THE INADEQUATE DOMINANCE OF REALISM:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. WAR ON TERROR

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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There has been and will continue to be substantial debate over how the international system can best be characterized. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the international system can best be characterized by the essential features of realism, but the use of realist policy prescriptions are inadequate when applied independently to deal with the threat of terrorism as it exists today. In order to demonstrate this an examination of realism in the international system, U.S. foreign policy, and case analysis of Afghanistan and Iraq will be undertaken to demonstrate that although realist policy prescriptions do have a role in dealing with modern transnational security threats, these prescriptions on their own are inadequate when dealing with terrorism.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank Professor Hevina Dashwood for her continued support and guidance through this journey. I would also like to thank Professor Daniel Madar for his assistance in the completion and refinement of this project.

A note of thanks to all of the faculty and staff in Brock University’s Department of Political Science for their support through the entirety of my university career.
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Chapter 1

REALISM, LIBERALISM AND AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF TERROR

There are two fundamental questions that have driven the study of international politics; how can the international system best be characterized, and can the system change or be changed? The physical manifestations of state formation have continued to transform, as well as the organization and power structures that are involved in maintaining a sense of order. The underlying principles have not altered significantly, as the nature of the system has been constructed according to the principles and prescriptions of the realist paradigm, and understanding of the system continues to follow this line of paradigmatic reasoning. Realism has been able to maintain its key principles while adapting to the issues of the time, at least until now. Although realism has been able to explain and adapt to certain key issues and events in the post-Cold War period, the reemerging security threat of terrorism does present some key structural and theoretical problems for the realist paradigm. Although terrorism is not a new security threat, it has consistently grown as a security issue, both nationally and internationally, since 1990, and even more so in the wake of September 11, 2001.

Several developments have surfaced over the past decade that have demonstrated some weaknesses in the realist approach to international politics and world affairs. Some of these issues are globalization, global environmental movements, transnational organized crime, the growth of cosmopolitanism, and terrorism. The specific example that this paper will use is the issue of terrorism and the U.S. response that has been used to attempt to deal with terrorism in the twenty-first century. Through this examination two key arguments are made; first, that realism still best describes the international system; and second, the realist
approach to international relations, with its emphasis on military and state power, is not sufficient as a means for dealing with transnational security threats such as terrorism. As such, the realist policy prescriptions, although appropriate in an anarchic international system, need to be reexamined when dealing with the issue of terrorism. In order to demonstrate this, the realist approach must be assessed and analyzed as to how applicable it is to the modern study of international relations. This can be demonstrated by first reviewing the current U.S. administration’s response to the September 11 attacks by focusing on a war against terrorism using military action, the “Bush Doctrine”, and preemptive self-defense. From this point, a review of the current war on terrorism campaign as seen through military action in Afghanistan and Iraq will be used to demonstrate the inherent problems with the U.S. administration’s war on terror. These cases also help create an understanding of how the U.S. identifies and perceives the international terrorist threat in the twenty first century.

Methodology

In order to successfully prove the arguments put forward in this study several analytical and quantifiable methods are used. First, the major tenets of realism need to be examined. Next, a test of the appropriateness of realist policy prescriptions regarding terrorism and the initiatives taken by the U.S. are to be organized into realist and liberal categories. The U.S. response to terrorism will be analyzed with specific reference to the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. From this point an analysis of the outcomes of these cases in relation to the policy statements made with regards to approaches and goals set forth will be assessed as successful, indifferent, or unsuccessful. Success will be defined by the policy initiatives and statements presented by the Bush administration regarding the war on terror and with
specific reference to the two cases and the extent to which these stated objectives have been accomplished.

This analysis does not make moral judgments of 'right' or 'wrong', but rather it assesses the success in relation to U.S. policy objectives as well as success in relation to the broader issue of international terrorism. These conclusions will be made after each case study, and then reviewed and compared in their full context once both cases have been analyzed.

Outcomes will be categorized as realist or liberal in nature and will also be compared in this context. Realism here is characterized as rational state actors relying on military power and liberalism is characterized as cooperation between states to use military power as a last option. These definitions, including a definition for terrorism, are spelled out in greater detail later in this chapter and in chapter two.

Chapter Two will examine the various arguments surrounding the root causes of terrorism, the potential policy options for dealing with terrorism as defined by the realist and liberal paradigms, and the policy options available to the U.S. for dealing with it. Chapter Three will pursue broad case analysis of the foreign policies and initiatives undertaken by the United States of America, demonstrating a realist approach to the war on terrorism, examining the specific cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The reasoning behind the comparison of the two case studies in the war on terrorism is to try to clearly identify the U.S. perception of the terrorist threat, as well as to articulate realist underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy. These examples are diverse in nature and demonstrate the distinction between the international conception of the terrorist threat and the means of dealing with it, compared to the U.S. conception and purpose of waging a war on terrorism. As will be demonstrated, the U.S. is attempting a universal military approach to dealing with
terrorism, even if its actions are not sanctioned by the international community, specifically referring to the United Nations; nor does current policy show great concern for individual state objections. The point that is proven by a review of these cases is that the U.S. is dealing with the terrorist threat through realist-type policy prescriptions, focusing primarily on states and state sponsored terrorism with military force. There are opposing views in the international community, both voiced in the UN and by individual states outside of the UN, that a purely militaristic approach, specifically one that is not approved by the UN, is inappropriate and will ultimately not help deal with the issue of terrorism; this is of particular concern given that the U.S. has a wide range of options for dealing with such a task. Chapter Four will attempt to demonstrate from both a theoretical and analytical level that realist policy prescriptions do not adequately deal with the issue of terrorism. This will be done by reviewing the conclusions presented throughout this study and will conclude with the argument that the actions of the U.S., demonstrating a heavy reliance on a realist approach, has been relatively unsuccessful for long term results and as such, terrorism currently poses one of the greatest threats to the international system.

The balance of this chapter will be devoted to the proposition that the international system can be best described as realist in nature and design. The organization of a system of states is ultimately codified and sustained by the underlying foundations of assumptions and reasoning that originally lead to the definition of the system as it is to be understood today. For this reason, the system does not progress in the evolutionary fashion that is often described through the understanding of the terminology of globalization.\footnote{For examples of this refer to David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution.} Therefore any
meaningful analysis must begin with an understanding of the international system and how it is structured and perceived from past to present. To begin this analysis, a review of the U.S. position in the world and the actions taken since September 11, 2001, followed by a theoretical review of realism and liberalism is necessary.

The International Context: The Power of the U.S. Today

The reason for focusing on the U.S. is a result of the impact that the U.S. has on international politics and events. To begin our review of U.S. power, it is helpful to mention some of the key policy trends of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth-century. The key policies demonstrated by are a willingness to pursue unilateralist initiatives, as exemplified throughout the twentieth century, as well as to emphasize the use of military force as a means of power, as seen in expenditures on defence during the Cold War. Key events such as these have helped to define critical areas for the study of U.S. foreign policy. Debates over unilateralism, U.S. hegemonic power, and over the nature of a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar international system have driven public and academic discussion of U.S. foreign policy, and have ultimately affected U.S. policy choices.

The first issue of U.S. unilateralism is one that must be dealt with cautiously, as it is too simplistic to state that the U.S. always acts unilaterally or multilaterally. Two key events among many, the Second Gulf War (2003) and Vietnam War, caused a great deal of controversy and uncertainty in the international system, but there are contradictions to such unilateralist actions. The U.S. has consistently been involved in multilateral efforts, such as


2 It is important to note that although the primary states involved in the Cold War framed policy with an emphasis on military power and that this acted as a classic case of balance of power in the international system, the ultimate goal was not destruction or military conflict, but rather political and economic dominance in the international system.
the Korean War and the Gulf War (1991), and a wide variety of UN humanitarian initiatives, thereby demonstrating that the U.S. has also prescribed policy that contains some cooperation and engagement in international issues of security. What has not changed, however, is the focus on the use of military force to protect U.S. interests, economic and strategic, regardless of the history of its allies. This may be explained by the basic essence of the realist argument that the U.S., and all states in general, will ultimately act in their own best interests.

How can U.S. national interests best be met? These questions have been given new significance in the wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. One of the central components to the U.S. national interest has been the maintenance of its hegemonic status, not simply in the sense of military power, but also in influence and coercion. An important note on this issue, is that the power status of the U.S. is fairly recent following the collapse of the USSR. Arguments surrounding the legitimacy of the U.S. hegemony are complex and can ultimately relate the debate over unipolar or multipolar systems theory. A series of international relations strategies designed to enhance and maintain the U.S. hegemonic position can be presented as follows.

...the scope and pervasiveness of American global power today are unique. Not only does the United States control all of the world’s oceans and seas, but it has developed an assertive military capability for amphibious shore control that enables it to project its power inland in politically significant ways... In brief, America stands supreme in the... decisive domains of global power... [and] that makes America the only comprehensive global superpower.4

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Brzezinski goes on to suggest that "this unprecedented American global hegemony has no rival." Support for the concept of the U.S. as a hegemonic power is not simply stated in academic terms, it is also clearly presented in the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy, "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." The policy also emphasizes the use of preventative war, not preemptive, in order to eliminate any potential threats to U.S. national security. This type of policy represents a significant departure from the policies of the Clinton administration and still remains controversial, as seen through the relatively close presidential race in December 2004. The use of preventative or preemptive war helps to highlight the U.S. international position or at the very least it helps to identify the U.S. perception of its own position in the international system. Again, it should be noted that although the U.S. has historically used a realist approach to foreign policy, virtually from the time of its formation, the specifics of the current policy are the direct result of the current administration and such policy may have been given additional momentum following September 11, 2001. At the same time, the current administration has also been attempting to use a form of democratic realism as a rationale for targeting the specific countries on its Axis of Evil, and the U.S. does have a history of foreign policy that is shaped around the promotion of democracy around the world. It should also be noted that many realists are skeptical of such policies as they can lead to military engagements that divert attention from more practical security issues.

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5 Ibid., 29
The reason for using the terminology of preventative war versus pre-emptive war seems to be in large part a semantic issue. Preventative war implies that engaging in military conflict with another state is done with the intention of preventing a large scale war from occurring, or to prevent an adversary from becoming dangerously strong. This tradition has been used in realist thinking from the time of Sun Tzu, where the real intention is to destroy one’s enemies before they have the ability to mobilize against ones self, which is closer to the concept of pre-emptive war. Pre-emptive war addresses a threat, or perceived threat, of an immanent attack. The difference in the language has to do more with perception than action. In the first case the argument is that the war limits casualties and a risk of destabilizing the international system, and in the second it uses force to thwart an immediate prospect of attack. The potential problem with relying on such policy is that the message that has been sent, when comparing the U.S. approach to its enemies, is that it has been implied that, “...if you want to defend yourself from us, you had better mimic North Korea and pose a credible military threat...” This approach of unilateralism has become a large part of the U.S. foreign policy agenda and its maintenance of power.

The final issue is the nature of the international system itself and where the U.S. fits into this system. First a note on defensive and offensive realism. For defensive realists, the international system, “...stimulates, and may compel a state to increase its power; at the least it necessitates that the prudent state prevent relative increases in the power of

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11 It should be noted that a policy of prevention or pre-emption does not necessarily result in unilateralism, it is simply that in this particular case, the U.S. has demonstrated a willingness to act unilaterally.
competitor states.”¹² From this position, “...The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.”¹³ In short, defensive realists would emphasize the prevention of a change in the international system and also that states do not seek to constantly gain greater power in the system, only to keep the status quo. Offensive realists view the system somewhat differently as they would indicate that states are constantly seeking to gain more power. States will ultimately, “...take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system.”¹⁴ Ultimately offensive realists would emphasize the elimination of rival states for the primary purpose of obtaining greater power, assuming that the relative losses are not too great as to outweigh the gains in power. Neo-realists such as Waltz may have attempted to provide some support for a unipolar system, although this is not Waltz’s ideal system of states, but in an increasingly complex international environment simply identifying the system or one’s position within that system as unipolar or multipolar may be too simplistic.

Attempts have been made to bridge the gap between unipolar and multipolar models as it has been argued that the pre-Cold War world was multipolar, and the Cold War was itself a result of a bipolar world. The collapse of the bipolar world ultimately led to the United States obtaining the position as a dominant nation-state, but at the same time, it transformed international relations in other ways. “In the late 1980’s the communist world collapsed

¹² Gilpin, 87-88.
and the Cold War international system became history."\(^{15}\) From this argument American hegemony was undermined by a simultaneous transition of the international system. Scholars such as Huntington have suggested that the old system, in which states competed against each other, no longer existed and in its place a new world order in which great civilizations (defined by close cultural affinities) are the central actors in power balancing processes was created.\(^{16}\) At the same time it should be noted that during the period of the Cold War and perhaps even more so after 1990, non-military aspects of the international system also created a shift in power resources. Through the integration of international economics and commodities other states and geographic regions are able to influence the international system through trade and commerce.\(^{17}\) This is one example through which power can be seen and explained by non-military means.

Huntington suggests that, "...for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational."\(^{18}\) This is a slightly different view on the nature of the international system as compared to traditional realism. In this perspective, a powerful United States operates in a multipolar system in which other great civilizations will seek to balance power in the international arena. As a result, the relative dominance of a single state over other states, or even over coalitions of states, loses relevance in the new world of civilizational competition. The only potential problem with such an assertion is that the U.S. is often considered to not only be the world's military and economic superpower, but also the cultural superpower; these two dimensions combined give the U.S. the ability to

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
\(^{18}\) Huntington, 21.
shape international norms. As well, there must also be recognition of two perspectives, the American perspective which believes it has an understanding of its power in the international system, and the perspective of those who feel threatened by the U.S. If it is possible for weaker states to combine their forces and influence under the common framework of cultural or civilization nationalism, then single states do not remain the primary concern, but rather regional groupings present the potential threat. Although realistically the EU does not pose a military threat to the U.S. at this point, the EU could potentially pose an economic threat and as the organizational structure of the EU increases a EU military force could potentially rival the U.S. in the future assuming that all member states and the United Kingdom could act in a united effort. Again from a realistic standpoint, the threat the EU could present would be in the form of power and control in the international system, not necessarily a threat in the form of military aggression against the U.S. This leads back to the initial questions which were presented.

U.S. foreign policy is defined by its power to influence states and state actors, and the drive to maintain this dominant position ultimately creates policy outcomes that reinforce such a security strategy. As a result, U.S. national interests are defined by warding off any threat to its security, which can be better understood as its ability to dominate in the international system. Although this is simply an analysis based on means and ends to understand power, as the leader in the hegemonic system the U.S. is in a position to choose

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20 This issue has become of increasing importance with the expansion of the European Union and attempts to promote Arab Nationalism in the Middle East.

21 It should be taken into consideration that traditional realists put the security and preservation of the state above all other issues. The ability to influence by extending the states territory is an area of debate, as over-extension is always an issue of concern for realists. See, Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M., “An Unnecessary War”, Foreign Policy, Issue 134 (January/February, 2003): 51-61.
a security strategy based on the ability to influence others and perpetuate the realist international order. Many authors differ in the overall power structure of the international system, and where the U.S. is positioned in the system. However, many see the U.S perception of the international system through the lens of realism, and as a result, they see traditional realist approaches to working within the international system. As a result of this, many authors seem to present a somewhat aggressive approach for U.S. foreign policy. Since the system is ultimately filled with a variety of threats, policies that emphasize the use of and present the appearance of strong military action or the ability to use military action to obtain specific ends are emphasized. To balance this point it should also be noted that realists tend to be cautious about the actual exercise of this power as it can be based on human miscalculation with devastating repercussions. As well, there is also recognition of the ability to use economic and "normative" power to influence and control the way in which the "great game" is actually played. As will be shown throughout the course of this study on U.S. foreign policy and the War on Terror, the "great game" is based on a "demonstration of power". This is a classic relationship to Morgenthau's political motives for power, in this case the demonstration of power can be seen as prestige in the international system.

The International Context: 9/11 and After

It was early in the morning on September 11, 2001 when two planes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, one plane crashed into the pentagon in Washington D.C., and another crashed just inside Pennsylvania. When terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, President Bush indicated that

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22 Chomsky, 21.
action would be taken against those responsible. It is these actions that will be reviewed in order to assess the U.S. response to September 11 and gain an understanding of how such actions have led to the current international situation. In order to isolate and categorize the actions taken by the U.S., the focus will be placed on two opposing points of departure, external efforts and internal efforts. Treatment of the external efforts will review the international actions that the U.S. has engaged in, while that of internal efforts will look at the national security policies that the Bush administration has enacted within the U.S. primarily found in the actions of U.S. Homeland Security.

The U.S. took a number of steps to address the "new", and very serious threat to its security posed by terrorism. The day after the September 11 attacks, Security Council Resolution 1368 was unanimously passed, condemning the terrorist attacks and pushing for international cooperation on combating acts of terrorism world wide. A series of other UN Security Council Resolutions would follow, continuing to condemn international terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorist groups. As well as working through the UN, NATO was also brought into the picture as NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson made a statement on September 12, 2001, "If it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty." With the support of the UN and NATO, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001 with primarily U.S. and British forces leading

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the military operation in Afghanistan for harboring Al-Qaeda and more specifically Osama bin Laden, believed to be responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. From November 27 to December 5, 2001, representatives from four Afghan factions met under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany to establish a new interim government for Afghanistan. Behind the scenes, the U.S. solicited support from other nations to promote Hamid Karzai as the new Afghan president. Although Afghanistan was not in any way settled, the focus of attention turned to Iraq.

