life. He uses the song to show, that like Gorgias, the doctor, the trainer, and the money-maker, believe their work to be about the greatest affairs among men. Unlike Gorgias and

Polus, these three craftsmen are able to give accounts of themselves and their arts by appealing to common opinions about what is good.

Socrates produces little dialogues between the characters in the song and himself. The doctor in the song speaks to advance his opinion that health is the greatest of human affairs. The trainer and money-maker in turn speak of bodily-beauty and wealth.¹⁴⁴ Socrates' three characters then ask Gorgias what is the greatest good for human beings that *he* provides. Gorgias argues that rhetoric is about "the greatest good and the cause both of freedom for human beings and at the same time, of rule over others in each man's own city" (452d7). Thus, the rhetorician's greatest good, to have power over others, is superior to the definitions provided by the characters in the song.

Gorgias's definition of rhetoric restores the prestige and praise that Polus attempted to give it. Yet, Socrates is not convinced that he knows what occurs in Gorgias's art – how is this greatest good produced?¹⁴⁵ He questions Gorgias's meaning about these speeches and his interpretation of the greatest good. In attempting to provide a response to Socrates' question, Gorgias immediately turns to political institutions as venues for his powerful art. The idea of ruling over others leads to the political arena. Coinciding with Aristotle's first two species of rhetoric, Gorgias states that rhetoric provides the speeches of persuasion in a law court and in the assembly. Gorgias also says there is a third all-encompassing use of rhetoric, which is to persuade in any political gathering.¹⁴⁶

This reply appeals to his students who would be most interested in persuading in the political realm. Yet, Gorgias's reply is not simply a strategic appeal to his audience; it is true that rhetoric's activity is most evident in the activities of political leaders and those arguing on behalf

of the laws of a regime.¹⁴⁷ Thus, the greatest good that Gorgias attributes to his art should be a political good; it most clearly occurs in political settings. Socrates draws Gorgias to the places where his art is put into practice and those over whom his art rules.

Gorgias explains that doctors, trainers, and moneymakers can be made slaves to the one “who can speak and persuade multitudes” (452e6). Socrates acknowledges that Gorgias has now clarified his art. For Gorgias, rhetoric is the “craftsman of persuasion” (453a2). Socrates then asks whether rhetoric makes “anything in the soul of the listeners in addition to persuasion” (453a4). Gorgias agrees that his art makes nothing else; his rhetoric produces persuasion alone. After Gorgias has posited this definition for rhetoric, Socrates takes their discussion in a different direction.

Although it may not be clear where Socrates is leading their dialogue after being so helpful in Gorgias’s “sales pitch,” Gorgias continues to speak with Socrates. It is possible that Gorgias searches for the truth about rhetoric’s power and trusts Socrates, or, he may simply regard himself as superior to Socrates and does not worry about being defeated. Taking up Gorgias’s opinion that rhetoric is a producer of persuasion, Socrates says he persuades himself that he is the kind of person who “likes to know the very thing the speech is about” (453a8-b2).¹⁴⁸ It is not the persuasion itself that Socrates is interested in, but rather the subject that the persuasion is about.

Yet, in this case, the subject is persuasion. Although Socrates claims that he does not understand Gorgias’s persuasion, Socrates has a suspicion (453b8). He does not put forward what he suspects about Gorgias’s persuasion because questions are more likely to make their argument clear. Socrates says he considers Gorgias to be the same kind of person as himself (that is, one who wants to know the subject of speech) and reassures Gorgias that he does not aim toward

victory over him in debate or seek to damage his reputation. Socrates tells Gorgias that his suspicion and subsequent questions about rhetoric come from the logical progression as things become clear in their argument.

Socrates argues that he does not attack Gorgias but simply follows the premises of the argument and watches for contradictions. Those who strive to be reasonable, as is the practice of Socrates and possibly Gorgias, would not allow anything outside of reasoned argument to distract them. Socrates links being the kind of person who searches for the truth in general to the particular argument in which he and Gorgias are engaged. Socrates searches for the most reasonable account of rhetoric, that is to say, the truth about rhetoric. Because Gorgias has not explored the truth about his own art, his own search for truth is hindered.

Socrates claims to be undistracted by the interests that may exist outside of the argument; such interests include the preferences of the audience and the reputations of the speakers. Yet, the particular dramatic context of the dialogue is not an external interest; it is an essential part of the argument. In this case, only through an argument between these two characters, Socrates, the philosopher who seeks truth, and Gorgias, the rhetorician who uses the power of speeches (arguments), will the truth about rhetoric become clear (453c5). Argument alone does not define rhetoric; just any set of logical statements will not be sufficient. What logical reason would the character searching for truth, the philosopher, have for introducing justice?

Socrates brings a concern for justice into the argument by asking Gorgias if he (Socrates) is posing questions justly.¹⁴⁹ Socrates asks about justice when he returns to the comparison of the art of painting. In the same way that Socrates said he was speaking as a legislator (451c1), he now questions whether he speaks as a just man. Socrates asks Gorgias if it is just to ask questions

about where and what kind of living beings Zeuxis paints. Gorgias agrees these questions are just. Socrates points out that the reason why it is just to ask “who painted, what kinds of living beings, and where” is because there are a number of painters painting “many living beings” (453d2). Likewise, there are a number of rhetors with different notions of justice speaking in many political communities with distinct definitions of justice.

If there were only one painter, the answer one would give about Zeuxis’s art alone would have been fine for painting in general. Similarly, if there were only one rhetorician and one city, Gorgias’s definition of rhetoric would be fine. How could one expand the definition of rhetoric to include the art of all rhetors and their relationships with their political communities, as one would expand the definition of painting to include painters painting different things in different places? Although there may be a general art of painting, the things experienced by one painter do not dictate for all painters that which they should paint. Since Gorgias, like the painter Zeuxis, is just one man, his art is limited to the kinds of things toward which he persuades.

Gorgias does not explain the purpose of his persuasion. As a productive artist, Gorgias claims to produce persuasion alone. Thus, Gorgias’s purpose is ambiguous because persuasion is an intermediate end. Socrates makes being a certain kind of person his purpose, follows the logical progression of the argument, and persuades in that direction. The kind of person Socrates aims toward becoming searches for what speeches are about and is concerned with justice (453a8-b2 and 453c7).

When Socrates verifies whether it is just to ask about the limits of a painter’s art, he may be suggesting that the rhetorician’s art is limited by the political particularities of the regime in which it is practised. Since the principles of different regimes have an effect on the characters they

produce, individual characters are inherently attached to particular political regimes. The animals the painter has experienced, his decision to paint only certain animals, and his ability all limit that which he paints. Likewise, the ends of persuasion the rhetor has experienced, his decision to persuade toward certain ends, and his ability to persuade may limit the ends toward which he persuades.

Gorgias's experience of, and decisions about, persuasion are limited to its instrumental role and seeming neutrality. He claims and likely thinks that he teaches persuasion without particular ends. Socrates' question of particularity is justly asked because persuasion must begin from particular arguments and lead to particular actions. If one thinks that persuasion can be produced for the sake of itself, but then intends to make other men one's slaves, one is still becoming a certain kind of person as one persuades according to one's intention. While Socrates desires to know what speeches are about and to speak justly, the only desire that Gorgias has mentioned his speaker having is to be master over men and have slaves (452e4).

Aristotle's two political species of rhetoric are illuminated in the conversation of Socrates and Gorgias. Socrates' two pursuits align with the two political species, deliberative and judicial. His concern about knowing the particular matters that speeches are about relates to deliberative rhetoric and his concern about speaking justly relates to judicial rhetoric. These are the two directions that Socrates' persuades toward. Gorgias claims his persuasion is focussed in the same way. His rhetoric is not about all arts but is limited to the law courts and other political gatherings, and "about those things that are just and unjust" (454b-3-5). While persuasion may function in many arts, both Gorgias and Socrates gravitate to political concerns.

In this passage, 453d7-455a3, Socrates distinguishes two sorts of persuasion – one

produces belief, which may be true or false belief, the other produces knowledge. First, Gorgias agrees that teaching in all subjects requires persuasion, and that teaching itself “persuades most of all” (453d10). Socrates gives Gorgias the example of the way students are taught arithmetic and therefore persuaded.¹⁵⁰ The philosopher and rhetorician agree that teaching necessarily includes persuasion but persuasion does not necessarily include teaching.

Rhetoric and arithmetic are both craftsmen of persuasion except arithmetic persuasion is of the didactic or teaching sort and rhetoric may not be. Gorgias is not confident that arithmetic is also a “craftsman of persuasion,” but replies that it is “apparently” a “craftsman of persuasion” (453e7). He hesitates because rhetoric no longer holds the exclusive position of craftsman of persuasion but is subordinate to arithmetic which has both a craftsman of persuasion and knowledge of the even and the odd. When Socrates divides persuasion into “sorts” Gorgias becomes more at ease because he can see that rhetoric can still be the superior “sort” of persuasion (453e9).

Socrates asks if it seems just to discuss this further and Gorgias concedes that it would seem just (454b1). Gorgias then returns to his earlier definition of rhetoric (452e1-4), which he shortens to being the sort of persuasion which occurs in “law courts and in other mobs, and about those things that are just and unjust” (454b4-5).¹⁵¹ In order to be brief and promote the most popular kind of rhetoric among his audience, Gorgias neglects persuasion on behalf of other ends. The other species of Aristotle’s rhetoric which persuade toward expediency and nobility are neglected for the sake of judicial rhetoric. Gorgias’s focus on the just and unjust coincides with Socrates’ suspicion.

Although he already has a “suspicion” of what Gorgias believes about rhetoric, Socrates

still insists that he arrive at the argument's conclusion as a result of each statement being laid out (453c1). He does not want their dialogue to digress into "guessing or hastily snatching up each other's words" (454c4). Socrates tells Gorgias that he should not be surprised when he asks about other matters, which, although they may be clear, should be brought forward for the sake of the argument. Socrates wishes to make Gorgias's opinions clear to Gorgias and tells Gorgias he argues so that, "you may bring your own views to a conclusion in accord with what you set down, in whatever way you wish" (454c5-6). Socrates presents his drive for consistency and avoidance of assumptions in a friendly manner, for Gorgias's sake.

Socrates encourages Gorgias to examine whether there is a difference between "to have learned" and "to have believed" (454c9-11). Gorgias holds that these are different things. As Socrates points out, there are false and true beliefs but knowledge is true; there is no false knowledge. Socrates asks Gorgias if they could establish two species of persuasion.¹⁵² The first of Socrates' species "provides belief without knowing and the second provides knowledge" (454e4).¹⁵³ Socrates proceeds to ask whether belief-inspiring or knowledge-inspiring persuasion occurs in the law courts, where the ends are the just and unjust. Gorgias chooses the belief-inspiring persuasion. Since this is not the kind of persuasion which teaches, those in the "law courts and the other mobs" are not learning what is just and unjust (454b4).

On the one hand, Socrates critiques Gorgias's lack of teaching. On the other hand, Socrates admits one cannot teach a large crowd the important matters of justice in a short time (455a3).¹⁵⁴ It may take a lifetime of just acts to teach even a few people about justice and longer if one's listeners are passionately opposed to a speaker.¹⁵⁵ In addition, the speeches given to the "large crowd" of the political assembly are directed toward practical actions, not primarily to what

is just and unjust. Socrates again encourages Gorgias to examine what they have said about rhetoric because Socrates admits that he is not able to have a complete understanding of what he is saying (455a9).

Is the purpose of persuasive speech to teach justice and injustice when the people gather together in an assembly, or, are the just and the unjust really among the assembly's concerns? Socrates points to actions in the city for which the rhetorician would not be able to provide advice: medicine, the art of the shipwright, the building of walls, the preparing of harbours and dockyards, and the art of generalship, choosing generals, distributing troops, and capturing lands (455b6-455c2). Instead of choosing rulers from the rhetoricians arguing about justice, a citizen should choose the "most artful" – those who are specialists in these practices.

Gorgias's art, as he has explained it thus far, seems ill-suited for the political assembly and the courts. Who could be the specialists in the just and unjust and practical political actions? Socrates' division of speech about the just and unjust and speech about the practical actions of the city corresponds with the division Aristotle makes between judicial and deliberative rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*. The ends of the different species both define and conflict with each other as a rhetorical argument develops. In Gorgias's case, however, the just is severed from the expedient. This separation appears when Socrates gives Gorgias the opportunity to make a speech explaining how his rhetoric both addresses justice and advises the city.

One looks to Gorgias's speech to answer the following questions. Can Gorgias produce persuasion alone? Or, is he becoming a certain kind of person, and does he guide others in the same direction? If it is only persuasion that Gorgias produces, why does he turn to the rhetoric of the courtroom? What are the particular experiences and assumptions about politics that affect

Gorgias's rhetorical arguments (as the animal images affect the painter)? How does Gorgias separate justice and expedience?

Gorgias's Speech: the Risk of Rhetoric's Power

Socrates challenges Gorgias to give a full account of his art. Does Gorgias's rhetoric address both the practical actions of the city, and the just and unjust? Gorgias's belief-inspiring persuasion is being put to the test. Socrates does not simply attack or seek to eliminate rhetoric, but he has fixed certain limits upon it by discussing the specialists in practical action (the doctor, the shipwright, or, most importantly in this case, the legislator), who may oppose Gorgias's claim that rhetoric is only about the just and unjust. Even while emphasising his own lack of expertise in rhetoric, Socrates promotes Gorgias's classes in rhetoric by asking the question that his potential students wonder but do not ask.

According to Socrates, the young men do not ask Gorgias what they will learn because they are ashamed. This is the first time shame is mentioned in the dialogue. The end of Aristotle's epideictic rhetoric appears in Plato's account of rhetoric. Just as Aristotle introduces judicial and deliberative rhetoric first and more formally than epideictic rhetoric in his *Rhetoric*, Plato subtly introduces a notion of shame in the *Gorgias*.¹⁵⁶ Yet, what are these potential students of Gorgias ashamed of? Is it because they do not really know what Gorgias will teach them and they are ashamed of their ignorance? Do they think Gorgias will teach them how to fulfill desires and achieve their purposes without having to speak about them? Are they ashamed that those desires are tyrannical, unjust, and thus, shameful? Socrates does not appear to hold these desires and he is not ashamed of his ignorance concerning Gorgias's power or what Gorgias may offer him. Socrates justly and, therefore, freely asks on behalf of these potential students "what will be ours,

Gorgias, if we associate with you?” (455d3).

More importantly, on behalf of the young men, Socrates asks how they will be enabled to give counsel to the city. Will they only learn about what is just and unjust or also about all the arts the city requires, such as the arts of the doctor, shipwright, general, and architect? Gorgias says he will attempt to make the entire “power of rhetoric” clear to Socrates because Socrates has nobly set out in this direction. Gorgias explains the events that Socrates alludes to. It is not the craftsmen who propose building walls and setting up dockyards in Athens; rather, these actions are achieved according to the advice of rhetors, such as Themistocles and Pericles (455e2- 4).¹⁵⁷

Socrates admits such things are said about Themistocles and that he heard Pericles himself give counsel on the middle wall (455e5). Gorgias also tells Socrates that each time a decision is made concerning these political matters, rhetors are always the ones advising, for they argue on behalf of whichever action they would like to see carried out (456a4). This very phenomenon is what puzzles Socrates most of all. Why are rhetors able to persuade more successfully than those with knowledge? Rhetoric “manifestly appears” to Socrates as “demonic” in power (456a7).¹⁵⁸ Just as Socrates has been making the argument clear, Gorgias attempts to make the whole of his art clear and to explain its mysterious power to Socrates.

Gorgias argues that rhetoric encompasses and rules over all powers. In order to demonstrate the capacity of his rhetoric, Gorgias tells Socrates of how he is able to assist his brother who is a doctor. Gorgias claims he uses the art of rhetoric alone to persuade his brother’s patients to suffer through the painful remedies for their various illnesses. Although Gorgias first gives evidence of his power through assisting one with knowledge (the knowledge of medicine) the arena of his art shifts to a competition to rule in the city.

Gorgias describes a hypothetical contest between a doctor and a rhetor to convince listeners who should be the doctor. He argues that the rhetor would successfully persuade listeners that he, rather than the doctor, should be chosen as the doctor for the city. Gorgias has demonstrated that the genuine doctor would be out of place when trying to persuade the city. Yet, he does not initially address the danger this involves and he continues to promote his art by claiming a rhetorician can “speak more persuasively than any other craftsman in a multitude” (456c7).

The danger that rhetoric poses for politics is shown in its capacity to dissuade an audience from choosing rulers whose judgements of practical matters are based on knowledge. Gorgias is more persuasive than one who has practical knowledge of medicine. In his speech, Gorgias reveals the distance between what a rhetor is able to do and what he should do. Gorgias ceases to praise rhetoric after stating that “the power of the art then is so great and of such a sort” (456c7-8). Rhetoric is an art and power but it is not knowledge and it is unnatural to make knowledge subordinate to rhetoric. Gorgias would be guiding citizens away from what he knows is reasonable and good for the city by attempting to substitute the rhetor for the doctor.

The risk of Gorgias’s art is underscored by the fact that he is a foreigner in Athens and such indifference to the health or justice of its citizens could be cause for his removal from the city. Gorgias loses his enthusiasm about rhetoric’s power; he adds that rhetoric must not be used against all people but must instead be used “just as every other competitive skill” (456d1). Just as one who is apt at wrestling or boxing should not attack his father, mother, other members of his family, or his friends, the power of rhetoric must be used selectively. Gorgias thinks his power should be used to help friends.¹⁵⁹ The intention of Gorgias’s art is no longer to be all-powerful,

but instead to be good to one's friends and bad to one's enemies. Gorgias is finally beginning to think more seriously about justice and how it should be taught.

If the purpose of Gorgias's art is to be good to friends and bad to enemies, he is faced with the challenge of teaching his students who are friends and who are enemies. Gorgias does not take up this challenge but retreats further from his original enthusiasm to point out that, just as the trainer in boxing should not be blamed or hated for training vicious boxing students, the rhetorician should not be blamed or hated for "imparting" the "skill" of speaking persuasively to unjust students (456e3). Instead of defending the argument Gorgias defends himself and attempts to conceal his ignorance about justice. Thus far, he has only taught his students "skill" or strategy, which seems indifferent to the ends of justice or injustice, but he argues that it should be used only for justice. Like the trainers of boxers, wrestlers, and those who fight in heavy armour, Gorgias implies that he is not responsible for his students who happen to use their skills unjustly.¹⁶⁰

Those who use what they have learned from him for the sake of injustice have "perverted it" (457a1). If perverting rhetoric makes it unjust then Gorgias appears to think that practising rhetoric appropriately makes it just. Rhetoric is instrumental in the same way as other arts and powers; whether rhetoric is just or unjust depends upon who is speaking. Despite rhetoric's dependence on its practitioner, Gorgias denies that the teachers are to blame or that they are bad men because abuses of their art occur. The students who misuse rhetoric must be blamed and Gorgias consequently accuses his students of injustices.

Both Gorgias and Socrates experience this risk of potential wayward followers, as a few of Socrates' "students" seem to become dangerous to political life in Athens.¹⁶¹ Yet, some crucial

differences exist between Gorgias as an educator and Socrates as an educator. Socrates never claimed to have taught anything (including rhetoric) and Socrates did pay the ultimate penalty, his life, for risking the potential misuse of his “teachings.” The young men follow Socrates because it is pleasant to watch him defeat other men in speech (*Apology*, 33c). Socrates does not redirect the blame aimed at himself to blame the young men with whom he spoke. Although Socrates claims that he does not act or speak unjustly, he pays the penalty for committing an injustice against the city.

Gorgias, in contrast, allows his students to be persecuted in order to save the reputation of his practice saying, “It is just, then, to hate, expel, and kill the one who uses it [rhetoric] not correctly, but not the one who taught it” (457c3). On the one hand, Socrates discourages young men from political life but then takes responsibility and pays the penalty for their actions against the city. On the other hand, Gorgias claims to teach young men how to be successful in political life but does not take responsibility for their use of that power. While Socrates, as a philosopher, may seem to reject a life dedicated to politics, he is more closely concerned with what occurs in practice. Gorgias, who professes to teach the method for success in political life, is unconcerned with what actually occurs in practice.

Part of Socrates’ intention in befriending Gorgias is to connect his art of persuasion to practical matters – to a responsible political life. The disconnect from practice occurs when Gorgias’s purpose shifts from complementing his brother’s work to replacing the true doctor in the city. Giving rulership to those without knowledge is unjust. Although he may have given little thought to justice at his school, Gorgias does have an opinion of justice. When forced to examine himself, he realises that the competitive desires of his art entail a definition of justice. Gorgias

may not be comfortable presenting his definition in public nor approve of the definition himself. Gorgias seems more concerned with being an adept arguer than a just man. Yet, when he recognises his lack of knowledge about justice, his subsequent contradiction, and his defeat he is ashamed and, thus, open to learning more about Socrates' rhetoric.¹⁶²

The Link Between Knowledge and Shame

In his speech, Gorgias reveals the problem inherent in his argument that rhetoric rules over all arts. Rhetoric can usurp those who are legitimately ruling based on knowledge, most significantly, those who have knowledge of what is just and unjust and those with knowledge of the best practical actions. Socrates sees that Gorgias has provided the framework for his own refutation. Gorgias has claimed that he teaches his students to use rhetoric justly. Thus, they must know what is just. Gorgias, however, does not know what justice is and cannot teach it. His opinion or belief about justice is false. Because a refutation looms over Gorgias, Socrates is at liberty to reveal more about the argument against Gorgias in order to teach him where he has erred. Socrates first responds to Gorgias's speech with an example of the popular argument that Gorgias has experienced (457c4-5).¹⁶³

Socrates describes arguments where the speakers have difficulty defining what they want to discuss; those arguing "break-off conversations" and their exchanges become riddled with personal attacks (457d2). One man will say the other is not speaking rightly or clearly. This disagreement causes the discussants to be angry and think that their respective opponent is jealous, only loves victory, and ignores what the argument was about.¹⁶⁴ After they have both said horrible things to each other, one of the two speakers will eventually give in shamefully to the other's position. Socrates says that audiences disapprove when the discourse among men, from

whom listeners hoped learn important matters, digresses to such a state.

