IN DISTRUST WE TRUST: ANALYSIS OF ACADEMIC APOCALYPSE

by

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SUMMARY

The paper concentrates on trust as a research topic that receives increasing attention from the side of different social disciplines.

The author of this thesis attempts to identify the reasons of this phenomenon, as well as the decline in usage of the concepts conveying a congenial idea, such as, solidarity, cooperation, social cohesion, social capital or connectedness. The key hypotheses, such as paradigmatic change within the social sciences, emergence of risk society, proliferation of the postmodern condition, new information and communication technologies and the crisis of democracy are considered through the works of the authors who now mainly responsible for the shaping of the discourse of trust. The concepts of Luhmann, Putnam, Sztompka, Fukuyama and Hardin are analyzed from an epistemological viewpoint in its ontological and political implications.

The primary goal of the paper is to overview trust from the methodological viewpoint, illustrating the limitations of the concept as a research strategy as well as it advantages in the epoch when the social sciences acquire a status of moral disciplines.
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INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that the topic of trust is very novel, one can nevertheless already witness the emergence of a new paradigm centered on trust. We can call it a paradigm since the discourses centered on solidarity, social cohesion or cooperation are slowly being absorbed or substituted by a new concept that appeared to be more perspective. Trust refers directly to risk, agency, responsibility, communication and cooperation. Trust reinterprets solidarity while discharging Durkheimean sociologism by introducing agency and a temporal dimension. It moves beyond the mechanics of the division of labor back to moral community and organic solidarity, simultaneously enriching the contemporary perspective on the sources of social cohesion. The concept of trust not only brings but also legitimates the diverse spectrum of 'soft' and moral bonds among the members of community. It reinstates the problem of the moral and could possibly engender a radical change in the subject of research and research methodology. A value-free methodology can hardly deal with the teleology of moral phenomena.

Trust as a social resource also provides an alternative to anomie, alienation, depersonalization, bureaucratization, social and moral decadence, animosity or political abstention. As a characteristic of the social system, many hypotheses were ascribed to trust, such as, it allows economizing on transaction costs, it is crucial in economic development and stabilization of democracy, it encourages participation, brings responsibility, broadens life perspective, and fosters cooperation. In other words it has the effect of social cohesion.
At the same time trust appeared to be elaborated together with the concepts of moral community that were designed as a condition limiting the application of trust. Moral community appeared to be the most suitable reflection of the familiar and unfamiliar. Trust as an orientation towards the unfamiliar, the unknown, the future, built on dynamism and action, appeared to be bound by familiarity. Its origins as a concept of trust-facing-risk soon after became used in the context of the positivist paradigm, featuring stability, being inimical to social change, risk and more resembling confidence in ‘expert’ systems, where experts are experts that situate themselves beyond the critique of the profane citizens. This observation was a starting point of my research, which I attempt to pose in this thesis as a problem.
AFTER DEFENCE

This section was written after the defence of the thesis in order to address a number of important issues that were not discussed sufficiently or remained vague and illogical. I preferred to write an additional section rather than incorporating changes in the body of the paper because of the following reasons. 1) My initial design of the thesis included the discussion of a hypothesis about the normalization of the concept of trust and an attempt to pose this as a problem. As a result of my study I feel necessary to move further, beyond the normalization of trust by the means of conservative discourse, into the ontology of the phenomenon as such, regardless the degree of precision in the definition of trust. At this stage I would prefer to begin with the latter problem and remodel the paper accordingly, however the importance of the problem of normalization should not be underestimated. Therefore in this section I will suggest another hypothesis which was already discussed throughout the paper, without being explicitly stated. 2) My general suspicion to the process of logical reconstruction of the research paper after the study is over, restrains me from the analogous methodological disguise. In addition, this form of introducing corrections will reflect not only the after-defense version of the thesis, but will reflect the procedure of defence itself.

Therefore, apart from the correction of grammatical errors and a deleted reference to the Oklahoma bombing, the paper remains as it was submitted for defence. I excluded the line to the Oklahoma bombing, though, not because of its irrelevance or as an overstatement, but as a gesture of my understanding of the research taboos of the American continent where a verdict of the lawyer is an ultimate true belief.
Regarding the research methodology, I applied in this paper, and the reasons why I omitted its discussion in the paper, it is necessary to say that since the research was a thematic one (comparing to problematic), I felt that it is irrelevant to construct the paper in the form: problem – task – goal – hypothesis – method – design – literature review – research – analysis – conclusions. Anyway, in the social sciences this chain is no more that an a posteriori reconstruction in order to comply with a scientific norm. Methodology that I followed in my research included a determination of the borders of the discourse on trust and identification of the main discursive elements – concepts and proper names, above all. My approach to research object included a sample with saturation, that is, I continued to include new elements into my analysis as long as I felt an increase in qualitative data. After the research was over I reorganized the material in the form of the main discovered poles of the discourse. As a result I refrained from including a large number of the reviewed sources. Therefore I can hardly accept the critique that I was examining only mainstream literature. Although it is theoretically possible to assume the existence of another discourse on trust, not overlapping with the one I examined, it would be already a problem of miscommunication in academia requiring a general reexamination of the large number of concepts with trust among them.

The critique of the paper included that it is not balanced enough since presumably the author’s position consists in disagreeing with Putnam and Fukuyama’s conceptualizations of trust. Thus, it was recommended that perhaps to strengthen the paper it would be better to associate to Hardin and reinforce his critique of Putnam and Fukuyama. The chapter on Sztompka seemed to be redundant at all.
However, in my analysis on Fukuyama the main idea is that despite our knowledge that trust can be created by cultural homogenization and religious sectarianism, the idea is that we have to invest in these practices is not justified. My analysis of Putnam suggested that even if we know that racial exclusion, traditional family, low mobility and reliance on expert systems, rather than adopting an active standpoint, promote trust in society, we do not have to rush into policy making. My treatment of liberal distrust of Hardin was the following. Even if we know that distrust is a virtue of the political system, the fact that its legacy is created by alienation, nationalism and irresponsible pride should not be passed over. In my chapter on Sztompka I was trying to put forward a thesis that we have to be critical to the idea that that distrust to government is a vital element of liberal democracy as Hardin suggested. Reapplying this concept on a less liberal ground one can notice that the distrust to government can even engender interpersonal trust, but it is not a time to rejoice. The latter is rather unstable unless it is strengthened by another cultural institution, such as, the Catholic Church. The state-building in Poland after the breakup of the Soviet bloc has unavoidably followed this theocratic and nationalistic model of development since it was the only resource of readily available trust, and therefore the possibility for the government to extrapolate this trust to itself. Sztompka’s concept of the “discourse of trust” effectively conveys the idea that such a discourse corresponds with nationalism, religious resurgence in the framework of national religion and pride. This I think should stimulate our thinking about the validity to construct social capital in terms of trust since trust reflects not only the high quality of life and high economic potential of society, but also a wide scope of negative phenomena. It reflects our cultural and class intolerance, exclusive thinking, racial hatred, gender inequality and civil irresponsibility.
One more recommendation was to examine the link between the strength of civil society and the level of trust since if trust can be a characteristic regardless of civil society this would substantially undermine Putnam’s concept. As I have mentioned above secondary associations are not the only ones that engender trust. Moreover I think that we have to be cautious identifying trust as a virtue without making a reservation. Therefore, I am not sure that this contains an explicit counterpoint in respect to trust and civil society. The Catholic Church despite its hierarchical structure engenders interpersonal trust and is an actor of civil society as well, even if it uses the resources similar to nationalism and pride. Nationalism, pride and exclusion contribute to interpersonal trust no less than secondary associations or spontaneous sociability – this is the point I am making in this paper. The focus exclusively on civil society, along with a statement about direct dependency between social capital, civil society and trust is often done to disguise this point.

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Making a customary reservation about the content of the paper, I would like to express my especial gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Charles Burton, and all my examiners.
Trust is a novel concept in the social sciences, which started to penetrate their discourse in the beginning of eighties, following Luhmann’s publication in German a decade earlier. The concept migrated to the field of political science only in late eighties along with the concept of “social capital”, which was quite successful in competing with somewhat similar theories of solidarity, social cohesion, cooperation, order or even social class. Initially trust served as an indicator of the state of social capital, following the assumption of a linear dependency between the two. The concept, however, appeared to be rather stimulating for political scientists having generated a large layer of trust-studies at both the theoretical and the empirical levels. Nowadays trust is becoming a powerful heuristic instrument with far-going paradigmatic consequences. Trust as a theory of the social sciences is now in the stage of becoming. It has superseded its primary assumptions of direct linkage with the common good and revitalized a number of previously forsaken ideas. An examination of its epistemological relevancy for the social sciences, as well as of its contribution to the history of ideas, could possibly provide a new angle for looking at this concept-in-becoming and the transformation of the research discourse.

The purpose of this chapter is to form a number of hypotheses about the academic discourse of trust and introduce trust as a concept of risk. The terminology that is necessary to deal with the concept of trust will be introduced, pursuing also a goal of providing its epistemological, institutional and contextual background. The chapter will focus on the set of categories in relation to which trust has been defined so far in the academic and political discourse. The first section will start with a description of
concepts similar to trust, such as familiarity, hope and confidence, and outline the relationship of trust to them.

Subsequent chapters will deal with the genealogy of trust and examination of the place of trust in the concepts that use it as a constituent component: solidarity, loyalty, social capital, and democracy, among others.

*Trust* as well as a number of other categories, such as *hope* or *confidence*, is marked by its evident futurological reference. This refers to the origins of the concept within the two related discourses of *apocalypse* and *eschatology*, which have been often utilized as powerful methods for redefining the everyday universe from the viewpoint of the future. Another dimension is that of genealogy, that is, discovering the balance of power relations involved in the processes of social construction. An application of Foucaultian genealogical approach to the discourse of trust not only provides an interpretation of the reason for the rediscovery of the concept at the end of twentieth century, but also suggests a new look at Foucault’s genealogy itself, initially juxtaposing the concept to eschatology and finally identifying the first with the latter. The subsequent chapters will develop the genealogy of trust as a concept that emerged out of the dominant apocalyptic gaze and the doctrine of the crisis of democracy, simultaneously I hope it will also draw a picture of the genealogy of genealogy, since trust in many its aspects mirrors the futurological roots of the genealogical approach. Our task now is therefore to establish first a relation between trust and its temporal reference.

In literary tradition the term *eschatology* is used as a generic name for the utopian, anti-utopian and apocalyptic genres, in religious tradition eschatology and apocalypse indicate different aspects of the coming end. Thus, eschatology means the knowledge of the end,
while apocalypticism is a teaching about approaching it properly. Both concepts imply a
certain concept of history. Apart from suggesting that the concept of trust is one of the
key in literary sense in many religious traditions, it is necessary to draw attention that its
application in the social sciences generally follows the same canon. Trust is a future-
based concept which role is beyond purely descriptive and epistemological. Trust is
positioned as a history-building, future-building process. Trust therefore becomes a
central theoretical element of the philosophy of history or theoretical history. Niklas
Luhmann was one of the first who brought trust as an independent concept in the
discourse of social science (Luhmann 1979). His analysis of the phenomenon, as well as
further conceptualizations, suggest that trust is (or can be employed as) a universal
(transcultural) notion, akin to alienation, anomie, natural selection, progress,
modernization or any other key concept of the philosophy of history. Thus Luhmann
concludes one of his articles on the topic with a proposition that if a society achieves a
condition when its members refrain from risking trust, this will lead to the shrinking of
the social system and new stages of ethnogenesis (Luhmann 2000: 103).

Luhmann’s account of trust is deeply historical because of its introduction through the
concept of familiarity. Largely basing on the notion of intersubjectivity, Luhmann
suggests that anonymity is what brings together meaning and world. Anonymity in this
context directly refers to familiarity since the other is experienced at first as a
depersonalized alter ego, formally identical to I. This depersonification of the world and
reduction of it to the state of anonymity makes the world familiar and enables individuals
to face its complexity. What is important here is that that in a familiar world expectations
are relatively reliable, thus making trust or distrust possible, where the latter are defined
as “every sort of commitment to a particular attitude towards the future” (Luhmann 1979:
Two components of this definition of trust come to the fore — *commitment* and *the future* or rather expectations towards it. The attempts of the last two decades to incorporate trust in the discourse of the social sciences have in whole followed the strategy to conceptualize trust in these terms. Piotr Sztompka’s ‘most general definition of trust’ follows the same guidelines of Luhmann’s work: trust for him is a “bet about the future contingent actions of others” (Sztompka 1999: 25). Luhmann’s approach is nevertheless more historical since by the act of trust, trusting agents attempt to inscribe themselves in the future in a certain way. As Luhmann put this, “Hazardous as well as propitious outlooks require a certain familiarity, a socially constructed typicality, so as to make it possible to accommodate oneself to the future in a trustful or distrustful manner” (Luhmann 1979: 19). The act of trust perpetuates trust itself.