Iraq had been an issue with the Bush administration from the outset, and by declaring it a member of the axis of evil, it became clear that Iraq would continue to be a target of interest for the U.S. “By September 2002, then, all three necessary factors for establishing a new norm in international law were in place: Iraq was defenseless, extremely important, and an imminent threat to our very existence.” Although Chomsky may be a little extreme in his assertion that the U.S. was attempting to create a norm in international law or that Iraq was defenseless, in fact the U.S. interest in invading Iraq was in “...direct confrontation of the accepted norms of international law...” Where Chomsky is correct is in his reiteration of the points that were expressed to the American public in the propaganda battle prior to the actual war. Next, the Bush administration began pushing for a removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, first by working through the UN and NATO, but after tremendous resistance from a number of states, namely France, Germany, Russia, and China, decided to work directly with states that were supportive of the U.S. initiative, and in response to this resistance the U.S. formed a “coalition of the willing” to

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28 Chomsky, 20.
29 Gareau, 190.
move against Iraq to remove all weapons of mass destruction, remove terrorist bases, and to remove Saddam Hussein from power. It was the connection of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein’s support for anti-U.S. terrorist groups that was presented to the UN and the U.S. public as the rationale for the need to deal with the imminent threat that Iraq represented fitting in with the overarching threat that the war on terrorism was to address.\textsuperscript{30}

On March 21, 2003, U.S. forces began the move into Iraq under the title Operation Iraqi Freedom and just over one month later on May 1, 2003, President Bush announced the end to major combat operations. Shortly after this a controversial move was made with the UN in the creation of Security Council Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003\textsuperscript{31} to bring the UN into Iraq for humanitarian and restructuring efforts, and then later slightly expanding the UN role with Resolution 1511 in October 2003 that calls for a provisional assembly to create a constitution and assist with the political restructuring of the state.\textsuperscript{32} The situation in Iraq is far from stable and there are questions about the future of Iraq that still need to be addressed, both for the future of Iraq, as well as the future of the Middle East. From this point, the second half of U.S. actions after September 11 moves to domestic security issues and concerns.

Immediately following the September 11 bombings, U.S. border security was tightened. With a sense of urgency and vulnerability, two key initiatives were taken in order to combat the threat of terrorism within the U.S. The Patriot Act was passed on October 26,\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 201-202.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1511 (2003),” http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356391.pdf?OpenElement (Last Accessed February 9, 2005). It is of significance to recognize that in the UN Resolutions on Iraq presented here, there is an emphasis on the sovereignty of Iraq as an independent state.
\end{itemize}
2001, and on October 8, 2002, the Department of Homeland Defense was created and changed the realm of national security and intelligence within the U.S. The first legislative proposals surfaced in the Senate just two days following September 11 (the Combating Terrorism Act of 2001). On September 19 the administration presented a new bill, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 to be followed on October 2 by House bill 2975, the Patriot Act. Then on October 5 Senate bill 1510, the USA Act was introduced. House and senate leaders worked to resolve the differences between HR2975 and S1510. On October 25, the final bill, HR 3162, the USA Patriot Act, passed and on October 26 was signed into law by President George W. Bush. On January 10, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent around a draft of “The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,” which has become known as the Patriot Act II, but has yet to become law.33

The National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002) set out three key strategic objectives: “1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 2) reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 3) minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”34 The strategy also presents six “critical mission areas”35 and within each of the areas identifies several initiatives that need to be taken. The document provides a clear strategy for how the U.S. perceives threats directly to the continental U.S. and how it will attempt to protect itself. Although homeland security is not a key focus of this study, it is

33 It is important to note that this document was “leaked” and it can be questioned as to what degree the policy recommendations will actually be used. For a downloadable copy of this document please refer to http://civilliberty.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story%5F01%5F020703%5FDoc%5F1.pdf (Last Accessed, May 12, 2004). This document is 120 pages in length, which is why it has not been directly included in the Documents section.
35 Theses areas are defined as intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency preparedness and response.
important to recognize that the response to September 11 has affected both foreign and
domestic policy initiatives surrounding the issue of security.

The International Context: Shifting Support

Although there are a number of UN resolutions addressing the subject\(^{36}\), the practical
application of an international effort for dealing with terrorism has been difficult to
implement. It is for this reason that the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” is not only a
significant international effort, but also allows for an opportunity to view the relationships
among states on this issue and further highlights the distinction between international
realists and liberals.

After September 11, 2001, there was a great deal of sympathy and support for the U.S.,
and a general feeling that something had to be done to deal with the growing threat of
international terrorism. There are mixed attitudes in the international community in the
approach that should be taken. In the case of Afghanistan, there was a great deal of
international support for a multinational military effort, as under various UN resolutions\(^{37}\)
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had been condemned by the UN Security Council. This
culminated in Security Council Resolution 1373,\(^{38}\) which declared war on Afghanistan, and
an international effort to overthrow the Taliban regime commenced on October 11, 2001.
This was an international effort primarily led by the U.S. and Great Britain, but also

\(^{36}\) United Nations Security Council, “Counter Terrorism Committee,”
purpose of CTC and resolutions regarding terrorism leading to its creation.

Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and
Associated Individuals and Entities,” (Last Accessed March 11, 2004).

ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement (Last Accessed January 13,
2002).
contained Canadian and French troops among others, and is currently under NATO command.

Contrasting this, there was relatively little support for a military invasion of Iraq, and ultimately there was never a UN resolution passed sanctioning the use of military force. It should be noted, that earlier resolutions were passed that implicitly threatened the use of force and it was the build-up of U.S. forces that led to the allowance of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. A coalition of "the willing", lead by the U.S., invaded the Gulf state on March 21, 2003. Countries such as Canada and France were opposed to military action in Iraq; in the case of Canada, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien was opposed to military engagement in Iraq without a second UN resolution. If a second UN resolution could be passed by the Security Council, Canada would recognize the legitimacy of the action and participate where possible. Canada even attempted to propose a resolution that would extend the time period allowed for UN Weapons Inspectors which would allow for the link that the U.S. was attempting to make between weapons of mass destruction and the greater terrorist threat, but such a resolution was opposed by the U.S. France maintained an even more orthodox line of opposition, maintaining that there was no need for any discussion of military action at the time. As a result, the case of Iraq demonstrates a lack of international consensus on how to proceed and it also demonstrates the tension within the international community as to how Iraq should be connected to the War on Terror if even such a connection should exist. The differences between the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan will be discussed in greater detail later, for now, it is only necessary to recognize that there are distinctions in the international approach to dealing with the problem of terrorism, and in
the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, there are distinctions in the definition of the problem as well.

The variation in the degree of international support for the U.S. initiated war on terrorism reflects a relatively basic lack of consensus on how to deal with the problem of terrorism. First, there is no clearly universal agreement on how to deal with the problem. Second, it seems apparent that military power is not sufficient to address the problem; and third, the overwhelming power of the U.S. has not clearly translated into securing influence and cooperation of the entire international community. What is extremely important to note in the international context with relation to U.S. policy is that in September 2002, there was still an atmosphere that gave the impression that the U.S. was willing and able to work through the UN rather than around it, although it is debatable as to the sincerity of the U.S. to work with the UN. The events that transpired to create a division in the international community are essential to understanding the unilateral hegemonic approach of the U.S.

**Realism and the International Order**

Traditional realism has been the dominant component of international relations theory through the twentieth century. Political scholars, drawing on the works of early thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli, and modern theorists including E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz, to name but a few, have articulated a broadly similar vision of an anarchic international system. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in

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39 An important note that should be acknowledged with this issue is that there has been a substantial increase in cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies on both the national and international scale which is a very powerful weapon when dealing with terrorism. See, Robert Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 (2002): 37-54.

1989, leading to the demise of the former Soviet Union, the changing nature of international relations has forced a number of realist thinkers to revisit some aspects of realist thought. A variety of realist perspectives have emerged from this process, each with its own descriptive and prescriptive aspects in an effort to maintain the dominance of realist thought. Some realist scholars have come to see the United States as a newly-dominant global hegemon, and thus describe the international system as unipolar. Others see the United States as a major player in a largely multipolar system, where power is distributed among several key states. Both views, however, are based on a number of problematic arguments which raise some important questions about realist assumptions concerning the nature of international relations in the early days of the twenty-first century, particularly when considering the issues of national and international peace and security.

In his book The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, E.H. Carr outlines the foundations of realist thought, suggesting that Niccolo Machiavelli was "the first important political realist". Carr draws three principal tenets from Machiavelli's work. First, history is a sequence of cause and effect. Second, theory does not direct the practice of international relations; rather it attempts to describe the practice of international relations. Third, politics (and by extension

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43 Ibid., 24.

international relations) are not driven by ethics, though they may provide a safe space in which ethical decision-making can occur\(^{45}\). From these beginnings, realists have developed a broad-based and carefully structured theory of the nature of international relations. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson have outlined the basic precepts of realist theory in their text *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.\(^{46}\) They present six central components of contemporary realist thought,

1. Politics and international relations are governed by objective laws, based on established patterns of human behaviour.
2. International Politics are guided by self-interest, which is defined primarily in terms of power.
3. The notion of self-interest defined by power is universally true of states in the current international system, though realists recognize that – at some point in the future – other concepts and events could alter this reality.
4. Realism recognizes that specific political actions carry moral significance, but also that the self-preservation of the state will supersede moral questions in a practical context.
5. States will cloak their action in moral rhetoric, and may even believe the sense of morality they articulate, but this will not change their tendency to act in their own self-interest.
6. In articulating these positions, the distinctions between political realism and other schools of thought are both real and profound.\(^{47}\)

From these descriptions, it is thus possible to make several generalizations about the realist perspective on the nature of international relations. First, realism believes in an anarchic international system, where the issues are always about power relationships and security. Second, realism expresses a state-centric vision of international relations, where domestic or non-state actors are unable to exert any practical or significant influence, due to the fact that they do not have the power (specifically the military capability) to affect the system in a meaningful way. This state-centric, power-based system also means that international

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 65.
\(^{47}\) Ibid., 4-14.
relations are essentially hierarchical, with the hierarchy defined by the relative levels of power, especially military power, exhibited by states. Third, the self-interest of states means that although temporary alliances may be possible, the international system is fundamentally incompatible with a long-term outcome of interstate cooperation, equaling a system of self-help. Fourth, international politics are not constrained by moral or ethical questions. Fifth, because of these other general characterizations of the international system in the realist world view, conflict, including military conflict, is inevitable in international relations.

If these are to be the foundations of understanding for the international system, then the question that must be asked is how can peace and/or stability be maintained? The balance of power concept is central to the stability of the international system.\footnote{Waltz, 118.} To reinforce this concept Kenneth Waltz presents several points: that states are unitary actors that seek self preservation and will use whatever means necessary to do this, and that balance of power is a result of that behaviour.\footnote{Ibid., 118.} It is also of importance to note that Waltz would assert that a balance of power scenario is most efficient and stable when only two dominant powers are involved, and when all other states maintain a lower power position. This is what Waltz refers to as a "small number system".\footnote{Ibid., 132.} This entire arrangement depends upon the overall stability of the structure and its ability to endure.\footnote{Ibid., 135.} One of the fundamental areas of concern for Waltz’s approach is that it is based on an international system engulfed in the Cold War, which has since ended. As a result, Waltz’s observations, which lead to his conclusions, no longer apply. This is not to say that all of the conclusions that Waltz arrives
at are incorrect, but rather to recognize two distinct points. First, is that realism, using observational analysis, can be threatened by time and changes in the game. The second point is that realism also has the ability to adapt, as it attempts to explain new and recent events through the traditional realist paradigmatic lens, but still has difficulty in explaining events or actions that fall short of war.\(^2\)

The opposite of the balance of power is the bandwagoning effect, originally suggested by Stephen Van Evera\(^3\). He suggested that bandwagoning occurs among weaker states grouping together with a dominant or rising power for the purpose of security.\(^4\) In his major work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John J. Mearsheimer undertakes a survey of balancing efforts against potentially hegemonic states from the time of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France (1792-1815) to the conclusion of the Cold War (1945-1990).\(^5\) He conclusively demonstrates that states naturally engage in power balancing efforts against potential hegemons.\(^6\) It was during the Cold War that realist concepts of power balancing became particularly convincing. In this bipolar reality, relatively stable alliances and the deterrent factor of mutually assured nuclear destruction spoke strongly to the reality of power balancing, and gave practical support to the realist notions of international relations. In the post Cold War era, power balancing is much more difficult, as the international system is dominated by one superpower, but this has not eliminated the realist notion that

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\(^{3}\) Cited in Waltz, 126.


\(^{6}\) Nye, “The Balance of Power and Its Problems”. 
states will still ultimately act in their best interests regardless of the increased role of international institutions and interdependence.57

From a comparative perspective, offensive and defensive realists might handle the specific issue of terrorism differently. Although this will be explored in the next chapter, it is important to briefly note that both offensive and defensive realists would still need to view terrorism at the level of the state, but their approach to dealing with a state that sponsors terrorism would be direct. For defensive realists it would be enough to simply ensure that the terrorist state was unable to launch an attack, where offensive realists would be inclined to attack the terrorist state before it could launch an initial assault. An important note on this is that realists in general would be cautious, so as to be absolutely certain about the threat; realists do not make guesses about threats.

Another perspective to be found in realism lies in the neoconservative principles of democratic realism. As an alternative to democratic globalism and liberal institutionalism, democratic realism remains focussed on the principle of promoting and protecting democracy, but only "where it counts"; meaning not going to all places all over the world, but to specific areas of interest.58 These areas of interest are regions where the defense or advancement of democracy assists in the larger security issue of the day.59 This type of neoconservative strategy, embracing a liberal democratic agenda, does not necessarily need to rely on international cooperation, but does seem to fit into a realist grand strategy for a unipolar international system.60

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59 Ibid., 17.
This analysis is relevant for two purposes. First, it is intended to demonstrate the underlying realist fiber of the international system. At this point, it would seem clear that realists have, at least historically, had great success explaining the world and as such, their tradition carries on through its embeddedness in the system of states. The second purpose of this analysis is to articulate an understanding of current power structures and potential responses to it. This becomes important when dealing with the issue of terrorism, as it does not clearly fit into the realist understanding of global dynamics with reference to war, power, or ideology.

**Liberalism and the International Order**

The question one must ask is, is there no room for movement away from realism in the international world? What is it about the international system that would prevent the easy transition of liberal ideas from the West to enter, if not dominate, the international realm of political activity? The answer has never been entirely clear. As international theorist Martin Wight put it,

> Political theory and law are ... systems of action within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of the good life. International theory is the theory of survival. What for political theory is the extreme case (as in revolution, or civil war) is for international theory the regular case.\(^6^1\)

The reason for this is anarchy. The international realm is anarchical, not necessarily in the sense that it is chaotic in nature; the contrary seems to be true. In fact, it displays an extraordinary amount of order and cohesion, but in the sense that there is no higher authority with a monopoly on the legal use of violence. In the end, it is every state for itself.

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Liberal international theory seems to carry a greater diversity of views than that of the realist school. The concern is that the liberal school has become so large and diverse, that it is difficult to clearly articulate a ‘liberal’ position on many issues. In Michael Doyle’s text, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, Doyle presents liberalism and its developments as follows,

The Liberals draw on Machiavelli’s view of republicanism but emerge with Locke’s seventeenth-century view of the government of free individuals, defending law and property, and then, the eighteenth century, a view of Liberal commercialism, pursuing the pacific implications of the free market. At the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant’s Liberal republicanism brought markets and rights and republican institutions together, reaffirming the centrality of liberal politics and setting out the bases of modern theories of individual responsibility, representation, and Liberal internationalism. Rejecting the view of world politics as a “jungle,” Liberals’ view of world politics is that of a cultivable “garden,” which combines a state of war with the possibility of a state of peace.62

Martin Wight, reforms the language for liberalism and presents three categories of international theorists; rationalists, realists, and revolutionaries.63 Wight and Hedly Bull would seem to articulate the value of rationalists. Bull’s most famous book, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*,64 is written broadly from within what Martin Wight called the Rationalist or Grotian School.65 Rationalism is in some ways an outgrowth of Realism in that it too recognizes anarchy as the defining characteristic of the international system. One of the defining characteristics of Rationalists is that they see more order than Realists do to the extent that they believe in the existence of something

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called international society.\textsuperscript{66} This international society is an organic or traditional institution that has grown out of centuries of diplomatic practice, the balance of power, international law, international organizations, and sometimes war.

Rationalism argues that different traditions and institutions help bring states together into an international society.\textsuperscript{67} The key point is that these traditions and institutions exist as procedural frameworks, not as means to particular ends. For example, the tradition of diplomacy continues to exist not because it allows for the expeditious attainment of some extrinsic aim like world peace. Instead, these traditions and institutions exist because they are procedural. They are mechanisms that allow for the easy discussion of any number of freely chosen aims. The rules of the road are a useful metaphor. These rules do not tell people where they ought to drive to, it is ultimately up to them to decide, but they do tell them to stay on the left and stick to the speed limit, no matter which direction they freely choose.\textsuperscript{68} This type of choice also allows for states to pursue their own self-interests, one of which will be their own survival. There is, of course, international law, but there is no sovereign legislative authority to make such laws.\textsuperscript{69} Sometimes the United Nations or other international organizations are responsible for making it; at other times, it is the product of treaties between two states.\textsuperscript{70} Nor is there an impartial means to enforce international law. When it is enforced it is generally done so by the affected parties themselves, not by a third

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{69} International law is also the best example of a key distinction for liberalism in international politics, in that liberalism valued based or value oriented.
\textsuperscript{70} Ruggie, 241.
party like a police force.71 So what does this mean for the application of liberal principles to the international realm?

