School Funding and Education

Policy-Making Models in Ontario

by

Stephen J. Bosanac, B.A. Political Science.

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts

Department of Politics
BROCK UNIVERSITY
St. Catharines, Ontario

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine various policy implementation models, and to determine what use they are to a government. In order to insure that governmental proposals are created and exercised in an effective manner, there must be some guidelines in place which will assist in resolving difficult situations.

All governments face the challenge of responding to public demand, by delivering the type of policy responses that will attempt to answer those demands. The problem for those people in positions of policy-making responsibility is to balance the competitive forces that would influence policy. This thesis examines provincial government policy in two unique cases.

The first is the revolutionary recommendations brought forth in the Hall-Dennis Report. The second is the question of extending full-funding to the end of high school in the separate school system. These two cases illustrate how divergent and problematic the policy-making duties of any government may be.

In order to respond to these political challenges decision-makers must have a clear understanding of what they are attempting to do. They must also have an assortment of policy-making models that will insure a policy response

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effectively deals with the issue under examination. A government must make every effort to insure that all policy-making methods are considered, and that the data gathered is inserted into the most appropriate model.

Currently, there is considerable debate over the benefits of the progressive individualistic education approach as proposed by the Hall-Dennis Committee. This debate is usually intensified during periods of economic uncertainty. Periodically, the province will also experience brief yet equally intense debate on the question of separate school funding. At one level, this debate centres around the efficiency of maintaining two parallel education systems, but the debate frequently has undertones of the religious animosity common in Ontario's history.

As a result of the two policy cases under study we may ask ourselves these questions:

a) did the policies in question improve the general quality of life in the province? and

b) did the policies unite the province?

In the cases of educational instruction and finance the debate is ongoing and unsettling. Currently, there is a widespread belief that provincial students at the elementary and secondary levels of education are not being educated adequately to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The perceived culprit is individual education which sees students progressing through the system at their own pace and

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not meeting adequate education standards.

The question of the finance of Catholic education occasionally rears its head in a painful fashion within the province. Some public school supporters tend to take extension as a personal religious defeat, rather than an opportunity to demonstrate that educational diversity can be accommodated within Canada's most populated province.

This thesis is an attempt to analyze how successful provincial policy-implementation models were in answering public demand. A majority of the public did not demand additional separate school funding, yet it was put into place. The same majority did insist on an examination of educational methods, and the government did put changes in place.

It will also demonstrate how policy if wisely created may spread additional benefits to the public at large. Catholic students currently enjoy a much improved financial contribution from the province, yet these additional funds were taken from somewhere. The public system had it funds reduced with what would appear to be minimal impact. This impact indicates that government policy is still sensitive to the strongly held convictions of those people in opposition to a given policy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my wife Carla, for her encouragement. To Professor David Siegal, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, for his advice and guidance.

I also wish to acknowledge my good fortune in being granted interviews with former Minister of Education, Dr. Robert Welch, Chancellor of Brock University, and Dr. Nicholas Mancini, Past President of the Ontario Separate School Trustees' Association.

My thanks are also extended to Mr. Norm Forster, of the Hamilton Public Board of Education, and Mr. Tony Davidson, of the Hamilton-Wentworth Roman Catholic Separate School Board.

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DEDICATION

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INTRODUCTION

In democratic societies the formulation and implementation of public policy is developed under any number of situations and circumstances. Various forces in society press on government to create new and modify existing public policies. These pressures can result in slight or wholesale changes, sometimes with predictable results and sometimes with startling unintended consequences. There are many policies and many more options, but there is one element of certainty that may be found in this area of discussion, this is that "policy is what governments do."[1]

The discussion that will take place in the following pages will examine two separate policy initiatives, and the provincial government's response to them. The first of these is the provincial policy of allowing the administrative control of education to shift from one of rigid centralization to a more decentralized system. The second is the extension of funding through to the completion of high school in the Roman Catholic separate school system. Within both of these areas the relationship between the province, school boards and the public had changed considerably. Both of these policies

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[1] Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 9 no. 4 (December 1976), p. 558.

affected the power sharing relationship considerably.

The provincial dominance of administration or its centralized control of the entire education system from Queen's Park changed for two reasons. School boards were not satisfied with policy directives that did not answer problems specific to their jurisdiction. Additionally, local taxpayers were beginning to assume more of the financial burden of the cost of education without a corresponding amount of control over the system. As the pressure mounted for more local control, which resulted in a push for a decentralized administration, a political power struggle between the province and school boards soon ensued.

The other issue was strikingly different. Whereas, there was general approval from school boards for the trend to decentralization, the same could not be said for the extension of funds to the separate school system. Extension brought with it the perception that Catholic students received public money to which they were not entitled. There were charges of the separate system being the recipients of special treatment. The separate schools appeared in the eyes of their detractors to be a big winner in financial terms. The lack of widespread approval for extension set this situation apart from the approval for decentralization.

The catalyst for change was a gradual growth in the disenchantment with the relationship between the provincial government and the school boards. This straining of relations

resulted in the province announcing that it would investigate education in its entirety. The result of this examination was presented in 1968, when the Hall-Dennis Report was made public.[2] With this report education in Ontario suddenly changed.

These examples will illustrate ultimately what the provincial government had to consider during the entire decision-making process. The public was not simply individual citizens, but the citizenry in many dimensions, both for and against a policy initiative. The populace brought forth its concerns and demands in this particular debate, from all the various points of view people could muster. However, policy in the final analysis, is what governments do. The province had to answer the public desire that action be taken. This ensured that problems in the system were to be evaluated, and if necessary, adjustments to existing practices would be proposed, then implemented.

Provincial politicians could have simply responded to public demands, and complied with the request for change. They also had the opportunity to decide what the best path to follow was, and implement whatever change they wanted arbitrarily. This method would leave them open to criticism, and the danger of political defeat on election day. The next option was to agree to a committee style examination of the

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[2]Living and Learning. The Report of the Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives of Education in the Schools of Ontario. (Ontario Department of Education, 1968).

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issues under review. This would eventually lead to a joint decision, that would hopefully give everyone some satisfaction.

The provincial politicians did not want to experience the situation that brought the brief political career of British parliamentarian Edmund Burke to an end. In 1774, Burke was elected to parliament and espoused the point of view that politicians were to apply their best judgements and act as "trustees" on the public's behalf. This was in opposition to a "delegate," whose job was to only represent the wishes of his constituents. He defended his position in the following manner:

> [The constituents'] wishes ought to have great weight with [the representative]; their opinions high respect; their business unremitted attention . . . . . But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. . . .If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question would be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgement, and not of inclination. . . .Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests . . . but it is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole.[3]

Edmund Burke was defeated in the next British election. It seemed that the public wanted its say regardless of the level of understanding. His defeat also served as notice that politicians were not to be given free rein to decide on the

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[3]Burke's Politics: Selected Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke on Reform, Revolution, and War. eds., Ross J.S. Hoffman, and Paul Levack, (Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1949), p.p. 115-116.

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As is often the case with the decision-making process in our Parliament-Cabinet system of government the real reasons for decisions made are not always officially announced. Consequently, we do not always know what in fact changes the mind of a government. However, there are certain facts available to us and depending on the policy issue, the reasons for some new policy are easier to find and discuss than others. A government may decide to act after strenuous analysis of all the relevant material presented to it. For example, a government will take notice when the public senses it is falling behind in certain academic skills and demands new education initiatives to improve education generally. Here the corrective measures are taken for all the public and not a particular segment of it. This is very different from the case of Roman Catholic students receiving additional public money for an education system operated outside of the traditional public school domain.

Regardless of the reasons for policy announcements, the policy process and its repercussions may be analyzed to help determine whether the decision-making process was a success or a failure. It will also help us to see if policy alleviated current serious problems, or simply created new ones.

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CHAPTER 1

POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING

There are a number of different styles of policy-making which can be used to categorize the handling of particular public policies. It is useful to determine if any one format is better suited than the other to deal with a particular policy situation. We may ask ourselves whether or not a specific policy model will lead to an obvious and predetermined conclusion or to a radical departure from existing policy. There is also the opportunity to examine if the new initiative is in fact a revolutionary event or merely the next completed step in a journey.

A review of what efforts go into public policy development and implementation shows that in the early stages of data gathering, the structure of decision-making frequently is free of political considerations and focuses mainly on a rational approach to the policy. These steps will allow policies to be implemented in different ways. The recommendations of the Hall-Dennis committee were presented as a comprehensive package for complete and immediate change. The improvement of separate school funding was carried out gradually over a long period of time.

Bureaucrats and politicians work in an environment which

CHAPTER I

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contains a broad political framework of factors consisting of prevailing ideologies, assumptions and values, structures of power, patterns of conflict and diversion.[4] In reality critical choices are eventually made within a severely restricted list of options. Before a choice may be made, policy-makers must understand that policy making is in part, "a technical question, a matter of developing more systematic means to canvas alternatives, assess costs and benefits, and implement choices."[5] It is not a procedure that is carried out in a casual manner with no sense of urgency. Rather, it is a system of the study of potential options, carefully scrutinized and discussed in order to determine what is appropriate for the community.

There may be occasions when very little policy analysis takes place in a given situation. Even though policy analysis which means that the "advice on the choosing of alternatives" and policy theory "the explanation of why certain alternatives are chosen and others are not" are usually taken into consideration, these factors may be considered to varying degrees.[6]

In order to understand the art of politics we must also understand that policy theory, the art of choosing between alternatives, is what governments do. Political parties

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modify their positions for a variety of reasons. These range from political expediency to the pursuit of justice for disadvantaged members of the public. Governments are motivated by three traditional political components in the process of choosing what they should do:[7]

- power-policy presents itself out of the relationship of economic, social and political forces in society, these forces are found in our institutions and processes,
- conflict-policy making is a matter of choice whereby resources are usually very limited and goals and objectives differ, and
- ideology-policy must be comparative across space and time, that is the study of the evolutionary development patterns of other similar political jurisdictions are used in order to explain policy differences better.

These three factors are related to each other, and form a very broad framework in which decisions will be made. They perform an important balancing function that ensures societal forces, choice and ideology are all brought into the policy making equation. These forces are much broader than public administration, whose function is to implement policy. A government's job is to harness these forces in order to answer public demands carefully. Policy becomes a problem for a government when any of the factors become unbalanced.

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[7]Ibid., p. 150.

involved in the redistribution of resources whereby benefits to one group are actually reduced while at the same time delivering new benefits to another group. These distributive effects are the result of the input received during the policy formulation and investigation process. In some instances a government may very easily stand behind a particular initiative if the distributive effects are generally welcomed by the public. Provided that the remedy to a situation is beneficial in improving the quality of life of citizens throughout the government's political jurisdiction, a victory may be claimed.

There are also moments when a government may be forced to make a decision that is unpopular with some segments of the community. When a choice has been made, the door is open to conflict because not everyone might have received some benefit from the government. There is also the chance that some members of the public might have actually lost a benefit that was previously possessed. Distribution of benefits is the real political challenge in the policy making process.

Surprisingly, "one is impressed by the lack of knowledge or even raw data of program impact including the distribution of program benefits."[8] Currently two reasons for this are supplied:[9]

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- the enormous technical difficulties in measuring the real beneficial or detrimental impact of policy on the various groups in the community.

The difficulty here is that a policy which has had a negative impact may not be corrected quickly because it would hurt re-election chances. Also, determining the success of policy can be so difficult that a government may hope for the best and make adjustments as required.

Although governments may find themselves surrounded by uncertainty with the results of their policy efforts, the policy itself is the result of the consequences of the following points:[10]

- environment - that which comprises demographic, geographic wealth industrialization concerns and the social conflict that may present itself,
- distribution of power - the pattern of policy reflects the distribution of power and influence in society,
- prevailing ideas -reflects cultural and ideological factors,
- institutional framework - the rules and regulations of the political system that policy must respect, and
- the process of decision making - how will the decision be carried out.

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[10]Ibid. p. 566.

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[12]Ibid, p. 5ff.

Regardless of a government's position in the legislature it always has to be prepared to govern and then to defend itself. Therefore, keeping policy choices current is very much a function of the policy-maker's existence. Forgetting any of these five considerations would seriously jeopardize policy success. There is little to be gained by promoting urban development strategies in rural settings. Likewise if a policy initiative is approved can it actually be implemented and if so will it be successful.

In order to ensure that the best possible policy results have an opportunity to occur, policy-makers must work within a framework. The framework chosen must have steps which build upon each other. The steps used should be able to lead policy-makers from a starting point to a conclusion. The resultant conclusion should be an appropriate response to a given situation.

