Temporality and the Dis-positional Abyss in Heidegger

Master of Arts Thesis at Brock University
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Theosophy and the
Dissolution of Aphasias
in Hagedorn

[Signatures and printer information]
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# Temporality and the Dis-positional Abyss in Heidegger

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Preface

In this Preface, I wish to point out, in broad lines, what I will do in this essay, what I will not do (the latter to ward off misinterpretation) and some of the methodological and technical considerations of how I will proceed.

Any claim to completion or even comprehensive thoroughness in dealing with any major theme of Heidegger must be suspect, in light of the over 70 published volumes of Heidegger’s works alone, let alone the hundreds of volumes of scholarship in several different languages. In the following, I will pick out a theme, viz., the theme of existential temporality, and elucidate it from out of several, though not all possibly pertinent, Heidegger volumes. I also will develop a criticism of one aspect of the Heideggerian analysis - that of the structure and disclosure of dis-position (Befindlichkeit) or mood - and will argue that a more accurate interpretation may have consequences for the existential-temporal analysis and the question after the meaning of Being. As it is beyond the scope of this essay to work the latter consequences out in any detail, I have postponed elucidation of the deepest level of temporal interpretation (in Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology) for another day. This essay is meant as a first slice into the overall problematic of ontological-temporal analysis. It will focus on Heidegger’s early development of temporal themes (Chapter One) and prepare the way for the temporal analysis and critique through a reinterpretation of the modes of disclosure of human existence (Chapter Two).

The essay, while formally a ‘thesis’, is more accurately what I would rather call ‘critical exposition’, i.e., critical development through textual exposition and interpretation. This ‘method’ proceeds by 1) a laying out a text in a continual condensation according to the inherent logic of the theme at hand; 2) an essential
formulation: 3) a questioning which opens up possibilities inherent in the text itself, or which draws out other possibilities by altering, structurally, the discourse or thematic formulation; 4) a reformulation according to the new orientation opened up. This is, of course, not the only way of proceeding but it is, in my view, the fairest way of developing a critique of another thinker. By explicitly basing itself upon that thinker's texts, and developing the inherent possibilities from within the thinker's own discourse (at least, to the degree that is possible without abandoning any critical intent), one engages in what Heidegger would call an 'Auseinandersetzung' or authentic philosophical dialogue.

I have also, in Chapter One, made use of a chronological and somewhat 'biographical' account of the development of themes from Heidegger's early work up until Being and Time. This, despite the ultimate philosophical naivete of such a temporality, familiarizes the reader with the existentiell origins of Heidegger's philosophical path, his first forays into the thicket of time in search of the clearing for Being. I find such a method helpful, as opposed to a historically contextless, thematic attack which works on the level of free-floating ideation or casual, contextless, reference to other texts, thinkers, or paths of development.

I do not formulate in detail the tradition which Heidegger is criticizing but try instead to formulate his own positive descriptions and analyses in their own right - a difficult enough task. Nor will I indulge in criticizing all the various arguments by the multitude of Heidegger scholars and philosophers influenced by Heidegger. Rather, I will make use of other people's writings only in order to help formulate, in a positive sense, my own understanding and presentation of Heidegger's ideas.

There are still scores of Heidegger's work which remain untranslated into English, particularly his early Freiburg work - none of the early lecture courses from the 'first Freiburg period' (1916-1923) have been translated. I have, then, in certain
cases where I thought these works to be pertinent, relied primarily on the secondary literature (particularly, for example, in sections I and III) while at least making myself acquainted with the original German texts. While this is not ideal scholarship, it has nonetheless been fruitful.

My concern is with the development of the temporal problematic and the articulation of the various modes of disclosure of being-there, confined within Heidegger’s early (1916-1919) and initial mature (1919-1926) philosophical project. I am not here concerned with the ‘later’ Heidegger, nor even with the texts which, more or less, coincide with the publication of Being and Time (this means such texts as What is Metaphysics, The Essence of Ground, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic). Nor, then, am I dealing, in this essay, with the relation of the ‘later Heidegger’ to the ‘early Heidegger’ or interpreting the early Heidegger in terms of his later thinking.

My interest is with the entire problematic of time, of temporality (Zeitlichkeit) in fundamental ontology and Temporality (Temporalitaet) in the question of Being. While envisioning an overall argument and project, I have only been able to proceed a short step of the way in this essay. Specifically, I have been able to focus on the ‘how’ of lived time, particularly in its so-called ‘authentic’ mode. While I have been unable to reach the existential-ontological analysis of the ecstatic-horizontal nature of temporality and the arising problems surrounding the development of the time of Being, I have been able to prepare the way for such analysis from a new interpretive perspective.
What after all remains
today for us
here now
of a Heidegger
For us
here now:
there, behind the absolute
of an already
what is there?

The beginning - before it, the already
an already that leads
back to nothing present

Death has already taken place
before everything.
Not just ‘Pay attention
I am going to die’, ‘I am mortal’
but ‘I am already dead’
even before living

The already that I am
sounds its own proper death-knell
signs itself its own death sentence
regards you in advance

What I had dreaded
naturally
already
republishes itself.

Today here now
the debris of
what after all remains
today for us
here now
of a Heidegger?

(Derived from Derrida's Glas, pp. 1, 10, 19, 79, 262 and 1 again)
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
(See bibliography for further details.)

Works by Heidegger

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Introduction

Already, today, not only is the 'metaphysics of presence' out of favour in Continental philosophy but, as a part of the deconstruction of the philosophical text, the concept of 'time' itself, as an essentially 'metaphysical' concept, has become questionable.¹ This may have more to do with the concept of 'the concept' than with the phenomenon of time 'itself'. More precisely, it may have to do with the textual context of 'the concept', a grammatatological texture which would destructure and dissolve the supposed contextless 'transcendental signified' of the 'ousialogical' or 'ontotheological' or 'logocentric' 'metaphysics of presence' and its corresponding 'conceptual re-presentation'. The conceptual schema of time governing this metaphysics and articulation would also be undone by this 'deconstruction'.

But there is always already time before and beyond the concept. In Heidegger, the temporal-hermeneutical texture of existence is what destructures the metaphysics of ousialogical presence and opens the horizon to the unconcealment (truth) of Praesenz, a sense of Being with intimations of the 'self-emerging presence' of the pre-Socratic physis in its essential relation to (in its 'truth' as) the original sense of logos [IM, 190].

However, if Heidegger's project of the temporal determination of Being is still circumscribed within a 'metaphysics of presence', we would want to understand what or how this 'presence' 'is', what time it is. But the self-circling temporality of existence and the fundamental ambiguity of Heidegger's 'Praesenz' do not lead to any straightforward thematic conceptual analysis. In Heidegger, the 'difference' within Praesenz, and the 'ecstatic' nature of existential temporality, transform the articulation from a projected conceptual and pro-positional rigour (albeit of a
In many a time, pursuing my individuality, only by your so much interés, and strongly, the sense of the moment, is not the purest, contrived, and special. What is the true, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise. The true, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise.

Moreover, the true, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise. The true, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise, the sort in the form of “true” to arise.
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The eternal analytic, though, will be my aim. The mixture of phenomenology and hermeneutics, the perpetual recoil of the hermeneutic circle, the nature of ecstatic-horizonal time, the factical historicity of existence, the priority given to the future dimension or 'ecstasis', the problem of the unity of the three temporal dimensions, the precise nature of the relationship between temporality (Zeitlichkeit) and Temporality (Temporalitaet), the significance of the temporal relation of Heidegger's original philosophical project to his 'later' thinking - these are difficult and complex matters to unravel and, due to the inherent recoil of existence (and) language upon itself, there is perhaps as little possibility of doing so in a straightforward thematic manner, here and now, as there was for Heidegger back then. In this essay, I would like to, at least, open a way towards these topics.

In a broad sense, what I have attempted to do with this essay is make some headway into a proper Auseinandersetzung or philosophical dialogue with Heidegger by focussing on Heidegger's concern with time in its fundamental 'existentiell' sense and the problematic around deriving an ontology from factically lived time in its dimensions of disclosure. I try to show, by a critique of Heidegger's modes of disclosure, that by heeding the structural significance of what I call the dis-positional disclosure (i.e., moods, affects and their import - Befindlichkeit), we can free ourselves from the compulsion toward transcendental grounding in the rationalist-metaphysical sense (a compulsion which is at the core of Western metaphysics and has its sway on the early Heidegger as the abysmal grounding of freedom) and free ourselves for the development of a released appreciation of Being (physis) as such.
This would lead to a ‘Temporally’ (Temporal) retroactive transformation of the temporality (Zeitlichkeit) of Being-there (Dasein). I will argue that Heidegger has pointed to something like this but not followed the path, at least as regards completing his temporal project. This was due, perhaps, to the hangover of transcendental rationalism which continued to shape his thinking before and, structurally, even after the ‘Turn’. It is also due to his turning away from the entire temporal problematic in the 1930’s.

There are two major issues, here, which are analogous to how G. Nicholson characterizes Being-there as an Exister and a Discloser [Nicholson 1992]. One issue (Exister) is that of the temporal characterization or Zeitigungssinn (temporalizing-sense) of being-there’s Being and how this temporal interpretation should unfold. Heidegger realized, even in Being and Time, that the temporal analysis of being-there would be incomplete:

...we need an idea of Being in general, and this idea needs to be adequately illumined in advance. So long as this idea is one at which we have not yet arrived, then the temporal analysis of being-there, even if we repeat it [as Heidegger is about to do in II.IV], will remain incomplete and fraught with obscurities. [BT. 382, H333]

Heidegger’s temporal analysis did, in fact, remain incomplete (and also fraught with obscurities), as the absence of the third division of Part One, ‘Time and Being’ of Being and Time testifies. I had envisioned working, mainly in a detailed expository manner, primarily on the existential-temporal theme in Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, attempting to work out the reasons why Heidegger’s project ‘failed’, to salvage what was of value as regards the temporality of being-there, and, if possible, to try to find a way to re-orient the discussion towards the time of Being. In Chapter One, ‘Early Development: the Hermeneutics of Factual
Historical Existence'. I give some context to Heidegger's discussion of time in *Being and Time* by tracing some aspects of the early development of the theme of time in the decade before the writing of his major work. However, before proceeding with the very 'abstract' temporal analysis in *Being and Time*, I felt such analysis would be more richly contextualized if the *existential* phenomena (being-towards death, anxiety in the uncanny abyss, resoluteness, authenticity, etc) from which the *existential-ontological* analysis is drawn, were first brought to the fore.

This leads to the second 'major issue' (Discloser), the issue of the accurate interpretation of what our modes of disclosure are, how they are structured, and what they disclose. This issue has more to do with 'how' being-there is, in concrete 'factual historical existence' - with the *Vollzugssinn* (enactment or actualizing-sense) - which, in the order of phenomenological interpretive procedure, precedes the more fundamental and more obscure temporal analysis. Chapter Two, 'The Abysmal Grounding of Being-there' distinguishes between 'everyday authenticity', 'uncanny authenticity' and the trans-existential awareness of Being which is inherent in 'uncanny authenticity'. The uncanny awareness is one which can be developed in a way which brings us outside the confines of the Heideggerian project. I will include a reinterpretation of the modes of disclosure, particularly dis-positional disclosure, and a criticism of the overall 'projective prejudice' governing Heidegger's orientation toward the factual phenomena.

More specifically, I show the early development of Heidegger's concern with time (prior to *Being and Time*) and, via a reinterpretation of our openness to the uncanny abyss, argue that Heidegger compromised his own insight into the primordiality of the disclosure of disposition, thereby sustaining the traditional hegemony of 'reason' (projection of ground) over mood and affect (disposition). Indicating the possibility of a liberated interpretation of 'disposition', I point to the
possibility of reworking existential temporality from a vantage point outside the ecstatic-horizon schema.

As mentioned, though, working the latter out is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this essay. I will only be able to make some inroads and bridges toward the new orientation indicated here, hopefully winning through to some 'islands of clarity'. But the temporal analysis and interpretation, as such, has had to be left for another time.

In what sense, then, the temporality of human existence is 'fundamental' is open to question. Must human existence, under the compulsion of its temporal being, shatter against Being in anxiety, grief, and suffering...in order to affirm itself and Being by opening the breach of the ontological difference and bringing Being to appearance in creative work? Are there 'metaphysical moods' and affects which transcend the disclosure of anxiety and the tragic framework? What is the existential - more precisely, existentiell - significance of metaphysical or self-transcendent experience? Is there a creative imagination which is a free-play 'grounding' of transcendence? Where does this leave the existential project? Again, I do not propose to answer all of these questions; but these questions are what guide the inquiry along its path.

Notes for the Introduction

1. "Derrida, however, takes the whole question a step further by arguing that time is an essentially metaphysical concept, and [by] denial of the possibility of an alternative concept of time" [Wood 1989, xi]. Wood's philosophical project shows that "far from ruling out 'another concept of time,' [Derrida] actually opens the way for one." [Wood 1989, 6]. Similarly, G. Nicholson's work [Nicholson 1992], not to mention the temporal analyses abounding within the Anglo-American tradition, signify that the concept of time is alive and well in contemporary thought.

2. See note 17, Chapter Two.
Chapter One

Early Development: the Hermeneutics of Factual Historical Existence

I. Heidegger's Early Development: The Concept of Time in the Historical Sciences (1916)

In this section, I will introduce various aspects of the theme of time by surveying some of Heidegger's early texts and some of the biographical details of his early development within the philosophical milieu of his time.

What is particularly valuable about Heidegger's early period is that it gives us insight into the gradual formation of themes and methods which resulted in Being and Time. In some cases, what is obscure in Being and Time, because of the rigours of a systematic terminology, is put more plainly in the earlier work. It may be expressed in various developing and sometimes more expressive terminologies or it may be linked to a polemical context which brings out different facets of the theme. In general, before Heidegger's insights into the possibility of reappropriating Kant's transcendental project for his own ontological purposes (around 1925), his thinking often had a more direct, intuitive, and evocative appeal.¹

Heidegger's first philosophical awakening to the 'question of Being' came while he was a seventeen year-old student (1907) at Jesuit secondary school, when he read Brentano's book, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. The question of the underlying meaning of Being which unites the disparate senses of Being (accident, essence [categories], truth, and potentiality/actuality) arose in Heidegger's mind. This philosophical question must have originally been in a context of spiritual striving for Heidegger, who came from a religious background (Catholic) and was, as
null
a Jesuit novice (from the age of 20 until 22), studying to become a priest. Though Heidegger turned to philosophy, it appears he retained his faith (though transformed to a non-dogmatic Protestantism) at least until near the end of the First World War.

We may surmise that the question of the relation of eternity to time, just as "the relation between the Word of Sacred Scripture and theological-speculative thinking" [Sheehan 1981, 6] 'agitated' him with a religious pathos as well as an intellectual one.

Although Heidegger's earliest writings, in general, are not particularly important for our theme, the lecture *The Concept of Time in the Science of History* [CTSH], which accompanied his *Habilitationsschrift* [GA 1] does merit consideration. It emphasises the difference between the time-concepts required for the study of history and for the study of physics or natural science in general [Wood 1989, 139]. History, as opposed to the standardized and homogenous time-for-measurement of physics, requires a time concept which allows the historian to understand "context of effect and development of objectifications of human life in its understandable peculiarity and uniqueness" [CTSH, 8; my italics] - and so requires a time-sense which allows of qualitative difference. Heidegger, though suppressing explicit metaphysical concerns at this stage, stresses the need for "a metaphysical resolution to the problem of knowledge" in the conclusion appended for the publication of the Duns Scotus book [GA 1, 403]. Similarly, in *CTSH* and with obvious Nietzschean overtones, philosophy's proper "will to power" must, as Krell puts it, "advance beyond epistemology to metaphysics" [Krell 1986, 127] - which we can interpret, with hindsight, as meaning toward existence and Being.

As Wood sees it, Heidegger makes some existential and foundationalist moves in this early essay: he emphasizes a "living through that overcomes time" [Wood 1989, 140], that is, the historian overcomes the gap between the non-present otherness of the past and the present by "living one's way through the temporal gap from the
present to the past" [CTSH; italics mine]. This suggests that despite the standard notion of the past as what 'is not' or as parasitic upon what 'is', human historical existence is such as to 'be' beyond what 'is' and already constituted by a past dimension. Wood construes Heidegger as showing humans to be, beyond the objectified world of knowledge, "living, creating beings [with] access to a preobjectified realm from which alternative objectifications can be grasped" [Wood 1989, 140].