Luhmann emphasizes the future and past orientations of trust. The past orientation is rooted in familiarity of the context of action. Familiarity presupposes our knowledge of history which is “the most important way of reducing complexity” (ibid: 20). Therefore one can notice that the role of familiarity for trust is ‘the exclusion of unanticipated action’. The future orientation of trust is revealed hence in its functionality for the future complexity; the act of trust reduces the coming complexity. This is why for the actor the future is not a future of unlimited possibilities. Luhmann puts this in the following Heideggerian way, “The actor binds his future-in-the-present to his present-in-the-future. In this way he offers other people a determinate future, a common future, which does not emerge directly from the past they have in common but which contains something comparatively new” (ibid). Trust, as conceived by Luhmann, is a notion largely based on the linear individuated perception of history. However, a reconstruction of this kind has certain limitations since it grounds familiarity in the past, although, it can be argued that
the past as a social construct preceded the conceptualization of the future. An assumption here is that the future can be possibly more complex than the past. Another problem is that the existence of the conjunctive mood, a strategy for multiplying temporal conditions and complexity is not well accounted for.

Familiarity and trust are both strategies of reducing the complexity of the social world, but they are not unique, so, apocalypticism¹ (interpretation of the future and the program of action) as contrasted to history (interpretation of the past) is also a strategy of suppressing complexity. Another strategy would be the control of the future – a number of examples can be given in this respect: from dictatorship to propaganda, or from suicide to psychosis, e.g. in the form of autism.

Familiarity has received its further development in consequent Luhmann’s publication on the topic (Luhmann 2000²). This article draws a distinction between confidence and trust in the context of the theory of familiarity. Thus he stresses the necessity to discern familiar and unfamiliar, mediated by symbols, which role is to reintroduce the unfamiliar into the familiar. The concept of symbol in this context retains for the author its original meaning, symbolon as opposed to diabolon. As Luhmann indicates, “symbols have developed as the successors of myth, replacing it first by symbolic interpretation and later by pure symbolism” (ibid: 96). Symbols therefore demarcate the border of the unfamiliar and the familiar within the context of the latter. Here we face the same assumption, but let us accept it for this moment, the assumption that the unfamiliar is complex and

¹ In less religious terms one can speak about prediction.
therefore hard to cope with, in other words it is harmful, unless embedded in the familiar and trivialized.

The theory of familiarity leads us towards the notion of risk, which, as Luhmann, as well as Beck, Giddens and Sennett among others, believes, is rather recent and appeared only in early modernity to indicate that "unexpected results may be a consequence of our decisions, and not simply an aspect of cosmology, an expression of the hidden meanings of nature or the hidden intentions of God" (ibid: 97). He also suggests that religion was before providing the symbolic function of coping with the unfamiliar, or if we interpret this in the language of postmodernity, religion was responsible for othering, permanent re|creation of the Other. However, modernity brought the destruction of these exclusive rights of religion to employ the symbolic function of coping with the unfamiliar with the help of the familiar. Modernity starts when risk supersedes fortuna. The right to delineate the borders of the Other becomes a private undertaking. Secrecy, as Luhmann notes referring to Short, could no longer be the core ‘of life and of prudence’, but trust, which becomes a new symbolic function of the other in your own hands, ‘is bestowed at your own risk’ (ibid).

The distinction between confidence and trust is one of the main themes in the studies of trust. The most accepted way of differentiating them was proposed by Luhmann (1979, 2000) where ‘previous engagement’ and ‘commitment’ introduce the distinction. Trust originates from our lack of knowledge about the future and in the case when knowledge is insufficient two perspectives are open: prediction and control (Sztompka 1999: 19-21). However, the actions of others are unpredictable and uncontrollable as Sztompka, overtly, while Putnam or Fukuyama latently, assumes. This assumption requires a special
consideration and will be further discussed in respect of Putnam and Fukuyama's proposals of establishing and supporting trust through exclusion. However, having accepted this assumption, we have the following 'orientations' (Sztompka) towards the unpredictable future: hope (resignation), confidence (doubt) and trust (distrust). Hope is a passive and vague feeling about the future; confidence is a partly justified, but still passive condition; trust is an engaged and anticipatory action. (ibid: 25). Hope and confidence belong to the discourse of fate, they are "contemplative, detached, distanced, noncommittal", while trust characterizes the discourse of agency and is "active anticipation and facing the unknown future" (ibid). These two discourses play the core heuristic role in Sztompka's 'sociological theory of trust'. He also introduces the notion 'syndrome of distrust', of which the discourse of fate is an indicator.

Luhmann's concept, which is generic for Sztompka's theory of trust, nevertheless makes an important focus on the distinction between danger and risks and identifies 'expectations which may lapse into disappointments' as a common feature of both confidence and trust (Luhmann 2000: 97). Moreover the interference of confidence and trust is very important for him. The origins of risk also mirror the origins of trust.

It is possible to distinguish between confidence and trust by looking at the reaction to disappointment. If one reacts to it by an external attribution, we characterize it as confidence. Otherwise, an internal attribution makes us regret our trusting choice. (ibid: 98). Therefore we see that the first is a situation of danger, whereas the second is of risk. It is also important to emphasize that only then when a situation is characterized by risk it can include trust. If you can just withdraw from acting, then no trust is involved. Therefore trust in Luhmann's understanding requires both risk and action.
Exemplifying the origins of risk, Luhmann points out at the shift from catholicism to protestantism, "In committing sins you risk the salvation of your soul, which thereby becomes a matter not of church practice but of individual lifestyle and effort" (ibid: 98). In other words, this reflects the same shift from a common apocalyptic picture of the world to the eschatological private choice.

Mutual influence of confidence and trust is important because, as Luhmann suggests, lack of confidence leads to alienation and subsequent lack of trust, while lack of trust results in withdrawal of activity requiring trust/risk. Looking at the problem from the opposite side we see that overtrusting leads to the erosion of confidence in expert systems, which in its turn undermines the condition of trust (ibid: 103). As it was mentioned earlier, Luhmann suggests that a situation of not risking trust can lead to the new stages of ethnogenesis. This is perhaps the difference of the concept of trust from that of Gemeinschaft or of solidarity, which ambitions for the place in the concept of theoretical history were quite distinct.

This chapter made a general introduction of the categories of familiarity, hope, confidence and trust; related trust to risks and danger and suggested a rough chronology of trust as a social phenomenon. It has also outlined a number of problems, consideration of which will constitute the following discussion. The following chapter will introduce trust as a social and academic problem.
The task of this chapter is to outline a referential framework of trust as a social problem and epistemological category. The idea of trust in the variety of its forms has been a topic of intellectual inquiry since the very origins of social-political thought. Therefore it is possible to find a reflection of this concept in the works of almost any author who is now considered to be a part of intellectual history. To transfer the focus from the hermeneutic features of the concepts related to trust to their cognitive side, I will refer mainly to the social categories of the past century, attempting also to depersonalize them where possible.

One can consider the following clusters of the notions related to trust. We can distinguish the first cluster organized around the terms solidarity-cooperation and including such concepts as fraternity/sisterhood, unity, connectedness or cohesion. The second cluster consists of terms generic to community and includes concepts such as stability, patriarchy, morality, tradition, hierarchy, or community. The third refers to social capital, habitus, milieu or networks. These clusters are not disjoined – they are closely interrelated. I will further consider some of the notions related to or preceded trust in order to outline the main features of the theoretical background of trust, its status as a social phenomenon, and its problematic as it is developed by social and political though.

Let us first consider the link between trust and cooperation. The article by David Good (Good 2000) focuses on this issue emphasizing a communicative aspect of cooperation. The definition of trust used by Good is rather general and can be summed up as follows: trust is the expectation that the other will not disappoint with his/her behaviour. Good
suggests examining the following hypothesis about our decision to trust: (a) available information affects our decision to trust and (b) that cooperative behaviour is the major source for such information. He refers to four psychosocial experiments: the prisoner’s dilemma, the trucking game, the ‘foot-in-the-door’ sales tactic and the intensity of communication which allow us to make a number of observations about cooperation and trust.

Thus, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, implying that “the net cost of trust being misplaced could be greater than the actual individual gain from trusting (ibid: 35),” not only suggests a cost-benefit analysis, but also allows us to conclude that a long-term perspective taken by participants makes their behaviour much more cooperative.

The Trucking Game, or a game of how to cooperate on a single-direction road, and what he calls the amount of communication express similar ideas that the higher the cooperation (communication) the higher the probability of a mutually beneficial outcome (ibid: 36). This example, however, has a more important implication – it suggests that the absence of threat is counter-productive for cooperative behaviour and trust.

The example of how to allocate a big sign on someone’s private property illustrates the ‘foot-in-the-door’ sales tactic. Thus, in order to allocate a big sign promoting safe driving on someone’s property, it is better to start with allocation of a small sign and then in 2 week 76% (contrasted to 17%) would admit to allocate a big sign (ibid). The implication of this tactic as well as the trucking game is that small initial rewards as well as small increments can be ‘counter-intuitive’, as Good puts it.
Rather analogous conclusions about the link between trust and cooperation have been developed by different schools of social thought. Thus, one more important finding is that “the absence of an ability to penalize a defaulter lead[s] to greater apparent trust (ibid: 37)”. Does not this suggest that the penitentiary system breeds distrust within a society, as Foucault argued in the Discipline and Punish? The presence of threat is the core of all mobilization theories, as well as political and economic strategies. The most current formula for the explication of this idea can be seen in feminist, Marxist, psychoanalytical and other branches of postmodern social discourse.

Good also indicates that processing information is a demanding process. Therefore people have to reduce a ‘welter of information’ to a manageable size. He also identifies the set effect and ‘cognitive inertia’ as stereotypical strategies of abstracting information. Pseudocommunities, discussed by Offe (1999), also convey the same idea of fast identification through a number of visible signs intended at establishing (dis)trust. Making an emphasis on the interpreter of information (reputation), Good nevertheless suggests that individual actions of a person creating her own reputation are rather Kuhnean than Popperian; such a person works against falsification, that is, one attempts to secure her position of a (dis)trusted person, concealing some important data that could force us to withdraw trust. Since trust depends on our ability to cope with an enormous amount of information, then observations that our life is becoming more complex can explain the withdrawal of trust from public institutions. A lack of information though can also lead to withdrawal of trust. If we take into consideration the fact that the government is essentially a Kuhnean thing, concealing malfunctions and problems, putting forward achievements, working in order to perpetuate its position and using falsification as its own strategy, the fluctuation in participation can also be at least partly explained. On the
whole Kuhnean paradigmatic change explains the succession of governments no less than democratic elections and majority votes.

Social cohesion is another important concept that now loses its paradigmatic battle with social capital primarily because of its inability to incorporate the other, diversity, mobility and instability. Cohesion remains to be more about homogeneity than heterogeneity. Social capital though follows the same pattern of development, but it is more progressive since it incorporated trust and subsequent ideas of the future, social change, instability. However, it is necessary to make a reservation that trust in the latter case is used as a synonym for confidence that has limited dialogue with social change. The protagonists of social capital use trust as a direct empirical evidence of the state of social capital. The topic of social capital and trust will be further developed in the chapter focusing on Putman.

This category of social cohesion requires introduction of (the) government as a referential point. Ernest Gellner in his pioneering work on this topic (Gellner 2000) begins the discussion of trust in polemics with Hobbes, radically disagreeing with the latter that anarchy leads to distrust and social disintegration. As an opposite viewpoint he suggests Ibn Khaldun’s sociology of Muslim societies, whose research suggests that it is namely anarchy that engenders trust and government that destroys it. Gellner supports his claim referring to pastoral societies. They, to his mind, demonstrate a high level of trust and the absence of government, which, once starting to emerge, leads to the erosion of trust and social cohesion. He also explains the reasons for government’s emergence. The most important of them is the division of labor beyond the pastoralism, in the city. Pastorals
had to unavoidably rely on artisans, who were excluded from the networks of the anarchy-generated trust.