One method that may be used is the "rational-comprehensive or root model," which is representative of the means to an end approach. It represents a "from-the-ground-up" style of arriving at a conclusion, by using the following five steps:[11]

- that civil servants determine what the purpose of a policy is, independent of the empirical means of examining other definitions of purpose,

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- that by using the means to an end formula the purpose or goal is understood and the policy needed to reach the goal is created,
- that the policy can be tested to show it is appropriate to meet public demand,
- a complete analysis of all factors be undertaken to ensure the policy is correct, and
- that theory is the guiding light of policy.

When this type of policy format is in use it is probably safe to say that the situation a government is dealing with is clearly understood. There is little chance or risk of an embarrassing political confrontation especially if the policy was analyzed carefully. The root system protected bureaucrats from attack because if the public wanted to amend the end or goal of a policy then a new set of means to achieve the goal was relatively easy to create and present for public scrutiny. Especially beneficial to policy-makers was that the root method provided alternative "means-to-an-end" approaches, if a recommended policy failed to gain public approval.

The root system provided a method of policy development which answered a well understood problem and it was able to provide a correspondingly precise result. It was based on empirical research and brought a certain level of confidence to policy development. The root model however, was not successful in giving direction when the goal sought was difficult to determine. In response to vague circumstances

which still required an answer, the "successive limited comparisons or branch" model was implemented.[12] The branch model could best be described as a pro-active approach that satisfied the public's demands. It caused policy-makers to adapt a new means of creating and implementing policy initiatives. This model also presented a new method of solving what were to become increasingly complex social problems for administrators.

The branch model consisted of five steps and introduced a method of policy development whereby implementers were called upon to direct their efforts towards an elusive goal. The result of developed policy aimed at such goals would not really be known until some time in the future. To make the situation even more difficult, professional staff would be asked to address the problem that on "many critical values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree and public administrators disagree."[13]

In response to the challenge of developing such a clear and rational policy, the successive limited comparisons model uses the following five steps to arrive at a consensus:[14]

- the determination of goals and empirical examination of such goals are to be seen as a partnership and not as competitors,

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[12]Ibid. p. 81.

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[14]Ibid. p. 81.

which still required an answer, the successive limited comparisons or branch' model was implemented.[12] The branch model could best be described as a pro-active approach that satisfied the public's demands. It caused policy-makers to adapt a new means of creating and implementing policy initiatives. This model also presented a new method of solving what were to become increasingly complex and problems for administrators.

The branch model consisted of five steps and introduced a method of policy development whereby implementors were called upon to direct their efforts towards an elusive goal. The result of developed policy aimed at such goals would not really be known until some time in the future. To make the situation even more difficult, professional staff would be asked to address the problem that on "many critical values or objectives, citizens disagree, congressmen disagree and public administrators disagree."[13]

In response to the challenge of developing such a clear and rational policy, the successive limited comparisons model uses the following five steps to arrive at a consensus:[14]

- the determination of goals and empirical examination of all goals are to be seen as a partnership and not as competitors;

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[12] Ibid. p. 81.

[13] Ibid. p. 81.

[14] Ibid. p. 81.

- means-to-an-end analysis is inappropriate,
- testing the success of the policy is usually limited to examination of some agreement on the policy in isolation from results,
- any analysis of policy is limited because all the possible outcomes, whether beneficial or not, cannot be immediately determined, and
- by comparing results of the output of this formula to past outputs of other formulas the reliance on theory is reduced.

The successive limited comparisons model does present the problem of not telling us what the objective of a policy will be, but the underlying problem is that society is unsure what its objective is supposed to be. Therefore, policy is being presented in an environment which has no precedents to rely on for direction. This is further complicated by public disagreement over what the ends of policy should actually be. The ultimate consequence of this is that "it is not irrational for an administrator to defend a policy as good without being able to specify what it is good for."[15]

Politicians and bureaucrats have been able to remain relatively unscathed because they used the "incremental" method of making policy changes.[16] It ensures that public demand is acknowledged and answered and would appear to facilitate modifications as the need arose. Incrementalism

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[15]Ibid. p.p. 84.

[16]Ibid. p. 84.

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Politicians and bureaucrats have been able to remain relatively unscathed because they used the "incremental" method of making policy changes."[*] It ensures that public demand is acknowledged and answered and could appear to facilitate modifications as the need arose. Incrementalism

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[*]Ibid. p. 84.

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is not the result of desperation on the part of policy-makers or a means of simplifying choices in order to get on to the next problem. Democracies especially during periods of rapid change almost exclusively modify policy through "incremental adjustment."[17] These adjustments will have an impact to varying degrees on members of the public.

Making policy is difficult because society is always placing new demands on a government and policy-makers may not always be sure what is being asked of them. In order to reduce the possibility of error an experienced policy maker will strive to achieve small victories in policy development. To do so will ensure that the goal of policy is still present, and may be safely reached through appropriate smaller measures as opposed to large dangerous steps.

The underlying condition is that incrementalism allows a government in uncertain conditions, to manage a situation that has the potential for political difficulty. It gives a government the opportunity to manage its political affairs carefully, and at the same time fulfil its constitutional responsibilities. This type of activity may be described as "muddling through . . . in some respects constitute a dangerous overreaction," but within an uncertain political environment, this type of reaction could be more realistically

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[17]Ibid. p. 84.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

described as cautious.[18] In difficult policy situations, the use of incrementalism would undoubtedly be the prudent course to follow. The difficulty that politicians and bureaucrats faced in policy creation still remained despite the use of incremental measures. If muddling through was still the end result of the root and branch models of policy development with the assistance of incrementalism, it could be argued both methods fell short.

The response to this was a formula known as the "normative-optimum model." The "normative-optimum model" which was considered to be a "reprocessing of both the comprehensive rationality and the successive limited comparison models," used these eight steps:[19]

- clarification of what policies are attempting to do,
- identify alternatives, consider new ones which will lead to an innovative new proposal,
- attempt to predict benefits of policy and determine which one represents the least risk,
- set a cut off point for considering possible results of alternative policies and identify expected results,
- the real test of the optimum policy is if the first four steps are approved,

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[18]Yehezkel Dror, "Muddling Through-Science of Inertia?" Public administration Review, vol. 24, no. 3, (September 1964), p. 153.

[19]Ibid. p. 156.

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- must decide if the problem is important enough to do an analysis,
- rely on theory and experience, rationality and extra rationality, and
- defined arrangements are put into place to improve the quality of policy making to encourage an intelligent effort.

Although this model may be more thorough and can be easily adapted to new situations, a government may not always have the luxury of having required the benefit of theory, experience and rationality as in the seventh step. A government may find itself in a brand new situation with little or no information to fall back on. Possibly an event is so current that new theories have to be developed and brought into the discussion. There may be policy decisions to be made on no foundation other than the policy-makers' instincts. These situations may be delicate because some people will benefit more than others. In this case incrementalism may still in the final analysis be the best means of policy development because it allows a certain amount of damage control on route to implementing a new policy.

- must decide if the problem is important enough to be an analysis.
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CHAPTER 2

HALL-DENNIS REPORT

In response to the changes, primarily in the area of scientific and technological advances, Minister of Education William Davis announced plans for a committee to study the entire educational process in Ontario. The result of this announcement was the report entitled Living and Learning.[20] This report was later to become better known as the Hall-Dennis Report, named after Mr. Justice E.M. Hall, and former school principal, Mr. L.A. Dennis. Together with a committee comprised of twenty-two additional members, public hearings were held. At the conclusion of submissions to the committee the resultant report was presented in June of 1968.

The contents of the report dealt with the concerns of the type of world students would be facing in the twenty-first century. The report commented that "if the current rate of social, economic, and technological change is maintained in the years ahead, the educational process will need continuing reappraisal, and school programs will have to be designed to

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[20]Living and Learning. The Report of the Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives of Education in the Schools of Ontario.

CHAPTER 7

HALL-DENNIS REPORT

respond accordingly."[21] This report was the point of departure away from centralization, and a bold new step into the decentralized education methodology.

The committee presented its report, which was designed to support one fundamental recommendation, and read as follows:

> Establish, as fundamental principles governing school education in Ontario,
> a) the right of every individual to have equal access to the learning experience best suited to his needs, and
> b) the responsibility of every school authority to provide a child-centred learning continuum that invites learning by individual discovery and inquiry.[22]

Out of this report came a wide variety of recommendations which were placed in four categories. These four categories were:

1) The Learning Program,

2) Special Learning Situations,

3) The World of Teaching, and

4) Organizing for Learning.[23]

The Hall-Dennis Report provided a comprehensive review of the education system, but this thesis is concerned with only certain aspects of the report. Those areas are the shift to decentralization, and the question of the extension of funds to separate schools.

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[21]Ibid. p. 5.

[22]Ibid. p. 179.

[23]Ibid. p. 179.

The Hall-Dennis Report advocated the decentralized approach to education. It emphasized that education was only effective if it could meet the needs of the individual student. In other words education had to become child-centred to meet the challenges of the future. The difficulty with this was that it was not possible to deliver this type of education system, while being controlled by the bureaucracy in Queen's Park. As long as the administration of the system came from the province, local education problems could not be rectified.

The provincially-driven reorganization of small to large school units was a necessity. The consolidation of many small boards into fewer larger ones, seriously strained relations with the public. Before the uproar over consolidation had the opportunity to die down the Hall-Dennis Report was made public. The recommendations in the report only served to maintain the public in an agitated condition.

The number of school boards had been reduced from 5,600 in 1945 to 1,600 in 1967.[24] This process of reduction known as centralization made the education system more cost effective. It also improved the level and calibre of service to students. However, the world was a changing place and not improving upon existing structures could prove to be disastrous.

The report said "larger and more responsible school

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[24]Ibid. p. 12.

boards should have far greater control and autonomy" over the operation of local education affairs.[25] At the same time it suggested that the "fundamental role of provincial authority should be to equalize educational opportunity by means of a redistribution of money to the local education authorities, while leaving most of the decisions concerning its expenditures to them."[26] Local boards should be allowed to spend allotted money in the most appropriate ways to address local needs.

The school board was also to be responsible for the curriculum of its own schools within certain provincial limits. This would require elected school board members to be responsible for the operation, and the quality of its system.[27] The time had arrived to recognize that education was an enormous operation, which could no longer deliver one uniform system of instruction. It was perceived that the current form of educational administration directed by the province was unable to meet local needs.

In response to this situation, the Hall-Dennis committee presented some very specific recommendations. Those concerning local control over curriculum were as follows:

> #83 Locate decision-making related to curriculum design and implementation at the school board level and in particular at the individual school level.

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[25]Ibid. p. 153.

[26]Ibid. p. 153.

[27]Ibid. p. 154.

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[54] Ibid. p. 183.

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[56] Ibid. p. 184.

> #84 Establish the responsibility of the Department of Education in matters of curriculum as that of the identification of curriculum problems, the commissioning of curriculum research, the dissemination of curriculum information, and the provision of aid and stimulation for innovative practice.
>
> #85 Prepare and present curriculum guides as broad statements, and make the design of detailed curriculum programming the responsibility of the teachers in the schools.
>
> #86 Provide aids to curriculum design and planning which will assist teachers in the development of their programs.[28]

These four recommendations encouraged a partnership between provincial and local educators. Each would be responsible for specific functions, but local educators would take prime responsibility for teaching.

In the area of school administration, a specific recommendation was presented in response to the concern of adequate administration in individual school jurisdictions:

> #198 In the application of administrative policies at the local level, employ principles of decentralization which will allow groups of schools and individual schools to respond uniquely and responsibly to the needs of teachers and students in the schools.[29]

Decentralization was the key word. Its strength as a process of change could no longer be denied.

The other issue that the province was being pressured to act upon, was the question of separate school funding to the

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[28]Ibid. p. 187.

[29]Ibid. p. 198.

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[28]Ibid., p. 197.

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completion of high school. The opening statement of the report addressed this issue:

> The Province of Ontario is committed to a public tax-supported system of non-confessional and Roman Catholic separate schools. This two-fold system was in existence prior to Confederation and was written into The British North America Act as a condition of that union. Unless the constitution is changed, this is the pattern that will continue. That being so, it is imperative that the needs of all children in Ontario be justly served in the spirit of co-operation, understanding, and good will that is increasingly noticeable in Ontario today.[30]

The Hall-Dennis Report never came out with a matter of fact statement on the question of extension. Undoubtedly all the good work that went into the report, and its results, could easily have been sabotaged if it had delved into such areas. It did espouse that a spirit of co-operation could be developed between both systems, and that ways of making joint use of provincial educational assets could be found.

Co-operation could be developed through the sharing of certain services. The list covered:[31]

- pupil transportation, to eliminate duplication of bus services,
- sharing of consultative staff, so that experienced professionals would be made available to all teachers and children,
- common sites, whereby both school boards shared facilities,

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[30]Ibid. p. 12.

[31]Ibid. p. 163.