This points to, despite Heidegger's early "Aristotelian-Scholastic, Neo-Kantian-logical and Christian theological influences" [Fehér 1994, 74], an already developed orientation toward so-called Lebensphilosophie. This was perhaps originally due, if only negatively, to the early influence of Freiburg's Rickert (the "neo-Kantian philosopher of values" [Sheehan 1981b, 6] and 'transcendental empiricism'), whose own criticism of Dilthey Heidegger later sharply repudiates as a 'trivialization'. Rickert, himself Heidegger's Doktorvater, points out however that, for Heidegger, the single most influential figure among the neo-Kantians was Emil Lask, to whom Heidegger was "very much obliged...for his philosophical orientation as well as his terminology" (quoted in [Kisiel 1993, 25]). Lask's phenomenologically-influenced neo-Kantianism provided Heidegger with seminal forms of his central notions of "facticity" and "understanding", his early method of "formal indication" and some key notion of immediate apprehension along the lines of Husserl's "categorial intuition".

But there appears to have been a more primordial 'intuitive' reaction against the prevalent neo-Kantian "ahistorical attitude" and "epistemological reductiveness" [Gadamer 1994, 22] of the day, a propensity which had even infected Husserl's phenomenology. This reaction was perhaps generally shared by the new generation of German thinkers. Heidegger had already read Nietzsche, probably Dilthey, and
perhaps Bergson by 1916. Krell indicates that Heidegger had read Dilthey at least since 1917 and credits Dilthey with (1) "elevating Bergsonian Lebensphilosophie and Bergson’s own intuitionism to a sophisticated hermeneutics of history", and (2) "fortifying Heidegger’s growing resistance to the bloodless transcendental consciousness of Husserl’s Ideas I" [Krell 1986, 20]. An examination of Heidegger’s references to Bergson would show that Heidegger admired this thinker’s attempt to rethink time outside of the traditional (i.e., Aristotelian) matrix but that Bergson’s interpretation of Aristotle was faulty, thus flawing Bergson’s own counter-concept of time. However, a comparative study would also show that, despite obvious differences, these two thinkers shared important common themes and orientations. Suffice it to say, the spirit of Lebensphilosophie was the thematic core of Heidegger’s early non-dogmatic thinking, and explicitly returns as late as his 1929-30 lectures. The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics.

Heidegger had only been lecturing for two semesters before the celebrated Edmund Husserl, founder of phenomenology, came to teach at Freiburg in 1916. Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900) had had a powerful influence on Heidegger since 1910 due particularly to the sixth investigation’s analysis of ‘categorial intuition’. When Heidegger left the seminary in 1911, he had wanted to study under Husserl, Brentano’s pupil, in Göttingen. Though they met when Husserl arrived in Freiburg, it was not until 1919, due to Heidegger’s war service, that Husserl and Heidegger could fruitfully develop their philosophical relationship, with Heidegger as apprentice to the master phenomenologist, Husserl.

In fact, it appears that sometime during the later war years of the first world war, Heidegger began to mature philosophically. His maturing took the form of freeing himself from all dogmatisms (including his church ties), developing a critical attitude toward all contemporary trends in philosophy, and, with no real ground to
stand upon but his own inherent *phronesis*, casting his questing intelligence and imagination forth at once into a profusion of possible paths. When he returned to Freiburg University, he lectured on a wide variety of topics, thinkers, and philosophical eras, all under the aegis of phenomenological investigation.

But it was clear that Heidegger’s notion of phenomenology differed from the start from that of the unhistorical, transcendental phenomenology of Husserl’s recently published *Ideas* (1913). As Krell says, Dilthey’s influence on Heidegger meant that “the transcendental ego would have to be brought to confront its finitude as factual historical life-in-process” [Krell 1986, 20]; already, in discussions at Husserl’s house, Heidegger had indicated that

...the primordial Ur-ego would be the ‘historical ego’ qualified; the pure ego would arise from the ‘historical ego’ by the repression of all historicity and quality but it would only be the subject of material-theoretical acts. (quoted in [Sheehan 1979, 317]).

Husserl had, perhaps in his overzealous response to Paul Natorp’s critique of phenomenological intentionality as a form of ‘psychologism’, overadapted to the epistemologically reductive orientation of the essentially solipsistic, constituting, transcendental ego of neo-Kantianism. As Fehér points out, the 1919 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* lectures begin with:

For phenomenology, the most original and decisive problem of phenomenology is phenomenology itself. (WS 1919-20; 1) (quoted in [Fehér 1994, 80]).

That is, Heidegger is already by 1919 developing phenomenology in a *hermeneutical* manner, radicalizing phenomenology so that it recoils upon itself, gaining a retroactive transparency in this circular self-processing. This recoil is due to the
factual existence of the being who interprets, and this factual existence is primordially an historical, i.e., temporal phenomenon. This retroaction foreshadows the methodological move in Being and Time by which Heidegger shows the ontical priority of the question of Being by developing fundamental ontology originally as an existential analytic, i.e., an analytic of that being, Dasein (factual existence), who quests after the meaning of Being [BT, section 4], whose Being is 'an issue' for itself.

For Heidegger, Husserl's motto 'to return to the things themselves' meant to go back to the 'facticity' of lived and living experience (Erleben) and "to find appropriate means for its description, to develop a conceptuality adequate to it" [Kisiel & van Buren 1994, 80-1]. Heidegger will ultimately (in the late 1920's) find the 'intersection' between interpretation and lived experience in the creative or 'productive' imagination:

the intersection between the semantical-meaning governed side of interpretation - and the active-performative dimension of lived experience (praxis) - will be traced back to the power of imagination which constitutes the wellspring of possibility. [Schalow 1992, xiv]

This is the way towards the locus of time, at least in Heidegger's later Kantian context. But the way to this is long. However, already in 1919, Heidegger refers to a 'hermeneutical intuition' which, in the service of phenomenology as a pretheoretical primal science (Urwissenschaft ), stays close to the facts of lived experience (c.f. [Kisiel & van Buren 1994, 82]). Furthermore, the method of non-objectifying "formal indication", which Heidegger develops early on, is meant as a meaning-determining outgrowth of pre-articulate, intentionally structured life itself. In 1919, the Ereignis "is first introduced as the central characterization of the most intense lived experience (Er-leben) of the historical I, in close conjunction with the meaning-bestowing
dynamics of the It which 'worlds''" [Kisiel 1993, 494]. By the time of the 1923 lectures on facticity [GA 63], hermeneutics becomes the "self-interpretation of facticity," [GA 63, 14; my italics], i.e., interpretation is recognized as an internal component of factical existence itself (as an existentiale, in the terminology of Being and Time).

Heidegger's concern with historical, lived time had gained, by 1919, the concreteness of an immediate existential concern. The concerns of life-philosophy, the primal and multi-dimensional historicity of lived time, of human existence, had already in Heidegger's mind usurped the transcendental stance of Husserlian phenomenology and transformed it into a hermeneutics of factical existence. Gadamer says that, upon completing his doctorate in philosophy (at Marburg among the neo-Kantians), he had felt something was missing, something he found when he then met Heidegger in 1923, as Heidegger came to Marburg to teach.

All at once I knew. This was what I had missed and what I had been seeking, namely the insight that philosophical thought should not consider history and the historicity of our existence to be a constraint, but rather that it should raise this, our very ownmost impulse in our lives, up to thinking.11

II. The Death of Lebensphilosophie: The Phenomenon of Time in Historical Existenz

Fehér states that

'Facticity' is a term adopted to substitute for the vague and ambiguous concept of life employed by life-philosophy, as well as for that of 'existence' employed by Jaspers and Kierkegaard. [Fehér 1994, 83]
One of the most overall important writings we have from the early period is Heidegger's 1919-21 Comments on Karl Jaspers's Psychology of Worldviews. This went unpublished until 1973 and has been only this year translated into English. I believe the meeting of these two minds was, as their masterworks of the 1920's testify (Heidegger's Being and Time and Jaspers's three-volume Philosophy) decisive for both thinkers. Here, however, we can only focus on the content of Heidegger's appreciation and criticism of Jaspers's earlier work and what this meant for his own immediate development.

With the above quotation, I mean to point out something of Heidegger's development: though he was in strong sympathy with the basic impetus of life-philosophy, he was never satisfied with its philosophical formulations, its basic conceptual 'naivete' - but Jaspers's Kierkegaardian notion of 'existence' showed Heidegger a way out of this philosophical naivete. Though, in Heidegger's eyes, Jaspers's work was too 'ontically' bound, the inherent tendency of his notion of existence was authentically 'ontological'.

It may, however, strike us here as contradictory or, at least, strange to seek an adequate conceptual basis, even an ontology, for the pre-theoretical sphere of 'factual life'. Is it not the point of life-philosophy that life is beyond our concepts? that life is flowing, unbound, un-limited by the restrictions of language, particularly conceptual language?

But it is precisely this naive 'realist' presumption which Heidegger is attacking with his notion of 'factual life' or 'factual existence'. This is certainly not to favour some idealism, neo-Kantian or otherwise. As mentioned, Heidegger defends life-philosophy from Rickert's 'trivialization', for example. But it was the genius of Heidegger's early philosophical project to stretch life out beyond itself, to recognize Existenz as an ontological sphere already 'beyond' 'life'. Heidegger is not 'pointing'
beyond life to some afterlife or infinity, nor intensifying the quantum of life-power in a Nietzschean manner. Rather, Heidegger’s ‘preconception’ is of the here and now concrete whole of factical existence. The finite stretch and multi-dimensional here-now ‘moment’ (Augenblick) encompasses our always, already dead, ex-ist-ing. Whether such an ontological standpoint is feasible or whether Heidegger has, as in Sartre’s criticism, introduced the “sleight of hand” of the “idealist attempt to recover death”, we must still attempt to work this standpoint out from its own vantage point before criticizing it.

At the same time, in order ‘to develop a conceptuality adequate to the Erleben of factical life, language is existentialized, situated in reciprocal interplay with its ‘referent’. Language exists in dialogue with life, as logos of life. Conceptual language – in Heidegger’s “formal indication” - becomes hermeneutic: as a part of the ‘life’ that it conceptualizes, it expands the domain of the concept into that life while, at the same time, withdrawing from its previous objectifying, overbearing, rationalist, transcendental claims. This transforms the notions of ‘concept’ and ‘conceptualization’, from the ‘Ideas’ of a ‘grasping’, appropriative and ‘objectifying’ process, to the “pre-concepts” of a “non-objective formalization of intentionality” which is an essential self-appropriation (of) ‘world’.

Krell summarizes the essence of Heidegger’s appreciation of The Psychology of Worldviews as follows:

First, Jaspers’ very language - especially such terms as Existenz, Existenzphantomen, and Dasein - suggests how the starting point of the prevailing ‘life-philosophy’ may be surpassed. Second, the idea of a ‘limit situation’ which would expose the essential character of existence, and the description of death as such a situation for each existence, foreshadow the methodological importance of the analysis of death in Being and Time. [Krell 1986, 24]
That is, Jaspers laid out what are perhaps the most crucial themes of Heidegger’s developing thought and provided him with a terminology that would help him articulate these themes in his own way. I think that the importance of this commonality of themes between the two thinkers far outweighs both then and now, the differences that Heidegger would articulate in his critique.

In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes between existential anthropology and fundamental ontology. The former, which is what he credits Jaspers with pursuing, “presents the factual existentiell possibilities in their chief features and interconnections” and interprets them “according to their existential structure” [BT, 348]. The latter, fundamental ontology, existentially delimits the very can-be or possible being (Seinkönnens) of existence itself [ibid]. It articulates the very possibility itself which the structure of existence is. For the Heidegger of Being and Time, this is the existential attestation of ‘conscience’ [BT, 348].

What is the difference between Heidegger’s ‘delimitation of the existential attestation’ and Jaspers’s ‘interpretation of existentiell possibilities according to their existential structure’? The implications are that the existential attestation (Heidegger), despite its being an attestation, is not existentiell - which would lead to our wondering just what experiential content it could possibly have; and that, despite the interpretation of existentiell possibilities according to their existential structure (Jaspers), such interpretation is not yet existential in the ontological sense - which would make us wonder how the interpretation could have proceeded “according to existential structure.” It appears that, though there is an important point at stake here, Heidegger is somewhat underestimating the power of Jaspers’s existential orientation.

The important point is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between an ‘empirical exemplification’ of something and an ‘existentiell attestation’ of an existential structure: generalities need not be fundamental whereas existential
structure is fundamental or 'categorical'. Heidegger is, in one and the same breath, warning the reader of Jaspers's work away from an interpretation which would trivialize it (into being a mere catalogue of disparate possible world-views [BT, II.2, note xv] with no inherent and existentially unified basis), and implicating Jaspers with a tendency toward encouraging such an interpretation. In studying what Jaspers says about limit or boundary situations and the non-empirical reality of Existenz, again, one would have to ignore the inherent tendency or exaggerate the 'merely' empirical tendency of Jaspers's thinking to make this criticism stick.

Nonetheless, one would also have to appreciate Jaspers's inherent tendencies in order to make the criticism in the first place. What Heidegger sees as flawed in Jaspers's approach is what he considers to be the haphazard method adopted for the work as a whole, the possible eclipse of the ontological interest by Jaspers's classificatory interest, and his reliance upon a certain borrowed epistemological and life-philosophy terminology which betrays his own brilliant (pre-) ontological insights. For example, according to Jaspers,

...the "primal phenomenon" of human life is the subject-object split and the resulting antinomial character of existence. [Krell 1986, 13]

The derivation from Kant is clear; hence a derivation from an epistemologically-oriented vocabulary and its 'ousialogical' ontology. To attempt to articulate an existential analysis and metaphysics from a traditional onto-logical framework is bound to abort the emerging existential-hermeneutic-ontological insights. It is along the same lines that Heidegger will orient his criticism of Kant whom he sees as having shrunk back from his own insight into the primordiality of the transcendental imagination and the ontological implications of the finitude of the 'subject': insights are lost due to epistemological and ontological prejudices.
Let us look closer into Jaspers’s work and detail some of the themes which are important for Heidegger’s development, particularly of the temporal thematic. Jaspers is exploring “the ultimate nature and totality of man, his preoccupation with the whole” [Jaspers 1925, 1]. He investigates the ‘I am’ of existence by thematizing the antinomies by which the human subject runs up against the boundary situations which define his or her existence. The totality of man is seen

...in certain decisive, essential situations that are bound up with human being as such and are inevitably given with finite existence (Dasein). [Jaspers 1925, 229]

According to Jaspers, a boundary situation is an antinomial contradiction which is essential, unresolvable, and which, as pervasive or structural in nature to that being who is thus defined (i.e., made finite, delimited by the boundary drawn) causes suffering, such as “anxiety in the face of death” or “despair in the midst of unavoidable guilt” [Jaspers 1925, 248]. In short, a boundary situation is a factual antinomy of finite existence.

Heidegger adopts this “general strategy for approaching the task of defining human existence...by pacing off the limits internal to it” [Blattner 1994, 163], particularly via what for Heidegger is the boundary situation, i.e., death. But the significant difference is that for Jaspers, “death is the ending of a human life” [Blattner 1994, 159], and the boundary situations gain meaning by virtue of what lies beyond the limit, i.e., “the infinite totality of life” or “endless spirit” [Jaspers 1925, 80]. For Heidegger, rather than life’s striving beyond itself toward an infinite other, life strives unto the limit and (to anticipate later development) we are, upon striking the horizon, thrown back upon our factual life as a whole, whereupon we attain to our own totality, the wholeness of existence itself. Rather than an impending event, death is, ultimately (as we shall soon see), a possible way to be, i.e, being-toward-
death. Life’s striving is a “factual inclination toward one’s own existence” [Krell 1986, 16], which “discloses and holds open a concrete horizon” [P. 19] which, ultimately as limit, rebounds the striving back upon itself.

Accordingly, the ‘I am’ of existence should not be interpreted according to biological notions of life, the subject-object split, or some obscure appeal to the infinitely flowing character of life; i.e., via a derived “Bergsonian line of argumentation” [P. 16]. Rather, the ‘I am’ should be grounded on the fundamental experience of factual, historically-situated existence. What does this mean?

‘Existence’...can be understood as a certain manner of being and thus as a particular sense of the ‘is’ that ‘is’, i.e., has, the essential sense of the (I) ‘am’. And we have this (I) ‘am’ in a genuine sense, not through thinking about it in a theoretical manner, but rather by enacting [actualizing] the ‘am’... . Understood in this way, the being of the self has the formally indicative sense of existence. ...we must find the sense of existence as the particular ‘how’ of the self...important here is accordingly the fact that I have myself, i.e., the basic experience in which I encounter myself as a self [so that] living in this kind of experience and gearing myself to its very sense, I am able to question after the sense of my ‘I am’. This having-myself...must be understood specifically with reference to historical contexts... [P. 25].

This passage reveals many points. For example, the ‘am’ of existence appears to be a mode of Being, which is to say, a mode of the ‘is’; that is, the ‘is’ of the third person singular. This could be the locus for a further analysis of Being itself and, therefore, more primordial than the ‘am’ of existence.