There are a number of reasons undermining the existence of government while simultaneously promoting trust. Gellner outlines the following: (a) nomadic lifestyle that is difficult to control and tax since all the property of nomads is also that of nomadic character; and (b) pastoral work is not labor intensive, but defense intensive. It is easy to multiply your property by just ambushing another shepherd. Comparing to agricultural sedentary producers, it is reverse, their labor is intensive and therefore the appeal to capture land is less pronounced, unless there are means of coercion and ‘the machinery for controlling the subjugated population’ requiring presumably efficient centralization. However “for a shepherd, the temptation to rob is very strong, immediate and unconditional” (ibid: 144). From this he concludes that there is the only method of solving this problem – to ‘gang up in a group’, otherwise called tribe. Therefore tribe is a form of self-policing, autonomous self-governance. At the same time we have to take into account that they relied on artisans that promoted urban culture.

It seems too radical to assert that such a viewpoint is completely opposite to that of Hobbes. Thus, Hobbes claimed that from the state of aggression, the state of distrust, government emerges and introduces trust, constraining aggression. Gellner’s proposal, valid for pastoral societies from which all the rest presumably originated (is not it an excessively universal claim?), is the following: Pastoral societies, characterized simultaneously by high aggression and the high level of trust, engender the city of artisans/clergy on which they have to rely, which, in its turn, requires government and is
Hobbesian in its nature. Finally, government of the city extends its influence on nomads either, destroying trust within their population.

The mechanism of causality, affecting trust and cohesion, proposed by Gellner, seems to have certain disadvantages – recognizing that government is in fact a double-face government, bringing trust to the city and undermining it within the nomadic environment, one has to bear in mind that at a certain stage, government, deemed inefficient for nomads in the beginning because of objective reasons, such as the inability to control taxes, achieves the required efficient relatively soon, realizing its opportunities to exploit the dependency of nomads on the city.

Identification of trust with the social cohesion of a certain kind (characterized by anarchy, tribalism and nomadism) seems to be at least partly misleading, since neither in case of the cohesiveness of anonymous citizens, not in respect of nomadic cohesiveness, the term cohesiveness itself does not suggest any qualitative or quantitative dimension. It functions as a synonym of ‘relation’. Solidarity, by indicating at the source for social cohesion, better captures the meaning of the social.

Gellner’s discussion of nomadism as a trust generating mode of life is also relevant as an alternative to and practice against the totalitarianism of the power institutions of our time, as this is discussed in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* and Rosi Braidotti’s *Nomadic Subject*. These concepts presuppose that nomadism can provide a ‘non-fascistic’ (Foucault) way of life, that of nomads and self-governance. The problem though with these concepts is that they assume that government’s technologies for control will not endure any changes to accommodate this way of life, they are based on nomadic
optimism that escape is possible. Government nevertheless remains a central point, while nomadism— a strategy of the opposition and simultaneous escape from government, which it can hardly overcome as a referential point. A nomad does not believe in institutionalized distrust, s/he chooses radical distrust.

I defined the second cluster of notions related to trust as generic to community and including stability, patriarchy, morality, tradition and hierarchy. I will deal specifically with the issue of moral community in the chapter on Fukuyama, however here it is necessary to outline the link between hierarchical institutions and the state of interpersonal trust within society, relation of trust and stability. The relation between trust and social change will be discussed in the chapter on Sztompka’s sociological theory of trust. It is also important to underline that there appear more and more studies attempting to conceptualize the traumatic experience of events of the last century, such as the Revolution of 1917 in Russia, the transition from the soviet to market model of government, numerous wars, social panics etc. In these studies the focus again is also on trust and moral community. However the topic of social trauma (which will doubtless deserve increasing attention) and its interrelation with trust requires a special research due to the novelty of the topic of social trauma itself.

Ronald Inglehart (1999) focuses on interpersonal trust in *Trust, Well-being and Democracy*. The article features two topics: (1) cultural and socio-economic factors that promote interpersonal trust and (2) the crucial question of how to stabilize democracy preventing it from sliding into, for example, fascism. Basing on the assumption that interpersonal trust is essential for economic prosperity, he suggests that democratic institutions by themselves do not produce trust (ibid: 88). Apart from the observations
that factors such as education and postmaterialist values have positive impact on interpersonal trust, he relies preponderantly on religious tradition as a primary explanation of why countries demonstrate different degree of interpersonal trust (ibid: 91). He refers to Putnam (ibid: 92), who suggested that large hierarchical structures deplete social trust, to substantiate his own findings. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church is centralized, protestant on the contrary – decentralized, while Orthodox is also centralized. The picture of the distribution of interpersonal trust highly negatives correlates with centralization of religions. He also asserts that, contrary to Fukuyama who argued that China is a low-trust society, data on China reflect its position as a high-trust society.

I would however be more reserved interpreting data on trust in such a way without a check for the level of homogeneity and presence of the other, or suppression of the other – the factor that to my mind corroded trust in the USA and not mobility as such, as Putnam suggests. The susceptibility of the Americans and the British to different sorts of social panics is notorious and discussed in many articles featuring the topics of social trauma and social panics. The othering or exclusion of the Japanese living in the USA after Pearl Harbor is just one of the famous examples of this kind (see e.g Thompson 1998, Neal 1998, Erikson 1998). Throughout the centuries it was a reliable strategy to enhance interpersonal trust. Susceptibility to panics leading to a mobilized exclusion can also be considered as a factor explaining high level of trust of Anglo-Saxon cultures. China becomes as a high-trust society mainly due to its homogeneity and the limited presence of strangers. It will be further discussed in more detail, but considering this viewpoint trust becomes not an indicator of social capital, but of efficiency of exclusion and suppression. Therefore I believe that Fukuyama is correct classifying China as a low
trust society since the basis for measurement trust should account for the trust towards strangers along with trust to your family of members of the kin.

Interestingly enough, Inglehart himself questions the validity of his argument indicating that Nordic countries are already post-Christian with church attendance close to zero level (ibid: 96), while Orthodox Christianity was virtually eradicated by the Soviets. Moreover, at the end of nineteenth, beginning of twentieth, century the Orthodox Christianity was largely distrusted as an institution, that can be illustrated by a complete reduction of the religious doctrine to apocalyptic teaching, where the wrath of god became an independent entity comparable to elements of paganism with virtually no resemblance to protestant eschatology. The Orthodox Church however enjoyed certain legitimacy since pride was highly attached to it as a reflection of “the Third Rome” phenomenon.

Another important subject Ingleharts deals with is how to stabilize democracy that is to protect it from the excesses of other forms of rule. Trust in this concept becomes the most crucial part of a cultural orientation, a characteristic of the public, preventing the erosion of democracy. Inglehart distinguishes two main factors that stabilize democracy – a culture of trust (especially among elites – the norm of the “loyal opposition”. Offe writes about trust among elites as particularly important for democracy (Offe 1999).) And mass legitimacy of democratic institutions (Inglehart 1999). However as an indicator for mass legitimacy Inglegart selects pride in political institutions and subjective well-being. In subsequent chapters I will consider pride specifically, suggesting that whole trust-like effect of pride is based on transference of responsibility for the risks of trusting. The example Inglehart uses to illustrate the stabilization of democracy is rather confusing.
Thus, he believes that by 1967 (the year when the absolute majority rejected the claim that Hitler was one of Germany’s greatest statesmen) democratic institutions in Germany gained legitimacy. However, the more reliable indicator could be perhaps the unsuccessful interiorization of guilt after World War I which then resulted in fascism and rather successful after World War II. Of course, considering guilt as a virtue saving democracy from sliding into fascism has an unavoidable ethical dimension. Currently a whole discourse of stabilizing democracy features the ways of how to avoid the practices of the ‘known enemies’ – closed societies, populist governments or totalitarian states, rather than looking at the inner potential of democracy. The assumption now is that democracy lacks stability, other forms of rule are seductive and many cultural features are potentially destructive.

Subjective well-being is to my mind a completely unreliable indicator since it is culturally determined. Thus the Russians, for example, use abstract referential points to determine their well-being. Economic welfare of neighbors can partake in that abstraction, but it is not by any means dominant. It is also a Russian cultural norm to answer negatively to the greeting “Hi, how are you?” – something like “more or less bearable”, while an American would rather reply with “good” or something positive without claiming excessive suffering which is a cultural norm.

Since Inglehart refers periodically to Russia, expressing a dominant viewpoint to the topic Russia and democracy of western political science in general, it is possible rather to indicate the stability of distrust towards Russia. Thus Inglehart constantly alludes to fascism in relation to Russia and reaches a conclusion that we cannot say that democracy is successfully installed in Russia. He refers to a mythical proto-fascist party, supposedly
of Zhirinovsky, but his election data is not valid and seems to refer to Zuganov's communists (Inglehart 1999: 101). The idea of Russia and fascism is common while mentioning of fascism in relation to any other Eastern European country is an exception.

Whether hierarchy destroys trust is also a question. Hierarchies operate in different conditions and with varying efficiency. To use again an example from Russia – Putin's initiative of reestablishing a “power vertical”, in other word, hierarchical structures of the executive branch led to the growth of both interpersonal trust and trust in main political institutions. Fukuyama builds his concept on the very same idea – hierarchy can be efficient and government intrusions can bring economic success to low trust societies.
Spontaneous sociability or, in other words, the ability to extend trust beyond familism and form on this basis broad corporate networks, efficient from the economic viewpoint, is the key concept developed by Francis Fukuyama in *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (Fukuyama 1995). Analyzing why different cultures demonstrate diverse degrees of cooperation, Fukuyama develops the topic that Robert Putnam put forward in his *Making Democracy Work* (Putnam 1993). However the primary focus lies now in the dimension of the economy, featuring the topic of *making the modern economy work* and searching for something more than empirical illustrations of how the lack of civic engagement affects the performance of democratic and economic institutions. In so doing Fukuyama turns to another set of empirical evidences and suggests that Weber’s insights into the connections between protestant ethics and economic productivity can be extrapolated to other phenomena distinct from religiosity, but similar in the nature of their ethical principals resulting in successful cooperation with strangers.

An objective criterion Fukuyama decides to deal with to support his claim about non-cooperative features of cultures is the ability to cross the limits of family structure in organizing business activity and attract strangers to the governing of an enterprise. The indicators that he suggests are the number, size and structure of business units. Among the main indicators that he selects are the number of big corporations, concentration of capital and certain ethical principals in organizing business networks, such as Japanese *keiretsu*, resulting in preferential business relations with a certain circle of partners when rational choice and immediate maximization of utility does not work as Fukuyama
insists. Thus he identifies that Japan, Germany, the United States, South Korea are characterized by the presence of big corporations (and in case of the first three - high level of spontaneous sociability) while Italy, China and Chinese societies, and France are identified as familistic societies where the emergence of big corporations has been always hampered by the lack of non-familistic trust and where the state has always had to step in to create and support large scale corporations. South Korea, while being a familistic society, as Fukuyama asserts, has big corporations namely because of the highly intrusive state. This claim has two important implications. Firstly, the state can and should play an important role in a familistic society if the latter wants to achieve economic success (by modernizing the economy) and at the same time a highly intrusive state does not promote trust distinct from its family form, if not it contributes to its active destruction.

In making this claim Francis Fukuyama questions the universality of the classical ideal of liberal capitalism, arguing that from the viewpoint of productivity it can hardly be the best form possible and in case of a familistic society will never be able to guarantee an economic breakthrough. Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have not been able to outgrow family business structure and thus could never become independent global economic actors as, for example, Korean corporations. At the same time it has to be emphasized that these Chinese societies are much more liberal and competitive being exemplary from the liberal economic perspective – many small family firms compete with each other, hardly existing longer than two generations. ‘Creative destruction’ therefore is much more intense however the results are modest. Fortunately there are methods of overcoming business familism: apart from the abovementioned role of the state, the author of the Trust suggests that foreign investments help to erode familism in business governance and introduce strangers into corporate structures.
Neither of these methods seem to heal however the underlying problem of the ‘missing middle’, a layer of intermediate associations lying between the family and the state. Spontaneous sociability based on trust in strangers is a characteristic of society, which is hard to achieve. At this point Fukuyama joins Putnam in his concern that there are facts testifying that social capital in America is eroding, social trust is declining, people associate less and willing to communicate less and the economic condition follows the democratic condition. Fukuyama opens the discussion about the ‘crisis of trust’, thus qualifying Putnam’s concerns about the decline of trust in society. In opposition to Putman who suggests that the main reasons for the decline are privatization of social time by the progressing technology, increased mobility and the destruction of family in the form of the moving of women into the labor force, Fukuyama believes that the primary reason is the decline of community, while certain negative consequences of capitalism (such as urbanization and industrialization) the welfare state and technology only contributed to the destruction of community.