In the twentieth century, the element of common international culture has not been entirely absent, and was famously described by Hedley Bull as an: “intellectual culture of modernity”,

some common languages, principally in English, a common scientific understanding of the world, certain common notions and techniques that derive from the universal espousal by governments in the modern world of economic development and their universal involvement in modern technology.72

Because he felt that this culture only existed at elite levels, Bull considered it a fragile basis on which to build international society. He might have changed his mind, however, had he been witness to the speed of globalization in the last decade. Whatever the significance of the culture of modernity in the modern world, Bull is surely right in insisting that it does not represent anything like a shared moral outlook, embracing both common ideas and common values, and rooted in societies in general as well as in their elites.73 It can be argued that the traditions of international society in use today are nevertheless effective instrumental conditions. They do not make any comment about the good life or some other aim to be pursued, yet they act as rules to which states subscribe when performing freely-chosen actions. An important note in the modern context is that Bull would also be horrified by the views of Al-Qaeda on proper norms, as they limit or eliminate freedom of choice and subscribe substantial punishment to even the slightest deviation from their concept of social norms.

71 Ibid., 218.
72 Bull, 33-34.
The Rationalist school does offer a positive liberal direction in international relations theory. It imposes no extrinsic aims on states, but it allows states to decide freely which aims to pursue and then promotes the mechanisms by which they might do so peacefully.74 Liberals want individuals to be governed by such procedural rules because they leave each of us free to make choices about our aims. It seems just as sensible to support and promote the institutions and traditions that make up a state system along similar lines.

Although the liberal internationalist view is potentially more complex than that of the realist school, there are key principles which characterize the liberal school; human nature is essentially good, progress is possible, war is not inevitable, war as a problem requires a multilateral solution, ethics can guide policy decisions, and international society can reorganize to make war less likely through reliance on international institutions and international law.75 In other words, conflict between states is not inevitable, and cooperation between states is possible. While not all liberals subscribe to all of these tenets, it is these characteristics that clearly define the difference between it and the realist school.

**The Dominance of Realism**

Through a review of realism and liberalism and drawing out the key tenets of each theory it can be seen that aspects from both theories could potentially be applied to explain the nature of the international system. Ultimately, it is realism that dominates the international system over liberalism. This is not because realism always provides the most beneficial solutions to international security problems but rather that the international system has historically been created along realist lines and as such the realist international system continues to perpetuate itself. As the system of states remains central to the

74 Roggeveen, 31.
workings of the international system, states ultimately seek to obtain power within this system. The example that will be used to prove this point in greater detail is the current U.S. led War on Terrorism. As the U.S. is currently the dominant power in the system of states and it appears to have the ability to dramatically influence the international agenda through its policies, it is important to recognize the U.S. as having a major impact on how the international system works. Since U.S. foreign policy can be seen as predominantly realist in nature, it be stated that realism dominates the workings of the international system itself. An important note to this point is that although realist policy and action does dominate the international system, it is not necessarily the most efficient or effective response to dealing with all modern international security threats, as the case with the war on terrorism suggests.
Chapter 2

UNDERSTANDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE 21STM CENTURY

Therefore, I say: know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of your enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.¹

Understanding a threat is possibly twice as important as actually dealing with the threat itself, as no solutions can be found if there is no understanding. Terrorism is a term that is often difficult to clearly pin down, and even with a working definition of terrorism there is still a lack of understanding as to the causes of it. It is for this reason that attention must be turned to understanding what the causes of terrorism might be, as they could be numerous. This chapter will attempt to demonstrate several things; first to define modern terrorism, second, to distinguish the motive of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, third, to build an understanding of the root causes of terrorism, fourth, to create a typology of potential realist and liberal responses to modern terrorist threats as presented thus far, and fifth, contrast this understanding with that of the U.S. The way in which terrorism is understood has a dramatic impact on how individual states and the international community, if consensus is possible, deal with the modern terrorist threat.

Terrorism in the International Order

One of the initial difficulties in engaging in a discussion about terrorism is defining the term itself. What is terrorism? Terrorism is something that has recently become part of everyday news and conversation, yet the term means different things to different people. This may be because the term has no precise or universally accepted definition. One possible way of viewing terrorism is as follows,

Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while antigovernmental extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on one's point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label "terrorist" to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do.²

In this viewpoint there are two very significant issues, the fact that terrorism is political regardless of the platform through which it is presented, and terrorism involves moral judgments. So what then does terrorism do?

An important key to the understanding of terrorism is to recognize that while each of the component parts…the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction to such an act or threat, and the social effects resultant from the acts and reaction…of the process are important, the emotional impact of the terrorist act and the social effects are more important than the particular action itself. In other words, the targets of the terror are far more important for the process than are the victims of the immediate act. The act or threat of violence is but the first step.³

The primary point here is that terrorism has an effect on the citizenry in order for the action to be useful. More specifically, terrorism targets ordinary people, not just political or military targets.

Terrorism is best defined as acts of violence committed against innocent persons or noncombatants that are intended to achieve political ends through fear and intimidation.⁴

This is true, but with some qualifiers. While quantifying terrorist incidents is simple, it is often much more difficult to identify the terrorist threat itself. To help understand the true nature of terrorism today, we can divide terrorist acts into several different categories, state-sponsored terrorism, groups attempting to overthrow government or achieve

independence\textsuperscript{5}, and terrorism enacted by fundamentalist groups\textsuperscript{6}. The focus of this paper is on the first and the last categories of terrorism.

From this overview a basic definition can be made; terrorism is an act, or series of actions, that are intended to create an atmosphere of fear in order to coerce through violent means, an opposing party, namely a state, for one’s own purposes. Ironically, this type of definition echoes a simplistic and classical definition of politics, which is making people do that which they might not otherwise want to do.\textsuperscript{7} To present this in a more traditional political fashion, terrorism can be seen as power politics using non-military means, and just as equally, traditional law enforcement can be used as a power resource.\textsuperscript{8}

Most modern terrorist groups are well organized, funded, and devoted groups of people, rather than simple mercenaries attempting to prove a point or make money.\textsuperscript{9} Large organizations are broken up into cells, which can be trained, set up and ready to perform their missions years in advance of the actual occurrence. This means that when terrorist groups are actually recognized, plans could have been in place for several years.\textsuperscript{10} Once the cell is in place, it no longer needs to rely on the organization as a whole; the cell acts as an independent component of the larger organization. This is also an over-simplification of terrorist groups. Not all groups are well financed, and highly organized. It is rather the situation that most terrorist organizations, in order to become internationalized, need to be

\textsuperscript{5} It is this category that the largest number of incidents occurs, Frank J. Cilluffo and Jack Thomas Tomarchio, “Responding to New Terrorist Threats”, Orbis, Vol. 42 Issue 3, (Summer 1998): 441.
\textsuperscript{6} For the purpose of this paper, such groups will be focused on as Islamic fundamentalist groups, although it should be made clear that Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups only contribute to a small number of the overall grouping.
\textsuperscript{9} Alexander and Gleason, 78.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 80.
more organized than their predecessors were, and also require more funding in order to create the web of infrastructure necessary. From this, modern terrorism can be said to have the same qualities as traditional terrorism, such as imposing fear over society, but it also includes a large ideological or philosophical context in which the action takes place.

Moving away from a specific definition, it is important to note that modern terrorism must also be seen as non-time sensitive, as the activities of a terrorist organization may occur after years of planning, preparation, and waiting. Modern terrorism is larger than the state, even when it is using state resources, as modern criminal organizations are capable of moving financial capital and physical resources around the world at almost any point in time.¹¹

Terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, frightens both leaders and citizens. It is a disease that is spreading, its cure is unknown. Controlling terrorism will require new mechanisms of cooperation -both nationally and internationally - between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Effective action must be simultaneously defensive and offensive and inevitably requires some compromise of civil liberties.¹²

There is also the issue of potential targets, as terrorist groups are not limited in selecting a potential target in the same manner that states are; by which a terrorist can select a target and move into position with greater ease and a less likely chance of being noticed than a military force attempting to attack a target, but targets must always be chosen wisely and we should not be misled by current U.S. actions to believe that it is the only targets for terrorist groups.

The United States is in a relatively unique position, as it is currently the world’s only political, economic, and military superpower. While this does make it a prime potential

¹¹Interestingly, as the resources that transnational criminals use are essentially protected by the state itself, the state has access to the same resources as well as traditional law enforcement which is an essential resource when attempting to locate and eliminate terrorists groups in a democratic state.

¹²Deutch, 10.
target for terrorist groups, it is not the only country that suffers from the threat of terrorism. Statistically, in 1996 only 25 percent of terrorist attacks were against the U.S., either government or civilian targets, while more than thirty other countries were victims of terrorism, the worst cases being Great Britain, Israel, Peru, and Sri Lanka. From a U.S. perspective, this fact seems irrelevant in light of the events of September 11, 2001, but the logic behind presenting such data is not to dismiss the tragedy of September 11, but rather to draw attention to the reality that many countries have had to deal with the problem of terrorism prior to September 11.

From this assessment there are two key issues that need to be addressed. First, that terrorist groups have the ability to act on an international level and second, and the more disturbing aspect of terrorism, is the potential that terrorist groups will make use of weapons of mass destruction. There have been reports alleging the sale of nuclear weapons components from the former Soviet Union in previous years. More importantly, this highlights that many governments have not truly considered; how serious the threat of a chemical or biological attack could be on a civilian population. Both of these types of weapons are easy to manufacture and can have horrifying consequences for civilian populations. The concern over the use of biological weapons as a means of terrorist warfare was confirmed after September 11 by the spread of anthrax through the U.S. postal system.

The use, or potential use, of these weapons does give rise to controversy, as one could come to the conclusion that there is a very strong possibility of much larger attacks than the ones witnessed thus far, while at the same time, one could take the position that this type of speculation is nothing more than paranoid propaganda which is more dangerous than the

13 Ibid., 10.
14 Ibid., 12
15 Ibid., 12.
actual weapons themselves. Regardless of the actual threat that these new weapons pose today, it is the threat for the future that is of concern.

The one thing that has not changed is that the new weapons of terrorism are weapons that are affordable to organized groups, and many chemical weapons can be made from common pharmaceutical products, making them readily available. All that is needed is the will to disrupt society. The fear is that rather than a chemical or biological attack on a population, a more devastating attack could occur against a nation’s national reserve, or on a primary trading post such as the New York Stock Exchange. A non-violent attack may consist of damaging computer systems with viruses, or rerouting financial transactions. An attack on such targets may not damage a great deal of real property or kill or injure many people, but it would severely damage national finances, and potentially the infrastructure that supports it. The threat of economic terrorism has become increasingly important to an emerging global system of economic integration. If economic stability can be shaken in one area of the world, there is the potential to disrupt the entire economic flow of the participating global community. Of course, not only are economic systems in danger, but the economics behind terrorist activities have changed considerably, as outlined in Table 1(p. 101).

Using the working definition as outlined above and looking at some of the weaponry that can be used, it is now necessary to look towards the Middle East and try to understand the function of terrorism in this region. The primary reason for looking at this region is the fact that it exemplifies the issues of radical terrorism and the ideology that follows it, as

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17 Ibid., 401.
well as acting as a base of operations for many extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda. It also becomes significant when examining current initiatives and approaches by the U.S in dealing with international terrorism.

**Fundamentalist Islam in the Middle East**

"One man with beliefs is equal to thousands with only interests." John Stuart Mill had the right idea when making this remark. Islamic fundamentalism is not directly related to terrorism or terrorist groups, but unfortunately it is the relatively small group of religious crusaders who make the most noise and ultimately have influence over the outside view of the Islamic world. The purpose of highlighting fundamentalist Islam in this paper is that the evidence relating to the incidents on September 11, 2001 are the result of Islamic fundamentalists sponsored by various states. One of the many things that leaders do to utilize Islam to their advantage is to use passages from the Koran. "Wars come to provide martyrs and that God may prove those who believe" and "Paradise is only to be attained when God knows who will really strive and endure."

There have been large amounts of money that have come from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other Gulf States over the last several decades that has led to the construction of madrasas (Islamic schools) and mosques, as well as the organization of Islamic charities, many of

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21 Ibid., 38.
which are influenced by fundamentalist ideology. In atmospheres such as these, it is taught that one should become a soldier of God and a martyr in order to enter heaven. In this light, terrorism has become an honourable fight against Satan. In modern militant Islamic politics, the Satan is the United States, and it is the duty of all faithful Islamic people to rise against Satan and save the values of Islam.

On February 23, 1998, Al-Quds al-Arabi, an Arabic newspaper published in London, printed the full text of a “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.” According to the paper, the statement was faxed to them under the signature of Osama bin Laden, a Saudi terrorist leader wanted by the U.S. The statement reveals a version of history that most Westerners will find unfamiliar. Bin Laden’s grievances are not quite what many would expect. The declaration begins with an exordium quoting the more militant passages in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, then continues,

Since God laid down the Arabian peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it with its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have spread in it like locusts, crowding its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure; and this at a time when the nations contend against the Muslims like diners jostling around a bowl of food.

The statement goes on to talk of the need to understand the situation and act to rectify it. The facts, it says, are known to everyone and fall under three main headings; first there is the U.S. presence in the Gulf states which have been, “...plundering its riches,

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23 It is an oversimplification and a gross distortion of the Islamic faith to imply that all of these schools are based on the distorted teachings of fundamentalist ideology.
24 Wright, 37.
26 Ibid., 14.
overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people..."\textsuperscript{27} The second issue is the U.S. policy towards Iraq which has inflicted, "...immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands of the Crusader-Jewish alliance..."\textsuperscript{28} As for Bin Laden, the U.S. actions against Iraq are also part of a larger conspiracy by Christians and Jews to persecute and destroy Muslims, which is a third issue. Bin Laden believes that the U.S. has focussed attention on Iraq in order to divert attention away from the Jewish occupation of Jerusalem, which stems beyond Iraq and into the ambition to destroy or incapacitate Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.\textsuperscript{29} These crimes, the statement declares, amount to "a clear declaration of war by the Americans against God, his Prophet, and the Muslims."\textsuperscript{30} Interestingly, to coincide with modern objectives, bin Laden also discusses the fall of the Caliphate in Spain in 1492 as a key event in the decline of Islam, blaming this on the Crusades. From this, some insight is gained as it can be seen that bin Laden appears to think in centuries, not years; bin Laden thinks far into the future as well as drawing from the past. Continuing, the declaration states that when enemies attack the Muslim lands, jihad becomes every Muslim's personal duty. After quoting various Muslim authorities, the letter then proceeds to the final and most important part of their declaration, the fatwa, or ruling. It holds that:

To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until the Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the Haram Mosque [in Mecca] are freed from their grip and until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, incapable of threatening any Muslim.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 16.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 16.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 16.  
\textsuperscript{30} Seabrook, 61  
\textsuperscript{31} Lewis, 19.
Bin Laden's view of the Gulf War as American aggression against Iraq is not entirely unfamiliar, but it is widely accepted in the Islamic world. For holy warriors of any faith, the faithful are always right and the infidels always wrong, whoever the protagonists and whatever the circumstances of their encounter.

To most Americans, the declaration is a travesty, a gross distortion of the nature and purpose of the American presence in Arabia. They should also know that for many, perhaps most Muslims, the declaration is an equally grotesque travesty of the nature of Islam and even of its doctrine of jihad. The Quran speaks of peace as well as of war. The hundreds of thousands of traditions and sayings attributed with varying reliability to the Prophet, interpreted in various ways by the ulema, offer a wide range of guidance. The militant and violent interpretation is one among many. The standard juristic treatises on sharia normally contain a chapter on jihad, understood in the military sense as regular warfare against infidels and apostates. But these treatises prescribe correct behavior and respect for the rules of war in such matters as the opening and termination of hostilities and the treatment of noncombatants and prisoners, not to speak of diplomatic envoys. The jurists also discuss, and sometimes differ on, the actual conduct of war. Some permit, some restrict, and some disapprove of the use of mangonels, poisoned arrows, and the poisoning of enemy water supplies, the missile and chemical warfare of the Middle Ages, out of concern for the indiscriminate casualties that these weapons inflict. At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder. At no point do they even consider the random slaughter of uninvolved bystanders. Nevertheless, some Muslims are ready to approve

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32 Ibid., 6.
33 Seabrook, 65.
34 Ibid., 66.
35 Ajami, 7.
and a few of them to apply, as is evidenced by the acts of September 11, the declarations’ extreme interpretation of their religion. Remember that terrorism requires only a few.

**Understanding the Roots of Terrorism?**

Although an overarching understanding of all of the potential root causes of terrorism is extremely difficult, there are a number of key issues that tend to be referred to: corruption, undemocratic measures/system, gender issues (health and education), poverty, and political goals. Lois T. Flaherty presents some of the common characteristics of, what she refers to as, radical movements.