However, "the sense of existence is...that sense of being that cannot be obtained from the ‘is’ [P. 26]. Heidegger makes it clear that the ‘am’ as a mode of the ‘is’ is merely a “formal manner” [P. 27] of speaking which is indicative of the traditional, inappropriate, ontological characterization of existence which plagues philosophy. Specifically here, it is indicative of the methodological and conceptual
inadequacy of Jaspers’s basic, guiding ‘preconception’, which, “in its objective rationalization, aesthetic attitude, and terminological heritage” [Kisiel 1993, 143], obscures the authentic phenomenon of existence. Rather, the ‘am’ is a ‘process of enactment’ and not reducible to the traditional notion of the ‘is’ as simple or standing presence. The ‘I am’ of ‘existence’ designates self-encounter; the ‘having of self’, within the framework of a questioning oneself as to one’s own meaning: es geht mich um: ‘it’ ‘goes about’, or ‘involves’ or ‘concerns’ or ‘is an issue for’ me.18

The ‘I am’ is a factically lived, historically enacting experience of self-questioning encounter. For Heidegger,

To explicate phenomenologically the ‘how’ of this enactment of experience according to its basic historical sense is the task that is most important for us in the whole complex set of problems we face concerning phenomena of existence. [P, 27]

The ‘fact’ of existing ‘is-historical’ – it "extends historically into the past of the ‘I’...that experiences it [the past] historically within the [futural] horizon of expectations” [P, 27] about which one is [presently] anxiously concerned” [P, 19] or “preoccupied”.19 That is, the factical historical life-situation yields the ‘how’ of existence: a multi-dimensional temporal (historical) distressed concern with self 20 which, enacted as a self-questioning encounter, is its own (self-) interpretive process.

Factual existence is hermeneutically historical. That is, in the ‘distressed concern’ of the factical ‘I’ which is “lived hic et nunc, and enacted accordingly in a situation within intellectual history” [P, 28]:

...the specific past, present, and future of the self...are experienced within a nonschematic sense of anxious concern [Bekuémmerung] that has to do with the enactment of experience in its ‘how’...[which enactment] has to be...appropriated from out of such factical experience...in a constant renewal of anxious concern...[P, 28].
null
This leads to Heidegger's notion of "conscience" and "falling". Conscience is the "authentic source" and "how" of historical experience [P, 29]. The essential tendency of "falling" is a falling away from "having a conscience", falling into ready-made, tried and true, "objective kinds of significances of the experienceable environment" [P, 29]. These 'significances' insinuate themselves "into the present situation in the form of an objective tradition" [P, 29], covering over the "basic motivating experiences" [P, 30] in the originality of their possibility. This leads to the necessity of deconstructing the tradition to get to those "original motivational situations in which the fundamental experiences of philosophy have arisen" [P, 3].

So we can see Heidegger trying to undercut the blinders of tradition in a radical way. Our 'having' ourselves means our interpreting ourselves; and our tendency to interpret ourselves from the outside in, so to speak, from the objectified world back onto ourselves, is what constitutes our falling. This is what becomes the 'inauthentic' everyday mode of being-in-the-world in Being and Time. Our past dimension includes past interpretations which harden into tradition and reify possibility. It is necessary, then, as a part of our own individual historicality, to free up self-interpretation from its congealed actuality and objective worldliness, free up the past from its deadweight, by deconstructing the given interpreted edifice, dismantling it back down to its foundations and roots in the past of a current existential project of self-interpretation:

A genuine kind of conceptuality can be opened up for us only when the concrete tradition experienced as still at work in one form or another has been constructed with an eye to the question of the ways and means of explicating our actual experience of the self. [P, 29-30]
Thus this destructuring can bring our present life-situation back to the wellsprings of creative origin, to the proto-language of silence before the beginning, and elicit an originally futural dimension of existence in order to allow of a new and authentic self-appropriation from the primordial sources of the factical ‘I am’ of existence. We have perhaps come a long way from Jaspers but we have done so by following, so Heidegger believes, the ontological-temporal implications of Jaspers’s own notion of ‘existence’.

Finally, Heidegger shows that the phenomenon of existence contains within itself its own ‘method’ of self-appropriation: it ‘is’ a self-appropriation:

We come to have the phenomenon of existence only within a certain ‘how’ of experiencing it, and this ‘how’ is something that has to be achieved in a specific manner. It is precisely this ‘how’ of appropriation and, moreover, the ‘how’ of our initial approach to the enactment of such appropriations that are decisive. 

That our factical, historically enacted life is at work right within ‘how’ we factically approach the problem of ‘how’ the self, in being anxiously concerned about itself, appropriates itself – this is something that belongs originally to the very sense of the factical ‘I am’. [P. 30; my italics ]

Thus the self-referential fact of existence, the historical processing of self-having, designates its own method of self-transparency. Hermeneutics, phenomenological interpretation, is grounded in existence itself. Let us see where this emphasis on the ‘how’ of the enactment of factical existence leads us in context of original Christian life-experience.
III. The Temporality of Vigilance: Waiting for God in the Factual Life-Experience of Original Christianity

In the winter semester of 1920-21, Heidegger gave a course called *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, which can be divided up into two parts (following Sheehan, 315): Part One deals with what factual life-experience is and how this phenomenon prescribes its own new phenomenological method, i.e., the hermeneutical phenomenology that Heidegger is developing. Part Two shows how 'original Christianity', as a factual life-experience, is primordial *kairological* temporality.

I wish to focus for the most part on Part 2, as a way of making concrete Heidegger's developing temporal analysis.

As in Heidegger's interpretation of Greek thinking, in Christianity there is a "lived but unthematized level of experience" which is a "pre-theoretical, pre-rational lived experience of 'self-exceeding,'" or "drawn-out-ness". This is, in Sheehan's terms, "movement as a dynamic interplay of presence and privative absence (pres-ab-sence)" which

...in early Christianity...is understood in terms of *temporality* whereas in early Greek experience, the pres-ab-sential movement is thematized in terms of *disclosure* or 'truth.' [Sheehan 1979, 315]

Heidegger has been developing a hermeneutical method since 1919 and, in Part One of these lectures, he works out the 'formal indication' of philosophical concept-formation. Briefly, formal concepts, as opposed to generic concepts, are the properly philosophical ones; but not formal concepts of a 'mathematical-objective' sort:
...the ontology that would articulate the full immediacy of human experience cannot be the then-current formal *mathesis* of objects, but a more *non-objective formalization of 'intentionality'* that would seek to preclude the classical distinction between subject and object. [Kisiel 1994, 177; my italics].

Formally indicative concepts, rather than objectifying and subsuming under general categories, are 'concepts' of a nonreflective understanding which "catch experience in its incipience and latency" [Kisiel 1993, 3]. They are "less intrusive pre-cepts or pre-concepts which at once reach back into life's motivation [thrownness] and forward into its tendency [projection]" [Kisiel 1993, 48], i.e., into life's intentionally structured factical experience.

Intentionality is 'formally' non-objectified as the dynamic movement of factical historical life-experience itself. Between 1919 and 1922, Heidegger creatively transforms some of Husserl's own intentional moments. Just as 'lived experience' is both the 'experiencing' and 'the experienced', 'living in' and the 'world', the 'way in which' and the 'what' in the primordial *unity* of "the thing itself" or the *phenomenon*; so intentionality is both the *Bezugssinn* (relational-sense) and the *Gehaltssinn* (content-sense) in the primordial *unity* of the intentional act's *Vollzugssinn* (the fulfillment- or actualizing- or *enactment*-sense). This enactment-sense refers to "*how* the person/world relation is enacted or fulfilled interpretively in concrete situations" [van Buren 1994, 161]. This leads to the fundamental level of interpretation, the *Zeitigungssinn*, (the temporalizing-sense), the time-character of the 'how', which is "the deeper sense of this enactment as *historical time*, with its interwoven moments of having-been, futural coming-towards and making-present" [van Buren 1994, 161]. Sheehan calls this "the temporal enactment of the event of meaning" [Sheehan 1979, 318]. As van Buren points out, "In 1919 Heidegger had called this temporalizing an
‘it worlds’ (es weltet), ‘there is/it gives (es gibt), and Ereignis (event/enownment)” [van Buren 1994, 161].

Heidegger distinguishes his Vollzugssinn from Husserl’s more static and thecally-oriented coincidence of intention and ‘fulfilled intuition’ by emphasizing the “immanent historicity already inherent in life itself”, the “spontaneous experience of experience” [Kisiel 1994, 181]. This is the self-processing recoil upon itself of pre-reflective understanding, the “self-referring familiarity of life with itself” (Lask’s ‘Hingabe”) the repetition which circles back upon itself hermeneutically, i.e., “without reflective distortion and intrusion” but by an “empathetic going-along with” [Kisiel 1994, 181]. The ‘making-present’ of intuition is grounded in the more primordial temporality of the factual historicality upon which intentionality is based.

Factual life-experience means ‘living in’ a meaningful world, living in the three world-modalities of the ‘world around’ (Umwelt), the ‘with-world’ (Mitwelt), and the ‘self-world’ (Selbstwelt) [Sheehan 1979, 316]. ‘World’ is the sphere of meaning (Bedeutsamkeit) about which we concern ourselves (Bekämmerung). In fact, factual life-experience, intentionality, is Bedeutsamkeitsbekämmerung , or ‘concern for meaningfulness’. The world is that part of our existence which we ‘have’, with which we are preoccupied and into which we ‘fall’ in our dynamic, historical, self-referential, interpretive existence. This is not far from saying (as becomes the catch-phrase of Being and Time) that factual existence is being-in-the-world. In fact, Heidegger says (in WS 1921-22) “Rather, factual life lives the world as the in-which, upon which, and for-which of life” [Krell 1994, 377-378; my italics].

Now, “the task of phenomenology is to thematize the very temporal enactment of the event of meaning” [Sheehan 1979, 318]. What does this mean in the context of Christian life-experience in the Christian world?
What gives us access to the phenomenon we are seeking to explicate is, according to Heidegger, the 'pre-grasp' (Vorgriff) or prior understanding of the phenomenon. The phenomenon, here, is 'original Christian lived experience' and the Vorgriff is our factual-historical life-experience. The temporality we are concerned with here is the historicity of lived experience. Referring to the contemporaneously written Jaspers critique, Sheehan writes, paraphrasing Heidegger, that 'the historical' is

...an authentic stretch of existence into its past...which is experienced... in such a way that existence possesses it and itself within the horizon of expectations which it has already projected ahead of itself. 'The historical,' therefore, is the self, that is, the having-of-oneself by the enacting of one's own existence in historical contexts. [Sheehan 1979, 319].

Before continuing with the elucidation of Heidegger's text, I can here preview the theoretical orientation which underlies my overall critique of Heidegger. The notion that the authentic past (or, perhaps better, that the factual past) is experienced within the horizon of an authentic (futural) project is a notion which will end up eclipsing the actual import of the past dimension of our existence and, correspondingly, the import of Befindlichkeit, our mood-al attunement or 'affective dis-position' to ourselves and the world. The "primacy of the future" gives an existential-temporal justification for hermeneutical 'understanding.' But the implication that the past dimension as uninterpreted is therefore (if experienceable at all) only the past of inauthentic and hardened 'tradition.' is, I contend, the result of a theoretical bias which obfuscates a real appreciation of the factual disclosure. The uninterpreted past may be an inauthentic one - but whether our past dimension is authentically or inauthentically appropriated is irrelevant to the fact of its
Disclosure. Prior to appropriation is disclosure: prior to the ‘what’ or the ‘how’ is the fact ‘that’. Prior to understanding/interpretation, even if, ultimately, ‘equiprimordial with...’, is the facticity of mood, the ‘givenness’ of the past, i.e., ‘thrownness’ (in the terms of Being and Time). Thrownness is prior to the “horizon of expectations” of the future and (as Heidegger remarks on occasion) provides the initial possibilities which can then be projected as future expectations - or not.

Nevertheless, it may be that ‘thrownness’ is a term used by Heidegger in order to solidify the hegemony of the future over the past and/or understanding over feeling, as if we experienced the past as an ‘already thrown project’, i.e., as a temporally reified set of expectations and interpretations. But, primordially, I would claim, we do not. We experience the past primordially via our moods and affects and the importances (felt meanings) - not possibilities - they attune us to. Prior to the thrownness of facticity is the fact of facticity itself, the ‘givenness’, the ‘already’, the ‘be-ing’ of facticity, not as some reified, inauthentic ‘thing’ of the ousialogical ontology but as a dynamic dimension of given import which has its own mode of access proper to it, i.e., moods and affects.

Hermeneutically speaking, the Vorgriff appropriate to the interpretation of dispositional disclosure is, first of all, a non-grasping attunement to... that lets the facticity of factual life be in the dispositional awareness appropriate to its phenomena. Secondly, the primordial linguistic description of the inherent, felt features of the dispositional awareness is an articulation which attempts to evoke the affective disclosure itself. Thirdly, there is a conceptual appropriation of ‘what’ had been disclosed, an ‘analysis’ primarily based on the pointers given in the primary linguistic articulation. For further ramifications of this, though, we shall have to wait until later analysis. However, in any case, in this 1920-21 lecture Heidegger...
himself appears to have more of a balance between the 'equiprimordial' dimensions or even favours a primacy of 'having been', as we shall see.

Let us return to Heidegger's analysis of the temporality of original Christianity. The explication of the 'how' of the enactment of the factual-historical self is concretized here by an explication of the 'how' of the enactment of Christian life-experience, the "vollzugsgeschichtliche Situation" (historically enacted situation).

Working from St. Paul's 'preaching' discourse to the Thessalonians and to the Galatians, Heidegger focuses on certain oft-repeated terms which point to two dimensions of the Christian basic state of Being.

The first term, *genesthai* (to have become), points to the existential moment of 'already having been/become', (*Gewordensein*), i.e., the facticity of *Gewesenheit* ('having-been') of *Being and Time*. This past dimension, 'alreadiness,' is not that of a bygone event but, rather, it "structures the current 'is'", is "the whole of what is already operative and determinative of the Thessalonians' present 'now'" [Sheehan 1979, 320]. In other words, they have already become followers of Christ and this alreadiness is 'a going concern' for them. 'Alreadiness' also *co-structures the future* "insofar as it 'does not follow behind existence, but rather always goes before it'" [Sheehan 1979, 320]. The 'alreadiness' dimension is also seen in terms of 'affective disposition' (*Befindlichkeit*), of 'tribulation' and 'joy', 'love' and 'hope'.

The second 'oft-repeated term' is *eidenai*, a kind of practical or pre-theoretical or "experiential knowledge" [Sheehan 1979, 320] or *emperieia*, a 'situational understanding' had by the projection of possibilities (i.e., *Verstehen*, 'understanding' in *Being and Time*). This is elsewhere in the New Testament referred to as *phronesis*, 'practical wisdom' [van Buren 1994, 162]. Here, it is frequently used in the phrase, "for you already know..." and signifies the understanding that is rooted in 'alreadiness,' in having-become. "All knowing one's way around is rooted in the
affective disposition in which one already finds oneself” [Sheehan 1979, 321] - which would, then, also mean a certain priority of the affective disclosure over ‘the understanding’. In a sense, this understanding, via an interpretive projection, draws out the implications of the dispositionally disclosed ‘already’ into the future, into a ‘becoming’. This knowing-becoming is a “reception of the Word accepted in great tribulation and appropriated as our condition” [Kisiel 1994: 183].

As Sheehan remarks: “This reversal of the place of the so-called ‘past’ in Heidegger’s work is one of its most significant - but least marked - achievements” [Sheehan 1979, 321] - meaning (so I take it) that there is here, in his early work, a certain existential and interpretive priority given to the past dimension rather than to the future (as Being and Time is renowned for and, as we have just seen, is a tendency already present in Heidegger).25 If this is the case, then what is known as Heidegger’s later ‘reversal’ (in the 1930’s) can be seen as the reversal of a reversal, a return to origins, origins in the factical, existential priority of the past dimension.

Heidegger then shows that the ultimate factor which ‘makes possible’ common religious experience, which makes God ‘present’ in the factical life-experience of Christians (of those who have ‘already become’ Christians and who have a certain concrete ‘understanding’ of their Situation as Christians) – that is, the ultimate modality in which God is given is temporality [Sheehan 1979, 321]. Christians have “turned to God and away from idols in order to serve a living and true God and to wait for his Son from Heaven” [I Thessalonians 1:10]. The Thessalonians have turned to God ['past’ dimension] and thus “changed before and for God” in order to become Christians “through serving God in authentic everydayness (through works of faith and labours of love) [present dimension], and through awaiting Him [future dimension] in the anticipation of hope” [Kisiel 1994, 183].
The primary purpose of this document is to present a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of various government policies in managing economic instability. The study highlights the importance of fiscal and monetary policies in stabilizing the economy during periods of economic downturn.