Fukuyama offers a number of examples of why community is important, emphasizing grassroots responsibility, communication and self-governance. Thus, community with its high level of solidarity economizes on transaction costs and is able to mediate the arising problems that lead to more efficient economic output as well as deliver certain social goods. Taylorism of American factories was characterized by massive trade unions, conflictability, lack of communication between managers and workers, irresponsibility of workers and their narrow specialization, the presence of the caste of trust-destroying managers and the bad quality of the end product. Along with this list there were contracts of enormous length specifying the very detail of employment and responsibilities.
Fukuyama suggests that we compare this with albeit paternalistic, but with a guaranteed employment and necessary training, communal, team-based and responsible, efficient and qualitative production of Toyota. He juxtaposes communal paternalism with ever-growing lawyerization of the American society (caused rather by self-deception about the ‘true nature’, that is, individualism of the Americans) breeding anomie and generating social problems. The problem of Taylorite production in America was, however successfully resolved by the adaptation of Toyota’s mode of the organization of production. The reason for this was a communal nature of the Americans contrary to the belief that they are an individualistic society. One of the key assertions of the book is that Americans are not individualistic or rather that they are primarily communitarian with a trait of individualism, whereas, for example, Chinese are much more individualistic than communitarian, compared to the Americans. This communitarian component of the American society is now in crisis. Previously it was able to overpower the implementations based on a false assumption of Americans’ individualism and understanding them as rational utility maximizers, but now social capital is substantially weaker and cannot withstand negative tendencies of individualism.

There is a tendency in political discipline to conceptualize political process as a fight between the families of rights. Traditionally recognizing three families of rights (Marshall): liberal, democratic and social, now group rights became an issue on the agenda (see e.g. Offe). Being in the essence all the same liberal rights, though now acting on behalf of the identity groups, they significantly change the political landscape. Most importantly is that for Fukuyama they are radically different from the viewpoint of traditional communities which provided social security, welfare, training and the similar social goods for their members. Since they act essentially as ‘tertiary organizations’
(Putnam) providing no communal ties and functioning as a lobby. This is why Fukuyama believes that it is important to emphasize the type of the community he is talking about, namely, *moral community*, whose members share “a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behavior” (153).

Although he argues that the nature of values is not important and the main thing is whether the community engenders mutual trust, Fukuyama is reluctant to call life style groups, often highly dispersed geographically, as moral communities. Thus, for example, vegetarians or homosexuals can hardly make a contribution to social capital. Homosexuals even destroy it through the destruction of family that is still an important generator of trust, especially if within the family itself there are ways of overcoming narrow and kin-limited trust as in Japan. A reservation here is that homosexual families are excluded from the upbringing of the young generation – legalization of their marriages is still a rare occasion in the current legislation, while cases of the adoption of children are even more exceptional. A moral community therefore seems to be not only efficient in producing trust, but also in fighting alternative systems of trust.

Assumption about the constant fight between the abovementioned families of rights is based on a hypothesis that there is a certain optimum of rights, so that we can only prioritize a certain family of them at the expense of the rest. Regardless of how convenient this scheme is, for Fukuyama they all represent only one part of the spectrum – individual rights. This is very well reflected, as he indicates, in constitutions and the bills of rights. It is hard to find in a constitution that community rights are recognized at all, with perhaps the only exception of family and traditionally recognized territorial communities. Whole discussion about rights is meaningless unless it is linked to trust, the
condition that promotes social cooperation and the common good in all spheres of social existence. However, it is important that trust is a condition penetrating the whole social system. If trust is bound only within the borders of the family then it hard to expect any progress beyond its limits -- society beyond the family remains uncooperative. Trust therefore is, using a metaphor, in a way an oxygen for an individual as a social actor.

Social rights in Marshall’s model are virtually individual, or at most, family, welfare rights. Group rights are not social either since they do not reflect any common or societal interests, among which trust is economically, and hence, politically, one of the most important ones.

Economic determinism in the approach to rights that Fukuyama defends here generally corresponds to the same Hegel-Marxist approach towards history that he adopted in *The End of History and the Last Man* (Fukuyama 1992). However it becomes substantially Marxist in respect to the methods of analysis and conservative in respect to conclusions. Thus his attitude towards the managerial class of a Taylorite enterprise reflects Marx’s discussion about the modes of production. As the bourgeoisie is a parasitic class for Marx, the class of managers for Fukuyama is what contains economic development, weakens workers’ responsibility and alienates them from both the production process and the product. His suggestion is to eliminate the layer of managers since they buffer the emergence of trust among workers. Fukuyama also attempts to apply his conclusions about the destruction of trust to all hierarchical institutions, suggesting that they undermine social cohesion and trust. This claim is not however consistent throughout the book since communal patriarchy and gerontocracy, to name a few, are all hierarchical structures. Fukuyama does not explain why certain hierarchical structures able to engender trust while others destroy it.
One of the approaches of how to achieve trust to strangers is to create an extended moral community that will be highly cohesive and inclusive. Fukuyama suggests that to form such a community along kin lineages is impeded because the very existence of lineages as a social phenomenon testifies that it is hard to overcome familistic trust. A viable alternative is a national community. A strong national identification, if it precedes regional, kinship and other forms of identification, speaks that this society enjoys social capital in the form of trust not limited to familistic trust. Japan and Germany, though the latter has changed significantly throughout the last four decades could enjoy a high level of trust to strangers and therefore establish large economic forms of cooperation. It is important to emphasize that such a society should be necessarily characterized by the absence of hierarchical institutions of any kind that could undermine horizontal trust, using Offe's category. It can be said that hierarchically organized Churches, such as the Roman Catholic Church, or caste and clan systems of stratification undermine the potential of national identity to incorporate the unfamiliar, the stranger. Trust consciousness, if we coin the term basing on class consciousness, will not correspond to national consciousness in these societies and therefore to expect their economic success would be completely groundless.

Speaking about different ways to overcome familism, among which are the German guilds, numerous Japanese social groups dedicated to a certain art that allowed incorporating biological outsiders into households, and Protestant sectarianism of the United States, it is necessary to indicate that the status of the latter is substantially different from the first two in the following respect. While the guilds and traditional arts played its role in the becoming of a non-familistic society, their impact nowadays is not
that important, at least Fukuyama does not attempt to link the erosion of trust and the current role of the guilds in the German society, whereas sectarianism for Fukuyama is a necessary condition for trust culture in the United States. His explanatory model is based on the assumption that sectarianism of the American religious life was the primary supplier of non-familistic trust and that currently we witness an erosion of this crucial social resource. What is not justified is why the United States could not incorporate the sectarian tradition while getting rid of the content as occurred with the guilds. Fukuyama himself speaks about Nordic societies which enjoy high level of trust, while being essentially post-religious societies, however he is reluctant to apply the model of Northern Europe. He appeals for preservation of sectarianism and tolerance towards religion, "Given the close relationship between religion and community in American history, Americans need to be more tolerant of religion and aware of its potential social benefits" (Fukuyama 1995: 319). He asserts that religious protestant sects promote "the American art of association". Why then he does not demand the preservation of the guilds, promotion of child adoption, or arts like Ikebana or Bonsai? Religion for him seems to have more legacy than the guilds. Taking into account that the appeal for religious tolerance is almost the sole solution to 'the crisis of trust' that is given in the book; the question emerges where this legacy is coming from?

The question is not however new if we turn our attention towards Weber's paradigmatic of the impact of Protestant sectarianism. Fukuyama's revision of Weber has the purpose to emphasize an overlooked, as he believes, concept linking Weber's theory of protestant ethics and its impact on capitalism, namely that sectarian Protestantism was increasing "the capacity to cohere in new communities" (ibid: 46). By "to cohere" Fukuyama implies primarily to communicate and cooperate. This, of course, suggests a complete
reevaluation of protestant ethics. The latter becomes important in promoting capitalism only insofar as it extends the networks of trust beyond familism. Fukuyama, therefore, reinforces Weber's claim of secularization and makes it even more visible that the whole legacy of the protestant ethics as a miracle for the economy is derived from the meaning of secularization. Fukuyama, by making an emphasis on trust rather than ethics reinforces this link, but instead of expected and unavoidable conclusion about social capital in the form of Protestant sectarianism, he reiterates the importance of religious sects as trust-keepers. The ability to extract from a liberal teleology a conservative solution is characteristic for the majority writings of Fukuyama. His new Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Fukuyama 2002) continues the same alarmist tradition in relation to freedoms. In his vision norms based on 'human nature' should always precede freedoms the consequences of which are unpredictable. In so doing he undermines his own recommendations for economic prosperity consisting in overcoming familism, since he is unable to go beyond his own amoral familism (familiarity with) of 'human nature'. In other words, he is unable to incorporate the other, the outsider, the unknown that embodies risk. His practice confirms his words as it is best illustrated by his Testimony for the Cloning Prohibition Act (Fukuyama 2001). I will further discuss the concept of social capital of Robert Putnam whose concern about the erosion of social capital mirrors that of Fukuyama. My primary focus will be then on the proximity of the notions of trust and social capital and the positivist discourse centered on stability and organization of its epistemology through exclusion. The


4 About Fukuyama’s understanding of human nature and arguments for its normative primacy, see Fukuyama, Francis (2:2002).
problem that I would like to pose is why the liberal concepts of trust are slow to appear and what implications this can have for the future scholarship of trust.
It seems that the two old camps had found a new way to revitalize a dying out rhetoric of liberalism and conservatism, which met its appeasement in the prefix ‘neo’ dominating the late eighties and early nineties. However the phenomenon appeared to be short-lived and the neospeak of neoliberalism and neoconservatism started to escape the tranquility of the Third way. A new point of disagreement was found in the conceptualization of trust. At the same time it seems to be a lucky discovery since political scientists acquired for the first time an almost positivist stability allowing for the introduction of the scientific clarity in the view of the both camps on the nature of government. Thus, conservatives became protagonists of trust in government, while liberals took a standpoint of distrust. I intentionally referred to positivism since in both cases distrust is a concept leading towards stability, better economic development and common good.

This chapter will focus on alternatives to trust as a common good, or rather an extrapolation of the positive connotation of interpersonal trust to the trust in government. I will concentrate on the works of Russell Hardin who has made the most important contribution to this viewpoint. The chapter will also refer to the problematic of the growing distrust to government and attempts to find out the reasons of why the processes eroding trust affect America in a greater extent then Western Europe, also a land of so-called liberal democracies. In this context I will question the qualification of the depleting trust in relation to democracy approaching from the liberal perspective. Therefore the task of this chapter to is to introduce the notion of trust, qualify it in liberal perspective as distrust in government favorable to democracy, and on the grounds of the growing distrust question the conclusions of the liberal distrust theory.
*Liberal Distrust* (Hardin 2001) is a paper presented by Russell Hardin at the 35th world congress of the International Institute of Sociology in Krakow. The main theme of the paper is to reestablish the federalists headed by Madison, as well as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Smith and all other liberal thinkers as the theoreticians of liberal distrust. The article directly refers to Anthony King’s paper on *American Exceptionalism* whose discussion was also centered on the Americans’ distrust to government and Europeans’ trust in the government, the main arguments of which will be later presented in this chapter. This reference is important since Hardin argues that the creation of the European Union and the America of the times of the Declaration can be characterized by the same phenomenon of distrust to government.

Madison by the words of Hardin becomes the most perspicacious architect of liberal government who succeeded in the institutionalization of distrust in it. His vision of the state as an authority attracting knaves and breeding corruption had largely helped to fulfill this task. This process has a contemporary, as Hardin correctly suggests – the becoming European Union, however the role of Madison is now played by England resisting Brussels and distrusting its eurobureaucracy. Although it would be incorrect to say that England drafts a constitution for the European Union and personify only this country for such a role, it is a far going proposal which is certainly reflected in the building of the common European government. The task nowadays as viewed from the liberal camp is to institutionalize distrust as deep as possible and prevent the eurobureaucracy from building any constituencies that will depend on it. What the liberals have therefore to do is to exploit through the key moment of history and manage to institutionalize distrust. Once this is achieved it works for at least 200 years. This looks
like a new concept of political and constitutional history. In this respect Derrida suggesting through the analysis of the American constitution that responsibility for government dissolves into nothing, loses all its critique since the dissolution of responsibility is deemed to be a crucial element in the building of distrust.