There are two problems with Socrates' account of "many arguments" (457c4-458b5). First of all, do audiences (perhaps especially those filled with young men) always disapprove of the kind of digression Socrates describes? Socrates speculates that his own followers like to spend time with him because it is entertaining to see men defeated in argument (*Apology*, 33c). The ignoble argument that Socrates describes may entertain a crowd of young men. Yet, according to Socrates' description here in the *Gorgias*, the audience is thoughtful and has an inherent sense of propriety; it recognises the failure of sound argument. These listeners know when the discussion is diminished in worth and becomes ruled by passions or the mere defence of the speakers' position regardless of its reasonableness. Is this a common audience? Or, is Socrates praising this kind of audience in an effort to provide a place for the possibility of an observing member of the audience? The many arguments that Socrates describes may not be dismissed by the average audience and thus, may usually be successful.

The second problem or question is, whether this is the kind of argument that Gorgias bases his rhetoric on? The way "many arguments" are conducted does not explain the way good arguments are conducted. Socrates questions whether Gorgias bases persuasive speech on these irrational disputes that Gorgias has experienced. If Gorgias does, then his purpose would be to defeat opposing arguments using any means and not to think about the purpose of either arguments. The purpose or ends of argument in the assembly and courts are expedience and justice respectively. Gorgias advertises his rhetoric as belonging to these areas but the men arguing in Socrates' example have no concern for justice or what is expedient for the community. Although Gorgias claims to produce persuasion alone, if he bases his teaching on Socrates'

example, he likely produces persuasion toward irrational, unjust decisions and actions.

By blaming the men who argue in this way, Socrates makes it shameful for Gorgias to teach this kind of argument or to attempt to argue this way himself. Socrates wants to point out the baseness of this kind of argument and de-emphasise its success. He also desires that civil conversation ensue after calling Gorgias's contradiction to his attention. When Socrates shows his opinion that such behaviour is blameworthy, he demonstrates that he will not argue simply for the sake of victory, but to make the subject clear (458a1-6). In contrast to those in the argument described above, Socrates states that he takes as much pleasure from being refuted as from refuting and he serves as an example of a kind of person who questions "with pleasure" (458a4).

In speech, Socrates seems to aim toward pleasure for both he and Gorgias, and thus, gives Gorgias the opportunity to quit the conversation. Yet, is this truly a possibility for Gorgias? His students are watching this demonstration and it is unlikely that they would be pleased with a premature conclusion. Considering the practical situation, Socrates knows that their discussion must continue. Gorgias is reminded of the political realities of compulsion, force, and the subsequent limitations of persuasive speech. Gorgias does not have the power to quit this conversation gracefully. The nature of political life may not trouble Gorgias while at his school among his students, but he knows that his students often aim to lead prominent political lives. Thus, Gorgias is irresponsible to his students and their political community.

By giving Gorgias the option to exit, Socrates shows his opinion that it is better not to speak if it will result in the argument of "guessing or hastily snatching up each other's words" (454c4). Gorgias does not choose to remain silent. Apparently, Gorgias is like Socrates in that he both refutes and is refuted with pleasure if something untrue is corrected (458b6-7). Socrates tells

Gorgias that being refuted is a greater good than what Socrates' receives when he refutes arguments. Yet, Gorgias does not refer to his taking this greater good he may receive from Socrates as the reason why he continues; he says he continues on account of the promise he made to answer any question from his spectators. Instead of taking up Socrates' offer of doing him a greater good (an offer of friendship), Gorgias, the rhetorician, refers to the contract he entered with the audience.

Socrates sees being refuted as a greater good because it frees one from the greatest evil. The greatest evil, according to Socrates, is for "a human being" to have a "false opinion about the things that our argument now happens to be about" (458b2). The argument of Socrates and Gorgias has been about rhetoric's definition. Rhetoric's definition includes knowing which speeches cause persuasion about justice and knowing how this differs from simply producing persuasion in souls. For a human, the greatest good would seem to be understanding the persuasion toward knowledge of justice, and true and false opinions of justice.

Earlier in the dialogue, Gorgias said that rhetoric was about the greatest of human affairs (451d6). Socrates did not refute that definition but wished to qualify it. Socrates' understanding of the greatest evil for a human being reveals his notion of the greatest good for a human being. Socrates seems to suggest that their conversation not continuing is the greatest evil. Thus, engaging in conversation about, and not accepting ignorance of, the most important questions seems to be the greatest good. Socrates encourages Gorgias to hold the same purpose as himself and to continue their conversation – to courageously choose the practical ends of speaking in a dialogue and clarifying arguments.

Gorgias claims that he is like Socrates and only follows the argument. Yet, it seems

Gorgias immediately contradicts himself when he seeks affirmation from his audience in an attempt to avoid this “match” with Socrates. His appeal is not simply contradictory if one considers that the audience is part of any practical end Gorgias and Socrates choose. Gorgias’s potential students cannot be forgotten, they are part of the reality of the argument. By recalling that he had previously given a lengthy display, Gorgias suggests that the members of the audience may be tired, while also reminding them of his prior “gloriously” executed speeches. This plea to the memory of the audience is timely, as Gorgias may presently be seen as less than glorious. He also criticises Socrates for being absent from his past display, thus amplifying both the practical truth that Socrates is a “fresh player in the game” and that he has not yet accomplished great speeches.

Gorgias implores Socrates to think about what the audience desires, suggesting that Socrates does not consider the audience in the same careful manner Gorgias considers it. These comments are attempts by Gorgias to draw himself into a favourable light before his students. Gorgias also tells the audience he does not want to interrupt their busy schedules, reminding them of their tasks or duties in their active lives. Although most men are pleased and preoccupied with the active life rather than the contemplative life, this audience appears to be drawing a great deal of pleasure from this conversation between Gorgias and Socrates.

The pleasure Gorgias uses for persuasion is weaker than the pleasure the listeners are already receiving from the conversation. Socrates’ practical argument rules over appeals to reputation or to private actions. Watching a famous rhetorician being defeated in argument by a local thinker impresses Socrates’ fellow citizens. Thus, Gorgias’s attempts to dissuade the audience from listening fail and Chaerephon speaks up on behalf of the loud protests from the

crowd. Chaerephon states that he could never be distracted by activities when arguments are delivered this way (458c3). Callicles seconds Chaerephon's exhortation. He claims to have experienced many arguments but never with this much pleasure. The minds of Gorgias and Socrates are being put to the test and such displays of intellectual capacity are attractive to ambitious young men seeking honour and glory.¹⁶⁵

Socrates states that their conversation will continue if Gorgias is willing. To this Gorgias replies that "it would indeed be shameful" for him to give up when he was the one who offered to answer all questions (458d7). Since not keeping one's promise is an understanding of injustice, Gorgias asserts that he avoids the shame linked to this kind of injustice. Yet, if he is not capable of answering the question is it unjust that he does not answer? Gorgias is discovering that he may be unable to do as he said; he was ignorant of his own capacity (or incapacity) and made a promise he could not keep. In addition to his notion that it is just to do good to one's friends, Gorgias again must consider another definition of justice – keeping one's promises.

Perhaps, it is not unjust that Gorgias lacks answers, but it is unjust to abandon his attempt to address Socrates' question. It is shameful that Gorgias has not given more thought to what is just, but this is not the direct cause of his potential shame. His shame comes from halting the dialogue and recognising he is not the great thinker he thought he was. The ends of nobility and shame raise the understanding of justice from externally agreed upon demands of behaviour to Gorgias's internal sense of order, the condition of his soul. While Gorgias may not think that a rhetorician must abide by, or promote, the justice of the city, he is learning that knowing justice must be included in the pursuit of truth. Gorgias's shame reveals the interrelation among the three species of rhetoric that Socrates uses in his speech. It is the epideictic end of shame which allows

this dialogue to continue.

While Gorgias may be concerned with the potential humiliation Socrates could inflict, Nichols suggests that Gorgias himself is curious about Socrates' rhetoric, which demands that the rhetorician be just.¹⁶⁶ Gorgias's desire to know how rhetoric can be just suggests that he acknowledges his deficiency in justice and admits to being unjust (or at least to neglecting justice). His interest shows that he also desires to know a way to avoid this practice of injustice. It would be useful for Gorgias to avoid the accusations that he makes men unjust and regards Socrates' argument that the rhetorician must be just as the key to avoiding such accusations. Thus, Gorgias would wish to know how Socrates' argument is true. Both men seem to desire truth, or at least desire to be intelligent, and to think it is a praiseworthy pursuit.¹⁶⁷

In contrast to Gorgias's search for truth, Socrates' search cannot be removed from the order of the soul and its ability to distinguish between knowledge, false opinion, and true opinion. Gorgias has not concerned himself with these distinctions, but knowing how they relate is essential for understanding how humans live and how they learn. It is not surprising that Gorgias's search for truth and education in self-knowledge has gone stagnant.¹⁶⁸ He believes that he has found truth, that his rhetoric is most powerful, and that he has nothing left to learn from others. Yet, Socrates shows Gorgias that he still has the ability to feel shame and recognise the disorder of his own soul. Gorgias does have knowledge of the soul, insofar as he can manipulate it through immediate pleasure; he does not know that it is the order of the soul that allows for reason to function and provide a clear understanding of reality. Gorgias is not living according to his own understanding of praiseworthy life, but is ignorant of wisdom and thus, powerless in argument.

Thus, Gorgias's profession of shame for not keeping his promise is, perhaps, secondary to

his actual shame for not knowing Socrates' argument. How can Socrates argue that the rhetorician is inherently just? It is unjust not to keep one's promise, but it is also unjust to seem to know and persuade without knowledge, as Gorgias does. This injustice is revealed when someone who does have knowledge is usurped by one who does not. Such injustice is most pronounced when someone who has knowledge of justice or medicine is undermined by one who does not have knowledge of justice or medicine respectively. Socrates understands persuasion about the just and unjust better and Gorgias is ashamed that the philosopher knows the rhetorician's things better than he, a rhetorician.

For Gorgias, the most praiseworthy life is that of the intelligent man. His purpose of becoming a wise man is linked to justice, because a wise man must learn what each thing is. Gorgias must have assumed he knew justice but Socrates demonstrates that he does not know justice. Thus, he must learn what justice is and discover how the rhetorician cannot be unjust. The just and noble ends are linked for Gorgias at this moment in the dialogue; the character he finds praiseworthy, the wise man, must know justice. For his own ends, Gorgias wants to be the kind of man who answers any question; for practical ends, Gorgias wants to appear as the just man and know justice so citizens cannot banish him for teaching injustice.

After Gorgias says he desires to avoid shame, their conversation becomes a series of questions and answers (458d7). Gorgias's rhetoric appears increasingly opposed to his desire to be wise. Socrates shows that Gorgias's success is a product of his own ignorance concerning justice and is dependent on the ignorance of his audience. Yet, Gorgias claims to teach justice. Socrates does not immediately condemn Gorgias, but he calls the contradiction found in Gorgias's speech a source of amazement (458e3). Being amazed or being at a loss causes Socrates to think matters

through more carefully; perhaps he missed what Gorgias was saying.¹⁶⁹

Thus, Socrates reviews what has been said. First, he asks if Gorgias can make a rhetorician of any student who wants to learn from him and Gorgias confirms that he can. Secondly, Socrates asks if the student who learns from Gorgias will be able to persuade a crowd without teaching it. Gorgias agrees that he will. Thirdly, Socrates questions whether this student will be more persuasive than a doctor even when discussing matters of health. Gorgias qualifies his previous claim by saying this persuasion only works “in a mob” (459a). Socrates finds this limitation is suspicious and questions Gorgias further.

When Gorgias assists his brother practising medicine, he is directly guided by the man with knowledge. Gorgias’s belief-inspired persuasion would not function in a room full of doctors – the rhetorician would not persuade doctors he knew about medicine. Socrates asks Gorgias if by “in a mob” he is referring to those who do not know about the subject being discussed (459a5-6). Gorgias agrees that this is true. Thus, the rhetorician is now more persuasive than one who knows, at least among those do not know. It is the rhetorician’s responsibility to either know, or at least to know who knows and to follow the advice of the knowledgeable.

If the rhetorician is not responsible, those who have knowledge and have an opportunity to persuade are left in a desperate situation. Listeners who do not know are more likely convinced by speakers who do not know, but pretend to know, than those who actually do know. This sets up a vortex of ignorance that leaves no place for knowledge in persuasive speaking. The non-knower has an endless supply of arguments not based on knowledge; these arguments appeal to the obstacles of reason such as flattery or fear. By constantly changing the distractions to which one’s speech appeals, the practical, political questions can be neglected.

Practical life continues with or without the guidance of persuasive speech. The common practice of rhetoric that Socrates describes causes practical life to carry on without the aid of reason. Reason is removed from practical actions and practical action no longer informs practical reason. It is difficult to bring reason back into persuasive speech. If listeners are habituated to speeches from ignorance it seems that they will not respond to argument from reason. Such a dependence on ignorance also explains the success of Gorgias's rhetoric and why it could be mistaken for the true rhetorical art. Gorgias draws his method of arguing from the "many arguments" Socrates claims that Gorgias experienced (457c4).

Gorgias agrees that those who do not know are more persuasive than those who do know. He does not seem to wholeheartedly endorse that type of speech but "that is what happens" (459b11). In order to understand how this happens, how arguments digress away from reason, Socrates return to the example of the doctor and says that the rhetorician is not a doctor but rather a "non-doctor.....[who] is a non-knower of the things of which the doctor is a knower" (459b3-4). Gorgias admits that the distinction between non-knower and knower is clear in the case of the doctor. Socrates then asks if the rhetor and rhetoric operate in this way with all arts, meaning one does not require knowledge of how "matters themselves stand" (459c2). Instead, rhetoric requires only that one grasp "a certain device of persuasion so as to appear to know more than those who don't know" (459c2).

Socrates is reminding Gorgias that "seeming" knowledgeable without "being" knowledgeable is shameful for one who pursues knowledge. This is clear in the case of the doctor but Gorgias may not think it is clear for his art. Gorgias said he was ashamed for not keeping his promise. Yet, Gorgias is not troubled by the shame of seeming knowledgeable without being

knowledgeable. Thus, Gorgias asks whether it would not be easier for the rhetoricians, who do not learn the other arts, to simply seem to know. Ease is not the aim of one searching for the truth, but, ease was the aim of the men participating in the “many arguments” that Socrates mentioned previously (457c4). When it became difficult for these men to make their subject clear they turned to name calling.

It is easier for the men to call each other names and it is easier for the rhetoricians not to know. The rhetoricians fare no worse than the true craftsmen before an audience that never knows the difference. Thus, Gorgias is arguing that ignorance is good; laziness, in the form of doing less difficult tasks and thinking less often about serious matters, is advantageous. Since seeming to know or seeming to be a doctor is easier than knowing or being a doctor, one should just seem to know or seem to be. The aim of producing pleasure and lessening pain (without regards to what is good, advantageous, or just for the listeners) is the consequence of Gorgias’s decisions to direct his persuasive speech toward what is easy and away from what is difficult.

Socrates tells Gorgias that the question of whether or not the rhetorician benefits, and gets the better of the craftsmen, will be answered only if it pertains to the argument. Socrates does not find what only “seems” to be, or, what is easier, to be useful in his search for the truth. It is difficult to be clear about the truth. Gorgias may wish for the truth but he does not face the difficulties within, and practical consequences of, his arguments. Since pleasing arguments have come to him so easily and his ability to confound his audience has never failed, Gorgias thinks he knows what is true. Yet, Socrates manages to undermine Gorgias’s speech. He is the first member of Gorgias’s audience to know the art of rhetoric.

Is knowledge of rhetoric a product of having “discovered a certain device of persuasion so

as to appear to know more than those who know to those who don't know" (459c1-2), or, is knowledge of rhetoric beyond that discovery? Gorgias experienced the discovery of a device of persuasion and enjoyed the ease this device provides. Socrates, unconcerned with "whether the rhetor gets the worst of it or not," takes the difficult route and questions how the rhetorician makes speech with regard to three sets of opposites (459c7). Socrates wishes to know if the rhetorician knows the just and the unjust, the shameful and the noble, and the good and the bad, or, if he persuades without knowing (459d2-3).¹⁷⁰

Socrates asks if rhetoric stands in the same relation in arguments about health as it does with these three sets of opposites. It is health and not medicine that Socrates compares the rhetorician's knowledge of the three opposites to. He does not demand that Gorgias, the rhetorician, have expertise in medicine like the doctor; he must know health, the everyday practice of medicine. A rhetorician could appeal to experts, such as doctors, and persuade according to their advice. Yet, if there is a knowledge or science involved in rhetoric, which would allow it to be an art according to Socrates, it should be knowledge about these three pairs of opposites.

There is knowledge of justice, injustice, good, bad, nobility, and shame, but it does not seem that rhetoric is such knowledge or that this knowledge belongs to rhetoric. If Socrates' approach in the dialogue is rhetorical, it seems that the art of rhetoric can give a spoken account of what a soul holds to be just, good, expedient, and noble.¹⁷¹ How dialectic and rhetoric work together now begins to become clear: the art of dialectic can challenge the opinions on these matters as they are found in an interlocutor's soul and revealed through his particular speeches. Employing rhetoric involves holding a certain definition of what is noble and questioning it

according to what is just and expedient. Scepticism is then tempered by working definitions.

What we hold as just, good, and noble produces the persuasive opinions according to which we act.

For Socrates, the pleasant and painful are secondary to these three ends. Socrates dismisses the ease and pleasure Gorgias appeals to when he (Gorgias) argues that a rhetor can seem to know when he does not know and still be persuasive. For Socrates, it is not reasonable to seem to know when one does not. It would appear that Gorgias stopped exploring persuasion when he recognised his knack for manipulating pleasure and pain; he found that justice is not useful if the ends of argument are pleasure and pain. More consideration would have caused Gorgias to realise that there are standards (of justice, goodness, utility, and nobility) by which we judge and regulate pleasure and pain. Since Gorgias did not think further about persuasion or his role as an educator, he did not arrive at Socrates' sets of opposites.

Most significantly, Gorgias did not think of the link between shame and injustice. He does feel shame when he does not search for truth well. However, Gorgias is not ashamed of neglecting a search for justice until Socrates makes the search for justice part of the search for the truth.

Gorgias has been arguing according to what is most pleasant when speaking to the many. He may not be enslaved to lower pleasures himself but he allows his students and listeners to be moved by them and to use them in argument. Yet, Gorgias cannot simply produce persuasion; if he produces persuasion without thinking about justice, it is likely that he produces unjust persuasion for the sake of pleasure. Gorgias is ashamed of his lack of knowledge but Socrates extends this shame to include injustice by demonstrating that a wise man cannot be unjust.

The Refutation of Unjust Rhetoric

Socrates demonstrates that guidance from one with knowledge is required to practise an art justly. Gorgias thought he could have knowledge of just things while manipulating speech unjustly for the sake of persuasion. However, Socrates' knowledge of rhetoric and its relationship to justice undermines Gorgias's opinion. The understanding of rhetoric that Socrates has is presented in his use of the three species. He brings these three forward in a particular way in his final message before Polus's intrusion into their conversation.

After questioning if a rhetor would have to know "the things themselves" with regard to the three sets of opposites, Socrates repeats them switching their order by placing the good and bad first, then the noble and shameful, and the just and unjust (459d4). Socrates always fixes epideictic rhetoric between the two more obviously political species of rhetoric. He recognises the dangerous tendency for epideictic speeches to be impractical and removed from political ends. Placing "the noble and the shameful" in the middle and having the judicial and political ends exchange position around "the noble and the shameful" calls attention to epideictic rhetoric's central role in the art.

The shift in order also demonstrates the species of rhetoric Socrates wants Gorgias to consider. The "good and bad" are the first set listed when Socrates asks whether one must know the opposites or merely devise persuasion about them (459d5). Socrates has changed the primary focus of rhetoric from speech about the just and unjust (which Gorgias wished to address in order to appeal to his courtroom-bound students) to speech about the good and the bad. Socrates wants Gorgias to consider justice in light of practical political ends. Gorgias had replaced the understanding that justice exists for the sake of the common good of the city with the understanding justice exists for the sake of individual advantage or pleasure.

This position cannot be maintained if a rhetorician attempts to meet Socrates' requirements. Socrates questions if Gorgias will now teach all of these matters – the noble, shameful, good, bad, just, and unjust – to his students, or, if he will teach a student to persuade about these matters without the student knowing these matters himself.¹⁷² If Gorgias is unable to teach students to seem to know without knowing first, the success of his education would depend on the students' already knowing. Yet, the student who has knowledge should not require an education in "seeming" to have knowledge.¹⁷³

In addition, Socrates questions whether Gorgias will teach his students to seem to be good as well as to seem to know. Socrates does not ask if Gorgias could teach his students to seem to be just but turns his attention to seeming goodness. This additional qualification of goodness suggests that his students would have to act well, emphasising the practical result of having knowledge. Gorgias must have the ability to teach his students who do not know and are not good, to seem to know or be good amongst those who do not know or are not good, or he would be unable to teach rhetoric on account of his students not knowing "the truth of these things beforehand" (460a1).

Can Gorgias teach seeming knowledge and goodness without knowing and acting well, without being good himself? Socrates believes this question, if answered, will uncover the truth of what rhetoric is and its power in the world (460a1). Teaching how to seem without knowing could mean that Gorgias can teach what Socrates and the doctor (men he trusts are knowledgeable) tell him to teach without having their knowledge himself. This possibility would actually cause rhetoric to be helpful for advising in human affairs. Yet, Gorgias seems unwilling to give authority to one with knowledge when he claims that if students do not know such things they

would learn them from him.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Gorgias is listening to Socrates and allowing himself to be guided by the philosopher; he may give authority to Socrates as one with knowledge of rhetoric. In order for Gorgias to teach what Socrates teaches him, Gorgias must be permitted to teach.