1) There is a sense of futility that anything other than extreme measures will work.
2) Destruction of the existing world order is seen as necessary.
3) Compromise and power sharing are rejected.
4) A new world order is envisioned.
5) The end justifies the means.
6) There are impatience and a sense of urgency.
7) The prospect of violent change has its own appeal. 36

To add to this, Flaherty also presents a single primary factor that has contributed to the overall rise in terrorist activities; tolerance and passive support. 37 This idea places the blame largely on the spread of social movements, expansion of freedom of speech, and the allowance of more aggressive, if not violent, protest in the Western world. This analysis, although offering some insight into the impact of globalization on the ability for the mobility of ideas and people, still does not adequately address the key social issues that are of significance in the growth of a fundamentalist mentality, particularly in the Middle East.

Another approach that focuses on the role of the state deals with the concept that when corruption and undemocratic measures exist within a host state, it plants the seeds of social

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37 Ibid., 34.
unrest, leading to the reinforcing of points 2, 3, and 4 in Flaherty’s analysis. Individuals are drawn to terrorism at the national level in order to retaliate against government measures which are viewed as illegitimate or unfair. It would seem then that this does not explain why terrorist groups would target democratic societies such as the U.S. In reality it does help to understand the perspective of terrorist groups that oppose the growth of the “modern state” and the U.S. specifically as the powerful leader in the international order. To return focus again to the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, the attack is not simply on democracy, but rather on the secularization of states in the international order, and the external imposition of the removal of religious law and leadership from political organization. In this context, fundamentalists use terrorist tactics primarily due to the power position that they are in, and as such, attack the greatest target of interest, the U.S. This idea leads one to the conclusion that Middle East terrorism is based out of religion above all other motives. At the same time it should be recognized that states such as Saudi Arabia seem to be unable to provide futures for their young citizens, a majority of whom are well educated through the resources of the state, which has shown to lead to social unrest within the state and a sense of hopelessness in their position in the world.

Shifting motives again, one of the critiques of modern scholarly material in understanding terrorism is that the roots of terrorism lie in what are often deemed to be gendered issues that are of national concern. By gendered issues, this does not

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specifically pertain to issues of woman’s rights, but also issues of health and education which are often overlooked in traditional strategic studies, but which cannot be left out of an examination of terrorism. These issues, in turn, cannot be separated from the larger issue of poverty. From a development theory standpoint, the key to this is the “North-South Gap”, the huge and growing economic disparity between wealthy and non-wealthy states. From an economic standpoint, this disparity and any negative social or cultural effects can be overcome through increased economic integration and interaction, but as integration and interaction between the West and the Middle East has not been entirely successful, the Middle East has become marginalized rather than engaged in the process. Unfortunately, this has largely led to the increase in the North-South Gap. Since September 11, many political leaders, including President Bush, have made the link between poverty and terrorism both in the Middle East and around the world. This concept, though, brings a great deal of uncertainty, as in the case of September 11 the hijackers were not particularly poor. It is for this reason that a distinction needs to be made between terrorist leaders, who are often born enjoying higher standards of living and educated in some manner, and the activists who carry out their missions. The activists who carry out their missions, are often from lower classes but will also include some middle class individuals, and a final group, the supporters of terrorist groups, who are often minorities in disadvantaged situations. This distinction does not detract from the theory that poverty and terrorism are linked, but rather helps to clarify the linkage.

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43 Ibid., 67.
45 Ibid., 27.
The key issue in relating poverty and terrorism, specifically in the Middle East, is the ability of the disadvantaged or even the middle class to obtain education outside of a religious model. In cases like Saudi Arabia, the government specifically built and funded mudrasas to relieve pressure on the state to provide education. This is not to infer that all religious schools have a negative in influence, but rather to emphasize that Middle Eastern terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism are inexplicably joined. As such education is of great importance, also coinciding with the perception of the few escapers; those individuals who can leave their country or region for higher levels of education, at the expense of the minority, which is perpetuated by the West.\(^4\) Poverty and its relation to terrorism is extremely complex, and should not be underestimated, but its overarching effects are difficult to identify and pinpoint.\(^5\) Poverty can also be viewed in terms of the relative economic deprivation of a state, and although there have been extensive efforts made to work with developing nations,

The 'purely' economic prescriptions of the IMF, World Bank and WTO have repercussions far beyond the merely economic sphere: they profoundly affect social relationships, culture, religion - no area of life remains untouched. Many people see in these a fundamental assault on the sensibility and tradition of the people; a form, indeed, of the very fundamentalism which they call forth in response, and which is met with astonished incomprehension in the West.\(^6\)

The people that become involved in fundamentalist activities see the West as infiltrating the culture and values of Muslim countries. The result of this pattern is a cycle of misunderstanding, hatred, and fear.\(^7\) This cycle is very similar to the cycle that was seen

\(^4\) Elnur, 58.
\(^6\) Seabrook, 60.
earlier with the security dilemma, which demonstrates how little progress has been made in this area. At the same time, there are considerations that must be recognized that are not economic. For example, it would seem that the Taliban did not appear to be too concerned about social or economic welfare as long as the people obeyed the theological state structure that had been organized in Afghanistan.

A final view of the roots of terrorism, specifically with regards to September 11, 2001, reviews the proclamation by Osama bin Laden outlined in the previous chapter. This declaration, although textured with religious language, is primarily a political statement. As such, one could interpret the root of terrorism in this instance to be largely political in nature, using the means and tools available to an organization that is militarily weaker.50 In this assessment, all of the characteristics of Flaherty’s analysis are demonstrated as the actions were extreme and, in the minds of the terrorist organization, the actions were needed and justified in order to create change in the Middle East. From this point of view the sources of discontent are politically and economically motivated.

1) The failure of Muslim postcolonial nationalism in the mid-Cold War period.
2) The oil production politics that artificially inflated the theological status of Riyadh’s ultraconservative Wahabism.
3) The Iranian Revolution of 1979, which raised the status of fundamentalist politics in general
4) The Afghan veterans’ shift to jihadic salafism, as opposed to Saudi Sheikism.51

This concept of political fundamentalist Islam carries with it clear goals and ideas of discontent. As such, it is an approach to terrorism that can be more easily identified and

understood in Western terms than the previous roots of terrorism. It is the combination of all of these root causes that allows for an understanding of terrorism, not simply any one on its own. A potential flaw in understanding terrorism is to believe that all terrorists and terrorist groups, in this case Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, share the exact same ideology, suffer from the same discontents, and desire the same outcomes. As such, only by examining all areas of potential roots of terrorism can any understanding be reached.

Realist Approaches to Terrorism

By focusing attention at only one level of understanding of terrorism, the ability to deal with the problem becomes elusive. Realists, unfortunately, suffer from the vice of perspective, as the realist view is most inclined to see the political Islamic agenda as not simply the root cause, but the only practical purpose of terrorism. As such, for a realist, the root of terrorism stems from political motivation, which in the realist realm denotes the desire to gain power and influence over territory and its population or to defeat an adversary in the political and economic order. As a result of this perspective, a simplistic solution presents itself; the destruction of the enemy, in this case the political Islamic agenda and its proponents. By eliminating the organized political threat, the threat of terrorism is decreased, and the disruptive influence that this group has to the balance of power in the international system is eliminated. This type of response is directly linked to the traditional realist goal of destroying a state’s means and motivations to wage war. There are two details that need to be worked through a little further though.

From a realist perspective, terrorist actions must be coherent and planned uses of force with rational agendas, goals, and outcomes. This is necessary for the realist understanding as well as being needed in order to calculate and apply an appropriate military response to
the threat. The second detail that needs to be addressed, and confuses the realist understanding, is that although it may be possible to recognize and identify terrorist actions in military terms, often their goals and objectives are not simply military in nature. The goals of terrorist groups, as have been discussed to this point, do have political and geostrategic influences, but this may not always be the primary motive for their engagement. As a result of this, a realist military response, based on attacking military bases and command networks, does not necessarily address the root of the problem of terrorism. This is not to infer that the realist approach does not offer potentially viable responses to the terrorist threat, but rather that there is a need to explore alternative means of dealing with the problem of terrorism in the Middle East. Also from the realist standpoint, there is the assumption that rationality will ultimately come into play, where seeing the ability of other states to use greater military force can act as a deterrent. If all states are utility maximizers, then the threat and intimidation of the use of force is a viable option for deterring the terrorist threat, but as has been witnessed, terrorist groups do not seem deterred by the power of the U.S. or any other state.

From this, a realist typological response can be created in order to gain better insight to potential realist responses to terrorism. The use of military force against states and state actors is the first point of departure. Second, by eliminating the primary target, the threat is ultimately neutralized. Third, the goal of maintaining power and position within the system of states is essential, and as such, the goal is not simply to eradicate terrorism, but also to ensure that the power status quo is maintained. Fourth, the use of alliances are optional, and are only necessary when the threat is greater in militaristic power than that of the state.

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52 It is also important to recognize that since the use of military force is not necessarily seen as desirable, the use of intelligence gathering, and the ability for police to arrest and imprison terrorists could be seen as a acceptable action beyond the use of military force.
Fifth, that controlling the means of violence, and in this instance the ability to obtain or produce weapons, can solve the security threat. Sixth, increase national power in order to deter or act with force. Lastly, that the threat of the use of force is always a positive deterrent. To conclude the discussion on the realist response to terrorism it should also be acknowledged that as noted in the previous section, state sponsored terrorism is but one variant in the terrorist threat. Realists tend not to focus on forms of terrorism that have roots or purposes outside of the state, and it is this issue that is of concern when addressing the U.S. War on Terror that will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Liberal Approaches to Terrorism**

A liberal perspective on terrorism, much like the realists, is based on a certain set of principles which allows for only a limited set of assumptions surrounding the causes, and as such, dealing with the problem of terrorism. The key distinction between liberals and realists is that liberals may decide to use military force, but are more likely to approach the problem with a focus on alternative means, as a direct military action can disrupt the international system which is already in a state of anarchy. One of the initial difficulties in identifying potential approaches for liberals in dealing with Middle East terrorism has been addressed in the previous chapter, the problem of a liberal scope that is often too broad and diverse. Yet, there are still some basic assumptions that can be presented. First, the role of international cooperation; the liberal approach recognizes that any attempt to deal with a problem as large as terrorism, even if only focused in one geographical region, requires multinational cooperation, which is easily obtained, as many states will benefit from dealing with this problem. The second aspect that should be addressed is the role of

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53 It is important to note that police and intelligence agencies can be a resource and that alliances between military and non-military operations do not necessarily always exist.
international law, and in the non-theoretical construct, the role of the United Nations. This diversity does play a role in any attempt to deal with the problem of Islamic terrorism, but before solutions can be presented, there is also the issue of how the problem is interpreted. As such, liberals look much more extensively at the various root causes as explanations of terrorism.

From this, a liberal typological response can be created. First, the use of violence, although a method that can be used, is used only as a last resort once all other avenues have been explored. Liberals have faith in human nature and the ability for progress, and would therefore emphasize the promotion of education, the provision of adequate social structures, and genuine democratic participation by the population. Two, the use of diplomacy is viable and necessary. Three, working with individuals and groups as well as coordinating efforts with the state and between states are all necessary to achieve success. Fourth, long term solutions, including the use of multinational organizations and international law, are viable and preferred over the use of force; as well, international organizations provide legitimacy to resorting to force. Fifth, violence is not a deterrent.

**Options for Fighting a War Against Terrorism**

One of the initial difficulties in waging “war on terrorism” is that terrorism is not a state or an individual. In order to overcome this initial obstacle, there has been a great effort to create a public identification with what might be called traditional war figures. This has been done by focusing on state sponsored terrorism, in order to create a clear and well

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54 It should be noted that multinational cooperation is often based on initial ideological similarities between states, i.e. states that agree with each other on the use of military force to deal with terrorism will cooperate. See, John M. Owen, IV, “Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy,” *International Security,* Vol. 26 Issue 3 (Dec. 2001): 117-143.

55 This is an important distinction from realism as presented in the previous section. The idea that intimidation or the threat of violence as a deterrent is not viewed as having the same ability to deter in liberalism as it is in realism.
defined enemy that can lead to recognizable outcomes; as such, key figures have been identified as "leaders" of terrorism, such as Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Jong Il for current initiatives, in the past the focus has been on Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi as well as others.\(^5^6\)

The United States is in a unique position in the international system, as it has the ability to use multiple tools to deal with complex international problems such as state-sponsored terrorism. "The components of counterterrorism policies are fairly standard throughout the world. They include public policy, diplomacy, law enforcement, public security, intelligence, and the use of force, including covert action."\(^5^7\) The U.S. has the ability to use international organizations, such as the United Nations and NATO, and the listed resources are compatible with realist policy, the distinction lies within the underlying understanding of how institutions can be used and to the ends being sought. Through international organizations there is the potential to use political, economic, and military sanctions on states that are supporting terrorist groups.\(^5^8\) To bolster this, the U.S. can also choose to impose such sanctions unilaterally due to its political, economic, and military superiority in the international system. In either case, this type of approach can be classified as a coercive diplomatic effort to deal with other states. The alternative is to use organizations such as the UN and NATO to engage in military operations, and again, the U.S. does have the military capacity to engage in such activities unassisted, to a large extent. The question then becomes, in relation to current U.S. policy, what do these options mean for the U.S.?

\(^{56}\) It is important to note the state sponsored terrorism is one variant of terrorist actions as other types of terrorism do not necessarily focus on or rely on the state. State terrorism is being focused on in this study as it relates to the U.S. War on Terror that will be outlined and discussed in Chapter 3.


\(^{58}\) The creation of the CTC under the UN is responsible for implementing monitoring UNSCRES 1373 as well as other measures of countering terrorist activities. [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/action.html](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/action.html) (Last Accessed April 22 2004)
Deterrence has been a key element to U.S. policy. Deterrence is used in international relations to, "...contain the aggressive behavior of an opponent state through the threat of retaliation." The theory of deterrence of course relies on the basic assumption of rationality that indicates that a state will not be willing to engage in violent conflict if it is going to suffer large scale losses that outweigh the potential returns or benefits. Such a theory generally has two applications. The first application is where one state keeps another state from acting in an unacceptable way by demonstrating that it has a position of strength over the aggressor state. The second application of the theory is where a state threatens its opponent with dire consequences if it does not comply with certain demands or does not stop doing particular deeds. The Libyan raid in 1986 and more recently, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, appear to fit the second application of the theory.

Deterrence theory rests on three primary premises. The first, that unacceptable damage, requires that a state must be able and willing to deliver great harm upon its opponent in order for the opponent to actually be deterred. The second is that the threat has to be perceived by an opponent. Thirdly, the threat must be credible to succeed. Credibility, in turn, comprises two elements: that the country making the threat is capable of delivering the "dire consequences" and that it has the will to do so. Until the attack on Libya, the theory of deterrence had been applied almost exclusively to military matters, although these particular attacks could also be seen as retaliatory. The U.S. administration stated that

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60 Ibid., 149.
62 Cohen, Realpolitik, 150-152.
63 Ibid., 152.
the raid against Libya would become a warning, signaling to other nations that sponsored international terrorism that they could now expect to receive the same punishment for their involvement, punishment that had previously been reserved for the terrorists themselves. States sponsoring or aiding terrorism, the Reagan administration warned, would hereafter find it counterproductive to their interests to be involved. This would seem to be the same logic that the current Bush Administration is intending to use. The question is, will it actually be effective?

There have been a number of UN attempts to create solutions to stop international terrorism. The 1973 General Assembly Resolution of Measures to Prevent International Terrorism One was probably the first UN resolution or idea that had significant potential to deal with the issues. Unfortunately, as with many UN initiatives, there was little consensus on how this resolution was to be used, primarily due to the complexity of the problem and the inability to formulate a universal definition of what exactly terrorism is. The only real focus of the UN with regards to terrorism has been on the issue of hostage taking and how to deal with that particular problem, but in the grand scheme of things, the UN's attempts to deal with terrorism have not directly dealt with the roots of the problem nor have they attempted to directly deal with terrorist groups. This is perhaps why the UN put forth a resolution to deal with terrorism after September 11, 2001, most significantly leading to the creation of Resolution 1373 “mandating the formation of the Counter Terrorism Committee CTC.”

65 Ibid., 67.
67 Ibid., 481.
There are provisions for state intervention or invasion through the UN Charter, Chapter Seven. Unfortunately, this issue is not always clear. When first considering the notion of intervention, one must be aware of the issue that intervention is in fact a breach of sovereignty\(^69\), the most important right of a state and of the international system. It is on this issue that Articles 77 and 78 of the UN Charter limit any interference to territories that are not defined as states, that ultimately disqualifies any UN member states.\(^70\) Even more importantly, "Article 2(7) also poses difficulties in intervention in matters directly within the domestic jurisdiction of a state."\(^71\) There is the possibility to override Article 2(7) by "...the mandate to intervene in response to threats to peace and acts of aggression as set out in Chapter 7."\(^72\) This has been a key element of the U.S. argument for UN involvement in the war on terrorism. However, even with this mandate, there is not a similar mechanism to override Articles 77 and 78 of the Charter. This ultimately creates a paradoxical situation, as even when intervention is legitimate due to its cause, the sovereign integrity of the state must be maintained. One issue that should be noted is that the UN Charter only specifically addresses the use of direct intervention, indirect forms of intervention are less restricted. With all of this stated, it should be emphasized that the UN was intended to make possible the prevention of war.\(^73\) Ironically, one of the most simplistic solutions for dealing with terrorism is to depoliticize the international response to terrorism all together.\(^74\) If the UN is

\(^69\) "Effective rule within a state. The principle of sovereignty holds that the state is the highest political authority and exercises the right to conduct its domestic affairs without external interference." Canadian International Relations. Daniel Madar, *Canadian International Relations*, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 2000): 356.