This liberal perspective is not unique though, the *Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx is also an institutionalization of distrust, and even the object of distrust, the state as a central authority, is all the same. Here is though a borderline – *distrust* of those thinkers who represent the conflict approach as being instituted in such a way as to promote radical social change, leading to a certain resolution of the conflict and the transcendence of the object of distrust. The ‘distrust’ of liberals should be embedded in the system of political institutions in such a way as to perpetuate itself. This is not an easy task at all, requiring a particular vision and understanding of the situation of an inherent abuse and mercantilism of all and sundry. Madison becomes a liberal prophet. England and East European states have a potential. The latter have, presumably, vested interests in the coalescence of government and distrust, since their memory of the soviet rule is still fresh. However, it is also possible to see these Central European states as a new constituency for eurobureaucracy, the emergence of which Anthony King dislikes (King 2000). This is an interesting approach that is not devoid of mythologies and that attempts to create a government that would satisfy Winnicott’s description of an ideal mother – she has to be just good enough, but not too good. It opens a new era in Public Administration.

Anthony King’s primary question in the *Distrust of Government* (ibid) is why despite the fact that the decline of trust/confidence in government throughout the last four decades was characteristic for both the United States and other western democracies, the declining
trust in government was much more pronounced in the United States. Our interest in this topic is to sketch how distrust in government can be linked to the functioning of liberal democracy. To put it in a more empirical form, why is the distrust in government (lack of confidence in government) a negative phenomenon? Although the attitude towards trust continues the line of Fukuyama and Putnam discussed earlier, the accent is important here – In King’s paper occurs a significant change – a deproblematization of distrust as such.

Anthony King suggests the following explanation to the original question. He puts forward an argument that the historical formation of government is an important factor in explanation of the American exceptionalism. Thus he believes that the Europeans think about the government rather than of government as Americans do. That is, replying to the question about their confidence in government, Europeans reply, keeping in mind the government which is in power at the time they are asked this question, e.g. Tony Blair’s Labor government. Americans reply regardless any particular government, referring to the system of government in general, “Indeed, when Americans talk about the government, as of course they frequently do, they typically do not have in mind the Bush administration or the Clinton administration; rather, they have in mind the powers that be in Washington, the federal bureaucracy, “the feds” (King 2000: 75).

Existing explanations for the loss of confidence in government, such as rising rates of crime, pressures of the welfare states, the disintegration of the nuclear family, the stagnation of real incomes, the increasing intrusiveness of the mass media – seem unsatisfactory for explaining America’s exceptionalism because the same factors are present in Europe also. Therefore one has to look for the different explanations of the
decline in confidence. Rephrasing King, where does the "fed scare" come from, since
Anthony King suggests that "the 'red scare' of the 1950s has been replaced by an equally
virulent 'fed scare' (King 2000: 77)"?

King indicates the following arguments that lead to understanding of government as
government and the government. First of all it is a visibility of government structures and
their spatial concentration, reinforced by symbolism, as opposed to Europe where
'government offices are widely scattered' and often decentralized. Washington is a
symbolically laden place versus, for instance, Bonn where people are reluctant to go
unless they really need to. The United States is also a country of exclusively political
history. All histories are secondary. US government (transcending the government) is
omnipresent in social life – the US dollar bills picture federal buildings and famous
presidents, while in Europe – nature, culture, people of science and the arts. American
culture is itself predominantly a political culture – tourists visit the Washington
Monument, the Jefferson Memorial etc., whereas the similar monuments in Europe have
no cultural or symbolic significance.

The argument that King attempts to develop is quite contradictory because of the two
distinct simultaneously present statements: the suspicion of government in America and
Americans' pride in their government. I will later return to the issue of pride that has not
received any specific attention by the scholars dealing with trust. However it is important
to designate here the possible relation between trust and pride. It seems likely that pride
alienates the risks involved in trusting, ascribes them to the other – thus a moral
community beyond its borders applies a doctrine of destructivity of amoral (not
sanctioned by a given moral code) action. Pride however can be an important resource for
the state since it promotes populism and nationalism that have proved to be important boosters of the economy, while being essentially democratic, though their liberal nature has to be seriously questioned.

Suspicion of government originated from the distrust in government while Europe has always embraced it and Canada generally followed the European path. This resulted in America’s government having limited constituency. The federal government in the US provides its citizens with armed forces, national postal service and old-age pensions, whereas in Europe the government is “the radio or television news in the morning, the train to work, the teacher, the doctor, the district nurse, the home-help, the distributor of meals on wheels, the provider of disability benefits and the provider of heavily subsidized seats at the opera (King 2000: 81)”. Business elites in the US mistrust government, probably just because they don’t have any reason to be cordial with it as opposed to Europe. The civil service in Europe is prestigious and competitive while in the US it is a place for mediocrities, a place of bureaucrats. European governments are specialized and efficient, while “dealing with the American government on a matter of any importance or complexity is almost invariably a hazardous, expensive and time-consuming affair – hard to avoid but best to avoided if possible (ibid: 83)”. Along with that King continues to develop his thesis that the Americans have been always proud of their system of government and that this pride was not groundless. Moreover, to the conclusion of Putnam, proposing to contain the factors depleting social capital and Fukuyama calling for respect in isolated moral communities, King adds his own solution of investing in political symbolism and pride to pull the democracy out of its worsening condition.
Despite this odd solution, some arguments look rather persuasive. Thus, Vietnam and Watergate, and associated lies contributed to the growing distrust. The problem was also aggravated by the fact that all US presidents after Kennedy were mediocrities, although they are expected to be the ultimate symbols of the United States, “when a president besmirches his own reputation, he besmirches America’s” (ibid: 89). Contrasting with Europe we see that political leaders “are not expected to have charismatic personalities or to be moral exemplars (ibid)”.

What is important is that King starts with Vietnam and not with Pearl Harbor or the Great Depression. Perhaps the American political system has just lost the ability to create, or rather, to sustain symbols. The Electoral College that systematically (although rare as an empirical fact) undermines the principle of majoritarian democracy can be perhaps also mentioned as one of the factors depleting confidence in government/democracy.

Another argument consists in the incomprehensibility of the American political system. Talmudism, or the practice of re|interpretation, is flourishing – the US has the biggest number of political scientists per capita. The United States developed a complicated system of lawyers and courts instead of efficient government. The focus in governance is on legislature rather than on the executive as in Europe. This is accompanied by the fact that the national political parties have lost their ability ‘to bring order out of chaos’ and “the rise of divided government, with different parties controlling the presidency and either the House of Representatives, the Senate, or both” (ibid: 93) became a norm. Moreover, since there is no such a thing as the government there is no electoral accountability whatsoever, while the Europeans experience no problems in identifying the rascals in power and have legal procedures to ‘throw the rascals out’.
Anthony King also suggests that there is an ongoing polarization of the political spectrum. He quotes one of his early works, "the public’s mistrust of government is unlikely to be reversed unless and until politicians and their parties stage a concerted return to the sensible center. The politics of polarization is the politics of mistrust." (King 2000: 96) At the same time, he writes, political elites are more consolidated in Europe nowadays.

King wrote this article before the September 11th, perhaps now he would look for a broader audience of "the fed scare." Thus he wrote, "It is one thing to explain Americans’ current distrust of government. It is quite another to account for the extreme intensity with which many Americans feel this distrust and to account for the fact that these extremely intense feelings – of anger, frustration, and betrayal – are directed to such a large extent at government, especially the federal government." (King 2000: 98) But pointing out at the isolationist politics of the US prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, one can suggest that there could be other explanations of the growing distrust coming from the field of international relations. All traumatic events resulting in the growing distrust in government come directly from this field.

While accepting King’s critical attitude towards the American government, and taking into account that he rejects the possibility that the US rebuilds confidence in government by investing in bureaucracy and changing the focus from the legislature to the executive branch of the political system (that is in a European way), the argumentation about the solution looks rather weak, if adequate for liberal democracy at all – to invest in political
symbolism, American pride and centrist opinions: quite an exotic solution of the problem. However is there any problem in distrusting the government?

Hardin’s cure is more consecutive (Hardin 2000) – he starts with an ultra-minimal state in mind, characterized by the institutionalized distrust, and suggests that the state became too paternalistic, especially for the current situation, and therefore the treatment is in reduction of government. He comes to this conclusion through the analysis of hidden assumptions made by the researches of social capital, social trust and political participation. Primarily he attacks ideas of Putnam, Fukuyama and Luhman, who invented a concept and perhaps the very phenomenon of the “depletion or erosion of social capital”. Although he is much more cautious in his assertions – this is the statement he makes. In this article he attempts to point out at a number of presumptions related to social capital, reinterpreting data on trust in government as data on confidence in government and while agreeing with the on-going decline in confidence he provides his explanation based on the concept of the welfare state and an ultra-minimal state, arguing that while the current state of affairs requires the latter, we still have enormous government and statist politics corresponding to the former.

Usual problems consist in identification of interpersonal trust with confidence in governmental institutions. Russell Hardin suggests that they are far from being analogous, “A personal relationship involving trust is far richer and more directly reciprocal than a citizen’s relationship to government (Hardin 2000: 31).” In fact what Hardin is doing here is building his exclusive definition of trust. He calls trust only personal trust, emphasizing inapplicability of the term to government. This approach seems a little bit radical since, for example, instead of confidence we can use following
the same strategy the term awareness and discredit confidence on the same grounds as he does it with trust. Moreover the limitation of this approach is that it borrows the European concept of government – instead of trust which involves risk and responsibility of the trustee, confidence refers to expert systems and our assertion that we lack this expert knowledge.

In fact he discusses this viewpoint but approaches it from a different angle. He assumes that we should be concerned with trustworthiness rather than trust – because “if we wish to induce changes somewhere, it is more likely in the former (Hardin 2000: ibid)”. The argument though refers more to PR-technologies than accountability. The government wants to be not only trusted, but also loved, to be free from mutual and binding commitments. Our trustfulness and credulity is the primary concern of government and not its own trustworthiness. In spite of certain theoretical attractiveness this is an overly optimistic concept of government that can abstract the political conjuncture and the public to make a self-assessment in its trustworthiness.

However, the logic of this step is much more reliable – Hardin attempts to transfer the research focus from civic engagement to governmental performance in the past. This is a strong argument against Putnam, who refuses to recognize citizens’ ability to assess functioning of government. This is why Hardin writes that survey questions on trust are not evidence of mere credulity – they testify that governmental institutions function less satisfactorily in relation to past performance.

Hardin also emphasizes a number of hidden assumptions. The first is that researchers by accentuating the value of trust in society implicitly make a claim for the value of
enhancing trust (e.g. Luhman 1980, Putnam 1995, Fukuyama 1995). He thinks that “we have to go beyond the flaccid – and often wrong – assumption that trust is simply good. This supposition must be heavily qualified, because trusting the malevolent or the incompetent is foolish and even harmful (Hardin 2000: 33)” Origins of this assumption, he believes, are in identification of trusting government with trusting a person.

Another untested and extremely popular hypothesis is that government needs the trust of citizens to function well. “This view is perhaps a variant of the claim of Emile Durkheim and Talcott Parsons that social order rests on shared normative commitments (Hardin 2000: 35)” Even terminologically protagonists of the “eroding social capital” attempt to impose their views upon the rest of scientific community and the population. So, Hardin writes that declining trust suggests a normative problem, while “declining confidence does not so readily provoke normative concerns (Hardin 2000: 31)”.

The fact that undoubtedly deserves mentioning in this context is that many researches of trust link the problems with eroding social capital, trust and confidence to Fukuyama’s argument about the end of history. Thus, Hardin suggests that we have to come back to the ultra-minimal state because the conflict between the followers of the free market and central planning was resolved to the favor of the former. Some scholars write about the dissolution of the Soviet Union (as the other) which should essentially have undermined the continuing policy of the federal government and therefore confidence it in. This argument is present in the article Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture, or Performance by Newton and Norris (Newton & Norris 2000). This is a positive fact because apart from the recognition of the other – a good in itself, the population was finally granted an ability to respond to the foreign policy of the federal government. On
the whole, Hardin's hypothesis that there the decline in confidence is engendered by a new social-economic situation which no longer requires a paternalistic social state sounds unpersuasive. To any of his reasons why we no longer require a welfare state could be supplied a long list of counter arguments. And in general to argue in favor of ultra-minimal state, starting off the uselessness of the welfare state in a given situation, might sound a novel approach, but certainly lacks in methodological strength.
Robert Putnam's concept requires special consideration. Firstly, he reintroduced the notion of social capital and trust into political science, since after Luhmann's publication of *Trust and Power* attention to this topic slowly decreased. This decline in interest to trust was primarily the consequence of the absence of empirical conceptualizations of social capital and more or less reliable indicators. Putnam for his part suggested a number of approaches towards the measurement of social capital, one of which is through trust (interpersonal as well as in public institutions).

