A Critical Examination of the Involvement of Canadian High-Performance Athletes in the Development of Anti-Doping Policy

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Abstract

The use of certain performance enhancing substances and methods has been defined as a major ethical breach by parties involved in the governance of high-performance sport. As a result, elite athletes worldwide are subject to rules and regulations set out in international and national anti-doping policies. Existing literature on the development of policies such as the World Anti-Doping Code and The Canadian anti-Doping Program suggests a sport system in which athletes are rarely meaningfully involved in policy development (Houlihan, 2004a). Additionally, it is suggested that this lack of involvement is reflective of a similar lack of involvement in other areas of governance concerning athletes’ lives. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the history and current state of athletes’ involvement in the anti-doping policy process in Canada’s high-performance sport system. It includes discussion and analysis of recently conducted interviews with those involved in the policy process as well as an analysis of relevant documents, including anti-doping policies. The findings demonstrate that Canadian athletes have not been significantly involved in the creation of recently developed anti-doping policies and that a re-evaluation of current policies is necessary to more fully recognize the reality of athletes’ lives in Canada’s high-performance sport system and their rights within that system.
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That I am the only named author on this thesis belies the contributions of others, without which this thesis would not exist.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In March, 2003, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) held the Second World Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the conference was to bring sport’s major stakeholders together to finalize and ratify the first *World Anti-Doping Code* (WADC), which “could be adopted by all sports authorities and be enacted by governments, so that sports and governments would all be reading off the same page” by the opening of the 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens, Greece (Pound, 2004, p. 78). In the summary notes of the conference plenary sessions, it was noted that one conference delegate from the Netherlands had observed that:

those present had come to talk about doping in sport but, when he looked around the room, he saw many people wearing suits, and only a few athletes, and even they were wearing suits. … He urged [National Olympic Committees] and [International Sport Governing Bodies] to establish athlete representation committees in their organizations, and make sure that the athletes were involved in the ongoing Code process. (WADA, 2003a, p. 59)

The noted lack of athlete participation¹ in international anti-doping policy development is not unusual. It reflects a lack of athlete participation in decision-making processes affecting their lives more generally. Sport policy researcher Barrie Houlihan summarizes the literature on international world-class sport policy when he writes that “sport policy is generally made for, or on behalf of, athletes, rarely in consultation with athletes, and almost never in partnership with athletes” (2004, pp. 421-422).

One reason for the lack of athlete participation in decision-making is that,
especially since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics first participated in the Olympic Games in 1952, national governments worldwide have attempted to harness success in elite sport as a tool for strengthening and promoting national image and unity. In order to ensure sporting success, governments, to varying degrees, became directly involved in the control of sport. In Canada, the policies that govern high-performance sport have been heavily shaped by state interests since the federal government first became involved in sport in 1961 with the passing of *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport* (Macintosh, Bedecki & Franks, 1988; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990). Today, the government develops the policies and administers the funding programs that govern high-performance sport in Canada and supports individual athletes and National Sport Organizations. It does so through Sport Canada, “a branch of the International and Intergovernmental Affairs and Sport Sector within the federal Department of Canadian Heritage” (Sport Canada, 2006a) the mission of which is to promote Canadian culture and work towards a more cohesive Canada (Canadian Heritage, 2006). One of the most recent and striking examples of the federal government’s attempts to use high-performance sporting success for political ends is its support of the Canadian Olympic Committee’s (COC’s) *Own the Podium - 2010* program, the goal of which is to become “the #1 nation at the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver” (Priestner Allinger & Allinger, 2004, p. ii).

In this system, however, Canadian athletes occupy the lowest position in a top-down, hierarchical structure. In order to be eligible for competition at the highest levels, a Canadian athlete must be selected by their National Sport Organization and then must sign a contract, in the form of an “Athlete/National Sport Organization Agreement.”
(Sport Canada, 2005a, p. 36) which exerts significant control over the athlete’s activities. In return, Sport Canada, through its Athlete Assistance Program, provides the athlete with a “living and training allowance” (Sport Canada, 2005a, p. 36). The relationship between the athlete and Sport Canada is such that high-performance athletes are, arguably, employees of Sport Canada (Beamish & Borowy, 1988, pp. 81-82) and that athletic performance is the commodity they produce (former Canadian anti-doping administrator, May 25, 2006).

Worldwide, as the instrumental use of sporting success by governments became the norm, a ‘win-at-all-costs’ ethos pervaded high-performance sport, and has led to ‘doping,’ or the use of proscribed performance-enhancing substances or practices (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006, p. 5). The use of performance-enhancing substances, Houlihan has noted, is one of the most “persistent and intractable issues in modern sport” (1999, p. 197) and Dubin has called it “cheating ... the antithesis of sport” (1990, p. xxii). Cheating suggests attempting to achieve sporting success by fraudulent means and thus is not a practice that governments or sport organizations find useful in promoting their image. Evidence of this was seen in the urgency with which Canada’s federal government called the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (often referred to as the Dubin Inquiry) after Ben Johnson’s positive test for steroid use following his 100-metre dash at the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. The report of the Dubin Inquiry was highly critical of the nature of the government’s involvement in sport and the emphasis it placed on winning.

Since the release of Dubin’s report, there has been a movement in the Canadian sport community aimed at making the country’s sport system “athlete-centred.” In 2002,
Sport Canada released *The Canadian Sport Policy*, a document that was developed in collaboration “with all levels of Canadian society” and which describes a “powerful vision for sport in Canada” (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 2). In the *Policy*, Sport Canada envisions that by 2012 a “defining principle” of the Canadian sport system will be that it is athlete-centred, or, in the *Policy*’s words, a system that:

exists for athletes/participants who are the primary focus in the development of policies, programs, and procedures. Athletes/participants² are involved throughout the system in decisions that directly relate to them. They share responsibility for participating fairly within an ethical framework. (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 13)

This focus on athlete-centredness is evident in several other national sport policies, and has resulted in significant changes to the Canadian sport system. However, whether or not these changes have embraced all aspects of the concept of athlete-centredness is debatable. While there has been little serious academic study of the athlete-centredness of the Canadian sport system, one recent study suggests that a revised organizational structure of the sport system has resulted in greater focus being placed on athletes (Thibault & Babiak, 2005). However, another suggests that perhaps the aspect of athlete-centredness that concerns athlete involvement in decision-making has not been realized:

[Canadian] administrators and bureaucrats … have not completely embraced the notion of sharing administrative power and decision-making among relevant stakeholders, and in this particular case the ones most affected by such a system – the athletes. (Kihl, Kikulis & Thibault, 2006, p. 32)

This puts in context the remarks made by the Dutch participant at the Second
World Conference on Doping in Sport and speaks directly to the purpose of this research project: to increase awareness of the lack of athlete participation in sport policy development and to illuminate ways that sport policy making could meaningfully involve athletes. The Dutch participant’s recommendation that athletes be involved in the development of anti-doping policies was a recommendation for an athlete-centred approach. Canadians attending the conference, including representatives of the federal government, should have been well aware of the arguments for an approach that had recently been enshrined in the federal government’s *The Canadian Sport Policy*. When these Canadians returned home to enact *The Canadian Policy on Doping in Sport* (CPADS) (Sport Canada, 2004a) and develop the *Canadian Anti-Doping Program* (CADP) (CCES, 2004a), did they place importance on including athletes in defining needs and goals and in determining how to meet them? Was the involvement – proposed or actual – of athletes, of a nature that could be considered “meaningful?” What are the disadvantages of not involving athletes in meaningful ways in policy development? Conversely, what benefits could be expected of meaningful involvement? What are the obstacles to meaningful involvement of athletes in policy development? How can these obstacles be overcome? These are the research questions that are central to this project.

Of course, these questions could be asked in reference to any sport policies and the athletes who are affected by them. However, they are especially appropriate questions to ask of Canadian anti-doping policies, for several reasons. First, the anti-doping policies that currently affect Canadian athletes are some of the most recently developed Canadian sport policies. Both the CPADS and the CADP were developed largely, if not solely, in response to the need to comply with the WADC before the Olympic Games in 2004, and
their development occurred after the idea that athletes should be “involved throughout the system in decisions that directly relate to them” (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 13) was enshrined as a “defining principle” in The Canadian Sport Policy. Policies so recently developed should reflect present-day thinking and action around the involvement of athletes in policy making and it is this current state of policy development that will be assessed in this study. Second, anti-doping policies significantly affect the lives of athletes. In an environment where improved performance is the primary goal, anti-doping policies regulate or prohibit the use of many performance-enhancing substances and practices by athletes. They also require that athletes make their whereabouts known to the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES), the national agency which oversees anti-doping initiatives in Canada) and/or WADA so that both organizations can locate athletes for testing purposes at all times. Additionally, athletes must be available for urine and/or blood testing, in the presence of a Doping Control Officer, 24 hours per day, 365 days per year lest they face sanctioning by WADA or their domestic anti-doping organization. Not only are athletes affected in terms of how they conduct themselves as athletes, they are also required to give up rights to privacy that other citizens, including other stakeholders in high-performance sport, enjoy. As a consequence, not only is it clear that athletes are heavily affected, but that they are the stakeholders most heavily affected by anti-doping initiatives. Finally, I have been a runner since 1982, only one year before Canada’s first anti-doping policy was written. Since then, doping and anti-doping initiatives have had a profound effect on the sport of athletics, influencing both the performances of athletes and the way the sport and its athletes are perceived. In this sense, my study was an attempt to learn more about changes to the sport and sport system in which I have
competed for years.

The findings of this study are the result of critical analysis of documents and interview transcripts, conducted between October 2005 and May 2006. Documents studied include the anti-doping policies themselves and other documents produced by sport-related government departments (e.g. Sport Canada) and sport governing bodies (e.g. CCES and WADA). The operation of these organizations generates many documents that are often available to the public. Frequently, these documents outline the roles that various stakeholders play in the policy development process and thus are an important source of information. However, documents are often the final product of considerable work and negotiation; they are not verbatim transcripts of the entire policy development process. Interviews with individuals knowledgeable of the anti-doping policy development process complement document analysis by providing both a greater understanding of the process and information about the roles of stakeholders that was not contained in documents, and by allowing the testing of ideas generated during document analysis. Additionally, several of the interviewees who participated in this study have extensive experience in the Canadian sport system and provided information regarding the history of high-performance sport and anti-doping efforts. This information contributes to the contextualization that occurs in chapters two and three.

Theoretical Perspective

A guiding theoretical concept throughout this project has been “radical social research,” described by McDonald as methodologically sound critical social research that seeks to “expose and explain injustice and unequal relations of power, and thus provide
the possibility for social change” (2002, p. 114). Central to this concept is a critical theoretical perspective.

Critical theory has its roots in Marxist thought and developed as a discipline through the work of scholars, most notably Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas, associated with “the Frankfurt School” in the decades spanning 1920 – 1970. Greatly simplified, these theorists were critical of the predominant perspective that knowledge acquired by rational, scientific means is the knowledge, or the only correct way of perceiving the world (Calhoun, Gerteis, Moody, Pfaff, Schmidt & Virk, 2002, pp. 289-291; Rigauer, 2002, p. 41).

There are several fundamental characteristics of critical research. One is that it challenges the status quo and assumptions that support it by focusing on social and economic inequality and imbalances of power, particularly between experts and non-experts (Alevesson & Deetz, 2000, pp. 8, 92; Brookfield, 1987, p. 7; Patton, 2002, p. 548; Sage, 1990, p. 3). In doing so it is explicitly political research that seeks to change the object of study (in the case of this study, a policy process) by confirming and elucidating an already presumed pattern of injustice (Patton, 2002, pp. 130-130). It is thus “orientational” research; critical researchers eschew “any pretense of open-mindedness” (Patton, 2002, p. 129) by beginning from the perspective that there is injustice to be addressed.

Another key element of critical research is that it recognizes the importance of historical and political context (Brookfield, 1987, p. 8). When history can demonstrate that the assumptions supporting the status quo have been socially constructed, as opposed to being natural or intrinsically “right,” the foundation for critique of the status quo has
been laid (Alevsson & Deetz, 2000, p. 43).

A third characteristic is that critical research draws attention to constrained work conditions where intrinsic work qualities (creativity, variation, development, meaningfulness) are ignored or subordinated to instrumental values and there exists extensive control of an employee’s mindset and a “freezing” of their social reality (Alevsson & Deetz, 2000, p. 92).

A great deal of sociological research on sport has been done from a critical perspective (Beamish, 2002, passim), including considerable work that examines the Canadian sport system. Beamish and Borowy, for instance, challenge ten myths that constitute the status quo thinking regarding Canadian athletes (1988), and Macintosh and Whitson place their work “within a growing corpus of critical sport sociology” (1990, p. 10). I draw on these works and others to provide the historical context for this study in chapters two and three, and also to support the premise that injustice exists in policy making in the Canadian sport system.

Theories shape how people approach research. They direct observation and analysis, and influence what is noticed when data are analyzed (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 37; Ezzy, 2002, p. 3). Conducting “radical social research” on the nature of the role that Canadian athletes play in the development of anti-doping policies focuses analysis on describing the power relations between relevant stakeholders in policy development in such a way that avenues for balancing power relations and eliminating injustice are illuminated.
Organization of the Thesis

I have divided this thesis into five chapters. Following this introduction, two chapters give context to the study by reviewing relevant literature; chapter two describes international high-performance sport and anti-doping initiatives, and chapter three high-performance sport in Canada, Canadian anti-doping initiatives and athlete-centredness within the Canadian sport system. Chapter four describes in detail the methodology and findings of this project’s original research and chapter five presents conclusions and recommendations for further inquiry. The following are brief outlines of each chapter.

International High-Performance Sport and Anti-Doping Initiatives

Chapter two focuses on the international history of the political use of, and emphasis on, success in high-performance sport, and the tacit acceptance of doping as a means to win. It also describes the history of anti-doping programs worldwide and the driving forces behind them. Understanding how amateur sporting success came to be used as a means towards political ends, and how doping became one means of meeting those ends, is critical in order to understand doping as an issue in high-performance sport and why athletes are rarely participants in decision-making around this and other issues affecting them as athletes.

In the late 1940s the Soviet Union began to develop one of the world’s first organized national sport systems, one successful enough that when USSR joined the Olympic Movement in 1952, it was able to use success in the Games as a showcase for the Soviet way of life and ideology. East Germany built on the Soviet model when it created its own system in the 1960s, and these efforts by eastern bloc countries combined
with other political factors to prompt the development in western nations of similar sport systems; amateur sport became a major forum for contesting the Cold War. One element of this contest was the development of state run/ funded doping programs and the acknowledgment across sport stakeholders that doping is one way to increase the likelihood of winning. However, several high-profile doping incidents, beginning with the death of an Olympic cyclist in 1960, prompted international sporting organizations and governments to establish anti-doping programs and agencies in the ensuing decades. One of the most recent, and perhaps the most significant, anti-doping initiatives was the formation in 1999 of WADA by national governments and members of the Olympic Movement.

The history of international high-performance sport and anti-doping initiatives illustrates that powerful political actors have shaped sport such that sporting success, produced by athletes, can be used to achieve political goals.

Canadian High-Performance Sport, Athlete-Centredness, and Domestic Anti-Doping Initiatives

This chapter describes the development of Canada’s high-performance sport system from its beginnings as an election campaign promise made by Pierre Trudeau in 1968, through the development and growth of the bureaucracy that came to govern sport policy making at the expense of participation by athletes and other stakeholders, to the recent calls for an athlete-centred Canadian sport system. It also describes the history of domestic anti-doping initiatives. Understanding the issues facing the Canadian sport system and its policy makers, including doping-related issues, requires knowledge of the
history of the system. Athlete-centredness, one aspect of which is the idea that athletes should be full participants in decision-making that affects them, is an important element of the answers to this project’s research questions.

Canada was not the first nation to use sport as a means for achieving political goals, but the development of its sport system does reflect the instrumental use of sport by other nations (most notably the German Democratic Republic). National image and unity were concerns when Pierre Trudeau’s government funded the development of a sport bureaucracy in 1970 and, ever since, political and bureaucratic goals have dictated the direction of the system. The report of the Dubin Inquiry in 1990 was critical of this influence and prompted ongoing calls for Canada’s sport system to become athlete-centred, or a system in which athletes are the active subjects, not the objects of, sporting programs (Canadian Athletes’ Association, 1994, p. 3). The literature suggests that athlete-centredness was not a characteristic of Canada’s sport system from its beginnings in the early 1970s through the 1980s (cf. Macintosh et al., 1988). Recent research suggests that decision-making in Canadian sport continues to occur without significant athlete involvement, despite calls to make the system athlete-centred and research in the fields of public policy and public administration suggesting that the result of involving those most affected by policy in its development is in fact better, more legitimate policy (Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2005b; Department of Justice, Canada, 2001; Patten, 2000).

Another major recommendation of the Dubin Report was that significant changes be made in the domestic management of doping in sport. Canada’s first anti-doping policy was written in response to the positive tests of two Canadian athletes at the 1983
Pan American Games in Venezuela, and the anti-doping policies of the government and National Sport Organizations were strengthened gradually in the mid and late 1980s. The country’s first independent anti-doping organization was established on the recommendation of the report of the Dubin Inquiry in 1990, and during the 1990s and 2000s, Canada has played a leading role in anti-doping initiatives worldwide.

**Methodology and Findings**

This chapter begins by describing in detail the original research conducted for this thesis, and includes discussion of qualitative research generally, and the methods used to gather and analyze relevant documents and conduct and analyze interviews. The analysis of the material generated comprises the majority of this chapter and illuminates the roles of various stakeholders in the development of Canadian anti-doping policies. Guided by the research questions posed in chapter one, special emphasis is placed on analyzing and critiquing the nature of athletes’ involvement in policy development.

The major finding of this study is that athletes were not significantly involved in the development of Canadian anti-doping policies for several reasons. First, athlete representation came through organizations, not athletes themselves. Second, athletes were effectively excluded from the Task Force responsible for reviewing and evaluating comments received during the CADP consultation. Third, athletes were effectively excluded as stakeholders in the system in favour of others considered ‘experts.’ And finally, organizational concerns for maintaining appearances took precedence over ensuring athlete involvement in decision-making. Each of these four themes is explored in detail, as is a fifth theme: that there is little commitment to even the concept of
involving athletes in decision-making by either the government or the sport community.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

In this final chapter I make concluding statements regarding the involvement of athletes in the anti-doping policy development process and what the nature of their involvement says about the state of the Canadian sport system and athletes’ place in the system. Additionally, I discuss avenues for future inquiry that my analysis suggests are necessary.