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Co-operation could be developed through the sharing o

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- pupil transportation, to eliminate duplication of bu
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- sharing of consolidated staff, so that experienced
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children;
- common sites, whereby both school boards shared facilities

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[40]Ibid, p. 52.

[41]Ibid, p. 283.

- joint projects, which would spread between both boards the cost of a new project,
- health services, especially medical and dental to be operated by a joint committee of both boards,
- counselling services, which allow both boards access to up-to-date information on the vocational side of education,
- computer services, using remote terminals to access a computer system,
- in-service teacher education, whereby joint conferences are held to improve teaching staff abilities, and
- special education, to set up joint classes to educate the handicapped while sharing staff and facilities.

In going beyond describing areas where the improvement of relations could be carried out, the report presented three recommendations that it felt had to be considered. These recommendations specific to separate schools are as follows:

> #252. Enact legislation which will form separate school boards into larger units of administration for separate school purposes, with boundaries coterminous with those of county and district boards of education.
>
> #253. In the implementation of the proposed plan for larger units of administration for education in Ontario, find some arrangement, acceptable to all, which will bring the two tax-supported systems into administrative co-operation, preserving what is considered by the separate school supporters as essential to their system, and at the same time making possible a great deal of co-operation and sharing of special services, avoiding duplication in many areas and services, and bringing to an end a controversy that has burdened the administration of education in Ontario since Confederation.

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cost of a new project.
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[illegible]

[illegible]

> #254. Develop patterns of co-operation between separate school boards and boards of education in the areas of transportation, school sites, health services, counselling services, computer services, in-service education, special education and joint projects, where such co-operation will reduce costs and organizational impediments to equality of opportunity.[32]

These recommendations would improve the ability of the separate system to deliver education services to an increasingly large number of students. It recognized that denominational schools could not be forced out of existence due to lack of financial support. Also by designing both separate and public boards along the same municipal boundaries and sharing of services between the boards, a statement was being made about the right of both education boards to exist.

The committee members recognized that the public was demanding change. At the same time they also understood that in order for these demands to be met a new relationship or education structure had to be developed. The structure was in reality a new power sharing arrangement, over the entire administration of education. This new formula would involve the province, school boards and parents as the key members. Also in a support role, were all the other segments of society who had a keen interest in education being a success. The only way education would be successful and deliver a product society felt was acceptable was to develop a strong interrelationship among all these groups.

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[32]Ibid. p. 203.

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Illustration One is a model that is used to represent an administrative design based upon the interrelationship which must exist among all elements and sub-systems of the total organization of learning. The development of equality of educational opportunity and the decentralization of decision-making are suggested by this model.[33] The province is to maintain its responsibilities in the areas of legislation, planning, research
development and systems evaluations. There was a need to have a certain uniformity across the province, and the provincial government had the fincial resources and expertise to look after there areas. Local educational authorities found in the Domain of Educational Implementation would be responsible for taking the framework of education ideas developed by provincial staff, and adapting them to local conditions.

What remained intact in this model was the chain of command, between the two levels of government. The province maintained its dominant position of leader in education, and school boards maintained their local administrative duties. The change however, was the transfer not of constitutional powers, this was not even considered, but rather the loosening of the grip of central control. Centralization proved to be effective in the past when the province was easier to operate. In the days of small population and

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
Legislature
Domain of Provincial Policy
Canadian Education Association
Council of Ministers of Education
Ontario Educational Research Council
Superintendents' Association
Advisory Council
Minister
Deputy Minister
Legislation
Planning, Research, Development (Supportive services)
Systems Evaluation
Teachers' Association
-Grants
-Management
-Statistics
-Data Processing
-Internal Administration
-Buildings
-Information
Communications
Domain of Educational Implementation
Association for Curriculum Development
Home and School Associations
Trustees' Associations
-Boards of Education
-Separate School Boards
-Other School Boards
Area of Interest and Co-operation
-Universities
-Community Colleges
-College of Art
-Special Schools
-Library Boards
-Private Schools
OISE Faculties of Education
Ombudsman
School Committees' Association
ETV Council
Religious Groups
Press
Labor
Student Groups
Parent-Teacher Associations

previous to the high technology era, education was a simple operation. There were minimal demands on government by the public.

The idea of decentralization was presented because it was the only answer to the inadequacies of provincially-mandated policy. The report emphasized that a new education system, more responsive to individual student need was essential. It argued that in order to determine what type of specialized treatment was to be implemented community consultation and participation in the orientation of education had to be promoted. The Model for Ontario ensured that decentralization would result in greater community involvement and consequently a more equitable sharing of the responsibility for education.

CHAPTER 3

EDUCATION POLICY

From Confederation through to the early 1960s the provincial government had accepted an ever-increasing role in the operation of education in Ontario. Initially the policy of the government was to do all it could to keep out of education. It was a problem that was better dealt with by local people. However, as the population increased and more schools appeared on the scene, the education system became a large unstructured operation with little cohesion among educators.

By 1867 it became apparent that local government was having difficulty maintaining the orderly development of basic education. Many townships in that period were geographic units whose prime purpose was to facilitate orderly local growth.[34] As a result of the concentration on local growth the operation of educational institutions began to suffer from inadequate organization. Even as this lack of organization became more pronounced the province was not willing to employ coercion to remedy local problems.

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[34]David M. Cameron, Schools for Ontario: Policy-making, Administration, and Finance in the 1960s, (University of Toronto Press 1972), p.11

CHAPTER 3

EDUCATION POLICY

The 1930s also witnessed the introduction of professionalism into the teaching profession. In 1875 only 22% of teachers had the benefit of professional training. This number increased to 95% by 1929.[35] Professional provincial inspectors were also introduced. The inspection branch served notice that the province had decided to increase its role significantly in the administration of education.[36]

As a result of the introduction of professionalism, Queen's Park began to re-organize and co-ordinate these scattered education units into a unified cohesive system. The answer to gathering these school units and improving the delivery of educational services was the concept known as centralization. Centralization gathered the complete responsibility for the administration of education under the provincial roof.

As of 1965 Ontario had in place a highly centralized education system totally dominated by the provincial government with local school boards performing more as administrative implementers of education policy. The province was not willing to share or surrender any of its constitutional powers, especially while the economic times were good. The need to decentralize did not seem great.

During the era of centralization, school trustees tended to be representatives of the public who were primarily

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As the province decided to eliminate the large number of small school boards which were not providing a standardized level of instruction, it at the same time was removing a large amount of control of schools from the local constituency. In order to reduce complaints about the provincial intrusion into local school affairs, Queen's Park supplied money to supplement boards whose costs were exceeding the ability to pay.[37] Local facilities improved but the price paid was the entrenchment of centralization.

It was also recognized that the surrender of local control was necessary to bring organization to a badly

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[37]David M. Cameron, Schools for Ontario: Policy-making, Administration, and Finance in the 1960s, (University of Toronto Press 1972), p. 88.

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[57]David M. Cameron, Schools for Ontario: Policy-making Administration, and Finance in the 1960s, (University o Toronto Press 1972), p. 58.

fragmented education system.[38] With the school boards in Ontario representing everything from the one room school house to large urban centres with thousands of students, it was impossible to establish a standard level of instruction that fulfilled the ever changing community needs. The provincial government was in a much better position to analyze the trends and answer problems on a wide scale. Centralization brought with it a system that provided a better quality education as well as being more equitable.

Centralization reduced school boards to being responsible for two functions:[39]

- provision of facilities, equipment and supplies, and
- securing staff.

Previously the trustees were responsible for the entire operation including curriculum, but when provincial domination of education curriculum became a ministry concern, trustees did not have their work load lessened. With the growth of student population and staff hiring, facilities procurement became more demanding than ever. Trustees had fewer but much larger duties and less power to go with it.

Usually governments act out of political motivation as a governing party is always preoccupied with maintaining power. Ontario in the 1960s took advantage of federal funds

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[38]Leslie R. Gue, An Introduction to Educational Administration in Canada, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited 1985), p. 68.

[39]Ibid. p. 80.

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and carefully adjusted an unorganized school system. The motivation was multifaceted. It demonstrated that the Tories were capable managers of a prosperous province. They were not afraid to take bold steps which hurt local control yet at the same time made sure that local officials were made to feel that they were a part of the solution. The government was acting to correct existing difficulties and to prepare students better for the challenges of the future.

Both opposition parties could not realistically voice any criticism regarding the benefits of centralization for some very different reasons. The New Democrats were a new party that evolved out of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in 1961. The NDP expended much effort on establishing and developing a new and credible image, so as to be seen as an alternative to the Tories. While not wishing to antagonize the voters over a concept that was administrative and of little concern to the public, the NDP simply ignored centralization at their early policy conventions. It was only in 1969, that the NDP addressed school issues in a significant fashion, and only on the subject of school district boundaries.[40] The Liberals at the outset were supportive of bringing the fairest educational opportunity to the public and their political philosophy would have supported a sensible re-

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[40]Programme: Policies of the Ontario NDP, Section 9.2.1 School District Boundaries, Council (February 1969).

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organization of the education system.[41] As with the NDP, attacking an administrative concept that caused minimal outcry from the electorate made little sense especially when the results of centralization, primarily new improved schools and a higher standard of education were achieved.

Centralization fit very comfortably in the branch model, because it selected and examined a goal simultaneously. Centralization would bring order to an unwieldy education process and the reasons for doing so were very closely related, one supported the other superbly. A means-to-an-end analysis was limited because the province had to move very quickly to take advantage of federal money allocated to the provinces. There was also a favourable political climate and public support for centralization. Additionally, excessive long term study might see the political climate change, and an opportunity to implement centralization would be lost. Centralization was felt to be a good idea because everyone involved in the policy debate agreed on the concept and its usefulness, even if the way it was implemented was not agreed upon.

There were also some problems that the branch system and centralization policy experienced. There was little or no study of the possible future results. For example, new demands that could make centralization obsolete or

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[41]"The Guelph Papers," ed., Robert F. Nixon, assoc. ed., Allan Linden, (Peter Martin Associates Limited), p.p. 2-4.

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[44]"The Guelph Papers," ed., Robert P. Nixon, assoc. ed., Allan Linden, (Peter Martin Associates Limited), p.p. 245.

alternatives to the total control the province held on education were not examined.

Probably the most telling indicator of the formidable strength of centralization was that up to 1968 many school trustees were involved only in local policy matters and nothing else. The actual administration and operation of school systems were managed by the province and its professional educators. Local trustees and their staff during this period primarily administered provincial directives.

Centralization as a governmental policy had performed its function very well in that it brought together a badly fragmented operation, and transformed it into a strong unified educational system. The public generally agreed this organizational idea was beneficial but the times changed again. In response to the Soviet Union launching the Sputnik into space in the late 1950s, and the resultant national embarrassment felt by western countries, education emphasis changed. Almost immediately the public in Ontario demanded a re-examination of its education system.[42]

As a result of the perception that Ontario was falling behind and that the confidence the public had enjoyed in its education system had suddenly been jeopardized Minister of Education William Davis, through an Order-in-Council set in motion an examination of education in reply to these public

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[42]Norm Forster, Public Relations Officer, interview by author, August 22, 1991, Hamilton Board of Education, Hamilton, Ontario.

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concerns. (See Appendix A). By using this method of appointing a committee, the government had taken the first step in all three policy models.

Following the root model, provincial civil servants set out to determine what the new purpose of education was to be. When they entered the next step of means-end analysis, the root model proved to inadequate. The root model required a definite means to reach an equally definite conclusion. The difficulty here was that society found itself living in a rapidly changing technological period, and any final conclusions could easily become outdated.

Eventually the root model was no longer appropriate. It called for the testing of policy to see if it satisfied the objective specified within the process. Unfortunately the empirical type of study required was not possible. The committee was studying an open ended policy process with indefinite conclusions. The root model dropped out as its methodology was not able to help arrive at suitable conclusions.

The branch model initially required that goals would have to be determined by all those involved in this policy examination. The branch model readily dismissed any final conclusions. It recognized that rapid change disqualified rigid responses. This model did minimal testing due to time constraints, and the nature of the policy in question. The branch model would force the education committee to analyze

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all recommendations in a very limited fashion because the benefits were not always known.

The last step in the branch model would have the committee compare its ideas to past examples. The failure here was that there was no past experience to fall back on. The committee was to be making recommendations that were revolutionary. The strength of its suggestions would be based on the research and reputation of committee members, and their confidence in the move to decentralization.

The normative-optimum model's initial step was to clarify what the new policies intended to do. The next step in policy development was to identify the means-end relationship. The normative procedure sought to examine various alternatives in order to keep its options open, and called upon policy-makers to attempt to predict benefits. This allowed for some discussion of the potential benefits that change could bring to education. The normative-optimum model was more confident. It would limit examination to its very specific goals of modernizing education and present its findings for examination. This was the real test for the normative-optimum approach. If the first four steps provided a satisfactory result, then the committee was ready to advance to the next stage for further examination.