Thus, Socrates establishes that Gorgias can teach students who do not know to seem to know and students who are not good to seem to be good, in addition to teaching what is good and bad, noble and shameful, and just and unjust. Socrates praises Gorgias for claiming to teach the “truth about these things” by telling him, “what you [Gorgias] say is fine” (460a5). It is praiseworthy and noble to try to teach what is just, good, and noble. Not trying to teach these ends or teaching mere flattery as persuasion, as Gorgias has been doing, is not praiseworthy; it is shameful. Socrates then argues that if Gorgias wants to make a student a rhetorician it is necessary that the student learn and know what is just and unjust. Returning to this pair of opposites, Socrates shifts Gorgias’s need to know to first being for the good and then the just. After Gorgias entirely agrees that to make someone a rhetorician he must know “the just and unjust things” (460a7), Socrates proceeds to question how one gets from not knowing something to knowing it, that is to say, how one learns about justice.

Socrates turns to the examples of a carpenter and a musician to illustrate what he means by how one learns. Gorgias confirms that one who learned carpentry things is a carpenter and that one who learns musical things is a musical kind of person.¹⁷⁵ According to Socrates, what one has learned makes him what he is. Learning medical things makes one a doctor – likewise for all who learn, and Gorgias agrees. Thus, Socrates says that those who are learned in just things would have to be just. Gorgias supposes this to be so (460b11). Socrates adds that he supposes the just

man acts justly as well as being just and Gorgias agrees. Since Gorgias agrees that those who knew justice would have to be, and therefore act, justly, it appears that he does think there is a knowledge of justice, and perhaps if one had knowledge of justice he could not choose to be unjust. Gorgias seems to think that there are just actions and that some relationship between knowing and acting exists.

Does the knowledge of justice make the one who has this knowledge just?¹⁷⁶ Would one have to set thoughts of justice aside in order to be unjust, act unjustly, or persuade another toward an unjust act? This seems to be the case if one cannot be or act contrary to one's thoughts. Thus, Socrates only needs to remind Gorgias of the definition of justice and he will be just. Or, is it possible that reasoning and acting could be separate to the extent they can conflict as opposites? Isolating reason from the other elements of the soul, spiritedness and appetite, may cause this conflict. As H.W.B. Joseph argues in his explanation of the tripartite soul, the respective functions of spirited and appetitive elements of the soul are doing justice and having just things or a just amount of things. Thus, isolating the reasoning element and its knowledge of justice prevents a soul from *being* just.

On the other hand, it does not seem to be the case that one can have knowledge of justice and be unjust or act unjustly. (In this same manner, a doctor could not choose to ignore his knowledge of medicine.) If reason rules the soul, then knowing justice would inform one's actions. Reason is isolated from the other elements when someone, a rhetorician for example, does not know what is just because he has not been actively reasoning toward justice. This rhetorician might not pursue justice if he did not desire justice, and he might not desire justice if he does not recognise his deficiency. He may think he knows or did know justice, as Gorgias

thought he did, but he does not know justice when being unjust or committing an unjust act.

Knowledge of justice compels one to be just. It seems that in order to remedy injustice one must both learn justice and desire to act justly. Yet, if one knows justice he should recognise its desirability. According to this argument, if Gorgias does not want to be just then he does not know justice; thus far, Gorgias has not given any evidence that he does know what justice is. In order to persuade Gorgias to think more about justice Socrates explains that Gorgias must desire to act justly in order to have knowledge of justice. Socrates tells him, “it is necessary that the rhetorician be just and that the just man wish to do just things” (460c1). Gorgias only allows this to be “apparently” so.

In order for the rhetorician to be a just man he must want to do just things. Socrates concludes that “the just man will never wish to do injustice” (460c4).¹⁷⁷ In these brief exchanges, Socrates tries to compel Gorgias to conclude that rhetoricians must not only know justice, but must also wish to act and be just. It is not clear that Gorgias does know justice at this point and he may wish to see it before he can desire it for itself. Although he makes no commitment to become just (and instead remains apparently just) he may be open to trust Socrates as one with knowledge of justice and to observe Socrates’ display of justice in his dialogue with Polus and Callicles.

When Gorgias responds elusively with “apparently” for these questions about being just, he demonstrates his belief that he, as a rhetorician, only needs to “seem” just or to “seem” to know. With regard to his own work, Gorgias does not link knowing to being. Even though he accepts that being is linked to acting, since he disconnected being and knowing, he disconnected knowing and acting – reasoning and practical life. Thus, it remains the opinion of Gorgias that he, a rhetorician knowing just things, need only appear to desire just things without being or acting

justly.

Again, Socrates states that the rhetorician will never wish to do injustice. Again, Gorgias answers with “*apparently*” rather than “yes” or “this is true” (460c7). Socrates cannot convince Gorgias to look toward actually becoming just, and giving up “seeming” and being “apparently” just. Thus, an exasperated or resolute Socrates turns to an earlier part of their conversation in order to illuminate Gorgias’s inconsistencies, and refute him before his students. Socrates begins by drawing up Gorgias’s previous claim that boxers’ trainers and rhetoricians should not pay a penalty to the city when their students are unjust. According to Gorgias, the existence of unjust rhetors does not mean that the teacher of rhetoric should be charged or forced out of the city. The rhetors themselves are to blame.

Socrates reminds Gorgias that he had argued that the charges and exile should be given to the student who does not use rhetoric justly. Yet, when Socrates verifies his conclusion that “the rhetorician” is “manifestly” one who would never do injustice, Gorgias again replies “apparently” and not affirmatively (460e2). After Socrates provided ample opportunity for Gorgias to avoid a full refutation, Gorgias still refuses to clearly state that a rhetorician must *be* just. Gorgias may willingly contradict himself in front of this crowd in order to discover what Socrates means. Why is a wise man necessarily a just man?

Socrates returns to an earlier part of the conversation where Gorgias agreed that rhetoric is about speeches of “the just and unjust,” not the “even and the odd” (450e7-8). Thus, rhetoric’s speeches are about justice. At that point, Socrates “supposed” Gorgias was saying that a rhetorician would not do injustice because rhetoric is making speeches about justice. Socrates goes on to say he was confused when later Gorgias said a rhetor may use his art unjustly (460d2).

The conflict in these two statements is clear – a rhetor could not unjustly practise an art that makes speeches about justice. A doctor could not practice medicine in a manner that was not according to the art of medicine. Either the rhetor does not know justice or he is not practising rhetoric.

Socrates shows that Gorgias's argument did not adhere to logical order; it does not harmonise (461a2). Socrates made his speeches because he thinks it would be worthwhile if Gorgias profits from this refutation. Socrates holds goodwill toward Gorgias. Pointing to this argument, which reveals that "the rhetorician is powerless to use rhetoric unjustly and to want to do injustice" (461a6-7), Socrates refutes the possibility that Gorgias's students could be unjust. This refutation is not merely a victory for Socrates, it is an articulation of the kind of ignorance that belongs to Gorgias regarding justice. Gorgias's classes in justice either do not take place or are unsuccessful, for he admits his education produces unjust students. Is Gorgias at fault here? Can justice be taught? Perhaps justice cannot be taught. It is not clear. (Is Socrates teaching Gorgias justice?) Yet, it is clear that justice has been relatively unimportant to Gorgias; what is important to him is being a skilled, quick-thinking speaker.

Because some of his students are not concerned with the degree to which Gorgias is just, Socrates does not undermine Gorgias's position completely. Like Gorgias, students wish to be capable speakers regardless of whether their ends are just or unjust. Thus, when Socrates points out Gorgias's error as an injustice it is not a "decisive blow" to Gorgias's position.¹⁷⁸ Socrates does not emphasise that Gorgias has also been proven the less-skilled speaker in front of his students. On the other hand, he may not need to. Gorgias's defeat is quite obvious. Since Socrates is concerned with aligning Gorgias's speech and actions with justice, he does not focus on

usurping Gorgias's authority over his students.

Gorgias realises that he is not the victor, and therefore, is not as wise as Socrates. Socrates is in the position of the praiseworthy kind of man Gorgias wishes to become. In order for Socrates to bring Gorgias closer to the just man he must make the just man and the wise man the same character. He must make Gorgias an epideictic speaker who connects his own desires with the political ends of justice. Just as the doctor works toward health, Socrates must remove the obstacles to justice in the soul. Gorgias's obstacle was the opinion that it is inexpedient for him to be just in his persuasive speech. Because of that opinion, he has not seen to justice in his own soul. Since he suffered a defeat in argument from one who studies justice and believes that the rhetorician is inherently just, Gorgias learns that it is expedient for him to learn about justice.

Political Responsibility – the Just Rhetoric

Just as the professor of medicine increases the likelihood that his students will practise and study the art of medicine for the sake of health, by practising and teaching his own art with the purpose of health, the rhetorician should practise and teach the art of persuasion according to justice, to increase the likelihood his students will use it justly (in addition to improving his own soul). Socrates provides guidance in addition to his own actions. He points to the three species of rhetoric. Gorgias is ignorant of justice and, therefore also of the art of rhetoric. It is difficult to judge the impact Gorgias's ignorance has on his students but Plato seems to suggest that Polus and Callicles can provide insight for such a judgement. Their characters are clarified in later sections of the dialogue. When Socrates illuminates the souls of Polus and Callicles, he finds that they are not ruled by reason; they are enslaved to honours and ever-changing pleasures. The existence of these disordered souls provides a compelling reason for political community and its

justice.¹⁷⁹

The political regime does not simply provide the force to restrain the tyrannical intentions of a Callicles or Polus; it can also provide guidance and training for their souls. They may be directed by a political understanding of justice that arises from searching for the common good and by various examples of noble citizens. Socrates uses the relations between the three species of rhetoric to connect the particular goals of these students with responsible positions in the *polis*. He translates that which they hold as noble and praiseworthy to also being just and expedient toward the good. For students who intend to be politically active, Socrates provides an education in battling injustices. Students are attracted to this education as Gorgias would wish they were attracted to his school.

The relationship between the rhetorician, Gorgias, and the philosopher, Socrates, appears to be one of possible friendship.¹⁸⁰ In this first section of the dialogue, rhetoric seems to operate for the sake of ending dialogue and replacing practical reasoning with a craft of speech-making. Socrates' rhetoric functions for the sake of providing the foundations for meaningful discourse (dialectic) and exercising practical judgement for improved political action. Although Socrates will eventually condemn rhetoric in this dialogue, he seems to allow a possibility that rhetoric is noble in this opening section. Socrates takes up the rhetorical end of justice and attempts to bring Gorgias's understanding of nobility closer to political responsibility. Being politically responsible and having knowledge of the soul results in the consistent argument that Gorgias desires.

Understanding the full implications of Nichols's statement that "Socrates steers Gorgias away from epideictic toward political (or deliberative) and above all toward forensic rhetoric" requires a careful study of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Such a study would reveal the relation of judicial,

deliberative, and epideictic rhetoric, and the soul. Gorgias has neglected this study; he has neglected the soul. A speaker must demonstrate that he seeks justice in order to establish the trust that persuades thoughtful listeners. Gorgias is incapable of such a demonstration. In order to succeed in argument, Gorgias must believe the justly ordered soul is most expedient and, thus, consistently defend justice. In addition, he must recognise the whole (reality), an order of which the rhetorician is only one part among other parts. Gorgias must know how to argue justly before he can practice epideictic rhetoric successfully.

Arguments on behalf of justice turn to political things. Gorgias realises he needs political knowledge and knowledge of the soul, or, he must trust Socrates. Gorgias is persuaded to link epideictic speech with justice through argument. Socrates demonstrates his superiority in all species of rhetoric, including epideictic rhetoric. Socrates' knowledge of the soul results in successful persuasion of a rhetorician. The way in which the philosopher persuades the rhetorician is distinct from, but affects, the way in which the rhetorician persuades his listeners. If the rhetorician is committed to justice then he connects injustice to shame. Although it seems easier to argue toward injustice, it is unnatural for humans who are political by nature and illogical for one directed toward practical judgment. If shame is not linked to injustice then individuals are definitively separated from each other, thought is isolated from action, there is little defence of the practical virtues, and it is more difficult to form friendships.¹⁸¹

CONCLUSION

In the *Ethics*, Aristotle made a place for persuasion as the instrument of the rational element of the soul for ruling the irrational and he positioned rhetoric as a power under politics. Persuasion was presented within the trusting relationships of friends and fathers, while rhetoric, the art of persuasion, was presented as useful for arguing about what is probable. In his treatise on rhetoric, Aristotle immediately aligns rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric can support dialectic by establishing reasonable explanations in the form of enthymemes and examples. Yet, speeches can also hinder dialectic when arguments based on apparent reasoning set obstacles for reason. Listeners can be persuaded to accept unreasonable explanations for experience.

The technologists and Gorgias decide whether their persuasion supports or hinders dialectic. Socrates approaches Gorgias because Gorgias does seek truth; Socrates befriends him on this search by questioning the true nature of justice.¹⁸² Socrates does not condemn the entire art of rhetoric when he refutes Gorgias. Instead, Socrates shows that the art of rhetoric is only possible when the rhetorician seeks justice. As his conversation with Gorgias draws to a close, Socrates provides three sets of opposites related to Aristotle's rhetorical art. Socrates employs the three species of rhetoric prior to his statement about the three opposites. Because Gorgias has neglected justice Socrates must focus on judicial rhetoric, which tends to be the most corrupted species of rhetoric. Once Gorgias accepts that justice is a desirable end, he must examine the justice of the city.

A just rhetorician encourages his listeners to think through why the laws were put in place as they are. The listeners can participate in the same practical judgement the legislators themselves employed when drawing up the rules of the community. Laws are designed to

encourage justice, but Gorgias and Aristotle's technologists come to think that justice is not significant. When aiming toward what is expedient for the individual without thinking of other human beings, any consideration of justice is soon removed from one's speech. A speaker, who chooses to preserve only his physical safety or his reputation, becomes unjust. Yet, a speaker cannot choose to remove the nature of persuasion from reality; a speaker must come to terms with what occurs in practice.

The particular, practical ends of persuasion, are connected to the good simply and this connection is organised through the three species. The significance of the division of rhetoric according to expedience, justice, and nobility is found in both its subordination to politics and its relation to the soul. The three species allow the individual to become naturally political. When a speaker holds the epideictic end, nobility, as his own end, and connects that end to justice and the common good, that speaker is naturally political. Although a noble act is not expedient for the one being praised, it is expedient for the political community. The city benefits when citizens dedicate their time, abilities, and even their life to improving political ends. Perhaps, in truth, a noble act does not *seem* expedient for the one praised, but it *is* expedient if one's end is justice, rather than mere self-preservation, or, if one defines self-preservation as preserving one's own just soul.

A noble act introduces a more precise justice into the political community than the law can provide. When a speaker is able to move between the three species of rhetoric he can consistently defend that justice. The ability to navigate the art of rhetoric is characteristic of a just soul. Although students' initial motivations for studying rhetoric may not be noble, if they discover the rhetorical art of Aristotle and Socrates, their study may introduce the more essential inquiry into the nature of the just soul. Both political philosophers and citizens are born from this inquiry. The

art of rhetoric, which is based on knowledge of the soul and justice, can only be recognised by those who know the nature of the soul and justice. When Gorgias qualifies his claim that he can persuade without knowledge, he says his persuasion only works “in a mob” (459a). Thus, thoughtful citizens, especially in a democracy, take great care not to become like a mob – like those who do not know. In order for citizens to have a working knowledge of justice there must be serious discourse about justice, perhaps, beginning with the rule of law. Aristotle gives a subtle warning to democracies: there are particular dangers posed by rhetoric when democracy’s ruler defines justice.

The Place of Rhetoric in the Politics

This study of rhetoric began with a reference to the opening book of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. In that treatise, the political art was referred to as the master art. While rhetoric and persuasive speech were briefly addressed in the *Ethics*, there is a striking near absence of rhetoric in Aristotle’s treatise on the master art, the *Politics*.¹⁸³ Rhetoric is mentioned only once. In Book V of that treatise, Aristotle states that the “growth of rhetoric” occurs when powerful speakers are leaders instead of military generals. While rhetoric is not very significant in the *Politics* as a whole, Aristotle’s decision to include it once makes rhetoric’s placement in this treatise of particular interest.

Previous to his statement about rhetoric, Aristotle writes that tyrannies occur in democracies when an individual is both the general (or military strategist) and the popular leader, and when that individual is not necessarily the popular leader chosen on account of his speeches. Following this statement, Aristotle argues that the ancient tyrannies rose from democracies because popular leaders were first of all generals, not powerful speakers. When popular leaders

are not chosen on account of their speech but their strength there is a risk of tyranny. These generals as popular leaders desire militaristic advancement before the advancement of the common good. (At times these ends may coincide but they are not identical.) Thus, powerful speakers could prevent a democracy from deteriorating into a tyranny.

According to Aristotle's statement about rhetoric in the *Politics*, it seems that people naturally turn from being ruled by force to being ruled by speech when political order or peace exists. Rhetoric does not exist prior to the establishment of the *polis* in this passage; it comes into being after the political leaders cease to be military generals and begin to be elected based on speeches. The provisions for mere life must already be in place before rhetoric appears or "grows" (*Politics*, 1305a). After the *polis* is established for the protection of life, it continues for the sake of the good life. Thus, rhetoric's role should be guiding citizens toward a good life within the *polis* and maintaining the conditions which promote a search for the best life.

Aristotle states that these speech-giving leaders do not usually attempt any war-like actions due to their lack of experience in military acts. Powerful speakers may attempt something (presumably militaristic or imperialistic), but it is rare because their practical knowledge and experience are in the area of eristics (*Politics*, 1305a). Yet, there is a problem of the opposite types of speaker. If the popular leaders are merely speakers and not generals because they are cowardly, the purpose of the *polis* will shift from the good life back to mere life. When popular speakers are more concerned with self-preservation and motivated by fear and pleasure, their persuasion operates on, and consequently promotes, the lower elements of human nature.¹⁸⁴

In the same passage of the *Politics* in which Aristotle mentions the growth of rhetoric he also stresses that in democracies popular leaders conflict with the wealthy and noble in order to

gain the favour of the people. Aristotle's one mention of rhetoric is found in a section about popular leaders courting the favour of the many. This suggests that rhetoric is susceptible to becoming the flattery of the many. Flattery does not contribute to the common good in a democracy and Aristotle's mention of rhetoric here should serve as a warning for citizens of contemporary democracies. Democracies deteriorate when the rule of the people, which is likely facilitated by the rhetoric of flattering speakers, overpowers the rule of law and serious discourse about justice.

The danger for democracies is the possibility that justice will be distorted by popular ends, ends toward which humans are most easily persuaded in speech. In practice, these ends are detrimental to both the happiness of individuals and the common good of the political community. If citizens believe their democracy is historically exceptional and that its justice is highly advanced – that it is the product of progress – this assumption leaves democratic citizens without a thoughtful defence of how their regime was ordered and legislated. Such an assumption denies citizens access to the practical, political discourse (which would develop from a defence of the “inner logic” of their regime).¹⁸⁵

Democracy and the Art of Character

Democracy needs the art of friends and fathers, not of flatterers. The art of friends and fathers introduced in the *Ethics* requires the persuasion of listeners about whom one cares; it requires persuasion from being irrational to rational. Socrates attempts to persuade Gorgias toward a fuller understanding of reason and truth. The friendship Socrates offers appears to be accepted: Gorgias participates in the dialogue and their shared end becomes knowledge of justice, the political virtue. The persuasion which Socrates employs in this dialogue is practical and

particular. Socrates is a comrade to Gorgias in the war against injustice and this kind of friendship is essential for a democracy.

Reasoning toward good decisions and actions is the function of practical judgment. The health of a regime, perhaps especially democracy, depends on the quality of its citizenry, that is to say, on their ability to make good practical decisions. Conflicting with this demand, democracy has the tendency to justify all pursuits of pleasure and neglect the virtue of its citizens. Just as the doctor must tell Gorgias what is healthy for the patient, Socrates must tell Gorgias what is just for his students. This indirect link (from Socrates to Gorgias and to Gorgias's listeners) can be severed if rhetoricians look to their audience for justice rather than looking to their audience to provide the means of persuasion toward justice.

When the audience defines justice, reason is prevented from informing practical decisions. Because justice and the rule of law are prerequisites to human freedom, Aristotle forewarns that democracies in particular should be wary of the state of rhetoric. When one holds freedom as the political end, one tends to avoid judging actions. Socrates explains this tendency of a young democratic soul in the *Republic* saying that,

he doesn't admit true speech or let it pass into the guardhouse, if someone says that there are some pleasures belonging to fine and good desires and some belonging to bad desires, and that the ones must be practiced and honored and the others checked and enslaved. Rather, he shakes his head at all this and says that all are alike and must be honored on an equal basis.¹⁸⁶

If all desires and therefore, all actions which follow desires, are acceptable, then it makes no difference whether one is ruled and persuaded by irrational pleasures and passions, or, by justice.

A study of rhetoric can hinder this thoughtless approach to decision-making and action. The relationship between the philosopher and the rhetorician provides a reasonable account of

rhetoric. Socrates, the philosopher, demonstrates his well-ordered soul as he navigates the three species of rhetoric instructing some toward philosophy and others to be educated in true opinions of what is good, just, and noble. Socrates uses the three kinds to introduce serious speech about justice and the good. Socrates practises justice by refuting and being refuted in turn. His character connects thought and action. Socrates searches for knowledge; thus, his desires are subordinate to this search. Those around him provide opportunities to further his understanding of the human soul. By questioning and challenging citizens' opinions, Socrates can guide members of the political community toward virtuous action.

One's opinion about politics affects one's understanding of rhetoric and one's understanding of rhetoric affects how one acts politically. If the general assumption is held that politics operates against reason (or that being political is illogical) then a citizen will neither study the political regime nor persuade toward justice or noble acts for the sake of the political community. Rhetoric can help demonstrate the limitations of, and possibilities for, political life – the need for character and shared political ends. Character defines the relation between the rational and irrational in the *polis* through public discourse as well as the relation between rational and irrational in a human life. As Aristotle argues at the outset of his *Rhetoric*, all people attempt to argue. The desire to be reasonable draws us together and provides a basis for trust. Holding the opinion that fellow citizens are reasonable and have been reasonable in the past creates a good starting point for taking their efforts to persuade seriously.