Specifically, I conclude that as has historically been the case, athletes are not considered true agents in the Canadian sport system. Additionally, I suggest that democracy is an appropriate “lens” through which to assess the meaningfulness of athlete involvement and that literature on democratic involvement of citizens in policy making suggests avenues for involving athletes in more significant ways. Finally, I suggest the need for future research into the history and changing priorities of Athletes CAN and into the experiences of athletes as engaged citizens in the Canadian sport community.
Chapter 2: International High-Performance Sport and Anti-Doping Initiatives

In Canada, where the federal government has been the most influential stakeholder in high-performance sport for more than three decades, it is rarely questioned that the government funds sport organizations, multi-sport organizations and athletes, that this funding is contingent upon adherence to sport-related policies developed by government bureaucrats, and that athletes and their accomplishments are used to promote both national image and national unity. In other words, the Canadian sport system is considered an inevitable and unchanging part of the Canadian high-performance sport landscape – it is taken for granted. However, national governments, including Canada’s, have not always been involved in the governance of high-performance sport, and their involvement, rather than being natural in any way, is the result of specific historical and political factors that make it politically advantageous for governments to use sport as a political tool.

Chapter two, by examining the history of international high-performance sport and anti-doping initiatives, provides context for examining the development and organization of high-performance sport in Canada. For the purposes of this thesis, high-performance sport refers to sport and sport systems in which athletes at the highest levels represent their countries while competing on an international stage. It is often called “amateur sport,” in reference to the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) pre-1974 policy of only allowing amateurs – those athletes who competed without material gain – to participate in the Games (Dubin, 1990, p. 46). It is closely correlated with what is
referred to as “Olympic sport,” the 28 summer and 7 winter sports contested at the Olympic Games. While the Olympic Games are the most well-known and influential example of high-performance sport, it also includes other international and national multisport games (e.g. the Commonwealth Games, the Pan American Games, the Canada Games) and single-sport national and world championships.

In the context of this thesis, it is important to distinguish between sport that falls within the above description of high-performance sport – sport in which governments and politics play major roles in governance whereas athletes do not – and other sports that could also reasonably be considered “high-performance.” For instance, high-performance sport in this context does not include sport played in privately-run, professional leagues such as the National Hockey League (NHL) or Canadian Football League, although athletes in some of these leagues (e.g. the National Basketball Association and the NHL) may occasionally represent their countries in high-performance sporting events such as the Olympic Games. Athletes in most of these leagues won the right to bargain collectively long ago, and as a result, they and their representatives play significant roles in the governance of their sport.

The chapter’s first section examines the history of international, high-performance sport. The discussion begins by describing the characteristics of high-performance sport that make it appealing as a tool to governments. This is followed by a discussion of the post-World War II development of national sport systems, which included within them state run, endorsed or tolerated doping regimes. The second section is an analysis of the history of international anti-doping initiatives.

The information in chapter two is an important part of this thesis for two reasons.
First, it provides the reader with a description of the driving forces that have resulted in present-day high-performance sport and anti-doping initiatives; that these forces have included national governments and international sport organizations is important context for understanding sport-related policies and their development. Second, it strongly suggests that those driving forces have been sport stakeholders other than athletes and that the voices of athletes have been silenced in the history of high-performance sport. Indeed, there is little literature to suggest that athletes have ever played a major role in the governance of high-performance sport.

History of International High-Performance Sport

There are specific characteristics of sport that make it appealing as a political tool (Hall, Slack, Smith & Whitson, 1991, p. 32-3). First, sport generates excitement through participation and spectatorship, the latter being of more interest to governments. The fact that many Canadians can remember exactly where they were when Paul Henderson scored his winning goal when Canada played the USSR in ice hockey in 1972, or when Ben Johnson ran a world record breaking 9.79 seconds to win the Seoul Olympic Games 100 metre dash in 1988, is testament to the level of excitement that sport can produce in spectators. Second, uniquely Canadian sporting moments that are remembered by many citizens, such as the two mentioned above, are also indicative of sport’s ability to generate feelings of community, from the level of families (Carmichael, 2001, p. 4) to that of nations (Hall et al., 1991, p. 32; Kidd, 2001, p. 5; Monnington, 2000). Newspapers exclaimed, “Canada’s gold” and “O, Canada” when our national hockey teams won gold in the Salt Lake City Olympic Winter Games in 2002, effectively encouraging all
Canadians to share in the victories of our national teams and bringing Canadians from various demographic groups together, providing them with a common point of interest (Cox, 2002; DiManno, 2002). Third, the accomplishments of high-performance athletes are easily understood by the many individuals who have, at some point in their lives, participated in the same sports. As a consequence, sport’s penetration into national consciousness is often much greater than that of other aspects of culture or government action (Hall et al., 1991, p. 35). A considerable part of a modern national identity “is the product of the invention and selection of tradition” (Allison, 2000, p. 350) and high-performance sport, with its excitement, community-building ability and penetration, lends itself readily to the manipulation of tradition. It is thus treated as an effective way to promote national identity, both at home and abroad, by all contemporary nation-states (Chalip, 1996, p. x; Harvey, 2001, p. 27; Houlihan, 2000, p. 217; Macintosh, 1996, p. 44).

As Houlihan notes, “success in sports events, and particularly the hosting of sports events, provides a benign and uncritical backdrop for the parade of national achievement” (2000, p. 216).

Nazi Germany’s use of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin for both domestic and international political purposes was one of the first major examples of government exploitation of the political potential of high-performance sport. Recognizing the value of the Games as a propaganda vehicle, the Nazi Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda “carefully manipulated the Games’ symbols to convey … themes that had a favourable reception among the post-WWI German population” (Beamish & Ritchie, 2005, p. 777). The Nazis introduced the torch relay, symbolically linking an idealized ancient Greek civilization with its modern, Nazi counterpart, and commissioned the Leni
Riefenstahl film *Olympia*, which presented a perspective of the Games aligned with the political aspirations of the Third Reich. Additionally, Germany’s athletes performed well at the Games, further bolstering Adolph Hitler’s political message (Beamish & Ritchie, 2005, pp. 779-780).

The fact that Nazi Germany had benefited from the instrumental use of its sporting success was not lost on the governments of other nations. In the post-WWII period, that knowledge combined with two other factors to result in an extraordinary emphasis being placed on winning in high-performance sport. The first of these factors was the rise of commercial television and international marketing efforts by transnational corporations, both of which pressured “national sport systems to develop a more ‘professionalized’ approach to training and competition in order to satisfy television’s and the market’s demands for world-class, record-breaking performances” (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, p. 5). The second factor was that sport research and athletes’ training regimens were increasingly being determined by a scientific rationality (Beamish & Ritchie, 2004, pp. 359, 365). The result of these factors was the development in the eastern bloc, and simultaneously in the west, of national sport systems involving “the instrumentally rational, systematic, scientifically and technologically assisted enhancement of athletic performance in pursuit of victory and the ongoing assault on the linear record” (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006).

The USSR was one of the first nations to develop such a system, one that exploited sport for maximum political value. The USSR’s return to the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952 and their domination of the Games in the early 1960s helped illuminate for other governments the value of sport in promoting political ideology and
developing positive national images, both important political concerns during the cold war (Harvey, 2001, p. 27; Houlihan, 2000, p. 214; Houlihan, 1997, p. 65; Macintosh, 1996, p. 44; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 3). Today, elements of the Soviet system are commonplace in many sport systems: central state funding; a financial reward system for athletes and coaches; use of the media to popularize the development of sport among the masses; development of a complex infrastructure for athletes that included training centres, a system of sports schools and housing; talent identification of athletes at young ages; and the general implementation of a “bio-medically informed, scientific approach to progressive resistance training that placed increased physical demands on athletes” (Green & Houlihan, 2005, pp. 21-23; Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, pp. 6-7). Another element of the Soviet approach was the state-sponsored use of performance-enhancing drugs, which became more sophisticated as the Soviet system matured. Beamish and Ritchie cite evidence that the USSR’s athletes, specifically those in the sport of weightlifting, had begun to use steroids in the early 1950s (2004, p. 360) and Dubin writes that during his Commission of Inquiry, Charlie Francis, Ben Johnson’s sprinting coach, testified that:

it was the practice of the Soviet Union to load sophisticated drug-testing equipment on a ship anchored in the nearest harbour to major international games where Soviet athletes were participating. The Soviets would then test the athletes immediately prior to competition to ensure they were clean. … much of what [Francis] said was supported by many other witnesses. (Dubin, 1990, p. 342)

Building on the model pioneered by the USSR, Manfred Ewald developed perhaps the most advanced and successful national sport system ever in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), one that assisted the GDR in its post-War nation-building
efforts (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006; Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, p. 7). In addition to a more rigorous talent identification system with close ties to the GDR’s educational system, top secret research, including the systematic doping of high-performance athletes, was conducted by East Germany’s heavily staffed Forschungsinstitut für Körperkultur und Sport (Research Institute for Physical Culture and Sport) (Beamish & Ritchie, 2004, p. 359; Green & Houlihan, 2005, pp 23-25).

The sport systems developed by the USSR and GDR led to extraordinary success in high-performance sport. Prior to 1952, the United States (USA) routinely topped the medal count at the Olympic Games, but the USSR was immediately a rival for the USA upon joining the Games in Helsinki, and, in 1976, even East Germany with its relatively small population, was competing with the USA at the Games (International Olympic Committee, 2006).

Western nations were well aware of the political advantages afforded the GDR and USSR by their sporting success, and a perceived need to compete with eastern nations played a major role in the development of national sport systems in the west (Green & Houlihan, 2005, p. 26). West Germany’s was one of the first western governments to react. The two Germanys fielded combined teams in the Olympic Games of 1956, 1960 and 1964, and West Germany’s athletes, bred in a decentralized, club-based sport system, were losing spots on the Olympic team to their GDR counterparts (Beamish & Ritchie, 2004, p. 362). In the mid-1960s, with the 1972 Munich Olympic Games looming, West Germany began to develop a sport system similar to that of the GDR (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006; Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, p. 9).

Other western nations may not have felt as directly pressured as West Germany,
but they too adopted various aspects of east bloc sport systems in order to compete internationally. In the USA, athletes, with the help of a team physician, reacted to steroid use by Soviet weightlifters by establishing their own program in time for the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne, and by the early 1960s, drug use had become common in most strength-based events (Beamish & Ritchie, 2004, p. 360). That American doping became more sophisticated over time is illustrated by Dubin in his report:

During the course of the Inquiry I heard evidence from more than one witness about a nonpunitive drug-testing program adopted by the United States Olympic Committee. ... [some] have alleged that the real purpose was to allow U.S. athletes to check their clearance times and modify their steroid cycles prior to competing.

(Dubin, 1990, pp. 340-341)

In Canada, losses to the USSR in international ice hockey were a major factor in the government’s funding and developing a national sport system during the 1970s and 1980s (described in detail in Chapter Three). Also, it has been suggested that while the federal government did not run its own doping program, Canadian sport administrators may have chosen to ignore strong evidence of doping by Canadian coaches and athletes (Dubin, 1990, p. 179). In Australia, a centralized, highly successful sport system — based largely on the systems of the eastern bloc (Green & Houlihan, 2005, p. 18) — was developed beginning in the early 1980s. Here too, there is evidence that the government was complicit in the doping of its athletes (Reiterer, 2000).

Conspicuously absent from literature on the history of national, high-performance sport systems is mention of athletes’ impact on system development. Instead, as high-performance sport became a major forum for contesting the cold war, athletes were used
to produce the victories that fostered nation-building and strengthened national image. Beamish and Ritchie write that during the cold war years, increasingly younger athletes were subjected to progressively voluminous and intense training regimes (2004, p. 365) and that both male and female performances were aided by steroids. In order to compete with eastern bloc nations “the west would apparently have to sacrifice not only its youth to the Cold War, but women would be among the casualties” (2005, p. 783). Green and Houlihan paint an equally bleak picture when they write that the “elite athlete in the GDR was treated as ‘a dehumanized tool within the sport system’” (2005, p. 25).

**International Anti-Doping Initiatives**

While it has rarely been admitted, it is clear that national governments were involved, to varying degrees, in doping their athletes and that doping was one of several ways that governments attempted to reap the political payoffs associated with sporting success. Indeed, coaches and doctors working in the GDR system were convicted of doping athletes by a Berlin state prosecutor in 1999-2000 (Hoberman, 2001, p. 8). Some in the international sport community view doping as an ethical problem in sport and a risk to the health of athletes (WADA, 2003c). It can also be reasonably argued that doping is a logical outcome of increasing competition in an environment characterized by an ethos of scientific rationality, and that the health risks of monitored and moderate doping would be no more severe than those already faced by ‘clean’ high-performance athletes (Beamish & Ritchie, 2006). However, a normative examination of doping in sport is beyond the scope of this thesis; of relevance are the driving forces behind anti-doping initiatives that have arisen since the 1960s.
As with the development of national sport systems, political imperatives dictated the establishment of the first anti-doping policies (Houlihan, 1999, p. 198). According to one interviewee:

the anti-doping business, as a whole ... wherever it occurs ... seems to have gone through similar stages ... [first] there's a shock phase that people go through, which is typically then followed by what I would call the administrative phase, the policy phase. You know, the suits and the administrators sit down and figure out what this means and what to do. (former anti-doping policy developer, May 2006)

Several researchers suggest the first “shock” that prompted sport administrators to consider doping a problem was the death of Dutch cyclist Knud Jensen from substance use during the 1960 Summer Olympic Games (Beamish & Ritchie, 2004, p. 360; Dubin, 1990, p. 412; Møller, 2005, p. 460). An autopsy revealed that Jensen had been using stimulants, and fear of the damage his death might have on the image of the Olympic Movement resulted in the first phase of anti-doping policies developed by the IOC and some International Sporting Federations (IFs) (Houlihan, 2004b, p. 64). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the IOC published its first list of banned substances, the governments of several nations, such as France, Belgium, Italy and Turkey, legislated against doping in sport, and the Council of Europe drafted a position concerning doping (Centre for Sport and Law Inc., 2002, p. 1; Dubin, 1990, p. 413; Houlihan, 1999, p. 198). However, during this initial stage of policy making, there was considerable disincentive to test athletes for drugs. Comprehensive, effective testing was expensive, and if evidence of widespread doping were to be uncovered it would damage the image of amateur sport. As a result, this phase of anti-doping policy making was characterized by in-competition testing, the
lack of random testing, and a lack of coordination between sport stakeholders. (Dubin, 1990, pp. 413-430; Houlihan, 1999).

In the mid-1980s it became clear that drugs were being used for training, not solely competition, and that athletes were spending considerable amounts of time training and living in countries other than their own. The costs associated with having to follow athletes around the globe in order to test them outside competition forced governments and IFs to realize "the resource implications of implementing an effective anti-doping policy" and accordingly, to take steps towards harmonization of policy (Houlihan, 1999, p. 199). Canada was a key participant in several early harmonization efforts. In 1985, it was granted observer status at the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Development of Sport/Experts Committee on Anti-Doping in Sport, then the leading government anti-doping movement. In 1986, it was Canada that proposed to the Council that a joint government/sport anti-doping charter should be established. At the Olympic Winter Games in Calgary in 1988, it was decided that Ottawa would host the First Permanent World Conference on Antidoping in Sport later in the year, and indeed, the International Olympic Charter against Doping in Sport, which “formed the basis for at least the next … decade of what the world’s anti-doping rules really were” (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005) was adopted at the conference (Dubin, 1990, pp. 414-415; Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). In addition to efforts in which Canada was involved, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Iceland adopted the Nordic Antidoping Convention in 1985.

If the death of an Olympic cyclist in 1960 was the initial “shock” that prompted anti-doping policy development, perhaps the biggest anti-doping policy-generating event
in history occurred at the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988 when Canadian Ben Johnson tested positive for steroid use following his win in the 100 metre dash. According to WADA, Johnson’s disqualification “focused the world’s attention to the doping problem to an unprecedented degree” (2006). Not only did it result in a federal commission of inquiry that completely changed the anti-doping policy landscape in Canada (see chapter three for a detailed discussion), but it was a factor in prompting similar changes in nations such as the United States and Australia (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005).

Throughout the early and mid 1990s, few major changes occurred in international anti-doping. The International Anti-Doping Arrangement (IADA) was formed by the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom in 1995 and later joined by Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. At the 1999 Pan-American Games in Winnipeg, participating countries discussed the creation of a “hemispheric co-operation” on anti-doping (CCES, 2006). However, in 1998, another major doping scandal occurred when a police raid at the Tour de France uncovered large amounts of prohibited performance-enhancing substances. In the wake of this scandal the IOC convened the First World Conference on Doping in Sport in Lausanne in 1999, where major sport stakeholders were invited to consider international and intersport harmonization of anti-doping efforts (Centre for Sport and Law Inc., 2002, p. 8).

The major recommendation of the Lausanne Conference was the establishment of an independent, international anti-doping agency. As a result, the World Anti-Doping Agency was established in November of 1999 (WADA, 2006b). WADA is a private organization governed by equal numbers of representatives from the Olympic Movement.
and governments, and since 2002 its head office has been in Montreal. However, simply creating an organization dedicated to fighting doping, one made up of most of the major stakeholders in the issue, does not create worldwide harmonization of policy and enforcement. Consequently, an immediate goal of WADA was to put an international anti-doping code in place before the 2004 Summer Olympic Games. At the 2003 Second World Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen, after what has been called “an extensive and unprecedented consultation process” (WADA, 2006c), the *World Anti-Doping Code* was finalized and adopted by many governments and sports governing bodies as:

the fundamental and universal document upon which the World Anti-Doping Program in sport is based. The purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-doping effort through universal harmonization of core anti-doping elements. (WADA, 2003c, p. 1)

The IOC has made the *World Anti-Doping Code* mandatory for the entire Olympic Movement (IOC, 2004, p. 82). Reflecting this, governments and sport organizations worldwide have endorsed the *Code* and implemented policies that comply with it. At the Canadian Federal-Provincial-Territorial Conference of Ministers responsible for Sport, Recreation and Fitness in Québec City in 2004, the Ministers adopted a new *Canadian Policy Against Doping in Sport* “in accordance with the new *World Anti-Doping Code*” (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 2004).

Present-day anti-doping policy direction has both admirers and critics.\(^5\) However, little research has critically examined the process through which current policy was developed and the roles that various sport stakeholders played in that process. Houlihan
writes that “in relation to public policy toward sport in general and doping in particular athletes are routinely relegated to the margins of debate” (2004, p. 421) and, as with literature concerning national sport system development, what history there is regarding international anti-doping initiatives fails to acknowledge athletes’ involvement in policy development. Instead, sport organizations, most notably the IOC, and governments have developed anti-doping policies in reaction to doping scandals that threatened to damage their images. And while a stated purpose of current anti-doping policies is to protect the right of athletes to participate in drug-free sport (Sport Canada, 2004a, p. 1; WADA, 2003c, p. 1), this and other rights bestowed upon athletes by policy-makers come at the expense of political rights (Houlihan, 2004a, p. 436).