The research findings suggest that a combination of fiscal and monetary measures is more effective in stabilizing the economy than relying on either policy alone. The analysis also reveals that the timing and implementation of these policies play a crucial role in determining their success.

In conclusion, the report recommends a coordinated approach to economic management, emphasizing the importance of proactive and timely policy responses to economic shocks. The findings underscore the need for continued monitoring and adaptation of policy strategies to address emerging economic challenges.
Waiting for the Zu-kunft or the coming-towards of the future is, for the Christian, a waiting upon the eschatological Parousia, i.e., the Second Coming. This is, in Heidegger’s eyes, what becomes decisive. It is, of course, not a waiting for an event - it is not within ‘objective time’ - but a waiting “which is bent back and referred to factical life-experience” [Sheehan 1979, 322], a waiting for a Moment (kairos - Augenblick) which “you already know (eidenai) well” [Thessalonians 5:1]. This waiting refers back not to a ‘when’ but to a ‘how’, the ‘how’ of the enactment of factical-historical life which, as a presence before God enacted out of the Moment, is characterized as a ‘staying awake’, a being-vigilant in the “constant, essential, and necessary uncertainty” of hope [Sheehan 1979, 322].

To summarize the Christian enactment of factical-historical temporality: it appears that Christian existence temporalizes as a whole from out of the moment-of-vision (Augen-blick) which ‘is’ in its having been and which maintains itself in the vigilance of its future coming.

Thus one can say that “one is becoming, in the uncertainty of the ‘future’, what one has already become” [Sheehan 1979, 322]; or ‘becoming what one already is’, a phrase also echoed in the ‘secular’ or rather God-forsaken context of Being and Time. The fundamentals of Heidegger’s temporal analysis are already present in these 1920-21 lectures, at least in an existentiell way and with a developing existential-ontological sense. Though the sense of ecstatic-horizontal time has not yet germinated, this is before Heidegger’s Kantian period and the transcendental framework he imports from Kant in order to articulate the nuances of temporal ontology.

Furthermore, we see the metaphysically concrete and experiential aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, its concern with the lived reality of metaphysical-religious experience in a rich, descriptive interpretation of texts, i.e., biblical hermeneutics from an existentially hermeneutical standpoint.
IV. The Temporality of the Uncanny: Running up Against Death in Factical Life-Experience As Such

In July of 1924, Heidegger spoke to the Marburg Theological Society on The Concept of Time. This lecture foreshadows many of the themes in Being and Time and articulates the temporality of human existence in a provocative and concise manner. Though there are interesting theological remarks and ramifications, interpretations of contemporary (Einsteinian) physical time (the time of nature) with its Aristotelian echoes, and much material on the origin of the ‘They’ (das Man) in the time of everydayness. I will, once again, concentrate on the theme of existential temporality.

The lecture begins by asking “What is time?” and ends with:

Time is the ‘how’ [i.e., not a ‘what’]...What happened to the question? It has transformed itself. What is time? became the question: Who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? Or closer still: am I my time?...Then Dasein would be: being questionable. [CT, 22E]

The question is transformed from an apparently conceptual-theoretical enterprise of philosophy into an existential appeal to self-questioning. Heidegger distinguishes his thinking both from theology (the concern of temporal Being before God-eternity via faith) and philosophy (the universal-conceptual understanding of time and eternity) by characterizing his thinking as a “prescience” (Vorwissenschaft) which is “an inquiry about... what interpretive discourse of existence says about existence and the world” [CT, 2E]. In 1919, he had portrayed philosophy as “primordial science” (Urwissenschaft). This meant a phenomenology which would undercut the insinuation of the reflective attitude into experience as such (as in Husserl) or
phenomenology as a pre-theoretical, pre-objective, way of disclosing living experience in "hermeneutic intuition" [GA 56/57, 117; my italics], i.e., the 'hermeneutics of facticity' we have already to some degree elucidated.\(^{28}\)

Through considering the measurable now-point of clock-time of the physicist, Heidegger devolves the analysis back to 'Dasein', 'being-there', via "the natural clock of the alternation of night and day" and "the fact that human existence has already procured a clock prior to all pocket-watches and sundials" [CT, 5E]. Dasein is alternately called "human life", that being which (authentically, at least) 'I am', which, in any case, is 'mine'. If, for the physicist, time is that 'within which' events take place, being-there is 'in time' in a distinctive way, such that "we can read off from it what time is" [CT, 7E]; such that "being temporal...is the fundamental assertion of being-there with respect to its Being" [CT, 7E].

Heidegger then puts forward eight "fundamental structures" or "ontological characteristics" of being-there:

1) Being-there is being-in-the-world, i.e., concernedful dealing with the world.

2) As being-in-the-world, being-there is being-with-and-for-one-another, "having the same world there with Others" [CT, 7E].

3) "The fundamental way of being-in-the-world-with-others is speaking, which is the "self-interpretation of being-there" [CT, 8E].

4) The 'specificity' of the 'I am' means that being-there is my own, is 'mine'.

5) For the most part, though, I am not myself but the Others, i.e., nobody - "No one is himself in everydayness" [CT, 8E]. This Nobody of everydayness is the leveled down by "tradition" [CT, 9E] 'They-self', (inauthentic appropriation of the past).
6) Being-there’s Being matters to it: speaking is speaking about itself, concernful dealing in the world is concern for the Being of being-there; “care for being-there has in each specific case placed Being in care” [CT, 9E].

7) In everydayness, being-there ‘has’ itself, non-reflectively; it “finds itself disposed alongside itself”. (This is, it would appear, a veiled reference to the ‘self-findedness’ of mood and a contexting of mood within the confines of everydayness).

8) “The primary relation to being-there is not one of contemplation, but ‘being it’” (es sein) [CT, 9E].

Almost every point is either about, or modified by, the fall away from being one’s self into the average everyday no-one, which is the result (though it is not stated this way here) of the ‘inauthentic’ appropriation of the past by an unquestioning and anonymous acceptance of tradition.29

At this point, Heidegger turns the analysis toward its essential goal: “the possibility of seizing being-there in the authenticity of its Being” [CT, 10E]. This possibility is “its most extreme possibility of Being” [CT, 10E], and grounds the aforementioned ‘ontological characteristics’ of being-there. But the problem is, how can we get this being into our grasp? How is being-there, which is its own possibility and still ‘underway’ in its possibilities (which “in so far as it is what it can be, is in each case mine” [CT, 10E]) “accessible in itself for an inquiry that is to interpret it with respect to its Being”? [ibid]. How can we claim any definitive analysis of human existence “before it has reached its end?” [ibid] (i.e., if a part of being-there is still ‘outstanding’, as Being and Time will put it).

The ‘end’ of my ‘being-there’ (I speak in the first person, as, for Heidegger, the existence of others, though in the identical existential situation, cannot authentically substitute for mine) is my death. My death is what gives my life its totality and authenticity, i.e., its Being.
The self-interpenetration of being-there which towers over every other statement of certainty and authenticity is its interpretation with respect to its death. [CT, 11E]

Heidegger now proceeds with the temporal analysis of being-there's Being according to its being-toward-death (as Being and Time terms it). Keeping in mind the temporal analysis of the 'how' of the Christian enactment of factual-historical life, we can proceed here with a non-theological temporal analysis of the 'how' of factual life or existence as such. With this analysis, Heidegger's existential analysis is reaching maturity and, in a sense, becoming properly ontological, undercutting any particular world-view (such as the Christian).

We are, according to Heidegger, always aware of death even if, for the most part, furtively. If “being-there as human life is primarily being-possible” and “the Being of possibility is always the possibility such that the possibility knows of death” [CT, 12], then being-there knows of death.

What is it to always have one's own death? It is being-there's running ahead to its being-past (ein Vorlaufen ...zu seinem Vorbei). [CT, 12; my italics]

I am aware of my death by running ahead to the “certain yet utterly indeterminate” possibility of my being-past, my “suddenly no longer there” [CT, 12E]. "The being-past takes everything with it into the Nothing" [CT, 12]. This is not some occurrence or event or some 'what'. Rather being-past is my being past in that it affects me to my very be-ing.

This being-past is not a 'what', but a 'how', indeed the authentic 'how' of my being-there. ...Insofar as running ahead to this past maintains the being-past in its specific 'how', the 'how' of being-there itself becomes visible. [CT, 12; my italics]
The *Vollzugssinn*, the enactment-sense, ‘how’ being-in-the-world is enacted factically-historically is brought to light in being-towards-death or, as it is here called, ‘running ahead to its being-past’. But ‘what’ exactly is this ‘how’ of being-there’s Being?

The running ahead runs up against death. However, it does not just end there (as in chronological time): the ‘nothing’ throws human life back upon itself, back upon the facticity of still being-there. I will quote Heidegger at length, as this is the crucial formulation of the implicitly temporal movement of the ‘how’ of ‘being-towards-death’, of authentic existence itself:

Running ahead to the being-past is being-there’s running up against its most extreme possibility; and insofar as this ‘running up against’ is in earnest, being-there is thrown back upon itself as still being-there. It is the coming back of being-there upon its everydayness which it still is, such that the being-past as authentic ‘how’ also uncovers everydayness in its ‘how’, takes it in its busyness and bustle back into the ‘how’...This being-past is able to place being-there, amid the glory of its everydayness, into uncanniness. [CT 13, my italics]

In being toward death, my authentic being-past, as authentic ‘how’, also uncovers factically inauthentic everydayness in its ‘how’ and places it into the authentic ‘how’ of uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*), of the ‘not-at-home’. Obviously the ‘uncanny’ is an important term for Heidegger. It is the locus and source of authenticity. However, Heidegger does not expand on it here. We can remark, though, that *the uncanny is the ‘how’ of the enactment of being-there’s authentic, factical-historical existence*. It dislodges everydayness, in its sardonic ‘glory’, into an abyss while yet throwing us back upon our factical being-there (‘being-here’, perhaps, is more appropriate), which appears to mean, for Heidegger, *still* being-there in everydayness, even if an *uncanny* everydayness.
It could also mean, perhaps more profoundly, being thrown back upon our factual being-there simpliciter, upon the fact of be-ing as such, i.e., at all. This interpretation would open up an avenue for the interpretation of Being, not only being-there, and would be an interpretation which would take its starting point from the factual disclosure as such; that is, from affective disposition or 'mood'. In fact, as we shall see, this is, at least to some degree, the path that Heidegger did take but his commitment to existential truth, to the 'tendency' of projective hermeneutics, conflicted this inmost 'motivation' of factual disclosure. I will develop this line of thought in Chapter Two. However, in the lecture we are now considering, the throw back lands us back in the world of everyday being-there, even if with some uncanny detachment, rather than back to the simple and stunning fact of be-ing at all.

The future is accorded priority here as 'the fundamental phenomenon of time' [CT. 14E]. 'Running ahead' is the authentic mode of being-there's temporalization of the future and,

In running ahead, being-there is its future in such a way that in this being-futural it comes back to its past (Vergangenheit)\textsuperscript{33} and present. [CT. 13E]

How are the past and the present described within this temporal dynamic? So far we have seen that being-futural, authentically, runs ahead into being-past (das Vorbei, the certain futural possibility of death; not the temporal dimension), and that it is this futural possibility of being-past that throws me back upon my 'still being-there', i.e., my past dimension (die Vergangenheit). This throw-back is a 'coming back' to everydayness, though not a simple return, as this everydayness is now encompassed within uncanniness. But what exactly is involved in this coming back to the once-removed everydayness of the past dimension?
Heidegger states that being-there, as being-futural, “as the authentic ‘how’ of being temporal” is “time itself” and so “gives itself its time” by wiping out all the idle talk and mundane busyness of “the bad present of the everyday” [CT. 14E]. This ‘giving time’ “cultivates the present and lets the past be repeated [or ‘re-enacted’] in the how of its being-lived” [CT, 14]. That is, my still being-here (despite the devastation of the certainty of death and the apparently concomitant, utter nothingness of my everyday being-in-the-world) yields a here-now Situation, a possibility of re-living in the world within the sway of another way, one defined from out of the uncanny and one that “has all time for itself” and this in a fundamentally qualitative manner.34

‘Qualitative’ refers to what Heidegger puts in a negative way, i.e., that authentic time “originally has no length” [CT, 14E] and is not measurable or quantifiable, not the irreversible and homogenized empty series of nows; not a ‘when’ or a ‘how much’, nor a bored or fashionable ‘now’ or ‘now-not yet’ which is concerned with a ‘what’. It is through this ‘time-reckoning’ that we “lose time and acquire a clock for the purpose” [CT, 15]. Dispensing with such existentially useless measuring (upon realizing that there certainly will come a time when we have no time) frees up time for its qualitative and, in Heidegger’s terms, historical happening, its ‘how’.

The past dimension (die Vergangenheit) of existential time “is anything but what is bygone (Vorbei).” We come back to the past as that which can be ‘repeated’ within the ‘how’ which existential conscience has liberated. Being-there’s historicity is such that

...in being futural, being-there is its past; it comes back to it in the ‘how’. The manner of its coming back is, among other things, conscience. Only the ‘how’ can be
repeated. The past - experienced as authentic historicity - is anything but what is bygone. It is something to which I can return again and again. [CT. 19]

Heidegger then, amidst his concerns for authentic historicality, formulates the “first principle of all hermeneutics”:

The possibility of access to history is grounded in the possibility according to which any specific present understands how to be futural. [CT, 20E]

The present can be historical by opening out into the future as possibility and this possibility, inasmuch as it is authentically futural, ultimately and uncannily bends around to a possible re-enactment of how and who ‘I am’. Being-there, thoroughly unique and individualized by death and yet unexceptional and equal to everyone else, is historical temporality (Zeitlichkeit): “Being-there is time; time is temporal. Being-there is not time but temporality” [CT, 20].

V. Summary and Conclusions of Chapter One

In section I, we underscored something of Heidegger’s initial distinction, as early as 1916, between the objective time-for-measurement of physics and qualitative and contextual lived-time of historical time. We further noticed the early development of a hermeneutical method (from 1919), a method which, in its retroactive recoil, its circular self-processing, expresses the essential historicity of pre-reflective, factual human existence.

In section II, via Heidegger’s early critical review of Jaspers in 1920, we saw Heidegger articulating the ‘how’ of the ‘I am’ of historical existence as a multidimensional temporal (historical) ‘preoccupation’ (or ‘distressed concern’) with self
which, as a self-questioning encounter, is its own self-interpretive/appropriative process. This 'preoccupation' with self tends to fall away from its conscientious state of distress over the 'boundary-situations' (Jaspers) of its existential state and fall into the present, tradition-bound self-interpretation, which covers over life's 'basic motivating experiences'. Thus a destructuring of the tradition is required to get at those experiences afresh in order to unlock an originally future dimension of existence which will allow for a new and, presumably 'authentic' self-appropriation. Thus we see Heidegger developing and sketching out more aspects of the temporality which belongs to factual existential historicity.

In section III, in a gloss on some of Heidegger's revised phenomenological concepts, we focussed on the Vollzugssinn or enactment (actualization)-sense as expressive of the concrete 'how' of the self-world of historical existence. This 'how', however, has a deeper significance, its Zeitigungssinn or temporal-sense. This is the interweaving of past, present and future in the historicity of lived experience: "the temporal enactment of the event of meaning" [Sheehan 1979, 318]. In an exposition of Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion course of 1920-1, as an exemplification of religious factual life-experience or historicity, the 'how' or Vollzugssinn was disclosed as a 'being-vigilant in the constant and essential uncertainty of hope'. The temporal sense (Zeitigungssinn) of Christian 'being-vigilant' was shown to be a kairological temporalizing out of the Moment which 'is' in one's already having become a follower of Christ and in waiting for the coming-towards of the eschatological Parousia.

Also noted in section III was a certain ambiguity as to which temporal dimension has priority, for Heidegger, in the overall historical temporalization. Heidegger's analysis in the Religion course appears to initially give the 'already' dimension of the past, and so (though these connections are not yet made explicit by
Heidegger), the past’s corresponding ‘affective’ modes, a certain priority over the situational and futural understanding’s projection of possibilities.

In response, though, to a contemporaneous characterization of 'the historical' (in Heidegger’s sense of historicity) as an experience of the past within an already projected future, I objected to this obscuring of the sheer facticity of the past and the eclipsing or curbing of the import of Befindlichkeit which is entailed by it.

To anticipate and give context to my criticisms in Chapter Two: a 'primacy of the future' (which will become key in Heidegger’s later temporal analyses), while giving an existential-temporal justification for hermeneutical understanding, implies that the past dimension as uninterpreted by projective understanding is either non-disclosable or disclosed only as an inauthentic appropriation of hardened tradition. I point out that whether the past dimension is authentically or inauthentically appropriated - that is, understood by a being which 'is always its own' - is irrelevant to the fact of its disclosure. Prior to appropriation is disclosure, i.e., prior to projective understanding is the facticity of dispositional disclosure and prior to the future is the 'past' which is not, primordially, 'in the throw' of any project.