This further examination did consist of a conscious effort to answer a serious problem through comprehensive analysis. The final elements of the normative-optimum model

consisted of using theory, experience, and a commitment to quality in order to complete the entire policy-development package.

The normative-optimum model was the best suited policy creation model. It took into consideration as many of the important factors as possible in order to arrive at the recommendations that were to be presented in the Hall-Dennis Report. The result of the report was the introduction of the concept of decentralization. This promised to redefine the educational partnership between the province, trustees and parents. As Ontario entered the new technological era and began to deal with the uncertainty of the future, the tri-partite membership would develop new education policy in a more equitable fashion.

By 1969 Ontario had achieved a decentralized curriculum but this did not mean that local school boards were creating their own courses for their students to take. Various committees and studies at the provincial level indicated that the time was right for students at the high school level to begin to pick some of their own courses in addition to taking some compulsory material. Provincial policy by this time saw decentralization as part of the normal working environment and not as a threat to its educational sovereignty.

In 1974 Minister of Education Thomas Wells saw the structure of education in Ontario as something very different from what was the case in the past. Whereas the province was

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once responsible for practically everything, Wells announced what the more current version of provincial responsibility had become. Ministry policy was designed to attain the highest level of quality and equality in both levels of educations, elementary and secondary, and this was to be achieved by providing:[43]

- the most comprehensive range of educational, cultural and recreational programs possible,
- highly qualified staff,
- proper facilities for approved education activities, and
- equitable sharing of tax revenue to meet the first three principles.

By 1974 Wells appeared to be able to answer some of the structural problems education experienced in the province before the Hall-Dennis Report. He announced that the achievement of the previously mentioned four objectives was now the responsibility of the Ministry of Education as well as the school boards. He went on to announce:

> As the British North America Act-in giving the educational mandate to the provincial governments within Canada-recognizes the need for an understanding of local conditions in the structuring of an educational system, so the provincial authority recognizes the tremendous diversity of conditions and needs that exists even within a single province. Thus the provincial government in Ontario has delegated the administration of specified areas of education to local authorities, with the result that school

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> boards have many responsibilities with regard to local educational activity and decision-making.
>
> While the Ministry of Education formulates the philosophy within which educational opportunities are offered, it does so within a framework that takes the views of the educational as well as the general community into account; it must thus have effective channels of communication through which it can be made aware of the views of school board officials, teachers and other educators, and the general public. It must also have efficient means of interacting with local authorities in order to provide whatever assistance is required in implementing programs and to ensure that the public is being well served by the educational community."[45]

The Tories managed to amend their policies from centralized to decentralized control, not by choice but by necessity.

[45]Ibid. p. 4.

[illegible]

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CHAPTER 4

SEPARATE SCHOOLS

Separate schools originated out of a completely different environment than did common schools as early as 1807. From the earliest days the motivating force behind Catholic education was the Church hierarchy. The goal for the Catholic Church was to combine religious training and education into one educational process. This was considerably different from what was proposed by common school supporters. However, the fact remained that these early separate schools were a part of the provincial education system, and consequently, the responsibility of the provincial government.

In the years of the union of Upper and Lower Canada there had always been a "strong sentiment in favour of a religious orientation of common schools in Upper Canada," as long as those schools were locally operated.[46] The sentiment for religious orientation supported at the provincial level was strenuously resisted. Once religious education was established it was not politically wise for the government to ignore the supporters of such an education system. During this early period Catholics comprised "an effective majority" in the assembly of Upper Canada, thus making it imperative to

[46]David M. Cameron, Schools for Ontario, p. 17.

work out an educational compromise.[47] The Government was forced to arrive at a compromise, if for no other reason than separate school supporters were a strong political force.

The early position of the province was based upon the interaction of "bureaucratic detachment, clerical pressure, and political concern - produced two basic principles of provincial policy towards separate school organization."[48] These were that separate school organizations must always "appear to be reasonably similar to those for public schools" and that "separate schools must never be permitted to organize in ways that would enable them to challenge the public schools as a system."[49]

The government was very much aware that it would have to accommodate two groups of people with divergent views. It was also known that the competition between the groups for survival would be great. As a result of these concerns, the policy of appearing to be fair to both boards was critical for electoral support. It was also critical that the public supporters be confident that their schools would be protected.

Originally the provisions for the institutionalization of elementary and secondary education in Ontario came from "the unco-ordinated activities of local entrepreneurs, missionary-oriented clergyman, and, especially, concerned

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[47]Ibid. p. 17.

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[11]Ibid. p. 17.

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parents."[50] As a result of this locally generated activity the Grammar School Act was passed in 1807, in Upper Canada. The Act provided for a system of exclusive education limited to those citizens with the financial ability to participate. It also adopted the name "Public" in order to make the system more readily identifiable.[51] Due to continued public pressure to expand education services the provincial legislature in 816 passed the Common Schools Act.[52] This Act provided legislative approval for the establishment of informal school boards. These early boards were established by incorporating a three member common school board of trustees in "any Town, Township, Village, or place."[53] To this point the province restricted its concern to the provision of grants, in proportion to attendance, and would not provide any money at all for boards which had less than twenty students.[54] Common schools were not actively discouraged, but the province did not want the responsibility for operating the schools. It chose to delegate the responsibility of education to local groups who very conveniently were willing to maintain this responsibility.

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[50]Ibid. p. 10.

[51]Ibid. p. 10.

[52]Ibid. p. 10.

[53]Ibid. p.p. 10-11.

[54]Ibid. p. 11.

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[20] Ibid. p. 10.

[21] Ibid. p. 10.

[22] Ibid. p. 10.

[23] Ibid. p.p. 10-11.

[24] Ibid. p. 11.

The rebellion of 1837, and the merging of Upper and Lower Canada into the new Province of Canada, didn't alter the view that school government was to remain a local responsibility. At the same time the new parliament of the Province of Canada set out to integrate the common schools of the former provinces into one true education system, and in 1841 passed the General Common Schools Act.[55] This act established the township as the basic unit of school government, as well as introducing the principle of separate schools.

Separate schools originated during the years just before Confederation. Upper Canada (Ontario) approved of denominational schools as long as religious education was administered at the local level. However, with the central government gradually taking over greater control of the organization and regulation of education, the problem of what type of orientation the provincial schools would follow presented itself.

The earliest catalyst for the separation of Catholics and Protestants was over the use of the Bible as an instructional text. The Protestants sought permission for the use of the Bible as a classroom text in 1841.[56] This was not acceptable to Catholics and prompted William Morris, chairman of a parliamentary committee on education, to say that the only solution was that "the children of both religious

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[55]Ibid. p. 12.

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persuasions must be educated apart."[57] In response to this situation, the Upper Canada Act of 1843 restricted separate school privileges to Catholics and Protestants.

Since the inception of the recognition of separate schools in 1841 these institutions had as always been treated as "dissentient schools," with their organization tied to that of the "parent" or common school system.[58] With the further enlargement of basic geographic boundaries of school areas from the township to the larger category of school sections in 1843, the separate schools suddenly were in danger.

The government adopted a new method of combining separate and public systems into one common education board in all incorporated cities and towns. These municipalities were not subject to the same rules that rural school boards were, which allowed separate schools to exist independent of public units. As a result of this, Catholic schools immediately lost their religious identity when they were incorporated into the public system. When Catholic educators applied to the City of Toronto education board for permission to have their schools declared denominational, they were refused.[59]

In response to this situation, Catholic Bishop, the Rt Rev. Comte de Charbonnel, applied for a separate school

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[57]Ibid. p. 17.

[58]Ibid. p. 18.

[59]Ibid. p. 18.

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[*] Ibid. p. 17.

[**] Ibid. p. 16.

[***] Ibid. p. 18.

district within the city. This was refused as well. The province saw that it was not possible for any type of accommodation to occur between both groups and so amended its Education Act in 1850, and removed the common school board's right to make such refusals. In its place the province allowed a separate school in each ward in any city or town in Upper Canada.

Eventually, in the Macdonald-Cartier Legislature of the United Province of Canada, the Scott Separate School Act of 1863 was approved as a response to the difficulties experienced in establishing separate school districts.[60] The Scott Act allowed both public and separate schools the right to maintain individual school boards within all provincial municipalities. This allowed both Catholic and Protestant groups the privilege of operating separate education systems.[61]

The Scott Act was significant due to the impact it had on the terms of Confederation. In order for Confederation to take place one factor that had to be guaranteed was the protection of Protestant education rights in Quebec, and identical education rights for Catholics in Ontario. These minimal education rights found in the Scott Act, were enshrined "in perpetuity," in The British North American

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[40]Ibid., p. 19.

[41]Ibid., p. 19.

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In order to ensure that "perpetuity" was not somehow forgotten or ignored, this guarantee of education rights was established in Section 93 of The British North America Act (Constitution Act of 1867). Section 93 ensured that no provincial law in Ontario or Quebec could jeopardize the legal right to denominational schools.[63] In the years that followed, further refinements were made to the size of particular school boards which presented unique organizational situations. The province continued to promote its policy of larger school units and made adjustments to school board boundaries as required. Eventually and with great reluctance, Upper Canada agreed to accept responsibility for organizing and operating a dual educational system in the province.

The constitutionality of separate schools did not provide for any greater rights for Ontario's Catholic system. In fact, Section 93 was often interpreted as the point at which education rights were frozen, unless the Constitution Act was amended. This interpretation caused the terms of the Constitution Act to be seen as unalterable, but this strict interpretation changed over time.

Provincial policy gradually replaced this former unalterable condition, and emphasized that only "prejudicial"

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[62]V.K. Gilbert, R.A. Martin, and A.T. Sheehan, A Hard Act to Follow: Notes on Ontario School Law, (The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1989), p. 17.

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change or modifications of terms was forbidden by the Constitution Act.[64] From 1840 to 1969 Catholic education rights in Ontario were limited, due to the persistant refusal of the province to increase financial help to the separate system. During this time the number of years students spent in the education system gradually increased, but not with a corresponding amount of financial aid. The public school system received full financial benefits.

By 1969 the political maturity of separate school boards across Ontario came into being, as they parallelled public board boundaries. This maturity came about as a result of the "spirit rather than the letter of the law" being used as a guideline.[65] In 1969 separate schools were allowed to organize county school boards, and this gave them an organizational format similar to the public board system across the entire province. With this maturity the sensitive question of improving the financial situation of Catholic schools appeared on the provincial landscape. The province would now be forced into examining the request for full funding to the completion of high school by Catholics.

As separate schools increased in number and size they began to share many of the administrative problems that their public counterparts experienced. They also had one unique problem which was capable of threatening the existence of

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[64]Ibid. p. 17.

[65]Ibid. p. 17.

change or modifications of terms was forbidden by th Constitution Act."[illegible] From 1840 to 1959 Catholic educatio rights in Ontario were limited, due to the persistent refusa of the province to increase financial aid to the separat system. During this time the number of years students spen in the education system gradually increased, but not with corresponding amount of financial aid. The public schoo system received full financial benefits.

By 1969 the political maturity of separate school boards across Ontario came into being, as they paralleled publi board boundaries. This maturity came about as a result of th "spirit rather than the letter of the law' being used as guideline."[illegible] In 1969 separate schools were allowed t organize county school boards, and this gave them a organizational format similar to the public board syste across the entire province. With this maturity the sensiti question of improving the financial situation of Catholi schools appeared on the provincial landscape. The provinc would now be forced into examining the request for ful funding to the completion of high school by Catholics.

As separate schools increased in number and size the began to share many of the administrative problems that thei public counterparts experienced. They also had one uniqu problem which was capable of threatening the existence o

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[illegible] Ibid., p. 17.

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Catholic education. The problem was to be found in the "disparity in the taxable capacities of the public and separate systems."[66] This disparity was directly related to the tax base, but it arose " from the historically inherited and constitutionally sanctioned principles of separate school government."[67]

As discussed previously, education for both systems historically was paid for by the local community or a group of interested parents. The responsibility for education which had a limited curriculum, was managed without provincial participation in the years before Confederation. After Confederation the government of Ontario was suddenly forced to take an active roll in the operation of education, by virtue of constitutional obligation.

It was when schools fell into the provincial domain that the difficulties arose. Separate education was well established in the province and guaranteed in the Constitution, but the level of funding was not mandated. Both factors of local operation of schools and finance contributed to the inconsistent method of raising tax revenues. The end result was the inconsistent dispersal of tax revenues. Even though Catholic education was promised financial support by law, the question of how much money would be allocated for separate education in Ontario remained to be answered.