The public discourse that occurs in a regime is the responsibility of citizens. As contemporary proponents of democracy, it is extremely important that the role of persuasive speech is understood in today's political regime; it is second only to an education in political

regimes themselves. A tradition that held rhetoric's place in education should not necessarily be regarded as strange, suspicious, or impractical. The proper education in rhetoric within political science would be best provided by a study of great political speeches (both written and spoken) and by revealing the source of the great speeches. Rhetoric can be understood as the noble art of character and an ability to pursue justice within oneself and one's political community.

ENDNOTES

1. Aristotle's treatise on character, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, or his *Politics*, or Plato's *Republic* or *Apology of Socrates* are examples of more obvious texts to look to for guidance concerning the just life.

2. Since there are no references made to the *Eudamonian Ethics* in my thesis, I shall simply refer to the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the *Ethics*.

3. In the opening lines of the *Ethics*, Aristotle links all arts, inquiries, actions, and choices to the good or the seeming good, and asserts that it is noble to say that all things aim toward the good (1094a1-3). Rhetoric, if it can be considered an art, may have a place here. From these two statements one can gather that: on the one hand, some arts, inquiries, actions, or choices may aim toward a seeming good, but perhaps not the good. On the other hand, the noble task is to say all things do aim toward the good, even when an art, inquiry, action, or choice, aims toward the seeming good. Noble speech can direct from the seeming good toward the good and it is the noble speaker who sees and clarifies this connection.

Aristotle argues that the purposes of the master arts are more choice-worthy than those of pursuits subordinate to the master arts and it is political science which appears to be the "most a master art" by directing all pursuits toward the good (1094a28). Aristotle establishes that since all actions are aimed toward the good, knowing the good is significant for how we live our lives, and political science sets out what members of political regimes should learn about all other arts (1094b2). Therefore, an art which aims toward the seeming good (one of the other arts besides politics) would by its nature be subordinate to the master art which is most choice-worthy.

Subordinate arts do not necessarily aim toward the seeming good as removed from, or opposite to, the good. The end of a subordinate art is limited to part of the good. Those who see partial goods as partial goods have an understanding of the good as a whole. The seeming good is a partial good which has been mistaken for the good as a whole. Those who mistake partial goods for the good see only seeming goods. Subordinate arts, when understood as subordinate and partial, are useful for the master art. Subordinate arts, when mistaken for the master or ruling art are harmful. They can hinder a search for the good as a whole and upset the order of other arts and activities which are parts of the whole themselves. A study of one part of the whole can lead to the proper understanding of the other parts, especially if that particular part is often mistaken for the whole.

Although there seems to be a space of an art of persuasion in the opening chapter, Aristotle first speaks of "rhetoric" in the second chapter of the *Ethics* and he immediately subordinates rhetorical skill to the more choice-worthy politics. (In his translation of the *Ethics*, Joe Sachs explains that Aristotle uses the substantive adjective, "the political," which Sachs translates "politics." It could also be rendered, "the political art," "political knowledge," or "political science." Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle*, [Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002], 2.)

Politics is central in Aristotle's study of character (*ēthos*). Politics uses the other "kinds of knowledge" and establishes laws, and, the highly honoured powers of "generalship, household economics, and rhetorical skill," are subordinate to politics (1094b3-4). Rhetoric initially

appears in the *Ethics* as a power (not as an art) under the political art. Since power is not an end in itself, powers must be used for the sake of an end outside of the powers themselves. Holding the human good as its end, politics puts knowledge and power to use for this purpose.

4. In the third chapter of the *Ethics*, Aristotle refers to rhetoric again; this time he writes about the way rhetoric differs from mathematics and the kind of results these studies provide. He states that “to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician seems about like accepting probable conclusions from a mathematician” (1094b26). Thus, Aristotle designates “demonstrations” as the material of the mathematician and “probable conclusions” as the material of the rhetorician. Mere demonstration is not judgement and is useful only after it is judged for action. Aristotle separates rhetoric from mathematics, which is not, in itself, practical.

Aristotle’s division into demonstration and probable conclusion seems to precede and may coincide with the division of the soul that Aristotle makes in the *Ethics* at the end of Book I. Just as the rational part of the soul cannot be sufficiently isolated from the whole soul, demonstration cannot be isolated from judgement concerning probable conclusions. Rhetoric functions with probable conclusions which require judgements about demonstrations that are the material of mathematics. Aristotle’s division of the soul into rational and irrational elements in the final chapter of Book I displays the need for more than mathematical demonstrations.

The activity of providing demonstrations, of reasoning with no end in mind, does not account for the divisions of the soul. The rational element is not best used (despite its being rigorously employed) when used often for the same problems (e.g. battling harmful passions) without being able to overcome such problems and proceed to more important problems. More reasoning is not better; reasoning in a way which brings one closer to one’s purpose, is better.

Rhetoric draws meaning in the form of probable conclusions from demonstrations. The rational element of the soul need not continuously reason conclusions drawn from what is demonstrated and judged to be probable. One may act and speak according to probable conclusions. The rational element can be buttressed by convictions according to previous judgements. For example, there is no need for a soul committed to avoiding excessive pleasures to reason why it is unbeneficial to be excessive each time it avoids these pleasures. This may mean not reasoning about such possibilities as often, but if the rational element does not retain conclusions and progress in judgement, and instead reasons every possible endeavour or aversion, the rational element does not contribute to the human good. One lacking trust in probable conclusions is never free to contemplate beyond practical daily decisions.

5. Beyond this appearance, there may also be benefits to avoiding excess material goods and performing acts for an end other than one’s self-preservation. Later in the *Ethics*, Aristotle questions whether it is possible to do injustice to oneself. Giving oneself less seems unjust but one might gain something more from it “such as reputation, or simply the beauty of it” (i.e., an act of going beyond justice to do something good for someone) (1136b1-24). Sachs writes that this passage of reveals that Aristotle sees the acts of a noble soul do more than what justice requires. Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle*, (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 97-8.

6. Aristotle's example of a father's relation to a child is probably one of the clearest demonstrations of such "admonition." It is reasonable for a child, who has not sorted out the best course of action, either through lack of experience, unpractised intellect, or a tendency to be overwhelmed by immediate pleasures, to obey his father. It is reasonable that a father will guide his child's behaviours by approving or disapproving speech and action. "Chastisement and encouragement" are effective ways to guide thoughts and actions (1103a).

The relation between two friends differs from the relation of father and child; it is based on a certain equality and recognised common purpose. Yet, there are still areas where one friend may have more experience and refined understanding of a subject than the other. Thus, a friend can be a reasonable guide when he has more knowledge of the topic at hand than his friend, or if his friend has forgotten significant matters.

7. If the whole purpose of political science is to provide a ready-made system of justice, as well as the means for protecting and promoting the common good as defined by that system, then one might avoid persuasive speech altogether and work toward its removal from politics and political science – serious affairs which require precision and impartiality. An argument similar to this is presented by the Athenian politician Kleon when he suggests that persuasive speech is a hindrance to political affairs in his speech in Thucydides' History (Book III [38]). Diodotus, arguing that speech can improve judgement, narrowly defeats Kleon's argument. *The Peloponnesian War: The Crawley Translation*, Ed. T.E. Wick, (New York: The Modern Library, 1982).

8. George A. Kennedy. "Introduction," *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4.

9. For some of Aristotle's opinions on the young see, *Ethics* 1095a and *Rhetoric* II: 12.

10. This understanding of rhetoric assumes that politics is an arena for pure competition, an arena for seeking honour or recognition for the sake of itself. In his article explaining the relationship between argument and action in the *Gorgias*, Charles Kahn argues that rhetoric designed to meet public opinion, leads to, or results from, the notion that participation in political life is "a career of personal advancement at any price." Charles Kahn, "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's *Gorgias*," (*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* I 1983), 84.

11. The similarities between the opinions of Polus and Callicles and modern social contract thinkers are striking. Thus, since the notions which make contemporary political life what contemporary scholars would call "unnatural" were already present in the thoughts of Gorgias, and subsequently in the thoughts of his students, Polus and Callicles, the unnaturalness or naturalness of the *polis* seems to be less a historical phenomenon than a stage in civic education.

12. Carnes Lord points out that Aristotle is used by specialists in rhetoric but those interested in his political or philosophical work do not read the *Rhetoric*. Carnes Lord, "The Intention of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric,'" (*Hermes* 109, 1981), 326.

13. Dialectic, Socrates' professed method of speaking, is the activity of logical questioning in a search for general truths. The meaning of counterpart "*antistrophe*" is "a turning about." It is the term used to describe the "returning of the chorus answering to a previous *strophe* except that now they move from left to right instead of from right to left." This metaphor may be helpful for showing how dialectic and rhetoric are related. Rhetoric is a reply to (the challenge of) dialectic; rhetoric is about the same topic, but that topic is sent in a different direction. As dialectic challenges opinions, rhetoric builds them. Liddell and Scott *An Intermediate Greek- English Lexicon*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), 81.

Defined as "an *antistrophos* (counterpart) to/for dialectic," it initially seems that rhetoric could be: a competitor for dialectic, subordinate to dialectic, in opposition to, or equal to (but different than) dialectic. John Rainold, a sixteenth century Oxford lecturer, argues Aristotle's use of *antistrophos* actually means that dialectic and rhetoric are closely related. This view seems to oppose the understanding taken up by Cicero, who thought *antistrophos* meant "converse." Rainold points to Aristotle's own use of the word in *Generation of Animals*; here Aristotle says "shell-skinned animals in the sea are the *antistrophos* of plants which grow on land." Both of these have methods of surviving and flourishing but due to their internal structure and external environment they act in distinct manners.

Rainold believes that this description shows that *antistrophos* is more likely to be similar to an "analogue" which corresponds proportionately to something else, for those things which correspond proportionately to one another comprise things connected by a reciprocal relationship." Rainold points out that Socrates says that justice is the *antistrophos* to medicine in the *Gorgias*. One finds that Socrates also describes rhetoric as the *antistrophos* to cookery in the soul. John Rainold, *John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Trans. Lawrence D. Green, (Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1986), 105-7.

I believe one of Aristotle's purposes for opening his treatise in this manner is primarily to draw one's attention to the well-known practitioner of dialectic, Socrates. Although Socrates aligns rhetoric to the ordinary art of cookery, Aristotle begins his art of rhetoric, as a whole, by aligning it with Socrates' approach of choice. Aristotle encourages his reader to turn to the dialogues, and if there is to be some understanding gained of an art of rhetoric, to find it practised there.

14. Aristotle may be regarded as inconsistent in his criticism because he provides an extensive account of the passions in Book II of the *Rhetoric*, and this seems to contradict his introduction where he argues against those who employ the passions. Aristotle does not need to avoid discussing the passions when they are presented following a reasonable account of rhetoric. This reasonable account is found in Book I, which addresses how rhetoric is related to politics and ethics. The possibility of rhetoric, as it is presented in the introductory section, is qualified by an understanding of the passions found in Book II, and the necessity of style and arrangement found in Book III. Passions and stylistic techniques, despite the persuasive victories they may bring, do not alone explain the nature of rhetoric.

15. Aristotle labels the group of speakers or speech writers, who ignore the artistic material of rhetoric and appeal mainly to judicial rhetoric, "technologists." They seem to diminish the act of deliberation in those listening to speeches. Aristotle first criticizes the technologists for their

neglect of artistic proofs and enthymemes (1354a15-1354b21). What has generally been translated as “handbook writers” or “authors of handbooks,” Aristotle first describes in participial form: “those constructing” (*suntithentes*), “the arts” (*tas technas*), “of speeches” (*tōn logōn*) (1354a12). In this passage, however, Aristotle collapses the terms into a novel verb: *technologousin* (1354b16). Therefore, I shall call those authors or composers of the arts of speeches technologists, as Darcy Wudel does in his thesis on the *Rhetoric*. Darcy Edwin Wudel, “Anger in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: An Inquiry into Politics and Persuasion.” (Master’s Thesis. University of Alberta, 1983) 12.

Technologeo appears five times in the *Rhetoric* in five different forms (the third person plural form appears twice but one includes the movable “n” and one does not), thus, this newly invented word looks different each time Aristotle writes it. See: 1354a17, 1354b27, 1355a19, 1356a11, and 1356a17. This information was found on the Perseus online referencing system. Gregory Crane, ed.-in-chief, *Perseus Digital Library*, (Somerville, MA: Tufts University); [online digital library]; available from <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/>; Internet.

This word strikes the contemporary reader as sounding similar to our own “modern” phenomenon: technology. Its lexicon definition is: “to bring under the rules of an art, to systematize.” *Technologeo* does not appear in any literature before this treatise; Aristotle uses it in none of his other works, and only the Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, employs it afterward. Aristotle invents this word to describe a group who attempt to render speech or reason into a craft. Since Aristotle will eventually incorporate the passions in his art of rhetoric in Book II, and Book III demonstrates that he is not opposed to stylistic nuances (as is evident in his use of the new word *technologousin* itself), Aristotle’s opposition to the technologists’ approach is not due to their method as such. It is their regard for art of rhetoric as a whole and how and why they believe persuasion is effective.

Within the technologists’ attempts to bring speeches under the rules of an art, they actually neglect what leads to an understanding of proofs and enthymemes, the body of the proofs, which is, according to Aristotle, the only material within the province of an art (1354a14 as well as 1354b21). Aristotle goes on to argue that attempts to bring speaking under the rules of an art ignore deliberative speeches, despite the fact that the method for judicial speech is the same. Both require proofs and enthymemes, however, since they differ in purpose, (that is to say, deliberative rhetoric aims toward a common future that members of a state will endure together, while judicial rhetoric aims toward a just decision for one man or group which may have little direct effect on the lives of those judging), judicial rhetoric is more susceptible to overriding that requirement for proofs and enthymemes and manipulating the passions instead.

16. Wudel, 14. Aristotle seems to design his rhetorical art to work with law, at least the law of a well-ordered state (1354a20). In order to develop a rhetoric that belongs in well-ordered cities one would use rhetoric in defence of its laws. A rhetoric that superseded law would have no place in the good state. However, even the good state, the law must be applied to particular cases and rhetoric serves the law by bringing the purpose of the law to individual circumstances. If the law held virtue as its purpose, rhetoric would strive to organise souls within the regime and to educate citizens. Those who depend upon the passions as their means of persuasion have nothing to say, not only because the state itself is well-governed, but because the particular souls within it are well-governed and immune to such emotional appeals (1354a19-20).

17. When Aristotle suggests that the enthymeme is the “body” that holds the proofs one can see a parallel to how the body holds soul. The etymology of enthymeme offers some insight into Aristotle’s use of this word. “*Enthymeme*” is defined in the lexicon as, first of all, “a thought, piece of reasoning, argument,” and secondly, as an “invention, device.” However, the components of the word may be more intriguing than its formal definition. Liddell and Scott, *Greek- English Lexicon*, (New York: Economy Book House, 1871), 263.

“*En*” is a preposition, which, when in a compound word usually means “in,” “among,” “at the same place,” or “with.” The latter half of the word: “*thymeme*” is closely related to “*thymos*.” “*Thymos*” has a number of definitions including, “soul,” “life,” “heart,” “will,” and “the seat of anger.” *Ibid.*, 371.

An account of this word is found in Darcy Wudel’s thesis and attributed to the article, “Enthymemes: Body and Soul” Arthur B. Miller and John D. Bee. This article follows up an etymological explanation with a discussion stressing the “affective” role of human action. In contrast to Bee and Miller, it seems better to emphasise that the *thymos* has more to do with anger and the types of desire concerned with honour and less with the appetites found in *De Anima*. However, I agree that the enthymeme gives “force” as a rhetorical proof and that the relationship between *phronesis* and enthymeme is central to Aristotle’s rhetoric. Miller and Bee suggest that Aristotle might have been punning when he called the enthymeme the “body” of persuasion, “because it *is* in one’s body, in and around the heart – and separated from the visceral cavity by the *phren* – that the *thymos* is found.” Arthur B. Miller and John D. Bee, “Enthymemes: Body and Soul” *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 5 no. 4 (1979), 211. Darcy Edwin Wudel, “Anger in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Inquiry into Politics and Persuasion.” Master’s Thesis. University of Alberta, 1983.

Aristotle’s use of enthymeme for the body of the proofs would suggest that the proofs are closely tied to the spirited element in human nature. One’s first encounter with the word enthymeme indicates that rhetoric’s artful material resides between pure logical reasoning and the lower irrational appetites. Thus, the proofs are found in this intermediate location.

18. Through a reflection on past opinion one can see how one moved toward something true from what, at first, only resembled truth (1355a15-16). Are there conditions required for this reflection to take place? If it is natural that truth and justice are stronger than untruth and injustice, then the existence of untruth and injustice must be the result of something unnatural. This unnatural condition may be the consequence of bad laws or the kind of common opinions which allow technologists to dominate a regime. Without good laws and the existence of some common notion that humans should strive to not be ruled by passions, very few would come to see truth and justice as naturally stronger.

19. In his study of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Eugene Garver provides an excellent account of the problem raised by sophistry. He draws his conclusion from a later section of the treatise when the sophist comes up again in Book II chapter twenty-four. Garver shows how sophists miss the full understanding of argument and its central role in rhetorical art. The reason for their omission is due to the fact that they neglect the *ēthos* or character. Garver explains that this “lack of *ēthos* can be immoral.” He goes on to say, “*Ēthos* is revealed in the mutual adjustment of general and particular in our choices. If rhetorical inferences are in general not necessary, then what

distinguishes a fallacious immediate inference from a legitimate enthymeme cannot be a middle term that causes a predicate to inhere in a subject, but an ethical middle term that causes the conclusion to be asserted on the basis of the evidence and so uses arguments *as* arguments.” The difference between the false and true enthymeme or means of persuasion is not logical but ethical.

Garver continues, explaining that “*Ēthos* is necessary in order to see and assess probabilities and signs. Without such an ethical middle the speaker cannot offer an intentional object, and cannot therefore aim at rational persuasion.” The sophists do not take into account the full purpose of rhetoric which is beyond mere success. They look to the easiest way to arrive at some external end. They do not argue properly but only seem to make conclusions. This does not matter to them because there is no ethical connection between themselves, their argument, and their audience. The audience of the sophist becomes, “the passive object of his designs, and [his audience] *cannot* be aware of what the speaker is doing.” Sophists do not abide by Aristotle’s art because they do not have the common good in mind or what Garver calls “shared intentions.” The use of short-sighted appeals to the emotions still affects the common good for they do not use their power or ability (i.e., their intellect) for prudent decision-making, which would contribute to the good of the political community. “The sophists.... fail to argue because their intelligence is not connected to *phronesis* but to an external motive. Therefore there is no shared intention and therefore no argument.” Eugene Garver, *Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 167-169.

20. Here, Aristotle specifically uses *rhetor* and not *rhetorike*. James H. Nichols Jr. provides a helpful explanation of this distinction in his translation of *Gorgias*. He writes, “The noun *rhetor* means speaker, orator, rhetor (sometimes with the implication good speaker); the adjective *rhetorikos* means skilled in speaking, rhetorical, or designating a person, rhetorician; with the feminine singular *rhetorike* one supplies *technē* (or perhaps in certain contexts *epistēmē*) to understand the rhetorical art (or science), rhetoric.” James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato’s Gorgias*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 28.

21. The Greek word for power Aristotle uses here is *dunamis* which is the same term for “ability to do” or “capacity.” Rhetoric is described as a power throughout this treatise. Thus, in this passage, it does seem strange that a rhetor can be a rhetor by choice. Garver discusses how Aristotle argues that one can be, “[called] *rhetor* on the basis of his knowledge and another on the basis of his deliberative choice” (1355b15). A rhetor according to choice seem to be an external perception of the rhetor by the audience, emphasizing how difficult it is to tell the rhetor from the sophist. The dialectic-type rhetor would argue according to knowledge and thus, according to his capacity to find the means of persuasion. The sophist-type rhetor would argue according to whatever means of persuasion he chose. In order to understand the available/possible means of persuasion the rhetor would have to have an idea about the human good or he would only see his choice as one concerning any means of persuasion at all. Eugene Garver, *Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 164.

22. Carnes Lord discusses Aristotle's comparison and points to the *Topics* 101a25-b4 and *Soph. El.* 165a19-31 as evidence for Aristotle's understanding of a dialectician's intention. Lord, Carnes, "The Intention of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric,'" *Hermes* 109 (1981), 326-339.

23. In the first chapter of Garver's book he makes the connection between the available means and the possible means. He goes on to explain in his notes that if he compares a definition from the *Topics* to the statements found in the *Rhetoric*, the existing (or available) and admitting (or possible) matters become equivalent. This connection demonstrates that dialectic and rhetoric are counterparts because both use the possible or available means of persuasion and not all or any means. (They are also counterparts because of the similarities Aristotle originally pointed out in chapter one, i.e., proving opposites and being shared in common by all).

In the *Topics* the distinction between looking to everything and only possible things is displayed in the example of a doctor looking for the possible problems with his patient. He is a doctor because he can look at his patient and know all the possible problems and try to treat based those problems; he does not have to address every single problem there has ever been or will be. The first passage that Garver refers to in the *Rhetoric* concerns "possible means" as opposed to all means. In the second passage of the *Rhetoric* that Garver refers to he finds "available means" as opposed to all means. In the *Topics*, Aristotle writes about "available means" but this passage discusses how dialectic is akin to medicine and rhetoric in the distinction between available/possible and all means. Keep in mind the *Topics* is the treatise about dialectic. Thus, since both rhetoric and dialectic include this separation between all means and available/possible means, they may be narrowing in on the "same area of knowledge."

In addition to this association, if we look further along in Garver's argument we find a connection to these available/possible means and the purpose of rhetoric. Just as the state or *polis* has what Garver refers to as internal ends (i.e., the good life) and external ends (i.e., life), rhetoric has internal ends to aim toward with the available/ possible means of persuasion, (i.e., human good) or external ends (i.e., successful persuasion). Just as ignoring the good life might not make states any less secure or wealthy but it would make them worse as states devoted to the good life, ignoring human good might not make rhetoric any less persuasive or successful but it would make it worse as rhetoric devoted to human good. Garver writes that neglect of the internal end would not make for "civic rhetoricians"(29).