Secondly, Putnam linked the decline of political participation to the decline of social capital, using the latter as a background concept for political participation and therefore democracy as such. Thus, Putnam suggested that the last quarter century is being characterized by the massive erosion of social capital which is well reflected in the decline of political (here *electoral*) participation, social trust and civic engagement. Putnam suggests using these three main groups of empirical indicators for measurement of the state of social capital.

Thirdly, Robert Putnam outlined a number of reasons that he believes might have contributed to the erosion of social capital. He discusses them as hypotheses, being perhaps conscious of the program that they convey. Broadly speaking social change is the main contributor to the depletion of social capital. Thus, he enumerates the following 'culprits': high horizontal mobility, the transformation in the occupational structure of

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women and their lifestyles and the new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in their impact of leisure. Paradoxically enough that these hypotheses have remained unchangeable in the last decade, despite even the fact that they absolutely neglect the ‘lessons’ of all anti-discrimination movements and employ a Luddist approach towards technology.

Putnam’s research engendered numerous studies of social capital throughout the world, applying often the same criteria towards the erosion of social capital which Putnam himself was slow to reconsider. The task of this chapter is to qualify the reliability of social trust as an indicator of social capital in the context of Putnam’s paradigm, namely that we witness an erosion of social capital that, presumably, this erosion undermines the very basis of democracy. The factors contributing to the destruction of social capital and social trust will also be examined.

In the previous chapter I referred to Fukuyama’s adaptation of Weber’s methodological approach to the study of economic prosperity through the notion of trust where the legacy of protestant ethics is derived from secularization. Putnam’s approach is somewhat analogous – however the object of research is the democracy condition as such. Instead of an incorporation of social change in a theory of democracy, democracy is treated as an unchangeable state when the traditional forms of electoral participation serve to illustrate the well-being of this political institution. No wonder that secularization becomes the shadow concept for choosing the examples to illustrate the erosion of social capital. Thus, all three factors that Robert Putnam chooses as the empirical indicators for the erosion of social capital follow the same motif.
Civic engagement viewed as formal associational membership is one of the ways for Putnam to illustrate the depletion of social capital. The link he establishes to underpin this idea is that secondary associations provide a forum for discussing socially and politically important issues thus motivating people to be active in electoral processes and self-governance. The membership in sports clubs therefore fulfils an important deliberative function for democracy and creation of solidarity or social cohesion among the members of society. It is equally important also for the economy since the members of, say, sport clubs, consume substantial amount of symbolic and material product, being engaged in the life cycles of an association. Thus, associational membership imposes, or in less radical terminology, introduces them into club culture, sport culture, etc. creating a motivation and providing stimuli for economic consumption. Putnam’s own example is that associated bowlers consume several times more beer and pizza than their unassociated colleagues. At the same time ‘beer and pizza’ conversations turn into an important contribution to political communication and interpersonal trust, being, in a sense, social capital. Putnam’s argument is that throughout the last decades the associational membership is rapidly declining is one of the indicators of the depleting social capital that leads in its turn to a withdrawal from electoral participation that is already dangerous for the democratic form of rule.

The logic of this argument is rather straightforward: an independent bowler is inefficient as a consumer of materialist values and dangerous for the producer, to the extent an independent philosopher is dangerous for a religious community being only reluctant to purchase religious services and objects of worship. Economic consequences from an economic communitarian view are obviously detrimental. What however is less evident is that an unassociated member of society will not be able to create his/her own
consumption patterns and establish different communication channels. It is also questionable that material production should be the benchmark of economic efficiency, rather than, for example, production of information. Developing the argument about the erosion of social capital, Putnam refers to the new phenomenon of civil society - the proliferation of tertiary associations, associations where members do not interact directly and their entire associational role is reduced to paying membership fees and reading a newsletter. Associations of pensioners, which work only as a lobby, is a frequently used example of this type of association. The meaning here is that for the isolated, independent, remote individuals, who possibly lack any shared values, a tertiary association becomes an effective conductor of certain political and economic interests. These members are therefore twice destructive - they refuse to uphold communal norms, speaking in Fukuyama’s language and they could lobby efficiently for their anomic state of life, eroding what remains of social capital.

The preceding chapter developed the idea of Francis Fukuyama that social capital is primarily in the ability to associate spontaneously. Robert Putnam speaks more about a state of association as such, the state that also engenders its own kind of social capital, a consumer social capital which is also important from the economic viewpoint if supported by domestic production. What is striking though is that neither Fukuyama, nor Putnam ever even mentions the protest forms of social capital. Although it is not hard to see a largely conservative political platform implied by both authors, it is still hard to justify the absence of even mentioning of this form of social capital. This type of capital could be possibly called negative social capital, but I will refer to it as carnival social capital, in order not to reinforce Fukuyama and Putnam’s viewpoints.
I will follow here the concept of carnival developed by Mikhail Bakhtin in *Rabelais and His World* (Bakhtin 1968). The key point is that spontaneous sociability and solidarity has always characterized the folk modes of expression and behavior in public sphere. Thus the behavior of the soccer fans before and after the match is filled with solidarity. If before they deliberately decide to reside in a hotel where the team of the opponent is staying in order to make noise and cause all possible kinds of discomfort on the eve of the game, then after it, they unite in the ways of expression of their feelings about the game, what often take quite destructive and even tragic forms. However, the carnival component is especially expressed in numerous other forms of protest – political, ecological, social, class or style, for instance. The scope of expression is rather broad: from a hunger-strike, lockouts, blocking of communication lines to demonstrations, fashions, lifestyles or slang. The political consequences of carnival social capital should not be underestimated – it can lead to upheavals and revolutions, bringing therefore a radical social change.

Social change is what Putnam’s concept of social capital is almost unable to accommodate. My reluctance to call it negative social capital is mainly due to the recognition of the fact that social change is in many cases a favorable outcome.

Democracies tended to institutionalize this protest sociability, thus the consequence of trade unions was the reduction of spontaneous forms of protest and therefore controlled social change. Trust and solidarity at *trans* and *house* parties nowadays became therefore a legitimate enemy for ‘liberal’ democracy since the tribal forms of expression, supported by the claim to grant the *freedom of self-medication* (Leary 1994), promised a too radical change the current political system could endure. Fukuyama’s desire to exist on the verge
of human history is so strong that he refuses to grant life to a clone, ready to prohibit biotechnology and put all forces on upholding the norm of human normality where the freedom of self-medication should not even be mentioned. In the similar fashion Putnam dislikes the new Information and Communication technologies. As he writes, a CD-player might provide a better sound and satisfaction than the symphonic orchestra, but they have a privatizing effect that leads towards the depletion of social capital (Putnam, 1997: 59). New information and biotechnologies accompanied by increased mobility and women’s emancipation appeared to be the main destructors of social trust and social capital. A rather weak and unsupported conclusion that aims at stability by all means and begins with an imagined assumption that there is a decline of political participation and the continuing crisis of democracy.

On the whole, Putnam’s examples of religious and sport organizations utilize the same model of deriving legacy out of the processes of desacralization. Thus, the situation with the decrease in official membership among sport clubs could be at least partially explained as secularization of sport, its commercialization and professionalization. The decline in membership coincides with the transformation of professional sports into a channel for vertical migration for previously disadvantaged social categories of the population. Martin Luther King marched to Washington in 1963 and this is approximately the date when religious affiliation starts to decrease. Fukuyama and Putnam’s model welcome the fragmentation of society and existence of isolated traditional, self-watched, homogenous communities, efficient from the viewpoint of normalization of its members or their exclusion. This is especially visible in Putnam’s analysis of horizontal mobility which he calls one of the factors contributing to the erosion of social capital. Marxist analysis is not the only one that can be applied here to
draw a radically different conclusion from the same set of data. Liberal perspectives go across the same lines. What Marxist or psychoanalytic analysis calls the awareness of the Other, egalitarianism, equal chances, interracial communication, inclusion – the processes that started to fill gradually the social system in the latter half of the century are interpreted by Putnam as factors exhausting social capital. The essence of social capital in Putnam’s scheme is virtually in the efficient suppression of diversity, imposed homogenization, effective othering and familiaritation through the means of self-watch communities, sedentary life, traditional morality and communal consumption.

Electoral participation, associational membership and social trust are the three indicators Robert Putnam uses to substantiate the erosion of social capital, however only the first provides a direct link to political participation since the type of social capital, Putnam refers to, can be called an electoral social capital since his primary concern is a representative democracy. The second one plays the role of a place for public deliberation, while the third, social trust, serves as an indicator of the willingness of the population to be engaged in cooperative networks. His concept of social trust is in fact multilayered and includes both interpersonal trust and trust in government, for which he suggests a number of ways of measurement – the Harris alienation index, time spent with neighbors, features of the architectural style inviting communication, as well as direct closed questions. Using this broad scope of data he concluded that the citizens have nowadays a greater distrust in government and are alienated (or associate less with) from the sphere of politics, less willing to communicate with their neighbors and trust them less. Transformation in family structure, occupational patterns of former housewives, mobility and the progress of technology are the factors that Putnam believes contributed to the erosion of trust.
As I was arguing earlier, the problem of this approach consists in the inability to incorporate social change. A recent work of Richard Sennett (Sennett, 1998), a professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, deals more successfully with the topic of new capitalism and the issues of risk, mobility and networks. His viewpoint challenges Putnam’s understanding of social capital through conceptualizing the new economic condition of the present day. He witnesses not just the erosion of traditional work ethic, diminishing trust in others, and growing risk and unpredictability of the future and other seemingly negative sides of the current age, but he also observes the becoming of a new work ethic based on short-term teamwork, new types of networking, better flexibility, broader risk-taking. It is hard however to say that Sennett is too optimistic about the ongoing change beyond its economic component, if one speaks about the transformation of identity and community. However, it provides a much better analysis of the erosion of the modern economy and community since the becoming of new forms of social capital perhaps more transient, where trust does not last long, but which, nevertheless no less (if not more) efficient from the economic perspective since these short lasting networks of trust appear to be more effective in risk-taking.

Sennett also alludes to the similar argument used by Putnam and provides data that radically contradicts it. Contrary to the common assumption that new technologies make business communication more indirect where face-to-face interactions are rare to occur, Sennett argues that new technologies instead lead to more frequent face-to-face meetings and in fact the businesspeople started to commute more often. Robert Putnam, as a classical neo-Luddite, proposes an incredibly weak hypotheses. Thus one of his main hypothesis that digital “technology ... is driving a wedge between our individual interests
and our collective interests” (Putnam, 1997: 59) sounds more like a diagnosis and immediate call for action, because even when it was suggested, there have already been a number of evident facts saying that ‘the technological transformation of leisure’ is not privatizing our leisure time irrevocably, it also gives us something substantial in return. For example, the technological change of the last decade has brought a mass rebirth of the epistolary genre in the form of the electronic mail that could be claimed as a recovering tendency in social capital.

I have indicated before that Robert Putnam was not sensitive at all to the feminist, psychoanalytic or in broader terms Marxist critique of the social structures and systems of domination. The United States is notorious for having the biggest number of prisoners as the percentage of the population; ghettos serve essentially the same function. Despite overall respect to liberal and democratic rights, social and group rights appeared to be largely neglected. The second half of the preceding century was characterized by the increasing overrepresentation of ethnic and racial minorities in public places. The discipline of urban studies has published extensively on this topic. This engendered the awareness of the other and has led to the lack of trust. However to link the lack of trust of this kind to the condition of democracy as such seems rather illogical. Putnam, however, finds this way of argumentation acceptable.

In general the position of both Putnam and Fukuyama in relation to group rights is radically conservative. Fukuyama is especially aware that group rights undermine social trust. Thus he argues that the state has limited opportunities to influence people’s sociability, their ability to take risks and trust each other. This is why “government policy ... should not seek to undermine existing communal institutions in the pursuit of abstract
diversity or openness” (Fukuyama 1996: 319). Fukuyama argues for the Melting Pot and the subversion of group rights.

An honest multiculturalism would recognize that some cultural traits are not helpful in the sustenance of a healthy democratic political system and capitalist economy. This should not be the grounds for barring certain people with cultures deemed unacceptable but, rather, grounds for the assertion of positive aspects of American culture like the work ethic, sociability, and citizenship as immigrants move through the educational system” (ibid.).