\(^71\) Ibid., 68.

\(^72\) Ibid., 69.


\(^74\) Long, 107.
used or perceived as a political institution, then it cannot be independently effective in
dealing with terrorism. Conversely, if the UN is used or perceived as a non-state actor, then
it could be very effective in dealing with the roots of terrorism that are not focused on the
state.

From the presentation of these options, they can be framed in realist or liberal models
for combating international terrorism. First, the use of deterrence, although potentially
fitting into both realist and liberal models, can be seen to have greater connection with the
realist approach as demonstrated through U.S. actions. Deterrence could be seen as liberal
if alternative deterrents were used beyond the threat of violence. The use of the UN and
international law can be seen as clearly liberal in nature, as it also combines the use of
diplomacy and state cooperation. The concept of intervention becomes the option that is
most cross-listed between realist and liberal as the concept of intervention can be viewed
from two perspectives. The use of intervention can be done under many directives, such as
humanitarian intervention or as a force overturning a government. The distinction between
liberal and realist can be seen in these two scenarios, as liberals may be more inclined to
use intervention under humanitarian efforts where realists may be more inclined to use the
term intervention for the purpose of regime change. The key distinction is that liberals are
more likely to use intervention in a cooperative effort, where realists are likely to use
intervention unilaterally if they have the means to do so.

Terrorism as Understood by the United States

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75 It is important to note that liberals were in favour of war in Iraq under the guidelines of humanitarian aid and
intervention, but were not as supportive of the prospect of removing WMD's. See Michael Ignatieff, "Human
Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism," Social Research, Vol. 69 Issue 4 (Winter 2002): 1137-1158 and
73-74.
The Department of Defense released a report in January 2001 on proliferation and the terrorist threat, focusing on the combination of states, organized groups, and individuals working together against the U.S. and U.S. targets.

The terrorist threat of today is far more complex that that of the past. Violent, religiously and ethnically motivated terrorist organizations now share the stage with the more traditional, politically motivated movements. State sponsors, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba, continue to provide vital support to a disparate mix of terrorist groups. As recent history shows, homegrown organizations and disaffected individuals have also demonstrated an increasing willingness to act on U.S. soil. Not only is the threat more diverse, but the increasing sophistication of organizations and their weaponry also make them far more dangerous. The Oklahoma City and World Trade Center bombings have already demonstrated the devastating effects of conventional explosives in the hands of terrorists.\(^{76}\)

This type of approach to the terrorist threat is ambiguous, as it does not clearly define an "enemy" or a "strategic target" to deal with the problem, which is often the approach of the U.S. and a classic realist response. The threat as explained above is more clearly defined and presented many times as "asymmetric warfare".\(^{77}\) In the FY2003 Program, there are no clear definitions of enemies or targets, but rather initiatives to secure the U.S. state from terrorists and other enemies. The fundamental problem with this approach is that it is difficult to defend borders from threats that are not identified, or possibly identifiable; this approach to dealing with the perceived terrorist threat also transcends into the international arena. Although such an approach does potentially leave the opportunity of understanding and recognition of non-state threats and non-state actors, which may more accurately define


modern terrorism, the U.S. has not focused on this aspect. As such there are two separate, yet interconnected issues: First, that the U.S. is lacking a clear definition of threats and enemies. Second, regardless of any academic definition, the complexities of putting any such definitions into real-world scenarios and actions, is extremely difficult, but is still necessary if anything is to be done. As a result of these two issues it can be stated that although there are initial flaws to the U.S. approach to dealing with terrorism and that these flaws are challenging to overcome. The key to this approach is the perception that the terrorist threat is organized through leadership and state sponsorship, and as such, removing leadership and state sponsorship is a viable solution to the problem.\(^78\) Through the creation of an Office of Homeland Security, there has been an increased effort to combine the resources through cooperation with police and intelligence agencies, but this is ultimately a defensive measure and does not actual “deal” with the problem of terrorism as much as attempts to protect the state and prepare for potential attacks making the efforts reactive in nature. This will have significant implications for later analysis.

The U.S. believes that by targeting specific terrorist leaders and state sponsors, the problem of terrorism will be reduced if not resolved. It is for this reason that the U.S. has engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This approach to dealing with terrorism is an excellent example of the U.S.-realist approach to security issues. It is important to note that the 9-11 Commission Report made recommendations not only on issues of dealing with terrorism abroad, but also emphasized that greater cooperation was needed between law enforcement agencies at all levels to coordinate their efforts in

\(^{78}\) Cordesman, “Defending America”, 23.
intelligence gathering and in arresting and prosecuting terrorist supporters in the U.S.\textsuperscript{79} Again, as stated above, such efforts have been implemented and there have been a number of arrests in the U.S. of suspected terrorists, but ultimately this is a reactive and defensive strategy that does not actually attempt to deal with any of the root causes of terrorism. As such, although these policies are valid in that they protect the state and its citizens, it is not a policy that moves a war against terrorism forward as it only temporarily eliminates part of the threat. Modern terrorists like bin Laden think in terms of decades and centuries, where defensive measures can only defend against the threat of the day without long term political will to continue to invest in them.

A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies outlines many reasons for concern of proliferation of WMD’s in the Middle East. In the first sections of concerns, the primary issue is the increasing inability of the U.S. to secure its own supplies as well of supplies of former Soviet states, and to ensure homeland security. This is where the relationship to terrorism becomes clear, as a single act of terrorism that involves WMD does not necessarily cost a great deal and requires a very small number of participants to inflict a maximum number of civilian casualties. To create further difficulties, a small group of terrorists using WMDs can perform an operation with limited ability to be detected, which again increases the inability to achieve security. To further complicate this analysis of reasoning, there is a relatively clear link between proliferation and terrorism in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere. The then Director of Central Intelligence, George J.

Tenet, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 6, 2002 and presented his arguments concerning the reasonability of terrorist groups using WMD in future terrorist attacks. "Although the September 11 attacks suggest that Al-Qaeda and other terrorists will continue to use conventional weapons.... As early as 1998, Bin Laden publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was 'a religious duty'."\(^{80}\)

There is no contention that the West must defend itself by whatever means will be effective, but in devising strategies to fight the terrorists, it would surely be useful to understand the forces that drive them. One must also question the means and methods through which dealing with terrorism has recently occurred. The fundamental question that will drive this entire debate for the next decade will be; have the Bush administration's initiatives against Afghanistan and Iraq successfully weakened the existing terrorist infrastructure? Or have these initiatives only incited a stronger sense of hostility and animosity against the United States and the Western world?

\(^{80}\)Ibid., 8.
Chapter 3

A REALIST APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR AGAINST TERROR

September 11, 2001 clearly demonstrated one thing, that the U.S. was completely unprepared for a terrorist attack of such magnitude on U.S. soil. In conjunction with this “security institutions of the U.S. federal government are particularly ill-suited to deliver homeland security.” As such a new grand strategy was needed, on both the national and international levels. On the national level, it has been stated that the counterterrorism effort is a positive first step, but such efforts need to be long term in their scope and funding. Such an approach can be seen as a domestic form of defensive realism. On the international level, for such an effort as eliminating terrorism, the U.S. needs to maintain diplomatic ties. In other words, “The United States needs friends, and thus must prioritize among its many foreign policy and defense policy initiatives, because these initiatives have frequently antagonized other governments and peoples.” In any case, the end goal, as much as it may be political, is to establish a sense of safety and security within the U.S.

The Bush Doctrine

To begin a discussion on the Bush Doctrine, it is necessary to first understand how it differs from previous administrations’ approaches to foreign policy issues. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Bush Doctrine has four distinct features; first, the NSS places global terrorist networks and “outlaw” regimes as a primary threat to the security of

3 Ibid., 51.
the U.S. and a threat to international peace and stability. This is significant, as previous U.S. foreign policy largely dealt with U.S. relations with other major powers in the international system. With this the strategy also argues that the policies of deterrence and containment are no longer sufficient. Second, the NSS focuses on the dominance of military force in the international system in order to ensure security. Third, the NSS promotes cooperation among the great powers for the purpose of pursuing the war on terror. To clarify this point, it is not simply cooperation, but rather cooperative management of the international system under the leadership of the U.S. Fourth, the NSS seeks to remove the root causes of terrorism, a focus that includes the global spread of free markets, democracy, and the removal of leaders deemed unfit. These points are of great significance in comparison with the understanding of the causes of terrorism by the U.S. and the specific cases that will be examined in this chapter.

The strongest and clearest guidelines for U.S. foreign policy were presented in President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union Address when he stated his first two primary objectives, of “ridding the world of terrorism”, and defining and defeating the axis of evil. These two defining points presented a clear direction of the administration, but there was some uncertainty about how these goals could be achieved. The states that defined the axis of evil, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, all have histories of diplomatic ties with the U.S. The

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6 Ibid., 21.
7 Ibid., 22.
8 Ibid., 23.
10 It should be noted that the degree of cooperation and “friendship” between these states and the U.S. does vary, as in the case of North Korea, the diplomatic relationship has been tense, if not antagonistic, relationship as the U.S. is still technically at war with North Korea. In the case of the other states on the Axis list, the historical relationship with the
only distinction among these countries is that of the 1991 Gulf War directed against Iraq, by then President George H.W. Bush Sr., with the approval of the United Nations. The axis of evil concept does highlight the administration’s understanding of terrorism and the terrorist threat. The perceived threat is taken in very broad terms and does not necessarily limit itself to terrorist groups or organizations, but expands on the threat by presenting the “potential” for the connection between a state and terrorist groups.

A clear point of the Bush Doctrine is that it calls for preemptive measures\(^{11}\) to deal with security threats. In his speech at West Point, President Bush stated, “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”\(^{12}\)

This logic is extended and articulated in political terms through the NSS,

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s new adversaries.\(^{13}\)

Of course, the NSS does not address the UN Charter, as if asserting that the concept of “customary right of self defense”, as it existed prior to 1945, remains equally applicable today.\(^{14}\) From this directive, three assertions that are implicit aspects of the Bush Doctrine can be defined. One is the use of “preemptive strikes” against states that threaten the

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\(^{11}\) For a brief review of preemptive versus preventative war, refer to Chapter 1 pg 6.
security of the U.S. The second assertion is that the use or role of the UN is not of significance to U.S. security and policy initiatives. The third assertion is that the state of the international system has not changed significantly since 1945, and the means of dealing with threat also has not changed significantly.

Another controversial aspect to current U.S. foreign policy is the character through which it has been designed. Being referred to as “morality-based” and “faith-based” foreign policy, there is some concern over the use of George W. Bush’s “moral vision” to guide foreign policy planning.\(^\text{15}\) This moral character has been seen many times in a number of statements by President Bush: “Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” “God is not neutral in this conflict between freedom and fear, justice and cruelty.” “Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. America will call evil by its name.”\(^\text{16}\) This character was highlighted most significantly in the declaration of an axis of evil. Defining evil is a moral, rather than a quantified strategic or political observation; this seems to fit into the concept of democratic realism. There is some concern that the Bush Doctrine, in combination with a moral vision, may be manipulating genuine faith with nationalist ideology. This is of great significance, as this would seem to be one of the methods used by the terrorist organizations that are being examined in this study. It has even been suggested that one of the early reactions to the international acceptance of the War on Terror was to use the opportunity to deal with all of the U.S.’s enemies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.\(^\text{17}\)

When stated independently this could sound like a strategic initiative, but if it were

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 38-39.
\(^{17}\) Posen, 54.
perceived to have been influenced by a moral agenda, then the War on Terror could appear to be a War on Islam. This type of moral vision does again affect the U.S. understanding of terrorism, the terrorist threat, and the ideals for dealing with terrorism, but must be cautiously weighed when discussing specific policy options employed by the U.S.

**U.S. Objectives for the War on Terror**

President Bush has made clear on many occasions that the war on terror will be a long war and a war that will be “fought on many fronts”. The goals and objectives were set out very clearly in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism – February 2003*, which called for defeating terrorists and their organizations; denying support, sponsorship or sanctuary to terrorists and ensure that other countries follow this same goal; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defend U.S. interests at home and abroad. This is referred to as a 4D strategy (defeat, deny, diminish, and defend). Each of these goals contains several objectives within it, and the policy does not only focus on states or state sponsored terrorism, but this is clearly the emphasis of the policy. Under the first goal, of defeating terrorists and terrorist organizations, there are three key tasks; identify terrorists and terrorist organizations, locate terrorists and their organizations, and destroy terrorists and their organizations. The emphases on this section is placed on improving intelligence and intelligence capabilities, improving the use of law enforcement, and improve the use of special forces and other military arsenals. It is important to note that the use of national law enforcement, an agency often considered lower on a scale of importance to the FBI, is recognized and can be utilized as a power resource. Within the

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19 Ibid., 16-17.
goal of denying sponsorship, there are five key goals; end the state sponsorship of
terrorism, establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to
combating terrorism, strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism,
interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists, and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and
havens. This section briefly details how to work with, enable, persuade, and compel states
to work with the U.S. on this goal. The third goal, of diminishing the underlying conditions
that terrorists seek to exploit, has two key objectives; partner with the international
community to strengthen weak states, and win the war of ideas. This goal focuses on
issues of development and democracy in order to improve the lives of those less fortunate
and allow for an outlet for those who are exploited or abused. The final goal, of defending
U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad, is the largest and consists of key objectives;
implement the national strategy for homeland security, attain domain awareness, enhance
measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of critical physical and
information-based infrastructures at home and abroad, integrate measures to protect U.S.
citizens abroad, and ensure an integrated incident management capability. The section
addresses several of the issues that are presented in the previous sections, such as
intelligence gathering, the use of law enforcement and other emergency agencies, and
working with the international community. This section actually does not present issues of
dealing with terrorism, as much as it deals with preparing for a potential terrorist attack.

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20 The document specifically identifies seven key sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North
Korea, and Sudan. Ibid., 18 In an interesting turn of events, through Sudanese cooperation during the war in
Iraq, the U.S. has lightened its policy towards Sudan.
21 Ibid., 17-22.
22 Ibid., 22-24.
23 Ibid., 24-28.
When combining the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism – February 2003, with the Bush Doctrine, a clear, but still contrasting, picture is created. The Strategy is a largely defensive document, emphasizing the use of intelligence networks and the support of the international community and organizations. The Bush Doctrine, by comparison, is a much more aggressive approach to dealing with the issue of terrorism, as it focuses on offensive measures to ensure security. It is in this example that a distinction can be seen as U.S. policy advisors tend to act as defensive realists, where the Bush administration tends to act as offensive realists. Although this is a distinction, in the grand scheme of U.S. policy this distinction can be viewed as two parts of a single policy in dealing with the terrorist threat. It is of importance to note that in both sets of policies, that the state is the primary actor\(^{24}\) and that states are ultimately the focus for either engaging or defending against terrorism. As such, these policy documents and statements lead to the conclusion that the U.S. approach to dealing with terrorism is largely realist in design and application. At the same time, it should be noted that characterizing U.S. foreign policy in general terms as offensive is also dangerous in light of the creation of the Office of Homeland Security. Ultimately it can be seen that there is a tension between the current administration and many policy advisors, and that a universal label is too simplistic.

The Case of Afghanistan: A Realist-Multilateral Approach

When terrorists attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, President Bush indicated that action would be taken against those responsible. This took the form of a campaign on many fronts, including military action, anti-terrorism legislation, international co-operation in matters of extradition and intelligence, and moves against sources of

\(^{24}\) Even though law enforcement and intelligence agencies are significant resources, they are ultimately a part of the states power resource and as such are not non-state actors.
funding for terrorism. The action had the aims of bringing to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks and defending the U.S. against further attacks. It was directed against terrorists and states harboring terrorists.\textsuperscript{25} Afghanistan was targeted for this very reason, as the Taliban government was harboring terrorists.

Afghanistan has long been a geopolitical and military point of contention. During the Cold War period, due to primarily geographical reasons, there was contention over the region between Soviet and American political influences. As Afghanistan represented a key strategic location between the USSR, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, there was competition between the U.S. and the USSR. The Soviets wished to expand the Communist empire to the ocean while the U.S. wanted to limit any such expansion. The distinction in this proxy war was the use of money to buy support rather than through direct military action.\textsuperscript{26} The Soviets did physically engage in Afghanistan in 1979, but with the support of U.S. dollars and military supplies, the Soviets encountered greater resistance than was expected.\textsuperscript{27} The Soviet invasion lasted until 1989, and had a devastating effect on the country until it was agreed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to stop funding and providing weapons to Afghan troops, which gave rise to a potential settlement and peace to the long civil war.