Thus, Garver argues that since this internal end establishes all the activities of the art, it is the "means to the given end." If the rhetorician accomplishes the internal end then, he also "achieves the given end." The rhetorician does not necessarily have to achieve the given end, he does "everything possible" to achieve it. Even if he does not achieve the given ends he is still practising his art, like the doctor would still be a doctor if the patient dies despite the doctor's efforts. The doctor, in addition to knowing the possible/available means to health, knows what is healthy and this is his internal or guiding end (28-29).

As Garver points out, it is not guaranteed that one will persuade even if one was aiming toward the given end. The power of achieving success is secondary to the guiding end of being a civic rhetorician. This results in "the good life being the means to life," and Garver looks to Socrates' argument in the *Apology*; he argues that virtue leads to wealth. In the same way, civic rhetoric (or Aristotle's art of rhetoric) leads to success. Garver then points to how spectacle is more effective in moving an audience, the given end, than plot but plot is still the only way to get

that “katharsis of pity and fear of a tragedy,” the guiding end, by those moved emotions. Spectacle is not the art of tragedy just as winning a debate is not the art of rhetoric. Garver has further proven through this insight about the available/ possible means of persuasion that there is a higher purpose of rhetorical art beyond persuasion – the human good. Eugene Garver, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 25- 29 and 254: note 12.

24. The passions are not actually mentioned the first time Aristotle presents the three forms of artistic proofs that come through a speech. Aristotle designates the audience as a form of proof it was not according to *pathos* but through a sort of examination by the audience (*diathēninaī*) (1356a3). Aristotle addresses the varying condition of the listeners' passions. He acknowledges that the audience is affected by speech but that passions must be taken into account because they influence our ability to judge. Different judgements are given according to whether one is “grieving” and “rejoicing,” and also according to passions directed toward others such as, “loving and hating”(1356a16). These two pairs of passions are discussed in book II chapter four of the *Rhetoric* which is dedicated to friendship. Aristotle writes that friends grieve and rejoice together because such action necessarily follows for those who believe they are loving friends (1381a3-4). Aristotle appears to be drawing a connection of friendship between the speaker and his audience, but friends must love and be loved in return. According to Aristotle, love is “wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good for his sake and not for our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power” (1381a1-2). He goes on to discuss how friends should have similar ideas of good and bad, and they should hate the same persons (1381a20). The emotions or experiences (*peirasthai*) of friendship seem to be among the technologists' interests but Aristotle does not approve of “those now bringing.... only that of which one has an experience...under the rules of an art” (*technologountas*) (1356a17). Experiences and emotions are not to be systematised. It is the experience alone, without reason, which the technologists can render into their art. The technologists may take the common experience of an audience and place their interpretation (i.e., that the passions rule) as an explanation for it. This practice has no regard for the role of the proofs as a whole. The role of passions appear to monopolise their understanding of proofs. Thus, it seems Aristotle diminished the role of the passions by introducing the proof of the audience as an examination (*diathēninaī*) (1356a3). Aristotle delays his discussion of the passions; he explain that each of the passions “will have become visible, whenever we speak about the passionate state” (1356a19) (my translation).

25. Sachs provides a brief explanation of the complex nature of *ēthos*. He argues that Aristotle presents *ēthos* as an active condition of the soul which allows human to perform virtuous acts. Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle*, (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), note, 25, p. 22.

The appearance of *ēthos* in a speaker is essential for persuasion. According to Aristotle, we trust the fairminded speaker for both general concerns and, perhaps, even more so, for uncertain matters. For Aristotle, the audience's opinion of the *ēthos* must result from the speech given, not a speaker's reputation from the past, in order for it to be the proof of *ēthos* (1356a10). He does not make this qualification for the other forms of proof – the argument or the audience.

There seems to be a particular problem with how *ēthos* comes about as a form of proof within the art of rhetoric. *ēthos* does not render itself into an art easily.

Eugene Garver cites this passage of the *Rhetoric* in the introduction of his book foreshadowing his theme. For him, the central argument of the treatise confronts how, “the relation between art and reality comes to a head in the consideration of *ēthos* – what does *ēthos* as a product of art have to do with *ēthos* that leads to good action?” *Logos* is not affected if it is the result of art and *pathos* is still *pathos* regardless of how it is employed artistically. Is *ēthos* still as much *ēthos* if it is the result of art? *ēthos* should be the result of actions. The question is whether a “skillfully constructed” character does seem to be less a character “because it is the result of calculation.” Garver suggests that Aristotle offers *ēthos* as both the meeting ground and place of tension “between craft and virtue.”

Understanding this tension within the meaning of a civic art is the key to understanding what Aristotle is saying in the *Rhetoric*. Garver also points out that the *pathos* has its own section: book II chapters two to eleven and *logos* has its own section: book I chapters four-fourteen and book II chapters eighteen to twenty-six. This means that *ēthos* stands alone without any specific section containing its own explanation although it seems to be the most authoritative form of proof. Eugene Garver, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 14-15.

26. Aristotle has written about ethics in other treatises, namely, the *Ethics*. A student of rhetoric should study and understand the most authoritative of proofs, if he expects to understand rhetoric. The virtues and standards for the good man found in the *Ethics* do not play the same role in the *Rhetoric*, but they are present. Although rhetoric is a power and not a virtue, and in itself, lacks virtue, it can serve the political art of which ethics is a part. For the *Ethics*, character is good in and of itself. For the *Rhetoric*, character becomes good for civic life through both art and action.

27. For the most part my references to the *Rhetoric* are taken from the Loeb Classical Library's translation. However, Kennedy's text is used here because Freese translates “justly” as “reasonably,” in this passage. George A. Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 39.

28. This verb is the same word Socrates uses when he is explaining to Gorgias how the four forms of flattery (cosmetic, cookery, sophistry, and rhetoric) “slip in under” the four branches of business of the body and soul: gymnastic, medicine, legislation, and justice (464d). James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato's Gorgias*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 47.

29. There are three reasons why this error occurs: “lack of education,” “false pretension,” and “other blameworthy happenings for humans” (1356a29). What might it mean to mistake rhetoric for politics? As we just discussed, in relation to the action of character or ethics, rhetoric seems to *be* politics, and is justly called so. The study of ethics is concerned with one human life and fostering good habits and virtue within it. Rhetoric is concerned with many lives, not just the upkeep of an individual soul. But, rhetoric does not have the same architectonic goals of the political art (see *Ethics* I.ii5-6 and *Politics* I.i). What would belong to the political art in which

rhetoric does not have a part?

The regime and its laws and institutions are initially established without rhetoric. The single mention of rhetoric in the *Politics* refers to how rhetoric appears only after unmitigated military leadership sets up a city. At first, popular leaders are in power based on their military force but later “with the growth of rhetoric, capable speakers act as popular leaders” (1305a30). After the conditions for mere life and the threats of physical force are no longer pressing concerns, rhetoric enters the *polis*.

Misunderstanding limits of rhetoric and claiming that it is politics, allows rhetoricians to use rule over the regime, its laws and institutions, without being dedicated to its good. Foreigners may teach rhetoric as persuasive speaking, which makes it seem to have little to do with citizenship. For example, Gorgias, a native of Leontini has no difficulty coming to Athens to educate Athenian citizens in rhetoric. Does Gorgias himself claim that rhetoric is politics? He seems to allude to such a claim when stating that his art (rhetoric) “is the greatest good and the cause of both freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time to rule over others in each man’s own city” (*Gorgias* 452d4-6). Claiming rhetoric to be, “the greatest good” does infringe on the realm of politics. Yet, rhetoric, even for Gorgias, may not give men the freedom to rule over other cities. The dependence and subordination of rhetoric to politics becomes evident when a foreigner attempts to persuade an assembly. It is questionable whether Gorgias himself could persuade the Athenians on political matters.

Democracies seem to have the largest role for rhetorical art. Persuasive speaking may not be as necessary for small groups of deliberators, such as those ruling in an aristocracy or an oligarchy. Since rhetoric is subject to “each man’s own city,” its role varies and subjects itself to the different regimes. If rhetoric were politics, the role of the particular regime could be ignored. However, this is not possible because each man comes from a particular regime and rhetoric itself grows after the regime is established. What makes persuasive speech in one regime may not make persuasive speech in another. Those who call rhetoric politics have not been educated in comparing regimes.

A lack of education may also lead one to mistake rhetorical art for the political art because speakers, without knowledge, may see their own or others’ ability to have power over an ignorant crowd, as the political art in its entirety. Thus, politics is reduced to controlling others so that they do whatever one wills them to do. Having the complete education which allows one to see why rhetoric can be called political art, but is not the political art, would include a knowledge of regimes, justice, laws, and their limitations. All of these are necessary for the existence and development of the *polis*. Beyond seeing the necessity and naturalness of political life through an understanding of citizenship, education should lead a human being to see the highest form of human life as the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. If the audience and the speaker are not educated in the purpose of politics, rhetoric seems to be the whole of politics.

There are also those who profess that rhetoric is politics on account of pride (1356a29). The proud have an inability to see the greatest good of the political community or the whole of politics; pride causes one to misjudge himself, others, and the *polis*. Seeing the beliefs or opinions (about the laws, the institutions, etc.) people happen to hold, only as an opportunity to employ one’s potential persuasive capacity for manipulation, the proud think of their own communication with other citizens as either for self-protection or self-gratification. From the

perspective of the proud, all other people are either jealous of their abilities or they recognise their (the proud's) greatness and flatter them. Pride leads to injustice from taking more than one is due, on account of overestimating one's worth. The proud do not recognise what the *polis* has provided for them and call rhetoric politics.

In an extreme case, pride might also lead one to think he could reduce politics to the level of rhetoric in order to rule. This would require removing the use of force and knowledge of what is best for the *polis* from the political reality. A creative way to accomplish this might be to make the avoidance of force what is best for the *polis*. The aim of the *polis* is then peace and of the citizen, the avoidance of violent death. There would be no need of force for a state which, above all things, was ruled by fear of war and violent death. What is best for the *polis* would not be the common good in terms of virtue but a non-offensive individual freedom where no one seems to rule another. No one needs to rule anyone or be ruled by anyone because each man knows what is best for himself (at least, according to himself). Hobbes seems to write about this notion in his *Leviathan* stating that, "that which may perhaps make such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar, that is, than all men but themselves and a few others whom, by fame or for concurring with them they approve." (XIII [2], pp. 75). Human organization arranged according to pride is not impossible for one to conceive, but, politics, at least according to Aristotle, includes both ruling and being ruled (*Politics* I.1). Pride may not allow for one to be ruled or to rule well. Rhetoric only requires that one rules through persuasion and is persuaded; the rulership which is beyond persuasion includes, the use of force and the knowledge of what is best of the *polis*. Carnes Lord, *Aristotle: The Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

The last cause Aristotle gives for rhetoric's mistaken identity is the blameworthiness of humans. Blameworthiness can take in a wide range of reasons for this error. In his later discussion of virtue and vice in Book I, Aristotle includes injustice, cowardice, licentiousness, avarice, little-mindedness, and meanness as blameworthy conditions (1366b10-20). Any number of the passions, the pursuit of money or comfort, and even a lack of time or intelligence are also to be blamed. However, these are not excuses and one should know that rhetoric should be separated from politics.

30. This suggestion is made by Carnes Lord in his article, "The Intention of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric.'" Lord argues that the reason Aristotle wrote a treatise on rhetoric was because he was concerned that an education in rhetoric (such as the one being delivered by Isocrates), was replacing an education in political science. Carnes Lord, "The Intention of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric,'" *Hermes* 109 (1981), 338-339.

31. Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle*, (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 1094a7.

32. This distinction is discussed in the *Topics*. Freese suggests that Aristotle is referring to the *Sophistical Refutations* (9) which is thought to be an appendix to the *Topica*. This passage states that refutations which are concerning dialectic are common and do not fall under an art. There are an infinite amount of refutations for particular arts and sciences. Although there are fewer common or universal principles, they are actually the bases of any refutation. Aristotle, *On*

Sophistic Refutations, Trans. E.S. Forster, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1955) IX. Thus, following this reference in chapter two (of the *Rhetoric*) to the *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle says he would first speak of these particulars, infinite as they may be. He immediately decides that, before speaking about these infinite particulars, first and foremost he should take up the genus of the rhetorical art. Thus, he decides against the limitless options provided by particular arts and sciences and chooses a manageable plurality provided by the kinds of rhetoric.

33. Translators have struggled with Aristotle's use of *eide* and most have decided its meaning is synonymous with *gene*. Grimaldi, for example, suggests that in this passage *eide* is the same as *gene*. Garver translates *eide* as "species" and this follows from the traditional translation of *eide* in the *Categories*. William M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle: A Commentary*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988), 79. Garver, 54.

By not using *gene*, Aristotle makes the division of rhetoric into phenomena which are seen; perhaps not in the manner of our "basic visual experiences," but what is seen while listening to speeches. Yet, dividing rhetoric by species (*eide*), as discussed below, may be a less random way of dividing the art than *gene*. If we all reasoned through the divisions of the speech we would probably arrive at the *eide*. The *eide* does not simply refer to how scenes appear but how scenes arise from speech, having "an invisible look, seen only in speech." Joe Sachs, *Aristotle's Physics: A Guided Study*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 248. In addition, this seeing does bear a linguistic relation to knowing. When *eide* is in the verbal form as the perfect past tense it becomes "know" in the present. Thus, "to have seen" is "to know." Liddell and Scott, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1889), 227.

Like Aristotle's rhetorical proofs, *pisteis*, *eide* has a position on the divided line of Plato's *Republic*. Socrates places *eide* at the top of the intelligible column under the sun. Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), note 39, pp. 464.

34. This word, *theōrein* means "observer" in the sense that he is watching or listening to an event as entertainment or for the sake of itself, and not for practical use or making decisions about actions. It is related to the verb meaning to contemplate. While translators regard this word as "mere" spectator, there is an argument that it implies more participation in the event or speech. Sachs, in his translation of the *Ethics*, translates the related verb "attentively considering" (1146b) and later as "actively paying attention" (1152a10). The unrestrained man is not even one who is actively considering, and this is problematic because it means he cannot be persuaded, he does not choose, and he may even have knowledge but he is not using it. This word, *theōrein*, is also found in the *Politics* in the same chapter as Aristotle's sole mention of rhetoric in that treatise. In that passage, Aristotle tells his reader that one could see in studying (*theōrein*) his past examples of revolutions how other revolutions occur (1305a). In his description of a child's education in the seventh chapter of the *Politics*, Aristotle writes that a child between two and seven should be *theōrous* (observers) of "what they will have to learn" (1336b). Finally, in the *Rhetoric* (1391b) Aristotle will qualify his statement about the epideictic audience. Since any audience one intends to persuade is some sort of judge, the *theōrein* is also a judge. The speaker is arguing against opposing arguments not persons, and thus, when writing epideictic speeches, the speaker must be

thought of as a judge of these opposing arguments when bringing together speeches for him. However, after stating this Aristotle returns to his original position that judges are only those concerned with civil matters (1391b).

35. My references to the *Rhetoric* are taken from the Loeb Classical Library's translation. John Henry Freese seems to provide the clearest translation. However, there are some discrepancies between some of the terms he chooses and those I treat in my thesis. He refers to jurymen and judicial rhetoric, as dicasts and forensic rhetoric respectively. Also, his choice of "mere spectator" for *theōron* loses the significance suggested by the note above. John Henry Freese, *Aristotle with an English Translation: The "Art" of Rhetoric*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 33.

36. Aristotle states that species are three in number (*arithmon*). This is a curious choice of words for Aristotle, since he contrasts the nature of mathematics and rhetoric in the *Ethics* (1094b28). The distinction between mathematics and rhetoric may not be as clearly defined as it initially seems.

37. Aristotle himself reasons (*legō*) that the one to whom the purpose of speech (*telos*) is spoken is the hearer. The word for hearer or listener (*akroatos*) encompasses both the observer and the judge. Near the beginning of the *Ethics* (1095a), Aristotle addresses the hearer as one who may or may not benefit from his treatise because they are looking toward action rather than knowledge. Nevertheless, Aristotle is concerned about those who will hear his discourse and how they will hear it. In chapter 10 of the *Ethics* Aristotle refers to the soul of the hearer (*akroatos*) and how it must be employed. Such a soul must not live by feelings; if it does, the soul will not be able to hear words (*logos*) (1179b).

The opening lines of the third chapter seem to be crafted according to reason. The verb *legō*, which means, "I speak or reason," or the noun *logos*, which means, "speech, argument, or reason," as well as their derivatives, are used five times in those first few lines of chapter three before the division of the hearers is discussed (1358b). The division into parts of speech, speaker, argument, and listeners, is a reasonable one.

38. Technologists and sophists take these routes respectively. They do not organise their rhetoric according to how to best bring an argument to an audience. As discussed above, the technologists enjoy the power of speech for the sake of itself irregardless of their effect on the audience. The sophists choose the apparent means of persuasion not for the sake of persuading the audience toward good judgment and action.

39. There are two ways this section poses problems for rhetoric as an art. Necessity implies compulsion and, like nature, is not subject to an art. This connection draws rhetoric away from being an "art." Rhetoric's definition as a power or capacity also positions it closer to a natural phenomenon, as Aristotle writes in the *Ethics*, "we possess certain capacities by nature, but we are not born good or bad by nature: of this however we spoke before" (1106a10). H. Rackham, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Loeb Classical Library, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1926), (II.5).

40. Time plays an interesting role in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Like the modern works of philosophy and political theory, time seems to be a central concern. In a sense, the differing times, like the political institutions, actually appear to be the defining feature of the different kinds (*gene*) of rhetorical speeches, as opposed to the species (*eidē*). If the hearers' thoughts did not have to be placed in or toward a particular time the various ends might be discussed in a different manner. Discussing the role and purpose of human beings seems to require an approach in terms of "time as the possible horizon." Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 1.

Epideictic speeches have a pivotal role in these problems surrounding time; they seem to be concerned primarily with the present. However, since they take into account both recalling the past and conjecturing the future, these speeches override the significance time might have, for the sake of other concerns such as "the power of the speaker" (1358b18 and 1358b6).

41. According to Garver, Aristotle does not merely describe three categories of rhetoric, he creates three interdependent and functioning species of rhetoric comparable with biological species. He writes that unlike biological species, the species of rhetoric are not grouped according to similarities, but are nevertheless related to each other in certain ways. Since speeches exist which do not fit into the three species, meaning speeches used outside of political action or speech that is only necessary, it cannot be the case that Aristotle simply looked around, saw three kinds of rhetoric, and placed them into groups. Instead, Aristotle's species of rhetoric share an "internal end," beyond mere successful persuasion. Garver also states that the three species have "form that can be identified with function," and are "essential kinds of practical activity." According to Garver, the reason that these three species of rhetoric are cases "of practical rationality functioning well," is because they are actually "*functioning*" (Garver, 55). This means that their status as species of rhetoric is not tied to the political institutions where they are found. Nor does Garver think Aristotle is primarily concerned with how the art of rhetoric operates universally; his interest here is not hermeneutics or epistemology. Garver stresses that Aristotle's rhetoric is focussed on practical activity. From a modern point of view, it is difficult to grasp an art of practical judgment because we regard politics as human convention, which arbitrarily places restrictions upon our natural selves. Today there is a rigid distinction made between the objective scientific knowledge and the opinions society creates. This is not the case for Aristotle; natural in science is similar to what is natural in common understanding. For Aristotle, the *polis* is natural and he did not arrive at these species from "transcendental deduction" or "an empirical investigation," but from a perspective which bears similarities to science and common understanding (Garver, 55-56). Eugene Garver, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 22-43, 55.

42. When introducing deliberative rhetoric at the beginning of this chapter, Aristotle specifically points out that deliberative rhetoric is concerned with advising in both public and private matters. Thus, that which is expedient could be so for either the state or the individual (1358b9).

43. Aristotle uses the example of a city enslaving its neighbours and those who are not doing injustice. The speaker is not only neglecting to show that he knows that it is unjust; he actually holds that it is not unjust or that injustice is redefined according to the expedient. Although some

translators and commentators have attempted to amend this passage adding, not “to show” that it is unjust to enslave one’s neighbours, the passage actually reads “it is not unjust.” Grimaldi, 84.

44. According to Garver, the plurality of practical goods and languages must be understood as they originate from the distinction between the two meanings of “good” in Aristotle’s *Ethics*. There is both the good simply or abstractly or absolutely (*haplos*), and the good for an individual (*tini*), meaning for something or some person (*Ethics* VII.12.1152b29). Garver, 56.

45. *Ibid.*, 57.

46. *Ibid.*, 56.

47. There would be no good simply, however, if there was one practical good. Garver provides a more complex explanation of the particular goods than what I am providing in this brief account. He further divides the particular good (the good *tini*) into what is good for me, what is good to do, and what is good for me to do. This third component rises from the second set of options available once one is looking to “what is good for me” and not the good simply. There are also a number of choices among things “good for me to do” among what is “good for me.” *Ibid.*, 57.

48. Garver asserts that if the diversity of individual, practical concerns was made into a theoretical concern, then it ceases to make sense. Thus, any theoretical inquiry into practice only results in questions concerning “whether the diversity is illusory, should be eradicated, or whether it” (the theoretical questioning of the diversity of goods) “shows that ethics is in fact irrational.” *Ibid.*, 56.

49. Often what is good simply should not be chosen. Assuming the good simply is one’s own good is not only a rational error, according to Garver, it is an ethical error – a product of bad character. *Ibid.*, 57

50. To explain how an individual relates to the good *haplos* Garver looks to three different treatises. The passage to which Garver refers in the *Rhetoric* does speak about people *wishing* to act according to what is actually the case in reality, while sometimes choosing what only seems good to them (1365a35). In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle discusses *making* each individual good (*hekastoi*) the whole good (*holos*) in our actions.