Aspects of the histories examined in this chapter have influenced the development of Canadian sport policies, including anti-doping policies, and are thus directly relevant to this research project. First, high-performance sport lends itself readily to use as a political instrument, one with few negative overtones (Houlihan, 2000, p. 216). As governments worldwide realized this and began to use sport as a promotional tool, Canada was directly pressured to do the same. Second, the histories of both high-performance sport and anti-doping clearly show that national governments and sport organizations have been the major influences in shaping sport and anti-doping initiatives; the absence of other voices, particularly those of athletes, in these histories, is conspicuous. As is described in chapter three, this model of high-performance sport governance is reflected in the history of sport in Canada.
Chapter 3: Canadian High-Performance Sport, Athlete-Centredness, and Domestic Anti-Doping Initiatives

Canada’s was not the first federal government to use high-performance sport as a means for achieving political goals; the development of the Canadian sport system has reflected the development of other national sport systems. The Canadian government showed little concern for sport prior to the 1960s; in 1936 for instance, Prime Minister Mackenzie King suggested that “it is doubtful that anyone participating in the Olympic Games is a representative of the Government of this country” (cited in Macintosh et al., 1988, p. 18) and it was routine for Canadian athletes to pay their own way to international events such as the Olympic Games (Hall et al., 1991, p. 73). However, since its involvement in high-performance sport in 1961, the federal government has been one of, if not the, major stakeholder in the country’s sport system, and beginning in the early 1970s has directly funded and managed a performance-focused sport bureaucracy.

While the prioritization of performance has had the desired effect – Canada competes well internationally, especially for a country of only 30 million people6 – it has also contributed to, if not directly produced, unwanted results. There is no evidence to suggest that any agency of the Canadian government has ever run its own doping program, but system-wide pressures to win have led to scandals involving the use of banned substances. As well, the government’s narrow focus on performance, combined with the centralization and professionalization of Canada’s sport bureaucracy, has resulted in decision-making that occurs without significant input from other stakeholders,
including athletes themselves (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990). These two issues - overemphasis on winning and the lack of stakeholder input into decision-making - were illuminated by the Dubin Inquiry that was prompted by Ben Johnson’s disqualification from the Seoul Summer Olympic Games in 1988. Since the Inquiry, anti-doping initiatives in Canada have been strengthened to the point where Canada frequently assumes “a leadership role in the international fight against doping in sport” (Canadian Heritage, 2001), and within the Canadian sport system a movement has commenced to make the system athlete-centred, or one that focuses on athletes’ needs and involves them in decision-making (Canadian Athletes’ Association, 1994, p. 3; Sport Canada, 2002, p. 13).

Chapter three is divided into three sections. The first is a brief examination of the history of Canadian high-performance sport. The second section examines the history of Canadian anti-doping initiatives specifically. Following this is an examination of the movement in Canada to make the nation’s sport system athlete-centred. These three histories illustrate that the Canadian sport system has been shaped by government agents with a focus on political objectives. Only recently has involving athletes in decision-making become a valued practice, but one that, as this chapter and the following will show, has had little real influence on athletes’ actual involvement in policy-creation and implementation. These three histories place particular emphasis on the history of domestic anti-doping efforts and athlete-centredness, and they lay the foundation for the examination of athlete involvement in anti-doping policy development in chapter four.
History of Canadian High-Performance Sport

Prior to the Second World War, government involvement in sport in Canada had little to do with performance. Instead, government programs focussed on improving the fitness and well-being of Canadians to increase their employability and military preparedness. The Depression of the 1930s was the impetus for one of the first examples of Canadian government involvement in sport at any level. British Columbia’s Pro-Rec program, by providing physical fitness classes for “unemployed and destitute young men” (Kidd, 1996, p. 247), sought to combat idleness and thus make the participants more employable (Harvey, 2001, p. 34; Kidd, 1996, pp. 247-250; Morrow & Wamsley, 2005, pp. 194-195). During WWII, the health and fitness of citizens again became an issue, but this time in terms of military preparedness. When significant numbers of Canadians recruited for war failed the army’s medical examination, the Canadian government passed the National Physical Fitness Act in 1943 in an attempt to improve the fitness of recruits (Harvey, 2001, p. 34; Houlihan, 2000, p. 215; Kidd, 1996, p. 252; Macintosh et al., 1988, p. 154; Morrow & Wamsley, 2005, p. 196).

In the 1950s and 1960s several domestic factors converged to prepare the way for direct government involvement in the production of a national high-performance sport system. First, Canada adopted Keynesian welfare state policies that resulted in the provision of funds for several social assistance programs such as unemployment insurance and old age pensions. This in turn led Canadian sport leaders to call for similar funding for sport (Hall et al., 1991, p. 73; Macintosh et al., 1988, p. 43). Second, Canada’s poor performances in increasingly visible international sporting events – particularly as cold war tensions increased in the sport of ice hockey – caused concern in
both print media and Parliament (Macintosh et al., 1988, pp. 11, 154). Finally, Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker had attended the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin (Kidd, 2001, p. 4) and had seen first hand the effect that sport could have on a nation’s citizens. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1960, he stated that he believed “there are tremendous dividends in national pride from some degree of success in athletics” (House of Commons Debates, 21 November, 1960, pp. 39-40, cited in Hall et al., 1991, p. 73). Indeed, Diefenbaker’s comments proved to be a significant break from federal politicians’ traditional laissez-faire approach to sport. Together, these factors laid the foundation for the federal government’s tabling of Bill C-131, An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport, in 1961 (Hall et al., 1991, p. 73; Macintosh, 1996, p. 44).

The Act marked the beginning of federal government involvement in high-performance sport by providing a relatively small amount of funding for improved sports administration, grants to sporting organizations, the establishment of the Canada Games, federal-provincial cost-sharing agreements and financial aid to physical education specialists (Hall et al., 1991, p. 74; Harvey, 2001, p. 28; Macintosh, 1996, p. 44). However, these programs resulted in only modest improvements in international performances (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 17) and as a result the federal government did not perceive it was receiving adequate recognition or return for its contributions to provinces (Macintosh et al., 1988, pp. 33-34).

Two ways of addressing these issues became clear to the government in the 1960s. The first option was for the government to continue its indirect involvement in sport and simply increase funding to national sporting associations, allowing them to continue to oversee sport governance. The second option was for the government to
develop its own agencies and deal more directly with athletes and coaches. The Trudeau-led Liberal government that came to power in 1968 chose the latter path (Macintosh, 1988, p. 124).

While campaigning to become Prime Minister in 1968, Pierre Trudeau spoke of sport’s potential for strengthening national unity and promised that, if elected, he would set up a Royal Commission on Sport in Canada (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 4). National unity is a fundamental issue for federal governments, and in the late 1960s, Trudeau’s vision of Canada faced attacks on nationalism from several fronts, including Québec, the oil-rich west, native Canadians and the working class (Kidd, 1988, p. 17).

Trudeau kept his promise and in 1968 established the Task Force on Sport for Canadians. The four individuals who composed the Task Force had little knowledge of the field of amateur sport as a whole, and their appointments were politically motivated (Macintosh et al., 1988, pp. 57-58). Despite this, their work led to the 1970 tabling of A Proposed Sports Policy for Canadians by Health and Welfare Minister John Munro (Harvey, 2001, p. 28; Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 98).

Far from being simply a proposal as its name suggests, the Proposed Policy was the beginning of the federal government’s “massive intervention” (Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 98) in high-performance sport that continues to this day (Macintosh, 1988, p. 124; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 4; Mills, 1998; Owen, 2005), and for this reason has been called “one of the single most important documents in the history of Canada’s high-performance sport system” (Beamish, 1990, p. 143). While one of the policy’s stated goals was to create greater equality of opportunity for Canadians in amateur sport (Beamish, 1990, p. 143), the Trudeau government’s true goals were the political payoffs

Among the Proposed Policy’s initiatives were the first direct funding of elite athletes through the Grants in Aid program for student athletes (Beamish, 1993, p. 188), and the formal ratification or establishment of several arms-length – although still government funded – agencies, including: the National Sport and Recreation Centre, which provided and centralized administrative support for national sports associations and fostered communication between them; the Coaching Association of Canada; Hockey Canada; and Sport Participation Canada (Beamish, 1990, p. 143; Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 104; Houlihan, 1997, p. 79; Macintosh, 1988, p. 125). These agencies and the government departments created to support them, Sport Canada and Recreation Canada, were the beginning of a Canadian sport bureaucracy that grew dramatically in the 1970s and early 1980s.8

In what has been called the professionalization of the Canadian sport system (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990), physical educators and sport administrators took advantage of this expanding state bureaucracy and its rational approach to decision-making to occupy strategic positions and influence policy in directions suiting their own values and interests. Professionalization promoted “new forms and discourses of knowledge,” the mastery of which translated into power and influence for the professionals (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 26). Macintosh and Whitson write that “There are others … who have been excluded from decision-making circles, or have dropped out themselves because of the apparent futility of raising issues that were
routinely dismissed as ‘irrelevant’ from the perspective of … rational discourse” (1990, p. 45) and note the tensions between decision-making processes that are democratic in nature and those in which expertise is valued (1990, p. 131). The trend to professionalization decreased the likelihood that political and ethical issues, such as those concerning geography, class and gender were ever considered, let alone acted upon (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 44).

Combined with the awarding of several major sporting events to Canadian cities – the Montréal Olympic Summer Games in 1976, the Edmonton Commonwealth Games in 1978, and the Calgary Olympic Winter Games in 1988 – professionalization served to strengthen the focus of Canada’s sport system on programs and initiatives aimed at improving performance⁹ (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, pp. 12-13; Macintosh et al., 1988, pp. 104, 106, 107; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, pp. 22-23). In 1981, for example, the federal minister responsible for sport, Gerald Regan, issued the white paper A Challenge to the Nation: Fitness and Amateur Sport in the 80s, in which it was made clear that the priority of the federal government was high-performance sport and that NSOs with a demonstrated record of, and commitment to, excellence were to receive the bulk of new funding (Houlihan, 1997, p. 80; Macintosh, 1988, p. 132).

However, following Ben Johnson’s positive drug test at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Summer Games, the Dubin Inquiry openly criticized the government’s emphasis on high-performance sport:

as the degree of [government] involvement in and funding of sport has increased, there has been a shift of emphasis in the nature and focus of that involvement. … the primary objective has become the gold medal. … The changed emphasis …
demands a re-examination of the role and mandate of government in sport. (Dubin, 1990, p. 525)

Both Dubin’s report and the subsequent government document *Sport: The Way Ahead* (Minister’s Task Force on Federal Sport Policy, 1992) suggested that the focus on high-performance was not in keeping with the original objectives of government intervention in sport – the promotion of ethically-based, fair competition and opportunities for all based on natural ability (Dubin, 1990, p. 525). However, suggestions from both reports to remedy this were ignored and the focus on performance continued unabated. In 1994, Michel Dupuy, the Minister of Canadian Heritage, whose portfolio also included sport, made clear that federal funding would be directed towards high-performance athletes in keeping with the mission of Canadian Heritage, the government department in which Sport Canada resided, which was to “strengthen and celebrate Canada” (Houlihan, 1997, pp. 82-83). More recently, increases in federal funding have continued and the government’s enthusiastic support of programs such as the Canadian Olympic Committee’s *Own the Podium – 2010* (Owen, 2005) make it clear that the goals of the system are still largely performance focused. *Own the Podium* calls for no less than Canadian domination of the medal standings in the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver, and even includes a strategic “Top Secret – 2010” program to develop advanced technology and equipment in the pursuit of Olympic gold (Priestner Allinger & Allinger, 2004, pp. 22-24).

While government influence has been a defining feature of the Canadian sport system since its inception it is important to note that there have been efforts made to consult with stakeholders in the Canadian sport community. The first occurred in 1977
when Iona Campagnolo, then Minister of State with responsibility for fitness and amateur sport, tabled the green paper *Toward a National Policy on Amateur Sport: A Working Paper*, which recommended public debate and discussion before the development of a new national sport policy (Macintosh et al., 1988, p. 115). While members of the sport community were initially excited by this opportunity, the consultations were short, some interested parties were excluded, and the focus of the meetings was primarily high-performance sport, with little attention paid to fitness and recreation. Very few stakeholders were satisfied and almost every brief submitted in response criticized the government’s single-minded focus on excellence at the expense of mass recreation (Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 10; Macintosh, 1988, p. 130; Macintosh et al., 1988, pp. 115-116).

A more recent attempt at wide consultation was the “pan Canadian sport consultation process” (Athletes CAN, 2001, p. 2) held as part of the development process of the 2002 *Canadian Sport Policy*. Athletes CAN, a national organization that acts as the voice of all national team athletes, was critical of early rounds of consultation, and “expressed its concern to the National Sport Policy Task Force about the lack of high-performance athlete representation at the first Regional Conference on Sport” (2001, p. 2). Recent research by Kihl, Kikulis and Thibault suggests that the consultation process may be similar to that which occurred in 1977 in that participants were selected for consultation, thus excluding others who may have contributed to a more open process. Even those who were consulted felt their input is not reflected in the final policy (personal conversations with authors, March, 2005).

The Canadian sport system has elements to it common among many of the
national sport systems developed since World War II. While Canada’s system most closely resembles West Germany’s (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, p. 9), the prioritization of performance, a centralized bureaucracy populated by sport professionals, the training and certification of coaches, and financial reward for high-performance athletes were also characteristics of the systems of the USSR and East Germany. And, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, Canada does perform well internationally, especially given its population. However, one important aspect of eastern sport systems, a state-run doping program, has never been part of the Canadian sport system. Despite this, there have been doping-related ‘scandals’ involving Canadian athletes that have prompted the development of domestic anti-doping policies and programs. The following section focuses on these initiatives.

History of Canadian Anti-Doping Initiatives

Much like the history of Canadian high-performance sport generally, the history of Canada’s anti-doping initiatives is one characterized by government intervention in reaction to politically charged circumstances, or what one interviewee referred to as “shock” (former anti-doping policy developer, May 2006). The death of an Olympic cyclist in 1960, for instance, was the shock that initiated international anti-doping efforts in the late 1960s (Beamish & Ritchie, 2004, p. 360; Dubin, 1990, p. 412; Moller, 2005, p. 460). However, it was 1983 before a significant shock involving Canadian athletes prompted Canadian sport administrators to develop the country’s first anti-doping policy.

That year, shortly before the Pan American Games in Caracas, Venezuela, it was announced unexpectedly that there would be drug testing at the Games and that the
testing would be more comprehensive than that to which North, Central and South American athletes were accustomed (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). The result was, in the words of one interviewee, "quite a free-for-all" (CCES employee, December, 2005) in which many athletes who were scheduled to compete failed to show up for the Games, others fled the athletes' village upon learning of the testing, and 19 athletes who did compete, including two Canadian weightlifters, tested positive for steroid use (CCES employee, December 2005; Centre for Sport and Law Inc., 2002, p. 2; Dubin, 1990, pp. xvi, 90; Sport Canada employee, April 2006).

The visibility of this scandal and the fact that publicly-funded Canadian athletes were involved prompted Sport Canada to write Canada's first anti-doping policy, Drug Use and Doping Control in December, 1983. The policy, written in one day by two administrators, was "pretty simple" by present-day standards (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). It required NSOs to "develop a plan for their sport to eradicate improper drug use by Canadian athletes and support personnel" (Dubin, 1990, p. 90) and stated that any Canadian athlete who tested positive for a banned substance would become ineligible for government funding for a minimum of one year, while a second offence would result in lifetime ineligibility (Centre for Sport and Law Inc., 2002, p. 3; Dubin, 1990, p. 91; Sport Canada employee, April, 2006).

Financially, the implementation and management of anti-doping plans was a heavy burden for NSOs. As a result, Sport Canada began to fund anti-doping initiatives, and between the years 1984 and 1988, under the same government policy, new initiatives were launched and others were strengthened and expanded (CCES employee, December, 2005 Sport Canada Employee, April, 2006). The Sport Medicine Council of Canada
Canadian Sport & Anti-Doping

(SMCC), the country’s governing body for high-performance sports medicine and
science (Safai, 2005, p. 93), was enlisted to develop *Standard Operating Procedures* for
doping control, and also contracted with the Institut National de la Recherche
Scientifique to conduct tests on Canadian athletes’ samples (Sport Canada employee,
April, 2006); Sport Canada and the SMCC collaborated on the production of anti-doping
educational material; arbitration procedures were put in place for athletes to appeal
doping charges; testing for drug use began at the Canada Games; and penalties for steroid
use were strengthened (Centre for Sport and Law Inc., 2002, pp. 2-4). Dubin refers to
Canada’s policy as “one of the most stringent in the world” (Dubin, 1990, p. xvii).

Much like the country’s first anti-doping policy, Canada’s hosting of the First
Permanent World Conference on Anti-Doping in Sport, was, according to an interviewee
with Sport Canada, prompted by another doping-related incident, this time at the Calgary
Olympic Winter Games in 1988:

> a Canadian cross-country [ski] coach, Marty Hall, in the middle of everything, we
> were playing nice and we weren’t winning any … medals or anything, in the
> middle of the whole thing. … Marty the coach says, you know why [Canadian skier
> Pierre Harvey] got hammered? Because every friggin’ East German … is juiced to
> the eyeballs in steroids. … Otto Jelinek was the minister at the time and he was
> trying to … be a polite host to the world, and then our national coach was slamming
> the guests … you know, without real proof, but it seemed pretty obvious. So Jelinek
> said we will host … the first world conference on anti-doping. (Sport Canada
> employee, April, 2006)

Another report suggests it was the Soviet Union’s athletes that Hall accused, and goes on
to state that “Canadian Olympic and government officials couldn’t distance themselves fast enough or far enough from his inflammatory comments” (Barnes, 2002). Regardless of Hall’s target, the political reaction was swift and later that year Ottawa hosted the conference at which the International Olympic Charter Against Doping in Sport was adopted (CCES employee, December, 2005; Sport Canada employee, April, 2006).

However, without question, the most significant influence on Canadian anti-doping initiatives was the scandal surrounding Ben Johnson’s positive test for steroid use following his world record in the 100 metre dash at the Seoul Olympic Summer Games in 1988. It is difficult to adequately describe the excitement felt by many Canadians viewing the 100 metre final, and the importance of the Dubin Inquiry was, in no small part, due to the resonance of this race with the Canadian public. Johnson had established himself as the “fastest human on earth” (Christie, 1988) in the marquis event of the world’s most important sporting festival. Furthermore, the “likeable, shy, polite, Canadian sprinter” had done so against his American “arch rival ... an arrogant, outspoken, pompous Carl Lewis” (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006) who had achieved legendary status in the sporting world four years earlier when he duplicated the 1936 feat of Jesse Owens by winning four Olympic gold medals in track and field in the Los Angeles Olympic Summer Games. Finally, prior to the 100 metre final a Johnson victory was not assured; Johnson had suffered a major hamstring injury earlier in the year and had shown poor form in his quarter-final race, advancing to the semi-final on time instead of guaranteeing advancement by placing first or second. In the final, Johnson’s “sensational run buoyed up a whole nation of sports fans” (Sokol, 1988), and three days later, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called his disqualification “a moment of great sorrow for all Canadians”
On October 5, 1988, only nine days after Johnson’s testing positive, the federal government passed Order in Council PC 1988-2361 establishing the Commission of Inquiry to be led by Justice Charles Dubin (Dubin, 1990, p. 585). The following year, over the course of nine months, the Dubin Inquiry called 119 witnesses, including more than 50 athletes, and received 295 exhibits and 26 briefs. Commissioner Dubin released his report in June, 1990.