This is not to imply that there is no possibility of interpretation of what has been disclosed by the self-finding of mood. As disclosed, a certain understanding is implicit. However, this need not be a projective understanding. If, as I am claiming, the fact of facticity itself is prior to the (projective) thrownness of facticity, then this facticity demands a 'mode of understanding access' which is appropriate to its disclosure.\(^{35}\)

In section IV, we presented the now (1924) well-developed theme of existential temporality in Heidegger’s lecture The Concept of Time, the ‘first draft’ of Being and Time. Here we have a temporal analysis of the 'how' of factual existence as such. In this work, the objective question 'what is time?' is transformed by
Heidegger into the existential appeal to self-questioning: ‘am I my time?’ Factical historical existence is now referred to by Heidegger as ‘being-there’ (*Dasein*) and is considered the being from whom we can ‘read off’ what time is by seizing upon it in the authenticity of its Being.

This authenticity is achieved in the temporal wholeness achieved in self-interpretation *with respect to death*. In ‘running ahead to its being-past’ (or ‘bygone’, i.e., in being-toward-death), being-there runs up *against* the certainty of the ultimate possibility of death. *This being-past is the authentic ‘how’, the self-actualizing enactment of being-there.* More deeply, however, there is a *temporal* dynamic occurring here. In futural running-ahead to being-past, the nothingness of death *throws one back* upon the past and present dimensions of still being-there, which apparently means for Heidegger, *still* being-there in ‘everydayness’. One is thrown back such that, however, the ‘how’ of one’s everyday being-there is ‘conscientiously’ dislodged into the abyss of uncanniness. *The ‘uncanny’ is the authentic ‘how’ of temporal, historical, being-there* and, in breaking the hold of everyday self-interpretation, it “gives itself its time” [CT, 14E] as a possibility which can be “‘repeated’ in the how of its being-lived” [ibid], as a possible re-enactment of how and who ‘I am’. Such being-there is historical temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*).

Thus we have seen in Chapter One, *the development of Heidegger’s notion of the historical temporality of being-there’s factical existence*, the emphasis focussing particularly on the authentic temporality of being-toward-death and the uncanny domain thereby opened up. Let us now, following this concise preview of the existential temporal themes of *Being and Time*, pursue the uncanniness of this temporal situation.
Notes for Chapter One

1. See [Schalow 1992].

2. Cf. [Sheehan 1981b].

3. Of course, this is a theme unto itself for, after all, Heidegger had a Christian burial, at his own request. See [Sheehan 1981, 106-110]. On the other hand, there is no Christian cross on his tombstone.

4. For studies of Heidegger's 1912-1916 articles and the Habilitationsschrift, see [Crowell 1994] and [Fehér 1994]. For the most thoroughgoing exposition and analysis of Heidegger's early period of development, see [Kisiel 1993].

5. Cf. [HCT, section 4d]. Heidegger had already critiqued Rickert in his 1919 lectures.

6. The theme of Nietzsche-Heidegger, despite extremely interesting parallels between Nietzsche's 'eternal recurrence' and Heidegger's factual-historical hermeneutic circularity, is far beyond the scope of this essay.


8. To be distinguished from the 1927 lectures and book of the same title.

9. Though Heidegger may not have reached clarity as to the temporal fundament of the analysis by 1919, he certainly had by the WS 1920-21 lectures, as we shall see in section III of Chapter One.

10. The genealogy of Heidegger's appropriation of Kant's 'transcendental imagination' for his existential-temporal ontology is beyond the scope of this essay. See [Schalow 1992] for a thorough discussion of this and the entire Kant-Heidegger dialogue. For our theme, see, particularly, Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Section Three.

11. See [Gadamer 1994, 21].


14. Heidegger will soon try to graft his existential insights onto a rigorously transcendental framework with dreams of definitive 'scientific' articulation - precisely the ontological project of Being and Time - and, as Krell and Kisiel and Sartre and Heidegger himself all indicate, each in their own way, he will fail. Kisiel thereby recognizes Being and Time as an aberration along Heidegger's philosophical path. See [Kisiel 1993, 458].

15. See [Kisiel 1994, 177]. See also section III of Chapter One for more on 'formal indication', the development of philosophical concepts.

16. Heidegger says, "Life speaks itself, in care, in a worldly way." [GA 63, 102]. In my phrase, the 'self-appropriation (of) world', the genitive is meant to be reciprocal, i.e., both objective and subjective; thus the parentheses around "of."

17. See [Blattner 1994, 157]. Blattner reminds us that as far as the classificatory interest goes, one
should remember that Jaspers was a psychiatrist lately turned philosopher and that Heidegger himself had a classificatory interest of a kind with his notions of authenticity and inauthenticity—see [Blattner 1994, 158].

18. I am here using some of the many attempted translations of this phrase.

19. This translation perhaps leaves a lot to be desired and, in bringing in ‘anxiety’, is quite loaded with retroactive interpretation. Bekümmerung is variously translated as “preoccupation” (Krell), “anxious concern” (McNeill), “the affliction of concern”, “distress”, and “distressed concern” (Kisiel). Perhaps the most straightforward translation of bekümmernschaften Erwartungshorizont would be “distressedly-concerned horizon of expectations.”


21. ‘Pres-ab-sence’ is a construction and interpretation of Sheehan’s, apparently based on Präsenz—however, Präsenz is the Temporale horizon for Being, not for Existenz.

22. This is perhaps not quite true: though at the time Sheehan wrote the above, we did not have Heidegger’s 1922 ‘lost manuscript’ on Aristotle: Phaenomenologische Interpretation zu Aristoteles, [GA 61]. There, also, the ultimate standpoint of the analysis (of the “phenomenon that lies before the truth of logos and the truth of nous”) is time. See [Brogan, 1994, 221].

23. In Chapter Two, I will show how this is so in detail in the analysis of mood in Being and Time. See sections VIII A and IX.

24. See Quentin Smith’s The Felt Meanings of the World [Smith 1986], particularly section 5. ‘The Appreciative Method of Metaphysical Knowing.’ Much of my basic standpoint regarding the primacy of ‘feeling’ derives from this profound and original work of American phenomenology.

25. The primacy of the future ecstatics (or ‘dimension’) is indicated in several works throughout the 1920’s. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes “…the future has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality. This is so, even though temporality does not first arise through a cumulative sequence of the ecstatics, but in each case temporalizes itself in their equiprimordiality. But within this equiprimordiality, the modes of temporalizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of temporalizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different ecstatics…The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future.” In The Concept of Time, Heidegger writes that the future is “the fundamental phenomenon of time” [p.14]. In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, he writes “Temporality temporalizes itself primarily out of the future. This means that the ecstatic whole of temporality, and hence the unity of horizon, is determined primarily out of the future.” [p.211]. This primacy of the future is a core part of Heidegger’s philosophical enterprise. As Krell (Intimations of Mortality) has shown, this priority already becomes problematic in Heidegger’s own eyes by around 1927-8, when the move toward the temporality of Being was being made. Temporality temporalizes out of all three ecstatics together and as a whole but, in each case, primarily out of one or the other ecstatics, such that, for example, authentic temporality temporalizes from out of the future and inauthentic temporality temporalizes primarily out of the present (though as a flight from, and, therefore, nonetheless as a temporalization from out of the authentic future). Apparently, the equiprimordiality of the ecstatics is of a different order from the primordiality or priority given to particular ecstatics in particular temporalizations. This is a topic I wish to develop a great deal more, in conjunction with the reinterpretation of the disclosure of disposition—but this, as with most of the riddles of Heidegger’s temporal analysis, has to be left until later.

26. In what follows, I shall use McNeill’s translation of Heidegger’s The Concept of Time for the
most part but alter it sometimes and in that case, I will refer to the German pagination. So [CT, 12E] refers to p. 12 of the English translation, while [CT 12] refers to the German text in this edition. The exception to this will be when the only change is my translation of Dasein as 'being-there'. See note 35, below.

27. While I could see a Christian insisting that Heidegger is some type of Christian (as one could also say of Nietzsche or anyone for that matter...if one is a Christian), I believe that this is not in accord with Heidegger's own expressed intentions nor his own personal biography. While it is clear Heidegger developed Christian terminology ('fallenness' for example) for his own existential analysis, it is also clear he is doing it with existential and ontological intent, not Christian intent. He expressly states in, for example, The Concept of Time (an address to the Theological Faculty at Marburg), that he is not doing theology [CT, 2E]. As we shall see, Heidegger's interpretation of death bears no resemblance whatsoever to any Christian notion of death.

28. See [Kovacs 1994].

29. Though Heidegger uses the term 'authentic', he does not use 'inauthentic' - i.e., 'unowned' - though his use of 'everydayness', here, is synonymous with what is later called 'inauthenticity'. By the time Heidegger is using the term 'inauthentic', though, i.e., in Being and Time, 'everydayness' is not necessarily inauthentic. As we shall see, here also, everydayness is dissolved within authentic uncanniness.

30. Heidegger does not use the term 'existence' in this lecture, apparently because he did not want to be part of the (what he probably considered) 'idle talk' of contemporary Marburg theologians who were, perhaps, becoming glib with Kierkegaardian terms. See [Kisiel 1993, 316].

31. This notion of death-awareness is 'verified empirically' by studies conducted by the existential psychotherapist, Irvin Yalom. See his Existential Psychotherapy [Yalom, 1980].

32. "Es ist ein Vorlaufen des Daseins zu seinem Vorbei" - I translate 'Vorbei' with 'being-past' or 'bygone' rather than with 'past' as does McNeill. For one, it transmits Heidegger's sense better; for another, it avoids conflict, later, with die Vergangenheit which is also rendered 'the past'. Kisiel translates Vorbei with 'being gone' [Kisiel; 316]. Vorlaufen was translated in Being and Time as 'anticipation' but I retain the more literal 'running ahead' which seems to have become the favoured translation.

33. "Die Vergangenheit" - Heidegger had not yet developed the ecstatic-horizontal character of temporality nor the specific terminology for each ecstatic; in particular, 'Gewesenheit' for the 'past dimension'.

34. 'Qualitative' is my term, not Heidegger's - it sounds too much like Bergson's distinction between 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' which, for Heidegger, is a terminological set of distinctions which reflect a present-at-hand ontology and is, therefore, not to be maintained. However, it can be used, if not conceptually 'rigourously', as illustrative of the intent of Heidegger's own distinction between time-senses here.

35. Though it is not my intention to thoroughly develop, in this essay, the basis of my critical orientation, I, earlier, briefly indicated the value of the 'method of appreciative knowing' as developed by Quentin Smith in his phenomenology of feeling (cf. [Smith, 1986]) and can somewhat expand it here. Put somewhat into a Heideggerian context: one appreciates the 'importances' of the world as disclosed immediately and intuitively via the affects and moods of factual disclosure, precedent to any projective understanding; one can then reappreciate such
importances in the 'afterglow' of the feeling through a descriptive articulation of the internal characteristics of these felt-disclosures – such as in the primordial articulation of poetry; one can then reappreciate these evocative but conceptually vague articulations by making conceptually explicit the fascinating implicit structural content. In this way, non-intrusively building upon and preserving previous levels of appreciation, an organic understanding and interpretation of the factical disclosure itself can be achieved. It can be seen that there are possible parallels between, on the one hand, what appears to be an early even if anomalous priority of the factical past and affective disposition (Befindlichkeit) in Heidegger's Religion course and, on the other hand, the fundamental priority of affective disclosure in the new phenomenology of feeling.
Chapter Two

The Abysmal Grounding of Being-there

VI. *The Uncanny Turn in Everyday Being-there*

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger works toward the question of the meaning of Being through an analysis of human existence or being-there (*Dasein*) which is depicted as 'being-in-the-world'. Division One of *Being and Time* is a preparatory fundamental analytic of being-in-the-world which shows being-there in its everydayness and portrays this everydayness in the inauthentic and average mode of existing which being-there 'proximally and for the most part' assumes. This is the *inauthentic, quite canny, everyday 'how' of being-there*. The self (Being-in) of being-there is interpreted in its public, 'they-self' mode. This means, it is interpreted in its fallenness into the quite contented, tranquilized, self-assured 'being-at-home' of the 'with-world' of everyday concerned solicitude.

Existentially speaking, however, this self is a positive 'nobody' who exists for the sake of anonymity. 'It' is a fallen lostness in the world, a "never dwelling anywhere" [217; H173]. Underneath the cheery facade lies a disturbing and turbulent ambiguity, a groundless nullity and alienation, a compulsive need for distraction which leads to entanglements and aborted projects, a progressive uprootedness and alienation which is noiselessly suppressed by the 'they-self' yet further aggravated by this tranquilizing suppression [sections 35-38].

Accordingly, at the end of Division One, the analysis shows that anxiety discloses a fundamental *uncanniness* in being-there's Being. 'Uncanny' in German is
'unheimlich', literally 'un-home-ly' or 'not-at-home'. This uncanniness cuts through inauthentic they-self interpretations and individualizes Being-in into the more primordial existential mode or 'how' of being 'not-at-home' [234; H189]. Being-in-the-world's everyday fallen being-at-home is seen to be a fleeing from the uncanniness, from the uncanniness of being-there's ownmost possibility as a self. The 'home' of inauthenticity is built as a shunning of the uncanny self and a closing off of authenticity. The worldly dispersion and fragmentation of the inauthentic self shows itself in the initial unwieldy attempt to gather being-there together into a whole, viz., the articulation of 'Care'. Care has the complex structure of Being "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-alongside (beings encountered within-the-world)" [237; H192]. This articulates being-there's triadic structure of existentiality/facticity/fallenness which, in turn, correspond to the constitutive ways of being-there's Being the 'there' (i.e., the modes of disclosure) of understanding/disposition/discourse).3

This leads, in Division Two of Being and Time (as in the analysis in The Concept of Time), to the posing of the question of being-there's authenticity and an existential interpretation of the structural whole of being-in-the-world or 'care'. Heidegger's interpretation begins with the existentiell themes of 'being-uncanny' (the Vollzugssinn), i.e., the themes of 'factically lived historical experience' such as the 'anticipation' of death and the resolute response to being-guilty. The interpretation then moves to the primordial 'whole' of 'anticipatory resoluteness' which is seen as a "distinctive mode of temporality" [351; H304]. This brings the interpretation to the fundamental existential-temporal standpoint (the Zeitigungssinn. Heidegger, though, no longer uses this schema of interpretation).
It should be borne in mind that the underlying question in *Being and Time* is not just that about the 'how' of being-there; nor even, as in *The Concept of Time*, the time-sense of that 'how'. Though the latter is still the transformative cornerstone of the entire ontology, the question of the meaning of *Being itself*, a question which is ontologically definitive of being-there itself, is now the ultimate horizon of the investigation. I would like to show that the notion of authenticity can be understood, as it initially is (and as we have just seen in *The Concept of Time*), as *authentic everydayness* - or it can be understood from out of the resolved openness to the question of Being, from out of a deeper and more sustained dwelling in the uncanny abyss, as one of *authentic uncanniness*.

Once again, the interpretation will move forward by stepping back. Openness to the question of Being refers to the disclosedness of being-there, of what constitutes the 'there' as such. With a clearer notion of being-there's authentic 'how', i.e., being-uncanny (section VII), we can proceed with the analysis of the two primary modalities of the 'there', viz., dis-position and understanding (section VIII) and then to a criticism of the 'projective prejudice' at work in Heidegger's articulation of these modes of disclosure (section IX). The analysis would then proceed to Heidegger's temporal analysis in *Being and Time* and to a possible reinterpretation of factual existential temporality in light of the interpretation which is opened up from a new basis of dis-positional disclosure.

**VII. Authentic Everydayness and Authentic Uncanniness**

As we have already seen, the uncanniness of being-there's existence is made more apparent in the temporal finitude of its Being: i.e., in its being-toward-death.
Falling, as a fleeing from uncanniness, is a fleeing in the face of death [296; H252], which is being-there’s ‘ownmost possibility’, the “possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence” [307; H262]. Furthermore, the call of conscience is the “call of care” [322; H277] which calls from the uncanny Self to the inauthentic worldly ‘they-self’. The call summons from

...primordial thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’ - the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world. [321; H276-7]

That is, the call summons thrown being-there from the uncanny. Though Heidegger does not explicitly link the concepts of uncanniness and ‘thrownness’, it would be fruitful to do so. According to Heidegger, moods (one of the constitutive structures of the ‘there’ of ‘being-there’) essentially disclose our thrownness and the ‘key-mood’ of anxiety, which discloses uncanniness, discloses this thrownness without illusion. In thrownness, one is brought before the "naked 'that it is and has to be'" of existing [173; H134], a factical existing which is “veiled in its whence and whither” [174; H135]. The ‘homeyness’ of they-self interpretations, which ‘know it all’ and always have a ready answer for everything, disappears before the cold and uncanny nightsky of our unknown, enigmatic, factical existing. We find ourselves ‘thrown’ into existence and do not know why we are here...and this existential situation must be resolved:

The self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. [330; H284; second italics mine]

As we have seen, authentic being-towards-death runs ahead to or ‘anticipates’ the certainty of death, awakens (possibilizes) that certainty, brings being-there face to
face with its own finite and uncanny existence. In so doing, being-there releases itself for an "impassioned freedom towards death" [311; H266]. Authentic hearing the appeal of conscience, the call "from the soundlessness of uncanniness" [343; H296], is the taking over of the fact of one's Being-guilty - being the "null basis for its null projection" [333; H287]. This yielding to the verdict of conscience is the choice of "wanting to have a conscience" and this "is a way of letting one's ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord" [342; H295]. In this reticent, anxious self-projection upon one's own existential guilt, being-there is resolute and this resoluteness is the enactment of the primordial and authentic truth of being-there [343; H297].