In the midst of struggles for leadership within the country, the Taliban seemingly arose from thin air in 1994. The Taliban became a force in Afghanistan to fight against the mujahedeen who had not brought stability to the region; and perhaps more importantly had

failed to open the supply lines from Central Asia.\textsuperscript{28} Newspapers like The New York Times only deemed the Taliban worthy of newsprint months after it had become the dominant presence in southern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{29} The rise of the Taliban was accompanied by optimism as they promised two things: “security and an end to the conflict between rival mujahidin groups that continued to wrack Afghanistan through the 1990’s”.\textsuperscript{30} Such promises could be accepted due to the desperation of the population who had experienced nothing but war and violence for decades. It was in the backdrop to this fighting that the Taliban arose, not only in Afghanistan but also among Afghan refugees and former mujahidin studying in the madaris of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{31} Ahmed Rashid conducted interviews with many of the founders of the movement in which they openly discussed their distress at the chaos afflicting Afghanistan. After much discussion, they created their movement based on a platform of restoration of peace, disarmament of the population, strict enforcement of the shari’a, and defense of the “Islamic character” of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{32} Mullah Muhammad Umar, an Afghan Pushtun of the Ghilzai clan and Hotak tribe who had been wounded toward the end of the conflict with the Soviet army, became the movement’s leader.\textsuperscript{33} Where does Osama bin Laden fit into the picture? The Taliban and bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network had retained distinct identities. Only in 1996\textsuperscript{34} did bin Laden relocate from refuge with the Sudanese

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., A3.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{34} Refer to Appendix 1 for a timeline of key events in Afghanistan.
government to the Taliban’s Afghanistan. Bin Laden caused some confusion for Afghanistan watchers as the Taliban, recognized as the government of Afghanistan only by neighboring Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, sought to break its isolation. As well, the Taliban continued to shelter bin Laden, even after his involvement in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

After September 11, many analysts wondered why the Taliban continued to host and protect bin Laden despite the international hostility that he brought with him to the regime. The answer to this lies within the history of the Taliban and the small amount of resistance that it continued to encounter from troops that had been trained and supplied by the U.S. during the 1980’s. As well, although the Taliban used the language of jihad, a majority of the front line fighters were peasants and did not completely accept Taliban control over their own lives. Bin Laden had brought with him to Afghanistan an experienced, well trained, and extremely loyal group of soldiers exceeding 2,000. While many of these troops trained in the al-Qaeda camps for terrorism, it is believed that several hundred of these soldiers were made available for duty on the frontlines of the Taliban’s war. The central concept of all of this is that the primary focus of the Taliban was the war with the Northern Alliance, not recognition or acceptance from the U.S. or the rest of the international community.

After September 11, the al-Qaeda network was identified as the culprit for the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. For two years the Taliban had been subject to a UN Security Council Resolution demanding that it surrender bin Laden to justice and cease

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36 Ibid., 14.
its support for international terrorism.\textsuperscript{37} The Taliban government did not comply or recognize the UN Resolutions, allowing bin Laden’s influence on the Taliban leadership to grow, and his terrorist activities to continue, culminating in the September 11 attacks.

Following these attacks the U.S. reiterated the demand that the Taliban surrender bin Laden to the U.S. and after a period of debate, and consultations among Afghan religious leaders, the Taliban leadership declined to comply. Military action began, under the code name Operation Enduring Freedom, on October 7, 2001.

The objectives and goals of the operation were clear, first, to capture Osama bin Laden, and second to permanently end Afghanistan’s role as a base for terrorist groups. This required the use of military force to overthrow the Taliban government as well as reconstruction efforts to create, “...a stable, effective and ideologically moderate Afghan state.”\textsuperscript{38} The stated framework for achieving such goals includes the creation and establishment of a political process that has the approval of the major contenders for power, as well as the Afghan people. This all leads to the promotion of a democratic pluralist Afghan state as the key to successful reconstructive efforts.\textsuperscript{39} The first stage of the process was to begin with the forced removal of the Taliban.

The United States and the United Kingdom made the necessary notifications to the UN Security Council that they were acting in self-defense.\textsuperscript{40} The U.S. stated that its defensive actions would, “...include measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 23.

\textsuperscript{40} This is granted through UN Resolution 1373 (2001): \url{http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement} (Last Accessed January 13, 2002)
installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.” It also stated that “further actions” might be required “with respect to other organizations and other states.” President Bush described the wider campaign against terrorism in terms that might also apply to the military action:

Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success.43

He also spoke of a conflict to be won by “a patient accumulation of successes.”44

The military action involved air strikes and special forces operations, and was coordinated to some extent with moves by Afghan forces opposed to the Taliban. Initially, the United Front, a group of factions known informally as the Northern Alliance, made gains in the north, west and center of the country. Later, anti-Taliban fighters in the south, provoking widespread defections and surrenders, complemented their efforts. The Taliban fled Kabul on November 13, 2001 and their control of territory was quickly reduced to one major city, Kandahar, and a few outlying pockets. The surrender of Kandahar came on December 7, 2001.45

At this point it would be beneficial to briefly review the successes and failures of the military campaign in Afghanistan. The direct military campaign was fairly successful, as the U.S. and its allies were able to overthrow the Taliban and destroy many terrorist training camps. Where they have not been successful in the military campaign has been in

41 Letter from Ambassador John Negroponte, Permanent Representative of the USA to the UN in New York, to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/946, October 7 2001.
42 Ibid.
their ability to capture Osama bin Laden. The capture of bin Laden is of great importance to the war in Afghanistan and to the greater war on terrorism, as bin Laden acts as an organizer and figure head for terrorist and radical Muslim groups. Also, since the invasion into Afghanistan was based on the need for "justice", the key component to success in Afghanistan, as well as the war on terror, would be the capture of key figures such as bin Laden.

The beginnings of the next stage of the operation, the reconstruction effort, is considerably more complex than the military operation, as often the reconstruction effort overlaps with several military efforts occurring in the country. A good starting point is to look at the negotiating of a political and legal framework for the future of Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany. The UN convened talks in Bonn in order to establish an interim administration, which would govern Afghanistan while efforts were made to establish new constitutional arrangements of a lasting nature. Four groupings attended the talks, and they agreed on an Interim Authority, to be led by Hamid Karzai, a former deputy foreign minister and a tribal leader from the majority Pashtun ethnic group. The predominantly Tajik Jamiat-e-Islami, part of the Northern Alliance, took the foreign affairs, defense, and interior ministries. An international force has been mandated by the UN to provide security, initially for Kabul and possibly for other areas as well, until indigenous security forces can command confidence in these tasks.\(^{46}\) The Interim Authority was only to run the country for six months, during which time a Loya Jirga (a meeting of tribal, political and religious leaders) was convened. This appointed a Transitional Authority, which will govern until democratic elections are held, no more than two years later, although elections were

delayed in March 2004 until September 2004. During the period of the Transitional Authority another Loya Jirga convened, in January 2004, to write a new constitution, and ultimately granted strong presidential powers.47

While the reconstructive efforts were underway, the initial driving force for targeting Afghanistan, the hunt for Osama bin Laden, continued. By December 10, 2001, the search for Osama bin Laden and his operatives continued, with the focus centered on the Tora Bora cave complex in the east of Afghanistan.48 U.S. bombers mounted heavy raids on the area, and anti-Taliban forces, aided by British and U.S. Special Forces, moved up significant numbers of men and tanks. Reports suggested that surrender may have been negotiated with some elements of al-Qaeda.49 Attention then turned to the possible next phase of the campaign against terrorism, which involves targeted military action against suspected al-Qaeda infrastructure in other countries.

President Bush gave the following comments on terrorism in his Pearl Harbour Day speech on board the USS Enterprise on December 7, 2001:

We’ve seen their kind before. The terrorists are the heirs to fascism. They have the same will to power, the same disdain for the individual, the same mad global ambitions. And they will be dealt with in just the same way. Like all fascists, the terrorists cannot be appeased: they must be defeated. This struggle will not end in a truce or treaty. It will end in victory for the United States, our friends and the cause of freedom.50

The air campaign in Afghanistan resembled a conventional operation comprised of two main stages. The campaign began with the targeting of al-Qaeda and Taliban air defences, command and control facilities, air bases and training camps. This was followed by

47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
daylight raids carried out by jet fighters against ‘targets of opportunity’ such as military vehicles, and by bombers against defense emplacements around major cities such as Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif.51

On December 6, 2001 it was announced that Pashtun tribal leaders had held talks with senior Taliban commanders and reached agreement on the surrender of the city of Kandahar. Taliban fighters in the city, and in the towns of Spin Boldak and Lashkargah, had already begun to lay down their weapons on November 7, 2001. The Taliban’s former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, said the decision to surrender had been taken to “save the life and dignity of Afghans.”52

An amnesty was agreed for those Taliban fighters willing to dissociate themselves from al-Qaeda terrorist activities, although the status of the top Taliban leadership, in particular that of Mullah Muhammad Omar, remained unclear. Mullah Zaeef insisted on December 6 2001 that Mullah Omar’s, “…life will be saved and he will be allowed to live with dignity.”53 The Bush administration declared it would not tolerate any amnesty for Mullah Omar, and on December 7, Dr Karzai stressed:

We have made it very clear that Mullah Omar has associated himself with terrorism and he has not yet made any statement that would disassociate him from terrorism. So he does not fall in the category of people who have security [under the amnesty agreement].54

As the demise of the Taliban regime became apparent, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, began consultations on a future

51 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
dispensation for the country. He carried out a range of consultations, including with Afghans living abroad, and visited Pakistan and Iran before making proposals to the Security Council.

With the fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance in mid-November, the UN had stepped up its efforts to secure agreement on a broad-based government. On November 20, 2001 it was announced that all the major groupings had agreed to attend a summit in Germany, in spite of pressure from former president Burhanuddin Rabbani for the talks to be held in Kabul. The venue for the summit was switched from Berlin to the Petersberg complex outside Bonn at the instigation of Mr. Brahimi, who believed the talks would have a greater chance of success in a more secluded location. The delegates that began arriving in Bonn on November 27, 2001 included representatives from four main Afghan groupings: the various factions of the Northern Alliance; the Rome Group composed of associates of former king Zahir Shah; the Peshawar Group of Pashtun tribal and religious leaders based in Pakistan; and the Cyprus Group of non-Pashtuns with close ties to Iran. The delegates also included some women, although several key figures, including Zahir Shah and Mr. Rabbani, were not in attendance.

After a week of negotiations, the Bonn summit culminated in the adoption of an agreement on the future governance of Afghanistan, with specifics for the next two years. The UN Security Council endorsed the Agreement in its Resolution 1383 of 6 December 2001. White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer said that,

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57 Ibid.
58 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001, annexed to letter from UN Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/1154, 5 December 2001.
the President is very pleased with the agreement that’s been reached on Bonn concerning the future of the Afghanistan government. He believes it is a positive agreement that bodes well for the people of Afghanistan.  

Ambassador James Dobbins, U.S. Special Representative to the Afghan Opposition, commented on factors which may have encouraged success at Bonn. He concluded that a greater level of U.S. involvement, the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbours to rebuild and maintain peace in Afghanistan, the immense amount of reconstructive resources available that have not existed before, and the fact that the Afghan people want peace, have all lead to the success at Bonn and the general good will in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Blair described the Agreement as “a remarkable achievement” and set it in the context of the campaign against terrorism, that although there was some original doubt about what would replace the Taliban, whether it would be better or worse, the international community and the many ethnic divisions within Afghanistan have come together and agreed upon a provisional government, a system of democracy, and basic representation. Prime Minister Blair said that the UK would be prepared to supply troops for the international security force and that he would “consider very carefully” a request to lead it. Prime Minister Blair also suggested that this decision should involve discussion in the House as well as in Cabinet, and said that,

I see every advantage of one country providing the main elements of headquarters of this operation - something the United Kingdom has done very well in the past.

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59 “Bush Pleased with Afghan Agreement on Interim Government”.  
60 Press Briefing on Afghanistan, US Department of State, December 7 2001,  
61 United Kingdom Parliament, House of Commons Debate, December 5 2001,  
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011205/debtext/11205-03.htm (Last Accessed February 13, 2002).  
According to the BBC, army sources said that "they favour Britain providing ground troops and helping to set up field headquarters in an operation which could involve up to 2,000 personnel." The Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, Bruce George, said on December 10, 2001:

> It would be wrong for countries who have been willing the end of this conflict to not participate in some form of force afterwards. But certainly I would not envisage them wandering around the country becoming targets to anyone who dislikes a non-Muslim presence in Afghanistan. So it will be fraught with danger, and that is why the Government should think very carefully about whether to deploy and how many to deploy.\(^6^4\)

The planned deployment is not a UN peacekeeping force, with strictly limited rules of engagement, but a force mandated by the UN still remaining under national command; ISAF. Similar arrangements have been used in a variety of situations, from the allied coalition in the Gulf War to the Australian-led Interfet force sent to East Timor to restore order after the referendum there in 1999. These operations are not without risk, but in volatile situations troop contributors often prefer the slightly greater freedom of action which they allow, and in particular the opportunity to avoid the sometimes entangling bureaucracy which can accompany a UN peacekeeping operation.

At this point, the operation in Afghanistan has had some successes and some failures. The U.S. has achieved its goal of changing the government which harboured terrorists and changing the political process in Afghanistan, at least on the surface. Unfortunately, the ability of the rotating military forces in Afghanistan to control the means of violence has been less successful, as troops are still frequently attacked. There is also no clear documentation or recorded evidence that the general population is consistently more


\(^6^4\) Ibid.
pleased with the current state of the country then prior to the removal of the Taliban, or that societal norms and policies have significantly changed since their departure. There has also been the ongoing problem of capturing or killing Osama bin Laden, which was the original motivating force behind targeting Afghanistan as a starting point in the war on terror. Bin Laden’s significance in the war on terror cannot be understated, as he has acted as a leader and organizer of terrorist actions around the world. With reference to the long term goals of a stable democracy and economy, it is too soon to make any firm assertions, but with the continual delays in proposed election dates, the prospect of democracy is difficult for many to see. Also, without the ability to control a monopoly on violence within the state, it will be very difficult to create and stabilize a national economy. As well, from looking at the current primary focus of the U.S., Afghanistan has become less of an area of interest since the invasion of Iraq, in essence, leaving their objectives less than half completed. At the moment, Afghanistan has not been transformed into “…a stable, effective and ideologically moderate Afghan state.”, 65 and it will take considerably more time and effort than the U.S. has currently put into the process.

This portion of the war on terror has been a combination of realist and liberal approaches. Military force has been the dominant factor in achieving many of the goals that were set out. This has also been an operation that has focused almost entirely on “states”, with the focus on the removal of leaders of the state, the attempt to control the means of violence within the state, and eliminating opposition from both inside and outside of Afghanistan. The liberal approach has surfaced, or perhaps better noted as a liberal institutional approach that has surfaced, as this was a multilateral effort sanctioned by the UN Security Council. The UN also played a critical role in the provision of humanitarian

65 Cronin, 1.
relief and the rebuilding of a new Afghan state, where the UN has focused on social issues and structures for the new Afghan state. The ability for such success is likely the result of a combined international effort possessing UN legitimacy.

The mission in Afghanistan, based on the goals set forth by the U.S., is far from over. Beyond the initial goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime, a number of goals have not yet been achieved. In order to qualify this case as a successful example in the war on terror, certain initiatives need to be taken; these initiatives are based on the original goals that were set out by the U.S. First, the capture of Osama bin Laden, or at the very least the acknowledgment of his current location, is necessary. Second, the strengthening of the rule of law and the broader acceptance of the role and rule of government throughout Afghanistan is essential to any immediate or long term structural goals. Third, the inability to eliminate violent attacks against military personnel or the ability to create an Afghan army or police force ultimately means that the goal of creating a stable and independent state has not yet been reached. Based on not simply a lack of process, but rather a general lack of planning or foresight to the obstacles that exist would seem to demonstrate that the U.S. was more concerned with the military campaign than the reconstruction effort.

If the mission is examined based on the goals set out by the U.S. with regards to its war on terror, some successes can be seen. Based on the 4D approach presented earlier, it is evident that by removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, the U.S. has at the very least started the process of three of the four areas, destroy, deny, and diminish. The difficulty with this assessment, which is implied but should be clearly articulated, is that the process has really only begun. If there is not long term political will to assist in the security and rebuilding of Afghanistan, it is very possible for the roots of the problems to resurface,
for terrorists to begin to use the financial needs of a war torn Afghanistan, and then for
terrorist groups to begin operating within Afghanistan. With regards to the area of defense,
it is difficult to either prove or disprove that attacking al-Qaeda has made the U.S. safer and
more secure from terrorist attacks. The justification that this has made America safer would
fall under the Bush Doctrine and its principles of preemptive war for the purpose of
defeating an imminent threat, but this is assuming that Afghanistan was the threat. In terms
of preemptive war, attacking Afghanistan does not necessarily fit as it was labeled as a
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, but those attacks were not carried out by
Afghanistan but by bin Laden and his terrorists. As such, preemption is an elusive concept
when analyzing Afghanistan. Beyond the safety of the U.S., there is a general feeling that
the war on terror has not made the world safer, but has rather provoked and united radical
groups that might not otherwise work together. There is also the issue upon which the
invasion of Afghanistan was predicated, the capture of Osama bin Laden. The question that
remains unanswered and may never be answered is; does the capture or killing of Osama
bin Laden progress the war on terror? As stated earlier, bin Laden’s importance to the issue
cannot be underestimated, but it also seems unlikely that his capture or execution will act as
much more than a symbolic success. At this juncture, the U.S. has had some preliminary
success that does present a positive outlook for the future, but its successes are somewhat
limited and very fragile.