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The result of inconsistent tax dispersal was that some separate schools in large urban areas, were in a better financial position than some public schools in other depressed or less developed areas. In situations were a community was served by both school systems, the public boards usually received substantially more money than the separate system. The resultant problem for the province was, "that in virtually every local community with a dual elementary system, the separate school has had a significantly smaller fiscal capacity than the public school."[68]

The reasons for these fiscal disparities are found in the early provincial funding formulas. Funding for Catholic schools was carried out by "the imposition of the three-mile radial separate school zone in rural areas, and the placing of the choice of supporting a separate school upon the individual Catholic property owner or tenant."[69] If you were Catholic, and chose to support a separate school, but lived outside the three-mile zone, there was no opportunity to do so.

The other part of this financial situation was that each Catholic property owner or tenant was free to choose which board it would like to support. A non-Catholic did not have this choice. If the rate of taxation became too great for Catholic taxpayers, they could switch to a lower tax paying

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The other consideration was the problem of granting to individuals the choice of supporting either the public or separate system. A serious difficulty occurred in the area of large corporations. The ownership of shares changes constantly and because the owners of shares are difficult to identify, encouraging Catholic owners to support the Catholic system was almost impossible. The result of this was that separate schools were denied this lucrative source of corporate funds.[71]

In 1913, provisions were eased to allow the proportion of property allocated to supporting separate schools to equal the number of Catholic shareholders or owners. This meant that a corporation did not need to know the actual names and number of all separate school supporters. Rather it only had to identify a percentage.[72] Later court rulings put the onus on the corporations to determine the actual percentage of support, by insuring that the percentage of support was never greater than the proportion of Catholic shareholders.

The result of this saw the separate school system enter

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[70]Ibid. p. 59.

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the 1960s with a very limited fiscal capacity, and a need for financial support equal to public schools. A brief presented by the Metropolitan Toronto Separate School Board to Premier Frost in November 1959 contained some startling statistics. This board educated 24% of metropolitan children, but only received 1.98% of business assessment. Enrolment during the four previous years increased 22% in the separate system as opposed to 7% in the public system. The tax structure at that time allowed $314. per child in the public system, as opposed to $63. in the separate system.[73]

In response to these difficult financial situations, separate school supporters presented the idea of a "foundation plan" which would "provide equal educational facilities for children."[74] This plan was not a grant in its traditional form, in that it did not involve simply giving money to a recipient. It was instead a program based on the following:[75]

- need,
- the principle of educational equality, and
- an equalization formula whereby schools which received low revenues due to poor assessments, received additional provincial funds.

The plan would make up for revenue shortages that were

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[73]Franklin A. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Ontario: From the Hope Commission to the Promise of Completion (1945-1985), vol. 3, p .89.

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The foundation plan called for the department of education to:[76]

- determine the total amount of money it would cost to educate a child,
- ensure that the cost would be met by the implementation of a uniform mill rate applied across the province on an equalized municipal assessment, and
- that any school board with weak financial capabilities would be subsidized by provincial grants.

Premier Robarts announced the implementation of the plan on February 21, 1963, and it would come into effect in 1964.[77] The Premier hoped that this plan would reduce the controversy over funding religious education. If public school supporters did not protest too strenuously the plan would be considered successful, and elementary education would be better financed. Although this plan was applied to both school systems, separate school education funding was vastly improved. Public boards with low property assessment also benefitted.

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Extension

With the elementary level of education funding being improved, the Catholic Church hierarchy and senior proponents of Catholic education started out on their next mission. The hierarchy decided to work towards securing "equal financial opportunity at the secondary level for Roman Catholics of Ontario".[78] This became known as extension, a procedure whereby public money was used to fund the entire secondary separate school system.

Although the future of extension was uncertain, separate school supporters were very much aware of the changing composition of the population within the province. As early as 1871 most of Ontario's immigrants originated from the British Isles. In 1871 the Irish, English and Scots comprised 82% of the provincial population.[79] At the same time the Catholic population of Ontario was 17%.[80] By 1941 the Catholic percentage increased marginally to 22.5%, and it was not until 1971 that Catholics became Ontario's largest denomination, representing a third of the provincial population.[81]

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[78]Ibid. p. 287.

[79]Desmond Morton, "Introduction: People and Politics of Ontario," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., The Government and Politics of Ontario, (Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1975), p. 3.

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The increase in the Catholic presence in Ontario was also felt in the separate school student population. In 1968 Catholic high schools were responsible for educating 32,611 students, by 1983 this number rose to 70,487.[82] One explanation for this increase was that separate high schools may have benefitted from a general disenchantment with the public system.[83] Another factor was the increase in Portuguese and Italian immigrants who were overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, and sent their children to religious schools.[84]

A more difficult proof of separate high school popularity was the financial demands placed on the local parish, as well as private contributions. The large increase in students taxed separate school resources to financial limits. The positive side was that the upsurge in attendance could only mean that there was strong support for the Catholic high school system.

In addition to increased attendance and financial problems that were encountered by Catholic supporters of extension, some other less public considerations were known to be present. Surprisingly, in 1969 the dominant problem separate school advocates had to deal with was not one of

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In 1969 it was determined by the trustees' association that full funding would not be won through a political campaign, or ugly public confrontation. The mood of decision-makers was such that any attempt to attack the government for persistent narrow mindedness, would cause irreparable damage.

Another serious impediment to funding success was the 1971 Tory convention victory of Premier William Davis.[86] In winning the convention, the new Premier of Ontario had to quickly establish himself as a strong leader who was not afraid to make unpopular decisions. In the period leading up to the 1971 provincial election, Davis said no to separate school funding and also cancelled the Spadina Expressway. These two decisions had recast the Premier from "Bland Bill" into "Decisive Davis," and adequately prepared the Conservative Party for the October 1971 provincial election.[87]

After the October 1971 Tory election victory, the Ontario

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[85]Dr. N. Mancini, Past President, Ontario Separate School Trustees' Association, interview by author, December 18, 1991, Hamilton, Ontario.

[86]Ibid.

[87]Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada,(Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., Scarborough, Ontario, 1986), p. 290.

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Separate School Trustees' Association concentrated its efforts on explaining to the public that the real question was not that the province was being asked to provide financial support to a second public school system, but rather that the public support "one public system with two school sectors."[88] The Conservative Party would go on to experience the challenge of minority government, scandals and reorganization of ministerial administration. There would be public demonstrations by Catholic school supporters and further campaigning for extension.

None of this mattered very much unless the general public would indicate its approval for extension. One of the first signs of that approval was an article in "The Catholic Register" in February 1984 which claimed that a Carleton University School of Journalism survey found "62% of the Ontario public would approve of tax support for separate schools through to the end of high school."[89] By 1984 Catholic high schools were present in almost every major Ontario city with 46 schools in the archdiocese of Toronto.

Premier Davis announced on June 12, 1984, that the education ministry intended "to permit the Roman Catholic separate school boards to establish a full range of elementary and secondary education and, as part of the public system, to

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[90]Ibid. p. 375. Also see Appendix B.

[91]V.K.Gilbert, R.A.Martin, and A.Sheenan, A Hard Act to Follow, p. 22.

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CHAPTER 5

FUNDING POLICY

The question of granting the extension of public funds to the completion of high school in the separate school system was a difficult issue. This was due to the polarized positions taken by the various participants in the debate. There was very little middle ground to be found that would give the provincial government a safe haven from public criticism. The two choices were simple but the decision was difficult. The government could either agree to extension and risk the wrath of the anti-extension forces, or refuse extension and suffer similar repercussions from pro-extension supporters.

This complex situation is substantiated by the different responses the author received during interviews of significant public figures in the extension controversy. The representatives of the pro-extension forces had absolutely no idea in advance that full funding would be granted. The proponents of extension also agreed that religion was not a critical issue. Anti-Catholic sentiment was not described as a significant factor in the campaign for education funding

CHAPTER 5

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On the government side of the funding discussions Premier Davis granted extension, in the "name of equity to equalize" education.[94] Past refusals of additional funding were based on political grounds, and alternative means of creating a more equitable financial arrangement were initially sought. When Premier Davis made his funding announcement, he and his cabinet were aware that the type of co-operation required to make financial equity a reality was unlikely to occur.[95]

The consideration of anti-Catholicism as a reason for the refusal to grant extension, also was not deemed to be a factor for the provincial cabinet.[96] Separate school supporters, as well as the cabinet itself, knew that the government would not be defeated solely on the issue of extension. Additionally, the attempt by Catholics to campaign and electorally defeat targeted members of the legislature, thus threatening the life of the government was also considered to be of no effect.[97] Surprisingly, for all the participants who were directly

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This was not the situation for public school supporters who perceived that Ontario was no longer a province of Protestant militarism. The question for the anti-extension supporters was, what went wrong? What caused Protestant strength in Ontario to disintegrate?

One answer theorized that Premier Davis met in a closed door session with the politically influential Emmett Cardinal Carter, and that "the Premier caved in" to political pressure.[98] Another factor was that the growth of the Catholic population in Ontario was beginning to challenge the majority position traditionally maintained by the Protestant population. It was charged that the resultant population changes were supposed to have caused the provincial government to back away from protecting Protestantism. This in turn would protect the Davis government from electoral defeat.[99]

In the provincial election of May 1985 the Tories were temporarily returned to power with a minority government totalling 52 out of 125 seats in the Legislature. The Tories lost power in 1985 after David Peterson and Bob Rae agreed to

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the creation of a Liberal-NDP alliance.[100] This alliance gave the Liberals the support they needed to unseat the Tories, who had held power since 1943.

Some people hypothesize that the granting of funds to the separate schools was the reason for the Tory defeat. More realistically, political defeat was the result of a number of critical factors. The Conservative party failed to maintain the following:[101]

- its tradition of changing its leadership approximately every ten years,
- its ability to revitalize the party caucus,
- party cohesiveness after a hotly contested and strenuous provincial leadership campaign in 1985, which damaged the internal strength and stability of the party, and
- most significant was that after being able to maintain dominance of the political "middle ground" the Tories were unable to keep this middle position, and began to lean towards the right.

Regardless of what the public may have said or felt, the process of implementing the policy of extension would be subject to hard facts, and the political instincts of the government.

In contrast to general public acceptance of policy changes in education that were introduced in the Hall-Dennis

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Report, the same level of agreement was not to be found on the issue of extension. The result of this magnifies what a government must understand before it begins to implement any decision-making policy model. A government must know that public policy is a reflection of some of the underlying values of a society and provides important insights into the extent to which the provinces approximate the ideals of representative democracy."[102] Governments discover that different problems they face require different answers and methods of arriving at those answers.

In response to any policy-making effort and most notably in the question of extension, decision-makers had to be especially conscious of these four factors:[103]

- the extreme diversity of views that the public held,
- the structure of the provincial bureaucracy and its relationship to the decision-making process,
- the different type and intensity of the political conflict felt by elected and appointed officials, and
- that the intensity of political conflict is usually matched by equally intense personalities of those engaged in effecting policy, as well as the mood of the times.

The success of any policy decision depends on how well the government reacts to these factors.

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[102]Allen Kornberg, William Mishler, and Harold D. Clarke, Representative Democracy in the Canadian Province. (Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., Scarborough, Ontario 1982). p. 203.

[103]Ibid. p. 204.

Report, the same level of agreement was not to be found on the issue of extension. The result of this requires that government must understand before it begins to implement any decision-making policy model. A government must know that public policy is a reflection of some of the underlying values of a society and provides important insights into the extent to which the provinces appropriate the ideals of representative democracy."[107] Governments discover the different problems they face require different answers and methods of arriving at those answers.

In response to any policy-making effort and most notably in the question of extension, decision-makers had to be especially conscious of these four factors:[108]

- the extreme diversity of views that the public held,
- the structure of the provincial bureaucracy and its relationship to the decision-making process,
- the different type and intensity of the political conflict felt by elected and appointed officials, and
- that the intensity of political conflict is usually matched by equally intense personalities of those engaged in effecting policy, as well as the mood of the times.

The success of any policy decision depends on how well the government reacts to these factors.

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[107]Allen Fornberg, William Mishler, and Harold D. Clarke, Representative Democracy in the Canadian Provinces. (Prentice-Hall (Canada) Inc., Scarborough, Ontario 1982), p. 185.

[108]Ibid, p. 204.

In briefly examining these four points there was no doubt about the difference of opinion in granting extension. The history of the refusal to allow full funding was well known to the public within the province. The bureaucracy presented to the government for discussion all the difficulties that the government could expect as a result of operating two educational systems. Fortunately for the government, both the NDP and Liberal Party were in favour of a more equitable financial arrangement. It was known that they were friendly to the idea of allowing major financial improvements to the separate system.