Dubin made several recommendations regarding doping control in Canada (1990, pp. 535-544), but the most major was that an independent anti-doping agency be created to oversee anti-doping efforts at arm’s length from government and sports organizations (CCES employee, December, 2005; Dubin, 1990, pp. 538-539; Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). As a result, in 1991 the Canadian Minister of State for Youth, Fitness and Amateur Sport announced the creation of the Canadian Anti-Doping Organization (CADO, renamed the Canadian Centre for Drug-free Sport or CCDS in 1992) and issued a new policy: the Canadian Policy on Penalties for Doping in Sport (CCES employee, December, 2005; Centre for Sport and Law Inc., 2002, p. 6). The new Policy was a “collective agreement, meaning that the sport community and the government of Canada … co-wrote the Policy” (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). The role of the CCDS was to administer the policy; they “did the testing, trained the certification officers … [and] produced the brochures” (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). As guidelines regarding sample collection, Doping Control Officer qualifications, results management, and mechanisms for challenging positive tests, the CCDS adopted the SMCC’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and incorporated the best of international practices to
“produce a set of procedures that [the CCDS] felt were … state of the art” (CCES employee, December, 2005).

Despite changes in organizational nomenclature – the CCDS merged with Fair Play Canada in 1995 to become the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES), the organization which currently oversees anti-doping in Canada, and the SOP became the Canadian Doping Control Regulations, or CDCR in 2000 – the government policy, CCDS administration, and IOC list of prohibited substances formed the foundation of Canadian anti-doping efforts through the 1990s and until 2004 (CCES employee, December, 2005; anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006; Sport Canada Employee, April, 2006). The government policy remained in place and revisions that were made to the SOP during this period were of an ad hoc nature, typically following challenges to the SOP by athletes charged with doping-related offences:

That really was where the feedback came, from the hearings, as we ran into difficulties because of authority or because of process or whatever, and we would just keep a running tally of the issues that we had. … so when we would do our rewrite of the policy, those things would be engaged. (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005)

Another interviewee put it more succinctly: “That’s the way things tend to evolve. You know, a loophole is found and somebody wiggles through the loophole, and so you close the loophole” (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006). However, the formation of WADA in 1999 and its mandate to create an international code that harmonized anti-doping across nations and sports signalled the beginnings of substantial change to the Canadian anti-doping system (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006; CCES
The development of WADA’s *World Anti-Doping Code* (WADC) for example, marked the beginning of an overhaul of the CDCR, as one requirement of the *Code* is that the anti-doping programs of all adopting nations and organizations be in compliance with it (WADA, 2006c).

Both the Canadian sport community and federal government contributed to the development of the WADC by participating in consultations that occurred between June, 2002 and March, 2003, when the WADC was adopted at the Second World Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen. The Government of Canada forwarded to WADA consolidated government responses to drafts of the WADC after consulting with other levels of government and federal departments and agencies (CCES, 2002a; Government of Canada, 2002a, 2002b). At the same time, the CCES solicited comments from the Canadian sport community, then consolidated and forwarded these to WADA (CCES, 2002b, 2002c).

Following the adoption of the WADC, a “complete top to bottom overhaul of the [Canadian] system” was required in order for it to comply with the *World Code* (CCES employee, December 5, 2005, CCES, 2003a). To facilitate this process, the CCES created an “implementation Task Force” to manage another consultation with Canadian sport stakeholders from March 2003 until April 2004 (CCES, 2003b, p. 1). The end result of this work was a new government policy, *The Canadian Policy Against Doping in Sport* (CPADS) (Canadian Heritage, 2004) and the replacement of the CDCR with the *Canadian Anti-Doping Program* or CADP (CCES, 2004a).

The CPADS and CADP are the two anti-doping policies currently in place affecting all Canadian high-performance athletes. The CPADS is the “government
commitment of a more general sort” (CCES employee, December 2005) to the implementation of the WADC in Canada. All NSOs and Multisport Organizations (MSOs) must comply with the CPADS in order to receive federal government funding (Canadian Heritage, 2004, p. 3). The CADP is also fully compliant with the World Code (CCES, 2004b) and can be considered a set of sport rules:

The Canadian Policy refers explicitly to the CADP and the CADP refers explicitly to the Policy and they’re certainly meant to be read together. ... so you’ve got a public sector policy complemented by, in effect ... private sector detailed rules in the sport world. (CCES employee, December 2005)

Despite the fact that recent changes to the Canadian anti-doping landscape were made in order to comply with a policy meant to harmonize anti-doping worldwide, Canadian athletes who violate anti-doping regulations face up to three different sanctions in Canada alone. The CADP, in accordance with the World Code, stipulates a two-year period of ineligibility from competition for first-time offenders, and lifetime eligibility for second violations\textsuperscript{12} (CCES, 2004a, p. 42). However, the CPADS declares athletes ineligible for government funding for life after one violation\textsuperscript{13} (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006). The COC also complies with the CADP, but extends the two-year sanction for first-time violators to include the next Pan American and Olympic Games, effectively adding up to two years to the sanction (Canadian Olympic Committee, 2003; 2004a).

Alongside domestic anti-doping policy making, Canada has been heavily involved in international anti-doping efforts, and has a “legacy ... as one of the key founding sort of nations on this whole doping initiative” (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005). In addition to the examples described in chapter two, it is notable that Canada bid
aggressively for, and won, WADA’s headquarters in 2000-2001 (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006).

Taken together, the histories of Canadian high-performance sport and anti-doping policies suggest that federal government intervention has defined sport in Canada, and that major initiatives in the Canadian sport system have been politically motivated. This reality was laid bare in the Report of the Dubin Inquiry (Dubin, 1990, passim). Conspicuously absent from these histories is evidence of any significant involvement of athletes in the development of anti-doping policies and sport policies more generally, a fact that has not been lost on several authors. Macintosh et al. note the lack of athlete input in decision-making around several major events in the history of Canada’s high-performance sport system. They write “there is no evidence in the House [of Commons] debate that sport organizations and interested individuals made any great attempt to influence or change” The Fitness and Amateur Sport Act in 1961 (1988, p. 27), and regarding 1970’s A Proposed Sport Policy for Canadians, they note that it was based on recommendations that are largely attributable to politicians and administrators (1988, pp. 57-58). In the consultations around the aforementioned green paper Toward a National Policy on Amateur Sport, “the views of current elite athletes were conspicuous by their absence” (1988, p. 118). Beamish and Borowy note a similar lack of athlete input in decision-making in the findings of extensive research into the lives of athletes in Canada’s high-performance system:

Our survey showed how little athletes are represented among the decision-making bodies in the high-performance sport system. … [and] that there are few formal channels open for athlete input into the administrative structure. (1988, p. 90)
In addition to the numerous examples of government and sport bureaucrats determining the nature of high-performance sport in Canada, there is a striking lack of examples in which athletes have played a major role in decision-making. Beamish and Borowy note only two, one occurring in 1975 when athletes successfully lobbied the government and Canadian Olympic Association (COA) for increased funding, and another following the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Summer Games in 1980, which resulted in changes to criteria for government funding of athletes, the creation of the (COA’s) Athletes’ Advisory Council, and athlete representatives at the COA’s Annual General Meeting becoming full voting members (Beamish & Borowy, 1988, p. 90).

In the years immediately following the Dubin Inquiry a movement was established to increase the accountability of the Canadian sport system by recognizing athletes’ needs and their role as important agents in the creation and implementation of policies and procedures. This movement to make the system “athlete-centred” is the focus of the following section.

‘Athlete-Centredness’ in the Canadian Sport System

One of the earliest references to athlete-centredness was in 1976 in The Unification of Sport Report (Kihl, Kikulis & Thibault, 2006, p. 12), a report that examined possible solutions for overcoming the divisive influence of Sport Canada and its agencies on Canadian sport (Macintosh et al., 1988, p. 105). However, it was the early 1990s, in the wake of the Dubin Inquiry and its critique of the nature of government influence on sport, before calls to make the Canadian sport system athlete-centred became more forceful.
Among the first of such calls was contained in *Sport: The Way Ahead*, the 1992 report of the Minister’s Task Force on Federal Sport Policy (Sport Canada employee, May, 2006). In it, athlete-centredness is a “central theme” (Minister’s Task Force on Federal Sport Policy, 1992, p. 29). While NSOs expressed to the Task Force that they are athlete-centred because everything they do is in the athletes’ interests, athletes disagreed, claiming “they lack direct involvement in decisions that affect them. … [and] do not want to manage sport but feel their knowledge, experience and insights could be better used” (Minister’s Task Force on Federal Sport Policy, 1992, pp. 60-61). The report concluded that for sport to become athlete-centred, there must be effective means in place to ensure that athletes’ voices are heard in decision-making.

A recommendation of the Task Force was that the federal government fund an independent athletes’ organization, which was already in the process of being organized by several athletes who had been members of the COA’s Athlete Advisory Council. Prior to the Dubin Inquiry, the Council had learned through athlete round tables held in major cities across the country that there was significant support for “an independent voice for athletes” (CAA co-founder, March, 2006). The Council did not act on this information immediately, but was prompted to by their experience at the Dubin Inquiry:

As an athletes’ council, we wrote a report to the Canadian Olympic Association, which we wanted to write to the Dubin [Inquiry], but we weren’t independent, right? We were a committee, so we had to present it to the COA. Because we were an internal committee we couldn’t go external. … We talked about these inherent tensions in the system of high-performance [sport] … and the COA just swept it under the carpet. (CAA co-founder, March, 2006)
In 1992, the Toronto working group of the COA’s Council decided “enough is enough” and formed the Canadian Athletes’ Association (CAA) (CAA co-founder, March, 2006). While the primary focus of the CAA in its early years was the legal rights of athletes, as part of its work with the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Sport Policy Steering Committee (Kihl, Kikulis & Thibault, 2006, p. 12) the CAA drafted *Athlete-Centred Sport: A Discussion Paper* (Canadian Athletes Association, 1994), which justifies and describes athlete-centred sport, and suggests best practices for implementation. In what is the only publication dedicated to the concept of athlete-centredness, the CAA is explicit regarding athlete involvement in decision-making:

Those responsible for leadership and decision-making in sport must include the athlete in both defining the needs and goals and in determining how to meet them; i.e. the athlete should be the active subject in, not the object of, sporting programs. (p. 3, emphasis in original)

The CAA suggests that in an athlete-centred system “mechanisms are in place to facilitate direct athlete involvement in decision-making which impacts on athletes in sport organizations at all levels” (p. 10).

More recently, in *The Canadian Sport Policy*, sport being athlete/participant-centred is listed as a “defining principle,” one described as follows: “The sport system exists for athletes/participants who are the primary focus in the development of policies, programs, and procedures. Athletes/participants are involved throughout the system in decisions that directly relate to them” (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 13).

These references suggest that a truly athlete-centred sport system exhibits two characteristics (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007 p. 14). The first is a focus on athletes’ needs.
Thibault and Babiak suggest that increased funding for athletes, the creation of high-performance training centres across the country, and the establishment of the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada are all recent changes within the system which indicate a greater focus on the needs of high-performance athletes and thus a shift towards athlete-centredness (2005, pp. 106-107).

The second characteristic of an athlete-centred system is that athletes within it are involved in decision-making that affects them. Thibault and Babiak suggest that Sport Canada’s mandating the inclusion of athletes on decision-making committees of NSOs is evidence of this characteristic (2005, p. 106). This change is particularly relevant because it concerns the ability of athletes to affect policy making. Committed to in principle in 1998 and formally implemented in 2000, this initiative is known as the “20% solution” because Sport Canada’s direction to NSOs was that they fill 20% of spots on decision-making committees with athletes in order to be eligible for federal funding (Thibault & Babiak, 2005, pp. 110-111).

If, as Thibault and Babiak suggest, a shift to athlete-centredness in the Canadian system is occurring, there is other evidence that it is occurring only gradually. Canada is one of few countries to have a national organization – Athletes CAN – formed exclusively to advocate athletes’ rights, and the references to athlete-centredness in federal reports, most recently in The Canadian Sport Policy, suggest that there is at least awareness of the value of the concept. Also, in order to receive Sport Canada funding, NSOs are required to involve high-performance athletes in decision-making (Sport Canada, 2000a, p. 2). However, three years after Sport: The Way Ahead called for a shift to athlete-centredness, Bruce Kidd wrote that the ethic of athlete-centredness had
influenced few stakeholders in the Canadian sport system, including athletes (Kidd, 1995, p. 9). And, as noted earlier in this chapter, critiques of the recent process for developing *The Canadian Sport Policy* suggest that little may have changed in the decade since (Athletes CAN, 2001, p. 2; Kihl, Kikulis & Thibault, personal conversations with the authors, March 2005). Kihl, Kikulis and Thibault even question whether athlete inclusion on NSOs’ decision-making bodies can be effectively implemented given the reality of athletes’ lives (2006, p. 20) and conclude in their study that:

administrators and bureaucrats … have not completely embraced the notion of sharing administrative power and decision-making among relevant stakeholders, and in this particular case the ones most affected by such a system — the athletes who have the weaker voices in the current governance structure. (2006, pp. 30-31)

It is clear from the history presented in this chapter that a shift to include Canadian athletes in decision-making that affects them represents a new and challenging direction in Canadian sport. As with international high-performance sport, sport in Canada has been, and continues to be, shaped primarily by politically-motivated government intervention focused on the promotion of national image and unity. A result of this considerable state influence is the absence of other voices, including those of athletes, at the decision-making tables of sport. A similar theme is evident in the history of Canadian anti-doping initiatives. Major anti-doping policy revisions are government-led and occur in reaction to doping scandals that threaten to tarnish Canada’s image as a sporting nation by suggesting that our success is the result of fraudulent means.

The trajectories of these two histories converged famously in the Dubin Inquiry, and in the aftermath of the *Inquiry* a movement was born to make the Canadian sport
system athlete-centred, or one that focuses on the needs of athletes and involves them “throughout the system in decision that directly relate to them” (Sport Canada, 2002, p.13). Whether or not sport administrators, and specifically anti-doping policy makers, have committed themselves to this shift to athlete-centredness is the focus of the remainder of this research project. In the following chapter, the processes for revising Canadian anti-doping policies is examined in this light.
Chapter 4: Methodology and Findings

This chapter outlines the methodology used in this study, and is divided into three sections. The first contains background information regarding qualitative research methodology, including sections considering emergent design, inductive analysis, the researcher as instrument, trustworthiness, and the value of document analysis and qualitative interviews. The second section describes the actual procedures used in this study. The final section describes the major themes to emerge from analysis, specifically the reasons that athletes have not been significantly involved in the development of anti-doping policies and the fact that in the Canadian sport system there is little commitment to the idea of involving athletes in decision-making.

It is important to mention that a major element of the methodology of this thesis, its critical perspective, has already been described in chapter one. A characteristic of sound critical research is that it provides significant historical context and thus allows examination of the assumptions underlying the status quo or conventional wisdom. This context has been provided in chapters two and three, where examination of the histories of international and Canadian sport and anti-doping initiatives suggests that sport is governed by government agents and sport professionals working to achieve political goals.

Qualitative Research

The procedures used to generate data in this study were document analysis and in-
depth, semi-structured interviews, two of many methods that fall under the umbrella term “qualitative research.” However, there are characteristics that are common to most types of qualitative research that merit consideration before describing the specific procedures used in this study.

**Emergent Design**

The first of these is characteristics is “emergent design.” Lincoln and Guba write that “the design of [qualitative] inquiry cannot be given in advance; it must emerge, develop, unfold” (1985, p. 225, emphasis in original). While it is possible to state beforehand the general focus of research and the methods to be used, a researcher may discover that the focus changes as themes emerge during the research. Similarly, they may decide that other sources or methods are appropriate for answering the research questions. In order to facilitate this sort of discovery and realization, it is important that data collection and analysis begin at the same time (Ezzy, 2002, p. 60; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 241-242; Patton, 2002, pp. 436-437). As an example, when I proposed this study in the summer of 2005, the methods I described represented a starting point; I had ideas regarding which documents I would analyze and whom I would interview. However, all of the documents that would become relevant to the project, the specific individuals I would interview, and the themes and ideas that would emerge from ongoing analysis were unknown to me at the time. The documents I analyzed and people I interviewed early in the research process directed me to other documents and individuals and informed my interaction with them.
Inductive Analysis

A second characteristic of qualitative research is that it involves inductive analysis. Induction is a reasoning process in which a conclusion is drawn from particular cases. In qualitative research, it refers to a researcher’s remaining open to the data and allowing specific observations to contribute to general patterns or themes (Patton, 2002, pp. 55-56). While the findings of some qualitative research are based almost entirely on inductive analysis, other studies combine induction with deductions based on preexisting theory (Ezzy, 2002, pp. 11-12; Patton, 2002, pp. 56-57).

This study is an example of the latter; it combines both inductive and deductive analysis. As mentioned above, critical social research begins with an explicit perspective, that injustice is an element of the social object being studied. However, even when beginning with such a perspective, it is important to allow patterns to emerge from data in order to fairly convey both the existence and nature of injustice; “preexisting theory [must not] constrain what is noticed” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 12; cf. Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 9).

The Researcher as Instrument

Traditional research reports, both quantitative and qualitative, are typically written as though to convey objective truth, “as if the moral and political implications of the author … had no influence on the production of the text” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 150). However, it is important to recognize that in qualitative study, the researcher is the instrument that collects and interprets data, and the content and credibility of research findings depend heavily on the identity and competence of the researcher (Patton, 2002, p. 14).
There are two audiences that need to be aware of the nature of the research instrument. The first is the researcher, the second is the reader. The researcher’s “self-critical consideration” of their own perspectives, biases and limitations is referred to as “reflexivity” (Alevesson & Deetz, 2000, pp. 112-113; Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 183-184; Patton, 2002, p. 299) and serves to keep them aware of how who they are influences what is observed, analyzed, and taken from analysis. For readers, being provided with any of the researcher’s “personal and professional information that may have affected data collection, analysis and interpretation” (Patton, 2000, p. 556) allows them to make their own judgments regarding the credibility of the findings. This style of writing oneself into the research differs dramatically from what was considered acceptable in qualitative research prior to the 1980s (Patton, 2002, p. 79), but today is considered “a disciplined approach to addressing the role of researchers in their research” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 154).