Garver writes that, “we should *choose* what is good for us and *wish* for what is good for us to be good *haplos*” (Garver, 57). But, the word used for our relation with the absolute good in the *Ethics*, *euchomai*, is not usually translated as “wish” but rather “pray.” “Human beings *pray* for these and pursue them,” that is the things which are good *haplos*, “but they ought not, but ought instead to *pray* that the things that are good simply be good also for them and choose things that are good for them” (V.1, 1129b1). Wish may be a part of prayer, but reducing the act of prayer to wish alone in this context may misrepresent one’s relation to the good *haplos*, as Aristotle defines it in the *Ethics*.

Both prayers and wishes direct human actions and speeches; however, wishing does not seem to recognise the good outside of human demands. A wish does not appeal to anything, at

least it is not an intelligent appeal but rather an appeal to chance or fortune. Prayer is generally reserved for religious concerns, not philosophical ones. Prayer acknowledges God's will outside of our human demands. Everyone may wish, but not everyone places their wishes in the form of prayer.

The *Rhetoric*'s single mention of prayer is found later in Book III when Aristotle discusses how to slander – “to throw dirt upon” – certain matters by using a diminishing metaphor (1405a Rys Roberts Trans.). He says one could call “to pray,” “to beg” instead of calling “to beg,” “to pray” (this example works in English as well, “I pray you”). Rendering “pray” into “wish” may display a similar modern scepticism of prayer. Wishing is not as slanderous as begging but such a translation makes us our own gods and denies a thoughtful or reverent relation to the good *haplos*. Garver's intention is probably to make the relation between goods clear to an audience unfamiliar with prayer. Ibid., 57. (V.1, 1129b1) Trans. Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle*, (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 80. *The Rhetoric & The Poetics of Aristotle*, Trans. W. Rhys Roberts and Ingram Bywater, (New York, New York: The Modern Library by Random House Inc., 1954), 169.

51. Garver succinctly states, “practice cannot be reduced to theory.” Garver, 57.

52. Garver gives us some insight into what it means to mistake the good simply for what is good for me. In Book II of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues that the sophistic enterprise is, to a large extent, the logical fallacy of assuming that since something is generally true it is true in particular cases or vice versa. This behaviour is not considered unjust today, but merely illogical. Garver writes that “Aristotle thinks that such an error is better diagnosed as ethical than logical.” If one is choosing what is good simply, one may not have recognised what they are choosing as the good simply. It may be difficult to comprehend the good simply when there seems to be many particular goods available and when political life is not regarded as natural for humans. If there are countless opportunities for pleasant lives of abundance then the question “what is a good life for a human to live” may not be posed. In addition, if the prevailing opinion presumes that man is naturally an individual entity whose interactions with others are naturally antagonistic, it is unlikely that one would search for a shared understanding of a good life. Such conditions may prevent any inquiry into human nature. Garver points out these aspects of contemporary life which hinder our ability to grasp a good simply. This suggests that present sentiments toward political life are more hostile to practical judgement than other times through history. Ibid., 57.

53. Garver calls the act of deciding between the abstract and individual good, agency. Agency leads to “a plurality of kinds of rhetoric and of moral languages.” Ibid., 57. The role of Garver's agent appears in *Alcibiades I* when Socrates encourages Alcibiades to take care over his soul (132b8). Socrates argues that in order to take care, the soul must have some way of examining itself (133b7). The examination must be made by the most divine part of the soul, which is the “knowing and thinking” part. This part of the soul allows both godly and “sensible thinking” to come about for Socrates (133c1-6). The division in thinking is a similar to the division of the good which demands Garver's role of “agency.” The agent allows both godly and “sensible thinking.” In the dialogue, Socrates focusses on sensible thinking for his student and reminds Alcibiades that moderation is self-knowledge (133c12-15). In order to know oneself, one must

know: how one's things belong to himself, how others' things belong to them, and how the city's things belong to it (133e1-9). Garver's "agent" would also come to understand these three ways of possessing things. Since agency operates between the good simply and what is good for me and good for me to do, the purpose of the agent is to know the moderate amount of abstract good belonging in each situation.

54. Desires are not appetites or passions, which aim to have particular things without thought of ends. Garver argues that the role of agency which decides whether an absolute good is "good for me," must ensure that the desire is guided toward the good and that the good is not defined by desire. The agent has a link to the good simply in his initial decision and recognises that the good is not available to him. Therefore, he can base his decision on reasoning about his practical experience. Garver lists the ways in which things are good as they are listed in chapter six (1363a19, 1363a25, 1363a29-30, 1363a37-38). These examples are available to us through common experience; they do not render subjects good according to our desires, but demonstrate that our desires recognise good. According to Garver, good men may even live outside of the law, for "to live beyond rule in a world of praxis is not to be blown about by passion but to act through character." "Praxis" refers to practical actions. Ibid., 58.

55. Garver states that expedience in general or abstractly is expedience according to "fixed standard of the good man." Ibid., 58.

56. According to Garver, there is a "plurality" of choices and ways in which rhetoric is used, but this plurality is not simply random. He states that the *Ethics* and the *Politics* emphasise the necessity of "perception and judgment" in particular circumstances. Yet, both of these treatises present a "plurality of goods" while providing no apparent method of evaluating or organising this plurality. Both of these treatises also leave this plurality to an individual *phronimos* (a prudent person), who determines what to do when there are no rules to follow. Garver goes on to call the systematic approach which yields the three kinds of rhetoric, "one of the outstanding achievement of the *Rhetoric*." Ibid., 58.

57. Ibid., 59.

58. Garver argues that in order to understand the system Aristotle presents in the *Rhetoric*, one must have a comprehension of practical reasoning, "informed by Aristotle's distinctions between abstract and concrete good, and by his conception of the relations between something being good and my desiring it, and so between first and third person understanding of the good." Garver's language through this passage is worth noting. He uses "offspring," "generates" (twice), and "issues" for the creative acts of Aristotle's writing. This biological reading of Aristotle's moral and political works is helpful for understanding how Aristotle develops his ideas. A similar idea of the biological form of Aristotle's writing seems to be evident in Harry Jaffa's *Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics*. Jaffa disagrees with Aquinas's method. In his subsection titled "Critique of the Analysis of the 'Commentary,'" Jaffa points out that Aquinas's method is not one of an "organism," but one of an "architectural structure." Jaffa is critical of Aquinas for not offering the possibility of growth

within the reading of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. According to Jaffa, a notion of development contained in Aristotle's work is not evident in Aquinas's commentary. The development of a reader does not occur when more information is stored in his mind, but rather when both his ability to find what is most important and his desire to know are enhanced. Harry Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952) 36-46. Garver, 58-59.

59. Garver states that rhetoric provides an order between general things (such as "persuasion or life") and each particular thing (such as "a speech or an animal"). Recall our distinction between *gene* (kinds) and *eide* (forms) above. It appears that the biological notion of rhetoric takes both into account, the *gene* as "genus," and the *eide* as "species." Garver provides a helpful comparison between rhetoric and biology showing that the divisions of rhetoric appear as species. For Garver, the species of rhetoric are the "kinds" we analyse as well as the "form that persuasion takes." *Ibid.*, 59.

60. According to Garver, functioning member of a species has a "peculiar relation of form and matter, based on the relation of form to end." *Ibid.*, 59.

61. Garver provides an explanation of these phenomena which have their own internal end as well as an external end. These are the *energeia*. An example of an activity that has a relationship to both an internal end and an external end is fishing. One still is fishing even if one does not accomplish the external goal of catching a fish. According to Garver, Catching the fish would be what Aristotle calls *kinesis*. Garver provides a discussion and comparison of *energeia* and *kinesis* in the third section of his first chapter. *Ibid.*, 34-41.

62. Recall the discussion of the sophist at 1355b18. Sophists may argue for mere persuasion since they hold their own ends as the ultimate purpose of their arguments. See pp. 22-23 above. While one may argue that sophist and technologists may persuade based on their audience, Garver argues that there is another set of standards beyond winning over one's audience. *Ibid.*, 60.

63. However, before the inquiries into the virtuous acts or acts of persuasion are made, Garver feels it is necessary to note that Aristotle's account of character ("being a certain kind of person") and rhetorical standards does not have to be true. One cannot know this without entering into an investigation. One might think that each particular action has an end of its own and that there is also the end of being good simply or being a good person. These two could be separate with no connection between them. Yet, since there is the indirect connection of abstract good and practical good through agency, there is something "intermediate." *Ibid.*, 60.

64. Garver argues that the rhetorical acts of the three species (the epideictic, deliberative, and judicial) are the moments where rhetoric has "internal goods and internal ends." Most rhetoric will fall outside these three kinds because it either has no artful argument, no political function, or has only external ends. Garver states that if "practices are identified by internal goods and internal ends, only the rhetorical acts that fall under the three species qualify as practices."

Species require a function, as we can see in biological species which have ends and function. Function is a relation of form to matter and operates according to how the form relates to its end. For rhetorical function, it would seem that the form related to matter is the argument related to the political action (a practical action), and the form to its end is the argument related to the expedient, the just, or the noble. Ibid., 60.

65. Garver compares this aspect of nature and art in his first chapter where he argues, "Nature and art, unlike chance and fortune, work by transmission of form. Whatever regularity there is between cause and effect follows from that transmission of form." However, according to Garver, our imitation of nature – art – cannot secure the same relationship between form and function or cause and effect that natural objects possess. Nature has the "internal principle of motion," while art is an "external cause of motion." Ibid., 33-34.

66. Although he describes rhetoric as the "offspring of dialectic and of politics," Garver thinks that most of the time this offspring does not fall into three species (1356a25). Garver says, "On my analysis, nature breeds true only in these species, and often has progeny which are not members of a kind." The species of rhetoric which do breed true, "provide places in which rhetorical activity has a political function and consequently the proper relation to both its parents, dialectic and politics." Rhetoric should arise from and be ruled over by dialectic, a search for the truth through logical reasoning, and politics, the architectonic search for the common good. Ibid., 61.

67. The analogy made between biological species and the species of rhetoric demonstrates how persuasion, like a human being, involves both the body (physical) and the soul (psychological). In the structure of the species one finds this tension between body and soul. The species may foster the rule of the body by the soul without dismissing the importance of the body. The consequences of being a body include being limited to a particular time and space. Thus, the species address separate times and spaces. The art of persuasive speech is organised according to this practical and physical life rather than isolated reasoned speech. Garver does not think this cooperation and relation between species occurs in biological species. According to Garver, the species of rhetoric are similar to biological species because they are the place of "existence and form." However, rhetorical species are not grouped according to likeness, and they depend on each other – neither characteristic occurs in biological species. Ibid., 62.

68. Furthermore, Garver points out the difference between the natural world and the political world. Plants and animals are natural and do not find their nature in the cosmos because the cosmos has no nature. For rhetoric the opposite occurs; the species of rhetoric on their own are not natural but find their good and function in the *polis* which is natural. Garver then points to Protagoras's myth about how all animals fit into a whole with interrelations of predator and prey as humans fit into a *polis* with economic and moral interrelations. Garver uses this myth to suggest that we should compare our world to the natural world and study how and why the human world is different but still a whole. Finally, Garver writes that the rhetorical species are "parts of one single art and one single *polis*," and their good is connected to that *polis*. Ibid., 62.

69. Ibid., 62.

70. Ibid., 63.

71. On account of their practical and political role the interdependence of species of rhetoric is not explained by logically considering how the species shift in authority. Garver demonstrates the novelty of this arrangement by comparing it to other examples of priorities and accessories. In the *Poetics*, a spectacle is always an accessory to the plot in tragedy; in the *Politics*, the slaves are an accessory while citizens are essential and there is no reversal possible; even in the *Rhetoric*, incidental emotions would never replace the proofs and enthymemes (1354a13-15). Rhetorical species have this strange “reciprocal priority” because they are not merely species but also an art, and belong in the *polis*. Garver explains that biological species have nothing which resembles this “reciprocal priority” arrangement. The reason rhetorical species do operate in this manner is because “the ultimate unity here is not the species, but the art as a whole and even more, the *polis* itself as a whole.” Ibid., 63.

72. Garver suggests we compare this statement with 1399b32-1400a4 in Book III where Aristotle gives a number of situations which will make men act and can be used for deliberative rhetoric, i.e., exhortation and dissuasion. Aristotle then states that the same group of motivations are used for accusation and defence, arguing “what dissuades serves for defence, what persuades for accusation.” An example of this might be how one could dissuade someone away from something because it was too difficult, and how one could defend someone because something was too difficult. Likewise, one could persuade someone toward something because it is easy and accuse someone for not doing something because that thing would have been easy. Ibid., 63.

73. Interrelations between these three ends can be found throughout the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. Garver refers to the *Politics* where justice is defined by what is expedient and the text is primarily concerned with “problems connected with living, living together, and living well.” In the *Ethics* where justice is described according to an individual, “there are interrelations among good for me, good for others, and good as such.” To further link judicial rhetoric to epideictic, Garver argues some of the sources of injustice for judicial speech can be discovered in the virtues listed in the section on epideictic rhetoric (1366b1-1367a2). From these examples it appears that the ends are dependent on each other and operate in a complementary manner. Ibid., 64.

74. Ibid. 64.

75. “Those praising and blaming do not examine if they brought about expedient things or harmful things, however, in praise they also establish that having made a small account of paying what was due to himself, he brought about a certain beauty (*kalon*)” (1358b30) (my translation). Freese translates *kalon* as “honour” but that seems to deny the possibility of doing something for beauty as an end in itself.

76. Aristotle turns to Achilles for an example of epideictic subject. Achilles was praised for helping his friend Patroclus, despite the fact he knew he would die in his efforts. We praise

Achilles, who chooses a noble death as more honourable. By placing life, which is assumed to be more expedient, below honour, Achilles demonstrates how the other ends of rhetoric, expediency and justice, can be secondary (1358b37-1359a6).

77. Garver, 64.

78. Garver explains that when assuming a set of abstract definitions of the expedient, just, and noble, one assumes that the good simply is his own good and attempts to “reduce deliberation to knowledge of the good.” According to Garver, one must remember that what is good in particular circumstances is not always the good simply, yet what is good in particular circumstances is still dependent on the good simply. We do not define what is good. What is good in particular circumstances “is understood relative to the good (*haplos*).” There is a connection between the particular good and the good simply, and the three species of rhetoric. Garver argues that “the end of deliberative rhetoric, the useful, is defined relative to happiness; the end of forensic rhetoric, the just, is defined through a long discussion of the principal cause of injustice, pleasure. The end of epideixis, the noble, requires an understanding of virtue, and these three are interdependent enough sometimes to conflict.” *Ibid.*, 65.

79. H.W.B. Joseph gives an account of the relationship between the three as they are described in the *Republic*. H.W.B., *Essays in Ancient & Modern Philosophy*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935).

80. This argument concerning the threefold good and the dialectical development of the good in the *Ethics* is found in Sachs’s notes throughout his translation. See especially note 231, pp. 135. Joe Sachs, *Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle*, (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 231.

81. Garver argues that judicial rhetoric has the surplus of the “lawful,” and epideictic rhetoric’s surplus is the “conventional.” One might recall that Garver states that the division of rhetoric itself was according to convention. Garver, 55.

82. This section is largely a paraphrase of Garver’s account of what he labels the “surpluses” of the rhetorical species. He explains that when one translates from one species to another there is an element of the species that resists. Because there is a distance between what is good and what one should do; an argument cannot shift from pursuing expediency to pursuing the just without something being lost. Yet, at times we must act and these arguments can provide compelling cases even though they do not foster more deliberation. The notion of surplus does seem somewhat confusing and I have not used Garver’s terminology here. *Ibid.*, 66.

83. *Ibid.*, 67.

84. Garver states that when the just is not restricted to the lawful, that is to say, it is still interrelated to the other ends, the just can be evaluated according to “whether it is useful and useful for what.” *Ibid.*, 67.

85. For example, the virtues that Aristotle lists in chapter nine of the Book I, “justice, courage, moderation, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, wisdom (both practical and speculative)” are not necessarily binding in the same way as laws. John Henry Freese, “Introduction,” *Aristotle with an English Translation: The “Art” of Rhetoric*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), xxxv.

86. Garver makes a similar argument but he does not address the point that law is put in place by practical judgement. Garver, 68.

87. The debate between Kleon and Diodotus takes place in Book III:[35-49] and “Diodotus prevailed.” Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War: The Crawley Translation*, Ed. T.E. Wick, (New York: The Modern Library, 1982), 153.

88. Garver argues that what is noble is beyond what is expedient in the same manner as what one *wishes* is beyond what one *chooses* to do. He had previously argued that what one chooses to do is “good for me,” and that one should wish for what is “good for me” to be “the good” (*haplos*). Garver, 57.

89. Aristotle writes in the *Rhetoric* that the Lacedaemonians wear long hair to show that they are “free men”—long hair is not expedient and it displays their freedom from physical labours. *Ibid.*, 68.

90. The actual list of the artistic proofs at 1356a1-5 in the *Rhetoric* does not specifically say that the passions are an artistic proof. Aristotle describes the second artistic proof as “the way the hearer examines [the speech]” (my translation). This demonstrates Aristotle’s reluctance to initially give authority to the passions as a proof of rhetoric. Aristotle’s decision to discuss argument and character first also distinguishes his writings on rhetoric from writings of modern political thinkers who describe and empower the passions as the basis for political order. For example, Hobbes’s *Leviathan* begins with, and is based upon, his account of the senses and passions. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. Ed. Edwin Curley. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994). My translation was taken from Kassel’s manuscript. Rudolfus Kassel, ed., *Aristotle’s Ars rhetorica*, (Berlonini; Novi Eboraci: de Gruyter, 1976).

91. Charles Kahn addresses the connection between character and persuasive argument in his article, “Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s *Gorgias*.” He refers to this interrelation as one between the personal and the elenchus, or, the moral and the logical. Bringing together the personal and logical elements of the *Gorgias*, Kahn argues that Socrates performs “an examination of the interlocutor’s life as well as his thesis” (110). When an interlocutor is refuted, the refutation reveals that he is not living as he says or thinks he should be. Yet, according to Kahn, Socrates believes that amidst the false moral beliefs that there is ‘a deposit of truth’ which exists in all human beings. This truth can be revealed in the interlocutor’s arguments.

In Plato’s dialogues, both the listener or reader and the interlocutor learn of this truth. Socrates demonstrates the benefits of existing as a harmonious whole person, speaking and living consistently, and of being part of a greater whole or of reality, speaking and living justly with

others. Once someone's character (*ethos*) is linked to this reality, contradictions between speech and actions diminish. In Kahn's article, the "personal" element of the argument prevents Gorgias from separating knowledge and virtue. Gorgias cannot ignore how his argument reflects on him, for "all moral arguments are *ad hominem*" (80); Gorgias cannot promote unvirtuous activity in a foreign country without raising eyebrows and possibly daggers.

This separation between logical and ethical can be found in arguments about the *Gorgias* as well as within the *Gorgias*. One such example is Charles Kahn's critique of Gregory Vlastos, which revolves around Vlastos's neglect of the moral significance of certain assumptions, and Aristotle's understanding of the spurious rhetoric. The three species would provide a clear view of Vlastos's error. Kahn's overall argument concerning the *Gorgias* is similar to the argument concerning justice and rhetoric in this thesis. Kahn argues that Socrates, the philosopher, connects argument and character in his pursuit of knowledge as virtue. However, Kahn neither focuses on the role of rhetoric in this dialogue nor looks to Aristotle's rhetoric as a guide. According to Kahn, Vlastos argues that Socrates ignores the distinction between the subjective measurer of pain and pleasure and the objective measurer of pain and pleasure. For Vlastos, observing, acting, and suffering are unconnected. His division between the observer and the participant (one acting or suffering) reflects the separation of epideictic from judicial and deliberative species of rhetoric. This separation reveals that Vlastos does not consider how intermediate rhetorical ends function for the sake of the good. While acting unjustly does not seem painful, it is shameful because it is harmful to the soul; it entails future pain.

Actors and observers are not separate entities. Vlastos objects to Socrates' shifts from observer to actor and back, and from epideictic to judicial or deliberative rhetoric and back to epideictic. Instead, Vlastos attempts to isolate the dialogue's argument from the practical situation and neglects the effect of argument on the soul. The reality that argument or reason rules the soul does not depend on Vlastos's rules of formal argument. The practical reality shows that humans have souls which need to be ruled and that humans do not exist in isolation. It is not logical for a logical being with a soul to deny the significance of the soul, nor is it logical for a reasonable, political animal to deny the role of political relations (86).

In contrast to Vlastos and Gorgias, Socrates can move from observer to actor and argues according to an ordered soul pursuing justice. Vlastos regards the move from observer to actor (in Aristotle's terms, from species to species) as a logical trick. According to Vlastos, observers and actors feel pleasure differently thus, they cannot be compared. Yet, human beings are both observers and actors; there is a connection between praise and encouragement.

Kahn addresses Vlastos's argument about the pleasures varying between observers and actors by admitting that pleasures of the observers are the general, abstract pleasures of beauty, whereas the pleasure of actors are particular, immediate pleasures. In the dialogue, Socrates has not shown evidence that the doer of unjust is more shameful than the sufferer. Kahn argues that Socrates moves from "worse for a particular man" (being shameful) to worse in general (being unjust). In this same way he argues for worse (bad) he argues for the good. Socrates (like Aristotle) navigates his rhetorical argument between particular goods and the general good. Socrates does not collapse the good into his particular good. Defending Socrates from condemnations of this kind of vanity, Kahn states, "I think that for Socrates if one aims at the good, it follows that one's is pursuing one's own best interests; hence, self-interest can be used to

justify or motivate, but not to define, the pursuit of what is good. (I doubt whether this makes Socrates a psychological egoist, as Irwin claims, 144.)” (p. 101, note 48). Kahn’s conclusion about Socrates coincides with my argument – Socrates navigates between the general and particular goods through his character and by using the three kinds of rhetoric based on his just soul, in order to further justice. Charles Kahn, “Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s *Gorgias*,” (*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy I*, 1983) 80, 86-101.

92. Garver, 69.

93. Argument from character is not less argumentative or logical than arguments about mathematics or natural discoveries. Garver explains that “rhetorical argument has logical properties and ethical properties, but the logical and ethical cannot be separated. *Logos* and *ēthos* will be specifically rhetorical *logos* and *ēthos*. If they could be separated, rhetorical argument would either be simply derivative from logic, or rhetoric – and practical reason – would have its own logic distinct from the logic studied by “logic,” and we might wonder whether it was really logical or rational after all.” *Ibid.*, 185.