The rhetoric of the Melting Pot has died under the pressure of the counter-culture and liberation movements, but the ideology of the nation-state remains – unification and if it fails – suppression. In the lexicon of trust – to provide familiarity, but avoid familism.
So far we dealt with trust in the economic and western political context, this chapter makes an emphasis on social dimension and features Eastern European transitional societies. Our primary focus will be made on Piotr Sztompka’s *Trust: a Sociological Theory* (Sztompka 1999). This book is virtually unique among a growing body of trust-related research. There are two main distinct features that deserve special attention. Firstly, Sztompka develops the concept of trust primarily as a concept of social change, providing extensive empirical evidence. I have expressed this idea in respect to Luhmann’s dialectics of trust-risk that essentially functions as a macrohistorical model. Secondly, Sztompka distances trust, transcending trust from the level of the empirical, in contrast to Putnam, who considers trust itself (proposing a number of disjoined indicators) as an indicator of social capital (stability). Therefore, trust is qualified and introduced to the theoretical framework as a component of social change. Distrust, e.g. liberal distrust of Hardin becomes an attribute of social change and is introduced as a ‘syndrome of distrust’. The idea of stability though is conveyed through the category of ‘trust culture’. Sztompka’s theory of trust overcomes the panic of Putnam and Fukuyama through the normalization of instability and social/political change.

Sztompka considers trust as a key concept of the social sciences, which emerged as a result of some paradigmatic changes among social disciplines as well as a response to the changes occurred in society throughout the last century and especially after the modernization cycle has reached its end (or entered its late/high stage). This part deserves particular interest since Sztompka concentrates more on the emergence of trust as a subject of sociology rather than tracing its genealogy as a cultural phenomenon as
Luhmann attempted to achieve in *Familiarity, Confidence, Trust* (Luhmann 2000). At the same time Piotr Sztompka suggests that there was more than a paradigmatic shift. It was also a response to the transforming reality. The second part of this discussion will focus on the case study, which Sztompka conducted in Poland. This case study poses a number of empirical problems with measuring trust or comprehension of trust cultures, if we speak in a less quantitative language.

The theories of trust as they exist now have been significantly affected, to my mind, by a hasty adaptation of Putnam’s concept of social capital without a thorough theoretical consideration of its axiological and ontological status. Fukuyama’s account of trust in the majority of aspects follows the same principles. As I illustrated above, trust is not an impartial analytical tool since it is conceptualized in the framework of conservative values with concentration on stability, low mobility, cultural exclusion and racial segregation, traditional family, formal membership, controllability, etc. Some of these concentrations are declared openly by the protagonists of trust in Putnam/Fukuyama’s version of it, while in respect to others a skillful disguise and manipulation takes place. Thus Putnam’s central thesis that the level of trust is declining is at least partly based on racial segregation. For example, the growing presence of the Other in public sphere has been unambiguously interpreted as hostile to social capital. Instead of a legitimate question if society needs this sort of social capital, the hypothesis is proposed as, for example with cloning, to ban research on cloning. However, the normative status of Fukuyama as the originator of the former hypothesis allows to getting rid of testing as a stage of scientific research as such.
Sztompka opens his discussion on trust referring to the origins of the problem of social cohesion in academia. He links the emergence of the discourse of trust with a culturalist turn in sociology, distinguishing between two sociological traditions and emphasizing transition from one to another: from “hard” tradition, represented by Comte, Spencer, Marx to the “soft” one, developed by Weber, Pareto, Mead. He discusses this culturalist turn in respect to both ontological and epistemological levels. Thus, on the ontological level one can speak about the transition from organic (hard, holistic, systematic) sociologies to the sociology of action (soft, fluid, field image of the social fabric). This, as he writes, constitutes a paradigmatic shift at the ontological level. The same shift reflected at the epistemological level signified the substitution of “hard” indicators, such as class, status, welfare, progress, organization, to “soft” and intangible meanings, symbols, values, or discourses (Sztompka 1999: 1). Generally speaking this concept is much more applicable to the European context than to American social thought that has been often hostile to leftist social thought attempting to conceptualize instability. Sociology of fluids (Urry) or any European-originated social thought of the last two decades meets essential barriers in America. On the whole this theoretical narcissism is characteristic also for Canadian social and political thought as it is reflected in the curriculum of our department of political science.

At the same time Sztompka distinguishes two sociologies of action where the second paradigmatic shift is occurring. From a utilitarian and positivistic concept of action, which can be seen in behaviorism, exchange theory, game theory or rational-choice theory, a scientific focus moved towards the ‘meaningful image of action’ brought by symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, hermeneutics or cultural studies. From the purely rational and economic individual towards the account of “emotional, traditional,
normative, cultural components: value orientations, social bonds, attachments, loyalties, solidarities, identities (ibid: 2)”. The key achievement of the sociology of action as he suggests was the concept of the “cultural embeddedness of action: “habitus” (Bourdieu) and “polarized discourses” (Alexander). And as soon as the concept of action became “culturalized”, there appeared an analytical problem – culture is intangible and imponderable: “As such synthetic cultural features are highly intangible, hard to pin down empirically and operationalize, they are often addressed in metaphorical terms as social moods, social climate, social atmosphere, collective morale, social boredom, social optimism, social pessimism, social malaise, and so forth (ibid: 4)”. What Sztompka describes here can be called the emergence of moral sociology. “After the long domination of the “hard” instrumental picture of social ties based on interests and calculation, fiscally mediated relationships, individualistic, egoistic rationality, we witness the rediscovery of the other face of society, the area of “soft” moral bonds. Viable society is perceived not only as the coalition of interests, but as a moral community (ibid)””. Among these “soft” bonds are friendship, love, patriotism, patron-client relationships, ritual kinship; there are also “hard” bonds within moral community, such as employment contract (team spirit, loyalty to the firm), and business transactions (trust toward the partner).

In a given context the term “moral community” was elaborated by Francis Fukuyama, Sztompka provides a useful qualification of this category. Thus he distinguishes three characteristics of moral community: trust, or ‘the expectancy of others’ virtuous conduct toward ourselves’; loyalty, or ‘the obligation to refrain from breaching the trust that others have bestowed upon us and to fulfill duties taken upon ourselves by accepting somebody’s trust’; and solidarity, or ‘caring for other people’s interests and the readiness
to take action on behalf of others, even if it conflicts with our own interests' (ibid: 5). Moral community hence emerged as a subject of sociology that captures the essence of the social in a greater extent, and is more important in a risk society. The problem of treating this subject consists however in an unavoidable break with a value-free science. Fukuyama attempts to be impartial, recommending being more tolerable to religious sects since they contribute to economic prosperity. But is he really impartial or was he constructing a theory substantiating his own moral viewpoint? Moral sociology lacks validity and destroys ‘scientific’ discourse, namely in ironic marks, since it discredits its own status within a scientific community even if it is able to disguise under science for a broader public.

Sztompka refers to five classic and six modern themes (ibid: 7-11) that have contributed to the concern for the moral bonds and moral community.

Five classic themes (I reduce here Sztompka’s referential network): the “lonely crowd theme” introduced by Toennies, indicates the dying out of moral communities and atomization of social life. The “iron cage theme”, originated by Weber, indicates at formalization and depersonalization of social life, and reification of individuals. The “anomie theme” by Durkheim indicates the antinomic character of axiological systems. The “alienation theme” coming from Marx, points out at the estranging of the individual from economic and political organization. And the fifth is the “revolt of the masses theme” introduced by Ortega Y Gasset, concentrates on the negative outcomes of urbanization and the mass culture.
Six modern themes: "civic culture", emphasizing the role of the self in the system by Almond and Verba. Then "civil society" that presupposes an intense public participation and developed public opinion. Bourdieu with his concept of "cultural capital" constitutes the third theme. Then follows Putman's "social capital" and Fukuyama adaptation of the term. The postmodern condition is reflected by Ronald Inglehart's observation of a transition towards "postmaterialist values": from class conflicts and trade unions – towards feminist and ecological movements, from economic interests towards harmony, dignity, peace, etc. And the last one - Sztompka's own "civilizational competence", in other words – institutional memory.

This culturalist turn occurred according to Sztompka mainly because of questioning earlier taken for granted problems of western liberal institutions, such as free markets, democratic regimes or the welfare state. Then there was a growing understanding that operation of the same social institutions is largely affected by cultural context. The same idea penetrated the field of international relations that previously neglected culture as such. There was also an observation of uneven speed of changes in political, economic and cultural segments of society. These themes while gathered together certainly support the idea that throughout the history there was a concern for the state of moral bonds within society. However their cumulative effect is less obvious. Moreover, the solution – to favor and protect traditional communities and be cautious towards new trends of life – was present in conservative (and not only – anarchy while being opposed to government relied nevertheless on traditional social groups) political thought from early modern times.
It is also important to underline that neither authors of the classic themes, nor modern ones, with the exception of Fukuyama and the more careful Putnam, who prefers to speak in terms of hypotheses, proposed a political solution to the abovementioned problems such as depersonalization or alienation.

Sztompka’s *Trust* contains a case-study designed to be an empirical application of his theoretical build-ups related to trust. In this case-study he attempts to identify primary factors responsible for the failures to establish a trust culture in Poland since the year 1945 when it became a member of the Soviet bloc. The case study is structured according to three historical periods, albeit they are subdivided into even smaller units. Thus, the first period is the one preceding the year 1989, the primary focus is done on the exclusion of trust from the public sphere. Further follows a brief period of growing trust as a result of the collapse of the soviet rule, which, however lasted only months and led to a further decay of trust. The focus of this period is on externalization of trust. The last period started in 1994 and could be characterized as the beginning of the becoming of trust culture in Poland.

The study is important in at least two aspects: 1) Epistemological aspect: Sztompka’s concepts of trust culture and the culture of distrust with some attempts to link them to the stability of regimes – although it still remains a mystery why the culture of distrust towards the state and government did not lead to the change of rule in Poland. It would be therefore highly desirable to consider the limitations on the possibility of the distrust syndrome to invoke social change imposed by the broader geopolitical context. Otherwise, from the viewpoint of terminology “the discourse of agency”, “the discourse of fate”, “internal trust”, “external trust”, “culture of cynicism”, and some other concepts
are rather successful steps in the primary operationalization of trust. 2) Methodological aspect: the author of the *Trust* provides methods for empirical operationalization of the key notions and suggests a number of indicators towards each of them.

Before I proceed to the discussion of his arguments, I would like to make two preliminary considerations. The first one arises from the distinction developed by Anthony King (King 2000) between Americans’ distrust to government and European confidence in it. The second suggests looking closer to the diverging paths of the nation-building in Poland and other countries of the Eastern bloc and the Russian Federation.

My hypothesis here is that, and Sztompka also emphasizes it in the *Trust* in relation to Poland, that all countries but for the Russian Federation were building their trust cultures on distinction – ethnocentrism, nationalism, Catholicism, Islam, while neither religion, nor nationalism have not become an active components of nation-building in Russia. When other countries of Eastern Europe experienced *national* resurgence, the Russian Federation was on the verge of the civil war and further dissolution. There are two main contributing factors that saved Russia from the destiny of the Yugoslavian Federation – the first one was its ability to build up a new territorial identity instead of the Soviet identity. This occurred within less than 2 years! Compare, for example, Canada, where the process of the Canadian identity building has already taken more than a century and where this identity remains in rather amorphous state.

Briefly developing the argument about distrust to government in America and distrust to government in the Soviet Union and Poland, referring to Sztompka’s case study, one should note that the difference is in the constituency that government in the latter two
cases was able to create. In this respect it is a deserving attention question to compare the US, other Western European democracies and the Soviet bloc countries, as far as they could possibly shed more light on the question of how to reconcile distrust in government and pride for it.

The following table relates the Soviet Bloc to Anthony King's scheme of (dis)trust in government, pride, and the existence of constituency.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Western Democracies</th>
<th>Soviet Bloc countries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in government</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride for government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government's constituency</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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Piotr Sztopmka suggests that there existed a “bloc culture”, that is, culture common for the bloc of Soviet states. Describing the bloc culture, he emphasizes the following features. It was characterized by the distinction between the private sphere as the domain of the good – of virtue, dignity, pride, and the public sphere as the domain of the bad – of vice, disdain, shame. (ibid: 153) As a consequence there was distrust to the state and its institutions and naïve belief in all information coming from abroad. (ibid: 154) The other feature was the distrust syndrome engendered by autocracy as a political condition.