In this spirit, it is important to know that I come to this research as a former athlete. My experiences as a runner through high-school, university and later in club settings were generally positive. However, often when my running friends and I were forced to think about the governance of our sport, something seemed amiss. We had questions: Why is qualifying for the national championships so complicated? Why is it complicated for us (Ontarians), but not for athletes from British Columbia? Why did the government send me this cheque? Why is the only decongestant that works for my seasonal allergies on the IOC’s prohibited list? For other athletes, some of them friends, it seemed as though the role of governing bodies was to keep them off national teams rather than to encourage their success. It was in the critical sociology of sport, taught in my undergraduate and early graduate years, that I found answers to my questions and
explanations for the actions of sport governing bodies. Suddenly, even if things were not just, they made sense.

My education in the sociology of sport and qualitative study gives me direction regarding conducting critical qualitative research into sport governance and decision-making in Canada. My experiences and those of my fellow athletes have given me knowledge of what it is like to be an athlete in the Canadian sport system.

This is my first major research project, and I am aware that what I do not know about conducting research is considerable. However, at different points during this research, the themes described in the findings section below have been presented to and reviewed by various audiences, and revised based on their feedback. For this reason, I am confident that they are a fair assessment of sport policy making in Canada.

**Trustworthiness**

It is necessary to “persuade audiences ... that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290), in other words, that they are trustworthy. Lincoln and Guba suggest that there are two types of rigour that can help establish the validity or trustworthiness of research: methodological rigour, and community consent and plausibility (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 178). Additionally, Patton suggests that there are criteria particular to critical research that can help establish its quality and credibility. Each of these is described in greater detail.

In addition to the use of accepted qualitative methods such as document analysis and conducting in-depth interviews, rigorous methods for establishing trustworthiness include triangulation and the creation of an audit trail (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 178;
There are several different types of triangulation (Patton, 2002, pp. 247, 555-563) and the two employed in this study are methodological triangulation and data triangulation. Methodological triangulation is the use of more than one research technique to generate or support research findings. In this project, for instance, both documents and interviews have been used. Data or source triangulation is the collection of data from a variety of sources. In this study, documents have been collected and analyzed from several different types of organizations, and interviews have been conducted with individuals from several organizations and with different relationships to the anti-doping policy development process. These two types of triangulation assist in developing trustworthiness by allowing researchers to test for consistency of results across sources and methods (Patton, 2002, p. 248).

The audit trail is another method of building trustworthiness, one that includes the keeping and coding of residual records stemming from the research project (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 319). I kept a record of day-to-day activities, thoughts and decisions regarding data collection and analysis, and raw data such as all documents, recordings, communications and materials generated during the analysis of data. This serves to establish the confirmability of the project and to allow examination of all aspects of the research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 319).

Lincoln and Guba refer to community consent and plausibility as another type of rigour (2000, p. 178), one similar to what Patton calls “audience review,” a form of “credibility triangulation,” which concerns whether or not an intended audience finds a study believable or reasonable (2002, p. 561). Different aspects of this study and its
findings have been reviewed by several different audiences. They were presented to four different academic conferences between April 2005 and April 2006, submitted to a peer review process for publication in an academic journal (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007), and internally, later interviewees were presented with preliminary findings in order to gauge their reasonableness. The feedback generated through these audience review processes are reflected in this study and its findings.

Finally, Patton outlines several criteria specific to critical research that, if met, enhance its quality and credibility. He suggests that critical social research should be explicit regarding injustice in terms of identifying its nature and sources; it should represent the perspective of the “underdogs and outsiders” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 45) and make visible the ways in which more powerful agents exercise and benefit from power; it should build the capacity of those involved to take action, identifying potential avenues for change; and it should provide clear historical and normative context (Patton, 2002, pp. 545, 548-549). In this project, considerable historical context and careful examination of anti-doping policy development illuminate the nature and sources of injustice suffered by athletes. At the same time, it is shown how government agents and sport experts exercise their power. In chapter five, I identify avenues for change that could result in greater, more meaningful involvement of athletes in policy development.

Qualitative Methods – Document Analysis

The use of documents to generate empirical material has several advantages as a research method. Most modern organizations produce significant numbers of documents for record-keeping and self-presentation (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, pp. 57-58). In
addition to being a rich and stable source of information, many of these are easily accessed and inexpensive if not free of charge (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 276-277). For example, in the case of Canadian governments and sports’ governing organizations, all policies, including anti-doping policies, are readily available, as are many documents that describe or support the development of policy. In many instances, these policies clearly outline the stakeholders in the policy process and, indeed, they may be a primary form of communication between stakeholders (Interviewee 7, May, 2006).

However, documents do have their limitations. While they may describe the workings of an organization or processes for policy development, they are not verbatim accounts of these workings or processes and, regardless of their source, they cannot be treated as “firm evidence of what they report” (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004, p. 58). It is this reality that makes methodological triangulation so valuable, and a key reason that I interviewed individuals involved in policy development in addition to analyzing documents related to the policy process.

*Qualitative Methods – Semi-structured Interviews*

Qualitative interviews are a powerful way to understand human experience from the viewpoint of the participant and to discover information we cannot directly observe (Patton, 2002, p. 340). They allow researchers to access some part of the interviewee’s reality as they are open to what the interviewee considers important and wants to discuss. The semi-structured interview can be considered a guided conversation; it is more flexible than a completely structured interview in that it accommodates probes and follow-up questions and allows exploration of avenues of questioning that are impossible
to anticipate but might contain important information (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, p. 71). However, a semi-structured interview is more than a free-form conversation in that it employs an interview guide. The guide:

lists the questions or issues that are to be explored. ... [and] is prepared to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each person interviewed. ... [it] provides topics or subject areas within which the interviewer is free to explore, probe, and ask questions that will elucidate and illuminate that particular subject.

(Patton, 2002, p. 341)

It should be noted that interviews also have disadvantages and limitations. For instance, Alvesson and Deetz write that an interviewee’s statements may be context-dependent, affected by interview location, interviewer-interviewee relationship and “the available cultural scripts about how one should normally express oneself on particular topics (2000, pp. 71-72). As a consequence, it is important to conduct interviews in environments where interviewees will not feel constrained to speak or act in culturally acceptable ways, and to always be conscious of building rapport with interviewees (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000, pp. 71-72, 195). Another disadvantage of interviews is the fact that interviewees offer a “filtered reality” (Lofland & Lofland, 1995, p. 68). They describe events with the questionable benefit of hindsight and the information they provide may be influenced by their social, cultural and political situations. Taken together, these disadvantages illustrate the importance of using triangulation to test the consistency of information provided by interviewees.
Procedures Employed in this Study

Document Collection

By the time I defended a proposal of this project to my thesis committee in August of 2005, I had been collecting relevant documents for almost two years. As a requirement of earlier coursework I had analyzed documents regarding the history of government involvement in the Canadian sport system. From my files, I recovered the relevant documents related to that work, primarily federal government and Sport Canada policies, and considered them the first data of my project. Additionally, through my interest in high-performance sport, I was aware of the international anti-doping harmonization efforts being led by WADA. In late 2004 I visited the WADA website (www.wada-ama.org) and made a systematic, page-by-page review of the website, saving all relevant documents on my home computer. Early in 2005, I made similar reviews of the Sport Canada (www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/index_e.cfm) and CCES (www.cces.ca) websites.

As I collected documents from these websites and engaged in early analysis, I became aware of other sources that might provide relevant information. I subsequently reviewed the Athletes CAN website (www.athletescan.com), the COC website (www.olympic.ca), the federal government’s Consulting With Canadians website (http://www.consultingcanadians.gc.ca/)\(^18\) and did keyword searches on the CNW Group website (http://www.newswire.ca/en/)\(^19\) and the CPI.Q\(^20\) and Canadian Newsstand\(^21\) databases.\(^22\) I also did advanced searches of the websites of WADA, the CCES, the COC, and Athletes CAN using the search engine Google,\(^23\) and retrieved several relevant documents in this manner.
In addition to documents retrieved electronically using the Internet, I received documents directly from organizations; some of these were offered by interviewees and others were provided upon my request. One document was sent to me by a close friend. In total, I identified 85 documents as meeting my relevancy criteria.

It is important to note that I did not collect all the documents I had hoped to. For instance, I requested, on several occasions, the comments received during the WADA and CCES consultations, but these were not provided to me. I presume these sorts of documents would be helpful in assessing whether or not athletes did comment, and then considering if and how their comments are reflected in the final policies. I also requested, but was not provided, the minutes of meetings and any notes that may have described the meetings of the CCES implementation Task Force or any briefings held regarding development of the new CADP.

Semi-structured Interviews

I established that I would interview individuals involved in or knowledgeable of anti-doping policy development. The use of these clear criteria for selecting interviewees is an example of “purposeful sampling” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 74) where interviewees are chosen because they are a source of rich information and can provide an in-depth understanding of policy development (Patton, 2002, pp. 40, 46).

The criteria for the selection of interviewees were somewhat problematic because my early document analysis strongly suggested that athletes were not significantly involved in policy development and it seemed entirely possible that no current or recently retired athletes would meet my interviewee criteria. If one aspect of quality critical
research is that it takes the perspective of less powerful stakeholders (Ezzy, 2002, p. 45; Patton, 2002, p. 545), it seemed wrong that the voices of athletes would be silent in my study. However, it was clear that those who were not involved in policy development could contribute little information regarding the inclusion of some stakeholders and exclusion of others. Also, if certain groups were shown to be excluded, it would be an important finding in and of itself.

Based on the timeline for completion of this thesis and the time required to arrange, conduct, transcribe and analyze interviews, my committee and I decided that a maximum of 10 interviewees would be appropriate. I received ethics approval to begin interviewing on October 17, 2005 and conducted a total of 12 interviews between December, 2005 and May, 2006. Eight of the interviews were in-depth, semi-structured interviews with individuals who met my interviewee criteria described above. The remaining four were brief, semi-structured interviews with current or recent national team athletes. Both sets are described in detail below.

The first individual with whom I conducted an in-depth interview was identified as a potential interviewee through preliminary document analysis and also by an informant working at a Canadian sport organization. The seven remaining interviewees were identified through purposeful sampling.

All eight of the individuals with whom I conducted in-depth interviews were contacted initially by email. In the email they were given a brief, general outline of this study and an invitation to participate as an interviewee. If they expressed interest in volunteering, they were sent a letter of invitation that described the research project, how the project’s findings would be used, the fact that their participation was completely
voluntary and how their identity would be protected (see Appendix A). Following their receipt of the letter of invitation, the interviewee and I arranged to meet at a time and place convenient for them. In most instances, I sent the interviewee an email in the days immediately preceding our meeting, confirming the meeting and giving a general outline of the topics I was interested in discussing.

Six of the eight in-depth interviews were conducted in person, and two were conducted by telephone. When I met with an interviewee, I would thank them for meeting with me and ask if they had any questions. We then reviewed the study’s informed consent form together (see Appendix B). During this review I ensured that the interviewee was aware of the voluntary nature of their participation, that with their permission I would record the interview\textsuperscript{25} to enable verbatim transcription, and that they were free to ask me questions at any time. Each of us signed and dated two copies of the informed consent form and kept one for our records. The two interviewees I interviewed by telephone were faxed informed consent forms that they signed and dated and then faxed back to me. While I did not review the form over the phone with the interviewees, I did ensure that they were aware of the completely voluntary nature of their participation, that the interview was being recorded, and that they were free to ask questions of me.

In all eight interviews I employed an interview guide. The guide for each interview was unique, based on a combination of my research questions, themes that were emerging from data analysis and my knowledge of the interviewee’s identity and experiences in the Canadian sport system. I began each interview with rapport building questions, typically asking the interviewee how they became involved in the Canadian sport system and, more specifically, in anti-doping initiatives. All of the interviews were
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conversational in nature, and at times I would ask an interviewee to elaborate on certain points. Rarely, I would stop a line of conversation altogether and ask to begin a new one if I was concerned that time might not allow us to discuss certain information in which I was interested. All of these eight interviewees provided important historical information and, where appropriate, I have included this information in chapters two and three.

In all of the interviews I encouraged the interviewee to voice their opinions, while keeping my own to myself; I wanted interviewees to speak freely and I had no interest in their feeling that our discussion was confrontational. I also believed that I had made my position on athlete involvement in policy making clear in my letter of invitation (see Appendix A). In a couple of instances, it was obvious that the interviewee’s opinions on a certain topic were similar to my own and I would let them know, for two reasons. First, I wanted the interviewee to speak openly, and believed that offering my opinion was a way to encourage this. Second, these interviews were conversations in which I was engaged as a participant and I enjoyed the opportunity to “open up” and talk freely myself.

These eight interviews ranged in length from 12 to 93 minutes. At the completion of each in-person interview I would let the interviewee know that I was turning off the recorder, and would ask them if they had any questions and were interested in receiving a transcript of the interview. All interviewees then received a letter of thanks (these were mailed to telephone interviewees) that also included my contact information and offered a copy of the interview transcript upon request (see Appendix C).

The four much shorter interviews with athletes were conducted to supplement preliminary findings that I presented at a conference in October, 2005. I had yet to conduct any in-depth interviews and document analysis did not indicate if or how
information regarding anti-doping policy development was getting from policy makers to high-performance athletes. However, one element of the emergent design of qualitative research is that it allows for “rapid reconnaissance” (Patton, 2002, p. 194); researchers can, if necessary, engage participants with relatively little preparation.

These informal interviews ranged in length from one to ten minutes and were conducted with current or recent (within the last two years) national team athletes. The information I was interested in gleaning from them was very specific, and I asked the same questions of all four athletes.26

While these interviewees did not receive a letter of invitation, I explained to each of them the nature of my research and then asked if I could ask them some questions. I was explicit about my desire to use the information they provided in my research, and I clearly explained to each that their answering my questions was completely voluntary and that, at any time, they could ask that their answers not be used in this study. I also explained that I would never disclose any information about them other than their national team status. All four consented to be interviewed. These interviews were not recorded because of their informal, conversational nature. Instead, immediately following an interview, I wrote notes about what was said.

Analysis

As mentioned above, beginning data analysis at the same time as data collection facilitates the emergent design of qualitative research, allowing the researcher to pursue unanticipated lines of inquiry (Ezzy, 2002, pp. 60-61; Patton, 2002, pp. 436-437). For this reason, I began organizing and analyzing the information I collected as soon as possible.
To each of the documents I assigned an acronym, based on the organization’s/author’s name, and a number, based on order of collection. For example, the third Sport Canada document collected was assigned the label “SC3.” The vast majority of documents I collected are available in electronic format and whenever possible I saved the document on my home computer and entered its information (title, author, retrieved from, date of publication, etc.) in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.

As soon as possible following an in-depth interview, I saved the recording on my home computer, then transcribed it verbatim and saved it as a password protected Microsoft Word file. Each of the interviews was labelled with the letter “I” followed by a number. For instance, the fourth interview I conducted was labelled “I4,” and these were also added to my Excel spreadsheet.

I began the analysis of a document or interview by printing and reading it. My only goal for the first reading was to get a general sense of the content. However, as thoughts about the data and its content or analysis occurred to me, I would make notes in the margins of the document or transcript or in a notepad I kept with me at all times. My goal for subsequent readings of the material was the same as for the first, simply to become more familiar with the content, and during these reading I also made notes. These initial readings were not done according to a predetermined timeline. Rather, I printed and read material as I collected it, and then did reviews of all my material when preparing for interviews, conferences or when writing an article.

I began a more formal stage of data analysis when I had collected almost all of my material. I followed the constant comparative method as described by Maykut and Morehouse, in which “what becomes important to analyze emerges from the data itself,
out of a process of inductive reasoning” (1994, p. 127). At this stage I began to “unitize” the data. This is the process of “identifying the smaller units of meaning in the data, which will later serve as the basis for defining larger categories of meaning” (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p. 128). This was a relatively easy task with the documents I had collected, but was more difficult with interview transcripts because of the more spontaneous and non-linear nature of conversational speech. As frequently as possible, I used an interviewee’s complete answer as a complete unit out of respect for the idea that an interviewee’s answer to a question is, to them, a unit of meaning. However, in cases where an answer clearly contained more than one distinct unit of meaning, I separated it into different units for the purposes of analysis. In some cases, what I perceived to be one unit of meaning would span several question-and-answer exchanges. As a result, some units were only a few words long, while others spanned several paragraphs.

I used newly printed copies of all documents and transcripts during this unitization process, keeping my well-read original copies intact. I cut each unit of meaning from the copy, and wrote the document’s code and page number on the back. Because some units were quite long, I highlighted words or phrases in the units that summarized the essence of the unit. If no words or phrases in the unit were appropriate, I would jot my own summary of the essence of the unit in the margin of the paper.

As mentioned above, I had been making notes about the data and my experiences since data collection began, and this note-taking is a part of analysis that Maykut and Morehouse have called “discovery,” which allows identification of a “large array of potentially important experiences, ideas, concepts, themes, etc.” (1994, p. 132). From these notes I was able to identify provisional categories into which I could put my cut out
units of meaning. I cleared the floor of my home office and divided the floor into sections for each category, and then put the units into the appropriate sections. If a unit of meaning did not fit into one of the provisional categories I had already created, I created a new category. Each unit of meaning was compared with all the other units in a category using “‘look/feel alike’ criteria” (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p. 136) before being assigned to that category.

After placing several units in a category, I would write a “rule for inclusion” for the category that served “as the basis for including or excluding subsequent units in the category” (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p. 139). For example, one of my categories was “expert knowledge,” and the rule for inclusion for the category was “this unit suggests that expert knowledge is the best knowledge.” In this way, once rules for inclusion were written for each of my categories, I had several “prepositional rule statements” (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p. 143) that formed the foundation of my findings. After completing the analytic process described above I had 13 categories that merged into five major themes, and these form the basis of my findings below.

Findings

The focus of this study is the present-day thinking and practice regarding the involvement of Canadian athletes in the development of anti-doping policies. This focus is achieved through examination of recent processes of anti-doping policy development, specifically the two consultations around development of the World Code and the CADP/CPADS.
As described in chapter three, stakeholders in the Canadian sport community were asked for comments during both consultations. In June of 2002, for example, the CCES issued a media release inviting comments from the sport community, including athletes:

The Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES) invites the Canadian sport community and the Canadian public to comment on the World Anti-Doping Code. ... [and] urges Canadian athletes, coaches, sport doctors and other medical personnel, and their organizations, and Canadian sport governing bodies, to contribute. (CCES, 2002a)

The CCES reviewed the comments it received and sent a consolidated Canadian sport community comment to WADA (CCES, 2002b). Another invitation for comment, similar to that issued for the first draft, was issued when a second draft of the World Code was released by WADA (CCES, 2002d). In November of 2002, the CCES held a call-in briefing on the World Code, “aimed at the Canadian sport community as a whole” (CCES, 2002e), and in December, another Canadian sport community comment was sent to WADA (CCES, 2002c).