94. To this claim that there will always be a diversity among cities and citizens, Garver adds the qualification, “without the scientific unification of the things people include under happiness.” *Ibid.*, 69.

95. In the eighth chapter of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses the five kinds of government: “democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy” and tyranny; their ends are freedom, wealth, education and the prescription of the law, and self-protection, respectively with the exclusion of the monarchy’s end (1365b31-34 and 1366a3-7). John Henry Freese, *Aristotle with an English Translation: The “Art” of Rhetoric*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 79-81.

96. Garver finds examples of this understanding of the good in the *Topics*. Aristotle writes about a city which regards killing one’s father as honourable. This act may be honourable in that particular situations but it is not honourable absolutely (*haplos*). Then he writes of a person who should take drugs because it is expedient. This act is expedient for an individual but not expedient absolutely (*haplos*) (*Topics* II:12.115b22-35). Today, these practical examples are in distinct categories, the former a case of cultural relativism, where a good is relative to a particular community, and the latter, moral subjectivism, which is concerned with how something is good for a certain individual in a specific situation. According the argument, Aristotle allows these cases to fall into the same category. They are instances which require one to hold the absolute good (just, expedient, etc.) *haplos* in mind, desiring that good and dedicating oneself to its imitation, production, and practice, while evaluating the limitations and possibilities of its manifestation in particular circumstances, whether that be the particular individual or the *polis*. Garver, 70.

97. *Ibid.*, 69.

98. Ibid., 69.

99. This idea appears later Garver's book when he argues that the intermediate and final ends may conflict. He writes that "the paradox of justice is that justice is a state of character, and yet the law is reason without desire." Ibid., 179.

100. Garver discusses how epideictic speech lacks an obvious political role. He does not regard Pericles' funeral oration as a political function as stable as the political functions (i.e., in the assembly and the courtroom) belonging to other two species of rhetoric, but he does acknowledge Pericles' speech as having a political effect. Ibid., 71.

101. The surplus of epideictic is the conventional, and according to Garver, the *ēthos* is only conventionally dedicated to its argument. If the speaker (his *ēthos*) is not connected to his argument and audience, then the *logos* of the epideictic speech is left to decay or wander in any direction, making mere "cleverness into virtuosity." Aristotle is careful to avoid this in the *Ethics*; the intellectual virtues are discussed only after the virtues of character are well-established and regarded as prerequisites. Ibid., 69.

102. Garver argues that these three abuses of rhetoric can be recognised as types of relativism. Relativism occurs when one attempts to argue logically where "only ethical arguments can fit." Ibid., 69.

103. Garver points to the passage in the *Ethics* which was discussed above. The ability to understand the "absolute good" and "relative good" appears similar to what Socrates discusses as differences between knowledge, true opinion, and false opinion in the *Gorgias*. Ibid., 56 and 70.

104. Each species of rhetoric brings together the good simply, the good for me, and the good to do in an argument. Thus, in his own work, Aristotle brings the good simply, good for me, and the good to do into an argument by accusing, dissuading, and blaming matters which are good simply but not particular good in examples where a focus on the particular good is required, showing the limitations of the good in particular circumstances, and also by accusing, dissuading, and blaming matters which are good in particular but not good simply where good simply is required, showing the possibilities for the good in particular circumstances and vice versa (defending, encouraging, and praising).

105. Garver argues that Aristotle writes an unsystematic approach for deliberative rhetoric, giving us a "collection of examples," and likewise for epideictic rhetoric, he provides a "catalogue of virtues." The only method or system among the three species is the legal system for judicial rhetoric, but this system is modified by the desires of the jurymen. Garver, 70.

106. In this section of Garver's argument, p.70, the rhetorical art is described as a specifically Aristotelian imitation of politics. Ibid., 70.

107. Aristotle does not seem to make the species unequal, yet, he writes six chapters about judicial rhetoric, five about deliberative, and just one about epideictic rhetoric. Aristotle does

state that the practice of deliberative rhetoric is more noble and fit for a citizen than judicial rhetoric (1354b23), but insofar as they are described as species of rhetoric he does not outrightly place them into a hierarchy.

108. Epideictic rhetoric is not connected to a “fundamental political *function*.” Garver, 71.

109. This account is found at 1253a14 in the *Politics*. Carnes Lord, *Aristotle: The Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 37.

110. Such practices are also familiar to contemporary citizens who celebrate Remembrance Day and Veterans’ Day.

111. Garver reminds us that epideictic rhetoric and deliberative rhetoric are closely related as they sometimes differ only in expression (1367b36). The beliefs concerning what is good in decision-making are the same beliefs a speaker or writer would display to gain the approval of the audience. Epideictic rhetoric is often what is employed when examining literature where the author expresses, and perhaps, subsequently teaches, his beliefs rather than using them for deliberation. In epideictic rhetoric, the “practical and impractical,” and the “objects of choice and things we can admire without necessarily doing anything about them,” are what Garver calls convertible ends. Thus, the beliefs found in a speech and the beliefs in the act of speech are convertible. Epideictic rhetoric maintains that “the act of speaking” is praiseworthy. Epideictic rhetoric shows that if something is worth speaking about then speech is worth something. Thus, Garver writes that epideictic rhetoric “makes the art of rhetoric complete.” It can give a reasonable account for itself. Garver, 73.

112. Unfortunately, contemporary citizens are honoured for not praising and blaming at all, and for accepting any action. The very places where one should be arguing that speech reveals better alternatives (i.e., educational institutions) one finds that many are undermining the belief that speech has anything to demonstrate; they are undermining the idea that speech is useful for clarifying what is good and bad. It is not acceptable to praise one opinion of what is good more than another opinion.

113. This understanding of nobility as related to utility or justice may be overlooked. Kahn does not think that the account Socrates gives of the admirable (*kalon*) as useful or pleasant is a Socratic or Platonic account (93). Instead, Kahn labels Socrates’ definition of the admirable a conventional definition. Kahn states “neither Plato nor Socrates is committed to the truth of the... premise....that the criteria for judging anything ‘admirable’ (*kalon*) are pleasure and utility” (p.113, note 62). Kahn thinks these possibilities for “criteria” are serviceable premises that lead to correct conclusions. One might wonder why it is that they are serviceable? Although pleasure and utility may not completely define *kalon*, their use in this definition is not merely conventional. There is an aspect of both the order of our souls and the order of political life that causes men to seek these ends when seeking what is admirable. Kahn argues that Socrates refers to utility and pleasure because those are the only two ends according to which people without morals act. Thus, Kahn cannot quite reduce the appearance of these ends to convention or public

opinion, for it does not seem possible that humans can lack morals altogether. Perhaps, living according to utility and pleasure is an underdeveloped morality, and shame is the growing pain of the soul that Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles must suffer to develop into consistent noble lives. According to Kahn, Plato turns from his moral psychology in the *Republic* to conventional judgement according to utility and pleasure in the *Gorgias*. Yet, when one takes a closer look, this conventional judgement is moral psychology. If the three kinds of rhetoric are crafted on the soul then decision-making, which is reasoning through the soul for practical ends, is an exercise in "moral psychology"; the "conventional attempt" exists for this reason. The connection to rhetorical art supports Socrates' seemingly weak argument. This notion of the admirable being either useful or pleasant reflects the soul and its interaction with practical life. Just as Socrates finds the "deposit of good" in his interlocutors, he may also find a "deposit of truth" in the conventions and traditions of the public (such as the tendency to qualify the admirable with the useful and the pleasant). Charles Kahn, "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's *Gorgias*," (*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* I, 1983) 93-113.

114. There are problems with epideictic rhetoric because of its lack of direct connection with the political realm. This seems to be the problem Socrates finds in *Gorgias*. Gorgias has a tendency to neglect the practical, political realities, that is to say, what is best for his audience of students. James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato's Gorgias*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), note 4 pp. 25.

115. Socrates' rhetoric has also been described as being "animated by the spirit of social responsibility." The second chapter of my thesis elaborates on this understanding of Socrates' approach. Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 27.

116. How does one know that the *polis* is unnatural? Understanding how it is natural and explaining that clearly is what one should be doing. Happiness is found in the common good and one must find one's good as a part of the whole. It is difficult to find the historical evidence that process has changed. After examining Garver's argument and its possibilities, it is helpful to study the *Gorgias*. Surely there is nowhere (not even our unnatural modern age) with more obstacles to justice than in the souls of the characters in the *Gorgias*. Hence, the need for an understanding of art rhetoric and *phronesis* is just as pertinent for Socrates as it is for us. It does not seem that modern individuals are more unnatural than Polus and Callicles. Thus, contemporary challenges are not more bleak than those Socrates faced.

117. James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato's Gorgias*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), note 4 pp. 25.

118. As I shall discuss below, Socrates' rhetoric functions for the sake of providing the foundations for meaningful discourse (dialectic) and exercising practical judgement in the political community. Dialectic requires thoughtful opinions about the just, the noble, the expedient, and the good. Rhetoric and dialectic can operate together; dialectic challenges the opinions in an interlocutor's soul that are revealed through his particular speeches. Employing rhetoric involves holding a certain definition of what is noble and questioning what is just and expedient. Dialectic scepticism is then tempered by working definitions, according to which one

acts.

119. Arlene Saxonhouse argues that Gorgias was in Athens in 427 B.C. Yet, the events described within the dialogue range from 427 B.C. to 406 B.C. According to Saxonhouse, the fictional nature of the dialogue permits a timely “timelessness” characteristic of “that truth which lies more fully in the fictions of Platonic dialogue than in the researches of any history.” Arlene Saxonhouse, “An Unspoken Theme in Plato’s *Gorgias*: War.” (*Interpretation*, 11, 1983), 142-145.

120. Socrates refers to his oracle-motivated encounters with wise men in his defence speech of the *Apology* (21b1-22a5). “Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*,” Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West, *Four Texts on Socrates*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 69-70. The presence of Chaerephon in this dialogue leads the reader to think of the relationship between Chaerephon and Socrates and in particular, Chaerephon’s role in Socrates’ death. Chaerephon was Socrates’ comrade since they were young. He was the one who questioned the oracle concerning Socrates’ wisdom and brought Socrates the oracle’s message (*Apology* 21a3). According to Socrates in the *Apology*, Chaerephon was the initial cause of Socrates’ quest to discover truth and wisdom among men. Since this inquiry eventually leads to Socrates’ condemnation and execution Chaerephon is indirectly the cause of Socrates’ death.

121. Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West, “Plato’s *Apology of Socrates*,” (*Four Texts on Socrates*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 69-70 [21c].

122. These demands are revealed when Socrates creates tension between justice and expediency by forcing Gorgias to claim to know and teach justice to Athenian students. This claim contests the role of fellow citizens. It is not expedient for Athens if foreign professors of political speaking are redefining, or undermining justice in the city. Socrates shows Gorgias that he must understand deliberative rhetoric and practical judgement, which is used when making laws in all political communities. Within their particular conversation, Socrates uses the practical demands the Athenian students place on Gorgias to admit he has little knowledge of justice. As mentioned in the previous chapter, James H. Nichols suggests that Socrates moves Gorgias from epideictic to deliberative and judicial rhetoric. This suggestion is found in the interpretive notes of his translation of the *Gorgias*. How Socrates accomplishes this change is the central question of my thesis. James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato’s Gorgias*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 25.

123. Chaerephon’s friendship allows them to do something good beyond what they deserve. Friendship does not seem to have the same rules of justice as citizenship.

124. Establishing what the three want and want to do is discussed throughout this passage. Chaerephon 447b3 “...if you wish.” Callicles 447b4 “Does Socrates desire...” 447b5 “...whenever you wish....” Socrates 447b9 “For I wish....” Callicles 447c6 “to ask whatever he might wish.” Ibid., 26.

125. Aristotle argues in the first book of the *Ethics*, that “admonition,” “chastisement,” and “encouragement” are effective in making people obey reason; but he does not exactly explain why this is so (1103a). We see persuasive speech has power because it can persuade people to act in a certain way. It works. At 1098a3 (*Ethics*), Aristotle writes that aside from the kind of life we have in common with the animals that perceive, we have “some sort of life that puts into action that in us that has articulate speech; of this capacity, one aspect is what is able to be persuaded by reason, while the other is what has reason and thinks things through.” Rhetoric must have some role empowering this rule of reason by persuasion, and Aristotle tells his reader that being reasonable by being persuaded is like “listening to one’s father or friends” is a reasonable thing to do (1102b33).

126. One should note that Chaerephon and Polus are not perfect reflections of Socrates and Gorgias. Chaerephon does not take up Socrates’ search for truth as his own; this is evident in the fact that he does not see Polus’s insufficiency. In addition, Socrates is not as mild in his inquiries as Chaerephon is; Socrates speaks about unseemly topics (see 494c4-e8). Courtesy is thus secondary to, and useful for, Socrates’ search for the truth. Polus does not follow Gorgias precisely either. Polus regards Gorgias as one who has a better command of speech than himself and although he does not want to be defeated by Socrates he does not oppose the authority of Gorgias as master of this art, whereas, Gorgias wishes to be master of the art of speech himself. Gorgias’s approach is less abrupt than Polus’s but Gorgias’s politesse is secondary to victory; when his students encounter one who is immune to flattery, their manners quickly disappear. The point here is that neither the philosopher nor the rhetorician is always capable of educating students to take up the same kind of life they have chosen.

127. As much as Plato may be critical of the pedagogical approach that Gorgias represents in this dialogue, he may grant that Gorgias truly believes he professes and teaches according to the truth. The struggle between Socrates and Gorgias is one which concerns their relation to truth. Gorgias does not consider how dangerous truth is and the responsibility involved in speeches and political arguments. It does not seem to matter to Gorgias whether his students understand how to reason or argue in a way that promotes and preserves reason in action. His students are taught to argue toward successful persuasion in terms of what will satiate the audience. Gorgias’s arguments are not committed to being reasonable nor to encouraging others to be reasonable. He regards himself as liberated from common opinions and capable of employing speech as he sees fit. Gorgias seems to mistaken indifference for an objective scholarly approach. The question then remains, why does Gorgias teach? Once he realises his capacity, what causes him to engage in the activity of “educating” others? Perhaps, since he thinks he is now beyond the stage of learning anything new, he believes that his only option is to teach. It may not be insignificant that he finds the act of crafting arguments pleasant.

128. It has been said that replacing a guiding political science with a descriptive one is like “replacing the art of making shoes, that is good and well-fitting shoes, by a museum of shoes made by apprentices.” A good citizen provides a guiding political science and we can assume that Socrates would prefer his “craftsman of shoes” to make practical shoes for use and not for a shoe museum, and he would not delegate his task to apprentices. In this particular instance,

Socrates wants to have speeches about rhetoric itself not merely the descriptions of rhetoric which Polus provides. Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 89.

129. One might even wonder if Socrates and Chaerephon were discussing these very comparisons in the agora for they seem to be typical of Socrates. Explaining the health of the body within the art of medicine is an excellent illustration for explaining justice in the soul within the art of rhetoric. As we shall discuss below, this metaphor points to how Gorgias's rhetoric lacks the practical purpose inherent to an art like medicine. Socrates also uses the art of painting as an illustration of written speech in the *Phaedrus* where painting is compared to writing in the *Phaedrus*. "Indeed writing, Phaedrus, doubtless has this feature that is terribly clever, and truly resembles painting. For the offspring of that art stand there as living beings, but if you ask them about something, they altogether keep a solemn silence. And likewise speeches do the same. For you would think that they speak with some understanding, but if you ask something about the things said, wishing to learn, it indicates some one thing only, and always the same. And when it's been once written, every speech rolls around everywhere, alike by those who understand as in the same way by those for whom it is in no way fitting, when it suffers offense and is reviled without justice it always needs its father's assistance. For by itself it cannot defend or assist itself" (*Phaedrus* 275d3-275e).

130. An art of rhetoric is not merely a collection of conclusions drawn from successful trial and error experiments of persuasive speaking. Understanding persuasion and the "power of speeches" are extremely complex undertakings and Socrates tells Phaedrus what would be required of one who is to be artful about speech making (*Phaedrus* 271c11-272b5). Aristotle's Book II of the *Rhetoric* could be regarded as an attempt to account for the various forms souls may take. This book (the *Rhetoric*) still bears the limitations of written work and cannot "perceive distinctly when such a one [soul] is present" (*Phaedrus* 271e4); perception of each soul requires practical judgment.

131. Soon after this interchange, despite Socrates' lack of interest in speaking with him, Polus does not allow himself to be excluded so quickly and jumps into the conversation once again. Socrates points out Polus's error; he is praising the art "as if someone were blaming it" when he should just explain it (448e3). Polus attempts to retort by saying that he explains or defines rhetoric as "the finest." Socrates replies that this definition only tells us what "sort" of art it is, not what rhetoric is, and thus what Gorgias is. Since true definition is secondary to Polus's persuasive description, he lacks the initiative to find true definitions, reflecting an inherent weakness in Gorgias's instruction. Socrates tells Polus that he answered well until the question about Gorgias's art. This time turning to Gorgias for clarification, Socrates again poses the question, "what sort of art Gorgias's was?" Gorgias responds, and thus, Socrates arranges the conversation he wished to experience (448e8).

132. These requirements might include knowledge of the laws, the history, and institutions of a regime. Aristotle lists the topic of deliberative rhetoric as "ways and means" (i.e., finances), "war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, legislation." Freese. I.4.(1359b20).

133. Polus's longest speech was actually only slightly longer than Socrates' dismissal of Polus. Compare: Polus at 448c3-8 and Socrates at 448e6-449a3. It is not the length of speech that offends Socrates but the nature of these types of speeches which makes them longer than necessary.

134. In contrast, those present in the *Protagoras* do not allow Socrates such liberty, despite Socrates' attempt to convince Protagoras that it is because he does not have the Protagoras's power to make or keep up with long speeches. Callias does not allow Socrates to claim that he does not have the capacity for long speeches and Critias attempts to make a compromise between the two speakers also ignoring Socrates' lack of ability (335c *Protagoras*).

135. Socrates mentions productive arts in this passage. He may be suggesting that rhetoric produces, just as weaving is about how the warp and the weft produces and music, soothing *eros* in the soul, helps to produce an ordered soul. Gorgias's brevity in agreeing with the roles of these arts is praised by Socrates with an oath to the female god Hera. The use of this god and the womanly activity of weaving suggests that there is something feminine about rhetoric. It could refer to the producing of ideas like Socrates' metaphor of child-birth for education by dialectic. For the extended metaphorical description of weaving as statesmanship see the Stranger's discussion with Young Socrates in *Statesman* 279a-283b. While rhetoric may not have the midwife role of dialectic, it might still have a prenatal and postnatal role in cultivating ideas in the soul. Music, while not necessarily a feminine art, is regarded as a part of young children's education, essential for making souls orderly, gentle, desiring in good measure, and thus, fit for philosophy (*Politics* Book XIII: 5-8). A young child's education is largely the concern and function of a mother so music's importance is linked to the feminine role in this way.

136. Aristotle writes, "But to know how just things are done and distributed is a bigger job than to know what is healthy....." *Nicomachean Ethics* V:9, 1137a13.

137. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates speaks about the rhetorical terminology at 266d - 269c and suggests such "subtle refinements" are empty if one does not also acquire knowledge and practical judgement (269d7). While Socrates grasps the meaning of the "arts of speeches" of others, their work is not the art of rhetoric. James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato Phaedrus*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 78.

138. Christina Tarnopolsky discusses how this occurs when Socrates reveals what the characters in *Gorgias* regard as noble and shameful. Christina Tarnopolsky, "Shame and Moral Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*: The Refutation of Gorgias and Callicles." (Presentation) in the Political Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, April 3rd, 2000.

139. The Kennedy translation is clearest in this passage. George A. Kennedy *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 39.

140. I follow Nichols's suggestion that Socrates "gently steers the conversation about rhetoric away from display speeches and toward political rhetoric." James H. Nichols Jr., *Plato's Gorgias*,

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), ft. 19, p.31.

141. Nichols, note 16, pp. 30.

142. The art of astronomy brings to mind the stargazer in the ship in Book VI of the *Republic* (488d7- 489a2). In that passage, the stargazer should be the one ruling the ship because he has navigational knowledge but he is not interested in sparring over power with the other sailors. Just as the stargazer's knowledge of the heavens can guide the ship, so could knowledge of arguments, ideas, and the truth about human nature guide the political body. In his interpretive essay, Allan Bloom mentions in his notes that astronomy was a suspicious art because investigating the heavens often lead to one being regarded as an atheist. Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, (New York: Basic Books, 1968). Gorgias himself mentions astronomers in his *Encomium of Helen*. He regards astronomers as those who misguide souls, because speech is accustomed to arbitrarily putting in souls whatever it wishes and making unclear what appears true. Thus, for Gorgias, speech about astronomy could only cause obscurity. "Supplementary Texts," George A. Kennedy *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 287.

143. This section occurs following the section on medicine and the inquiry into what rhetoric is supposed to be doing. These apolitical arts may be what Gorgias should teach and they do provide a certain capacity with which can learn anything. By exercising a student's reasoning ability, a teacher increases the student's power. Yet, such studies on their own do not lead to a student having power over others. Learning the arts of calculation, arithmetic, geography, and astronomy may help one rule oneself and navigate one's world (based on reality, actual phenomenon, practical circumstances) but the subject matter involved in this education does not compel other human beings to recognise one's knowledge. Gorgias wishes for his education to produce power to do anything without the restraints of practical reality or a qualifying standard of justice or goodness. He persuades his students with promises of rulership over other human beings. This order is not a struggle of all against all but there is an ordered equality – "geometrical equality" (508a6).

144. These three occupations may also offer possibilities for comparison with rhetoric and politics. The doctor causes one to think of justice and injustice in the soul, the trainer of legislation, and the money-maker, who is "wealthy without fraud," could remind one of any person who profits honestly from his pursuits. Nichols suggests that the moneymaker could be compared to what Socrates says about the philosopher in the *Phaedrus*. The soul which participates in "philosophy without fraud" in the *Phaedrus* gains his wings after three thousand years of philosophising or loving children with philosophy (*Phaedrus* 249a2-3).