Prior to the extension debate becoming a high profile political issue, the Conservative government policy was not to provide for extension. Government policy was not to upset the status quo and thereby risk losing its long-term dominance of the province. However, government policy towards funding education gradually changed. The idea was to allocate grant money to both school boards as required. This approach of careful adjustment of finances continued with new grant plans such as the Foundation Tax Plan and further improved funding of Grade 9 and 10.

In 1961, the NDP adopted numerous positions regarding financial equity in education. These policies related to tax base, commercial assessment, and other issues. At this time the NDP would only agree to divert all school taxes collected from commercial properties to a central fund to finance

secondary education.[104] This formula was not an approval in principle of full funding but merely an admission that the financial inequities that existed in Ontario had to be dealt with more fairly.

This was followed in 1969 by the report entitled "The Financial Crisis in the Catholic High Schools."[105] This report was the first official discussion of education policy by the NDP. Although many recommendations regarding education were made, the financing component of the report signalled an acceptance of extension. The recommendation indicated that there would have to be enough Catholic and non-Catholic students to be financially feasible for two school boards to exist.

At the 1982 NDP convention the "Education Policy Committee" identified the problems it saw with education. It noted that the government had not addressed itself sufficiently to the dangers that public education would face due to proposals to extend public funding of separate schools.[106]

The Liberal Party chose to distinguish its policy by the philosophical basis upon which the party was built. The

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[104]David Cameron, Schools for Ontario, p. 104.

[105]The Financial Crisis in the Catholic High Schools, (New Democratic Party of Ontario, Toronto 1969).

[106]Programme: Policies of Ontario New Democratic Party, (New Democratic Party of Ontario,) Convention of 1982, Policy 9.1.3.

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foundation of Liberal Party policy was to define the type of society the party was working to achieve. Although the Liberals supported grant programs, such as the foundation plans, Robert Nixon in 1970 argued "that Liberal philosophy has been and always will be a passionate dedication to the freedom of the individual" and that the Liberal "strives continually to expand the amount of freedom in society."[107]

Conservatism as Nixon understood it was concerned with "protecting the status quo, demanding clear proof of the need for change and then reforming to the smallest degree necessary to remedy the problem."[108] Conversely, the definition of liberalism included "the perpetual pressing forward to a freer society where individuals can develop to their full potential a continual removing of barriers blocking the avenues of individual progress."[109]

In May of 1968 the Liberals argued that all schools should receive "free text books" and that costly equipment needed for technical instruction be made available to Catholic high schools on a shared basis.[110] Later, in November 1969 the Liberals issued a formal statement in favour of extending

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[107]The Guelph Papers, ed., Robert F. Nixon, assoc. ed., Allen Linden, (Peter Martin Associates Limited 1970), p.p. 2-3.

[108]Ibid. p. 3.

[109]Ibid. p. 3.

[110]Franklin A. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Ontario, p. 349.

foundation of Liberal Party policy was to define the role of society the party was working to achieve. Although the Liberals supported grant programs, such as the foundation plans, Robert Nixon in 1970 argued "that liberal philosophy has been and always will be a passionate dedication to the freedom of the individual" and that the Liberal "strives continually to expand the amount of freedom in society."[xxv]

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[xxv]The Ontario Experience, ed., Robert F. Nixon, James, ed., Allen Lindsay, Trevor Martin Jason Lakes Limited 1970), pp. 2-3.

[xxvi]Ibid. p. 3.

[xxvii]Ibid. p. 3.

[xxviii]Frank R. Walker, Catholic Education and Politics in Ontario. p. 149.

funding to Catholic schools and declared that the "traditional restrictive interpretation of the BNA Act" was "incompatible with the contents of the Hall-Dennis Report."[111] The Liberals also declared that "we would expect economies to occur through the sharing of facilities between the two sectors."[112]

By 1970 the Liberals determined that the people of Ontario would not accept the province paying the potential costs associated with extension. As a result of this public reluctance, the Liberals advocated a sharing of resources such as textbooks and technical equipment. During the next fourteen years the Liberals, although cautious, never wavered from the policy position of support for extension through to the completion of high school in Ontario. When Premier Davis announced his decision to grant full funding, the Liberal Party supported it unequivocally.

On June 12, 1984 Premier William Davis rose in the Legislature of Ontario and gave the province the reasons for allowing a Roman Catholic high school funding extension.[113] The announcement of extension offers an opportunity to study which method of policy creation was used.

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[111]Ibid. p. 350.

[112]Ibid. p. 350.

[113]Legislature of Ontario Debates, June 12, 1984, p. 2414. See Appendix B.

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Policy Models

In 1984 the decision to commit the province to full funding was put in place. The next step would be to find an appropriate method of implementing the extension announcement that would be acceptable to the public. Also the political decision-makers would have to be very cautious about alienating too much political support, which could jeopardize future electoral victory. It would be imperative that the government proceed within a policy-making model that would keep it in power, and put funding policy into effect.

The root model permitted extension to be considered as a specific goal, before any analysis of facts took place. With the policy in sight, the government would have to find a means of reaching the goal of extension. The difficulty in this method was the absence of an opportunity to determine if the means were appropriate. Testing the means would require a precarious "leap-of-faith-format" with some potential repercussions remaining unknown. The effectiveness of the policy could only be undertaken by examining theoretical applications.

The government also did not view extension as the closing of the funding debate. The public in the future would still expect further adjustments in funding. The root model would identify a goal, and a response to achieving the goal would be developed. At this point the issue would be settled. Unfortunately, the question of financing education would

Policy Models

continue after extension was put into place.

In the branch model, policy and data were examined together, as opposed to the root model of deciding on a goal then examining how to get there. In a potentially volatile political situation policy-makers would want to be certain that there was agreement on the end, rather than declaring the end without thought. This would require extensive analysis of the means-end relationship.

In this model there was little demand for extensive research regarding the result. All that was required to determine the suitability of extension, was that decision-makers agreed to the policy itself. The branch model broke down at this point because decision-makers could not be certain that the means-end were correct. Also agreement on the policy itself was not known to be present.[114]

The nature of extension made it imperative that the government use a decision-making model that could accommodate policy objectives. The model would have little difficulty in confirming who benefitted from extension. The same model would also have to contemplate carefully the citizens who could be harmed. The decision required extensive examination of options, and if needed additional analysis.

Again the normative-optimum model is the most appropriate to use because of the extensive effort it makes to examine a policy issue fully. The normative model called for a maximum

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[114]Dr. R. Welch and Dr. N. Mancini, interview by author.

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In the branch model, policy and data were examined together, as opposed to the tool model of deciding on a tool then examining how to get there. In a potentially volatile political situation policy-makers would want to be certain that there was agreement on the end, rather than debating the end without thought. This would require extensive analysis of the means-end relationship.

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effort in arriving at a new policy. It did not look for final solutions. This model fit separate school funding because the debate over financial equity would be on-going. In arriving at the decision to grant public funds to the end of Grade 13 in the Catholic system, the government had to use the normative approach because it demanded that decision-makers have an objective they wanted to reach. The decision had to be developed upon empirical research.

Table One illustrates that budgeted education expenses grew for twenty-five consecutive years, and continued so until the Liberals took power as a majority government in 1987. This tells us that the province saw education as a high priority item in the years up to 1975. During this period education never accounted for less than one-quarter of provincial gross expenditures.

It must also be remembered that during this period of high levels of expenditure on education, there was less competition for government money. Unlike present times when health care expenditures have overtaken education, provincial revenues were previously more buoyant than they are now. From 1975-1985 the approved level of budgeted expenditure on education was still increasing, but as a percentage of the total budget, education investment continued to decline until it reached 19.1%. The province was putting the additional financial burden on local school systems, and when budgeted costs stabilized at 20%, Queen's Park felt it had the room to

effort in arriving at a new policy. It did not look for final solutions. This model fit separate school funding because the debate over financial equity would be on-going. In arriving at the decision to grant public funds to the end of Grade 13 in the Catholic system, the government had to use the normative approach because it demanded that decision-makers have an objective they wanted to reach. The decision had to be developed upon empirical research.

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redistribute its education finances and establish extension.

TABLE ONE

EDUCATION AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PROVINCIAL BUDGET

YEAR	BUDGETED EDUCATION EXPENSE	GROSS PROVINCIAL BUDGET	%
1960	282,304	1.129.076	25.0
1961	355,814	1,251,285	28.4
1963	391,689	1,522,809	25.7
1964	430,140	1,560,919	27.5
1965	485,465	1,680,709	28.8
1966	564,634	1,959,027	28.8
1967	762,235	2,405,588	31.6
1968	1,015,994	2,991,540	33.9
1969	1,142,023	3,611,453	31.6
1970	1,316,470	4,256,740	30.9
1971	1,529,400	5,307,900	28.8
1972	1,742,400	6,162,400	28.2
1973	1,948,300	6,704,100	29.0
1974	2,067,200	7,632,300	27.0
1975	2,284,000	8,962,500	25.4
1976	2,667,300	11,461,200	23.2
1977	2,918,900	12,741,100	22.9
1978	3,231,600	13,986,400	23.1
1979	3,446,400	15,215,200	22.6
1980	3,672,900	16,606,200	22.1
1981	3,843,800	17,786,900	21.6
1982	4,390,600	20,861,700	21.0
1983	4,825,800	23,932,400	20.1
1984	5,235,400	26,135,500	20.0
1985	5,440,200	28,239,200	19.2
1986	7,039,200	32,081,800	21.9
1987	6,434,800	33,692,400	19.1

Sources: Statistics Canada, Provincial Government, Finance Revenue and Expenditures. Historical Summaries of Gross General Expenditure Cat. No. 68-207

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YEAR	BUDGETED EDUCATION EXPENSE	GROSS PROVINCIAL BUDGET	%
1960	282,304	1,129,076	25.0
1961	359,814	1,251,265	28.8
1963	391,089	1,332,809	29.3
1964	430,140	1,560,913	27.5
1965	485,465	1,680,709	28.8
1966	564,634	1,959,027	28.8
1967	762,235	2,402,582	31.6
1968	1,015,994	2,901,540	35.0
1969	1,142,021	3,011,453	37.9
1970	1,316,470	4,234,749	31.0
1971	1,529,400	5,302,500	28.8
1972	1,712,300	6,102,400	28.0
1973	1,948,300	6,704,103	29.0
1974	2,062,200	7,432,300	27.7
1975	2,264,000	8,342,500	27.4
1976	2,662,300	11,461,200	23.2
1977	2,918,900	12,741,100	22.9
1978	3,231,600	14,986,400	21.6
1979	3,446,900	15,315,200	22.5
1980	3,672,300	16,606,200	22.1
1981	3,843,800	17,786,900	21.6
1982	4,250,600	20,801,700	20.4
1983	4,825,800	20,913,400	23.1
1984	5,225,400	20,149,500	25.9
1985	5,440,200	28,219,200	19.2
1986	7,035,200	32,481,800	21.6
1987	6,434,800	33,643,400	19.1

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, Provincial Corporation, Finance
Revenue and Expenditure. Historical Summaries of
Gross General Expenditure Cat. No. 68-207

Table Two illustrates why education funding has been, and will likely continue to be, a controversial subject. The provincial government had decided to redistribute limited financial resources in what was felt to be the most appropriate method. The difference between the disbursement of funds received by the two school boards was gradually being reduced.

Depending on one's point of view an argument could be made that the province was penalizing public education by reducing funds. On the other side of the issue an equally strong point was being made. This was that Catholic education was being denied the ability to improve, and extend the historic constitutional right of education to the completion of high school.

When comparing the percentage of funds allotted to the two school groups, the province knew that due to the limitations of its financial resources it would have to get the money from somewhere. In order to meet its new commitment to pay for improvements to Catholic schools, the public school funding percentage after 1984 decreased very quickly in comparison to previous years.