The uncanny has been shown to be the source of the Self's (being-in's) authenticity (cf. Section IV). However, inasmuch as being-there is being-in-the-world, resoluteness implies a disclosure not only of being-in but equiprimordially of 'the world'. In the uncanniness of anxiety, the world is rendered Nothing, but a Nothing which crowds around in an oppressive, repelling, and 'nihilating' manner.' And in resolute Being-guilty, the uncanny Self, the anxious Self exposed 'outside the home', not only resolves upon its Being-guilty but "brings the Self right into its current [world]"", discloses the Situation, the "current factual involvement-character of the circumstances" [346; H300] and resolutely "seizes upon it [the factically possible] in whatever way is possible for it as its [being-there's] ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the 'they'"! [346; H299]. The enveloping world which had been uncannily 'suspended' in the abyss returns with its factual, situational possibilities and it is precisely here, back 'at home', where resolute being-there "frees itself for its world." In this resoluteness toward oneself, individual being-there can also become the "conscience of Others", "liberating" the Others who are with 'it' by the authentic solicitude of 'letting' them 'be' [344; H298].
Chapter Two

It is remarkable that, suspended in the abyss of the nothing of the world, no ‘transcendental’ or ‘transworldly’ possibilities have been granted the uncanny Self. The self is abandoned to the world and to the factual mundane (in fact, the they-self) situational possibilities: resoluteness realizes its ownmost possibility for Being in the they and in ‘taking over’ being the “null basis of a null projection”. However, despite this ‘abandonment’, there is nonetheless a liberating quality in becoming free of illusions. A profound equanimity and a certain ‘clairvoyance’ (Hellsichtigkeit) for the accidents of the Situation” [H384] now prevail. Furthermore,

...along with the sober anxiety, which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakeable joy in this possibility. [358; H310]

It appears that the uncanny Self comes back home with an enlightened, albeit ‘disillusioned’ vision, which changes nothing in the world but rather modifies the ‘how’ of one’s being-in (-the-world) from inauthentic everydayness, not to an ‘authentic uncanniness’ but to an authentic everydayness (resoluteness), i.e., to a full and self-transparent being ‘there’ in the world. There appears to be something of a resolved balance which allows for an authentic, whole, and sustained happening of being-in-the-world.

Nevertheless, the joy and equanimity speak more of a response to being cleared of illusions, being released from the burdensome half-truths of the they-self, rather than as responses to the fact and content of one’s actual existential situation. The uncanny Self, in Being and Time, is rather mercilessly thrown back upon its own nullity and abandoned to ‘the world’ and its factual possibilities.

However, in between inauthentic everydayness and authentic everydayness, there is the realm of the uncanny abyss, the twilit realm of sheer possibility, which I
The phrase "at the time of the monitoring, the site was also an important market for local producers. The fish market was located near the river, which was the main source of fresh fish. The river was also an important source of water for the local population."

In addition to the fish market, there was a small vegetable market located near the river. The market was open every morning and sold a variety of fresh vegetables. The vegetables were grown locally and were of high quality. The market was popular with both locals and tourists.

Despite the economic importance of the market, there were some concerns about the environmental impact of the activities. The market was located near a sensitive ecosystem, and there were concerns about the potential for pollution from fish processing and market activities.

The local government was working to address these concerns, and they had recently implemented stricter regulations for the market. These regulations aimed to reduce the environmental impact of the market and protect the local ecosystem.

Overall, the fish market and the vegetable market were important economic activities in the area. They provided a source of income for local producers and were popular with both locals and tourists. However, there were ongoing efforts to ensure that these activities were conducted in an environmentally responsible manner.
just referred to, above, as a potentially authentic uncanniness. If there are no transcendental possibilities (as in ‘transcendental illusion’) for being-there, are there not nonetheless ‘transcendent’ or ‘trans-worldly’ possibilities, even if ‘only’ in the sense of ‘pre-worldly,’ possibilities which emerge from the uncanny abyss itself? Might not these possibilities retroactively entail more than just the worldly factual possibilities to which I have been abandoned? Are there no other possibilities than resolute-being-in-the-they possibilities upon which being-there can resolve? Is authenticity ‘just’ a shift in mundane attitude or does authenticity engender its own possibilities?

It would appear that beyond the stark, forlorn, and abandoned emptiness of Being and Time’s analysis of resoluteness, Heidegger would assert that there are ‘positive’ possibilities engendered by authenticity, possibilities which arise by virtue of the constancy of authenticity, through enduring the anxious abyss, being able to stand being out-standing-in the uncanny Open of the truth, the ‘there’ of Being. Revealed in the uncanny may even be, beyond any authentic, existential response to the uncanny, an abandonment of the self to a self-transcendent appreciation of Being itself. Kisiel says (in a slightly different context),

The quiet abandonment of the “self-world” is ... at the core of the transcendence of the world to original temporality, and at the threshold of the turn from Dasein to Being itself...[Kisiel 1993, 388].

We are, at the moment, though, concerned with authenticity.

The uncanny realm of the Nothing, the finitude of being-there, is not only a limit which ‘modifies’ being-in-the-world’s everydayness but, reminiscent of Jaspers, a ‘boundary situation’ which, in Heidegger, can transform being-in-the-world as a whole. The resolute transparency of authentic self-Being sets existence free to be its
there", free of the illusions of the they-self. But, more importantly, resoluteness frees us for the Self’s 'primordial action', viz., "letting one’s ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord" [342; H295]. A spiritual-creative ethic emerges in Heidegger’s work. The creative ‘building’ of the poet-artist, statesman, philosopher, and the nurturing-cultivating dwelling of the peasant - people whose work is 'at home' out 'in the Open' - are shown and commemorated in various works after Being and Time. 

Though this theme ripens as a part of Heidegger’s 'Turn', the seeds of it are in Being and Time and are laid out in chapter II.5 on being-there’s historicality. This chapter begins by remarking that

...death is only...just one of the ends by which being-there’s totality is closed round. The other 'end', however, is the 'beginning', the 'birth'...not only has Being-towards-the-beginning remained unnoticed; but so too, and above all, has the way in which being-there stretches along between birth and death. [425; H373]

This ‘stretching along’, the 'temporal sojourn' between two nothingnesses, is being-there’s 'historizing' or 'happening' (Geschehen). The basic constitution of this historizing is an interplay of the three temporal dimensions which equiprimordially happen as being-there’s Being.

In resolute being-toward-death (futural), "every accidental and 'provisional' possibility [is] driven out" and human existence "gives [itself] its goal outright", is brought “into the simplicity of its fate" [435; H384] by

...handing down to oneself...the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as thus come down [435, H383; my emphasis].
That is to say, the explicit ‘handing down’ (repetition) of one’s heritage (past or ‘having been’), of the factual possibilities of the Situation, is also an active “taking over” of one’s thrownness which, with the essential lucidity granted by transparent mortality, is simplified into a unique and fateful *moment* (present, or ‘moment of vision’), the *happening* of one’s ‘time’, i.e., of one’s historical epoch.

Only a being which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual ‘there’ [having been] by shattering itself against death...can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its thrownness and be in the *moment of vision* for ‘its time’ [437; H385].

This is primordial historizing. In an impassioned freedom for death, being-there hands down to itself “a possibility which it has inherited and yet chosen” [435; H384], i.e., ‘taken over’. The choice, made unique and clear by the simplifying vision of finitude is, and is of, one’s own existence. It is a ‘repetition’ (as in Kierkegaard), a “*reciprocative rejoinder* to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there” [438; H386]. As Heidegger says in another work,

For even if an epoch still strives to maintain the inherited level and dignity of its being-there, the level falls. It can be maintained only if it is at all times *creatively transcended*. [IM. p. 63; my emphasis]

In other words, ‘transcendence’ is a creative transformation of one’s being-there. This ‘creative transformation’ has the internal necessity, in the freedom of choosing, of ‘fate’ and, in community with others, it works out the original ‘destiny’ of its ‘generation’ [436, H385]. Here we see the initial *existential* formulation of what later becomes the fateful epochs of Being, the *Ereignis*. 
Thus we see that the uncanny can lead, not only to an authentic everydayness, but to an authentic uncanniness which develops \textit{creative} possibilities or, perhaps better, ‘creates possibilities’ from out of the uncanniness of Being itself. The ‘moment of vision’ embraces being-there as a \textit{whole} and \textit{thus} partakes of the Being of being-there, \textit{thus} of Being itself. Though this ‘moment’ is claimed by existential truth, it includes a disclosure of trans-existential Being itself, even if only through the horrors of the Nothing. Something of a \textit{spiritual uncanniness} emerges as a possibility within authentic uncanniness. It is via this path, the one that detours into the abyss, that we may emerge into the azure skies beyond the horizon which encircles the clearing of being ‘there’. But what extemporizing temporalization would this be?

In order to understand the temporality of existence and, ultimately, the time of Being in Heidegger, we need to look more closely at the existential constitution of being-there, the ‘clearing’ for Being. By getting a clearer view of being-there’s disclosedness or openness, we will be in a better position, both thematically and structurally, to understand the underlying temporal interpretation and its different possibilities.

\textbf{VIII. Disclosedness as Such}

We have seen that the uncanny turn leads from everyday being-in-the-world to an uncanny being-in-the-world or from inauthentic everydayness to an ‘authentic everydayness’. There also appears to be, beyond authentic everydayness, the possibility of the ‘primordial action’ of creative, self-transforming being-there or what I called ‘authentic uncanniness’. However, I have also indicated that there is a further possibility inherent in the ‘moment-of-vision’, one that opens out beyond the
authenticity of being-there, out onto the phenomenon of Being itself: spiritual uncanniness. With the taking over of my thrown existence, I step into the 'moment of vision' for my historical time; but this Moment is not only the possibility of the 'reciprocative rejoinder' of repetition but also a glimpse into and disclosure of (i.e., openness to) Being itself. Whether this disclosure need be taken as an 'understanding' of Being or whether the more neutral term of 'awareness' of Being is more fitting is something we shall be able to decide in what follows. It would appear that 'awareness' of Being is, at least, a less prejudicial term."

Heidegger calls the general ontological structure of being-there's Being 'being-in-the-world'. Division One of Being and Time, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analytic", is divided according to the different constitutive items of this unitary structure, i.e., according to 'being-in', 'the world' and its 'worldhood', and the 'who' of the 'being-with' which is co-constitutive of being-in-the-world. The orientation is towards being-in as such [BT, section 12], which foreshadows the overall interpretive orientation towards authentic being-there, even though Heidegger throughout attempts to keep the unitary structure of being-in-the-world as a whole held together.

To be 'in' the world is to be the 'there' for Being: Da-Sein, 'there-Being'. To be the 'there' is 'the issue' of Being for being-there [171, H133], i.e., what being-there 'goes about' (geht um...translated as 'is an issue for') doing by nature of its Being.

But of what does the 'there' of being-there consist? The 'there' is being-there's 'disclosedness' (Erschlossenheit): dis-closed-ness: our being 'open', being a 'clearing' (Lichtung) illuminated by 'light'. This is material whose evocative meanings are brought out more fully in later writings. Our disclosive structures are the happening of truth; we stand, endure, the 'there' in the Clearing, open for the
Lighting, the lightning of Being's presence-ing, much as it 'behooves' Hölderlin, as a poet, to

...stand

Bare-headed beneath God's thunderstorms.
To grasp the Father's ray itself, with [my] own hand. 10

Here, however, at this point in Being and Time, Heidegger only states that "being-there is its disclosedness" [171, H132-3]. Our being-there is 'cleared', it "is itself the clearing" and is 'illuminated'[171, H132-3]. But in what does this luminescent disclosedness consist? And for what is the Clearing open?

Chapter 1.5 gives us the first basic analysis of the existential constitution of the 'there' of being-in as such, and it is done in terms of disposition (or 'findedness', Befindlichkeit), understanding (projection) and discourse. The second part of the chapter shows how we are our 'there' in the inauthentic everydayness of they-self being, which is, essentially, a way of Being best characterized as falling. In everydayness, to be in the world is to 'dwell' alongside the world that is familiar to me as the everyday scene of my concerns. Being-there tends to fall away from itself into the world, into the public world, so that it interprets itself from the standpoint of the beings which it encounters in the world. This is inauthentic self-interpretation, a flight away from the self-understanding which is indicated in the uncanny disclosure of anxiety. We have seen, however, that being-in can be modified by an authentic dwelling in the world, authentic everydayness, and we have already somewhat described its 'how'.

In Division Two of Being and Time, after temporality has been shown to be the meaning of Care, the disclosive structures of the 'there' are reinterpreted in light of temporality and particularly in light of authentic temporality. I will now focus,
however, on the fundamental existential structures of being-there’s factual existence, namely, disposition and understanding, as presented in chapter 1.5 of *Being and Time*.

**VIII A. Being-there as Disposition**

‘Disposition’ (*Befindlichkeit*) is Heidegger’s ontological term for what we experience ‘ontically’ or, rather, existentially as the attunement which *moods* possess. Moods disclose *how we find ourselves to be*. We are, according to Heidegger, always in some mood or other, even if normally just the “pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood” which manifests our Being as a *burden*. In fact, in Heidegger’s 1929-30 lecture course, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (*FCM*) ‘profound boredom’ is seen to be the fundamental attunement of our time and is linguistically linked (*auf Deutsch*) to ‘homesickness’ (*FCM*, 80). The ‘not-at-home’ of uncanniness, from which we normally flee and which “pursues being-there constantly” (234, H189), can, apparently, be manifested by boredom (and, I would suggest, other moods) as well as by anxiety. In the same work, Heidegger says that

...moods are the ‘presupposition’ for and the ‘medium’ of thinking and acting. That means as much as to say that *they reach more primordially back into our essence*, that in them we first meet ourselves - as being-there. ...[Moods are] this peculiar being attuned, the primordial, pervasive attunement of our whole Dasein as such. (*FCM*, 68; my emphasis).

What is crucial about moods is that, in them, we are brought before our Being as ‘there’. We are *disclosed* as a whole and, Heidegger adds, we are disclosed *as* a *thrown* being, one who ‘*has been delivered over*’ to itself. In other words, we are disclosed *as* a being which *exists*, which ‘*has to be*’. Whether this is, indeed, what moods disclose, *primordially and by structural necessity*, is questionable. I will
argue, later, that the ‘...has to be’ aspect is an empirical possibility of some moods but not a structural aspect of the disclosure of moods in and of themselves.

Heidegger draws out three essential characteristics of moods. First, being-there is disclosed as thrown and, ‘proximally and for the most part,’ as fleeing from this disclosure, evading our very self. This is the ‘falling’ of being-there, an essential tendency we have seen developing as a part of Heidegger’s analysis from early on. This ‘turning away’, though an ‘essential characteristic’ of moods, nonetheless manifests a “privation of disclosedness” [229, H184] and is the case only ‘proximally and for the most part’. Therefore, there are moods (such as anxiety), however rare, which turn toward ‘Being one’s Self’.

Second, moods have “already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole, and this makes it possible first of all to direct oneself toward something” [176, H137, my emphasis]. That is, a) the disclosure of moods is structured by the ‘past’ dimension b) mood is holistic self-world-disclosure; and c) moods are the ‘presupposition’ for other ‘intentions’ or comportments.

Of primary importance for the temporal analysis is the reference to the past dimension or ‘temporal ecstasis’. In the temporal analysis of the modes of disclosure, moods are shown to temporalize primarily out of the ecstasis of ‘having been’ (die Gewesenheit, ‘beenness’). “The existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back to something” [390, H340]. Moods bring us back to ‘what has been and is’ or that ‘in the face of which’ one ‘has been thrown’ (das Wovor, which is the ‘horizontal schema”)."