145. This ignorance Socrates' question suggests may seem to contradict what he said earlier when he mentioned he was starting to understand the sort of thing Gorgias wished to call his art (450c3). However, Socrates may think there is a distinction between what Gorgias wants to call rhetoric and what is actually occurring when Gorgias presents a speech.

146. This third place for persuasive speech could be aligned to epideictic, as some scholars regard epideictic rhetoric as a default category for all speeches that are neither judicial nor deliberative. However, Eugene Garver argues that epideictic rhetoric maintains its own standards; it is not just any speech. Garver, note 1, p. 259-260.

147. Nichols suggests, for both Gorgias and Socrates, that rhetoric is concerned with non-political speaking, but since they are still speaking in front of Gorgias's students, they would focus on the kinds of rhetoric linked to honour and political power (note 22, *Gorgias*, 33). While rhetoric may not be "limited to addressing political groups," there is an extent to which rhetoric must take into account the political environment in which it is found. Aristotle also seems to appeal to politically ambitious students by first mentioning the two obvious and directly political species and not introducing epideictic rhetoric until the third chapter.

148. The verb "to persuade" in Greek means "to obey" when used in the passive form. It seems that Socrates here uses the verb in the middle, "to be persuaded by oneself" or "to obey oneself." Socrates uses persuasion on himself. Socrates employs this expression in *Alcibiades I* 105a1 in the *Phaedrus* 92e and 97b. Nicholas Denyer, *Plato Alcibiades*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 92. It is also interesting to note that at this point in the *Gorgias* persuasion has not been divided into belief-inspiring and didactic persuasion. It is not necessarily knowledge-based persuasion, as we would think of it, that fuels Socrates' pursuit toward what is true in speech. Socrates has a particular kind of knowledge; knowledge of his ignorance persuades Socrates to know what the power of rhetoric is truly about. In this dialogue, it is Socrates alone who produces persuasion in Socrates' soul. He is persuaded according to the kind of person he wants to be (the character he wishes to become). The most praiseworthy character for Socrates is one who desires to know the meaning of the speeches. Socrates' character is defined by his search for truth and motivated by a knowledge of his own ignorance.

149. "Justice" was already mentioned twice in this dialogue, Chearephon asked Polus to "justly" name the doctor according to the art he knows (448b4), and Gorgias said that Socrates apprehended "justly" (451a1). At this point however, I think it is important to point out that Socrates has a concern for justice when asking Gorgias to turn to the particularities of one's experience and the effect that experience has on one's art.

150. Arithmetic was previously mentioned among the other arts of calculation and geometry (450d7). When reflecting the species of rhetoric, arithmetic is the impractical version of judicial rhetoric. Thus, just as teaching arithmetic comes before calculation, teaching judicial rhetoric, perhaps through the laws, provides the clearest approach to a full understanding of rhetoric.

151. Nichols suggests that the majority of Gorgias's pupils would have been most interested in using rhetoric to persuade about the just and unjust (note 24, *Gorgias*, 35). In addition to this immediate appeal to the audience, there is a tendency for the judicial audience to avoiding the difficulties of judging and leave that role to the rhetor. In the same manner that the technologists in Aristotle's rhetoric prefer the skill of speaking in the lawcourt to deliberative rhetoric, Gorgias focuses his rhetoric to speech in the lawcourt. Aristotle argues that in deliberative rhetoric, where

the speaker's interest is contained in the judgement, it is only necessary for rhetoric to clearly state how matters stand. However, when the judgement concerns another person, unattached to both the speaker and audience, it is possible to simply "win over" the hearers by appealing to their interests. Judicial rhetoric is described in this passage as involving two separate individuals without a common interest as citizens. The audience more readily considers a court case subordinate to their own affairs, making it easier for a rhetor to persuade them by means of giving-in to an argument that pleases them, rather than thinking about the argument and judging it (1354b22-35).

152. Socrates' species differ from Aristotle's species, since Aristotle's species arise from the fact that his rhetoric is comprised of proofs or beliefs (*pisteis*) and, initially, not knowledge; although proofs are not altogether separate from knowledge, Aristotles' species are primarily connected to the belief part of Socrates' dichotomy of rhetoric into two species.

153. Although, Socrates here does not seem to promote belief-inspiring persuasion and uses this distinction against Gorgias's practice; belief-inspiring persuasion is not intrinsically bad. If we are never persuaded of something we do not yet know, we may never be aware of its existence. If we trust it exists we may learn and know it later; we believe there is something to know. At the same time we know that we are merely persuaded of something and have not thought it through or are incapable of doing so at this point in time. Once again this seems to be a case of knowing our own ignorance, our own limitations. In speaking with Callicles later in the dialogue, Socrates blames both bad memory and distrust (a lack of belief) for his struggles.

154. Nichols says this is a polite way of bringing up how little rhetoricians care about "conveying justice" (note 28, *Gorgias*, 37). It is true that a time limit is a concern for teaching about truth and virtue. If Gorgias's students have not learned these things during the course of their upbringing it would be very difficult to instill noble motives now. Socrates tries to reorder their souls through shame. When attempt to order these characters, Polus and Callicles both show hints of noble intentions.

155. Socrates also faces the tension between time and justice in the *Apology*. Socrates' position seems to be that there is always time to be just and that he was just his entire life; yet, there is not always time to remove the slander one acquires when being just. He teaches by example, by offering sufficient witness for justice. It is not that Socrates does not have time to defend justice, but rather that he does not have time to dispel hatred. Thomas G. and Grace Starry West, *Four Texts on Socrates*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 19a1.

156. The introduction of Aristotle's third species is for the purpose of blaming, not praising. Socrates did praise Gorgias's brief speaking at 449d7, but his praise was not serious. The shame Socrates attributes to the students is more significant and Socrates tends toward the shaming function of epideictic speech rather than the praising for the later sections of the dialogue.

157. Socrates could almost be guaranteed the examples of building walls and dockyards would spark a refutation from Gorgias. The political achievements of these men were well known. Later

in the dialogue, Pericles is blamed for building a bad citizenry (515e2-6) and this seems true from Thucydides' account of Pericles' rule in the *Peloponnesian War* (Book II: 65). We also find that Themistocles' walls were less than adequate (Book I:93). This is not to say that speeches never lead to action like good buildings being built and citizens being encouraged. Rather, Gorgias seems to suggest in this passage that it does not matter if you know the facts of these arts as long as you can seem to know; as long as it is realised that this perspective does not lead to the improving the structure of anything. The weakness in this approach is evident in the political careers of both men Gorgias uses as examples.

158. The word used here is *daimonia* the same term which Socrates employs in the *Apology* to describe the nature of the force which opposed him when he was "about to do something incorrectly" (*Apology*, 40a3). Socrates daimon is explained in the following passages of the *Apology*: 24c1, 27c3-28a1, and 40a3. The terms also appears in Socrates' speech in the *Symposium* (201d-204c). West, 73.

159. This reminds the reader of the definition of justice brought forward by Polemarchus in the *Republic*: "doing good to friends and harm to enemies" (332d4). When challenging this definition, Socrates shows Polemarchus how difficult it is to know who your friends and enemies are. At the end of that conversation, Socrates proves this definition cannot be correct because, if doing harm to someone makes them worse, doing harm could not be the work of justice. Justice is a virtue and virtue always makes one better not worse. Since Socrates and Polemarchus resolve that it is never just to do harm, their definition of justice is refined to simply doing good to friends.

160. This version of rhetoric as a private skill of fighting does not sound the same as the prominent, political practice Gorgias offered his students. It sounds more like Kleon's opinion of rhetoric in his speech condemning the "art" altogether. Kleon argues that rhetoric does not belong in serious matters of the assembly; it belongs in sideshow competitions where rhetors can show off their eloquence (Thucydides, Book III [40]). This display of rhetoric is similar to Gorgias's own practice of rhetoric. Gorgias's students, however, *are* going to use rhetoric for public affairs, not private display making. Like the fighter's practical purpose in the city is to battle in war, the rhetor's practical purpose is to persuade in actual political matters about what is just and expedient. Gorgias is not preparing his students for this task.

161. The most noteworthy of Socrates' interlocutors in this position was Alcibiades, who, after gaining a great deal of power in Athens was sentenced to death by the Athenians during his absence on a naval campaign. He deserted, first to Sparta and then Persia. After betraying the Athenians, Alcibiades eventually returned to his home city. In the *Apology* Socrates claims he "was the sort of man (and in private [he] was the same) who never conceded anything to anyone contrary to the just – neither to anyone else, nor to any of those who my slanderers say are my students" (33a1-4). West, 85.

162. Christina Tarnopolsky, "Shame and Moral Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*: The Refutation of Gorgias and Callicles." (Presentation) in the Political Theory Workshop, University of Chicago,

April 3rd, 2000.

163. In the initial discussion of Polus and Chaerephon, a distinction was made between the painter's art based on experience and the doctor's art based on knowledge (448b4-c3). Upon which of these basis is art the persuasion founded? Socrates argues that Gorgias has the experience; thus, one might conclude that Socrates is saying Gorgias lacks the knowledge upon which he could base persuasion. The question of rhetoric's basis also relates to the passage in the dialogue where persuasion was divided into belief-inspiring and knowledge-inspiring (454c9-11). If persuasion were belief-inspiring then it could either come from experience or knowledge. If persuasion were knowledge-inspiring it seems that would have to come from knowledge. Gorgias professed to teach the belief-inspiring persuasion (454c). Yet, Socrates has knowledge of the reasoning behind belief-inspiring persuasion; Gorgias merely experiences persuasion, taking into account which speech persuades in each case as opposed to what occurs during persuasion. Gorgias has not questioned *why* his techniques persuade. Experience is not to be altogether undermined. It is helpful for practical judgement toward actions, for as Aristotle writes in the *Ethics*, "...practical judgment is not only about what is universal, but needs to discern the particulars as well, since it has to do with action, and action is concerned with particulars. This is why some people who do not have knowledge, and among others, those who have experience, are more adept at action than others who do have knowledge;" (Book VI:7, 1141b16).

164. Gorgias has shifted his subject matter from Socrates' original inquiry about rhetoric's power to a defence of his teaching rhetoric. He is not focussed on the argument but on preservation of his art and himself. Gorgias and Socrates managed to remain calm as Socrates describes an nearby avenue of anger and defensiveness they should avoid in their dialectic (457c4-e2).

165. Callicles declares that their argument is more pleasant than "many arguments" (458d2). He tells them that such conversation could continue all day and he would be gratified. What is the nature of this pleasure and gratification? It is not the gratifying pleasure of the feast, the reference with which the dialogue began. He is gratified by this battle of minds; he eagerly anticipates seeing one man defeated, the other revelling in victory. The kind of pleasure drawn from displays of superiority are not among the bodily pleasures so they seem noble and, again, suitable to the honour-seeking young man.

166. Nichols, 136-7.

167. Through speech about what is praiseworthy, men can be brought from being fellow citizens or companions to being friends. In the *Lysis*, Socrates says that he is searching for a friend and even refers to Solon's wish for a foreign friend (212e3); Gorgias could fill that role. Although justice does not define friendship, a common understanding about justice seems to be a prerequisite for two friends. Justice causes souls to be healthy; true friendship is noble beyond mere justice but justice is still a required condition. Gorgias, being a gentleman, at least aims toward what is just in front of his audience; he acknowledges the political importance (or necessity) of justice, but can he see the importance of justice in his own soul? Having a just soul is an essential part of Socrates' desire for truth, and until Gorgias holds justice in his own soul as

praiseworthy, it is doubtful that he could be Socrates' friend.

168. Gorgias admits, "no one has yet asked me anything new for many years" (448a2).

169. Socrates cannot comprehend why someone would choose "seeming" over "being." In this case, he does not comprehend why someone would choose seeming to be just rather than being just or seeming to know various arts (wall building etc.) while not actually knowing them; in fact, Socrates does not think it is possible to choose this option, it only occurs through ignorance. Gorgias and his students must not know that there is actually such a thing as being just or it may exist but it does not pertain to them. It is only evident to them that seeming just is advantageous.

170. The previous chapter suggested that arguing according to these three sets of opposites, the good and the bad, the noble and the shameful, and the just and the unjust, could allow the rhetorician into the political realm in a responsible manner. The just and the unjust and the good and the bad are the main concerns of the *polis*, and thus political science. In the *Politics*, Aristotle distinguishes man from the rest of the animals because he has speech about justice and utility (1253a14). In the *Rhetoric*, the first species of rhetoric aims toward the expedient and avoids the inexpedient. My thesis aligns Aristotle's deliberative rhetoric with the set of opposites "good and bad" to which Socrates refers. Aristotle cannot make deliberative rhetoric's end the "good and bad" because then it would be political science. Plato does not have to be careful about the authority of political science in the same way because Socrates is talking to Gorgias and possibly encouraging him to engage in, or at least recognise, political science. Aristotle, on the other hand, writes a treatise which tries to give rhetoric a role without allowing it to trump the authority of political science. The expediency of rhetoric will be discussed when its use is questioned in the discussion with Polus (481b2-4). In this passage, Socrates attempts to distance Gorgias from what has been expedient and useful in his own rhetoric and realign expediency to justice, the good of the political community, and the noble man. This discrepancy between the three rhetorical opposites of Aristotle and Socrates can also be described in terms of an argument against narrow individualism. Socrates does not mention the efficient and inefficient because he is trying to force Gorgias to see that when an individual regards justice as advantageous (expedient) for himself the political good is produced. One becomes a political artist when he produces this connection with the common good. Thus, in *Alcibiades I*, Socrates does mention efficient and inefficient because Alcibiades has already linked his good with the political good (*Alcibiades I* 124e15). Efficiency and inefficiency, like pain and pleasure, are intermediate ends; one must always ask, "efficient for what?" If for happiness, then efficiency includes the means for the good, just, and noble (116c7). According to Socrates, Alcibiades finds himself confused and unsure concerning these four sets of opposites: just and unjust, noble and shameful, bad and good and expedient and inexpedient (117a6-7). Socrates then begins a discussion of knowledge and opinion. He concludes that it is a great evil for one to suppose one knows that which they do not know. This ignorance is most harmful (inexpedient) and shameful (not noble). Socrates questions whether there is anything greater than the "just, noble, good and advantageous things" (118a5). Thus, supposing that one does not know that which he does not know is the greatest good; this knowledge is most expedient and noble. In truth, the "just, noble good, and

advantageous things” are the greatest. For humans, knowledge that one does not know that which he does not know about the “just, noble, good, and advantageous” is the greatest (possible) good. This knowledge is a knowledge of one’s deficiency and a deficiency produces a desire. By not mentioning the inexpedient and expedient as opposites in the *Gorgias*, Socrates omits the intermediate end that leads one to the other ends and, in a sense, is the central concern for rhetoric and the end with which Aristotle realigns rhetoric away from the systematic rhetoric of Gorgias. Socrates’ omission may be an effort to look more closely at rhetoric’s purpose (“*why* it is”) in order to understand its nature (“*what* it is”). Gorgias can examine rhetoric’s usefulness, expedience, or power after understanding its purpose. Nicholas Denyer, *Plato Alcibiades*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

171. The expedient is not included in Socrates’ list. See previous note.

172. Gorgias was not professing to teach virtue initially and so he could not be blamed for any misbehaviour among his “educated” students. In the *Meno*, Gorgias seems to have said that he does not teach virtue. He would then contradict that claim here for virtue is obviously connected to speech about the noble, and justice itself is a virtue. Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vol.3, Trans. W.R.M. Lamb. {*Meno*} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 70.

173. As Aristotle argues, one who sees what is true can also see apparent truths, likewise concerning the apparent means of persuasion and means of persuasion. See page 4 above.

174. The chances are slim that Gorgias has even come across a student who did not hold some opinion on these matters. Gorgias could probably be confident that his students would claim knowledge upon arrival at his school and he could depend on their saying so, after all, who does not know what is just, noble, and good? On the other hand, Socrates may believe that few do know these matters and teaching them might not be possible if a student has not learned them by the time he arrive at Gorgias’ school.

175. The example of carpentry comes to play an important role in the discussion with Callicles at 514b4-c9.

176. This is a significant problem. There are thinkers who seem to have knowledge of just things; they have considered what justice is and may profess to have a degree of knowledge on the subject. Yet, these same thinkers may behave more unjustly than one who seems to know less about, or has given less thought to, justice. Such spurious professors of justice may exist and not act as justly as those who follow external rules of justice but this is not the serious question. There are thinkers who have knowledge of just things. Are they just?

177. Nichols tells us that some of these short exchanges are left out by a number of editors Nichols believes they are all important. I think this true because Gorgias is very careful in how much credence he gives to each affirmative answer (e.g. “apparently” means “seems” not “is”). Socrates is also precise about the verbs he is using. Following these short exchanges help us to see how each views the relationship between justice and the rhetorician. Is there a science of justice the rhetorician must know? Can one do just actions without knowing justice? Is it enough

to wish not to do injustice or must one study injustice to have knowledge of it? These are a few questions clarified somewhat in this exchange.

178. Tarnopolsky makes this insight in her article outlining the place for shame in the logical argument that Socrates uses to refute Gorgias. Christina Tarnopolsky, "Shame and Moral Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*: The Refutation of Gorgias and Callicles." ([Presentation] in the Political Theory Workshop, University of Chicago, April 3rd, 2000) 17-18.

179. Socrates cares about how ideas take root and grow in his listeners; he considers each soul and its justice and nobility. In contrast, Gorgias proceeds to teach his art as if his students were, and would continue to be, entirely just, while conjuring up a defence that assumes they will become radically unjust in the future. In addition to not seeing to justice in his own soul, Gorgias is indifferent to the state of his students' souls. When Gorgias ignores how his students' souls are being lead by his speech, he forgets their souls. It would seem Gorgias's neglect would not be doing them any favours or gratifying them in the future. His gratifying speech increases the likelihood his students will neglect their souls, and become the kind of men that Gorgias himself would advise the city to expel or kill (457c2). Nichols, 39.

180. This friendship is not explicitly stated but it is found in the drama of the dialogue when Gorgias steps in to continue the discussion with Callicles. Scholars may not see this as an example of friendship. For example, Kahn makes no suggestion that Gorgias does begin to grasp what Socrates is teaching. Kahn interprets the continuation of the dialogue after Gorgias is refuted as a message to the readers; however, the message to the readers is slightly different if Gorgias does respond and coerces Callicles to complete the discussion. Rather than Socrates having a particular message for the readers, the friendship that is formed between Socrates and Gorgias, without transcending the action of the dialogue, may best communicate Plato's message to readers. Charles Kahn, "Drama and Dialectic in Plato's *Gorgias*," (*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* I, 1983) 84.

181. The practical virtues are not discussed at any length in this thesis, however, they do come to play a central role in the remaining sections of the *Gorgias*. The introduction notes the practical virtues of moderation and courage (See p.4 above). The practical virtues are arguably the prerequisites for the intellectual virtues (wisdom and justice) that Gorgias and Socrates must pursue. Thus, while the philosopher persuades the rhetorician toward justice, the rhetorician's role may be to persuade the many toward moderation and courage in action.

182. Judging by Socrates' actions, justice seems to be doing good to one's friends. This definition is also discovered by Gorgias when he begins to consider justice more carefully, but Gorgias has not begun to consider the nature of friends and enemies. (See p. 109 above). Socrates is able to tell who his friends are by testing whether they consistently defend justice, are just, and wish the good for others. The just life is thus, also, the life seeking friends. Gorgias may search for truth but he searches for neither justice nor friendship.

183. Eugene Garver also notes Aristotle's relative silence on rhetoric in the *Politics*. Garver goes so far to mistakenly claim that this treatise "says nothing at all about rhetoric." Garver, 240.

184. For example, Kleon uses the anger and vengeance of the Athenians to act quickly in punishing the enemy and deters them from deliberating further. Book III:[35-49]. One might also argue that these "lower elements" of human nature are actually unnatural. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War: The Crawley Translation*, Ed. T.E. Wick, (New York: The Modern Library, 1982),153.

185. Essentially, I agree with Eugene Garver that the problem with contemporary public discourse (as he outlines in his book) is that epideictic rhetoric is severed from the political species of rhetoric. It is unclear that this separation is a product of "our times" specifically. Most of the men in the *Gorgias* appear to have a modern opinion concerning the purpose of politics and the role of rhetoric (Garver, 206). Garver seems to think that the natural *polis* is a historical phenomenon. Our institutions and societies cannot be void of the original (natural) purposes of politics and its instrumental rhetoric. While Garver may argue that the possibility of true rhetoric and true politics taking place is small, it seems that there is the possibility that most people (including most people in the times of Aristotle or Plato) always behaved and thought in the (pusillanimous) manner empirically described by moderns. Socrates explains political speech by comparing it to the work of pastry-chefs against whom doctors must compete. Pastry-chefs have the advantage of popularity; they have always had this advantage; they still have this advantage. Let us return to when Socrates first asked Gorgias about his kind of speeches. Socrates inquired whether "they were those that make clear to the sick by what way of life they would be healthy?" (*Gorgias*, 449e). When diagnosing the sickness, that is to say, the injustice, of a political community one must remember there is a fine line between when one is getting used to being sick and when one has become healthy. This is perhaps what Garver is referring to when he states that it is difficult to find an absolute good or standard good life in contemporary times when there are so many constantly changing options for possible lives to lead and goods to choose (Garver, 56). Having many options for possible lives may lead a society to consider itself a healthy, functioning society when it is actually overrun with distractions symptomatic of its disease. Some may consider a free democracy a great place to practise philosophy. There is a line of criticism which runs contrary to this consideration. Democracies have a tendency toward Gorgias's opinion or the product of Gorgias's opinion that the very act of shaming becomes shameful. This opinion eliminates any serious discourse about the best actions and the best life. Democrats have a difficult time finding their place in the political community, despite, or because of, their freedoms and advantages.

The term "inner logic" was taken from the description Patrick Malcomson and Richard Myers provide when describe their approach to studying political institutions. Patrick Malcomson and Richard Myers, *The Canadian Regime*, (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2002), 19.

186. [561b7-c3]. *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom, (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 239.

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