TABLE TWO

TOTAL EXPENDITURES & GRANTS ALL SCHOOL BOARDS ONTARIO

YEAR	TOTAL ALL BOARDS	TOTAL PUBLIC BOARDS	% FUNDS	TOTAL SEPARATE BOARDS	% FUNDS
1960	598,343	506,228	85.0	92,115	15.0
1961	686,401	582,582	85.0	103,819	15.0
1962	752,670	643,104	85.0	109,566	15.0
1963	790,480	665,392	84.0	125,094	16.0
1964	959,383	799,055	83.0	160,328	17.0
1965	1,083,715	897,407	83.0	186,308	17.0
1966	1,259,533	1,038,935	82.0	220,598	18.0
1967	1,527,742	1.245,197	82.0	282,545	18.0
1968	1,819,809	1,473,778	81.0	346,031	19.0
1969	2,243,043	1,843,650	82.0	399,393	18.0
1970	2,284,188	1,816,928	80.0	467,260	20.0
1971	2.796,714	2,275,851	81.0	520,863	19.0
1972	3,090,858	2,513,367	81.0	577,491	19.0
1973	3,209,550	2,603,324	81.0	606,226	19.0
1974	3,535,400	2,832,617	80.0	702,783	20.0
1975	4,507,130	3,618,844	80.0	888,286	20.0
1976	4,845,299	3,799,675	78.0	1,045,624	22.0
1977	5,277,647	4,145,234	79.0	1,132,413	21.0
1978	5,613,204	4,361,489	78.0	1,251,715	22.0
1979	5,974,931	4,614,577	77.0	1,360,354	23.0
1980	6,516,003	4,996,363	77.0	1,519,640	23.0
1981	7,286,914	5,550,065	76.0	1,736,849	24.0
1982	8,192417	6,199,013	76.0	1,993,404	24.0
1983	8,832,562	6,628,738	75.0	2,203,824	25.0
1984	9,436,614	7,015,952	74.0	2,420,662	26.0
1985	10,006,411	7,331,105	73.0	2,675,306	27.0
1986	10,772,862	7,617,659	71.0	3,155,203	29.0
1987	11,902,478	8,395,542	71.0	3,5006,936	29.0

N.B. 1) 1985, 1986, 1987-saw extension of Roman Catholic funding

SOURCE: Expenditure and General Legislative Grants - All School Boards, Ministry of Education, Business, and Finance Branch.

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TOTAL EXPENDITURES & GRANTS ALL SCHOOL BOARDS ONTARIO

YEAR	TOTAL ALL BOARDS	TOTAL PUBLIC BOARDS	% FUNDS	TOTAL SEPARATE BOARDS	% FUNDS
1960--	598,347	506,228	85.0	92,117	15.0
1961	686,401	582,582	85.0	103,819	15.0
1962	752,670	643,104	85.0	109,566	15.0
1963	790,490	665,396	84.0	125,094	16.0
1964	959,383	799,055	83.0	160,328	17.0
1965	1,083,715	897,407	83.0	186,308	17.0
1966	1,259,533	1,038,935	82.0	220,598	18.0
1967	1,527,745	1,245,197	82.0	282,548	18.0
1968	1,819,809	1,473,778	81.0	346,031	19.0
1969	2,243,043	1,843,650	82.0	399,393	18.0
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1981	7,286,914	5,530,065	76.0	1,756,849	24.0
1982	8,192417	6,199,013	76.0	1,993,404	24.0
1983	8,832,562	6,628,738	75.0	2,203,824	25.0
1984	9,435,614	7,015,952	74.0	2,419,662	26.0
1985	10,006,421	7,331,105	73.0	2,675,316	27.0
1986	10,772,962	7,617,259	71.0	3,155,703	29.0
1987	11,902,470	8,395,542	71.0	3,506,928	29.0

N.B. If 1985, 1986, 1987—saw extension of Roman Catholic funding

SOURCE: Expenditure and General Legislative Grants - All School boards, Ministry of Education, Business and Finance Branch.

The figures in Table Three illustrated to decision-makers that Roman Catholic enrolment in the elementary and secondary levels was continually growing at a very steady rate. In 1960 the Catholic system accounted for 25.5% of the total provincial school enrolment, and as Table Two shows separate schools received 15% of allocated funds. By 1984 when the Davis Government announced full funding, Catholic enrolment had jumped to 33.3% while receiving 25% of total allocated expenditures on education.

In reality even though the gap in funding the two systems appeared to be narrowing, the separate school system was finding it more difficult to meet current education standards and programs. In some cases money was not available to meet education ministry guidelines, but the separate student population continued to grow.

TABLE THREE

% OF ROMAN CATHOLIC TO PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENT ENROLMENT

YEAR	TOTAL # OF PUBLIC ELEMEN. & SECOND. STUDENTS	TOTAL # OF R.C. ELEMEN.& SECOND. STUDENTS	% OF R.C. STUDENTS
1960	1,106,512	282,651	25.5
1961	1,160,892	301,338	25.9
1962	1,211,776	316.831	26.1
1963	1,266,040	331,334	26.1
1964	1,320,369	353,405	26.7
1965	1,368,112	370,669	27.0
1966	1,412,926	387,971	27.4
1967	1,466,291	402,497	27.4
1968	1,522,483	408,914	26.8
1969	1,573,240	413,556	25.1
1970	1,603,968	418,433	26.0
1971	1,609,223	422,137	26.2
1972	1,605,948	422,166	26.2
1973	1,584,413	424,217	26.7
1974	1,567,195	427,294	27.2
1975	1,566,785	427,853	27.3
1976	1,550,347	422,793	27.2
1977	1,521,607	421,619	27.7
1978	1,481,822	420,183	28.3
1979	1,438,025	420,820	29.2
1980	1,403,097	423,438	30.1
1981	1,367,809	425,706	31.1
1982	1,349,479	429,946	31.8
1983	1,320,988	433,509	32.8
1984	1,313,173	437,553	33.3
1985	1,298,499	461,300	35.3
1986	1,295,284	487,255	37.6
1987	1,300,502	515,813	39.6

SOURCES: 1) Education Statistics, Ontario. Enrolment in Public Elementary Schools, and Enrolment in Secondary Schools.

2) Education Statistics, Ontario. Roman Catholic Elementary School Enrolment and Roman Catholic Secondary School Enrolment.

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1968	1,522,483	408,914	26.8
1969	1,573,240	413,576	25.1
1970	1,603,966	418,433	26.0
1971	1,609,223	422,137	26.2
1972	1,605,948	422,166	26.2
1973	1,584,414	424,317	26.7
1974	1,567,196	427,294	27.2
1975	1,566,785	427,803	27.3
1976	1,560,347	422,784	27.2
1977	1,521,607	421,619	27.7
1978	1,481,829	420,183	28.3
1979	1,439,025	420,840	29.2
1980	1,403,007	423,436	30.1
1981	1,367,809	424,706	31.1
1982	1,349,479	429,346	31.8
1983	1,320,508	429,509	32.5
1984	1,313,173	427,553	33.3
1985	1,298,199	481,360	37.3
1986	1,295,264	487,255	37.6
1987	1,300,502	515,813	39.8

SOURCES: 1) Education Statistics, Ontario. Enrolment in Public Elementary Schools, and Enrolment in Secondary Schools.

2) Education Statistics Ontario. Roman Catholic Elementary School Enrolment and Roman Catholic Secondary School Enrolment.

The first step of the normative-optimum model insisted that the decision-makers know what the policy would attempt to do, supported by proof provided in the described tables. In the second step of identifying alternative policies, there is little evidence to be found that other funding ideas were considered within the normative policy model. It is well known that the discussion of alternatives as required in step three had been going on for many years, therefore it was unlikely that any new points could have been presented.

It was simple to understand upon reaching step four that the Catholic schools would be recipients of vast sums of money, thus making them better off financially. It was still unclear if or how the public system would be harmed. By the time the policy-makers reached step five which was to test the policy, it was not known how many policy-analysts studied the results. It may have been that these analysts concluded that extension was not appropriate. The opposite may also be true, but the final analyst, Premier Davis had the last say. The remaining three steps were not needed at the time the policy-decision for extension was approved.

Extension was in reality a long developing policy process that relied on fact as well as intuition. The decision to proceed was not made solely in a brief period of intense examination, but rather in decades of debates by all the provincial parties and the public. In June of 1984 the government brought forth its reply.

CONCLUSION

From 1960 to the present, education and funding policy have adapted to the changing times and done so through different methods of policy development. This was due to the special nature of each policy situation. The move from centralization to decentralization was demanded by the public because of the presence of social and economic forces to which the province, trustees and parents were subject.

The shift to decentralization was the result of external forces which left the public with the impression that education in Ontario was falling behind. Regardless of whether or not Ontario was educationally deficient, a nagging fear of being so was enough to force a new look at the provincial school system and its results.

If provincial politicians stood their ground and decided that there was no need for a re-examination of education, then there was an excellent opportunity for the government to suffer the same results Edmund Burke did many years before. What occurred was a power sharing arrangement whereby the province maintained its prominent position, but in a much less authoritative manner. The province adopted a policy which resembled an administrative partnership. This policy also curtailed the provincial ability to guide education

CONCLUSION

independently.

Funding was a unique subject because the impact of the extension decision would most certainly aid Roman Catholic education, and only provide a government guarantee that the public system would not be unduly hurt. The decision that all three political parties supported was not influenced by the same considerations as changes to education policy. Supporters of extension did not represent the majority of people in the province, as opposed to a majority of people who wanted more control of education at the local level.

Education policy was put in place to ensure that current demands were answered, funding policy was put into place because the time had arrived. In the first case politicians at the provincial and local levels became subject to the demands of the public, and were influenced to act accordingly. There was little choice in the matter, thus citizens were dictating policy. In the second case the majority of the public had the table turned against them. With the granting of extension, the government in concert with the opposition parties were dictating to the public, and got away with it.

Prior to 1968 provincial policy-makers did not have to be unduly worried about the competition of political wills, within the balance of power. This is no longer the case. It should be recognized that the policy in question will determine who has the ability to partake in, and influence the outcome.

independently.

Policy may be created by reaching a consensus between the government and the public. It may also be created by those with the power to do so. In using the normative-optimum model, the government made use of a method which responded more competently to the known characteristics of the extension issue. Time will tell if the Tories were correct.

The fascinating thing about both education policy and funding is that in these two cases, we may find it hard to declare a winner in the usual sense of the word. One may be justified in explaining that the political response to public demands for change went to far. Of course others will say that change did not go far enough. It may be that education and funding policies implemented in Ontario were successful because the general quality of life, and provincial unity were maintained.

APPENDIX A

THE ORDER-IN-COUNCIL

Copy of an Order-in-Council approved by His Honour the Lieutenant Governor, dated the 10th day of June, A.D. 1965.
The Committee of Council have had under consideration the report of the Honourable the Minister of Education, dated the 10th day of May, 1965 wherein he states that,

Whereas it is deemed expedient to revise the courses of study for children in the age group presently designated as Kindergarten, Primary and Junior Divisions.

And whereas it is deemed expedient to appoint a Provincial Committee to make a careful study of the means whereby modern education can meet the present and future needs of children and society.

The Honourable the Minister of Education therefore recommends that there be established a Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives of Education in the Schools of Ontario for the purposes hereinafter mentioned:

- to identify the needs of the child as a person and as a member of society
- to set forth the aims of education for the educational system of the Province
- to outline objectives of the curriculum for children in the age groups presently designated as Kindergarten, Primary Junior Divisions
- to propose means by which these aims and objectives may be achieved
- to submit a report for the consideration of the Minister of Education.

That the Committee be empowered to request submissions, receive briefs and hear persons with special knowledge in the matters heretofore mentioned.

That the Committee be empowered to require the assistance of the officials of the Department of Education, in particular members of the staff of the Curriculum Division, for such research and other purposes as may be deemed necessary.

That members of the Committee be empowered to visit classrooms in the schools of Ontario, by arrangement with local school systems.

The Committee of Council concur in the recommendation of the Honourable the Minister of Education and advise that the same be acted on.

Certified
J.J. Young
Clerk, Executive Council

APPENDIX A

THE ORDER-IN-COUNCIL

APPENDIX B

STATEMENTS BY THE MINISTRY

ROMAN CATHOLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS

Hon. Mr. Davis: Mr. Speaker. I wish to inform members of the Legislature that the government has undertaken a careful and fresh review of the outstanding issues surrounding public support for the Roman Catholic school system, and this afternoon I wish to outline a new course we have decided to pursue.

As colleagues on both sides of the Legislature will appreciate, this has been a subject of long and heartfelt controversy in the development of our province, ever since we assumed the burdens and choices that go with responsible government in 1842.

In an open and dynamic society such as ours, basis issues are not resolved or sincere differences settled in silence. However, we have managed to grow together because we have reconciled long-standing differences and then moved forward. Progress is made not by opening old wounds but by healing old grievances. In that spirit, I believe we have an opportunity now to put one of these difficult issues behind us as we seek to continue the progressive and harmonious development of our province.

The architects of Confederation, John A. Macdonald and George Brown, were Protestants who preferred the development of a nonsectarian educational system. However, in order to secure their national vision, they accepted and advocated the protection of denominational "common" schools in the British North America Act. All Ontario provincial governments since that time have interpreted the "common" schools of that day as the elementary system. Consequently, dual elementary Roman Catholic and public education systems have been maintained and equitably funded across this province.

Historically, it has been possible for elementary schools to continue through to the 10th grade and, in recent years, many Roman Catholic school boards have organized their programs with public support to enrol pupils at the grades 9 and 10 level. In keeping with the understood interpretation of the Canadian Constitution, secondary Roman Catholic schools have not been provided public funds beyond grade 10. Roman Catholic families have seen and continue to see such a limitation on public funds beyond this level as arbitrary and inequitable.