Thirdly, moods are “a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us [177, H137-8]. This disclosive submission to the world (as a whole, i.e., the worldhood of the world) is what allows beings within-
the-world to *matter to* or ‘affect’ us. This affective mattering of mood is, in fact, “the primary discovery of the world” [ibid] as a significance-contexture for phenomena:

Indeed, *from an ontological point of view* we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’. [177, H138]

As we can see, Heidegger largely frees us from the traditional rationalist misinterpretations of moods as ‘merely subjective’, and as inadequate and confused thoughts which are essentially ‘irrational’. Rather, moods disclose, primally, being-there in and as a meaningful context. To an unprecedented extent, Heidegger ‘grounds’ human existence in this original disclosure. To underscore this, again, he says:

Ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for being-there, in which being-there is disclosed to itself *prior* to all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure. [175, H136; Heidegger’s emphasis]

In emphasizing the priority of mood, here, Heidegger adds that “when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods” [ibid]; “even the purest *theoria* has not left all moods behind it” [177, H138].

However, Heidegger also maintains that

Factually, being-there can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods. [175, H136]

Heidegger, no doubt, views this latter injunction as what distinguishes his orientation as some kind of ‘irrationalism’ or ‘mere romanticism’. And it is this injunction towards mastery that is of supreme importance for his notion of authenticity.
However, for those of us who would pursue the fruitful interpretive line Heidegger has opened up as regards moods, the injunction toward 'mastery', even if as a 'mood of mastery', appears to be the point at which Heidegger closes off interpretive possibilities and himself succumbs to the traditional 'rationalist' prejudice at the core of Western philosophy. I shall develop this criticism of Heidegger in section IX, below.

In moods, according to Heidegger, being-there is delivered over to itself and this means, as our Being is 'existence', delivered over to itself as a possibility. We are brought before our factual throwness: the "naked 'that it is and has to be'" [173, H134] of our existing.

This concept of 'throwness' consists of two conjoined aspects in the 'that it is and has to be'. The first aspect is the 'that it is' of facticity. Facticity is that "certain way of presence-at-hand which is being-there's own" [82, H55] and, in the disclosure of disposition, this has a certain priority. It is

...the 'that it is' of [being-there's] 'there' which, as such, stares [us] in the face with the inexorability of an enigma" [175; H136].
This 'that it is' is veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither'. [174, H135]

The origin and destiny of our Being is primordially unknown. Therewith, the 'that it is' is "disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly" [ibid]. There is a fundamental, i.e., a priori, unknowability pertaining to our factual being-there at all, an unknowability which, as its enigmatical character dawns on us, intensifies the facticity of be-ing of the 'that it is'.

Nonetheless, being-there's facticity is articulated in terms of 'throwness', as we see from the second aspect of throwness: the '...and has to be'. This is, the 'Being an issue for itself' aspect of our Being, the Selbstbekuemmernung, 'potentiality'
aspect, which properly belongs to the second constitutive item of disclosedness: projective understanding. In light of the fact that we are articulating the disclosure of disposition, one might wonder why and how this projective aspect insinuates itself into the primordial disclosure of mood.

In section IX, I will develop a criticism of Heidegger’s analysis of the disclosure of moods. I will argue that Heidegger’s injunction to mastery, and his premature injection of projection into the heart of disposition’s disclosure, poisons Heidegger’s initial insight into the primordiality of the disclosure of moods. However, let us look, first, at the disclosure of understanding.

VIII B. Being-there as Understanding

Understanding is equiprimordial to disposition in constituting the ‘there’: “a disposition always has its understanding...Understanding always has its mood” [182, H142-3].

Earlier in Being and Time (section 18), Heidegger has shown how the functional contexts of everyday being-in-the-world refer back to a basic, pre-ontological understanding of that for-the-sake-of-which (the Umwillen) these involvements are projected. That for-the-sake-of-which ‘the world’ is significant is being-there, specifically ‘being-in’, the being ‘there’ as the meaningful discloser of/for the world.

In the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called ‘understanding’. ... To say that the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ and significance are both disclosed in being-there, means that being-there is that being which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself. [182, H143]
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As existing, being-there has its Being. More specifically, it has it as a potentiality-for-Being. This being-possible is, existentially, what understanding is:

...possibility as an existentiale is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which being-there is characterised ontologically. [183; H143-4]

"Being-there is in every case what it can be" [183, H143]. This essence of understanding, its being-possible, is shown in its character as projection, the 'throwing' ahead of oneself a possibility of being-there.

With equal primordiality the understanding projects being-there's Being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' and upon significance. [185, H145]

This dual projection means that being-there is projected both authentically and inauthentically, as the 'for-the-sake-of-which' is 'the Self' and 'significance' is 'the world'. Authenticity, as we have seen, is compromised essentially by inauthenticity and is more a matter of the degree to which one projects upon either self or world, i.e., whether "understanding throws itself primarily into the 'for-the-sake-of-which'" [186; H146; my italics] or primarily into the world.

Temporally, the ecstasis of the future underlies projective understanding:

When one understands oneself projectively in an existentiell possibility, the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-towards-oneself out of that current possibility as which one's being-there exists. [385, H336]

The 'horizon' of futural projection, the "'whither' of the ecstasis" [416, H365], is the 'for-the-sake-of-which' (Umwissen)."
...
'Being-in'-'the-world' is 'possibilizing-significance'; "the world, qua world, [is] disclosed as possible-significance" [184, H145]. the possibility of projecting meaning upon the world as such and thereby freeing up intraworldly beings for their own possible involvement in a meaning context. The "pre-ontological understanding" (by which Heidegger here means pre-conceptual understanding) is actually a pre-ontic (pre-being [Sein(le)], existentiell ('lived experience' or comportment of being-there), primordial, ontological projection of the world as such. "Being-there is in itself 'ontological'" [34; H13] in that, without reflective explicitness, it transcends itself and all beings toward the world via this meaning-providing primordial projection.

The projection projects the world as such, "the 'wherein' of an act of understanding" which "lets beings be encountered" [119; H86] and this means, by definition (as Heidegger interprets 'intentionality'), 'encountered meaningfully'. Meaning, as "that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself" [193; H151] is "the 'upon-which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something" [193; H151]. Furthermore,

...'meaning' must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the disclosedness which belongs to understanding. [193; H151]

Heidegger has here shown the disclosure of understanding to be formally structured by meaning. But he has not articulated the dispositional disclosure with such a characteristic. Why not? It would seem more realistic to say that each mode of disclosure, as a disclosure, has its own mode of meaning. Indeed, Quentin Smith points out that,

It should be noted that in Being and Time Heidegger describes moods as being disclosive of (amongst other things) the ways in which phenomena "matter."
Everything that we can reasonably hope for is within reach if we give our mind to it. The power to achieve great things is within us all. The key to success is persistence. If we believe in ourselves and work hard, we can overcome any obstacle. The human spirit is capable of incredible things.

In business, it is essential to have a clear vision and a well-planned strategy. It is also important to adapt to changes and be open to new opportunities. Collaboration and teamwork are crucial for success. Each person brings unique skills and perspectives to the table, and by working together, we can achieve great results.

In the realm of technology, innovation is key. As technology advances, it opens up new possibilities for growth and development. It is important to stay informed about the latest trends and developments in our field. By embracing new technologies, we can stay ahead of the competition and pave the way for a bright future.

In society, we must work together to create a more just and equitable world. This involves advocating for change, supporting those in need, and promoting understanding and respect for all. By coming together, we can make a positive impact and build a better future for everyone.

In conclusion, the power of our minds and the potential we possess is immense. By believing in ourselves, working hard, and collaborating with others, we can achieve great things and make a meaningful impact on the world.
Anxiety discloses the way of “mattering” of the “indefinitely threatening.” Such ways of “mattering” can be interpreted as felt meanings... But in Heidegger’s metaphysical interpretation of anxiety in *What is Metaphysics?* he does not mention this felt meaning; rather, anxiety is significant for Heidegger because it enables the question about the reason for the Being of being to be raised [Smith 1986, 24].

However, for Heidegger, *disposition, too, is, essentially, a kind of projection*, a *past projection*, a projection (*Entwurf*) which has been thrown (*geworfen*). Here we see why being-there’s facticity is fundamentally ‘thrownness’.

Being-there, as essentially having a disposition, has already got itself into definite possibilities. ... But this means being-there is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself - thrown possibility through and through. [183; H144]

Disposition, as the disclosure of being-there’s thrown projection, is even responsible, according to Heidegger, for our ‘going astray’, our ‘errring’: why being-there “has in every case already gone astray and failed to recognize itself” [184; H144].

From this we can see the basis for (or, perhaps, the result of) the ‘priority of the future’ in Heidegger’s ontology.11 Projective understanding (which has the future as its corresponding ecstasis), is finite and modified by disposition (which has the ‘past’ as its corresponding ecstasis) as to its range of possibilities. But understanding modifies disposition *structurally*, in that moods are basically past projections. Let us look closer at this and ask whether this does justice to the disclosure of mood.12
IX. *The Projective Prejudice*

Recalling what we ascertained in section VIIA, for Heidegger.

Factically, being-there can, should, and *must*, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods. [175, H136, my italics]

Similarly, we observed in section VII that, according to Heidegger,

The self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can *never* get that basis into its power; yet, as existing, *it must take over Being-a-basis*. [330; H284; second italics mine]

I wish to draw a parallel between these injunctions which underscores the compulsion of a ‘projective prejudice’ at work in Heidegger’s thinking. We ‘should’ be masters of our moods *just as* we ‘must’, albeit futilely, attempt to ground the abyss. Inasmuch as we are, supposedly, unconditionally guilty in the uncanny abyss, we *must* act or respond resolutely from this guilt or fall into inauthenticity. The factical situation of ungrounded uncanny existing - thrown existence - is intolerable and *must be resolved* by existential choice, by conscientiously *taking over* one’s Being-guilty. We become resolute by taking over being the ‘null (thrown) basis (Grund) of a null (finite) projection’, by projecting the throw ourselves. Though, as we have seen, Heidegger does perhaps allow for a path out of this dreadful nullity of existence via the primordial action of a creative rejoinder to the uncanny gesture, the notion of guilt, particularly at the time of *Being and Time*, is presented as an ‘*a priori*’ existential-ontological one, not just an ‘empirical’ possibility or manifestation of one’s factical lostness in the ‘they’.” That is, we are exposed and disposed to the
uncanny but are nonetheless to take up a position, to posit it existentially, to pose as masters.

This signifies that the abyss (*der Abgrund*) requires grounding (*Grund*: reason), that, even though we are out of our depth and have, in fact, drowned, we are nonetheless to persist in seeking shoreline, seeking horizons. To illustrate this point by poetry, in Georg Trakl’s *Lament*, we read:

The icy wave of eternity
Would engulf the golden image of man.
His purple body shatters
On horrible reefs.
And the dark voice laments
Over the sea.

The abyss threatens to destroy the rational view of man; the fact of death shatters all attempts at ‘transcendence’, leaving us alone to flail about hopelessly. This poem ends without any heroic return from the abyss:

An anguished boat goes down
Under stars.
The silent face of the night.  

The silent, anguished plunge into the abyss of death goes down and does not emerge, disappears without a trace. Yet this is a poem, after all, a creative response to the abyss.

Nevertheless the point I want to make here is that, for Heidegger, just as we should resolve and ground the uncanny abyss of our Being, so, he believes, we should master our moods, possess the dispossesssion of disposition. What I wish to
emphasize, in contrast to Heidegger, is that just as there is a moment of disclosure of Being - not just being-there - in the uncanny disclosure, a disclosure which may have, in itself, nothing to do with grounding or reason (even in the broadened sense which Heidegger employs), so we should, if we are concerned about the truth of the disclosure, allow our metaphysical moods \(^7\) full range to sink deeper into the positionless abyss and heed the attunement to Being itself. In so doing, we appreciate\(^8\) what is there and avoid the compulsion to provide grounds. Such appreciation does not of itself 'bring' Being to 'presence' - but it does 'let Being be' and actualize our openness to Being. We may, as a secondary benefit, find a transformation of the notion of creative grounding which, now, flows without need, as free, creative appropriation of the overpowering power of Being.

Yet, for Heidegger, the 'inexorable enigma' of the 'that it is' is nevertheless a veil to be removed. Out of tenacious passion for truth, he seems to justify a violent grasping and tearing away what is concealed within the breach opened up by being-there's ecstatic, projective transcendence. Equiprimordial to the 'positive' \(a\ priori\) unknowability of sheer 'be-ing there' is the 'negative' fact that the whence and whither are 'empirically' or factually unknown. That the 'that it is' should be or become known is due to the overall structural imperatives Heidegger has assigned to our existential disclosedness - that is, due to the modification of disposition by understanding and discourse.

That, existentially, this unknownness may become problematic is certainly a possibility and a potentially positive and creative possibility, at that. However, in the facticity of dispositional disclosure, it is rather the sheer presence of the 'that it is', beyond its knowability, which is opened up. How is it, then, that the structure of understanding insinuates itself into the very structure of disposition itself, at all and,
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specifically, as lacking? Heidegger (in [BT, sec. 29]) attempts to articulate the very 'ownmost' structure of the moody disclosure itself, which may then be mediated or intertwined with the other 'equiprimordial' modes of disclosure (viz., understanding and discourse). So, how is it, then, that we already find an understanding-structure within the very core of moods themselves? Moods and affects when they subside, when their own revelatory import has unfolded and been appreciated for what it primordially is, are indeed linked to understanding and discourse. But the latter are not to eclipse the dispositional revelation by undermining its own disclosure. Rather, they may compliment, even modify, the disclosure with their 'equiprimordiality', as long as they preserve the inherent content and structure of that moody disclosure.

Perhaps with Heidegger's notion of 'existence' guiding the interpretation of being-there, such an interpretation is inevitable. This would mean, in terms of possibility, that being-there both 'is' its possibility (as the factically congealed actuality of its past, i.e., what moods attune to) and 'has' its possibility (understands itself. Cf. [68, H42]). The 'is' of the 'that it is' of the moody disclosure, would already be the 'is' of existence ('that it exists') - and we could say that moods disclose thrownness, 'tout court', that is, thrown projection. Being-there's facticity, then, would only be the chronological-temporal reality of there having been projections that have now slipped into the past and are now retained by memory and mood. However, I believe this would be a premature eclipse of the element of facticity involved in the disclosure of moods, an eclipse motivated by a 'projectional prejudice'. If we take as our point of departure being-there as factual existence (as Heidegger understood it in the early 1920's), or even if we take it as existential facticity (to reverse the grammatically induced priority) rather than as primarily just 'existence', we may
avoid this misinterpretation and restore to moods and to being-there the factical element that has been undermined.

Thus, if, as Heidegger recognizes, the moody disclosure is of itself beyond the range of thinking and action, cognition and willing (which, I take it, means beyond 'understanding')\(^\text{19}\), then this 'beyond' should be reflected in the \textit{a priori} structure of this mode of disclosure. However, in Heidegger's interpretation of how we factically \textit{find} ourselves, the pure 'that it is' is still supposedly experienced as \textit{lacking} an explicit intelligibility which, despite its being fundamentally beyond comprehension, is portrayed as a positive lack, precisely as Sartre's Being-for-itself is a positive lack of Being-in-itself. I argue that this supposed lack leads to a distortion of the structural constitution of disposition, of its fundamentally factical import, and to a resulting distortion of the phenomenal facts of particular moods themselves.

I believe this is of great significance for the proper and complete interpretation of non-existential moods, i.e., metaphysical moods disclosive of Being itself. If we are dealing with disposition as disclosive solely of being-there and we have already taken 'existence' as the guiding \textit{Vorhabe} of the interpretation, then it would follow that the facticity of the moody disclosure reveals only the thrownness of existence.

However, 1) a phenomenology of moods and affects would show that there are metaphysical moods and affects which disclose Being itself,\(^\text{20}\) a fact which Heidegger recognizes, in any case, in his reworking of the anxious disclosure in \textit{What is Metaphysics?}, and in other descriptions of other moods (boredom, awe, astonishment, wonder, equanimity) in other works;\(^\text{21}\) 2) existence, of itself, points beyond itself to Being and so, paralleling that, thrownness, of itself, points beyond itself to facticity pure - which need \textit{not} be interpreted as referring to a present-at-hand or \textit{ousialogical ontological underpinning}; 3) while the disclosure of moods, as
a disclosure of 'being-there as delivered over to itself' (i.e., of existence) may be accurate of the content of some moods, it is not binding structurally for all moods. This 'structural insinuation', like the assumption of the 'burdensome' character of the moody revelation of Being-there, is a result of interpreting moods as past existential projections, not a result of phenomenological investigation. That is, it is the result of a projective prejudice, not of an adherence to the actual 'presupposition' of the dispositional disclosure.

It, therefore, should not be ruled out in advance that moods can disclose something other than my own thrown existence for then the disclosure of Being itself, for example, would be subjected to an interpretive schema inadequate to its actual disclosure. The strangeness of be-ing, awe and stupefaction at the sheer fact of be-ing, for example, could only be interpreted negatively and reductively.