In a final effort to analyze the broader war on terrorism, one must ask where
Afghanistan fits into the war on terror. As has been demonstrated there was a link between
Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, and terrorism, but was Afghanistan a critical starting point?
There are potentially several starting points for engaging in a war against terrorism, but
Afghanistan does contain some logic. It also demonstrates inconsistencies within U.S. foreign policy. For example, there is criticism of the U.S. for not condemning the Sudan for its harboring of bin Laden or for its ongoing civil war and virtual genocide, but rather providing aid in order to use its airspace. Also, it has been stated by President Bush that it is necessary to win the hearts and minds of the people who are being “liberated”, which leads to the lack of reconstructive efforts. If a war on terrorism is to be fought on the level of ideology and perception, then military action would seem to be the completely incorrect approach to winning such a war, and would rather incite resentment towards states that seem to not understand Muslim culture or faith, and are ultimately perceived as conquerors.

**The Case of Iraq: Realism at its Finest**

Confrontation between the U.S. and Iraq is not a new phenomenon, most visibly demonstrated through the initial Gulf War in 1991. The distinct difference between that military conflict, and the conflict that is currently occurring, is that the 1991 Gulf War was sanctioned and supported by the United Nations. The tension between Iraq and a majority of the western world never calmed as the UN continually passed resolutions condemning Iraq’s actions, also clearly indicated by the U.S. and British bombings of Iraq in 1998, 1999, and 2000. A former ally to the U.S., Saddam Hussein was clearly no longer supported by the U.S. administrations of the post Cold War period.

A U.S. led invasion of Iraq was, for many, not a great surprise. The fact that the Bush administration made its first priority in 2000 to find an approach to overthrowing the Iraqi

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66 See Appendix 3 of this paper for a timeline of key events in Iraq.

government\(^68\), left little doubt that in 2003 the U.S. would finally act on its initiative. By comparison, the actual military events that have occurred in Iraq seem somewhat more simplistic than the military activity that had occurred, and is still occurring, in Afghanistan. The complexities of the situation with Iraq are a result of diplomatic relations among a number of states and the United Nations.

President Bush declared his intentions to deal with Iraq when he distinguished the regime as one of the three members of the axis of evil and in his January 2003 State of the Union Address.

Our nation and the world must learn the lessons of the Korean Peninsula and not allow an even greater threat to rise up in Iraq. A brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.\(^69\)

In this speech President Bush alludes to the twelve years of “deception” and the violation of international law\(^70\) and presents this as a reason why Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and security.\(^71\) At an even earlier stage in the debate, at the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President Bush made his argument to the world, in an attempt to convince skeptics on the Security Council.

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq’s regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purpose of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be met – or action

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\(^70\) See appendix 3 for an outline of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iraq.

\(^71\) “President Delivers State of the Union”
will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.\(^2\)

The prospect of invading Iraq was argued as protecting international peace and security due to the threat that Iraq posed with its WMD. In order to appease the UN, on November 18, 2002, Iraq allowed an initial team of UN weapons inspectors back into the country, with more to come over the next several months, in order to fully inspect the entire state for compliance of all UN resolutions regarding the post Gulf War military situation. During this period of time, there was a great deal of debate among the five permanent members of the Security Council as to whether or not invading Iraq was necessary or appropriate. The strongest opposition came from France and Germany, orienting a ‘coalition of the unwilling’, while Great Britain again proved to be the U.S.’s strongest ally heading the ‘coalition of the willing’, and Canada seemed to lead a ‘coalition of the silent’. Despite a number of diplomatic attempts to convince opponents, particularly France, Germany, and Russia, the U.S. continued to face opposition and decided not to take a vote of the UN Security Council, and instead presented the recommendation for UN Weapons Inspectors to leave Iraq on March 16, 2003.\(^3\)

A key issue that needs to be addressed is why the U.S. bothered to engage with the UN over this an invasion of Iraq. Unfortunately there is no clear answer, but liberal institutionalism offers several inferences. Some of the possibilities are that the U.S. felt that it needed the UN’s approval for issues of legitimacy on the international and national levels. The U.S. may have assessed a monetary and logistical need found in a large

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coalition, particularly if it was believed that rebuilding Iraq would be a long term project. It can also be determined that the U.S. was obligated to maintain the approach presented in the Strategy, which specifically involved the coordination of the international community, and uses UN resolutions to create precedents for its policies. Perhaps, most pessimistically, the U.S. simply needed time to organize and prepare its troops for the invasion process. Most likely, a combination of these reasons as well as others played a role in the decision to pursue a UN resolution.\textsuperscript{74} Regardless of the reasons, the fact that the initiative was taken in a vigorous fashion does have implications for the future. It does not matter which perspective one chooses as either way the U.S. made it abundantly clear that it would attack Iraq with or without a UN resolution.

The goals that were set forth by the U.S. with regards to Iraq were relatively straightforward in nature, removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, locating and destroying any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and creating a democratic government. The first two goals were clearly the focus of the administration, and attempts at using international law as the basis for an invasion into Iraq\textsuperscript{75} were made. The case for invading Iraq has since come under close scrutiny as the WMDs and terrorist training camps that were supposedly in Iraq have not yet been located, and as a result of the invasion, terrorist groups have emerged within Iraq. In conjunction with their third goal, of creating a moderate and democratic Iraq, this also falls into the more general policy of creating a more moderate,

\textsuperscript{74} It is interesting to note that originally French President Jacques Chirac was contemplating participating, but realized that opposition to the operation would increase his national popularity. It can be inferred that President Bush used the process of the UN for similar reasons.

stable, and Western-friendly Middle East. The approach to achieving these goals are
simple as well, the use of military force to remove Saddam Hussein and ensure that any
WMDs are accounted for and secure. The outline for the transition of power to an Iraqi
government has also been clearly articulated by the Bush administration, detailing five
steps:

1. Hand over authority to a sovereign government;
2. Help establish the stability and security in Iraq that democracy requires;
3. Continue rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure;
4. Encourage more international support; and
5. Move towards free, national elections that will bring forward new leaders
empowered by the Iraqi people.

The transfer of power occurred on June 28, 2004 with the installation of Prime Minister
Iyad Allawi as the head of the interim government and free elections took place on January
30, 2005. Iraqi's voted for representatives in a 275 member Transitional National
Assembly resulting in a victory for the coalition known as the United Iraqi Alliance.

However it has not been made clear when U.S. military personnel will actually leave Iraq.
As well, it should be noted that although these steps have been presented as end goals, there
has yet to be a presentation of the means and plans to achieving these goals. The majority
of the focus of the Bush Administration was on the military assault on Iraq and the capture
of Saddam Hussein. The steps outlined here deal primarily with reconstruction efforts, but
they do not address the problem of terrorism or its roots, which was a large part of the U.S.

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initiative to begin with. A brief overview of the military campaign and how it has met its set goals is necessary.

To enhance the U.S. and British intention of engaging militarily in Iraq, on Tuesday March 18, 2003, President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to enter into exile within 48 hours (March 20, 2003), or the United States would engage in a full military invasion of the Iraqi state. On March 21, 2003 British and American land forces entered Iraq, taking control of areas bordering Kuwait and parts of the Faw Peninsula. British marines seized several southern oil export facilities and U.S. armored columns pushed further into Iraq towards the Rumaila oilfields. About 7 oilfields were set on fire by Iraqi forces. U.S. Special Forces began conducting significant operations with Kurdish units in the north of Iraq. A primary objective of Coalition forces was to take control of oil wells before they could be sabotaged by Iraqi forces. Twenty one days after the first movement of troops entered Iraq, on April 14, 2003, U.S. and British forces took control of Baghdad; a key military victory. On May 1, 2003, President Bush announced the combat operations in Iraq had ended, the announcement coming several weeks after the expected completion date of combat operations. Even after the presented completion of combat operations and the capture of Saddam Hussein, ongoing violent resistance continues to present itself to coalition forces, as a continually higher rate of U.S., British, and allied casualties occur.

The military operation to this point has had some success as Saddam Hussein has been removed from power and captured. Where the goals stated to justify the campaign have failed lies in two key areas, intelligence and stability. The military campaign was presented and justified by the accusation of the existence of WMD's in Iraq, but no WMD's have been found and the supposed weapons depots and mobile chemical/biological units have ultimately been non-existent or completely false. In the area of stability, Iraq is almost at a state of civil war, as resistance continues to grow and prove to be an insurmountable obstacle. As well, the instability that has been created within Iraq has lead to the creation and infiltration of terrorist groups; groups that did not exist in Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion. Although the immediate military campaign was successful, the reconstruction period has been fraught with difficulties.

Looking at the reconstruction effort in Iraq, there have been many difficulties. An interim government was organized, elections were held on January 30, 2005, and the process of rebuilding the state has begun, although there are still key elements of the states development which have not been fully addressed; primarily security. The original scheduled date that had been set for the transition of power to the Iraqi interim authority was November 15, 2003, but was ultimately delayed until June 28, 2004. When will free elections be held? How long will the U.S. be willing to suffer military loses in Iraq, before fully removing troops? These questions will have a tremendous impact on the overall development of the state, and have the ability to cause the future of an independent Iraqi state to succeed or fail. There have been media announcements about potential elections, but there is some uncertainty as to when such elections could happen. There is also a great deal of concern over the outcome of any elections in an ethnically and religiously diverse
state, where the means of controlling violence is not yet available to any state actor. The reconstruction effort has also faced the problem of not being able to secure and maintain contracts for rebuilding critical infrastructure, as contractors and employees of constructions firms have been kidnapped and executed, and has forced some companies, and worse yet, some countries to remove support for rebuilding Iraq.

The operation against Iraq has been primarily unsuccessful; this is largely dependent on an assessment of the initial goals set forth by the U.S. From a positive perspective, the U.S. goal has been achieved through the capture of Saddam Hussein, and the transition of power is in process. From a negative vantage point, although Saddam Hussein has been captured, no WMDs have been discovered, and the transition of power over to a new Iraqi government has been met with difficulty as it has become increasingly difficult to ensure security. The other problem that presents itself when trying to ascertain success or failure, is that the U.S. has presented a time line for the transition of power and rebuilding of critical infrastructure that extends into 2005, but based on the experience of Afghanistan, the timetable that the U.S. has set out does seem to lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure for the future of Iraq. It is through this linkage that the realist approach to foreign affairs by the U.S. can be seen. In both the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq a realist approach has been emphasized and the planning and foresight for the reconstruction effort seems to have never been fully worked through. As such, many unanswered questions still remain with regards to the reconstruction effort in Iraq.

The operation against Iraq, based on the goals set forth by the U.S. in the broader context of the war on terror has been questionable. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the validity to the claim that Iraq was in fact a terrorist threat does create some difficulty in
presenting any strong conclusions. What can be argued is that the U.S. has been successful in destroying the government and military in Iraq, but the ensuing instability has made it possible for terrorists to use Iraq as a base of operations and for the transfer of weapons and money. Where the U.S. has been unsuccessful is in the context that they have not been able to diminish the root causes or limit the resistance to the occupation of Iraq, and as such is unable to defend U.S. personnel in Iraq. Based on this, the war in Iraq has not been tremendously successful, nor has it significantly progressed the broader war on terror and reveals the U.S. over-emphasis on realist style military tools as a means of achieving its objective.

**Conclusions**

Several key elements have been drawn out in this chapter; first, that U.S. policy is largely dominated by realist policy prescriptions; second, that the war on terror has only had limited success; and third, as a result of the first conclusion, that the war on terror has been dealt with using primarily a realist model of action. The fundamental issue that needs to be addressed is the conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy has not changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. would still seem to perceive the solution to problems remaining in military matters, as can be seen through the approach taken with Iraq and Afghanistan. This means that a realist approach to international affairs is where the U.S. feels its interests lie, and can best be achieved. The issue that has yet to be truly decided upon is whether or not this approach to international affairs is actually sufficient for the U.S.’ or for any other states’ future security. The answer to this problem remains within the overarching structure of the international system. Since the international system is predominantly realist in nature, and countries continue to rely on realist means to react to other states and to events in the international system, using realism is not
necessarily an incorrect policy choice. What has been seen here is that although realist policy prescriptions have helped the U.S. achieve its immediate goals, it continually becomes more apparent that realist policies alone will not solve the problem of terrorism or rebuild the countries that have been devastated from this war and years of neglect. Although the Strategy that has been presented does include liberal policy aspects to it, these aspects only play a minor role in the grand strategy and have yet to be truly implemented. Ultimately the policies used to this point represent a combination of both offensive and defensive realism, with offensive efforts taking the lead in the initiatives. It seems that the defensive aspects of the U.S. are nationally based and have not been adequately included in the tactical efforts of engagement nor the reconstruction efforts.

The next critical concern has to do with the overall progress in the war on terror. The White House has released a progress report that details several key improvements as a result of the war on terror; progress in interoperability, planning for a better prepared America, sharing information more efficiently, developing and executing programs to increase preparedness, funding preparedness and streamlining an associated grant system, training for tomorrow’s challenges, strengthening America’s readiness and assets, and involving communities in the preparedness effort.\textsuperscript{83} The potential problem with this is that it is entirely referring to U.S. national security and does not address the issue of international terrorism. This document is also entirely defensive in nature, which again poses a problem when discussing the war on terrorism, as it does not seek to deal with the problem as much as it seeks to prepare for another terrorist attack. The other area of interest

is that this document displays the characteristics of realism, as it focuses entirely on the role of the state, and does not focus on issues of justice, social structures, or any of the aspects of the 4D approach as outlined in the National Strategy. Even in the aspects of law enforcement and intelligence, these are ultimately seen as a defensive resource for the state and although they can be proactive in potentially stopping a terrorist attack, it only delays the larger terrorist threat.

The final issue of significance is the choices of targets that the U.S. has made. The U.S. has attempted to make a direct link between Afghanistan and Iraq to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, having success in Afghanistan but not in Iraq. This ultimately leads back to the general understanding of terrorism by the U.S. One of the most important issues surrounding the case of Iraq is that one of the primary stated reasons that the U.S. engaged with military action is due to the fact that Iraq possessed WMD’s. This ultimately leads to the realist conclusion that the ability for a state to obtain and maintain a destructive military arsenal is a symbol of power, and the U.S.’s own emphasis on military power has helped to sustain this concept in the international system. This leads other states to the conclusion that WMDs equate to power in the international system.

As a result of all of this several concluding statements can be made. First, that the U.S. policy towards the war on terror does not adequately address the roots of the terrorist problem, and can in fact, instigate the creation of more terrorists. The focus on standard military strategies of engagement and defeat of organized armed forces style of “war” has led to the oversight of some of the most basic causes of terrorism such as poverty, a lack of a democratic style system of government, and other factors detailed in Chapter 2. Second, that the U.S. does not seem to have a long term focus on reconstruction efforts, but rather
has approached the issue of reconstruction with a focus on speed and the removal of U.S. troops. It should be noted, that the U.S. schedule for the departure of a vast majority of its troops and the complete hand over of power to the Iraqi government is for early 2005.  

Third, although military action can be appropriate in many situations for dealing with aspects of terrorism such as training camps, munitions facilities, and dependent infrastructure, military action alone is insufficient for dealing with the roots of the terrorist problem. As such a realist approach to combating terrorism will ultimately be insufficient, which may explain why the White House released a progress report that was heavily focused on defensive measures and preparedness for a future terrorist attack. To be fair to this issue, the White House progress report could also be seen as attempting to emphasize the parallel importance of non-military resources such as law enforcement and intelligence gathering. Finally, the massive monetary expenditure by the U.S. in the war on terror has made it virtually impossible to continue combating terrorism for the long term. Based on the basic economic costs of a military campaign, a predominantly realist approach compared to the costs of a predominantly liberal approach would seem to follow with the U.S.'s inability to continue with the war on terror. The conclusion that must be drawn from this is that, although realism does have a place in the fight against terrorism, it is insufficient and inadequate for the creation of international peace. Unfortunately, the U.S. war on terrorism has made the world more prepared for a terrorist attack, it has not made the world safer from it.

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84 This specified time period no longer seems plausible, and President Bush has set no specific timeline for the removal of troops from Iraq.
Chapter 4

CAN THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM BE SOLVED?

So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.¹

This thesis has demonstrated that although the international system of states is inherently realist and that the U.S. response to terrorism has been primarily realist as seen through the analysis of U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Iraq, the problem of terrorism cannot be dealt with only through realist means. The introductory chapter demonstrated that the international system can be characterized by realism and that the state system is still the dominant feature in international politics. It argued that power can still be measured through the ability of coercion, which gives credence to realist features of the international system. It has also been presented that a realist response is not the only approach that can be taken, as a range of potential liberal responses may actually address the deeply rooted problems of terrorism more effectively. This is not to indicate that a military response was completely unnecessary, but rather that a purely realist approach will ultimately be unable to achieve the stated goals of the U.S.