Following the adoption of the World Code by the delegates of the Second World Conference on Doping in Sport on March 5, 2003, the CCES immediately launched another consultation to revise Canadian anti-doping regulations and bring them into compliance with the new international standard, seeking “the participation of members of the Canadian sport community and governments” (CCES, 2003c, p. 1) and announcing that an implementation Task Force would be formed from representative stakeholders to lead the revisions (CCES, 2003c, p. 2). A letter describing a detailed plan for revision of the regulations was sent to stakeholders in late April (CCES, 2003b), and between April
2003 and January 2004 “the Program was presented publicly for review four times” (CCES, 2004d, p. 3) including two “sport community/government briefings” held in October, 2003 and January, 2004 (CCES, 2004e, 2003d). During this time, the CCES received dozens of comments and CCES representatives attended the Athletes CAN Forum in September, 2003 to meet with athletes (CCES employee, December, 2005).

The end result of these consultations is the new CADP, and the CCES proudly reports that it is the result of “a careful and exhaustive process of consultation with the Canadian sport community” (CCES, 2004d, p. 1). Perhaps the most concise statement of the entire process is found in the CCES 2003-2004 Annual Report:

Bringing the World Anti-Doping Code home, and applying it to Canada’s doping control program, required a complete overhaul of the existing policy and regulations. Involving the sport community in the drafting process was crucial to ensuring we had a collective agreement on the new Canadian Anti-Doping Program. … and we will have the satisfaction of knowing that its evolution was shaped by its owners and constituents. (CCES, 2004d, p. “Message to Stakeholders”)

Despite the involvement of the sport community in these consultations, analysis of documents and interviews shows that, in reality, athletes were excluded from decision-making processes during these consultations for several reasons: athlete representation came through organizations, not athletes themselves; athletes were effectively excluded from the Task Force responsible for reviewing and evaluating comments received during the CADP consultation; athletes were effectively excluded as stakeholders in the system in favour of others considered ‘experts’; and organizational concerns for maintaining
appearances took precedence over ensuring athlete involvement in decision-making. Each of these four themes is explored in detail below, as is a fifth overarching theme to emerge from analysis, that there is little commitment to even the concept of involving athletes in decision-making by either the government or the sport community.

**Athlete Representation Through Organizations**

From the beginning of these two consultations, anti-doping policy-makers focused on consulting with organizations rather than with athletes and there is little evidence that athletes were invited to the consultation process. Instead, invitations to participate in decision-making were communicated to sport organizations only, or in such a way that only sport organizations could be expected to respond. This is evident in an early Executive Summary of the WADC dated June, 2002, that neglects to mention athletes or their representative organizations when it states:

stakeholders who are expected to accept the World Code include: the International Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, International Federations, other International Sport Organizations (for example: major event organizations), National Olympic Committees and National Anti-Doping Organizations. (WADA, 2002, p. 4)

Further evidence of the fact that consultation regarding the WADC was conducted primarily through organizations can be seen at the Second World Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen where the WADC was adopted. WADA writes that attendees of the Conference included:

- 101 nationalities
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- 1200 participants
- All 28 international Olympic summer sport federations
- All 7 international Olympic winter sport federations
- 65 international Olympic and non-Olympic federations
- 80 governments of the world
- 120 media representatives
- 70 local volunteers (WADA, 2003d, p. 5, bullets in original)

What is not listed is the number of athletes who attended. There were 13, nine of whom were, or were formerly, IOC Athletes’ Commission members, notable because Houlihan refers to the Commission as being “tightly managed” by the IOC (Houlihan, 2004a, p. 4). Only three of the athletes in attendance were active athletes. Of the 41 Canadians who attended, only one was an athlete and was also a member of the IOC Athletes’ Commission (WADA, 2003b).

Back in Canada, consider how the CCES communicated with the Canadian sport community:

“With most National Sport Organizations [the CCES] would communicate … to the Chief Executive or the President or the Executive Director. Many [NSOs] would also have a staff person who … has the anti-doping file in their own organization. … So we would also be talking at the staff level to people. … We would have communicated with people through the Canadian Olympic Committee, the Canadian Paralympic Committee, Commonwealth Games and any other umbrella, major event umbrella organization that would capture a lot of sports. … We certainly put things out through the
Athletes CAN system.” (CCES employee, December, 2005)

This suggests that those who oversee anti-doping policy development in Canada delegate responsibility for communication with athletes to other organizations such as Athletes CAN and NSOs. However, there is little to suggest that these organizations pass calls for comment along to athletes.

Athletes CAN, for instance, the mandate of which is to represent all Canadian national team athletes, includes no mention on its website (www.athletescan.com), in the organization’s newsletter FastForward (Athletes CAN, 2003), or in its 2004-2005 annual report (Athletes CAN, 2005) of soliciting any comment from athletes or of having been involved as an organization in the anti-doping policy development process. In NSOs, interest in anti-doping initiatives has historically been minimal unless a specific individual is a champion for the issue:

And just to give you an idea of, of how little, really how little attention was paid to [anti-doping policy in NSOs] … the way that the policy works is that CCES has been mandated with managing the Program, but it is a policy that is adopted by each sport organization. … it came up about three or four times … [an] athlete [in a hearing] would argue, ‘you have no authority, because the organization has not adopted the policy’. And guess what, it hadn’t. There was no system to ensure organizations adopted the policies. Somebody would send around a memo, ‘don’t forget to adopt a policy’, and it would come around to an AGM or whatever and it wouldn’t get on the agenda. … it was a difficult business to get them adopted, it just wasn’t, it wasn’t part of the everyday … business of the organization. (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005)
The CCES did attempt to get direct athlete input on at least one occasion. In September, 2003, two employees of the CCES attended the annual Athletes CAN Forum, where “athletes and other delegates gather and discuss priorities and actions for the future of sport” and distributed a standardized, ten-question survey (CCES, 2003f) that was completed by 27 athletes (CCES, 2003e). While this survey addressed “some critical issues [the CCES] wanted to get direct athlete input on,” it was conducted “well into developing our new program” (CCES employee, December, 2005). This suggests not only that athletes were not involved throughout policy development, but also that stakeholders other than athletes were defining what constituted “critical issues.” Additionally, while the purpose of the CCES attendance at the Forum was “to gather information concerning athletes’ views on various anti-doping related issues” (CCES, 2003e), it is not clear that athletes were made aware that their input was being solicited as part of decision-making around anti-doping policy development.

The only communications in my analysis that could be considered direct invitations to athletes are CCES media releases. However, careful searches of the CanadianNewstand, CPI.Q and CNW Group databases suggest that no information from any of the CCES media releases, specifically invitations to submit comments on the WADC and CADP, ever made it into publicly-available media.29 Expecting athletes to instead access media releases by regularly visiting the CCES website may be demanding too much of them, especially given that in both consultations, timelines were often tight for commenting on drafts and being made aware of upcoming deadlines and events. For example, stakeholders were allowed two weeks to comment on the second draft of the CADP, and one “Call-in Briefing” was announced in a media release only two days
before the call (CCES, 2003c; 2002b).

Suggestions that effective communication was not made with athletes are supported by the fact that none of the athletes I interviewed knew that the CDCR had been revised, let alone that they had been invited to participate in the revisions. One athlete recalled that he/she may have been contacted by electronic mail, but could not be sure, and said that, “I get stuff from [my NSO], the COC, the CCES, [my Provincial Sport Organization], Sport Canada ... it’s difficult to decide what’s important and some stuff I won’t get to for a couple of months” (national team athlete, October, 2005).

Anti-doping policy makers clearly believe it is appropriate to solicit comments from organizations that may represent athletes rather than from athletes themselves. The problem with assuming that athletes are represented appropriately by these groups is that past research indicates otherwise. Bruce Kidd, in a 2003 essay, notes that in most cases athletes still have to win the right to elect representation on their respective National Olympic Committees and International Federations (Kidd, 2003, pp. 7-8). Kihl, Kikulis and Thibault suggest that the current Canadian policy of mandating that athletes occupy at least 20% of positions on NSO boards “is unsuitable for encouraging athlete participation in decision-making and ensuring their voices are heard” (2006, p. 21).

*Athletes Effectively Excluded from the Decision-Making Task Force*

My analysis of the Canadian Anti-Doping Program’s overhaul also suggests that the nature of the implementation Task Force responsible for reviewing and evaluating comments received during the CADP consultation effectively excluded athletes from involvement. In a letter dated April 25, 2003, the CCES announced that the Task Force
would be created:

The CCES hopes that some organizations or individuals may want to play a more active role in this important project. We invite them to consider joining the implementation Task Force. ... Chaired by the CCES, this will be a formal initiative joining a small group of participants from the sporting community and governments. We think about ten individuals is the optimum number for balancing efficiency and coverage of stakeholders. ... This Task Force will play a key role in developing and implementing the World Code compliance strategy. (CCES, 2003b, p. 5)

This Task Force was to be composed of volunteers, some of whom would be “required to be in Ottawa to facilitate the ongoing planning which will be required” (CCES, 2003b, p. 5). The letter also suggested that membership on the Task Force would require a “commitment of time and of energy that may be onerous on occasion” (CCES, 2003b, p. 6).

Information in the previous section of this chapter suggests that athletes likely would not have known about this Task Force in order to volunteer for it. Indeed, the language used in the letter inviting people and organizations to join the Task Force suggests it was sent only to organizations. Additionally, when one considers that a significant percentage of high-performance Canadian athletes already have difficulty integrating sport with other aspects of their lives such as education, employment and personal relationships (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 1997, pp. 18-19; 2005, pp. 15-18), it is apparent that most athletes would not have been inclined or able to volunteer for this decision-making Task Force. Regarding the difficulties that people experience being
members of such task forces, one anti-doping policy developer was very clear when discussing a similar task force that developed the 2000 version of Canadian anti-doping policy: “It’s very difficult to get people together. ... I was in Ottawa so it was easy for me. It was not easy for other people who had to come in, particularly an athlete representative” (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005).31

To its credit, the CCES did initially suggest that the Task Force should be representative of stakeholders in the Canadian sport community (CCES, 2003b, p. 5). However, in the end, the CCES “didn’t make a public call for volunteers” (CCES employee, December, 2005) but instead:

went out and ... tapped a few people on the shoulder because we knew that they were well informed or that their sport was important. ... We went out and went to certain people who we knew would be helpful. (CCES employee, December, 2005)

As a result, the task force included “a number of people from sport organizations and some outside experts,” but no athletes (CCES employee, December, 2005).

Athletes Excluded as Stakeholders: ‘Expert’ Knowledge over Experience

In the documents that were produced during consultations around the WADC and CADP, references to relevant sport stakeholders are numerous. However, in these references, athletes and athlete organizations such as Athletes CAN are rarely mentioned, despite the fact that both the Canadian government and various stakeholders in Canadian sport claim to value an athlete-centred system. Instead, they are, presumably, included in phrases such as “the Canadian sport community” (CCES, 2002b, p. 1), “all levels of sport” (CCES, 2002f, p. 1), and “Canadian NSOs, MSOs [multisport service
organizations] and other bodies” (CCES, 2003a).

One of the central reasons athletes are not considered legitimate stakeholders is that the input and knowledge professional bureaucrats bring to the policy making table is considered more valuable than that of athletes. The CCES implementation Task Force, for instance, consisted of “a number of people from sport organizations and some outside experts” (CCES employee, December, 2005). Because the CCES Task Force was formed by going out “to certain people who [the CCES] knew would be helpful” (CCES employee, December, 2005), it is apparent that people from sport organizations and experts are considered more helpful than athletes. Another interviewee said “I work with a lot of boards of directors, I work with a lot of high-performance committees that all have athletes involved, and … their [athletes’] meaningful input is just about zero” (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006). This interviewee’s perception of the value of athlete input is made perfectly clear in this statement.

One interviewee suggested that athletes do not have the level of understanding of policy documents necessary for involvement in policy making:

You don’t expect 99% of them to be reading those [NSO/athlete] agreements and understanding what they’re signing, or the policies of the organization until… it’s a necessity, so I don’t think that most athletes could tell you really what’s in the policy. (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005)

Another suggested that athletes do not have the “time, skills, or inclination” to be involved in sport governance (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006).

Anti-doping policy development reflects this sort of thinking. More than one interviewee noted that policy development has been a “closed shop” involving very few
people (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005; anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006; former anti-doping policy administrator, May, 2006), and one interviewee suggested that lack of involvement of non-experts in anti-doping policy development is indicative of trust:

The Canadian sport community tends to be very trusting of us, that in this field, we’re the experts, we know what we’re doing, we know what’s happening internationally and we can, we can offer leadership that they are quite comfortable with. (CCES employee, December, 2005)

This tendency to value expert knowledge is, as suggested in Macintosh and Whitson’s discussions concerning the professionalization of the Canadian sport system (1990), a reflection of the tendency system-wide. For example, the Federal-Provincial/Territorial Sport Committee, a committee tasked with implementing The Canadian Sport Policy, “establishes work groups, comprised of government staff and sport community experts to generate recommendations on how to implement the actions” in their Priorities for Collaborative Action documents (2005, p. 6). And the Sport Matters Group advocates the implementation of “a new standard operating procedure whereby sport sector experts participate in ... deliberations and decision-making processes ... reflecting the expertise required to effectively achieve the [Canadian Sport Policy’s] goals” (Sport Matters Group, 2006, p. 5).

Organizational Concerns for Maintaining Appearances

Evidence shows that in the development of anti-doping policy there is a concern for appearances, one that serves to exclude athletes from decision-making. Two major
examples of this emerged from my analysis. In the first, government agents and anti-doping policy makers are focused on maintaining Canada’s image as one of the world’s leaders in anti-doping initiatives. In the second, Athletes CAN is concerned with maintaining an image that does not include doped athletes. This suggests, perhaps, that little has changed since Charles Dubin wrote in his 1990 report that “concern for appearance, not substance, has been a continuing theme in the evidence” (p. 401).

A recurring theme in policy documents and interviews is the idea that Canada is a “top anti-doping nation” (CCES, 2004b). Three interviewees suggested that this is an attempt to compensate for the hurt, embarrassment and shock that “we” felt over the Ben Johnson scandal (former anti-doping policy administrator, May, 2006). “Canada still self-flagellates over Ben Johnson” as one interviewee put it (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005).

Time and again in documents and interviews, the theme surfaced that Canada has a legacy as “one of the key founding sort of nations on this whole doping initiative” (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005). One interviewee, for instance, when discussing Canada being the second country to ratify the recent UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sport said “we wanted to be first, but we couldn’t get it through the system as quickly as we wanted to” (CCES employee, December, 2005). And what I found to be one of the most interesting examples is that of the bid to host WADA’s headquarters, mentioned in chapter three. This exchange from one interview tells the story:

Interviewee: So [Secretary of State (Amateur Sport)] Coderre … said ‘I want Canada to bid for the headquarters, and I want … to spend a year campaigning for
it.’ … [There was] an unlimited budget. We went, went after it. And in the end Canada was awarded the headquarters in Montréal.

Interviewer: Okay, and just out of interest, why did, like why would Coderre want to…

Interviewee: Prestige. (Interview with Sport Canada employee, April, 2006)

Following Canada’s winning bid, several government media releases promoted the achievement. One, titled *Canada’s bid to host the World Anti-Doping Agency Permanent Headquarters Site Wins!* stated that “the choice of Montreal confirms that Canada is the world leader in anti-doping initiatives” (Sport Canada, 2001).

Clearly, there is pride taken in appearing to be at the forefront of anti-doping initiatives. As a result, during the consultation around the new CADP, extraordinary value was placed on having the *Program* adopted and in place well before the Olympic Summer Games in Athens, as is clearly stated in a CCES media release after the finalization of the new Canadian Anti-Doping Program: “Now Canada’s Program must be implemented by [NSOs] by June 1, 2004 – an aggressive deadline, but comparable to that of other top anti-doping nations” (CCES, 2004b).

It was the desire to achieve this goal that dictated the timeline for the overhaul of *Canadian Doping Control Regulations*, whereas a truly athlete-centred approach would require that the timeline be determined in accordance with ensuring the full involvement of athletes in decision-making. To be fair, WADA did require that all sports organizations comply with the *World Code* by the Olympics in Athens or risk being declared ineligible for the Games (WADA, 2003d, p. 8). However, when one considers that the new anti-doping rules “didn’t represent that much of a change of the status quo
for us” (CCES employee, December, 2005) and that, in fact, the old CDCR “were quite a bit tighter than the new rules” (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006), it is difficult to suggest that Canada would have been reprimanded in any way for not complying with the World Code as quickly as it did. This is supported by one interviewee’s comment that revisions to the Canadian regulations had to be done quickly not because of pressure from WADA, but rather:

because we had, we had a sense that we wanted to have the Canadian Program up and running sufficiently in advance of the Athens Olympics. That we would, people would feel comfortable with the Code compliant set of rules, because that’s what was going to be in place for the Athens Olympics. So that represented something of a goal or a milestone that we wanted to meet. (CCES employee, December, 2005)

The second example of organizational concern for appearance which affects athlete involvement in decision-making relates to a reluctance on the part of Athletes CAN to deal with doping-related matters. As already noted above, analysis of Athletes CAN documents suggests this to be true, and two interviewees were very clear regarding this reluctance. An exchange with one interviewee describes it best:

Interviewee: Well Athletes CAN, as a specific point of their mandate, refuses to deal with doping, because, there’s been this sort of naïve belief that the athlete alleged to have doped will somehow taint their work. And so I’ve spent 5, 6, 7 years hitting them on the head and saying, listen up! This is important to athletes. Aw no, didn’t want to go there. And they never did, and they still don’t. And it’s stupid.

Interviewer: I, I mean I’ve heard that. I just find it amazing.
Interviewee: Because this is the one thing where every athlete is affected, and you know you’ve got to rise above the, you know, we always say to the criminal lawyer, ‘Oh! how can you represent such scum?’ And it’s sort of like, you’ve got to get above that. Because what you’re doing is you’re, you’re supporting a principle. And Athletes CAN, support the principle. Yes, there’re athletes that dope and there are a whole lot of others that don’t, but they, your role should be to take a stand in this and they never would. … Which is, I think, a huge thing you should write about. Because I think it stinks. … So having said that, our consultation group had no athletes on it. Because Athletes CAN would have been the logical assumption or the logical place to go. We invited them. No, didn’t want to get involved.

Interviewer: Now … what I was told before was that they didn’t like, they didn’t like to get involved in representing athletes at hearings. Is, so, are you …

Interviewee: But that wasn’t the issue, the issue was to get involved in the design and creation of the total program to ensure that it’s fair to athletes. (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006)

This example is particularly striking because, as the interviewee suggests, a concern for appearance is prioritized above what, historically, has been a valuable principle for the CAA and Athletes CAN. In the only Canadian sport organization publication dedicated to the concept of athlete-centredness, the CAA suggests need for “mechanisms … to facilitate direct athlete involvement in decision-making which impacts on athletes” (1994, p. 10). Concerning consultations around the development of the 2002 The Canadian Sport Policy, Athletes CAN suggested that “A national sport policy should recognize that athletes must be involved in making the decisions that affect
them” (2001, p. 5) and that “significant contribution from athletes … will result in a better policy” (2001, p. 2). Even more recently, in its 2004-2005 Annual Report, Athletes CAN claims to be a “consistent presence at the decision and policy making tables of sport” (2005). The dedication of Athletes CAN to the concept of athlete-centredness could not be clearer; however, the evidence suggests that it may be compromised in the interest of maintaining the appearance that all Athletes CAN members are drug-free.