In summary, while it may be the case that, in being-there's disclosedness as a whole, disposition is a priori and equiprimordially connected to understanding (and discourse), inasmuch as we are analysing the disclosure of mood per se, there need not be presumed, in the very structure of mood itself, a primordial orientation to, or disclosure of, factual being as a projective possibility of Being and thereby of some inherent 'understanding'.

Thus, we have seen that understanding is modified by disposition, i.e., projection is modified by thrownness, in that it is limited as to its range of possibilities by the situation one has been thrown into: the freedom of projection is finite. On the other hand, disposition is modified by understanding in a more fundamental, that is, structural way, in that moods are interpreted, by Heidegger, as a temporal mode of projection. Mood is the way past possibilities, congealed into facticity, disclose themselves, affecting our current futural projection of possibilities.
Thought negatively, then, moods are a limiting factor, the dead-weight of the past; thought positively, they are what give actual possibilities, the possibilities of our situation, what give a context within which possibilities can be meaningfully projected. In any case, any revelatory import moods may have, considered in their own right, appears to be precluded by the structural interpretation of moods as a kind of projection.

I would maintain, rather, that the dispositionally disclosed fact that I have been here at all and continue to be here at all is not revelatory of some past projection. While death may reveal my existential condition and situation (the fact that I have lived, for the most part, inauthentically and that, by owning that, I have the possibility of authentic existence before me), death also reveals the overwhelming and stunning fact that I am and that anything is or could ever have been at all. Precisely this is the move toward Being itself.

X. Summary and Conclusions of Chapter Two

In section VI, we recapped the movement from inauthenticity to authenticity in Being and Time and showed that, corresponding to the shift in the underlying question, there is a shift within authenticity itself. That is, corresponding to the underlying question shifting from the 'how' of being-there (in early Heidegger) to the question of the meaning of Being itself (in Being and Time), there is a possible shift from what I have called authentic everydayness (which Heidegger has articulated in Chapters II.2 and II.3 of Being and Time) to what I have called authentic uncanniness (which Heidegger has articulated in Chapter II.5 of Being and Time but only developed during 'the Turn' in his thinking).
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a page from a book or a document, but the content cannot be accurately transcribed.
In section VII, we unpacked the significance of this distinction between authentic everydayness and authentic uncanniness. Authentic everydayness is first seen as the uncanny Self’s ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ back home in the ‘still being-there’ of the they-world, a lucid dis-illusioned abandonment to a world which one has existentially abandoned yet factically returned to. This is also depicted as a conscientious taking over of one’s guilty finitude: i.e., being the “null basis of a null projection”.

It was remarked that, while there first appeared to be no ‘transworldly’ possibilities opened up in the uncanny, nonetheless, something like a ‘spiritual-creative ethic’ emerges in Heidegger’s later work (of the 1930’s), with its roots in what is worked out in Chapter II.5 of Being and Time: Temporality and Historicality. We asked: ‘Are there no possibilities, other than resolute-being-in-the-they possibilities, upon which being-there can resolve? Is authenticity “just” a shift in mundane attitude or does authenticity engender its own possibilities?’ We answered: ‘Not only is one freed from fallen ensnarement in mundanity but, by enduring the uncanny abyss, one can become free for “letting one’s ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord” [BT, 342] in the transformative “reciprocative rejoinder” which “repetition” is meant to be’. This is what I have called “authentic uncanniness”, viz., the return to the world, not only without illusions but with a project of creative grounding.

Furthermore, as in The Concept of Time, the ‘handing down’ to oneself of possibilities in creative repetition is the achievement of the enactment of being-there’s primordial temporality or historicity, the ‘happening’ of one’s ‘time’. In a more thorough working out of previous themes, Heidegger develops the possibilities of ‘authentic uncanniness’ which, as a futural projection (shattering itself against death)
equiprimordially in the process of *having been* (letting itself be thrown back upon its factual there) can be in the moment of vision for 'its time' [BT, 437].

In concluding this section, we pointed to a possibility inherent in authentic uncanniness' moment-of-vision, one that opens out beyond the authenticity of being-there out onto the phenomenon of Being itself: what I have called *spiritual uncanniness*. With the taking over of my thrown existence, I step into the 'moment of vision' for my historical time; but this Moment is not only the possibility of the 'reciprocative rejoinder' of repetition but also, as an embracing of being-there as a whole, a glimpse into and disclosure of (openness to) Being itself. Though such a Moment is included within the grasp of the projective and creative grounding of authentic uncanniness, it remains to be seen whether Being is most primordially disclosed within such understanding or whether the most primordial disclosure belongs to a different modality of being-there's disclosedness.

We have, with this, articulated a movement in Heidegger from inauthentic everydayness to authentic everydayness to authentic uncanniness to what I have called *spiritual uncanniness*.

In section VIII, bearing in mind the underlying question after the meaning of Being and the open path toward its disclosure via being-there's authenticity, and in order to prepare the way for the temporal analysis of being-there and Being as such, we examined the basic existential constitution of the 'there' of Being, i.e., the modes of disclosure or openness of the illuminated clearing of 'there-Being'. These modes are *dis-position, understanding* and discourse.

In section VIIIA, we saw that dis-position or 'findedness' (*Befindlichkeit*) was Heidegger's term for what we experience as the self-attunement of moods. Heidegger frees us to an unprecedented extent from traditional rationalist prejudices regarding
the supposed 'irrationality' of moods. He emphasises the primordiality of moody disclosure. In moods, being-there is disclosed to itself prior to, and beyond the range of disclosure of, all thinking, knowing, willing, and acting – which I take to mean, in effect, 'beyond understanding'. Moods are, also, holistic self-disclosure and, as 'disclosive submissions' to the world, are what allow the world to 'matter' to us. Furthermore, moods disclose the facticity of being-there's be-ing: the 'that it is' of being-there's 'there' "stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma" [BT, 175].

However, we also saw a certain compromising of these insights by Heidegger in 1) his injunction towards a necessary 'mastering' of our moods; 2) the transformation of facticity to 'thrownness' in the articulation of mood's disclosure as revelatory of the 'that it is and has to be'; 3) the concomitant understanding of the primordial veiledness of facticity as a projective possibility, a veil to be removed, i.e., as, nevertheless, circumscribed within the sphere of understanding.

In section VIIIB, understanding was articulated as the possibility of being-there, the being-possible of the self-having character of existence ('...and has to be'). The essence of being-possible is its character as projection, the hermeneutic-interpretive existing of being-there. In projecting, we 'throw forth' a meaning context within which both the self and the world are understood as meaningful. Meaning is "the 'upon-which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something" [BT, 193], the 'wherein' of an act of understanding.

We noted that 'meaning' was accorded structural and definitive status as regards understanding but not as regards disposition, and suggested that each mode of disclosure should have its own mode of meaning. It was further suggested (by Quentin Smith) that the 'matterings' of mood be could be regarded as "felt
meanings”, though this was left undeveloped by Heidegger. Rather, Heidegger understood disposition, too, as a kind of *projection*, specifically a *past* projection, a projection that *has been thrown* – thus explaining 'thrownness'. Furthermore, we can see that, while projective understanding (which, temporally refers to the *future*) is finite and modified by disposition (which, temporally, refers to the ‘past’) as to its range of possibilities, disposition is modified *structurally* by projective understanding, in that moods are ‘merely’ past projections. This means that Heidegger gives an obvious priority to the future, in the temporality of being-there, and to understanding, in the modes of disclosure.

In section IX, I critiqued the underlying projectional prejudice in Heidegger’s analysis of being-there (*Daseinanalytik*). The injunctions toward the mastery of moods despite their avowedly being *beyond* the range of willing and thinking, and the necessity of resolving existential guilt through grounding the uncanny abyss of our Being despite our being the “null basis (*Grund*) of a null projection” [BT, 334] which can “never get that basis into its power” [BT, 330], are seen, rather, as indications of a compulsion to provide grounds (*Grund* – reason). This is indicative of the rationalist-projective prejudice at the core of Western thinking and still, despite all, operative in Heidegger.

This prejudice structurally insinuates itself into the interpretation of the disclosure of disposition by transforming that disclosure into one of ‘past projections’ rather than felt meanings, into disclosure of thrownness rather than facticity itself, into understanding rather than mood in and of itself. While disposition is linked to understanding and discourse, the latter are not to eclipse the dispositional revelation by undermining its own disclosure. Rather, they are meant to compliment, perhaps
even modify, this disclosure with their 'equiprimordiality' as long as they preserve the inherent content of the moody disclosure.

This points to the possibility of a phenomenology of mood and affect which would base its articulation on the *internal* characteristics of these 'dispositions' rather than on their *positive lack* of rationale or even their motivation power for the creative project of grounding their abyss.

Such a phenomenology could have metaphysical implications in that, in freeing the interpretation of moods and affects from the constrictions of the *existential* interpretive schema, which encompasses them within *self*-disclosure (or disclosure of being-in-the-world), we could open the interpretation to the possibility of metaphysical moods and affects. In the Heideggerian context, this means that *Being itself* could be disclosed dispositionally and we could pursue the question after the meaning of Being via a phenomenological metaphysics of felt meanings. Such affects such as awe, astonishment, joy, as well as grief and boredom could be given their due in a metaphysical sense.

In light of the implausibility of Heidegger's interpretive schema for disposition, it remains to be seen whether this has any effect upon the temporal interpretation. If there is an unfounded projectional prejudice in Heidegger's interpretation of being-there's modes of disclosure, does this same prejudice, with its project-horizon schema, enter into his interpretation of the horizontal schema of ecstatic-horizontal temporality? With this essay, I have prepared the way for obtaining an answer to this question.
Notes for Chapter Two

1. I have, in the following, always translated *Dasein* with 'being-there'. I will hereafter cite this work by the English pagination first, then the German as in, e.g., [217; H173]. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, all references in this Chapter are to *Being and Time* [BT].

2. Though the correspondence of discourse to fallenness is problematic. These triads lead to the ultimate triad of the temporal interpretation, i.e., to future/past/present.

3. See [WM, p. 336-38].

4. See [344, H298], I have substituted 'world' for 'concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.'

5. Cf. [Pöggeler 1997 p. 86]. Here, he makes a distinction between "authentic fallenness" and "inauthentic fallenness".

6. See [Marx 1971, Part VI]. Werner Marx, working mainly from Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*, writes: "This interplay [between *physis* and *techne*] formed a 'world'. In this world-opening event, something 'hitherto unthought, unsaid, unheard' is brought forth, produced by the 'creators', something new originates" [Marx 1971 p. 141] Again quoting from Heidegger’s *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Marx writes: "*Physis* as initially incipient sense of Being 'behooves' the 'Dasein' of historical man'. Likewise, the creative occurrence of presence 'behooves' the creators, poets, thinkers, and statesmen" [Marx 1971 p. 218]. Cf., Heidegger’s *What is Metaphysics, Introduction to Metaphysics, The Origin of the Work of Art* and other essays in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, etc...not to mention his 'Nazi speeches'. These works of Heidegger are all beyond the time-line which I am considering in this essay but the essential point is already contained within *Being and Time*, as I now show.

7. I use the term 'spiritual' as a descriptive term, similarly to how I use 'metaphysical', i.e., as implying a relation to Being as such. See note 17, below.

8. To ward off objections to the phrase 'phenomenon of Being': Heidegger writes, in his Introduction: "What is it that must become a phenomenon in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we exhibit something explicitly? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden ... Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only 'in disguise', is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities" [BT, 59; H35]. That is, what must become a phenomenon in a distinctive sense is Being itself. Sartre, still probably the most profound interpreter of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, certainly takes Heidegger as attempting to bring Being to phenomenological disclosure and critiques this project by insisting on a 'Being of the phenomenon' which never comes to disclosure as a 'phenomenon of Being'. See [Sartre 1966, introduction].

9. See [Nicholson 1992, Chapter 1].

10. From Friedrich Hölderlin’s *As on a Holiday*, translated by Michael Hamburger in [Hoelderlin 1980].

11. This essay is a preparation for a reinterpretation of the factual-existential temporal analysis (Zeitlichkeit) which Heidegger accomplishes in *Being and Time* and which is the stepping stone...
for the incompleted project of the temporal (Temporale) analysis of Being.

12. Once again, this must remain somewhat undeveloped and obscure as the ins and outs of the temporal analysis, the significance of the 'horizontal schema' of 'ecstatic-horizontal' temporality, must await another occasion. What is pertinent here is simply that understanding temporalizes primarily out of the future.

13. Whether the priority of the future ecstatic is the basis for the priority of projective understanding or vice-versa is a matter of interpretation. In Heidegger's ontological analysis, the temporal interpretation is the fundament and therefore the basis of the priority of the understanding. However, the existential interpretation, the 'ontic fundament' from which the ontological analysis draws its concepts, works out the phenomena of being-there's various disclosures; so, decisions made, here, (such as a priority of understanding over disposition) could be seen as the basis of the temporal-ontological analysis.

14. Otto Pöggeler may be remarking something similar in the following: "Heidegger's discussion of possibility exhibits another remarkable feature: in general, the interpretation of understanding formally develops the ecstasies of Dasein out of temporality; the interpretation of disposition, by contrast, makes explicit a distinction between authentic and inauthentic uses of temporality." [Pöggeler 1997, 82; my italics]. Pöggeler, shortly thereafter, develops a critique of Heidegger's notion of the 'having been' (Gewesenheit). He asks, "...isn't the past deeper than 'having-been'? In its passing the past is dissipated and, in departing, withdraws into itself; it is just on the basis of this self-withdrawal that it remains in altered forms and so can be 'retrieved'. As the past it is pure facticity for us. [Pöggeler 1997, 83; my italics]. "But" Pöggeler continues, "Being and Time always connects facticity with existentiality, connects the 'already' together with the 'ahead' and so only takes 'having been into account ... it remains inappropriate to bring the past into an analysis of Dasein only as 'having been'. Heidegger himself appears to withdraw from the commitment to a futural interpretation of time..." [Pöggeler 1997, 83]. I take the following critique to be, in part, a development of the path opened up here by Pöggeler.

15. On the other hand, the possibility of falling into the 'they' is also interpreted as an existential, i.e., as an ontological determination of our existence. This may imply that inauthenticity is always a possibility and to the degree that we manifest the existential modality of inauthentic they-Self-being, we are guilty; to the degree that we own the fact of being-guiltily lost in the they-Self, we can resolve guilt in the innocence, perhaps, of creative grounding. In any case, resoluteness appropriates inauthenticity authentically.

16. From Trakl's Klage (Lament); my translation with help from M. Hamburger's and L. Getts's [Trakl, 1973].

17. I employ the term 'metaphysical' to refer to the experience and/or study of the meaning of Being as such and as a whole. Moods revelatory of Being itself - such as, to some degree, Heidegger's interpretation of anxiety in What is Metaphysics?, and Smith's interpretation of joy, love, reverence (plus many others) - are metaphysical and may be contrasted with existential moods (revelatory of being-there as a whole) and mundane moods (revelatory of intraworldly beings or inauthentic being-in-the-world). Anxiety, for Heidegger, serves the double function of bringing being-there to itself, primordially and as a whole, and opening being-there to Being itself. Thus anxiety is still a key-mood in that it is the cornerstone to 'spiritual uncanniness' or the realm of metaphysical moods and affects.

18. 'Appreciation' is a technical term in the 'metaphysics of feeling', referring to the manner of disclosure of feelings and moods. See [Smith 1986, Introduction].
It is clear that neither cognition nor willing (nor ‘thinking and acting’) can be equated with Heidegger’s sense of ‘understanding’. Heidegger’s ‘understanding’ is primordially (as I’ve indicated in section III, for example) not cognition but a circumspective and preconceptual way of being in the world in one’s mundane dealings. But Heidegger’s understanding is still - as is cognition - fundamentally projective in character - a projection of a horizon within which beings are encountered as (mundanely) meaningful (i.e., useful) and projective understanding is the basis for what can become, in a derived or leveled way, the theoretical and reflective understanding of ‘rational’ cognition (assertion or judgement - see BT, section 33), i.e., the ‘theoretical attitude’ which has forgotten its existentiell roots in projection and merely retained the projective form of understanding. What I am trying to show is that, in Heidegger’s analysis, projective understanding has overstepped its boundaries and insinuated itself into the very structure of disposition itself in a way that destroys any pretension of ‘equiprimordiality’ which Heidegger wishes to maintain, viz., my interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of disposition as one of ‘past projection’. The understanding that would flow from a restoration of the actual disclosure of disposition (as in a phenomenology of feeling) would base itself on the actual phenomena of feeling in a more phenomenologically adequate conceptuality.

20. See, for example, [Smith 1986].


22. See [Smith 1986].
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