In considering at this time whether the government of Ontario should extend

APPENDIX B

STATEMENTS BY THE MINISTRY

HUMAN CATHOLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS

financial support to secondary Roman Catholic schools, as has been requested by the Roman Catholic community for over half a century, we have been guided in our deliberations by three fundamental principles, all of which must be respected in the resolution of this matter.

First, we must not only respond to the claims of the moment, but we must also work to honour those contracts and obligations that were struck to create a united Canada in 1867. Second, we must not undertake a course of action that by its nature or in its execution would cripple or limit the viability of our nondenominational public secondary school system, which is accessible to all and universally supported and which will always remain the cornerstone of our education system. Third, we are not mere hostages to old arrangements, so we have a contemporary responsibility to be sure our answer on this question strengthens rather than fragments the social fabric of this province.

While men and women of courage and conviction have been divided on this issue, up to now no Ontario government has felt it was able to discharge its duty according to these fundamental principles while at the same time granting public funds to a complete Roman Catholic secondary school system. I now believe this could be responsibly undertaken and, therefore, it is our obligation to resolve the issue.

This new direction is not compelled by or founded upon a reinterpretation of old statutes or jurisprudence. The letter of the old law cannot substitute for common sense. Further, we must all appreciate that historic benefits must keep pace with changing conditions. Roman Catholic families do not object to paying their share of the cost of an extensive universal nondenominational educational system; however, they cannot at the same time accept a logic that argues their historic benefits should be locked in.

Since the beginning of our parliamentary democracy, freedom and therefore diversity and pluralism have been fundamental values. Our public school system has always been fundamentally important and our commitment in this regard must not be diminished. The strength of Ontario's educational heritage rests in the general merit and the value of a universally accessible, publicly supported school system. Experience has now taught us, however, that a limitation on public funding which confines it to the public secondary school system is no longer required to sustain the viability of public education in our province.

Implementing a dual secondary system will necessitate wise administration, which I will address in a moment. Yet I am confident our secondary

system, in which we can all take considerable pride, will not be jeopardized. For some time, a third of the students in our dual elementary school system have been enroled in our Roman Catholic schools. Through the administration of core curriculum and proper funding, our public elementary school system certainly has remained viable and indeed, second to none.

With more stable enrolments at this time, along with appropriate funding, core curriculum changes and soon province-wide testing, there is no reason to believe our public secondary school system will preform any less effectively in the future.

2:20 p.m.

Members should be aware of the fact that to protect our public education system, while assuming some costs which are now carried privately by Roman Catholic families, will require additional public funding. While some of this can be accomplished through appropriate redistribution, our ultimate objective will remain one of providing high-quality education at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayers.

In practical terms I do not believe we could or should create a separate public system for a small segment of our community that wishes to isolate itself, but we are addressing today the aspirations of a good third of our families, who have demonstrated their competence and determination to provide contemporary education for their children.

Above all, I wish to address a concern I have always held and which has been honourably put forward by many others. In all our endeavours we must seek to build fellowship and common values, not segregation and mutual suspicion; but dualism today surely does not mean upholding, advancing or legitimizing the ancient idea of a separate Protestant Ontario and a separate Roman Catholic Ontario.

Clearly, our Roman Catholic citizens want to maintain their own school system for their children, but our community is not, as tragically some other parts of the world still are, divided on religious grounds. Roman Catholics, regardless of their educational backgrounds, work equally within our society and are every bit as ambitious to share fully in the life and progress of Ontario.

If we are to serve the spirit and the realities of 1867, we should acknowledge that basic education was recognized then and that today basic education requires a secondary, as well as an elementary, education. As the non-denominational system has evolved to meet society's needs so too has the Roman Catholic school system.

The extension of financing to separate school grades 9

and 10 demonstrates that financial and operational arrangements can evolve over time and honour the intentions of the original constitution. If we work co-operatively and prudently, we can complete this task without compromising the quality of our public schools, while demonstrating the essential justice and good faith of our society.

It is, therefore, the government's intention to permit the Roman Catholic school boards to establish a full range of elementary and secondary education and as a part of the public system, to be funded accordingly. This new program will be introduced at the rate of one year of secondary education for each school year, beginning September 1, 1985. This process will be accomplished in much the same way we are implementing the new special education provisions and will parallel the revised secondary school structure. Some flexibility will be included to allow for a phase-in period that is in keeping with the capacity of the individual board in question.

Our first step will be to set up a planning and implementation commission to guide and advise all parties on the implementation of this change. It will receive and adjudicate the plans submitted by the Roman Catholic school boards. It will advise the government on required changes in the Education Act and, most important, it will conduct arbitrations that may well be required in some instances arising out of the sharing or the transfer of schools and school locations, as well as other matters related to the transition.

This commission will be vital to the effective execution of this program and will be made up of representatives of the Ministry of Education, the educational community at large and the Roman Catholic community.

It is not the expectation of the government, and I trust the separate school systems across Ontario will recognize this clearly, to expend large sums on new capital grants to accommodate demands for new secondary school facilities. Rather, the commission will ensure that our abundant existing capital stock is effectively employed to provide a full range of programs. I underline this point because I think it is very important. As my predecessor, John Robarts, indicated, a duplication of facilities caused by such a policy would be impractical and indefensible. The first planning task is to make maximum use of existing school plants.

Equally, we must consider the interests of our secondary school teachers. It has been a long established practice for elementary Roman Catholic school boards to have Roman Catholics constitute the large majority of the teachers they employ. In

the light of declining enrolments in our secondary system, it would be unacceptance and unfair to extend this practice to the new Roman Catholic secondary school system. Consequently, for a period of 10 years, Roman Catholic school boards will employ non-Catholic teachers in their secondary schools who, once hired, will be permitted to earn tenure-the proper word would be "seniority" religion notwithstanding.

The planning and implementation commission will work with the Ontario Teachers' Federation, the Education Relations Commission and others to assure that all teacher personnel matters are addressed in an equitable fashion. Further, while the essence of this new policy is to enrich the education resources available to Roman Catholic families in Ontario, it is my hope the new Roman Catholic school boards will consider granting to all students and their families in the most positive way universal access to publicly supported Roman Catholic schools should such access be desired, limited only by the availability of space and the designation of assessment support.

I should also like to take this opportunity to state that it is still the wish of the government, pending the response to questions now before the courts, to create within certain boards of education panels of trustees elected by Franco-Ontarian electors who will have defined powers governing classes in schools where French is the language of instruction.

While my hope today is to resolve a historic issue in our traditional public education structure, what we have decided to do legitimately raises questions about the place of independent schools in our province. While rights are not at issue, the diversity and quality of our society are affected and served by these schools. The government believes it is timely and useful to review the role of these schools in educating our children. Thus, a commission of inquiry will be established by the Ministry of Education, first, to document and comment on the role of independent schools; second, to assess whether public funding and its attendant obligations would be desirable and could be compatible with the nature of their independence; and, third, to identify possible alternative forms of governance for these schools and make recommendations for changes deemed to be appropriate.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to address briefly our responsibility in funding education generally. The current formula for calculating general legislative grants has been in place since 1969. There is also the public concern about the costs of

education and the ability of our school boards to contain such costs.

Given these considerations, along with the statement of policy I referred to at the beginning of may statement, the government intends to set up a commission to inquire into the financing of elementary and secondary education in Ontario. This examination is appropriate in order to ensure efficiency, economy, effectiveness and equity. It is also timely as the province moves to extend support for the Roman Catholic school system.

Both the commission on independent schools and the commission on the financing of elementary and secondary education will report in May 1985, and responses to their recommendations will be concluded by January 1986.

Before I close, may I return for a moment to the basic decision upon which we seek the understanding and acceptance for the community at large-the extension of public funding for our Roman Catholic secondary school system. Of course, there will be difficulties and, clearly, as with all changes in the order of things, some advantages that may seem to be found in the status quo will be given up in securing new benefits. I am convinced, however, that our secure and vibrant school system is not threatened and the majority of our citizens who support our nonsectarian school system will not be hurt.

As Sir John A. Macdonald explained the accommodations of his time to the majority over a century ago: "We do not want to stand on the extreme limits of our rights. We are ready to give and take. We can afford to be just, we can afford to be generous, because we are strong."

It is neither my hope nor my expectation to settle all differences today. No one enjoys the last word in any democracy. However, as has been the case in nation building and constitutional reform, it is my strong conviction that the path we have chosen is worthy of broad agreement and will serve our common interests.

It is time to put behind us any lingering doubts about our regard for one another and to rededicate ourselves to the bright hopes of our future.

2:30 p.m.

Mr. Rae: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order: In the light of the historic statement the Premier has just made, I wonder if it would be appropriate for the leaders of other parties to be allowed to respond to a statement I think is one that does a great deal to unite this province. It is certainly one I would like to respond to on behalf of my party.

Mr. Speaker; I ask the direction of the House.

Hon. Mr. Davis: Mr. Speaker, can I suggest, because I go back in history a little, that there have been three occasions in my time as a member of the

House when statements were made by the then Premier, at which time the leaders of the opposition parties made some observations. I appreciate the suggestion from the member for York South.

I recall it at the time Mr. Frost made certain observations and I recall it at the introduction of the foundation tax plan when Mr. Wintermeyer-I think I am correct in this and the member for Brant-Oxford-Norfolk (Mr. Nixon) can correct me-and the then leader of the New Democratic Party made certain observations. On an issue of this nature, I would have no objection to accepting that as precedent.

Mr. Peterson: Mr. Speaker, this is indeed a historic day and I think all members of this Legislature recognize it as such.

When the Premier's assistant phoned my office at roughly one minute to two this afternoon to say there would be a major announcement, knowing the Premier as we do I must confess we thought it would be about the dome and not about so significant an issue in the history of this province.

We unreservedly support this statement. I am sure the Premier is aware of that. With the Premier's strong sense of history, which he revealed today in his statement, and his acute memory for what has transpired in this province, I am sure he would be the first to stand with me in applauding the member for Brant-Oxford-Norfolk for the strong stand he took on this issue when he was the leader of the Liberal Party.

It is no secret that in the history of this province many people have given blood-some real and some symbolic-over this issue. On behalf of my party, I am proud today to identify myself and my colleagues with the statement of the Premier on this major advance in position. I am not one of those who is going to ask why. I am only going to say "hurrah." It is long overdue. It has been too divisive an issue for too many years in the past.

I take this occasion to celebrate the road-to-Damascus conversion of the government on this issue. We are committed to trying to work with the government in any way we can to bring forward a successful, speedy and easy facilitation of these policies. We will work through a select committee, if that is one of the ways chosen. We will use our good offices to make sure these historical injustices are rectified as quickly and expeditiously as possible.

Mr. Rae: Mr. Speaker, few issues in our public life are as difficult or as divisive as issues surrounding religion and language. It is a curiosity to me that this is true. Ever since I went into politics I have been surprised by it, struck by

it and sometimes appalled by it. Anything any government can do to bring the people of this province together on an issue that has proved to be as difficult and as divisive as this particular one is a tremendous contribution to decency and to our sense of civility as a province.

I would be wrong not to be generous today to the a Premier, as he has, I think, been generous to the people of this province in making this policy clear today. I would also be wrong if I did not pay tribute to the courage of many members of my own party who made this case and, indeed, made several parts of the Premier's speech before it became popular or before it became easier to do so. I pay tribute to some members of my own party who, at considerable personal cost, have participated in various election campaigns on this particular issue.

I say this not in a spirit of partisanship but simply in the sense that sometimes those who are prepared to say things 10 or 20 years in advance do pay a certain price. I think it would be wrong for us not to pay tribute to members in all parties who have taken the position that it was time-I believe some time ago, but certainly today-to recognize that we have fundamentally two public systems at work in the province, that they have to be funded fairly and equally and that we have to recognize the claim of a very substantial minority to genuine equality in educational funding.

It is going to take a great deal of goodwill, it is going to take a great deal of give and take and it is going to take a great deal of understanding to make this policy work.

When I raised this matter with the Premier in his estimates six months ago, I was hoping for an answer. I am very pleased with the answer we have received. I did not receive one at the time I asked for it; I am delighted to have received it today.

We will be coming back with some questions about implementation, some questions about how the policy can be made to work and some questions about overcrowding still in the elementary system: there are a number of problems that are still outstanding. But I want to say the Premier has made a very important contribution to a sense of fairness in this province by making this statement today. We congratulate him for it. We look forward to working with his government in seeing that it can work on a nonpartisan basis. All of us in this House have an obligation to make it work. The Premier has my personal commitment and the commitment of our party that we will make it work.

The time was right. We are delighted the move has been made. Equality has made an important advance in Ontario today.

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