One interviewee did suggest that Athletes CAN formed a committee to vet the CCES documents circulated during consultation, and that Athletes CAN members would have been sent emails directing them to the documents and the CCES website (Interviewee 7). However, at no point during my analysis was an athlete ever identified as having been involved with any decision-making processes, and there was considerable confusion around whether or not Athletes CAN was represented on the CCES implementation Task Force, leading me to conclude that they were not.

**No Commitment to Involving Athletes in Decision-Making**

As described in chapter three, the concept of athlete-centredness has two components. The first is a focus on the needs of athletes, and the second, the involvement of athletes in decision-making that affect them (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, p. 14). However, one theme to arise from my analysis is that there is little commitment to this second component by stakeholders in the Canadian sport community. As one interviewee put it:

[athletes are] treated as commodities … in the operation of sport. So we’re athlete-centred in one way. But if you really scratch below the surface of athlete-centred …
many of them see it as the idea of ensuring that we have everything needed to produce athletes. ... It's a little less about should we not feel ourselves accountable, be evaluated on the basis, of how the experience has been for athletes. (former anti-doping policy administrator, May, 2006)

Certainly the strongest calls for athlete involvement in decision-making were contained in *Sport: The Way Ahead* (Minister's Task Force on Federal Sport Policy, 1992, pp. 60-61) and the CAA’s position paper on athlete-centred sport (1994). And in the federal government report *Sport in Canada: Everybody’s Business. Leadership, Partnership, and Accountability*, it was recommended that the government “ensure that top-level athletes have more control over the system by encouraging sports organizations to give them significant decision-making strength in those issues that affect them” (Mills, 1998, p. 122). However, careful review of Sport Canada’s funding guidelines show that the government has never mandated specific levels or forms of athlete representation on decision-making bodies. Multisport service organizations and those seeking government aid through “project stream” funding and the “hosting program,” for instance, have no guidelines concerning the involvement of athletes in decision-making (see Sport Canada, 2005a; 2005b; 2005c; 2006b). The guidelines are different for NSOs; however, in the 2000-2001 Contribution Guidelines, “athlete-involvement in decision-making” is only one, and a minor one at that, of a number of factors used to determine an NSO’s funding eligibility score (Sport Canada, 2000b, pp. 33, 35). In the 2001-2005 Sport Funding and Accountability Framework (SFAF), funding did become dependent on an NSO showing that it has “the direct involvement of high-performance athletes in decision-making” (Sport Canada, 2000a, p. 2). However, this policy does not give any guidance concerning
how athletes should be involved or in what types of decisions. Furthermore, in no policy is the direction from Sport Canada stronger than this, and in fact it is weakened in the subsequent SFAF where it pertains only to national team athletes (Sport Canada, 2004b, p. 8).

The fact that government funding policies concerning athlete involvement in decision-making become weaker over time contradicts The Canadian Sport Policy's vision of a sport system involving athletes "throughout the system in decisions that directly relate to them" (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 13). However, even in documents supporting implementation of the Canadian Sport Policy, athlete involvement in decision-making is never mentioned again as an aspect of athlete-centredness or of "enhanced capacity" (see Federal-Provincial/Territorial Sport Committee, 2003, pp. 7-8; Sport Canada 2005d, pp. 4, 5; 2005e, p. 1; 2006, p. 3).33

When the major funder of, and thus major influence on, the Canadian sport system (anti-doping policy developer, December, 2005; Sport Canada employee, April, 2006) fails to effectively strive for athlete involvement in decision-making, perhaps it should not be surprising that Canadian sport organizations attach little importance to it as well, even while lauding or advocating engagement of other stakeholders in decision-making. The Sport Matters Group, for example, in a document about changing Canadian sport and physical activity for the better, writes that:

Sport serves as common entry point (sic) into democratic, collective decision-making and problem-solving. ... Sport is a collective activity that allows Canadians to learn and practice skills that makes civic engagement practical and meaningful. (Sport Matters Group, 2005, p. 16)
This seems an ideal opportunity to mention athlete-centredness and the benefits of involving athletes in decision-making, but the connection is not made.

In a similar manner, during the consultations around the WADC, the CCES critiqued a draft of the *World Code* in one of the consolidated Canadian sport community comments:

The Canadian sport movement believes stakeholders need a more direct voice in the approval of modifications to such an important document. It is essential ... that modifications be approved in a way that ensures wide-spread if not complete acceptance. At the very least, the consultation process ought to include a detailed canvas of stakeholders in the form of a vote on proposed amendments. (CCES, 2002b, p. 7)

Once again, here is an opportunity to advocate the need for athlete involvement in decision-making. However, not only is it not done in this document, as shown earlier in the findings of this study, it is not done in practice.
The analysis of Canadian anti-doping policy development suggests that athletes have not been significantly involved in decision-making processes despite claims that the "evolution [of Canada’s anti-doping program] was shaped by its owners and constituents" (CCES, 2004d, p. "Message to Stakeholders"). While policy makers contend that athletes were invited to participate in consultations regarding the development of anti-doping policies, it is clear that invitations were made in such a way that athletes could not reasonably be expected to respond. Instead, policy-makers chose to consult with organizations that purport to represent athletes and, as has historically been the case in Canadian sport policy making, the places at decision-making tables have been filled by ‘experts’ who define both the goals of policy and the means for achieving them in accordance with government and organizational priorities. Despite the Canadian sport system’s focus on a shift to athlete-centredness, little importance was placed on involving athletes in decision-making around policies that significantly affect their lives, and while athlete-centredness is frequently lauded as an ideal, other politically motivated commitments have taken precedence in the Canadian sport system.

The findings also suggest that the exclusion of athletes as participants in the policy process is not a uniquely Canadian phenomenon. My analysis shows that even in the development of the World Anti-Doping Code, athlete involvement was minimal, supporting Houlihan’s claim that athletes remain disenfranchised participants in international sport (2001; 2004a) and that there are few mechanisms through which they
can negotiate the conditions of their working lives. A “substantial democratic deficit” to which Houlihan refers includes, most significantly, little in the form of “‘input democracy’, i.e. the extent to which those within a polity are able to affect the policy agenda” (2001, p. 41).

Returning to the Research Questions

Examining the results of this study in the context of democracy is particularly illuminating. While the findings described in chapter four definitively answer questions regarding whether or not anti-doping policy developers placed any importance on involving athletes in policy development, answers to certain additional questions are clarified when the findings are viewed through a “democratic lens.”

Athlete-centredness and the involvement of athletes in decision-making remain relatively under-researched areas. However, there is a sizeable body of literature regarding “public involvement” or “citizen engagement” in decision-making outside of sport, based on the principles of deliberative democracy, which suggests what constitutes “meaningful” involvement and how it can lead to better decisions and more democratic institutions. Democracy, in this context, is not direct democracy, but rather an expansion of representative democracy: “People … aren’t seeking direct democracy. … They are looking for meaningful opportunities to influence decision-making and complement not replace the voices of experts and other stakeholders” (Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2005a, p. 4; cf. Culver & Howe, 2004, pp.68-69; Delli Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004, p. 317).

There is strong support for the idea that discussions concerning the involvement
of athletes in decision-making are discussions about democracy. Consider the similarity between the CAA’s suggestion that a truly athlete-centred sport system includes athletes in “defining the needs and goals and in determining how to meet them” (Canadian Athletes’ Association, 1994, p. 3) and Donnelly’s suggestion that the “democratization of sport] must include the power and the right to determine the forms, circumstances and meanings of participation – it is full involvement, not just participation” (1993, p. 417, emphasis in original). Kihl, Kikulis and Thibault make the direct link, stating that “an athlete-centred system should be based on democratic principles that support discussions ... in which participants most likely affected by a decision, partake or are appropriately represented” (2006, p. 4). There is also government support for this idea; Federal-Provincial/Territorial sport ministers, in their declaration of Expectations for Fairness in Sport, endorsed a vision of sport requiring that “sport organizations in receipt of public funding will be ... democratic in their organizational life” (2001, p. 3). In this light, the remaining research questions are addressed below.

*Was the involvement of athletes – proposed or actual – of a nature that could be considered “meaningful?”*

While it is clear that athletes were not significantly involved in the consultations around the World Code and CADP, literature on democratic public involvement initiatives suggests that even if they had been, it is unlikely their involvement could be considered meaningful. Consultations, as a specific method of involving stakeholders, are “typically expert focused” (Canadian Policy Research Networks, 2005a, p. 1) and are not meant to make partners or decision-makers out of participants (Turnbull & Aucoin, 2006,
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p. 6). Turnbull and Aucoin go on to suggest that:

to qualify as “meaningful” … a public involvement initiative must meet the
following criteria: it must be linked to the policy decision-making process; its
participant-roster must reflect the diversity of the population; the process must
provide an opportunity for the participants to receive credible, balanced, honest
information about the issues in question; the process must be organized and
facilitated so that its deliberations respect the principles of equality and fairness;
and, the results of the deliberative process must be communicated effectively to the
public at large. (2006, p. 7)

A prerequisite for meeting these criteria is some involvement of stakeholders, but, as is
already clear in the case of anti-doping policy consultations, there was little, if any,
involvement of sport’s most important stakeholders, athletes.

What are the disadvantages of not involving athletes in meaningful ways in policy
development? Conversely, what benefits could be expected of meaningful involvement?

The suggestion by Athletes CAN that the significant involvement of athletes in
the development of sport policy will result in a better policy (2001, p. 2) is supported by
research on democratic involvement in decision-making. When those who are most
affected by a policy are meaningfully involved in its development it can result in more
effective and legitimate policy, more trust between participants, and stakeholders who are
eager to be engaged and more knowledgeable regarding policy issues (Canadian Policy
Research Network, 2005b, p. 6; Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs, 2004, p. 320; Turnbull
& Aucoin, 2006, p. iii).
While a desire for effective policy is perhaps self-evident, the idea that sport can encourage a more civically engaged citizenry is strongly supported by the Canadian sport community (Sport Matters Group, 2005, pp. 15-16). And, in the opinion of one interviewee, a lack of legitimacy is a major disadvantage of not involving athletes. He/she suggested that Canada’s failure to institutionalize any form of athlete consent to anti-doping policy “might be the single biggest threat to [the] long term survival” of the existing Canadian anti-doping system (former anti-doping policy administrator, May, 2006).

What are the obstacles to meaningful involvement of athletes in policy development?

Existing research on public involvement suggests that both policy makers and would-be participants in the policy process may be reluctant to engage in meaningful deliberation. However, there are also obstacles unique to sport or anti-doping initiatives.

In consultations, such as those held as part of developing the World Code and CADP, policy makers have considerable control in that they determine the issues that are circulated for consideration, to whom they are circulated, and the value of comments that are returned. They may fear losing control of the process if they open it up to stakeholders (Turnbull & Aucoin, 2006, p. 31). Citizens are reluctant to get involved because of the time required, awareness of their own ignorance of the issues under consideration, and a lack of trust and confidence in the process. Also, meaningful involvement can take a great deal more time than less deliberative methods (Turnbull & Aucoin, 2006, p. 32).

My analysis did not illuminate any explicit fear on the part of policy makers of
losing control to athletes by opening up the process of policy development. A more important factor, described in chapter four, seems to be that decision makers are not motivated financially to involve athletes. While funding guidelines may contain a line or two about the need for athlete-centredness in some sport organizations, eligibility for funding is still heavily dependent on an organization’s ability to produce results in the form of medals at international sporting events. As one interviewee put it:

You can give me a job description in this hand, and you can give me a list of how I’m going to be evaluated in this hand; which one do you think I’m going to respond to? I’m going to be evaluated, I’m going to make sure I cover those bases. (former anti-doping policy administrator).

Regarding the reluctance on the part of athletes to become involved in policy creation, my research design was such that I did not speak with athletes concerning their becoming engaged in the Canadian sport community. However, other sources show that the nature of being a high-performance athlete presents unique obstacles to involvement in policy creation. Many athletes already experience difficulty integrating sport with other aspects of their lives, leaving little time for additional work as engaged citizens (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 2005, pp. 15-18; 1997, pp. 18-19). This fact was mentioned by every one of my interviewees. Beamish also suggests another reason, one that concerns athletes’ lack of awareness of the “politics of production” of their working lives. The lived experience of athletes “is narrowly focused on the production of superior performances and does not tend to extend to a complete understanding of the entire structure of the high-performance sport system and its global political significance” (1993, p. 202). An interviewee expressed similar thinking when he/she said:
Athletes just don’t have the mechanisms to understand how systemic their issues are. They still don’t get that. Because they’re never there long enough to really meet enough athletes to discover how systemic the issues are. They always think it’s about me, because that’s … the athlete personality. (CAA co-founder, March, 2006)

The time required to involve athletes meaningfully may have been one of the obstacles that worked against athlete involvement in recent anti-doping consultations. While no document or interviewee suggested that greater athlete involvement would have been pursued had there been more time, as described in chapter four, revisions to Canadian anti-doping regulations had to occur quickly in order to be completed well before the Olympic Summer Games in Athens. The greater obstacle, also described earlier, may be that political and organizational goals such as maintaining Canada’s status as a leading anti-doping nation, take precedence over involving athletes in decision-making.

How can these obstacles be overcome? / Recommendations for Policy Makers

The answer to this question is perhaps the most important because it involves making recommendations for improving policy development in the Canadian sport system and illuminating avenues for social change, thus fulfilling a fundamental requirement of radical social research (McDonald, 2002, p. 114).

If the involvement of athletes in decision-making that affects them is a valued principle, as is suggested in the Canadian Sport Policy (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 13) then there is a need for policy makers to be introspective and to critically examine how and with whom they communicate, where organizational and policy goals originate and
whose interests are served by achieving them, and what is lost when situated or experiential knowledge is subordinated to 'expert' knowledge. Once again, work that has been done in the field of deliberative citizen engagement may contain the most appropriate solutions.

Perhaps the most important step that could be taken is to formally institutionalize athlete involvement in decision-making. Turnbull and Aucoin suggest criteria for a “clear litmus test” for the institutionalization of meaningful public involvement in policy: public involvement must be a core element of the policy process; public input must be given substantial weight, as opposed to being a “token effort,” in policy development processes; and the commitment to institutionalized public involvement is system-wide and not concentrated in certain departments (2006, p. 3). One interviewee, speaking specifically about anti-doping policy, suggested that an “athlete consent component” could be built into the policy process in much the same way that rigorous processes exist for ensuring that policy is scientifically and legally sound (former anti-doping policy administrator, May, 2006). Sport Canada could begin facilitating the institutionalization of athlete involvement by funding only those sports organizations, including NSOs, MSOs and hosting campaigns, that clearly demonstrate the meaningful involvement of athletes in decision-making.

Regarding how to institutionalize meaningful involvement, several authors suggest that a key to democratic reform is the use of ‘situated knowledge’ as a balance to expert opinion (Patten, 2001, pp. 236-238). Rebick, for instance, endorses the idea of “having experts on tap rather than experts on top” as a way to ensure that the voices of those most affected are heard (2000, p. 231). There are several models for ensuring
meaningful public involvement. Rebick describes attempts at “small group democracy” (2000) and the Canadian Policy Research Network has published many documents on “public dialogue,” most notably *Public Dialogue: A Tool for Citizen Engagement* (2000). This manual, developed in collaboration with several departments of the Canadian federal government, including Canadian Heritage, shows how public dialogue can be integrated into departmental activities, thus giving stakeholders a more meaningful role in decision-making (p. 3).

The potential for tools such as public dialogue to change sport policy making is considerable. Ensuring that athletes’ views are heard and contribute to policy outcomes, and that more than a small group of professionals participates in decision-making could result in greater understanding between stakeholders and athletes who are both knowledgeable regarding policy issues and are eager to be involved in decision-making that affects them. This would represent a fundamental change in the way Canadian sport policies are developed, and could be positioned as a way that Canada leads the sporting world.

*Recommendations for Further Research*

All research answers some questions while at the same time generating others; this study is no exception. The findings of this project suggest several important lines of research that would lead to greater understanding of the roles played by athletes in the Canadian sport system.

*Athletes CAN*

One of the most striking findings of this project is that Athletes CAN may
sometimes be a reluctant participant in the development of policies that significantly affect athletes. One interviewee bluntly called this “appalling” and suggested that Athletes CAN has been “co-opted by a very patronizing system that ... infantilizes the athlete” (CAA co-founder, March, 2006).

This finding suggests the need for critical research into the history and evolution of Athletes CAN. Specifically, research should address questions such as: What organizational changes have occurred at Athletes CAN? How have these changes affected the ways that Athletes CAN represents athletes? What is the nature of relationships between Athletes CAN and other stakeholders in the Canadian sport system? What do athletes think about Athletes CAN and its work? Critical examination of these and other questions may illuminate avenues for more effective representation of Canadian athletes.

**Democratic Sport Policy making**

This study and work in progress by Kihl, Kikulis and Thibault (2006) both suggest that the application of democratic principles to sport policy processes can result in more significant and meaningful involvement of athletes in decision-making. An important and exciting result could be a more athlete-centred Canadian sport system that encourages the civic engagement of its participants.

In this project I have briefly discussed how democratic principles are non-existent in the case of anti-doping policy development. Critical research into the development, implementation and evaluation of other Canadian sport policies would illuminate the extent of the Canadian sport system’s “democratic deficit”, and could suggest avenues for
positive change.

*What do Athletes Think?*

Perhaps the most important line of research borne of this study would be one that gives voice to athletes themselves. The boundaries placed on data collection early in this research project resulted in the exclusion of athletes’ voices, but there is evidence suggesting that young Canadians\(^{34}\) want to be involved in decision-making that affects their lives. At the Canadian Policy Research Network’s *Dialogue and Summit Engaging Young Canadians* in 2005, Canadians between the ages of 18 and 25 expressed a vision of being properly equipped to “become active citizens engaging in political and civic life” (Canadian Policy Research Network, 2006, p. ix). They wrote:

If we had more say, if people were listened to, we would participate more.

Democracy must become more tangible and real. That means having a bigger voice in decisions that affect us through new avenues and mechanisms for participation.

(Canadian Policy Research Network, 2006, p. 20)

Similar research involving Canadian athletes could show that they too want to be involved, and at the same time may illuminate special concerns that are unique to athletes.