Sztopmka’s notions of “parasitic innovativeness” and a “grab-and-run” attitude provide an important development of distrust, which are to indicate a state exceeding distrust found in public opinion. To my mind it is even necessary to link distrust (I speak here
primarily about political distrust) to different types of protest movements, neuroses, criminal activity and the like. Thus, the processes of state-building understood as an internal fight between gangs for a monopoly of tax collection and security provision and through this acquiring legitimacy and becoming an embodiment of legality, as Max Weber suggested, can be reinterpreted as an establishment of control over distrust in a certain society. This formula allows going beyond the restriction of legitimacy and can be applied towards autocratic regimes as well. It can be argued that it is namely the inability to control distrust resulted to the break up of the Soviet system.

It has been indicated above that pride can intensify or contribute in a certain way to trust in government. However, this resource was unequally distributed across the Soviet system. From this viewpoint an event of crucial importance was the election of Karol Wojtyla as a Pope John Paul II in 1979, as Sztompka notes:

"Two rich traditional resources of communal bonds, that had been partly dormant, were masterfully reawakened and linked by the Pope: nationalism and Catholicism. There was a tremendous outburst of national pride, religious emotion, and impersonal solidarity. The quality of trust found so far only within the close networks of family and friends extended to wide segments of the population. A family-like solidarity was rediscovered on a much wider social scale, private trust was raised to the level of national-religious community. To paraphrase Banfield, one may say that "amoral familism" of the exclusive, defensive, negative kind turned into "moral familism" of a much more inclusive positive sort (ibid: 157)."

The link between religious renaissance and the collapse of the Soviet universe was so strong that even now it is perhaps the most popular explanation of the reasons for the changes that the Pope is primarily responsible for the changes in the Soviet Union and its satellites. It is important to emphasize that such a viewpoint is completely unviable
beyond the borders of Poland. Mikhail Gorbachev could not appeal to religious beliefs and nationalism due to complexity and heterogeneity of the Soviet Union – his program was pragmatic: “new thinking,” “perestroika,” “glasnost.” As a hypothesis it is possible to suggest that Gorbachev’s idea was to awake another powerful resource for mobilization if not communal bonds – the guilt for the failures of the Soviet economy in every Soviet citizen. He failed precisely because the average Soviet citizen refused to accept the guilt and share responsibility. Paradoxically, his “sobriety project” did not become a success story because it had only intensified the parasitic nature of the distributive system and led to withdrawal of trust in government.

Alena Ledeneva, a researcher of the networks of the Soviet system of ‘blat’, that is, informal networks of access towards the distribution system, constantly misinterprets the nature of the system suggesting that all Soviet people were involved, although to different extents, in the system of informal networks. Her study, based on semi-formalized interviews, was conducted in Academgorodok, an academic city penetrated by the “blat” networks that can hardly be compared to any other city of the Soviet Union with an exception for Moscow and other capitals of the republics constituting the USSR. My argument would be that despite the fact that the majority of the Soviet citizens were the consumers of the shadow redistribution system supported by the network of ‘blat’, there existed a clear identification of people who had “blat” by those who had not. They were identified as ‘blatnye’ or people involved in the networks of ‘blat’. Therefore, the task of the Secretary General of the USSR was doomed to fail – the masses at large were reluctant to accept guilt for the stagnation of the system.
The dialectic of pride/guilt was not on Gorbachev's side, compared to, for instance, Germans who at the end of 50s started to take pride into their system while acquiring the guilt syndrome. Guilt in this respect can function as a no less powerful resource for national identification and social trust. The preceding century provided a diversity of patterns for national identification, exceeding territorial, kinship and linguistic borders, but nevertheless not weakening the phenomenon itself. There are also quite contrary examples – thus, the national identification of the Jews returned from religious to ethnic, from professional to utilitarian (suffering and persecuted nation).

One of the most important distinctions characterizing the growing trust versus growing distrust is the distinction between two types of discourses – the discourse of agency and the discourse of fate. Szтомпка provides data on gambling correlating with data on growing distrust. Data on corruption constitute the second indicator of the discourse of fate. The third is vigilance or practices of self-defense (gas sprays, reinforced doors, etc.). The externalization of trust is the forth indicator (preference to foreign goods, support for joining NATO, savings in foreign currency, immigration). The fifth is belief in populist politics. Szтомпка proposes to use the following behavioral indicators – immigration, electoral abstentions ('exit' options), strikes ('voice' option), short-term life planning – educational decisions, the neglect of investing, distrust of professionalism, preference to paid services compared to those provided by the state, disbelief in democracy, and engagement in politics has trust-destroying consequences (ibid: chapter 8). These are rather different indicators than of Putnam for measuring distrust to government. Political engagement as such is considered as a trust-destroying activity.
However, it is hard to assert that distrust as such is a negative societal condition for a society in transition from central planning to market economy. Thus, such factors as axiological chaos, legal chaos, executive inefficiency and corrupted officials that engender risk entailing the syndrome of distrust receive often a different explanation in Russia. For example, Kapelushnikov (2002) puts forward an idea that normative chaos, executive inefficiency and inability to enforce new legislation made the transition to the new labor model smoother, contained disruptive protest movements and unemployment. Underemploying and underpaying the labor force, companies nevertheless provided a number of social benefits. The lawyerization of society did not follow. At the same time companies were free to dismiss excessive labor resources without paying benefits. This paternalism is somewhat reminiscent of Japanese *keiretsu* from the societal viewpoint, except for the fact that mobility of the labor force significantly exceeded all other transitory economies. From the viewpoint of the classical Western labor market, the situation looks terrifying, but at the same time – companies managed to preserve resources and hire more suitable personnel, absence of minimum wages encouraged people to be more active while changing jobs and seeking employment simultaneously at several places. Legal chaos and the lasting distrust to the court system and authorities affected the labor market in such a way so it was more efficient in the amortization of negative sides of transition. In the chapter on Fukuyama I have already emphasized the idea that certain societies achieve better economic output in a situation close to a normative vacuum. Russia provides a somewhat similar example of this phenomenon. It may later turn out that the traumatic experience of transition to the market economy will be less expressed in the Russian Federation that was more than 70 years under direct economy, than other Eastern European societies that should presumably have more institutional memory or civilizational competence in Sztompka’s lexicon.
The syndrome of distrust seems rather a cultural phenomenon. Sztompka enumerates seven reasons that led to the eradication of the syndrome of distrust in Poland starting 1994. Thus, (1) former communists turned out to be liberal, (2) economic growth began and became tangible, (3) access to the consumer society, (4) there began an emergence of capitalist infrastructure and legal institutions, (5) recognition by NATO and the EU, (6) new and old social capital and religion, (7) and there was a generational turnover. If we try to define the eradication of the syndrome of distrust in Russia after 1998, the parallel is only between economic growth and generational turnover. While other possible reasons include, but are not limited to: break up with international credit institutions (as a client), return to hierarchical government, determination of the ownership on private property and deprivatization of the state (preponderantly and faultily interpreted by the western media as an usurpation of the freedom of speech on the part of Putin).

Surprisingly enough, the whole eschatology of Poland is built on the figure of the Pope. *Neomythological consciousness* (Rudnev 1997) that dominated literature, the arts and science in the twentieth century appeared to be most prolific in the replication of biblical themes. Being rather ironic to religion himself, Sztompka nevertheless derives the legacy for Polish [Catholic] revolution from the same source as Weber – the secularization of public life. Poland in transition is characterized by the almighty *Radio Maria* regulating political and social life and providing an interpretation of social reality. Russian media was also characterized by the oligarchic interpretation of the on-going and coming events. However, to overcome media oligarchs turned out to be an achievable task, while it is doubtful that it will be a solvable task for the Polish authorities.
CONCLUSION

The task of this thesis was to provide an overview of trust as a social problem and the concept of the social disciplines. The primary hypothesis that has been deliberated in the thesis is that trust as a category oriented towards risk and the unfamiliar is being currently normalized by the means of the positivist discourse. The most important feature of trust is its ability to bring the concept of social change in theoretical context and therefore counter-balance the rhetoric of the discourse of stability, that was previously engendering the ‘crisis of democracy’. The potential of trust was however substantially undermined by the hasty adaptation of the methods of facing the unfamiliar developed and protected by the image of the world where the virtue of stability was hypertrophied. The goal of this research paper was to bring to the fore the problem that an unsuccessful resolution of the problems of trust and withdrawal from risky and responsible action results in attempts to immortalize traditional norms through the classical set of predefined actions – prohibition, ban, exclusion, suppression and homogenization. To sum up the discussion, I would like to emphasize the following elements of the discourse that allow formulating the problem of normalization of trust as deserving the primary attention of the scientific community.

First, the concept of moral community emerged to illustrate the existence of social capital beyond the primary circle of family members. Although in the majority of cases the term moral community conveys the idea of the secondary social group, it is nevertheless possible to observe the extension of moral community to the borders of the nation-state, as Fukuyama argues in his book on trust in relation to the Japanese and Germans. The problem here is that the argument of the beneficiary consequences of non-familiarity
networks for economic development is substituted by distancing the border of the familiar through efficient erosion of kinship relations. In other words moral community only introduces another line of alienation by the means of efficient homogenization of the population and extensive national rhetoric. Trust and risk are being reduced to pride and reliance on security services. Therefore the concept of trust loses its meaning as a concept of social change and social dynamics.

Second, Robert Putnam uses trust as an indicator of social capital, Fukuyama's notion of spontaneous sociability aims exactly at the same phenomenon. Generally sharing the fruitfulness and doubtless heuristic benefits of this approach, I would like to pinpoint the framework in which the concept of trust is being embedded. This concept has two most important features. It is based on the assumption that social capital is eroding (spontaneous sociability is weakening, public participation is declining, etc.). This assumption results in the search of solution that negates the concept of risk. Trust without risk becomes no more than confidence, subverting the discourse of agency and bringing back confidence in expert systems where the public can hardly become anything more than the mass of voters. This is especially visible in Putnam's concept of social capital that largely interpreted through the lenses of electoral participation.

Third, the concept of democracy that concentrates on the measures of its stabilization ignores the protest forms of social capital, a sort of negative social capital that I tend to interpret positively. The suppression of these negative forms of social capital becomes therefore a virtue for democracy and is interpreted as social capital as such. Religious sects, closed communities, low mobility, racial and ethic segregation, cultural suppression and homogenization become forms of social capital. Putnam's blame on
horizontal mobility and women's joining of the labor force for the 'erosion' of social capital looks particularly unjustified. These trends have brought increase in the awareness of the Other, cultural diversity and revealed numerous social problems previously solved by the means of exclusion. This resulted in the certain increase of risk and decrease of interpersonal trust. But how can we call such a capital built on exclusion a social capital? Moreover, interpersonal trust as an empirical indicator is largely irrelevant – it measures no more than the presence of the Other in a familiar neighborhood. Mobility has increased this parameter, but did it erode any networks of trust?

Four, A normative approach towards trust (versus axiological) is dominant now in the social sciences. It brings proposals for building social capital largely based on homogenous ethnic, cultural or religious communities since they have proven to be efficient in normalization of dissident thinking and deviant practices. The logic used by the protagonists of this approach provides obviously a better picture – they emphasize their role in networking, financial and social security and the similar. At the same time it is possible to argue that they slow down the provision of the same functions by formal networks, bring unequal chances, exclude large segments of the population and the similar. I would like however to put forward another hypothesis that they receive their academic status as communities engendering social capital largely through the same argument Weber applied in his analysis of the role of Protestantism: secularization engenders Protestantism with new work ethic and networking principles that fosters the economy in its turn. The economic and social legacy of religious sects is derived from secularization, destruction of hierarchical networks. Simultaneously secularization itself loses its legacy as a positive process of socio-economic development and the focus is being transferred on the preservation of religious communities. This step in the logic of
argumentation for strengthening religious communities demands a special consideration. Therefore one can consider the call for sectarian engagement as a mean to increasing spontaneous sociability as particularly weak.

Five, the suggestions to create the broader circles of familiarity as means to distance the level of the unfamiliar through the creation of broad identity groups, nationalization of citizens and inscribing national symbolism on their bodies, pride and the similar national, religious, racial or gender discourses, seems to me more the proposals for the surrogates of trust. It hardly possible to observe any improvements in the overall ability of the individual to deal with the unfamiliar, with strangers, the Other though these approaches. Trust as a social concept at this stage of its development is devoid of any personal eschatology, but is full of collective apocalypses. The future development of the category of trust should feature more its dynamic side – the future, risk, responsibility, communication, reconciliation and the unknown, in order not to follow the way of solidarity, cooperation or cohesion, that will deplete its potential to incorporate social change.
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