The flaws of the realist argument do create some difficulties; the persistence of American unipolarity, the rise of non-state actors as security threats, and an ethical agenda

in post Cold War politics are not explained through traditional realism.\(^2\) To dispute such an argument, one must recognize that the realist agenda of political action will ultimately create a system of states that are dominated by a single power, leaving little recourse for self interested, non-cooperative states to react, but this does not mean that a desire to gain power and influence over the international system ends. On the contrary, an international system dominated by a single power creates instability and as such a state becomes a clear target for non-traditional security threats. The result of an international system that is both realist and unipolar is the necessity for the less powerful to use liberal structures and institutions, as such, the most powerful state does not rely on international institutions, but uses them to create international consensus and legitimacy. All of this can be seen through the actions of the U.S. and its foreign policy decisions regarding its War on Terror. It is important to note, that although the international system itself may be realist in nature, it does not mean that there are no other alternatives to realist policy prescriptions for working within the system.

U.S. foreign policy, as discussed earlier, has a tradition of military action as a means of achieving its goals. It is at this point that the effect of causation becomes evident. The U.S. grew to be a superpower, and ultimately the only superpower, in a realist international system. Regardless of minor changes in structures or institutions, the U.S. continues to use a realist model of foreign policy, and in turn, helps in the perpetuation of the realist international system

Terrorism, perhaps like the international system, is largely characterized by perception. The perception that the U.S. has with regards to terrorism is that of a traditional realist. The

U.S. clearly defines its enemies and states which they are attached to, and focuses military attention on states which have been designated as terrorist threats. The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq reveal the limitations of the resort to force as the main means for combating the problem of terrorism. As demonstrated, the U.S. has historically used realist means for achieving its goals, but in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the broader war on terrorism, the use of military force alone has proved to be ineffective in eliminating opposition within these countries, and regardless of the number of soldiers that are in these countries, they are unable to provide security for the reconstruction efforts. The problem becomes increasingly complicated as the current focus on security threats stem from non-traditional threats to national security, which are not solely state centered in their application. The effect that the War on Terror and U.S. policy has had on the UN and the international system as a whole is in actuality not as great as some might indicate. It is argued that the legitimacy of the UN has not changed since September 11, 2001, for the very reason that the international system is realist.

Although the U.S.'s immediate goals in Afghanistan were partially realized, overall, the results of the U.S. led war on terrorism are inconclusive. It seems clear at this stage that the U.S. did not fully anticipate the resistance that it would receive when engaging Afghanistan and Iraq, and there seems to have been a lack of planning and foresight in the reconstruction process of these two countries. The failures in the reconstruction process unfortunately feed back into the initial root causes of terrorism, which then creates and continues the cycle of terrorist breeding. If one were to take either a purely moral or purely strategic analysis, or a combination of the two, more failures can be identified than successes. This does not mean that complete failure is inevitable; as it was stated earlier the
reconstruction of a country does take a considerable amount of time. What it does mean is that U.S. policy prescriptions are flawed and need revision, and that a realist approach to dealing with the problem of terrorism, although necessary in some cases, is not a sufficient long term solution.

It is important to note, that although this paper has argued that U.S. policy is realist, the specific policies of the current U.S. administration have compounded the problems in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have clearly misunderstood the essence of the problem of terrorism. An alternate U.S. administration, although likely relying on realist policy prescriptions, may have utilized resources differently and may have analyzed the problem and provided alternative solutions. This does not mean that the U.S. would not have invaded Afghanistan, or even Iraq; it simply means that the specific policies and approaches may have been slightly different.

The Future of Terrorism

Cooperative action is needed for the continuation of an effective war against terrorism. Given the situation today, it is reasonable to assume that the threat of terrorism still exists, unfortunately it is impossible to assess at what level and to what degree the threat exists. A strategy of 'pre-emptive war' is not a legitimate or effective approach to dealing with terrorism. If terrorism is to be isolated to states and state targets, then such a strategy does have its advantages, but this ultimately relates back to the issue of root causes. If the primary root cause relates to a lack of democracy, then the approach of eliminating non-democratic states has the potential to resolve the issue of terrorism. If the primary root cause relates to economic development, then an approach that involves economic aid and restructuring would seem more appropriate. If the primary root relates to political motivations, then an attempt to allow more views to be heard and allow for change might
have a more effective result; but as stated in Chapter 2, there are a variety of causes of terrorism often working in conjunction, which is why reliance on any one strategy is likely to fail. The problem is that none of these solutions can work independently, nor can they be implemented without large scale international political will. As it stands now, none of these problems have been resolved; although, it should be emphasized that a project of this scale cannot be expected to be fully effective in only two-and-a-half-years. This brings about the issue of what can realistically be expected in this relatively short period of time. Regardless, it is quite possible that U.S policies have made matters worse rather than creating solutions to the initial problems.

Rather than trying to define specific goals that should be met in order to measure success, the larger issue must be examined. Can the problem of terrorism ever truly be solved? Taking into account the root causes indicated in this thesis, a combination of approaches could potentially lead to the elimination of terrorism. The problem with such an assumption is that terrorism is often referred to as the weapon of the weak, meaning that one of the potential root causes that need to be addressed is the general distribution of power in the international political system to create greater levels of equality. This does not mean that the system must be multipolar in nature, but rather to recognize the dangers of a unipolar system with limited resources for less powerful states. So what type of approach can create the greatest opportunity for success?

Reliance on military force can deal with the problem of terrorism, but it alone cannot solve the problem. Unfortunately, terrorists often work in small groups and can work within a national system of security. The Patriot Act, although controversial, does make some attempt to resolve this issue, but diverges from the international approach. In the end,
finding terrorists can be reduced to police action, which is similar in concept but opposite
in application to the international effort. The U.S. strategy of pre-emption is comparable to
a police raid, but in the international context ultimately encompasses collateral damage and
a much larger commitment by a larger group of actors. Furthermore, the U.S., acting on its
own, is unlikely to be able to respond adequately to the threat of terrorism.

The international system is realist in nature, this has not changed since September 11,
2001, and the attempt at a “war” on terrorism and the actions used to pursue such a war
demonstrate this fact. This thesis has demonstrated, and as the U.S. administration is
belatedly discovering, a military approach will have to be combined with greater efforts at
multilateral collaboration together with a variety of tools for a strategy to respond to the
terrorist threat. Furthermore, the U.S. war on terrorism has not created a greater level of
world security and today terrorism is as great of a threat to U.S. and world security as it
was prior to September 11, 2001, and unfortunately the cycle of realist policy and action
seems to be unending.

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APPENDIX 1: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS: AFGHANISTAN

1991 - US and USSR agree to end military aid to both sides.

**Mujahedin Triumph**


1993 - Mujahideen factions agree on formation of a government with ethnic Tajik, Burhanuddin Rabbani, proclaimed president.

1994 - Factional contests continue and the Pashtun-dominated Taleban emerge as major challenge to the Rabbani government.

1996 - Taleban seize control of Kabul and introduce hardline version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic punishments, which include stoning to death and amputations. Rabbani flees to join anti-Taleban northern alliance.

**Taleban Under Pressure**

1997 - Taleban recognised as legitimate rulers by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Most other countries continue to regard Rabbani as head of state. Taleban now control about two-thirds of country.


1999 - UN imposes an air embargo and financial sanctions to force Afghanistan to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial.

2001 January - UN imposes further sanctions on Taleban to force them to hand over Osama bin Laden.

2001 March - Taleban blow up giant Buddha statues in defiance of international efforts to save them.

2001 April - Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, the second most powerful Taleban leader after the supreme commander, Mullah Mohammad Omar, dies of liver cancer.

2001 May - Taleban order religious minorities to wear tags identifying themselves as non-Muslims, and Hindu women to veil themselves like other Afghan women.

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2001 September - Eight foreign aid workers on trial in the Supreme Court for promoting Christianity. This follows months of tension between Taleban and aid agencies.

2001 - Ahmad Shah Masood, legendary guerrilla and leader of the main opposition to the Taleban, is killed, apparently by assassins posing as journalists.

2001 October - USA, Britain launch air strikes against Afghanistan after Taleban refuse to hand over Osama bin Laden, held responsible for the September 11 attacks on America.

2001 November - Opposition forces seize Mazar-e Sharif and within days march into Kabul and other key cities.

Taleban Falls

2001 5 December - Afghan groups agree deal in Bonn for interim government.

2001 7 December - Taleban finally give up last stronghold of Kandahar, but Mullah Omar remains at large.

2001 22 December - Pashtun royalist Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of a 30-member interim power-sharing government.

2002 January - First contingent of foreign peacekeepers in place.

2002 April - Former king Zahir Shah returns, but says he makes no claim to the throne.


2002 June - Loya Jirga, or grand council, elects Hamid Karzai as interim head of state. Karzai picks members of his administration which is to serve until 2004.

2002 July - Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir is assassinated by gunmen in Kabul. US air raid in Uruzgan province kills 48 civilians, many of them members of a wedding party.

2002 September - Karzai narrowly escapes an assassination attempt in Kandahar, his home town.

2002 December - President Karzai and Pakistani, Turkmen leaders sign agreement paving way for construction of gas pipeline through Afghanistan, carrying Turkmen gas to Pakistan. Asian Development Bank resumes lending to Afghanistan after 23-year gap.

2003 June - Clashes between Taleban fighters and government forces in Kandahar province leave 49 people dead.
2003 August - Nato takes control of security in Kabul. It is the organisation's first operational commitment outside Europe in its history.

2004 January - Grand assembly - or Loya Jirga - adopts new constitution which provides for strong presidency.

2004 March - President Hamid Karzai announces Afghanistan's first post-Taleban elections are postponed until September. Afghanistan secures $8.2bn (£4.5bn) in aid over the next three years.

2004 April - Fighting in northwest between regional commander and provincial governor allied to government. Twenty people, including two aid workers and a police chief, are killed in incidents in the south. Taleban militants are suspected. First execution since the fall of the Taleban is carried out.

2004 June - Eleven Chinese construction workers killed by gunmen in Kunduz.

2004 September - Rocket fired at helicopter carrying President Karzai misses its target; it is the most serious attempt on his life since September 2002.

2004 October/November - Presidential elections: Hamid Karzai is declared the winner, with 55% of the vote. He is sworn in, amid tight security, in December.

2005 February - Harsh winter weather is feared to have left hundreds of people dead.
APPENDIX 2: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS: IRAQ

Chemical attack on Kurds

1988 16 March - Iraq is said to have used chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabjah.

1988 20 August - A ceasefire comes into effect to be monitored by the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (Uniimog).

1990 15 March - Farzad Bazoft, an Iranian-born journalist with the London Observer newspaper, accused of spying on a military installation, is hanged in Baghdad. Iraq invades Kuwait

1990 2 August - Iraq invades Kuwait and is condemned by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 660 which calls for full withdrawal.

1990 6 August - UNSC Resolution 661 imposes economic sanctions on Iraq.

1990 8 August - Iraq announces the merger of Iraq and Kuwait.

1990 29 November - UNSC Resolution 678 authorizes the states cooperating with Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to uphold UNSC Resolution 660.

Operation Desert Storm

1991 16 -17 January - The Gulf War starts when the coalition forces begin aerial bombing of Iraq.

1991 13 February - US planes destroy an air raid shelter at Amiriyah in Baghdad, killing more than 300 people.

1991 24 February - The start of a ground operation which results in the liberation of Kuwait on 27 February.

Ceasefire

1991 3 March - Iraq accepts the terms of a ceasefire.

1991 Mid-March/early April - Iraqi forces suppress rebellions in the south and the north of the country.

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1991 8 April - A plan to establish a UN safe-haven in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds is approved at a European Union meeting. On 10 April the USA orders Iraq to end all military activity in this area.

1992 26 August - A no-fly zone, which Iraqi planes are not allowed to enter, is set up in southern Iraq, south of latitude 32 degrees north.

1993 27 June - US forces launch a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad in retaliation for the attempted assassination of US President George Bush in Kuwait in April.

1994 29 May - Saddam Hussein becomes prime minister.

1994 10 November - Iraqi National Assembly recognises Kuwait's borders and its independence. Oil-for-food

1995 14 April - UNSC Resolution 986 allows the partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and medicine (the "oil-for-food programme"). It is not accepted by Iraq until May 1996 and is not implemented until December 1996.

1995 August - Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Gen Hussein Kamil Hasan al-Majid, his brother and their families leave Iraq and are granted asylum in Jordan.

1995 15 October - Saddam Hussein wins a referendum allowing him to remain president for another 7 years.

1996 20 February - Hussein Kamil Hasan al-Majid and his brother, promised a pardon by Saddam Hussein, return to Baghdad and are killed on 23 February.

1996 31 August - After call for aid from KDP, Iraqi forces launch offensive into northern no-fly zone and capture Irbil.

1996 3 September - US extends northern limit of southern no-fly zone to latitude 33 degrees north, just south of Baghdad.

1996 12 December - Saddam Hussein's elder son, Uday, is seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in Baghdad.

1998 31 October - Iraq ends cooperation with UN Special Commission to Oversee the Destruction of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Unscom).

**Operation Desert Fox**

1998 16-19 December - After UN staff are evacuated from Baghdad, the USA and UK launch a bombing campaign, "Operation Desert Fox", to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes.
1999 19 February - Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, spiritual leader of the Shia community, is assassinated in Najaf.

1999 17 December - UNSC Resolution 1284 creates the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) to replace Unscom. Iraq rejects the resolution.

2001 February - Britain, US carry out bombing raids to try to disable Iraq's air defence network. The bombings have little international support.

2001 May - Saddam's son Qusay elected to the leadership of the ruling Baath Party, fuelling speculation that he's being groomed to succeed his father.

2002 April - Baghdad suspends oil exports to protest against Israeli incursions into Palestinian territories. Despite calls by Saddam Hussein, no other Arab countries follow suit. Exports resume after 30 days. Weapons inspectors return.

2002 September - US President George W Bush tells sceptical world leaders at a UN General Assembly session to confront the "grave and gathering danger" of Iraq - or stand aside as the US acts. In the same month British Prime Minister Tony Blair publishes a dossier on Iraq's military capability.

2002 November - UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq backed by a UN resolution which threatens serious consequences if Iraq is in "material breach" of its terms.

2003 March - Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix reports that Iraq has accelerated its cooperation but says inspectors need more time to verify Iraq's compliance. Saddam ousted.

2003 17 March - UK's ambassador to the UN says the diplomatic process on Iraq has ended; arms inspectors evacuate; US President George W Bush gives Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face war.

2003 20 March - American missiles hit targets in Baghdad, marking the start of a US-led campaign to topple Saddam Hussein. In the following days US and British ground troops enter Iraq from the south.

2003 9 April - US forces advance into central Baghdad. Saddam Hussein's grip on the city is broken. In the following days Kurdish fighters and US forces take control of the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. There is widespread looting in the capital and other cities.

2003 April - US lists 55 most-wanted members of former regime in the form of a deck of cards. Former deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz taken into custody.


2003 August - Bomb attack at Jordanian embassy in Baghdad kills 11; attack at UN HQ in Baghdad kills 22 including UN's chief envoy. Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, or Chemical Ali, captured. Car bomb in Najaf kills 125 including Shia leader Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim.


2003 October - Dozens killed in Baghdad bombings, including attack on Red Cross office.

2003 November - Security situation deteriorates. By early November - six months after President Bush declared the war over - more US soldiers have been killed in Iraq than died during the war to oust Saddam. In the course of the month 105 coalition troops are killed - the highest monthly death toll since the war began.

2003 14 December - Saddam Hussein captured in Tikrit.

2004 February - More than 100 killed in Irbil in double suicide attack on offices of main Kurdish factions.

2004 March - US-appointed Governing Council agrees on interim constitution after marathon negotiations. More than 100 killed in attacks on Shia Muslims marking holy period of Ashura.


2004 June - US hands sovereignty over to interim government - headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Saddam Hussein transferred to Iraqi legal custody.

Saddam Hussein transferred to Iraqi legal custody.

2004 August - Fighting in Najaf between US forces and Shia militia of radical cleric Moqtada Sadr.
2004 November - Major US-led offensive against insurgents in Falluja.


2005 28 February - More than 100 people are killed by a massive car bomb in Hilla, south of Baghdad. It is the worst single such incident since the US-led invasion.
APPENDIX 3: OUTLINE OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON IRAQ

UNSCR 678 - November 29, 1990

- Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."
- Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

UNSCR 686 - March 2, 1991

- Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.
- Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
- Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.

UNSCR 687 - April 3, 1991

- Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."
- Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.
- Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities."
- Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction.
- Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
- Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.
- Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.
- Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.

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• Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.

UNSCR 688 - April 5, 1991

• "Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."
• Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.
• Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.

UNSCR 707 - August 15, 1991

• "Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687.
• "Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.
• Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.
• Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
• Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.
• Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.
• Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for UN and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 715 - October 11, 1991

• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 949 - October 15, 1994

• "Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait.
• Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.
• Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.

UNSCR 1051 - March 27, 1996

• Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA.
• Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
UNSCR 1060 - June 12, 1996

- "Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1115 - June 21, 1997

- "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
- Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.

UNSCR 1134 - October 23, 1997

- "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
- Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.

UNSCR 1137 - November 12, 1997

- "Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.
- Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1154 - March 2, 1998

- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."
UNSCR 1194 - September 9, 1998

- "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1205 - November 5, 1998

- "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
- Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 1284 - December 17, 1999

- Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).
- Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.
- Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.
- Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.
Additional UN Security Council Statements

In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the UN Security Council has also issued at least 30 statements from the President of the UN Security Council regarding Saddam Hussein's continued violations of UNSCRs. The list of statements includes:

- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 5, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 19, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 28, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 6, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 11, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 12, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, April 10, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 17, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, July 6, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, September 2, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 24, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 8, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 11, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 18, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 8, 1994
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 14, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, August 23, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 30, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 29, 1997
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