*Summary*

This study has analyzed the involvement of Canadian athletes in the creation of anti-doping policies. Examination of the history of both international and Canadian high-
performance sport and anti-doping initiatives suggests that athletes have rarely been significantly involved in decision-making that affects their lives. The research conducted for this thesis, analysis of interviews with individuals involved in anti-doping policy creation and of documents related to policy development, demonstrates that Canadian athletes continue to be relegated to the margins of policy development, despite claims by Canadian sport stakeholders that athletes are and should be involved. I hope that the findings of this research project will demonstrate to sport policy makers that “we need a better balance of power for athletes in the system” (former anti-doping policy administrator, May, 2006) and ways that both sport policies and the Canadian sport system can be improved by including athletes.
Endnotes

1 In this thesis, discussion of athlete involvement or participation in policy development or decision-making includes both currently active athletes and those athletes who have recently retired. The issues associated with involving only active athletes have been noted by several authors (e.g. Beamish & Borowy, 1988; Ekos Research Associates Inc., 1997, 2005; Kihl, Kikulis & Thibault, 2006) and several of the individuals interviewed for this project. They include issues associated with the consent and supervision of minor athletes, the inability of current athletes to integrate sport with other aspects of their lives, a lack of consistency in the “pool” of current high-performance athletes available to participate, and lack of access to resources necessary for participation (e.g. money, fax machines, telephones, ability to travel, etc.). Some of these issues may be solved or alleviated by involving recently retired athletes who are older and have more experience with policy issues, and are no longer focused solely on sport.

2 In The Canadian Sport Policy, “‘athlete’ is generally used to describe people involved in competitive sport, ‘participant’ to those involved in sport for recreation, and ‘athlete/participant’ when referring to both” (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 2, footnote 1).

3 See WADA, 2003b, for a list of all participants at the 2003 World Conference on Doping in Sport.

4 Interestingly, the head of the IOC at the time, Juan Antonio Samaranch, was quoted in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo as saying that the Tour de France situation, in his opinion, was not an example of doping: “Doping (now) is everything that, firstly, is harmful to an athlete’s health and, secondly, artificially augments his performance. If it’s just the second case, for me that’s not doping. If it’s the first case, it is.” (BBC, 1998)

5 Beamish and Ritchie (2006) critique WADA’s reliance on ‘the spirit of sport’, or “what is intrinsically valuable about sport. ... the essence of Olympism; how we play true” (WADA, 2003c, p. 3). They suggest that “policies based upon an abstract ideal of ‘the spirit of sport’ will fail because they are completely inconsistent with the social, historical and political trajectory world-class sport has taken in the past 60 years” (2006, pp. 137-138).

6 Canadian performances in the Olympic Summer Games have been relatively modest; in the last three Olympic Summer Games, in Athens, Sydney and Atlanta, Canada placed 21st, 24th and 21st respectively in the unofficial medal count (IOC, 2006). However, in the last three Winter Games in Turin, Salt Lake City and Nagano, Canada placed 5th, 4th and 4th respectively. When total number of medals is used as a measure – and it is one of no less than seven different measures used by the COC in its post-Turin summary of Canadian performances – Canada was third in Turin (COC, 2006, p. 17). For the sake of comparison, consider that East Germany, with a population considerably smaller than Canada’s, placed in the top three spots in the unofficial medal count in all 10 Summer and Winter Games in which it competed between 1968 and 1988, including two first place finishes in the Winter Games of 1980 and 1984 (Jackson & Ritchie, 2007, p. 34).
7 That greater equality of opportunity for all Canadians was a goal of the 1970 Policy is clearly evident in the following excerpts:

“But sports is more than a grand festival every four years. ... It is - or rather it should and can be - an integral part of the individual quality of life for Canadians - all Canadians, regardless of income or social position” (Munro, 1970, p. 1).

“we must face the fact that the opportunity for involvement in sports and recreation is extremely unequal as between the different socioeconomic classes within our population. ... So we are going to devote special attention to the less fortunate regions and classes of people in our country” (Munro, 1970, p. 3).

Similar sentiment is expressed throughout the Policy. However, while Munro was clear that the “pursuit of international excellence [should be put] in its proper perspective – as a consequence and not as a goal of mass participation” (Munro, 1970, p. 23, emphasis in original), several authors have convincingly suggested that not only did this never happen, it was “nothing but an empty promise” (Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 100).

8 Between 1970 and 1984, the Fitness and Amateur Sport Branch of the federal government grew from 30 to 121 people and, during the same period, the professional, technical and clerical staff that support the NSOs in Ottawa grew from 65 to 532 (Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 135).

9 In keeping with the focus on high-performance, Recreation Canada, responsible for fostering mass participation, never received the same level of support as Sport Canada, which focused on elite sport. By 1979, $4.50 was spent on sport for every dollar spent on fitness and recreation (Macintosh, 1996, p. 46) and in fact, Recreation Canada was disbanded in 1980, leaving mass participation as an issue for provinces (Harvey & Proulx, 1988, p. 105; Houlihan, 1997, p. 78-79).

10 According to the Minister’s Task Force on Federal Sport Policy, the Canadian sport community includes “the collection of ... national, not-for-profit, single-sport organizations (NSOs) and 15 or so multi-sport organizations (MSOs) representing their constituents, provincial/territorial sport organizations (PSOs) and community clubs and leagues” (1992, p. 46), to which I would add the federal government. The most influential of these organizations include: Sport Canada, a branch of the federal government; the Canadian Olympic Committee, an MSO which was endorsed by its own board of directors as “the official advocacy voice for high performance sport in Canada” (Canadian Olympic Committee, 2004b); and the National Sport Organizations that oversee the governance of specific sports. These three are involved in most, if not all of national sport policy making. Other less influential groups become involved in policy making that affects them directly and as their influence allows. An inexhaustive list include Athletes CAN, the Canadian Paralympic Committee, the Canada Games Council, the Canadian Association for the Advancement of Women and Sport and Physical Activity, the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport, and Canadian Interuniversity Sport.
11 For instance, while medal standings per country are not recognized by the IOC, Canada ‘placed’ 21st of 201 countries in the 2004 Athens Summer Olympic Games, and 5th of 80 nations in the 2006 Olympic Winter Games in Turin (IOC, 2006).

12 Sanctions imposed under the CADP actually range from no period of ineligibility to compete lifetime ineligibility, depending on the violation (e.g. presence in the body, use, possession, tampering, trafficking) and whether or not the athlete was at fault. However, the sanctions most commonly discussed are the two-year and lifetime suspensions levied for the presence of “prohibited substances” in the athlete’s body. Complete regulations can be found in the Canadian Anti-Doping Program (CCES, 2004a)

13 One interviewee noted the important distinction between the sanctions levied by government, and those imposed by sports bodies:

all the policies that have come out ... divided sanctions into two clear ... distinctions. One was a sanction that related to entitlement to federal funding. You know, and that’s all the government could do. The government couldn’t say anything about eligibility to compete, or, you know, are you a member in good standing, because athletes are not members of government, they’re members of their federations. ... The sanctions that were levied against entitlement to compete, you know, you can no longer be on our national team, or you can’t coach for us, those were levied by the sport federations. (Sport Canada employee, April, 2006)

14 It should be noted that while there is little, if any, evidence of athlete involvement in the development of anti-doping policies, athletes do consent to comply with anti-doping policies “based on the contractual relationship which exists between Sport Organizations and their members or Participants through those individuals’ agreement to participate in sport according to its rules” (Sport Canada, 2004a, p. 5)

15 These are all real questions prompted by my experiences as a runner during the 1990s. My teammates and I considered the qualifying standards for the national athletics championships to be arbitrary and unreasonably difficult to achieve, a perception supported by the fact that year after year the championships were run with incomplete fields in many events. However, we learned one year that some athletes from B.C. had earned their spots at nationals simply by filling in an application. The cheque refers to money I received in 1992, completely unexpectedly and long after the performance it was meant to reward. Also in 1992, I was forced to stop taking the only medication I could find that relieved my suffering from seasonal allergies so that I could race without testing positive, or “returning an adverse analytical finding,” in today’s anti-doping parlance.

16 The four conferences were: the 5th Annual Sport Management Student Research Colloquium, Brock University, April, 2005; the Annual Conference of the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport, Winston-Salem, October, 2005; the Macintosh Grad Student Day Conference, Queen’s University, January, 2006 and; the 6th
Annual Sport Management Student Research Colloquium, Brock University, April, 2006.

17 By “relevant,” I mean any document that meets one or more of the following criteria: (i) it is an anti-doping policy that affects Canadian athletes; (ii) it was an anti-doping policy that affected Canadian athletes; (iii) it describes, or was used in, any aspect of the development of an anti-doping policy that affects/affected Canadian athletes; (iv) it describes the development of Canadian sport policy generally.

18 “The Consulting With Canadians site provides a structured, single-point of access to on- and off-line consultations. Participating government departments and agencies have provided the consultations listed on this site” (Government of Canada, 2006).

19 “The CNW Group web site is the most frequently used and most widely accessed full-text news release site in Canada” (CNW Group, 2006). Five keyword searches were conducted on the Canada Newswire site: (i) Canadian centre ethics sport; (ii) cces; (iii) doping; (iv) anti-doping; (v) antidoping.

20 “The CPI.Q (Canadian Periodical Index) indexes over 400 Canadian periodicals covering a broad range of subjects including current events, health, technology, the arts, history, culture and business. Coverage from 1988 to the present, with full-text articles available from 1995 to the present” (Brock University, 2003).

21 “Canadian Newsstand offers access to the full text of over 18 Canadian dailies, including the Toronto Star, National Post, Ottawa Citizen, Calgary Herald, Montreal Gazette and more. Content is updated daily with a 7-day embargo period. Canadian Newsstand also includes the St. Catharines Standard from 1996 onward and the Niagara Falls Review from 1999 onward” (Brock University, 2004).

22 Twelve keyword searches were conducted using the CPI.Q and Canadian Newsstand databases: (i) Canadian centre ethics sport; (ii) cces; (iii) doping; (iv) anti-doping; (v) antidoping; (vi) world anti-doping agency; (vii) world antidoping agency; (viii) world anti doping agency; (ix) WADA; (x) world anti-doping code; (xi) world antidoping code; (xii) world anti doping code.

23 The advanced search option of the Internet search engine Google (www.google.com) allows users to retrieve web pages and specific document types from user-specified sites. For example, it is possible to specify a search of all Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) documents that reside on www.athletescan.com. I decided to do these advanced searches because, from my work experience maintaining websites, I know that organizations will sometimes have documents on their servers without having visible hyperlinks to them on their websites. An advanced search will retrieve some of these documents.

24 As per Brock University Research Ethics Board file 05-053 JACKSON.

25 I recorded the six in-person interviews using a Creative Labs Zen Micro MP3 player,
which will record up to 10 hours of conversation and save it as a .wav file that can be transferred to a personal computer and played back using a digital media playback device such as Windows Media Player or iTunes.

26 The questions asked of the four athletes were:
(i) Did you know that Canada’s anti-doping regulations were overhauled in 2003-2004?
(ii) Were you aware of the fact that you were invited to participate in the overhaul of these regulations?
(iii) Are you a member of Athletes CAN?
(iv) Can you tell me about being a member of Athletes CAN?

27 The 13 categories were: Athletes CAN; value of experts; few involved in policy development; no athletes involved; communication through sport organizations; history of Canadian anti-doping initiatives; history of world anti-doping initiatives; politics in sport policy development; Canada as a top anti-doping nation; athlete-centredness; focus on athletes’ needs as opposed to the involvement of athletes; negative case analysis / instances of athlete involvement; tensions regarding sport as a public good v sport as a private enterprise.

28 The CADP and CPADS are not separated for analysis because they were developed together through the same consultation process (CCES employee, December, 2005; CCES, 2004c). In fact, the CPADS is based on a policy document that was part of the first draft of the CADP (CCES, 2004c, p. 2).

29 Because the CCES had invited the public to comment (CCES, 2002a), I also searched the federal government’s Consulting with Canadians website in order to see if formal government consultation was conducted.

30 While the letter does not indicate addressees, language in the body of the letter suggests it was sent to organizations. For example:
“This letter… is an invitation for your organization to identify a contact person” (CCES, 2003b, p. 1).
“The CCES requests that your organization identify a contact person for the implementation project” (CCES, 2003b, p. 5).
“Any individual within your organization who is interested” (CCES, 2003b, p. 6).

31 While this interviewee’s comments suggest there was an athlete representative on the 2000 task force, another interviewee, commenting on the same task force, said “There wasn’t an athlete in that group” (anti-doping policy developer, January, 2006).

32 “The Sport Matters Group (SMG) is a voluntary group of national and provincial sport organizations and leaders who have come together to consider the future of sport in Canada and to collaborate on various sport policy issues. The SMG includes over 80 organizations and sport leaders actively involved in public policy issues that affect sport and physical activity. The SMG has been involved in bringing forward the sport sector’s views on such items as The Canadian Sport Policy, the Voluntary Sector Initiative, the
*Physical Activity and Sport Act*, federal budgets, and the linkages between sport and healthy living” (Sport Matters Group, 2005, p. acknowledgements)

33 Making the Canadian sport system athlete-centred is an aspect of *The Canadian Sport Policy’s “Goal III: Enhanced Capacity”* (Sport Canada, 2002, p. 18).

34 As a group, Canada’s high-performance athletes are quite young. Sixty-four percent are 26 years of age or younger, and 42% are under the age of 24 (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 2005, p. 3).


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Personal copy provided by the authors.


http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/ama-wada/index_e.cfm


Date

Dear ____________________,

The research project that you are being invited to participate in is entitled, “Involvement of Canadian Athletes in the Development of Anti-Doping Policies”. Greg Jackson, a masters student at Brock University, is conducting the study. The focus of this research is the involvement and impact that Canadian high-performance athletes have had on the development of anti-doping policies that affect them. The research questions that guide this study are:

- How have Canadian athletes been involved in the development of anti-doping policies that affect them?
- What impact have Canadian athletes had on the development of anti-doping policies?
- What are the barriers to greater involvement by Canadian athletes in the development of policies that affect them?

Your involvement is greatly appreciated. I hope that your participation will benefit you by encouraging reflection and discussion around the experiences of athletes in the development of anti-doping policies. Additionally, your participation will benefit the academic community by developing further empirical knowledge regarding athlete involvement in the development of sport policies.

Results from this study will be used to enhance understanding of the development of Canadian sports policies. Dissemination will occur in academic journals and conference presentations. However, your identity will not be disclosed in any written or oral presentations of the findings of this research. Any information provided by participants will be strictly confidential. Furthermore, I, as the principal investigator, am the only individual who will have access to information that might identify participants. The names of specific participants in the study will not be attached to comments or issues raised within project reports or presentations generated from this study. The interviews will be recorded for research purposes, however audio tapes and interview transcripts will be destroyed following the completion of this study.

Please note that participation in this study is voluntary and you may decline to answer any questions that you find inappropriate. You may also withdraw from the study at any stage before the completion of interview analysis (e.g. prior to commencement of the
interview, during the interview, or after completion of the interview). If you choose to withdraw, any data that you provide will be destroyed and excluded from the study. Of course, if you choose to withdraw or not to participate, there will be no negative consequences.

Following the transcription of your interview, I will send you a copy of the transcript for your review and comment. Should you have any further questions concerning the interview or the study in general, please feel free to contact me by phone at 416-485-8686, or by email at gj04zz@brocku.ca. Additionally, concerns about your involvement in this study may be directed to the Research Ethics Officer in the Office of Research Services, Brock University, at 905-688-5550 x3035, or to my faculty advisor, Dr. Ian Ritchie, at 905-688-5550 x3966. This study has been reviewed by and received ethics clearance through the Brock University Research Ethics Board (file number: 05-053 JACKSON). Please keep a copy of this letter of information for your records.

Sincerely,

Greg Jackson
MA Candidate
Physical Education & Kinesiology
Brock University
Appendix B: Informed Consent Form

Title of Study: Involvement of Canadian Athletes in the Development of Anti-Doping Policies

Principal Investigator: Greg Jackson, MA Candidate, Department of Physical Education & Kinesiology, Brock University

Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Ian Ritchie, Assistant Professor, Department of Physical Education & Kinesiology, Brock University

Name of Participant: (please print):

- I understand that this study involves research, and that I am being invited to participate.
- I have been given and have read the letter of invitation provided to me by the Principal Investigator conducting the research (Greg Jackson).
- I understand that the purpose of this study is to explore the involvement of Canadian athletes in the development of anti-doping policies.
- I understand that my participation in this study includes participation in an audio-taped interview with the Principal Investigator that will last approximately one hour.
- I understand that participation in this study will pose no risk or harm to me other than that typically experienced in everyday life.
- I understand that all personal information will be kept strictly confidential and that all information will be coded so that my name will not be associated with specific responses.
- I understand that all collected information, including audio tapes and interview transcripts, will be destroyed following the completion of this research project.
- I understand that only the Principal Investigator & the Faculty Supervisor (Dr. Ian Ritchie) will have access to my data, and that all information will be stored securely in the home of the Principal Investigator.
- I understand that participation in this study is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the study at any time before the completion of interview analysis and for any reason without penalty.
- I understand that before the completion of this research project, I will be given an opportunity to review and comment upon the transcript of my interview.
- I understand that I may ask questions of the researcher at any point during the research process.
- I understand that I have no obligation to answer questions that I feel are inappropriate.
- I understand that there is no payment for participating in this research.
- I understand that the results of this study may be published in academic journals and presented at conferences.
I understand that if I have any questions about my rights as a research participant, I can contact the Brock University Research Ethics Officer by phone at 905-688-5550 x3035 or by email at reb@brocku.ca.

As indicated by my signature below, I acknowledge that I am participating freely and willingly and I am providing consent to be interviewed.

I ________________________________,

Have read and understood the relevant information regarding this research project
Understand that I may ask questions in the future
Indicate free consent to research participation by signing this research consent form

Participant’s Signature: ________________________________

I have explained this study to the participant

Researcher’s Signature: ________________________________

Greg Jackson
MA Candidate,
Physical Education & Kinesiology
Brock University
416-485-8686
gj04zz@brocku.ca

Dr. Ian Ritchie
Assistant Professor,
Physical Education & Kinesiology
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905-688-5550 x3966
ian.ritchie@brocku.ca

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through Brock University’s Research Ethics Board, file # REB 05-053 JACKSON

Please keep a copy of this Informed Consent Letter for your records.
Dear Participant,

Thank you for your participation in the research project, “Involvement of Canadian Athletes in the Development of Anti-Doping Policies”. As you are aware, the purpose of this study is to examine the involvement and impact that Canadian high-performance athletes have had on the development of anti-doping policies.

Your participation has been essential to the understanding of the role athletes play in the development of anti-doping policies. I hope that the findings of this research will be helpful to those involved in the development of future sports policies.

I will send you a summary of the findings of this study following its completion. Additionally, I would be happy to send you a transcript of our interview for your review and comments. If you would like to receive one, or if you have any concerns or questions about this research project, please do not hesitate to telephone me at 416-485-8686 or email me at gj04zz@brocku.ca.

Thank you again for your participation!

Sincerely,

Greg Jackson
MA Candidate
Physical Education & Kinesiology
Brock University